Strategic Analysis

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India's Strategic Autonomy and Rapprochement

with the US

Guillem Monsonis

To cite this article: Guillem Monsonis (2010) India's Strategic Autonomy and Rapprochement
with the US, Strategic Analysis, 34:4, 611-624, DOI: 10.1080/09700161003802802

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Strategic Analysis
Vol. 34, No. 4, July 2010, 611–624

India’s Strategic Autonomy and Rapprochement with the US

1754-0054
0970-0161
RSAN
Strategic Analysis
Analysis, Vol. 34, No. 4, Apr 2010: pp. 0–0

Guillem Monsonis
StrategicMonsonis
Guillem Analysis

Abstract: The debate around strategic autonomy offers a conceptual framework to

understand how India, as an emerging power, tries to negotiate autonomy in its security
and military relationship with the United States. In the context of Indo-US rapproche-
ment, the dynamics of power relations are not commensurate with India’s will to keep
an acceptable degree of autonomy. Consequently, the concept of strategic autonomy,
which is a realist mutation of the traditional non-aligned posture, can be described as a set
of strategies aiming to balance independence in both foreign policy and security
decision-making processes with the imperative to forge close strategic ties with the US.

Introduction

There is no question that we will ever compromise, in any manner, our independent foreign
policy. We shall retain our strategic autonomy. (Manmohan Singh)1

T he Indo-US rapprochement, especially in the field of security, has raised opposi-

tion and disagreement about the new directions of India’s post-Cold War foreign
policy among the strategic and political communities. In its relationship with the US,
India’s twin objectives are: to accumulate power, in the broader sense of the term,
while retaining enough strategic space to manoeuvre. The question for India is how to
calibrate this strategic equation: maximising the benefits in its partnership with Wash-
ington while preserving the independence of its foreign policy and of its strategic
assets. The concept of strategic autonomy2 has become the new mantra in India’s stra-
tegic lexicon in order to express and synthesise these strategies. If the concept of stra-
tegic autonomy is not per se a novelty in the Indian strategic discourse, its frequency,
the divergences in the manner in which the word is used and the geopolitical context
in which it is used are new. Nevertheless, this apparent ‘rag-bag’ concept, even
though it lacks a clear and unanimous definition, provides room to accommodate
views of the entire Indian political spectrum. Despite its definitional discordance, the
Indian concept of strategic autonomy has hardly per se been the focus of any schol-
arly analysis.3 The concept may have been mentioned, especially in Western litera-
ture, but it is mostly referred to as ‘the most emotive issue in India foreign policy’4 or
as an Indian ‘post-colonial rallying cry’.5
This article proposes to analyse Indo-US relations within the conceptual frame-
work of strategic autonomy in order to understand how India has managed its rap-
prochement with the US without losing its ability to pursue an independent foreign
policy. It tries to answer two fundamental questions: what is strategic autonomy? And

Guillem Monsonis is a Researcher at the French Institute of Geopolitics, Paris.

ISSN 0970-0161 print/ISSN 1754-0054 online

© 2010 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
DOI: 10.1080/09700161003802802
http://www.informaworld.com
612 Guillem Monsonis

how is this concept impinging on Indo-US relations? The main argument is that con-
tinuous emphasis on strategic autonomy structurally limits the scope of rapprochement
with Washington in the field of securitsy.

The meaning of the concept and its origins

Defining the concept of strategic autonomy
Broadly, strategic autonomy can be defined as a policy aiming at gaining or preserv-
ing a large degree of independence in fields identified as strategic. The objective is to
maximise the autonomy of decision-making of a country within the framework of an
international system characterised by its interdependence. Constructivist international
relations scholar Alexander Wendt defined autonomy as ‘the ability of a state-society
complex to exercise control over its allocation of resources and choices of govern-
ment’ not only to ‘survive’ but also to retain its ‘liberty’.6 The realists make a dis-
tinction between the concepts of autonomy and sovereignty. According to David
Held,7 ‘sovereignty is power and control over one’s future or the ability to take final
decisions, while autonomy is the capacity of nation states, not to set goals, but to
achieve goals and policies once they have been set’. The narrow definition of the
concept of autonomy as raised by international relations scholars appears restrictive
in order to understand India’s perception of strategic autonomy. The use of the
concept of strategic autonomy in India seems to encompass both the notions of
autonomy and sovereignty; it is about independence in decision-making as well as in
policy implementation. Given the broad definitional parameter of the concept of
sovereignty, certain types of sovereignties8 will resemble the concept of autonomy
while others will fundamentally differ.
In the context of India, the usage of the concept of sovereignty appears necessary,
given the manner in which strategic autonomy is defined: the unwillingness to depend
on great powers, given India’s colonial and post-colonial historical experience.9 This
emphasis on autonomy in the Indian case reminds one of what Stephen Krasner men-
tions as the fourth kind of sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, which he defined as
the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory.10
Applied to India’s growing relationship with the US, an essential parameter is further
added to this broad semantic framework. The perception of an asymmetry is the result
of both a propensity to minimise India’s capability to keep sufficient autonomy and a
tendency to exaggerate US power. In this context, the question of autonomy is a
response to a perceived risk of dependence on the American partner.
Given these considerations, strategic autonomy can be defined as a set of dis-
courses and strategies aiming to safeguard the independence in both the foreign policy
decision-making process and its implementation as well as independence in the use of
strategic military assets. In the field of foreign policy, strategic autonomy is associ-
ated with a set of discourses/practices aiming to promote a multi-faceted diplomacy,
to avoid alliance-like structures and to favour ‘selective partnerships’. At a technolog-
ical and military level, it is more a set of strategies aiming to provide India with self-
sufficiency/self-reliance and thus reduce its dependency on the developed countries,
especially on the US, by different concrete policies.11 In both cases, the main objec-
tive is to create or to keep a sufficient strategic space in order to maintain autonomous
rooms (in terms of technical and economic self-sufficiency) to manoeuvre in national
decisions. It is seen as an imperative to allow India to achieve great power status.12
 Strategic Analysis 613

International sanctions following the nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998 have convinced
India’s strategic community and political class that autonomy in the political and stra-
tegic field is conditioned by that in the technological field.

