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Received: 19 December 2016 | Revised: 12 July 2017 | Accepted: 13 July 2017
Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 555–568
doi: 10.1002/app5.193
Original Article
Hijacking Adat Recognition Through the Establishment of New
Customary Community Council in Papua, Indonesia
Rosita Dewi *
Abstract
Papuan supporters of the Special Autonomy
Law hoped that it would become an instrument
to ensure their right to equality through the
respect and recognition of their unique identity.
This recognition facilitated the blossoming of
an adat institution called the Papua Customary
Council (Dewan Adat Papua). This institution
is an important representative of Papuan.
However, it was opposed to the Special
Autonomy Law, and several of its members
have closed relations with the Council of
Papua Presidium (Presidium Dewan Papua),
which supports the pro-independence movement.
Eight years after the implementation of this
law, a new adat institution was formed called
the Customary Community Council (Lembaga
Masyarakat Adat (LMA)). The LMA is
supported by the central government to vis a
vis with the Dewan Adat Papua. This article
analyses the reasons why the LMA was
established as a form of government recognition
in Papua. Interestingly, the LMA’s strategy is
similar to that employed under Suharto by
the Customary Deliberative Council (LMA)
prior to the Special Autonomy Period when
adat institutions were formed and recognized,
although with the new goal of achieving
governmental policies of interest.
* Centre for Political Studies - Indonesia Institute of
Sciences (Pusat Penelitian Politik - Lembaga Ilmu
Pengetahuan Indonesia), Jakarta, Indonesia; email
<ro_sita2000@yahoo.com>.
published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License,
which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial
and no modifications or adaptations are made.
Key words: recognition, Customary
Deliberative Council (LMA), Customary
Community Council (new LMA), Papua
Customary Council (DAP), Merauke
Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE)
Introduction
“Which company are you from?” A woman
sitting beside me posed this unexpected
question when I joined a long queue to speak
with Lenis Kogoya at his office in the
presidential palace. She was a broker for a
Chinese company looking for investment
opportunities in Papua and thought I was
acting in a similar capacity. Many investment
seekers are now flooding to see Kogoya.
According to a friend working for an NGO,
the easiest way to meet with him is to suggest
to his staff that a project is going to be imple-
mented in Papua. As the leader of Papua’s Cus-
tomary Community Council (Lembaga
Masyarakat Adat, referred to in this article as
the new LMA), Kogoya developed patronage
networks in Jakarta that led to his appointment
as one of President Joko Widodo’s advisors.
Adat or customary—which Davidson and
Henley (2007) described as a way of life that
links history—has been a political and
economic source of power since the Special
Autonomy Law for Papuan peoples formally
recognized the adat rights of indigenous
Papuans and obligated the adat community’s
involvement in decision making. Lenis
Kogoya is powerful due to his position as the
head of the new LMA. This council is not the
sole adat institution in Papua, however. Papua
© 2017 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
556 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies
now has a plethora of so-called adat institutions,
each struggling to represent (some) Papuans
according to its own agenda. This plurality is
confusing to Papuans. The strongest and most
authentic adat institution is the Papua
Customary Council (Dewan Adat Papua
(DAP)), which was based on the Second
Papuan People’s Congress in 2000 and has
branches established from below. These
bottom-up characteristics are the source of
the DAP’s legitimacy as a representable adat
institution. However, because the DAP
frequently criticizes the central government,
the government does not recognize the DAP,
which has resulted in its failure to implement
concrete programs for Papuans and has bred
dissatisfaction from the Papuan elite. This
adat institution only became the principal
dialogue partner during Abdurrahman Wahid
Presidential term in 2000 (Chauvel 2005;
McGibbon 2004).
The central government created the new LMA
as an ostensibly reliable and representable adat
institution 8 years after the enactment of the
Special Autonomy Law. Its top-down charac-
teristics weaken this council’s legitimacy as an
adat institution, but it has proven to bring
more concrete programs to Papua and,
therefore, has begun to receive the support
from some segments of the Papuan elite.
