Definitions of Natural justice on the Web:

 a set of procedures designed to ensure that decisions are made fairly.

www.for.gov.bc.ca/hfd/library/documents/glossary/N.htm
 a concept based on the idea of Fair Procedures and including basic elements such as the
requirement that an employee should be given full notice of charge(s), has a right to be
represented and to have a full opportunity to offer a defence of charges, has the right of
appeal, and that any penalty ...

www.siptu.ie/YourRights/TUFGuideToLabourLaw/GeneralInformation/Glossary/
 Natural justice is a legal philosophy used in some jurisdictions in the determination of
just, or fair, processes in legal proceedings. ...

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural justice
 Natural Justice is a charity that does research on the causes of criminal behavior, and
especially on the related effects of nutrition. Natural Justice carried out an experiment in
the Aylesbury Prison for young offenders. ...

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural Justice

Natural justice is a legal philosophy used in some jurisdictions in the determination of

just, or fair, processes in legal proceedings. The concept is very closely related to the
principle of natural law (latin: jus naturale) which has been applied as a philosophical
and practical principle in the law in several common law jurisdictions, particularly the
UK and Australia.[1][2]

According to Roman law certain basic legal principles are required by nature, or so
obvious that they should be applied universally without needing to be enacted into law by
a legislator. The assertion in the United States' Declaration of Independence, "We hold
these truths to be self-evident," expresses some of this sentiment. The rules or principles
of natural justice are now regularly applied by the courts in both common law and Roman
law jurisdictions. Natural justice operates on the principles that man is basically good,
that a person of good intent should not be harmed, and one should treat others as one
would like to be treated.[3]

Natural justice includes the notion of procedural fairness and may incorporate the
following guidelines:

 A person accused of a crime, or at risk of some form of loss, should be given

adequate notice about the proceedings (including any charges).
 A person making a decision should declare any personal interest they may have in
the proceedings.
 A person who makes a decision should be unbiased and act in good faith. He
therefore can not be one of the parties in the case, or have an interest in the
 outcome. This is expressed in the latin maxim, nemo judex in sua causa: "no man
is permitted to be judge in his own cause".
 Proceedings should be conducted so they are fair to all the parties - expressed in
the latin maxim audi alteram partem: "let the other side be heard".
 Each party to a proceeding is entitled to ask questions and contradict the evidence
of the opposing party.
 A decision-maker should take into account relevant considerations and
extenuating circumstances, and ignore irrelevant considerations.
 Justice should be seen to be done. If the community is satisfied that justice has
been done, they will continue to place their faith in the courts.[4]

Principles of Natural Justice

Re: Principles of Natural Justice

The right to a hearing in accordance with the Rules of Natural Justice may be expressly
provided for or the courts may imply such an obligation exists. There are essentially two
sections to the Rules of Natural Justice, the first being derived from the Latin maximum
"audi alteram partem" (let the other side be heard). This is the duty of to allow persons
affected by a decision to have a reasonable opportunity of presenting their case.

The second part of the Rules of Natural Justice is derived from the Latin maxim "nema
judex in causa sua" ( no one can be the judge in his own cause). This gives rise to a duty
to act fairly, to listen to arguments, and to reach a decision in a manner that is untainted
by bias.

In an article entitled "Fair Procedures for Students in Universities and Colleges"

presented by Sheila M. Devine at the Canadian Society for the Study of Higher
Education, June 1987, Mc Master University, Ms Devine quotes from A. de Smith in
Judicial Review of Administrative Action in stating that the following principle is a good
one for university administrators to note:

"...The government Principle ought to be that authorities empowered to make decisions

that are seriously detrimental to the liberty, proprietary rights, livelihood, status or
reputation of individuals should be required to give prior notice and opportunity to be
heard to those who are directly affected, except where the imposition of such duties
would be impracticable or manifestly contrary to the public interest or Parliamentary
intent..."