From non-alignment to strategic autonomy

In India, there is a strong intellectual attachment to the idea of strategic autonomy. One can,
however, ask whether the focus on autonomy is the product of a specific historical circum-
stance or a permanent organising principle of India’s foreign policy.13

Both dimensions in this context are essential in order to understand the origins of the
concept of strategic autonomy. It is not only a legacy from the post-Independence era,
especially the non-alignment years, but also an adaptation to the realities of the post-
Cold War system.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and economic reforms of the 1990s needed a
reformulation of the main principles of India’s foreign policy, especially the paradig-
matic concept of non-alignment. Because of a strong attachment to the old Nehruvian
precepts among the political and bureaucratic elites, which is largely conservative, and
the emergence of alliance politics, such reformulation was not properly conducted.14
Despite this absence of a grand strategy, Indian policy-makers started an ambitious
multi-faceted and multi-focused foreign policy, which consisted of engaging all major
world powers quasi-simultaneously. The rapprochement with the most powerful actor,
the US, was exceptional, both in its scope and quickness, given the historical bilateral
estrangement. This engagement was, in theory, antithetical with the historical non-
alignment posture, even if this concept had evolved since Nehru’s years.15 But despite
continuous claim of the political class to adhere to the principles of non-alignment,16
most Indian experts agree that non-alignment, understood in its very classical sense, is
no more an appropriate foreign policy for India.17 Today, it is mostly used as a kind of
rhetorical exercise, aimed at developing or keeping strong diplomatic ties with some
developing countries. If the main objective of non-alignment during the Cold War
years was to strengthen national independence and the refusal to give up sovereignty to
the superpowers,18 nowadays it is mostly understood among strategic thinkers as ‘inde-
pendence in decision-making and autonomy of choice’.19 The inclination of the
strategic community and the political class is to remain loyal to the principles of non-
alignment. The contemporary evolution of the concept of strategic autonomy, there-
fore, is not a question of a benign semantic shift. It is driven by two main necessities
and implemented through a renewal of the traditional concept of non-alignment.
First, given the transformations in the global geopolitical landscape and the grad-
ual emergence of the country as a global player, the perception of non-alignment as an
obsolete idea figured prominently in the strategic discourse. Non-alignment was the
political response to historical challenges taking place in a particular geopolitical con-
text: decolonisation, third worldism and disarmament. However, these are no longer
major drivers of Indian foreign policy. Thus, one of the main differences between
strategic autonomy and non-alignment lies in the manner in which these phrases are
used in the international context.
Simultaneously, with the emergence of strategic elites belonging to the realist
school and the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party as a political party, these elites gained
considerable influence, which resulted in the marginalisation of the traditional
614 Guillem Monsonis

Nehruvian discourse.20 The concept of strategic autonomy was emphasised by those

thinkers who wanted to preserve ‘the core element of the traditional principle of non-
alignment’,21 to quote Brahma Chellaney, while taking India away from its ‘idealist’
stand and preparing its emergence as a ‘global power’. Until recently, the notion of
autonomy was, in the political and strategic discourse, engulfed in the broad paradig-
matic concept of non-alignment.
This political updating of the concept necessitated a dissociation of the goals and
the strategy of non-alignment. Lalit Mansingh22 has rightly made a distinction
between Nehru’s strategy and the political and strategic instruments required to
achieve that strategy. In substance, the aim remains identical: to provide India with
sufficient strategic space in order to achieve autonomous great power status. Against
this, the strategy has evolved from the traditional non-aligned policy, with its idealist
and moralistic overtones, to an eclectic mix of realist,23 defensive and reactive tactics
intended to increase India’s ‘bargaining power’ vis-à-vis the international system in
general and the US in particular. The concept of strategic autonomy is an expression
of this new political mantra. Since it is reactive in orientation, strategic autonomy shows
a rupture with the programmatic nature of the traditional concept of non-alignment as
defined by K. Subrahmanyam24 as ‘a national strategy’.
Strategic autonomy is the expression of the convergence of an historical autonomous
strategic discourse with newly acquired material means for autonomy. With the success-
ful concomitant realisation of the missile programme,25 driven by A.P.J. Abdul Kalam,
and the Pokhran II nuclear tests, the Indian press, political class and strategic community
can base their autonomous discourse on concrete ‘hard power’ national gains.

The discourse on autonomy: a manifestation of diverging views in the process of

rapprochement
In order to assess the imperative of strategic autonomy in the context of Indo-US rap-
prochement, it is pertinent to analyse the political and strategic discourse on auton-
omy.26 Interestingly, what is questioned here is not the nature of the concept itself but
its ambit. The question of what can be the acceptable level of autonomy, which has to
be kept intact, ranging from a minimalist conception to a maximalist one, becomes
more important. It indicates the political and strategic space available for the relation-
ship with the US as a whole or for some specific issue. I make a distinction between
those who consider that autonomy can be negotiated in the process of rapprochement
and those who use it as a symbol of an ideological reluctance to partner the US.27