This article focuses on the institutionaliza-
tion of adat recognition in Papua, especially
regarding two adat institutions, the DAP and
new LMA, and argues that the legal or formal
recognition of adat produces different interpre-
tations and degrees of institutionalization
because there is no consensus on the content
of adat at the time of legal recognition. In
post-recognition politics, adat is no longer
limited to the matter of Papuan identity. It is
now implicated in benefits or profits and is
strongly related to concrete development
programs. The Papuan case shows that
development-oriented adat institutions could
win over the hearts and interests of a
materialistic and pragmatic local elite, further
diminishing the substance of adat.
The politics of adat are significant because
adat authority leads to political-economic
power in Papua’s post-recognition era. This
published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
September 2017
article examines the dynamics of adat
politics, even at the village level. It also
provides important insights for research on
the political implications of adat in other
parts of Indonesia or in other developing
countries where customary authority has
political meaning.
In this article, I examine two cases in two
villages—Duku and Muli1—which serve as
examples of the involvement of the new
LMA in land grabbing in the Merauke district
as part of the Merauke Integrated Food and
Energy Estate (MIFEE) project comprises over
a million hectares of land which threaten the
adat lands (Dewi 2016, pp. 91–95).
Spirit of Adat Recognition and Special
Autonomy for Papua
After the fall of the New Order Government,
demands for Papuan independence were
further strengthened. In July 1998, Papuan
intellectuals established the Irian Reconcilia-
tion Forum, known as Forum Rekonsiliasi
Masyarakat Irian (FORERI). This forum
actively organized national dialogue between
Papua and Jakarta, the centre of the Indonesian
Government, in February 1999. The Papuans
were represented by a team of 100, led by
Tom Beanal, who met with President Habibie
to discuss the concerns of the Papuans.
However, because the Papuan representatives
directly requested independence for Papua,
the Indonesian government closed this dialogue.
The new president, Gus Dur, reopened
dialogue with Papuan leaders represented by
the Presidium of Papua Council (Presidium
Dewan Papua (PDP)). Gus Dur also changed
the name of Irian to Papua to show the central
government’s seriousness in removing the
stereotypes associated with the name of Irian,
that was believed to be an acronym of Ikut
Republik Indonesia Anti Netherlands.2 He
1. Due to the sensitivity of this issue, the names of the vil-
lages have been changed.
2. The meaning is integrated with Indonesia and anti-
Dutch. During the Dutch period, the name Papua was used
to distinguish between Papua and Indonesia. Therefore, af-
ter the integration, the Indonesian government changed the
name to West Irian (1963) and then Irian Jaya (1973).
© 2017 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
 Dewi: Hijacking Adat Recognition
also supported and helped fund the Second
Papua Congress in 2000. This event successfully
mobilized Papuans to support the PDP’s
declaration of independence and intensified
demand for Papua’s independence (King 2004;
Singh 2008).
The central government, however, had no
intention of supporting Papuan independence
from Indonesia and decided instead to give
Papua special autonomy status. The Special
Autonomy Laws for Papua and Aceh3 were
the central government’s response to demands
for independence in these two provinces after
Indonesia lost East Timor in the referendum
on 24 August 1999.4 This special autonomy
materialized on 21 November 2001 when the
central government, under Megawati Sukarno
Putri, enacted Law No. 21/2001, which granted
recognition to the adat communities in Papua.
Although the recognition has been granted by
law, Papuan special autonomy was not well
implemented. The Special Autonomy Law
was negotiated between a special committee
of parliament (Dewan Permusyawaratan
Rakyat (DPR)) and a team appointed by the
Governor of Papua. Moreover, the content of
this law did not accord with the interests of
the central government because it resulted from
a Papuan initiative; the Papuan negotiators
were also unsatisfied as it did not meet all of
their demands.5 The central government feared
3. Aceh was also granted with special autonomy through
enactment of Law No 18/2001, which was replaced by Law
No. 11/2006 on governance of Aceh. Due to the separatism
and vertical conflict between Aceh free movement (Gerakan
Aceh Merdeka (GAM)) and central government, central
government gave the special autonomy for Aceh in order to
reduce conflict and defend national integrity and Indonesian
unity. The fall of Suharto made the voice of Aceh independence
louder. In order to reduce the demand of separatism in
Aceh, as well as in Papua, central government enacted
the Special Autonomy Law for these two prosvinces.