In my view, the basic Rules of Natural Justice should be followed by any University
hearing involving faculty, staff and students. These Basic Rules usually include the
following procedural guidelines:

1. Individuals should be provided notice, in sufficient detail, as to the scope of the

hearing and the allegations against such individual and/or any negative
information to fairly enable the individual to show any error that may exist;
 2. The hearing should be held within a reasonable time after the notice has been
provided;
3. The information should have an opportunity to be heard and reply to the
allegations and/or negative information;
4. The individual should be entitled to question witnesses, especially those giving
evidence against the individual;
5. The individual should be entitled to call witnesses;
6. The individual should be entitled to request an adjournment or postponement for a
reasonable period of time, especially if the individual or one of the individual's
witnesses has a legitimate inability to attend;
7. The persons hearing the matter should be possessed of a reasonable level of
expertise relative to the matters being dealt with. In a University setting, this
would meant that faculty, staff and students would constitute the Hearing
Committees, as appropriate, and would possess sufficient knowledge of
University issues to bring to the tribunal the necessary expertise:
8. The Committee hearing the matter has a duty to approach the hearing with an
open mind, listen fairly to both sides, and to reach a decision untainted by bias;
9. Members of the hearing panel should ensure that grounds for setting aside the
hearing on a reasonable apprehension of bias do not exist, and they, therefore,
should absent themselves if there is a special relationship or association with the
individual appearing before the hearing;
10. A record of the proceedings of the hearing should be kept;
11. The individual should be provided with a copy of the record or at least a summary
of the evidence of the proceedings;
12. The individual should be provided with a copy of the hearing committee's
decision or recommendations, together with the reasons;
13. In cases concerning discipline, where a decision is made and the consequences of
the finding may have serious consequence on an individual's future, consideration
should be given to permitting the individual to make submissions as to the
penalty;
14. Where matters are dealt with in an oral hearing, the panel members ruling on the
decision should be present throughout the course of the proceedings;
15. Depending on the seriousness of the allegations and the consequences of a
negative decision and the complexity of the issues involved, the individual may
be entitled to representation or legal counsel, but there is no absolute right to such
counsel.

The minimum Rules of Natural Justice are codified in Ontario in The Statutory Powers
Procedure Act, and, where the procedural rules of a tribunal are deficient, then the
provisions of the Act should be looked to in order to compensate for such deficiency.

It will likely be a procedural error, unless the parties agree otherwise by waiving their
rights, not to fellow the basic Rules of Natural Justice in a hearing.

3. Principles of Natural Justice

3.1 Explaining the above Constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court held that the rules
of natural justice require that —
(1) charged employee should be given notice of the charges he is called upon to explain
and the allegations on which those are based;
(2) evidence should be taken in the presence of the charged employee;
(3) he should be given opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses;
(4) he should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies;
(5) no material should be relied on against him without giving him an opportunity of
explaining such material.

3.2 Principles of Natural Justice operate in areas not covered by any rule or law; they do
not supplant the law but only supplement it.

3.3 The following are the two important basic principles of natural justice:
(i) No one can be a judge in his own cause (‘Nemo debet essa judex in propria cause’),
(ii) Hear the other side (‘Audi Alteram Partem’).

3.4 The principle, ‘No one can be a judge in his own cause’ implies that the accuser
must not sit in judgment on the accused. The judge can under no circumstances combine
in himself the roles of judge and jury, of judge and witness or judge and prosecutor. He
must be totally free from any bias. Bias can be of three types: (a) a pecuniary interest, (b)
a personal interest, and (c) a general interest, in the subject matter brought before him for
decision. Bias is relevant not only in the disciplinary authority but also in the inquiry
officer even where the inquiry officer is a different person from the disciplinary authority.

3.5 The second principle, ‘Hear the other side’ means (a) that a judge must hear both
sides and must not hear one side in the absence of the other. It means that the delinquent
Government servant has a notice of the charges he is called upon to explain and the
allegations on which those are based; (b) that he has access to all relevant evidence that
he wishes to adduce; (c) that he is given the opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution
witnesses and to produce witnesses in defence and offer himself for examination; (d) that
no evidence should be recorded behind his back but all of it should be taken in his
presence; and (e) that no materials should be relied on against him without his being
given an opportunity of explaining them.