Strategic autonomy as a relative concept

The issue of retaining strategic autonomy is perceived by most political and strategic
actors as one of the imperatives that mark the rapprochement. This category has the
propensity to perceive rapprochement in pragmatic terms rather than through the ide-
ological prism. The relationship with the US is mostly perceived as an opportunity to
acquire power to emerge as an effective player on the world scene. Thus, strategic
autonomy can only be a relative principle which has to be calibrated according to a
cost-benefits analysis.28 The pragmatics and the maximalists see the imperative of
autonomy as related to this main objective. Among the pragmatics, Raja Mohan
argues that India ‘needs to go beyond the dearly held notions of strategic autonomy and
accept its new international responsibilities’.29 Interestingly, he opposes the concepts of
 Strategic Analysis 615

autonomy by insisting that Indian foreign policy should start a transition from auton-
omy to responsibility. According to him, an excessive emphasis on strategic auton-
omy is an obstacle to India’s quest for great power status. He echoes George
Modelski’s conception of responsibility as a characteristic inherent of great power
status30 and strongly criticises India’s defensive and isolationist tendency, which he
illustrates by using the porcupine as a metaphor.31 Most pragmatics assessed the nuc-
lear deal by applying this costs/benefits scheme and saw it as an opportunity for
India.32
While similar in many aspects, the maximalists’ discourse on autonomy evolves
within the framework of a neorealist perception of the international system. They tend
to emphasise that India is confronted with great powers, which are unwilling to pro-
mote her quest for major power status.33 Maximalists and most BJP leaders (espe-
cially when in the opposition) share a conception of strategic autonomy largely
directed towards the preservation of India’s instruments of power. Despite the com-
plex and diverging views,34 which led the BJP government to launch the Shakti nuc-
lear blasts, the maximalists and even pragmatics in the party agree on the fact that the
country’s nuclearisation significantly reinforced its strategic autonomy.35 Representa-
tives of this school of thought were among the first to publicly mobilise the concept of
strategic autonomy in order to justify the need for those tests.36 This discourse was
also adopted by nuclear issue experts,37 who tend to consider the deterrence capability
provided by nuclear weapons as a means to strengthen India’s strategic autonomy in
its foreign policy and politico-military pre-eminence in its immediate sphere of influ-
ence. In this perspective, deterrence and autonomy are two concepts intimately linked,
the first reinforcing the second. Not surprisingly, both maximalists and the BJP, this
time in the opposition, criticised the nuclear deal, which they said threatened the stra-
tegic autonomy of India’s nuclear weapon assets and programme.38
Beyond its tactical nature, the BJP’s opposition emphasises the idea of nuclear
sovereignty. Strategic autonomy in this context is understood as the autonomy of the
strategic arsenal and it broadly means independence in maintaining basic security.
Interestingly, this conception of strategic autonomy39 has a close resemblance to the
French one.

Strategic autonomy and the ideological refusal of rapprochement

The Indian Left,40 idealist Nehruvians and the pacifists used the concept of strategic
autonomy in a discursive framework, characterised by an ideological anti-American
antagonism to any kind of rapprochement with Washington. This discourse comes
within the scope of a macro-strategic ideological framework, which perceives the
evolution of India’s foreign policy since the 1990s as a consequence of its submission
to the ‘US imperial project’.41 The political portrayal of US power is central to the
discourse of this section: to demonstrate the loss of autonomy of the country, they
insist on issues like the port call of a US aircraft carrier, carrying nuclear weapons in
Chennai42 or on speculation that the US is setting up ‘lily-pod’ bases in India,43 which
is becoming an ‘Asian outpost of NATO’.44
The approach of the Indian Left is also a fall-out of the increasing nationalistic
tone of its discourse,45 a characteristic which has outshone its traditional anti-nuclear
stand.46 The Left uses strategic autonomy as a protection, a nationalistic fence against
a globalised and capitalist ‘exterior’, perceived to be driven by Washington and which
is fundamentally hostile to India’s interests. In a classical Marxist dialectic of class
616 Guillem Monsonis

struggle, the Left has also portrayed, in its discourse, ‘US superpower’ vis-à-vis the
Indian people, insisting on the latter’s vulnerability.47 Indian dominant classes,
according to this discourse, are seen as sacrificing the country’s strategic autonomy as
well as people’s interest and ‘finds itself on the threshold of a global role and is impa-
tient to become part of the global capitalist class’.48 This kind of discourse remains
marginal in India’s strategic and political fields, and owes its political and media visi-
bility to the coalition government system, which gave the political position of the Left
parties excessive media attention.

Strategic autonomy as a limitation in the security relationship with the

United States
The question of how to keep sufficient autonomy in the framework of a bilateral rela-
tionship is often a strategy of the weak state in a situation of asymmetry in power. For
the weakest, this strategy aims to fundamentally compensate inequality in status. In the
context of Indo-US relations, this asymmetry has a double dimension: it is not only an
asymmetry in status and power of the two partners but also an asymmetry between
Indo-US relations and the relations that New Delhi shares with other countries.

The distorting prism of India’s representations of US and Indian power

The relationship between the perception of an asymmetry of the two partners and the
loss of autonomy as a consequence of the rapprochement partially originated due to a
common self-perception of weakness and vulnerability among political and strategic
elites while delineating India’s relations with the US.49 The propensity to exaggerate
US power while underestimating India’s capability to retain its autonomy is a major
source of concern in the relationship. The rapprochement is perceived as subjugation
and a move towards junior partner status. Since the beginning of the 1990s, opponents
to Indo-US rapprochement, both from the left and the right wing parties, see it as the
Indian political leadership’s submissiveness to Washington.50 One saw a similar kind
of debate during the civil nuclear deal which emphasised the loss of autonomy caused
by an unequal deal between two unequal partners.51
Washington seems to take into account this Indian sensibility and has tried in
recent years to valorise India’s importance in its discourses. It insists on New Delhi’s
‘equal partner’ status52 while placing India in the same league as China or Russia.53
Interestingly, some scholars have juxtaposed Indian ‘weakness’ to China’s capability
to retain its strategic autonomy.54 This has led some commentators to insist on the
need to emulate Beijing which, according to them, has managed to negotiate a benefi-
cial partnership with Washington.55