4. This special autonomy was mentioned in broad
guidelines on state policy (Garis-garis Besar Haluan
Negara (GBHN)) through the upper House of Parliament
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR)) Decree No.
IV/1999 on 19 October 1999.
5. Both Papua and the central government drafted their own
Special Autonomy Law. However, an active campaign by
local, national and international activists, as well as support
from the National Awakening Party and the Golkar Party,
resulted in the Papuan draft being accepted in parliament.
© 2017 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
557
that by granting recognition to Papua through
the Special Autonomy Law, Papuan solidarity
would strengthen, possibly leading to Papuan
independence (McGibbon 2004; Chauvel
2005).
Special autonomy marked an important
stage in Papuan history. Recognition was
legally given by the central government to
Papuan communities, which allowed adat
values and customs to become central to the
Papuan way of life. The Special Autonomy
Law mandated the establishment of the Papuan
People’s Assembly (Majelis Rakyat Papua
(MRP)), a formal government body charged
with protecting and promoting Papuan values
and interests. The implementation of this law
facilitated the blossoming of adat institutions
such as the DAP. Through this law, traditional
institutions could now regulate social,
economic and religious aspects of Papuan
livelihoods; despite the new existence of
governmental institutions, Papuans have
always held respect for adat values. Thus, every
government official that aimed to co-opt adat
leaders into informal alliances understood the
power of traditional leadership.
Enhancement of the Papua Customary
Council
The Papua Customary Council or DAP claims
to be an adat organization representative of
more than 300 tribes in Papua. This organiza-
tion was established by Theys Eluay during
Suharto’s regime, although the name was
changed from the Papuan Customary Delibera-
tive Assembly (Lembaga Musyawarah Adat,
referred to in this article as the LMA or old
LMA) to DAP,6 which was reflective of the
change in the organization’s direction from
one of support of the central government to
opposition.
The LMA was established as an adat over-
sight institution to support adat communities.
It was initiated by popular Papuan figures,
6. This LMA is different from the new LMA, Lembaga
Masyarakat Adat, which translates to Customary Commu-
nity Council and is led by Lenis Kogoya.
558 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies
including Theys Hiyo Eluay (Sentani tribe),
Oktavianus Rumbekwan (Biak tribe) and Dan
Habel Wanda (Waropen tribe), after several
meetings conducted on 2 July 1984. This
council supported the Papuan struggle for adat
rights, while also synchronizing and collabo-
rating with official government programs. Its
overall agenda was to assist the government
with the implementation of development poli-
cies and minimize conflicts of interest amongst
Papuans to ensure the smooth operation of
government projects (Griapon 1993). This
adat institution was positioned as a govern-
ment broker in which Eluay played a key role
as both a tribal leader and local parliament
member. Because it supported government
interests, the government correspondingly
recognized this council (Wenehen 2005, pp.
134–135).
However, in 1993, the LMA became an in-
strument of opposition to the Indonesian gov-
ernment. Eluay turned this institution from
one of government support to one of govern-
ment dissent after the Functional Group
(Golongan Karya, Golkar)7 failed to nominate
him as a member of the local parliament.
Suharto’s subsequent fall created the opportu-
nity to strengthen the pro-independence move-
ment.8 This made Eluay the foremost leader of
the pro-independence movement in Papua.
Thus, the LMA became the forefront political
movement and succeeded in holding the
Second Papuan Congress in 2000 to support
Papua’s independence (Dogomo n.d.). This
7. The Joint Secretariat of the Functional Group or
Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya was established on
20 October 1964 by the Indonesian army. On 4 November
1970, Golkar joined the election for the first time. It became
the political machine of Suharto. Golkar dominated the
election during Suharto presidential term. After Suharto’s
fall, Golkar became the Party of Golkar in 1999.