3.6 The following further principles emerge from a consideration of what is stated
above: (i) that the decision must be made in good faith and (ii) an order must be a
speaking order.

3.7 The principle that the decision must be made in good faith implies that the judge has
bestowed due consideration to the facts and evidence adduced during the inquiry and has
not taken into account any extraneous matter not adduced during the inquiry and that he
has arrived at the decision without favour to any of the parties.
3.8 The principle that the order must be a speaking order is based on the premise that
whether the judge has considered all the aspects of a matter before him can be ascertained
only if the order which he makes is a speaking order. The requirement of making a
speaking order will minimise the possibility of arbitrary exercise of power as the
necessary search for reasons will ensure reasonableness. Reasons are the links between
the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They
disclose how the mind is applied to the subject matter while arriving at a decision.

3.9 The provisions of the C.C.A. Rules in fact satisfy the requirements and the principles
of natural justice will be satisfied if the procedures laid down in the Andhra Pradesh Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991 are scrupulously followed.

3.10 The Supreme Court, in Union of India vs. T.R. Verma, AIR 1957 SC 882 has
summarised the principles of natural justice thus: “Stating it broadly and without
intending it to be exhaustive, it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that
a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies,
that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be
given the opportunity of cross-examining the witness examined by that party, and that no
material should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of
explaining them.”

3.11 Hence, the rules of natural justice are violated:

(a) where the inquiry is confidential and is held ex parte (without valid reasons) or the
witnesses are examined in the absence of the charged officer;
(b) where the charged officer is denied the right to call material defence witnesses or to
cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, or he is not given sufficient time to answer the
charges, or the Inquiry Officer acts upon documents not disclosed to the charged officer;
(c) where the Inquiry Officer has a personal bias against the person charged.

3.12 However, in this connection, the famous dictum of Lord Denning, Master of the
Rolls in the case of R vs. Secretary of State for Home Department, (1973) 3 All ER
796 of the Court of Appeal, Civil Division, published in the All England Law
Reports, that “Rules of natural justice must not be stretched too far. Only too often the
people who have done wrong seek to invoke the rules of natural justice so as to avoid the
consequences”, approvingly quoted by the Supreme Court of India in the case of H.C.
Sarin vs. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1686, sounds pragmatic.

List of cases concerning about the principles of natural justice

Central London Property v High Trees House [1947] KBD Denning J

Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans [1982] HL
Deen, R v [1994] CA
Glynn v Keele University (1972) QBD
HM Coroner for Inner London West District Ex p. Dallaglio, R v [1994] CA
Leicester City Justices, ex parte Barrow and another, R v
Nicholas Mullen, R v [1999] CA
Nettleship v Weston [1971] CA
Reeves, R v [1964] CA
Ridge v Baldwin (1964) HL
Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] CA
Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Khan, R v (1985) CA
Thames Magistrates' Court, ex p Polemis, R v [1974] DC

Central London [Justice – Equity doing justice to soften the common

Property v High law]
Trees House [1947] D leased a block of flats in London from C in 1937. When
KBD Denning J war broke out, many flats were left empty as people were
evacuated to escape bombings. C agreed to reduce the rent
by half if D stayed. D paid the reduced rent until the end of
the war, and C then claimed for the "arrears".

Held: Denning J "discovered" the equitable doctrine of

promissory estoppel, and said that although C were once
again entitled to the rent originally agreed after the war
ended, they could not go back on their promise to accept a
reduced rent for the earlier years.

When a party to a contract makes a promise to the other,

which he knows will be acted on, that he will not enforce
his strict legal rights; the equitable principle of promissory
estoppel makes that promise binding on him until such
time as he gives reasonable notice of his intention to
resume those rights.