Strategic autonomy and the resistance to alliances and military agreements

The debates around the defence framework agreement of 2005, the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) and the Logistic Support Agreement (LSA) by far exceeded
the simple technical issues of those agreements and raised the broader question of the
nature of the partnership. Some among the political class and of the strategic com-
munity thus associated these agreements to Washington’s will to push India into a
military and political alliance.56 First, the concept of ‘strategic partnership’ raises two
kinds of comments referring to the issue of keeping strategic autonomy. In its form, if
 Strategic Analysis 617

this concept seems to be vague enough not to appear restricting,57 it also bears the
idea of a permanence in the engagement, which according to most experts and politi-
cians in New Delhi, is not compatible with the imperative of strategic autonomy.
Moreover, it implies, in its content, a commonality of strategic interests between the
two countries58 and a certain degree of equilibrium in the relationship. On this sub-
ject, a well-known expert asked in 2005 if ‘India and the United States could create a
strategic partnership that will further the security and foreign policy interests of both
countries?’59 The potential for a strategic partnership, encompassing all security and
defence questions, needs a convergence of interests, which is lacking, given both part-
ners’ different international status in the global power hierarchy, the South Asia
security context and for India the importance of retaining its strategic autonomy.60
Thus, despite American discourses on the transformation of the relationship to a ‘glo-
bal partnership’, India seems to favour and negotiate a selective kind of partnership.61
The necessity of a relationship à la carte is noticed by many Indian authors and
decision-makers,62 who prefer an ‘issue-based’ partnership configured for two coun-
tries which should have ‘not permanent but temporary identity of interests’.63 Practi-
cally, for New Delhi, apart from avoiding any kind of alliance stricto sensu,64 it
means not being linked with any US sponsored collective or bilateral security struc-
ture which may compel India to intervene against its own interests. From an Indian
perspective, divergent agendas with the US imply a double necessity: to identify those
divergences and exclude them from the partnership while resisting US pressure to
reintegrate them. US security offers, essentially structured around joint military exer-
cises, India’s integration to the Pacific Command (PACOM) cooperation structures
and New Delhi’s adherence to some logistic and technical agreements seems to go too
fast and too far from the Indian mood.65 India’s will to retain maximum strategic
room to manoeuvre also explains the difficulties faced by Washington in convincing
New Delhi to sign specific security agreements. The Access and Cross Servicing
Agreement (ACSA), aiming at facilitating common logistics66 and interoperability
between the armed forces of both countries, is pending since 2004 and is now before
the Cabinet Committee on Security where it has little chance of getting approved.
Washington has even rechristened the agreement’s nomenclature a Logistics Support
Agreement (LSA), given New Delhi’s sensitivity towards the word ‘access’, which is
judged to be too intrusive.67 According to some Indian commentators,68 such an
agreement could ‘support increased militarisation of the Asia Pacific Region and
facilitate US military interventions in Third World Countries’. The impact of the LSA
can indeed be read at two different levels; if some US officials reckon that it is ‘a very
basic and routine’69 agreement or a ‘barter arrangement’70 not politically restricting,
elements within the Indian political class and strategic community argue that Wash-
ington through this Act could push India to become a more compatible strategic ally.
A similar kind of reluctance is observed in the case of India’s participation in the
PSI.71 An Indian naval expert argues that ‘vessel interdiction exercises are integral to
the PSI, these may be used to solicit India’s participation in the initiative’.72 Major
concerns like New Delhi’s historical mistrust towards non-proliferation regimes, its
unwillingness to be perceived as an ally of the US and the fear that it could be rele-
gated as a subsidiary force of the US navy in the Indian Ocean also explains this res-
istance.73 The End User Verification Agreement (EUVA), aiming at verifying if the
US military hardware sold is being used for the mandated purpose (which may imply
on-site inspections),74 raises a new kind of concern regarding India’s strategic auton-
omy. It is seen as an intrusive agreement about which Admiral Sureesh Mehta, Indian
618 Guillem Monsonis

chief of the naval staff, declared: ‘There are certain things we can’t agree to. As a sov-
ereign nation, we can’t accept intrusiveness into our system, so there is some funda-
mental difficulty [. . .] We pay for something, we get some technology. What I do
with it is my thing.’75 Some experts in India perceived the EUVA as intrusive, espe-
cially in sensitive areas like Jammu and Kashmir,76 given that New Delhi will have to
allow access to its military facilities and intimate the location of the equipment.77
In order to overcome these Indian concerns, US officials are trying to sell their
security offer by insisting on the potential economic benefits78 or on the lack of inter-
operability between both navies in humanitarian and disaster interventions.79 Never-
theless, the military cooperation with India will remain limited, given New Delhi’s
reluctance to sign such security agreements due to its sensitivity on the question of
strategic autonomy.

Promotion of multi-faceted diplomacy to keep autonomy and its impact on the Indo-
US defence relationship
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Indian strategic and political circles were
worried about the unipolar and quasi-hegemonic nature of the international system.
Having lost a strong historical partner and realising the lack of relevance of non-
aligned ideology in real politics, P.V. Narasimha Rao, the then prime minister of
India, felt that India had to open itself to the world and in this context needed to
redefine its relationship with the US. This need necessitated new strategies in order
to keep India’s strategic space, which until then was governed by the non-aligned
posture. The nuclear tests of 1998 were a kind of response of the BJP government
to this question; simultaneously, New Delhi pursued a multi-faceted diplomacy in
order to diversify foreign policy while engaging all great powers. This imperative
to retain strategic autonomy in foreign policy is recognised by most political lead-
ers and strategic thinkers.80 The discourse on the ‘strategic triangle’ with Moscow
and Beijing, although politically illusory, attested to this Indian dilemma. More
concretely, the pacification of relations with China and the attempts to revamp
Indo-Russian relations were parts of this multi-faceted diplomacy. Both China and
Russia became elements in the rapprochement strategy towards the US. But the
Indians continued to face a dilemma. India was finding it difficult to balance the
rapprochement with the US, which was moving faster than its partnership with
Moscow or Beijing. The intensity and the ‘global’ ambition of Indo-US relations
are not balanced by India’s relations with other great or medium powers. Because
of the complexity and the diversity of its international and security agendas, India
needs to follow the track of a multi-faceted diplomacy, especially vis-à-vis Russia,
China and Iran. Energy supply, membership of the UN Security Council and the
desire to become a major player in Central Asia are among the agendas which
might collide with US interests and will require good relations with alternative
powers. More specifically, how does the pursuit of a multi-faceted diplomacy,
which seems to be driven by the motto ‘autonomy by diversity’, affect military
cooperation with the US?
Regarding the relationship with Beijing, the US’s willingness to partner India in
order to ensure that‘China’s rise is peaceful’, to quote Nicholas Burns’s phrase,81 is
tempered by New Delhi’s desire to keep cordial relations with its powerful neigh-
bour.82 Thus, naval exercises like Malabar are calibrated so as not to irritate China.
New Delhi is trying, through these military exercises, to find the correct equation in
 Strategic Analysis 619