8. The pro-independence movement was getting stronger
with the establishment of Forum Rekonsiliasi Rakyat Irian
or Foreri, which was established in 1998 by civil society
groups such as churches, traditional councils, women’s
group and student organisations. Foreri aimed to foster as-
pirations of Papuans as indigenous people in Papua. This
organisation succeeded in organising a team of 100 (tim
seratus) led by Tom Beanal to meet President Habibie in
national dialogue. In this meeting, this team voiced their de-
sire be independent from Indonesia (Singh 2008, p. 106).
© 2017 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
September 2017
congress was monumental for the recognition
of the rights of the Papuan peoples vis-á-vis
the Indonesian Government. The LMA became
one of the pillars of the Papuan Presidium
Council (PDP),9 which continued to mobilize
Papuan peoples.
However, after Eluay was murdered in No-
vember 2001, the LMA changed its name to
the DAP and decided to establish itself as an in-
dependent organization with the purpose of
protecting and advocating for Papuan rights
through the implementation of special
autonomy. The Special Autonomy Law
created new opportunities for the determina-
tion of the Papuan peoples within the context
of the Indonesian union (Amiruddin 2006, pp.
166–167).
As established on 8 February 2002, the DAP
sought to protect the rights of indigenous
people in Papua so Papuans would become
‘the master on their own land’. The DAP’s
statute emphasized that it is not a political
organization in favour of Papuan independence;
however, many of the elites and DAP members
also became members of the PDP. Even the
Chairman of the DAP, Tom Beanal, was the
Vice-Chairman of the PDP. After Eluay’s
assassination, there was overlapping leadership
between the DAP and PDP. Tom Beanal
became the chairman of both organizations.
To accommodate the adat structure, the
organizational structure of the DAP followed
adat regional divisions. The Regional
9. The PDP had peacefully supported Papuan indepen-
dence. It was formed during the Papuan great meeting or
Musyawarah Besar (mubes) in February 2000. The mem-
bers of this council were elected from the Mubes delega-
tions who were considered to be representing the Papuans
in their regions. The council consisted of 31 executive
members and 501 elected members as regional representa-
tives. Eluay and Beanal were appointed chief and vice chief
of the PDP. The Mubes participants believed that these two
leaders who came from big tribes in Papua could unite Pap-
uans. This council was prepared to declare Papuan indepen-
dence. It tried to reconstruct the history of Papua in 1961
and propagate that the New Guinea Raad (NGR), formed
by Dutch government in the 1960s, had declared Papuan
independence (refer to King 2004, p. 41 for a discussion
of the PDP’s formation and Chauvel 2005 for a discussion
of the PDP’s reinterpretation of the Manfesto Politik and
the flag raising).
 Dewi: Hijacking Adat Recognition 559

Customary Council (Dewan Adat Wilayah) Table 1 Members of the Papua Customary Council
consisted of the following seven adat regions Adat
represented in Table 1. The subsequent level No. regions Local Customary Council
of the Regional Customary Council was the
1. Tabi Dewan Adat Wilayah Tabi
Local Customary Council (Dewan Adat Dewan Adat Defonsoro Selatan
Daerah). The lowest level in the structure of Dewan Adat Defonsoro Utara
the DAP is the Village Customary Council Dewan Adat Grime Nawa
(Dewan Adat Kampung). Although the village LMA Port Numbay
Dewan Adat Keerom
council is the lowest level of the customary Dewan Adat Sarmi
council, it has an important participatory role Dewan Adat Mamberamo Raya
in articulating the aspirations of the DAP at 2. Saireri Dewan Adat Byak
the local level. In addition, the village council Dewan Adat Yapen
often introduces topics to be discussed at Dewan Adat Waropen
Dewan Adat Nabire
higher levels of the council. As such, the con- 3. Doberai Dewan Adat Mnukwar
cerns and aspirations of the Papuan peoples Dewan Adat Sorong
are made known to the government. LMA Malamoy
The DAP aims to incorporate grassroot LMA Raja Ampat
Papuan aspirations and concerns from and LMA Sorong Selatan
LMA Tambrauw
has the goal of revitalizing adat institutions,
Dewan Adat Meybrat
which were legitimized by the Second Papuan LMA Tujuh Suku Teluk Bintuni
People’s Congress. However, the DAP has not Dewan Adat Wondama