Denning J (obiter dicta) said that had Central London sued

for the arrears for the years 1940-45, it would have failed.
It would have been estopped from going back on its
promise [as set out in the 1940 agreement] to accept a
reduction in rental, even though that promise had not been
supported by any consideration from High Trees because
to hold otherwise would have been unjust
Also here

Chief Constable of [Justice - rules of natural justice - must be allowed to

the North Wales present his case]
Police v Evans D the Chief Constable dismissed C a probationer constable
[1982] HL because he had heard largely unfounded rumours about his
private life, but D believed them. The rumours included a
former "hippy" lifestyle, the keeping of 4 dogs and
financial difficulties.

Held: The Chief Constable’s decision to force the

resignation of the respondent was vitiated by his erroneous
 assumption that he had an absolute discretion and by his
total failure to observe the rules of natural justice in not
giving the respondent the opportunity to refute the
allegations on which the chief constable relied.

C won
Per curiam: Judicial review is not an appeal from a
decision but a review of the manner in which the decision
was made, and therefore the court is not entitled on an
application for judicial review to consider whether the
decision itself was fair and reasonable.

Deen, R v ^[Justice - prosecutor's fallacy]

[1994] CA D was convicted of a series of rapes of young
women DNA evidence linked him to three
rapes.

Held: The first stage in DNA profiling is to

achieve a match.
The second stage is the statistical evaluation
of the match.
A forensic scientist said there was a match and
wrongly said that the possibility of it being
somebody else was one in 3 million.
As to the statistical evaluation the chance of
anyone other than the defendant matching the
profile was 1 in 3 million.
There are two distinct questions.
1. What is the probability that an individual
will match the DNA profile?
2. What is the probability that an individual is
innocent, given that he matches the DNA
profile?
The 'prosecutor's fallacy' consists of giving the
answer to the first question as the answer to
the second.

Retrial ordered

Glynn v Keele [Justice - rules of natural justice - must

University be allowed to present his case]
(1972) QBD D the University where C was a student. At
the end of term C and others were seen
naked. There was not time before the end of
term to do other than send C a letter, fining
him £10 and suspending him.

Held: D had not complied with the rules of

natural justice in that he did not give C a
chance of being heard before he reached his
decision to inflict a penalty. But as C had
 suffered no injustice and the punishment was
correct, there would be no order.

C lost
[Comment] This can be viewed as a rogue
decision as it sought to deal with the decision
and not what it should, and that was to correct
the procedure.

HM Coroner for [Justice - rules of natural justice -

Inner London decision maker must not allow real
West District possibility of unconscious bias]
Ex p. Dallaglio, During an adjournment of the inquest
R v [1994] CA concerning the sinking of "The Marchioness",
the coroner was reported as describing some
of the relatives of the deceased as "unhinged"
and "mentally unwell."

Held: The use of the expressions "unhinged"

and "mentally unwell" indicated a real
possibility of unconscious bias. The coroner's
decision would be quashed and the matter
remitted to a different coroner for a fresh
decision on whether to resume the inquests.
R v Gough [1993] followed.

Leicester City [Justice - rules of natural justice - must

Justices, ex be allowed to present his case - with
parte Barrow assistance from "McKenzie Friend"]
and another, R DD had not paid the Poll Tax, a solicitor asked
v (1991) CA that DD be allowed the assistances of a
McKenzie Friend, which the magistrates
refused. The case was heard and a liability
order made against DD.

The Divisional Court dismissed an appeal, DD

appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Held: In civil proceedings to which the public

had a right of access the court, as part of its
duty to administer justice fairly and openly,
was under a duty to permit a litigant in person
to have all reasonable facilities for exercising
his right to be heard in his own defence,
including quiet and unobtrusive advice from
another member of the public accompanying
him as an assistant or adviser.

D won
Per curiam: The term ‘McKenzie friend’ with its
connotations of a certain status and mystique
 should not be used to describe the assistance
provided by another member of the public to a
litigant in person in the presentation of his
case.