order to ‘deter’ Beijing without risking a conflict. A significant increase in the Indian
force levels in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific can be perceived as a threat by China.
This will be especially true in case of large-scale exercises involving one or several
Carrier Battle Groups, simulating air and sea operations against a conventional
enemy. This probably explains the Indian decision not to permit a multilateral dimen-
sion to Malabar 2008 naval exercises,83 despite Japan’s initial proposal. This neces-
sity has also been raised in a 2006 note of India’s Ministry of Defence,84 which ‘asked
the armed forces to go slow in their interactions with the US’. The ‘China factor’ also
contributed to Indian reluctance to sign the PSI, especially with regard to the risky
consequences of an eventual interception or interdiction of a Chinese vessel by an
Indian warship operating under the PSI’s dispositions.85
The necessity to carefully handle other powers as a strategy to retain strategic
autonomy also explains India’s reluctance to expose some critical technologies during
Indo-US exercises. The existence, in the Indian arsenal, of many Russian-built sys-
tems had raised the issue of their exposure to US intelligence. Apart from the per-
ceived risk that those technologies may land in Pakistan’s hand, it is probable that
Moscow has asked New Delhi not to use those assets when exercising with the US
navy or air force.86 It explains why the radar NIIP N011M Bars of Sukhoi Su-30
fighter/bomber was not switched on during US-based Red Flag exercises in 2008,87
and also the absence of the silent Kilo class submarines during Malabar.88

Conclusion
Some scholars argue that Indian emphasis on strategic autonomy will decrease with
its accession to a great power status and that ‘great powers don’t speak of auton-
omy’.89 This vision seems to understand autonomy only as a power-transition impera-
tive and puts aside the emphasis on autonomy, which is always used as an expression
of a power rivalry in a precise geopolitical configuration. Even with the capability to
define international agendas, great powers, to counter the diverging policies of other
powers, tend to adopt postures to minimise their influence. For instance, the EU is
today struggling to create new autonomous strategic capabilities in order to reduce its
dependence on the US. The concept of strategic autonomy is indeed a driving prin-
ciple in the European Galileo GPS programme.90
Apart from India, France is the other major example of an ‘autonomy focused’
country. Since Charles De Gaulle’s years, France has been insisting, in its political
and strategic discourse, on the need to maintain its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the
US. But is the French experience relevant for India? Will India become an ‘Asia
France’, as one US expert asked?91 The major lesson of the French experience for
India should be that autonomy only works efficiently when combined with power.
France’s autonomous posture has been built as a way to retain its power and influ-
ence, and not to create it. De Gaulle chose to quit NATO military command structures
only after the acquisition of an independent nuclear capability. In the past, India has
tried to achieve autonomy, but has not been successful given the historical experience
of its non-alignment posture. Empowered by 10 years of successive economic growth,
New Delhi’s recent experience shows that autonomy as political bargaining tool in its
relations with the US appears to be an effective posture in terms of results. However,
India will have to continuously calibrate the right balance between ‘self-governance’
and ‘effective governance’92 in order to optimise the benefits of its relations with the
US and the world.
620 Guillem Monsonis

Notes
1. Shekhar Iyer and Anil Anand, ‘India Strategic Autonomy will be Retained: PM’, Hindustan
Times, August 13, 2007. Full speech delivered in Lok Sabha, August 21, 2006.
2. This concept is sometimes labelled ‘strategic independence’.
3. Raja Mohan and Subash Kapila are among the few who have emphasised the concept of stra-
tegic autonomy in the Indian context. See Raja Mohan, ‘India’s Great Power Burdens’, India
Seminar, 581, 2008; and Subash Kapila, ‘India at Sixty: Strategic Reflexions’, SAAG paper,
2377, September 17, 2007.
4. See Ambassador Teresita Schaffer, ‘Critical Question: US India Nuclear Deal’, CSIS Newslet-
ters, October 31, 2007.
5. See Devin Hagerty, ‘India and the Global Balance of Power’, in Harsh V. Pant (ed.), Indian
Policy in a Unipolar World, Routledge, New Delhi, 2009, p. 40.
6. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 1999, p. 235.
7. Quoted in Jennifer Anne Sterling-Folker, Theories of International Cooperation and the Pri-
macy of Anarchy, Suny Press, State University of New York, Albany, 2002, pp. 43–44.
8. Stephen Krasner identified four types of sovereignties: international legal sovereignty, West-
phalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty and interdependence sovereignty. See Sovereignty:
Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999, p. 3.
9. Thus, defining strategic autonomy, Steven Hoffman speaks of ‘not allowing Indian decisions
or positions to be influenced by any foreign power’. See Steven Hoffman, ‘Indo-US Strategic
Worldviews’, in Ashok Kapur, Y.K. Malik, Harold A. Gould and Arthur Rubinoff (eds), India
and the United States in a Changing World, Sage, New Delhi, 2002, p. 228. Sumit Ganguly
recalls that ‘At a national level, the memories of colonial rule contributed to a political culture
which privileged the concept of national autonomy. The desire to maintain the greatest pos-
sible independence in the conduct of India’s foreign affairs was a sentiment that pervaded the
country. Public opinion, to the limited extent that it was concerned with foreign affairs, would
find any notion of deference to external powers to be intolerable. [. . .] The country had been
under the yoke of colonial rule for 200 years and the weight of this colonial past was consider-
able.’See Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi, ‘Explaining Sixty Years of India’s Foreign
Policy’, India Review, 8(1), January-March 2009, p. 5.
10. Stephen Krasner, no. 8, pp. 3–4.
11. Indigenisation policies, diversification of foreign providers, refusal of political conditions
associated with transfers of technology, total freedom on civilian and military nuclear potential
and priority to subsystems acquisitions instead of complete systems.
12. See Subash Kapila, no. 3.
13. See Raja Mohan‘No Free Rides to Greatness’, Indian Express, April 19, 2008.
14. Termed by Kanti Bajpai as Maximalists and as Realists by Stephen Cohen. See K. Bajpai, ‘No
First Use in the India-Pakistan Context’, paper prepared for Pugwash Meeting, 279, London,
November 2002, pp. 15–17; and Stephen Cohen, India: Emerging Power, Oxford India Paper-
backs, New Delhi, 2008, p. 43.
15. On the evolutions of non-alignment, see Carsten Rauch,‘Farewell Non-Alignment’, PRIF
Reports No. 85, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2008.
16. See Yashwant Sinha in interview with Amit Baruah, The Hindu, August 20, 2002. See also
statement of Priya Ranjan Dasmunsi in Lok Sabha, ‘Submission Regarding the Visit of Presi-
dent of USA to India’, March 2, 2006, at http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/psearch/
result14.aspx?dbsl=5495.
17. Sumit Ganguly, interview with the author, Paris, May 2007; Madhurendra Kumar, ‘Challenges
Before India’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century’, in Annpurna Nautiyal (ed.), Challenges for
India’s Foreign Policy in a New Era, Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, 2006, p. 67; Harsh
V. Pant, ‘Emerging India Needs a Superpower Policy’, Asian Age, July 30, 2008.
18. See Subash Kapila, no. 3.
19. I.K. Gujral, ‘A Foreign Policy for India’, MEA External Publicity Division, Government of
India, MEA External Publicity Division, Government of India, New Delhi, 1998, p. 4.
20. Right from the 1980s, ‘the nationalist sector of the Indian scientific community and civil bureauc-
racy gained the upper hand [. . .] As a result, Indian scientists decisively changed the orientation of
Nehru’s disarmament and his peaceful (non-military) nuclear policy.’ In Ashok Kapur, Pokhran
and Beyond. India’s Nuclear Behaviour, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2001, p. 27.
 Strategic Analysis 621