been officially recognized by the central 4. Bomberay Dewan Adat Fakfak
government. In order to gain government Dewan Adat Kaimana
LEMASKO (Lembaga
recognition, the DAP has attempted to register musyawarah adat suku Kamoro)
as an adat community organization at the of- 5. Anim Ha Dewan Adat Merauke
fice of the Political and State Union (Kesatuan LMA Asmat
Bangsa dan Politik, Kesbangpol), but the Dewan Adat Mappi
application was not approved. The central Dewan Adat Boven Digoel
DMA Momuna (Yahukimo)
government maintained a suspicion of the 6. La Pago Dewan Adat Wilayah BALIM
DAP and feared that it would mobilize Dewan Adat Puncak Jaya
Papuans against the Indonesian Government Dewan Adat Tolikara
because key DAP members also belonged to Dewan Adat Yahukimo
the PDP. Moreover, the DAP and PDP did Dewan Adat Lani Jaya
Dewan Adat Puncak
not support the Special Autonomy Law. The
Dewan Adat Yalimo
DAP had even organized a symbolic return of Dewan Adat MamTeng
the Special Autonomy Law to the central LEMASA (Lembaga adat
government in 2005 to show that the law had suku Amungme)
failed (FGD in Jakarta on 25 August 2005; 7. Me Pago Dewan Adat Paniai
Dewan Adat Deiyai
Elisabeth et al. 2005). Dewan Adat Intan Jaya
Dewan Adat Dogiyai
New Customary Community Council: a
Due to the change of name from Papuan Customary Delib-
Parasite for the Adat Recognition
erative Assembly (LMA) under Eluay to Papua Customary
Council (DAP), several adat institutions on the local level
The formation of the Customary Community (district) are still using ‘LMA’ instead of ‘DAP’.
Council, or the new LMA, was supported by
the Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal organization the same abbreviation to
and Security Affairs in 2010 as the official gov- deliberately confuse the Papuans (Table 1).
ernment organization of Papuan representa- The central government may have feared that
tion. The ministry tried to ‘revive’ the former the DAP had the power to mobilize adat
LMA established by Eluay by giving this new communities and contribute towards the

© 2017 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies

published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
560 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies
strengthening of the separatist movement.
Furthermore, the DAP is considered to be
legitimated by the majority of Papuans after it
successfully mobilized Papuans in the Second
Papua Congress.
The strength of the adat communities’
movement led to the Draft Law on the
Recognition and the Protection of the Indige-
nous Peoples (RUU PMHA) in 2009, which
ensured the central government could not ig-
nore the role of adat institutions as represen-
tative of adat communities. The Papua and
West Papua development acceleration agency
(Unit Percepatan Pembangungan Papua dan
Papua Barat), a hand of the central govern-
ment, could no longer be effectively recog-
nized as a Papuan representative. The MRP
also cannot play this role due to Papuan
distrust, as well as central government
distrust of the MRP.10 Therefore, the new
LMA was formed in Papua as an artificial
Papuan representative.
As a government body, the new LMA func-
tions to preserve the adat communities of Pa-
pua and to articulate their goals. In addition, it
has the purported goal of synergizing develop-
ment programs with the central government to
foment the prosperity of the Papuan peoples
within Republic of Indonesia. In contrast to
the DAP, the new LMA labels itself as a pro-
gressive adat organization. However, based
on its actions that are further described in this
section, this organization may be more accu-
rately described as a broker than a partner. Le-
nis Kogoya has said to the media that he will
“encourage this council from the province to
10. The central government was suspicious that the MRP
would become a super body for Papuans against the central
government because several elected members of the MRP
were perceived to be separatist supporters. On the other
side, Papuans distrusted the MRP because its membership
selection did not accord with government regulation no.
54/2004. Several MRP members elected by Papuans and
considered pro-Papuan were not even inducted. The central
government divided the MRP, which from 2005–2010 cov-
ered all of Papua, into two bodies (MRP Papua and MRP
Papua Barat) in 2011 with the intention of reducing the
MRP’s power and authority and making the MRP just an
‘ornament’ of special autonomy (focus group discussion
in Jakarta on 19 July 2006).
