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European Journal of Communication

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DABþ as a systemic ! The Author(s) 2020
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introduction of digital
radio

Tom Evens
Ghent University, Belgium; imec, Belgium

Abstract
Radio is on the brink of a digital wave brought about by the introduction of digital audio
broadcasting (DABþ). Despite market success in a few European countries, there
remains little evidence of industry support and consumer demand. By means of a
stakeholder analysis, the article identifies the main stakeholders in the implementation
of digital radio in the region of Flanders, to recognise tensions between public and
private interests and to discuss possible government policies aimed at promoting the
standard among all stakeholders. By seeing DABþ as a systemic innovation, it offers a
structural approach to address the ongoing dynamics of the organisational and institu-
tional system around DABþ and other media distribution technologies in other
European markets (or beyond).

Keywords
Digital radio, Flanders, innovation, media infrastructure, media policy

Corresponding author:
Tom Evens, Ghent University, Korte Meer 11, Gent 9000, Belgium.
Email: Tom.Evens@UGent.be
2 European Journal of Communication 0(0)

Introduction
Unlike other branches of the media industry that are undergoing rapid digital
transformation, radio broadcasting remains largely an analogue island in a sea
flooded by digital platforms. Mobile apps, music streaming and Internet radio
aggregators are raising popularity among young media consumers, yet traditional
radio broadcasting networks continue to command the bulk of listening time.
About 85% of total listening time in Europe is still on traditional broadcasting
networks, where the total number of stations is rather limited because of spectrum
scarcity, whereas Internet radio (web and/or apps), giving access to thousands of
available stations, accounts for about 10% of total listening time (European
Broadcasting Union (EBU), 2018a). These data support the thesis of Oliveira
et al. (2014) claiming that radio is a resilient medium. Radio’s position as a
means of simultaneous communication with large and unseen audiences has
been challenged by newer media indeed but maintained by consistently embracing
new technology that deepened radio stations’ engagement with listeners and pro-
vided opportunities to reach new audiences (p. iii).
Despite radio transmission and reception remaining overwhelmingly analogue,
radio broadcasting may well be on the brink of a digital wave brought about by the
introduction of digital audio broadcasting (DABþ). DABþ is a digital standard
used for the terrestrial distribution of radio signals and is supposed to replace the
analogue frequency modulation (FM) standard. A full overview of the presumed
advantages of DABþ goes beyond the scope of this article, but literature describes
how DABþ emerged as a technologically superior successor of FM (see Hoeg and
Lauterbach, 2009; Lax, 2017; O’Neill, 2009). In brief, DABþ is said to offer
prospects of wider choice of radio stations, improved reception and sound quality
for listeners, lower distribution costs for radio broadcasters and lower energy
consumption for multiplex operators. Digital radio in the form of the original
DAB standard was developed in the late 1980s and has been seeking mass
market adoption since. By 2005, it had become clear that DAB was considered
to be inefficient and outdated (Ala-Fossi, 2010). Nevertheless, pressure from indus-
try lobbying to upgrade the system led to multiple European countries to imple-
ment the DABþ as the newer standard for digital radio and to set milestones for
switching off FM transmissions. But, despite a few countries (among others
Norway, Denmark and Switzerland) where DABþ is performing relatively well,
most European markets show little evidence of industry support and consumer
demand for a technology that has been on the market for about 20 years (EBU,
2018b, 2019).
This article sees DABþ as a systemic innovation which necessitates the involve-
ment of both the demand and supply-side of radio broadcasting. Collaboration
between and coordination of all stakeholders in the value chain is therefore seen as
a prerequisite for a successful implementation of the new distribution standard
(EBU, 2014). Since the introduction of DABþ means a significant reorganisation
of the radio broadcasting value chain (see O’Neill and Shaw, 2010), its success
Evens 3