21. Brahma Chellaney, ‘A Concert of Democracies’, Asian Age, July 3, 2008; and S. Nihal Singh,
‘Manmohan Foreign Policy Coup almost Rivals Indira’s’, Asian Age, September 11, 2008.
22. Lalit Mansingh, ‘Foreign Policy Imperatives for a Nuclear India’, in N.S. Sisodia and Chitrapu
Uday Bhaskar (eds), Emerging India: Security and Foreign Policy Perspectives, Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 2005, p. 45.
23. Former Indian Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit spoke about a ‘de-ideologised’ foreign policy. See
speech at the German Society for Foreign Policy, September 16, 1993 in Nadesan Satyendra,
‘Goodbye Non Alignment’, at http://www.tamilnation.org [websited closed 25 January 2010].
24. K. Subrahmanyam, ‘Introduction’, in Jaswant Singh, Defending India, Palgrave Macmillan,
London, 1999, p. ix.
25. A few months after the Pokhran II nuclear tests in Rajasthan, the AGNI I ballistic missile
became operational in November 1999.
26. This discourse is characterised by its reactive nature. Each Indian step forward in the partner-
ship resulted in a broad use of the concept, both among the political leaders and the media.
27. The classification operated by S. Cohen and Kanti Bajpai will be used for this purpose. For an
in-depth description of those schools of thought, see Stephen Cohen, no. 14 and K. Bajpai, no.
14.
28. See Alexander Wendt, no. 6, pp. 235–236 and Uday Bhaskar, ‘The Buddha is Smiling’, red-
iff.com, May 20, 2008.
29. Raja Mohan, Resources, Rising Powers and International Security, Centre for Humanitarian
Dialogue, Geneva, http://www.hdcentre.org/publications/resources-rising-powers-and-inter-
national-security-O.
30. George Modelski, Principles of World Politics, Free Press, New York, 1972, p. 141.
31. See Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, Penguin Books India, New Delhi, 2003, p. 262.
32. See Uday Bhaskar, ‘Nuclear Deal with US Good for India’, India News Online, July 25, 2005.
33. Subash Kapila, no. 3.
34. Many reasons have been advanced by scholars to explain the tests. See, for example, G. Perk-
ovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2002; B. Karnad,
Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, Macmillan India, New Delhi, 2005; Karsten Frey,
India’s Nuclear Bomb and National Security, Routledge, Oxon, 2006.
35. Beyond their military significance, the 1998 blasts, in the Vajpayee government’s calculations,
allowed India strategic space vis-à-vis the US by increasing the room to manoeuvre in future
negotiations on nuclear and proliferation issues. Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal, Director of the
Centre for Land Warfare Studies, claimed that, ‘nuclear weapons have undoubtedly bestowed
on India the strategic autonomy that is necessary to safeguard its interests’. See Gurmeet Kan-
wal, Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal, Knowledge World/IDSA, New Delhi, 2001, p. 10.
As a pragmatic, see Uday Bhaskar, ‘The Buddha is Smiling’, no. 28. See also Jaswant Singh,
‘UPA Needs to Clarify Indo-US Nuclear Deal’, BJP Today, 15(6), March, 2008, pp. 16–31.
36. See Jaswant Singh, quoted in ‘India Rejects ASEAN Criticism of N-Tests’, The Independent,
July 29, 1998. See also ‘PM Urges Swiss President to Expedite Bofors Case’, Hindustan
Times, November 24, 1998.
37. See Gurmeet Kanwal, no. 35, p. 4.
38. See common declaration of Vikram Sood, Satish Chandra and Ajit Doval, ‘Indo-US Nuke
Deal: No Compromise on Strategic Autonomy’, India News Online, August 21, 2006; and
Bharat Karnad ‘Nuclear Deal: Partnership or Subordination’, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal,
1(1), January–March 2006, p. 8.
39. ‘Nuclear deterrence remains a fundamental pillar of France’s strategy. It is the ultimate guar-
antee of national security and independence. It is one of the conditions of our strategic auton-
omy’. ‘French White Paper on Defense and National Security’, Odile Jacob Publishing
Corporation, Paris, 2008, p. 69.
40. By Indian Left, I understand the political parties, Communist Party of Indian and Communist
Party of India-Marxist, and their sympathisers.
41. Achin Vanaik, ‘Post Cold War Indian Foreign Policy’, India Seminar, 581, 2008, p. 2. See also
‘India’s Place in the US Strategic Order’, Aspects of India’s Economy, 41, December 2005.
42. The pacifist and antinuclear activists Achin Vanaik and Prawful Bidwai signed a state-
ment of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) criticising the govern-
ment decision to allow the US ship to dock at Chennai. See ‘Statement on USS Nimitz’,
CNDP, June 2007.
43. See John Cherian, ‘India’s Foreign Policy Shift: From NAM to Strategic Partnership with the
US’, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, 3(1), January–March 2008, p. 64.
622 Guillem Monsonis