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September 2017
village level to secure the government’s pro-
grams in Papua” (Tabloid Jubi 2013).
Lenis Kogoya was appointed the first leader
of the Customary Community Council, or new
LMA, on 7 December 2010. The organiza-
tion’s committee also consisted of Hertog
Waisimon, Demianus Awiyuta, Paskalis Netep
and Ev. Napi Kogoya. These members, espe-
cially Lenis Kogoya, have a close relationship
with the government (interview with Lenis
Kogoya on 12 March 2016; http://
lmaprovinsipapua.blogspot.jp).
The new LMA of Papua was formed to gar-
ner Papuan support and to counter the influ-
ence of the DAP and bring adat institutions
further under the influence of the central gov-
ernment. When the DAP was the only adat or-
ganization, its support by the Papuan peoples
was assumed to be unequivocal. With the
emergence of the new LMA, the DAP was no
longer the sole body of adat representation.
The policy that formed the new LMA and
made Kogoya its leader successfully gnawed
at the DAP, as noted by a member of the
MRP, Joram Wambrauw:
...the DAP, as a part of the PDP, returned as a
political organization in December [1961].
Therefore, in order to create an organization
parallel to the PDP, the[new]LMA was formed.
However, these may represent antagonistic
interests and oppose one another (Interview with
Joram Wambrauw on 23 Oct 2015).
Lenis Kogoya comes from a tribe in
Jayawijaya, in the Papuan Highlands. He has
a close relationship with Joko Suyanto, the Co-
ordinating Minister of Political, Legal and Se-
curity Affairs of President Yudhoyono.
According to information from an MRP mem-
ber, in the 1990s, Kogoya lived in Suyanto’s
house when Suyanto became Airbase Com-
mander of Jayapura, Papua (interview with
Joram Wambrauw, 23 October 2015).
These close ties between Kogoya and Joko
Suyanto are even more clear when considering
Kogoya’s previous positions within the gov-
ernment. Furthermore, under President Jokowi
(2014–2019), Kogoya has been appointed
President of the Special Staff. This strategic
leadership appointment may be one means by
© 2017 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
 Dewi: Hijacking Adat Recognition
which the new LMA, purported to represent
the Papuan people, may in fact be used as an
instrument to justify and implement central
governmental policies.
Furthermore, the new LMA does not have a
wide range of supporters from Papua. The new
LMA has sought to garner support from
Papuans participating at the lower levels of
the DAP (district and sub-district, or even the
village level) as part of a strategy to reduce
the role of the DAP and foment further internal
fragmentation. Accordingly, the government
has also attempted to approach dissenting
Papuans.
[The new] LMA and Unitary State of the
Republic of Indonesia have cooperated to kill us,
us Papuans (Tabloid Jubi 15 November 2015).I
said to DAP, the politics of dualism have always
become the agenda of the [central] government in
order to make DAP powerless. Don`t forget that
[new] LMA [Customary Community Council] is
well-facilitated by government. People who pre-
viously supported DAP also joined here [new
LMA]. There are also several people who do not
want to join DAP and would rather become a
member of the [new] LMA. Someone created this
situation who knew very well the current political
scenario in Papua. This man [Kogoya] was
placed in power because he had been trained. It
isn’t just anyone. Where does Lenis come from?
From the Highlands. This is an intelligent move
(Interview with Septer Manufandu on 22 Oct
2015).
As stated by Septer in the previous quote, the
current network of political power in Papua
has been filled with the people from the High-
lands. This includes the Provincial Governor
(2013–2018), Lukas Enembe, who comes from
Tolikara; the first and second Head of the
Papuan People’s Assembly (MRP) also comes
from the Highlands. The DAP leader, Forkorus
Yaboisembut (2007–2015) is from Sentani. He
replaced Tom Beanal (2002–2007) who comes
from the Amungme tribes in the Timika
district. Kogoya’s placement as the new LMA
leader may form part of a strategy to balance
political power in Papua, as Highlands peoples
have a record of opposing government
policies. From the perspective of the central
government, support from the Highlands area
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561
is crucial because this area is also believed to
be the centre of the Papua Separatist Move-
ment (Organisasi Papua Merdeka). Therefore,
control of the Highlands may imply a potential
stabilization of the Papua political situation.