crucially depends on the alignment of public and private interests and the willing-
ness of all main stakeholders to support the technology. However, as Halbert
(2015) states, the success of a new standard for digital radio broadcasting is a
‘complex negotiation system’ in which multiple factors come together and shape
the outcome of the technology (p. 215). Radio broadcasters may be reluctant to
invest in new transmission facilities because of a lack of a sizable audience, which
makes it hard to sell advertising. Similarly, automobiles manufacturers may be
reluctant to include DABþ as standard radio receivers in the car as long as there is
no substantial demand for such receivers. All this even reinforces consumers’ reluc-
tance to purchase a new digital receiver, eventually leading to a chicken-and-egg
problem. In response, government policy may unveil a digital switchover plan to
overcome problems related to power inequalities in the chain and to ensure a
smooth transition from analogue to digital radio. The goal of this article is, there-
fore, to identify the main stakeholders in the DABþ implementation process, to
recognise tensions between public and private interests and to discuss possible
government policies aimed at promoting the standard among all stakeholders.
The context of this research is Belgium’s Dutch-speaking region of Flanders,
where government presented its Digital Radio Plan in 2016 and multiplex operator
Norkring launched a commercial DABþ offering in 2018. However, scepticism
about the potential economic success of the standard as well as a commercial
dispute between the main stakeholders hampered industry support and led to
slower than anticipated market development. Together with FM radio’s popularity
(over 80% daily reach of population), which increases concerns that the anticipat-
ed switch-off date of 2022 is highly unrealistic, as well as the quick uptake of
competing Internet platforms for audio consumption, conflicting interests between
multiplex operator Norkring, public service broadcaster VRT and leading com-
mercial broadcaster Medialaan prompt us to examine critically the momentum and
future success of DABþ. By considering DABþ a systemic innovation, the article
reveals how the critical interplay between the different stakeholders in the radio
broadcasting industry in Flanders has hampered the introduction of DABþ. The
institutional context of Flanders may be specific, yet the problems regarding the
implementation of DABþ are relatively comparable with other European markets
and necessitate further academic scrutiny. For this sake, the article offers a struc-
tural approach to examine the ongoing dynamics of the organisational and insti-
tutional systems around DABþ and other media distribution technologies in other
European markets (or beyond), which might prove valuable for similar research
undertakings.
Although the study is limited to its empirical context, the article aims to con-
tribute theoretically to a more general understanding of how digital radio distri-
bution technology can be introduced in national media markets and how
government policies can shape the outcome of this process. In contrast to the
massive focus on the global switch to digital television, the transition from ana-
logue to digital radio remains understudied in media and communications litera-
ture. Recalling Pease and Dennis (1995), radio remains ‘the forgotten medium’ as
4 European Journal of Communication 0(0)

scholars, analysts and journalists tend to overlook radio’s influential role in the
media industries (see Dubber, 2014). Moreover, this article responds to a renewed
call for critical research that addresses the logics of media distribution infrastruc-
tures and that explores the relationship between technology, government, indus-
tries and audiences. Most scholarly emphasis is on ‘platforms’ as the underlying
(infra)structure of digital media, yet the presence of physical distribution infra-
structure remains critical for and its ownership reflects power structures in the
media and communication industries (see Halbert, 2015; Jauert et al., 2017).

DABþ as a systemic innovation

The technical and organisational design of DABþ is very different from that of
traditional FM broadcasting systems, and its introduction demands a change of
the entire radio broadcasting industry. The digitisation of radio involves more than
simply upgrading the distribution system, but necessitates a significant modifica-
tion of the value chain. On the distribution side, multiplex operators enter the
value chain as new middlemen, responsible for building, maintaining and upgrad-
ing the technical infrastructure (transmitters), guaranteeing regional/national cov-
erage and grouping the channels into multiplexes (mux) (Hoeg and Lauterbach,
2009). In contrast to FM where individual stations organise their own transmis-
sion, DABþ introduces separate functions of programme provider, data service
provider and multiplex operator. One DABþ mux typically carries services from
8 to 12 radio broadcasters, who need to enter into commercial agreement with a
multiplex operator to secure distribution. Unequal bargaining power in the value
chain increases risks of certain broadcasters who are left with no distribution
contract. Jauert et al. (2017, p. 19) warn that such gatekeeper model for adminis-
trating multiplexes may cause competition concerns (e.g. discriminatory treatments
and pricing) and suggest such a model may favour commercial needs over
audience-driven interests. On the reception side, DABþ requires digital equipment
so that listeners need to replace FM receivers by digital receivers if they want to
continue to listen to their favourite stations. Since radio consumption in the car is
high, the availability and uptake of in-car receivers is paramount to the success of
DABþ. Automobile manufacturers would thus need to include DABþ receivers as
an option and preferably as standard in their models.
The situation described above implies that rather than a technological innova-
tion, DABþ should be considered a systemic innovation, which requires not just
focussing on the technology itself, but on understanding the (lack of) dynamics of
the organisational and institutional system around DABþ. Systemic innovation
comprises interrelated technological, organisational and institutional adaptations
as well as changes in human behaviours and practices (Maula et al., 2006). The
success of technological systems is shaped by a dynamic network of stakeholders
interacting in a specific industrial area under a particular institutional framework
that is involved in the generation, diffusion and acceptance of that technology
(Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991). However, change and innovation in complex
Evens 5