R v Nicholas [Justice - supremacy of the Rule of Law]

Mullen [1999] D was found to be in possession of terrorist
CA bomb equipment, such as used by the IRA. He
fled to Zimbabwe but was illegally kidnapped
and deported to Britain where he stood trial
and was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment.
The judge said he was a highly dangerous
man.

Seven years after his trial he appealed on

grounds concerning his deportation from
Zimbabwe to England.

Held: Allowing the appeal, that "unsafe" in the

Criminal Appeal Act 1995 s. 2 was wide
enough to encompass an abuse of process
prior to trial.

The methods employed by the authorities to

procure M's deportation represented a blatant
failure to adhere to the rule of law and the
need to discourage such behaviour as a matter
of public policy was also an important factor.

Not guilty

Nettleship v
Weston [1971] Also here
CA

Reeves, R v
[1964] CA

Ridge v [Justice - rules of natural justice - must

Baldwin be allowed to present his case]
(1964) HL D the watch committee for the police
dismissed C who had been acquitted at Crown
Court on charges relating to conspiracy and
corruption. The trial judge intimated C had not
given professional and moral leadership to
other officers.

Held: The decision to dismiss C was void

because the watch committee had not
observed the principles of natural justice.
C had not been charged nor informed of the
 grounds on which they proposed to proceed
and had not been given a proper opportunity
to present his defence.

C won

Schmidt v [Justice - judicial review - legitimate

Secretary of expectation - Lord Denning Obiter]
State for Home CC were given leave to land in the United
Affairs [1969] Kingdom for the purpose of attending
CA education in scientology. The British
Government, having been convinced that
scientology was socially harmful, rejected their
applications for extension of their stay in this
country.

Held: The Home Secretary had power under

the Aliens Order 1953 to refuse aliens
permission to land or to extend their time of
stay and he had acted in the interest of
society.

There being no right of entry or extension of

stay, questions of interference with rights and
of the applicability of rules of natural justice
did not arise, because his act was
administrative.

Obiter, per Lord Denning MR: The Home

Secretary should, in exceptional
circumstances, listen to reason as to why
he should not apply a certain policy.

C lost

Secretary of [Justice - judicial review - legitimate

State for the expectation]
Home A and his wife, both Pakistani nationals wanted
Department ex to adopt a child, aged 5 1/2, born in Pakistan
p Khan, R v of a close relative.
(1985) CA A sought advice and was handed a letter
issued by the Home Office which declared the
legal position.
A commenced the necessary procedures along
the lines indicated by the letter for such cases.
Owing to an administrative muddle the entry
application for the child was refused.

Held: By sending the circular letter the

Secretary of State had effectively made his
 own rules. The categories of unreasonableness
were not closed and an unfair action would
seldom be a reasonable one. The Secretary of
State had misdirected himself according to his
own criteria and had acted unreasonably.

A won

Thames [Justice - rules of natural justice - D must

Magistrates' be allowed to present his case, this
Court, ex p includes time to prepare his case]
Polemis, R v D, a Greek see captain was alleged to have
[1974] DC allow oil to spill into London Docks. He was
served with a summons at 10.30 am he was
due to sail at 9.00 pm the same day. At 4pm
his case was heard, he was convicted and
fined £5,000. D applied to the High Court for a
quashing order (certiorari) to quash the
conviction.

Held: Certiorari granted because it was a

requirement of the rules of natural justice that
a party to proceedings, and particularly
defendant in a criminal case, should be given a
reasonable opportunity to present his case,
and that included a reasonable opportunity to
prepare his case before being called on to
present it.

Per curiam: When the court cannot conduct a

trial in accordance with the rules of natural
justice in the time available before defendant’s
ship sails, the court should ensure that some
sensible provision is made for security for the
appropriate penalty in the event of a
conviction, bearing in mind that, in the
absence of security being offered, the court
has power, as a last resort, to remand
defendant in custody.