As an adat organization recognized by gov-
ernment, the new LMA holds a significant role
in coordinating Papuan policies with the cen-
tral government. Due to the Special Autonomy
Law, every policy to be implemented in Papua
must first be consulted with Papuan adat com-
munities. Thus, consulting the new LMA may
be enough to legitimate government policies
implemented in Papua, even if this organiza-
tion clearly aligns with the motives of the
central government.
Thus, the formation of the new LMA could
be argued to form part of the government’s
strategy to implement its policies in Papua, in
both the realms of security and development.
However, its legitimacy may be challenged,
as the new LMA was established without the
free, prior and informed consent of Papuans.
In terms of development, the main problem
for initiating investments in Papua is the land
leasing process, as most land is considered
adat, or community land. Thus, adat represen-
tation in land leasing processes is very impor-
tant, and the specifications of the Special
Autonomy Law must be considered. Currently,
the new LMA has been able to bypass these
considerations, essentially becoming a broker
of adat lands. It supported the grand design
of Indonesian development (Master Plan of
Expansion and Acceleration of Indonesian
Economic Development, MP3EI). The central
government has increasingly welcomed invest-
ment in development since 2011. As a result,
the number of investments in Papua has contin-
uously grown. Statistical data show that
foreign investments more than doubled from
2010 to 2013. In the same period, domestic
investment surged to five times its 2010 level
(Statistics data of Papua 2010, 2015). (Figure 1)
shows the increasing number of domestic and
foreign companies that have invested in Papua.
To strengthen its position, the new LMA has
also intensified its participation in the lower
levels of hierarchy in Papuan communities.
Together with the Coordinating Ministry of
© 2017 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
562 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies
Figure 1 Number of domestic and foreign companies invested in Papua province
Political, Legal and Security Affairs and the
Ministry of Home Affairs, Kogoya inaugurated
the new LMA in several districts, sub-districts
and villages, thus officially affiliating them
with the new LMA (Tabloid Jubi 19 October
2015). The new LMA was inaugurated in sev-
eral regions of Papua that had become focal
points for investment. For example, in 2011,
Kogoya created a new LMA region in Timika,
where the Freeport Company, the main inves-
tor in Papua, is established (Tabloid Jubi 28
Mei 2011).
Moreover, to support the MIFEE, a project
whose implementation has been delayed since
2010, Kogoya also inaugurated the new LMA
in the Merauke district. This may be
considered strategic given that Merauke,
along with Mimika, is one of the two biggest
contributors to the GDP of the Papua
Province, as well as an important investment
target by central government (Statistics
Indonesia 2013).
In these cases, the adat communities
accepted participation in the new LMA
because the central government promised to
provide salaries for participating council
members. Moreover, the central government
also promised that the local government would
be allocated a budget for the operation of the
new LMA. Borrowing from Visser (2012),
published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
September 2017
the position of the LMA can be described as
the “...insider-out and outsider-in of govern-
ment intervention projects, since they are
expected to be familiar with adat rules and
practice concerning land ownership, marriage,
kindship, and jurisdiction”. This case can be
seen clearly in the involvement of the new
LMA in the land grabbing that occurred
through the MIFEE project in Merauke.
The Role of the Customary Community
Council in Brokering the Merauke
Integrated Food and Energy Estate
The Customary Community Council in
Merauke (LMA-Merauke) was formed in
2002, long before Lenis Kogoya became the
organization’s leader. The formation of a
Customary Community Council, or LMA, in
the Merauke district was initiated by Albert
Moyuend Gebze and Ignas Ndiken in 2000
when they began to vocalize their idea in
Marind Anim villages in Merauke. In 2001,
the first meeting was conducted to elect the
board members of the LMA. In 2002, the
LMA was formed with Ignas Ndiken as leader
of the Merauke district. The inauguration of
LMA board members was witnessed by the
head of the Merauke district and the bishop of
Merauke (interview with AM 23 August
© 2017 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
 Dewi: Hijacking Adat Recognition
2014). This LMA was ‘used’ to preserve and
revitalize the Marind culture and communi-
ties, which comprise the major indigenous
group in Merauke (interview with PB 20
August 2014; GG 23 August 2014; ER 23
August 2014; and EL 31 October 2015).