systems is often difficult to accomplish and time-consuming due to the many

stakeholders and opposing interests involved. Government policy is justified so
as to coordinate the introduction of a systemic innovation and develop a shared
collaborative project among all key stakeholders. Innovation-specific policies may
reduce the financial risks and regulatory uncertainties associated with the imple-
mentation of the technology (Wieczorek and Hekkert, 2012). However, the role of
government is not only limited to that of a market fixer when innovation systems
fail to deliver positive effects but also to a market maker when public actors
become responsible for actively shaping systems and creating relationships of
trust between the stakeholders (Mazzucato, 2013). A critical challenge for public
actors lies in dealing with the difficulty of seeing the horizon of the future policy
environment and the ability to properly anticipate and plan in the present. Since
the success of a technology is hard to predict and its potential often overestimated,
it is paramount that governments keep outside options and develop flexibility so as
to avoid ‘policy myopia’ which can lead to ‘government failure’ when mass adop-
tion of the technology ultimately fails (Nair and Howlett, 2017). An active role of
government is particularly important in case commercial and public interests are
out of balance.

(Lack of) balance of interests

The introduction of DAB/DABþ has been widely criticised for serving national
and European interests but not necessarily those of the entire radio broadcasting
industry. As O’Neill and Shaw (2010: 39) claim, its development was not driven by
the quest to find the most innovative neutral solution, but by a need to serve the
needs of the status quo: Digital radio was said to foster the needs of national public
service broadcasters that dominated the industry before the introduction of com-
mercial radio. At the end of the 1990s and again in the late 2000s, public service
organisations were thought to act as a driving force for innovation in the radio
industry and were used as the ‘DAB locomotive’ (Jauert et al., 2010: 106).
However, the prominent role of public service broadcasters could not prevent
market failure as commercial broadcasters were initially reluctant to embrace
the standard. Most stations saw little return on investment and were reluctant to
increase expenses for digital-only channels without any prospect for additional
revenues: Simulcasting (i.e. simultaneous transmission via FM and DAB/
DABþ) would almost double the transmission costs (Bonet et al., 2009).
However, some broadcasters saw potential for an increase in the actual number
of commercial stations, which offered further scope for expanding their channel
portfolio and extending their brand. At their turn, community and small-scale
stations have widespread concerns about the high transition costs for going digital,
which raises questions about the financial sustainability of DAB/DABþ.
Moreover, local stations are less suited to DAB/DABþ, which were designed to
cater for nationwide coverage (Evens and Paulussen, 2012). It is thus fair to
6 European Journal of Communication 0(0)