44. See ‘No Strategic Partnership with America’, CPIM, at http://www.cpim.org/nuclear/folders/

08292007-strategic_Defence_123.pdf; and D. Raja, ‘N-deal Adrift from CPM’, Asian Age,
undated archive.
45. For example, one of the slogans used by the CPI(M) was ‘No to Anti National Nuclear Deal’.
46. Foreign Left parties mostly criticised the agreement using an antinuclear discourse.
47. Prakash Karat, ‘Implications of Indo-US Strategic Alliance’, in Subordinate Ally, Signpost,
LeftWord Books, New Delhi, 2007, p. 27.
48. See Aniket Alam, ‘The Indo US Nuclear Deal, Nationalism and the Left’, South Asia Citizens
Web, October 5, 2008, at http://www.sacw.net/article110.html; and ‘Resolution of the Conven-
tion on Dangerous Indo US Strategic Alliance under the Garb of the Nuclear Deal’, Lok Raj
Sangathan online, August 26, 2008.
49. K. Subrahmanyam, ‘Partnership, Not Alliance’, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, 1(1),
January–March 2006, p. 3.
50. In 1992, Manmohan Singh was accused by the opposition of being a ‘US agent’ and of ‘pre-
paring the Indian budget in Washington’. See ‘Statement of PM in Rajya Sabah on Indo-US
Nuclear Deal’, August 17, 2006.
51. Speaking on the nuclear deal, Jaswant Singh declared that ‘strategic partnership is most effective
when between two equals’. See statement issued by Jaswant Singh in Rajya Sabah, March 5, 2006.
52. See Berger declaration in ‘We Must Develop a New Relationship’, Asian Age, May 5, 2000.
53. As an example, see G.W. Bush, ‘State of the Union’ Speech, 2006. In 2005, after important pro-
tests organised by the Left in West Bengal following Cope India military exercises, the US
Embassy made a statement in Kolkata which insisted on the ‘equal statuses’ of the two partners.
54. B. Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, no. 34, p. 495 and Nihal Singh, ‘Nuclear
Deal, US Will Put India’s Foreign Policy to Test’, Asian Age, October 2, 2008.
55. Maj. Gen. V.K. Madhok, ‘Indo-US Alliance’, Daily Excelsior, February 4, 2007.
56. ‘These developments do not compromise India’s sovereignty or independence. These are
arrangements between two equal, important partners who look to the future and understand
what some of their shared values and objectives must be.’ Quoted in Siddharth Srivastava,
‘Indian Left out of Step over US Exercises’, Asia Times, November 11, 2005.
57. Dhruva Jaishankar, ‘The Vajpayee-Manmohan Doctrine’, Pragati, 19, October 2008, p. 11.
58. Natwar Singh, Speech at the Institute for International Relations, Moscow, October 27, 2005.
59. Amit Gupta, ‘The US India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary Interests?’,
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, February 2005, p. 1.
60. The broadening of the relationship since 2000 showed that New Delhi and Washington share
common agendas on non-sensitive issues like the protection of Sea Lanes of Communications
(SLOCs) or humanitarian and disaster interventions. These agendas are often publicly pro-
moted by political leaders from both the countries. However, a strategic partnership necessar-
ily depends on the broad convergence of interest of the two partners.
61. ‘We should seek opportunities for cooperation wherever our interests coincide, forming a part-
nership with the United States on a case-by-case basis.’ Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, ‘Indian
Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities’, Indian Foreign Policy, Foreign Service Insti-
tute, New Delhi, 2007, p. 108.
62. ‘. . . it would also serve India’s best interests not to pursue any strategic alliance or partnership
with the United States. We have concluded that a nuanced issue-based policy towards the
United States would best suit India.’ ‘We also suggest that India-US relations need to be con-
figured around not permanent but temporary identity of interests. . .’ ‘India-US Relations: Pro-
moting Synergy’, Report of an Independent Core Group, IPCS, New Delhi, 2003, p. 3.
63. Amit Barua, ‘Strategic Alliance with the US not in India’s Interests’, The Hindu, March 20, 2003.
Ambassador Jaishankar speaks of ‘strive for the optimal rather than the ideal’ in ‘India and USA:
New Directions’, Indian Foreign Policy, Foreign Service Institute, New Delhi, 2007, p. 788.
64. Devin T. Hagerty analyses the Indo-US relations in the mark of IR alliances theory. See Devin
T. Hagerty, ‘Are We Present in the Creation. Alliance Theory and the Indo-US Strategic Con-
vergence’, in Brian Shoup and Andrew Scobell (eds), US-Indian Strategic Cooperation into
the 21st Century, Asian Security Studies, Routledge, Oxon, 2006. pp. 11–37.
65. The security relationship is indeed, from an Indian perspective, submissive to the political bilat-
eral relationship as a whole and to the Asian geostrategic context. Although the Indian navy and
air force are willing to increase interactions with their American counterparts, the Indian govern-
ment keeps political control of the relationship carefully calibrated to a case-by-case strategy.
 Strategic Analysis 623