conclude that neither commercial nor community broadcasters were very eager to
adopt DAB/DABþ as the new radio transmission standard.
Governments have been pushing DAB/DABþ to the market while favouring
the interests of the industry over the public interest. Indeed, the social need of the
technology has been questioned in literature (Anderson, 2013). Since the launch of
DAB/DABþ, too much emphasis has been put on its presumed technological
benefits rather than on consumer benefits. According to Lax (2017), there was a
major difference between how technical staff understand radio and how listeners
use and appreciate it. Rarely has there been a direct reference to the listeners’
perspective; all too often the focus was on ‘technical solutions for non-existing
problems’ (p. 39). The idea of relative advantage is key to understanding the weak
consumer adoption of the new radio standard (Halbert, 2015). While marketing
campaigns focused on DAB/DABþ’s technical superiority over FM, improved
sound quality and clear reception were not a decisive factor for listeners.
Although these campaigns certainly increased consumer awareness, promotional
airtime has not had a substantial persuasive effect on consumer demand (yet).
Rather than the (contested) technical superiority, new and digital-only channels
are generating interest in and driving sales of digital receivers. Albeit that broad-
casters are operating digital-only channels, the question is whether these additional
channels are worth having to the consumer. In most cases, these digital-only
channels are nothing more than non-stop music offerings that hardly provide
extra value to streaming or podcasts. As consumer interest remains low, adoption
of digital receivers goes slow which is creating lack of sizable audience. This in turn
discourages further commitment from radio broadcasters (Halbert, 2015).
The total lack of coordination among all stakeholders in the value chain and the
lack of synergies with other related industries such as automobiles and consumer
electronics retail induced policymakers to address the failing market for DABþ
(Bonet, 2017). The establishment of a working group, such as Digital Radio UK,
that promotes digital radio to the public and acts as the interface between listeners
and the industry has proved to be highly effective to drive the digitisation of the
radio industry (Lax, 2014). Such representative body can overcome waning indus-
try support and bring all key stakeholders, including representatives of listener
groups, on board. Policies can provide appropriate incentives to stakeholders that
are dependent on regulatory conditions. Commercial broadcasters, who may block
DABþ as a mechanism to avoid extra competition from new digital channels, can
be incentivised by the prospect of deregulation (in terms of ownership structure or
local content requirements) or a reduction of licence fees. They can also be encour-
aged by automatic renewal of analogue licences when they would start to broad-
cast digitally. However, the question is whether broadcasters are then seeing real
value in offering services via DABþ or are just blinded by the direct financial
advantages associated with keeping their licence. Since simulcasting implies an
increase in transmission costs, broadcasters advocate a quick FM switch-off.
Governments need to plan the switchover process carefully by setting realistic
milestones to be achieved and decide whether FM will be remained or abandoned
Evens 7

in the post-switch-off period. Instead of letting the market decide, a clear choice
for technical standards in consumer electronics, such as mandatory digital
receivers in cars, is said to spur adoption and make available a wide range of
reasonably priced receivers (EBU, 2018b).

Methodology
In order to map the complexity of opposing interests regarding DABþ in the value
chain, this article relies on 16 expert interviews conducted with representatives of
public and private stakeholders involved in the introduction of DABþ in Flanders.
The sample includes representatives of all main segments of the radio broadcasting
chain, ranging from broadcasters, multiplex operator, automobile manufacturers
and consumer electronics, and attempts to represent a variety of perspectives on
DABþ:

• Public service broadcaster VRT accounts for approximately 64% of listening

share and was assigned to support a sector-driven transition from FM to
DABþ;
• Nationwide commercial broadcasters Medialaan (DPG Media) and Mediahuis
represent approximately 20.5% and 6% of listening share, respectively, and are
must-have stations;
• Regional commercial broadcaster Top Radio has a market share of 0.86% and
was one of the first commercial broadcasters to go digital;
• Local broadcasters hit fm and MIG were selected to examine local radio’s dif-
ficulties of accessing DABþ frequencies;
• Multiplex operator Norkring is the sole owner of DABþ licences and operates
the DABþ network;
• Automobile federation Febiac represents the car manufacturers, whose uptake
of in-car receivers is crucial to the success of DABþ;
• Consumer electronics companies Pioneer and Philips provide digital receivers to
retailers and car manufacturers.

In addition, governmental institutions Department for Culture, Youth and Media

and the SARC Media Council; umbrella organisations European Broadcasting
Union (EBU) and Medianet Vlaanderen; consumer organisation Test Aankoop;
and research company GfK were consulted for their expert opinion and back-
ground insights. In general, the sample reflects the organisational and institutional
system around DABþ in Flanders. Experts were selected based on convenience
(personal contacts) and snowball sampling.
Expert interviews are a widely used method to gain access to specific knowledge,
yet the results need to be handled carefully. Expert knowledge is not neutral since
experts are part of the societal debate and may have the ability to shape the out-
come of this debate. Experts might subjectively interpret or even strategically
ignore developments, and may be biased in favour of the organisation (interest)
8 European Journal of Communication 0(0)

they represent. It is therefore critical to not only identify issues that were addressed
but also examine those perspectives experts tried to neglect or silence. In addition,
the study benefitted from confidential information that was given ‘off-the-record’
(i.e. not upon quotation) but that helped to deepen our understanding of certain
issues at play. Moreover, some stakeholders only participated in the research on
the condition the statements would not be attributed to them.

Case study: DABþ in Flanders

Context and history
Digital radio has been operated in Flanders since 1997, when public service broad-
caster VRT launched the first DAB multiplex (12A). The multiplex covered the
entire region of Flanders (Brussels included) and provided eight radio services: five
simulcasts of FM stations and three digital-only channels (two with non-stop
music, one with a news loop). With this, VRT attempted to create an attractive
offer that would be convincing enough for consumers to purchase a digital receiv-
er. Although the network signals covered about 99% of the territory, DAB became
a failure due to the unavailability of a wide range of digital receivers, both in retail
stores and cars (the number of receivers sold was estimated at around 50,000), and
the absence of commercial channels Qmusic and 4FM. The latter denounced
VRT’s double role both as content provider and multiplex operator, and refused
to use a network controlled by the public service broadcaster to distribute their
radio programmes. Moreover, lack of a licencing framework for digital radio cre-
ated regulatory uncertainty towards the commercial broadcasters, who expressed
interest in controlling a multiplex themselves.
The Flemish government responded to this call with, first, the development of a
regulatory framework regarding the allocation of digital radio spectrum; second,
the separation of the VRT’s transmitter infrastructure into an independent legal
entity; and third, the licencing of the multiplexes. In 2008, the government released
frequency block 11A that would be reserved for the launch of one national, com-
mercial multiplex and that would be licenced based on a comparative evaluation
process (or ‘beauty contest’). In addition, the VRT’s transmitter infrastructure was
separated into an independent legal entity. Norkring, a subsidiary of Norwegian
telecom operator Telenor and leading distributor of terrestrial broadcasting serv-
ices, initially purchased a 49% share of the entity for e9.8 million (and currently
owns 75% of the shares, the remaining part resides with the government). The
privatisation of the infrastructure and the involvement of a neutral operator aimed
to disentangle VRT’s double role and establish a level-playing field between VRT
and commercial broadcasters: A neutral operator would avoid conflicts of interests
between the different stakeholders in the value chain. In 2009, the licences to
multiplexes 10 (digital television) and 11A (digital radio) were granted to
Norkring for 15 years. Instead of licencing particular broadcasters, a wholesale
model was preferred: Rather than selling services to an audience, Norkring charges
Evens 9

broadcasters for transmission to the public. Such a model would allow a multiplex
operator to optimise the level of service to its various customers and allocate
spectrum the most efficiently. It also guarantees radio broadcasting would
remain a free service to the audience.
However, it would take until May 2016, when the government approved a
Digital Radio Plan to reform FM frequencies and support a switch to all-digital
radio, before DABþ appears on the policy agenda. Government approved auto-
matic renewal of FM licences for the major commercial broadcasters, alongside an
obligation to invest in DABþ. It also decided that FM would be switched off 2
years after digital reaching 50% listening share, expected by the year 2022 (or 2024
the latest). In addition, a Digital Radio steering group was established consisting
of public service broadcaster VRT, main commercial broadcasters Medialaan
(Qmusic and Joe) and Mediahuis (Nostalgie and NRJ), multiplex operator
Norkring, and the government. A memorandum of understanding was signed,
with the aforementioned stakeholders committing themselves to cooperate on mar-
keting and communication and make agreements with the automobile industry
and retail sector. The overall goal is to support the further development of
DABþ and formulate a coordinated plan for radio’s digital future. As part of
this agreement, in November 2018, government supported a Digital Radio Week
to promote the benefits of digital radio to the public. Moreover, a government-
commissioned research revealed that the 25% of the population was aware of
DABþ and that 8% had listened to it recently (compared to 33% via Internet
and 81% via FM). DABþ accounted for 3% of total listening time (compared to
12% Internet and 76% FM) (Ipsos, 2018). Late 2018, Norkring was awarded a
licence of a final multiplex 5A/5D, providing digital capacity to another 13 radio
stations.