66. The first steps of naval cooperation were a ‘logistical nightmare’, given the lack of interopera-
bility, according to a retired Indian navy commodore (discussion with the author).
67. Cherian Samuel, ‘Indo-US Defence Cooperation and the Emerging Strategic Relationship’,
Strategic Analysis, 31(2), March 2007, p. 230.
68. Sandeep Dikshit, ‘Are There Not Strings to the Indo-US Nuclear Deal’, in S.K. Pande (ed.),
Indo-US Nuclear Deal: A Reference Compilation, Delhi Union of Journalists, New Delhi,
2007, p. 327.
69. See the declarations of former US Pacific Command Chief Admiral Dennis Blair in ‘Proposed
Defence Pact with US Raises Eyebrows’, The Times of India, April 20, 2008.
70. Declarations of James Clad, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for South and South-
east Asia at Observer Research Foundation on September 18, 2007. Quoted in Ramesh Ram-
achandran, ‘Proliferation Initiative to Benefit India: US’, Asian Age, September 20, 2007.
71. Bharat Karnad, ‘Aim Low, Hit Lower’, India Seminar, 545, 2005.
72. G. Khurana, ‘India-US Combined Defense Exercises: An Appraisal’, Strategic Analysis,
32(6), November 2008, p. 1057.
73. James R. Holmes, ‘India and the Proliferation Security Initiative: A US Perspective’, Strategic
Analysis, 31(2), March 2007, pp. 328–329.
74. The EUVA is a part of the US Golden Sentry Program led by the US Defence Security Coop-
eration Agency (DSCA).
75. ‘Proposed Defence Pact with US Raises Eyebrows’, no. 69.
76. Naresh Sagar, ‘US and India on Logistics Support Agreement’, Thaindian News, February 28,
2008, at http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/us-and-india-on-logistics-support-
agreement_10021924.html.
77. See Maj. Gen. Mrinal Suman, ‘End Use Monitoring Regime’, Indian Defence Review, 21(1),
2005. at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/2008/03/end-use-monitoring-regime.html.
78. A US official stated that India could save $20 million during major war games like Red Flag if
it signs the LSA. He also argued that India would not have had to pay hard cash for US fuel
and supplies during the evacuation of its nationals in Lebanon in 2006. See ‘Indo-US Logisti-
cal Support Agreement: India Can Save US$20 million per War Game’, India Defence Report,
3649, December 15, 2007.
79. Nicholas Burns argues that ‘a significant Indian defence purchase from the US -for example,
of the new advanced combat aircraft that the Indian Air Force seeks – would be a great leap
forward and signal a real commitment to long-term military partnership.’ Nicholas Burns,
‘America’s Strategic Opportunity with India’, Foreign Affairs, 86(6), 2007, p. 141.
80. See for example Brahma Chellaney: ‘In keeping with this long-standing independence, India is
likely to retain the option to forge different partnerships with varied players to pursue a variety
of interests in diverse settings . . . A multi-aligned India pursuing omnidirectional cooperation
for mutual benefits with key players will be better positioned to advance its interests and pro-
mote cooperative international approaches in the changed world’. Brahma Chellaney, ‘India as
a Global Bridge Builder’, Asian Age, September 3, 2008.
81. N. Burns, ‘America’s Strategic Opportunity with India’, Foreign Affairs, November–
December 2007, p. 4.
82. In the beginnings of the first Bush administration, US policy towards China got more inimical.
Some Republican MPs saw in India a strong asset in the strategy of contention of Beijing. The same
year, Ambassador Blackwill, a China specialist, was appointed as the new ambassador in India.
83. ‘Antony Nixes Expansion of India-US Naval Malabar Exercise’, Indo-Asian News Service,
September 24, 2008.
84. ‘Be Careful in Dealings with US, Forces Told’, Times of India, July 29, 2006. According to an
MoD official quoted in the report, the reason lies in the fact that ‘It would send wrong signals
if our armed forces primarily focused only on the US to the neglect of all others. The effort
should be to have interactions and cooperation with as many countries as possible.’
85. See Deepa Olapally, ‘US India Relations: Ties that Bind’, Sigur Center Asia Papers, George
Washington University, Washington DC, 2004, p. 11.
86. An Indian air force official, when asked about the reasons of the non-use of Bars radar of the
Sukhois during exercises Indra Dhanush held with Royal Air Force, stated that ‘It was for a
mixture of reasons. The Russians have their Intellectual Property Rights and we have our con-
cerns’. Quoted in Shyam Bhatia, ‘India’s Sukhois Turn it on in UK Skies, Turn Off Radars’,
Indian Express, August 27, 2007.
624 Guillem Monsonis

87. The US used to deploy RC-135 Rivet Joint SIGINT aircraft during such exercises.
88. Sujan Dutta, ‘Undersea Nuke War with US’, The Telegraph (Kolkata), August 21, 2008.
89. Raja Mohan, ‘Resources, Rising Powers and International Security’, no. 29.
90. A French official on the Galileo programme: ‘It is inconceivable for us to have our future
weaponry—and almost all of it will have positioning chips embedded—under the control of
the United States’ [. . .] ‘It’s a matter of strategic autonomy for Europe. It also forces the U.S.
to negotiate with Europe as an equal. After all, we are allies and we should trust each other.
We are willing to trust the U.S. and that trust should run both ways.’ See Peter B. de Selding,
‘Europe Takes Steps to Prevent Galileo from Interfering with GPS Military Code’, Space
News, July 7, 2005.
91. See Dan Blumenthal, ‘Will India Be a Better Strategic Partner than China’, Presentation for
Non-proliferation Education Center, Washington, DC, at http://www.npec-web.org/Presenta-
tions/060206%20Blumenthal.pdf.
92. David Held, A Globalizing World? Routledge and the Open University, Oxon, 2000, p. 163.