Stakeholders and interests

Despite being licenced already in 2008, it took Norkring about 10 years to launch a
commercial DABþ offering. This slow progress of DABþ mirrors the complexity
of opposing stakeholder interests that thwarted an efficient coordination of the
radio broadcasting value chain and that were hard to reconcile by government
intervention. The introduction of DABþ in Flanders was highly contested by the
main private stakeholders, who showed little enthusiasm to abandon FM and to
face additional competition by going digital. The obvious hurdle was the tradi-
tional chicken-and-egg problem, which refers to a multi-party coordination and
requires simultaneous commitment from all stakeholders. The involvement of
VRT was an essential prerequisite for digital radio’s success. As stipulated in the
renewed management contract with the Flemish government (2016–2020), VRT
was asked ‘to support a sector-driven transition from FM to DABþ’. VRT also
advocates that not only its own presence, but a wider availability of stations, more
in particular those operated by leading commercial broadcaster Medialaan, was
10 European Journal of Communication 0(0)

paramount to the success of DABþ:

We were actually seeking for a coalition of the willing. Although VRT accepted that
the government wanted us to lead this process, the successful transition in Norway
taught us all broadcasters have to collaborate to make DABþ a success. We believe
all broadcasters have to agree on the technology, but to compete on content.

However, Medialaan’s enthusiasm to broadcast via DABþ was limited since they
had little belief in the economic potential of the technology. The broadcaster was
hardly interested in DABþ as long as there would be no substantial group of
listeners with a DABþ tuner and tried to postpone its decision to adopt the tech-
nology until there would be a profitable business case for it. The commercial
broadcaster was concerned about the substantial costs related to simulcasting
via FM and DABþ and therefore preferred to wait until consumer demand was
proven.

One of our main concerns is a double distribution cost because we multicast our radio
stations. Since digital uptake remains limited, we have to pay two bills: one for dis-
tribution via FM and one for distribution via DABþ. The optimal scenario is a quick
FM switch-off in the near future since distribution via DABþ is much cheaper than
distribution via FM. For this reason, we prefer to go digital-only as soon as listener
demand allows us to do. That’s why we will also increase our promotion efforts.

Whereas FM secured reach and market share, the lack of a sizable audience on
DABþ was expected to produce a negative impact on its advertising revenue.
Similarly, Medialaan fears that the availability of more radio stations would
‘lead to too much fragmentation of audience share with advertising spending
having to be divided among more broadcasters in order to reach a similar share
of listening. This will put pressure on advertising prices’. Another commercial
broadcaster states that at this moment ‘media agencies and advertisers certainly
do not believe in DABþ [. . .] But we firmly believe that digital-only channels may
address specific audience needs and will drive growth of the radio advertising
market’.
As much as Medialaan was concerned about the prospects of a more compet-
itive advertising market, the crucial reason for not going digital were its concerns
about Norkring’s position as sole multiplex operator – the notorious elephant in
the room during the interviews. Since Norkring controls all commercial DABþ
muxes, it operates as a monopolistic gatekeeper; a position from which it can
ultimately decide on the conditions for carriage. Norkring responds,

The government selected us as the network operator based on an open procedure. We

do not see our position as a monopoly. We believe we are a neutral operator willing to
Evens 11

develop an innovative market and deliver a distribution service to radio broadcasters.

We provide a neutral platform at a standard price. [. . .] Carriage of more channels has
brought our prices down. I believe we now charge a competitive price.

However, several stakeholders protest against this monopoly, which produces pric-
ing power and may be counterproductive in the long term:

Especially in the beginning of its operations, Norkring behaved in a monopolistic way

charging excessive prices. This has changed now, but the situation of Norkring being
the sole entry point for stations that want to broadcast digitally remains risky. More
competition in the distribution market would be more than welcome.

Qmusic and Joe are must-have channels for Norkring’s DABþ offering – a hard-
to-get position the commercial broadcaster took benefit of during the negotiations.
As soon as the negotiations between Norkring and Medialaan about distribution
had become in an impasse and it had become clear neither of the parties would
change their position, government intervened to fix this market failure. Hence, its
Digital Radio Plan stipulated that nationwide commercial stations would be
awarded an automatic renewal of analogue licences provided that they would
broadcast digitally by September 2018 the latest. A similar obligation was put
on newly awarded commercial stations, except for the local stations. One broad-
caster admits,

Let’s be honest. We broadcast via DABþ because policymakers obliged us to be on

that platform, not because we believe in the technology.

Lack of competitive dynamics in the infrastructure market, however, created the

somehow inappropriate situation that the government mandated channels to
broadcast via DABþ, who, therefore, had to negotiate with a monopolistic oper-
ator. Medialaan eventually launched Qmusic and Joe on DABþ in September
2017 and obtained extra capacity for seven additional non-stop music channels,
which are also available online (website and app). This allows the broadcaster to
expand the number of stations, which was impossible in the saturated FM market,
and to reach new commercial target groups. Other stakeholders see herein a grand
design to reproduce current power structures. In this context, the transition to
DABþ is criticised by many for being ‘driven not by a future vision, but by a
political agenda to serve and protect the interests of the existing broadcasting
duopoly. For sure, the lobby efforts of the big media groups paid off well’.
The introduction of DABþ was also assessed critically by local radio stations,
whom policymakers have been historically treating as the Cinderella. The
sector, which represents about 8% of listening share, is concerned about the
high transition costs for going digital, which makes such a transition unlikely.
A few local stations eager for national coverage were able to negotiate a deal
with Norkring, but had to stop transmissions soon because financial return
12 European Journal of Communication 0(0)

was almost non-existent. Unlike smaller commercial broadcasters, local stations

have little bargaining power to negotiate favourable conditions with Norkring.
Most have no interest in nationwide DABþ allotments, but see opportunities
when ‘national multiplex 5A/5D would be reorganised into regional clusters’, a
policy option that has hardly been explored.

We are interested in broadcasting via DABþ, but not as long as Norkring continues
to treat us as national broadcasters. Norkring is clearly not interested in including
local stations in its ensemble. [. . .] We fear there will be just no place left for local
stations in the digital era.

This is due to the fact that Norkring is granting access on a first come, first served
basis, which induces the main broadcasters to introduce new digital-only channels
to preserve their market position. As a result, local broadcasters are left with no
spectrum, unable to broadcast digitally provided they were capable of paying for
(national) distribution. By prioritising commercial needs over public interests, it
can be questioned whether such a gatekeeper, using a spectrum as a scarce public
resource, produces the best possible outcome for society. Since an operator may
deny small-scale radio stations in favour of more popular ones, it is suggested
must-carry regulations could be imposed to transmit at least one non-
commercial station in each service area. Furthermore, some stakeholders question
whether government should preserve fair and reasonable terms of access to digital
spectrum and impose wholesale tariffs on multiplex operators.
Whereas some stakeholders argue government intervention has remained large-
ly insufficient to fix the market, others rather contest the government’s active role
in making the market. Most commercial broadcasters believe that 5G rather than
DABþ will be the future distribution infrastructure for digital radio and question
whether the government really had to impose a new standard for digital radio
instead of letting the market decide on technology. The government’s neutrality
was questioned by many stakeholders, especially because it owns 25% of shares in
Norkring. One broadcaster states,

Government has to incentivise free and fair competition and create the optimal con-
ditions in which media organisations operate. When government decides on technol-
ogy, things usually go wrong. Government has picked a technology which has not
proven its long-term sustainability yet, and which is expected to be overtaken by more
advanced streaming protocols.

The involvement of the automobile industry (listening to the radio accounts for
about 50% of total listening time) and retail sector (wide availability of reasonably
priced receivers) is critical to the success of DABþ. Nevertheless, both branches
hardly identify substantial consumer demand. Hence, they remain reluctant to lead
Evens 13

the introduction of DABþ and rather see themselves as a follower:

We tend to follow what the consumer wants. As much as Norkring wants us to

lead and shape the market, we continue to integrate FM receivers as long as listeners
prefer FM.

The automobile and electronics industries demand clarity in a possible switch-off

date and favour a brief period of simulcasting. Most stakeholders agree that all will
be fully engaged to make the transition to DABþ a success once the government
decides on a fixed, yet realistic switch-off date. In this context, they welcome the
decision that, as part of the European Electronic Communications Code (EECC),
new cars will have to be equipped with a digital radio receiver by end of 2020:

In-car reception is extremely important for the success of DABþ. If government

would oblige digital receiver in cars, then 50% of all cars would be equipped
within 4–5 years. And if this would occur on a European level, then scale will come
into play and tuner prices will fall dramatically.

Discussion
This article presented the results of a stakeholder analysis and discussed the intro-
duction of DABþ in the region of Flanders. This process has been described as a
complex negotiation system in which conflicting interests between multiplex oper-
ator and radio broadcasters combined with a genuine lack of consumer interest in
the technology thwarted a smooth transition from FM to DABþ. In an attempt to
fix the market, the government was able to bring crucial stakeholders together with
the aim to assure a performing network (coverage), value-added programming
(content), availability of digital receivers (consumer electronics), involvement of
the automobile industry (cars) and promotion to the public (communication).
With its Digital Radio Plan, the government acknowledged that rather than a
technological innovation, DABþ had to be considered a systemic innovation
and that coordination of all stakeholders in the value chain was needed to develop
a joint vision on the future distribution of radio programming. The establishment
of a steering group, the role of the VRT as a locomotive, the automatic renewal of
analogue licences, the anticipated switch-off and the organisation of a Digital
Radio Week should be evaluated in light of this goal.
Despite these attempts, however, DABþ’s bright future is not guaranteed. Not
only do our results show that several stakeholders in Flanders show little enthu-
siasm in supporting the digital standard, further studies indicate that consumers
see hardly any added value in a technology that has already been implemented,
unsuccessfully though, since the late 1990s. The question raises to what extent the
14 European Journal of Communication 0(0)

implementation of DABþ as the new standard for radio broadcasting in Europe

should be seen as a top-down, technology-led process rather than an evolution
demanded and supported by the audience. Whereas the adoption of DABþ is
increasing slowly, despite being aggressively promoted in some countries, the pop-
ularity of Internet radio is growing rapidly, with online streaming, podcasting and
personal audio devices challenging the status quo of the radio industry while
representing a real centre of innovation and creativity.
Since alternative platforms are likely to further challenge the sustainability of
DABþ as the primary radio distribution infrastructure, government intervention
to stimulate the DABþ market was repeatedly criticised by stakeholders. By lack
of consumer demand, the development of DABþ was predominantly pushed by
lobbying organisations, advancing the interests of the infrastructure and (parts of
the) broadcasting industries. One, therefore, questions if we could speak here of
regulatory capture, which occurs when in the policy process the commercial inter-
ests are prioritised over the public interests, and which could turn out to be coun-
terproductive, both for the industry and audience. A single focus on DABþ,
promoting it as being superior to FM, may eventually produce policy myopia
and does little to address the structural transformation of the radio broadcasting
industry. Although heavily contested, it becomes realistic to believe that the
Internet rather than DABþ is challenging FM as the primary distribution infra-
structure, and that DABþ will remain in place only until the 5G mobile standard
will have emerged as a global platform for content and connectivity somewhere by
2025. Hence, there is a real challenge for policymakers to anticipate these evolu-
tions accurately and develop future-proof, platform-neutral regulation instead of
prioritising one standard to another.
Historical experiences in the implementation of digital radio in Europe show a
great variety of country-specific combinations of the types of policies being devel-
oped, which makes it hard to ‘transfer’ success recipes. Success of DABþ in one
country (e.g. Norway or Switzerland) does not automatically produce success in
another market, and heavily depends on cultural, economic and political condi-
tions that are specific to each separate market. Detailed overviews of national
radio markets (such as EBU, 2018b) may help policymakers to learn from best
practices and develop future-oriented plans for smooth digital transition. Yet
much scholarly work needs to be done in order to understand the underlying
factors of change and continuity in the European radio markets, especially in a
comparative manner. As mentioned in the introductory section, research in radio
remains relatively limited, especially when it focuses on objects that demand in-
depth insights into industrial and political developments together with a more
advanced level of technical knowledge. Research in the underlying dynamics of
media distribution and infrastructure would clearly benefit from a more holistic
and interdisciplinary perspective that takes into account a wider institutionalist
context.
The approach of systemic innovation used in this article might prove useful here
as it provides an original framework to address structural conditions in which the
Evens 15

digitisation of radio takes place. All too often media objects are researched in
isolation from the ecology in which they are produced, circulated and consumed,
which is leading to one-sided analyses or oversimplified conclusions. Evaluating
the adoption of digital radio receivers cannot adequately happen without a critical
analysis of the surrounding institutional context which shapes the conditions in
which consumers decide to purchase a technological artefact. Neither can one look
at the structure of media markets without examining the history and specificities of
media policymaking which have affected, at least in part, the performance of
today’s media industries. Future research could therefore address the interplay
between technological, organisational and institutional systems as well as drivers
of media consumption to produce a more holistic understanding of the relationship
between media institutions, technologies, markets and society. An analytical
framework considering media technology as systemic innovations may provide a
valuable contribution to this.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Rani Huttener and Joran Van Daele for their invaluable
work related to the collection and analysis of the interview data.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication
of this article.

ORCID iD
Tom Evens https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7274-7432

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