Marind is the one of the major tribes that
lives in the Merauke district.11 The structure
of the LMA-Merauke accommodated the
traditional Marind leadership structure. LMA
leaders were chosen from the adatelders
(tokoh adat) but did not hold the position of
adat leader in the village.12 Thus, this council
had a claim to be representative of the Marind
community.
The DAP also exists in Merauke, but it is
not as strong as the LMA in that district. There
are several reasons for this. First, the local
government supports the LMA instead of the
DAP due to the LMA’s support of local
government policy. The DAP was amongst
the first to reject the MIFEE. In July 2010,
the DAP sent a letter to President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono stating that it rejected
the MIFEE project. Johanes Wob, the secre-
tary general of the DAP in the Anim-Ha
region, criticized the fact that in legal
procedures, indigenous people were structur-
ally disadvantaged against companies and
announced that indigenous peoples’ land was
‘not for sale’ (Ginting & Pye 2013, pp. 166–
167). Second, due to the DAP structure not
following government administration but
rather divisions of adat regions, the leader of
the DAP in the Anim-Ha region does not
come from the Marind tribe; therefore, the
DAP in this region is not as popular as the
11. Marind people consist of four groups based on the four
wind directions: Imoh, Mayo, Ezam and Sosom. Every
group in one village has its own adat leader.
12. Usually, the LMA leader is a village elder who cannot
achieve the position as adat leader in the village. Adat lead-
ership in Marind Anim was usually inherited, but some-
times, it was obtained by tokoh adat through
achievement. Due to his position as tokoh adat, this LMA
leader is expected to be able to influence the adat commu-
nity in the village. LMA leadership thus contested the au-
thority of the adat leader in the village (interview with
adat community and adat leader in SN, DM, AL and OG
village in Merauke district, 2014–2015).
© 2017 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
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563
LMA amongst the Marind people, the major
tribe in the Merauke district.
During the first phase of the LMA in
Merauke, this body existed only at the district
level. An initiative was then taken to establish
LMA-Merauke at the lower levels of the
sub-district and village. The head of the
Merauke district, John Gluba Gebze, invited
village elders to his office and persuaded
them to create the LMA at the village level
by demonstrating its importance in the
villages. He explained that a LMA leader in
each village would become a local govern-
ment partner for village development and act
as a mediator between the government and
each adat community (interview with PB 20
August 2014).
However, LMA-Merauke formation met
with resistance from Marind communities,
especially at the village level, because this
organization would reduce and overlap with
the authority of local adat leaders,
undermining the pre-existing adat structure.
The existence of the LMA at the village level
created a new leadership structure in the
village (Figure 2). Many villages thus did
not form part of the LMA-Merauke and
refused to recognize its existence. Instead,
they proclaimed the adat leader as their only
true leader.
After the local government, under Gebze
(2000–2010), initiated an investment program
in Merauke in 2007, the presence of the
LMA-Merauke has become more notable.
Over time, the LMA-Merauke has strength-
ened its claim as the representative of adat
communities, coinciding with the new leader-
ship of Lenis Kogoya. The LMA-Merauke
began to function as a local government
partner in the implementation of the develop-
ment program when Marind communities
were involved, particularly regarding the
leasing of adat lands (Lembaga Masyarakat
Adat Suku Marind Anim, unpublished data).
To solidify its position as a government
partner, in 2012, Kogoya invited the
LMA-Merauke to participate in the new
LMA of Papua Province. During this inaugu-
ration, the LMA-Merauke was promised an
annual budget of one billion IDR from local
564 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies
Figure 2 New leadership structure in the village after 2010
government expenditure. The close relation-
ship between the new LMA and the central
government may be seen part of a government
strategy to create an ‘understanding’ with adat
communities and guarantee the implementation
of its policies.
Certain conditions were also arranged to
expedite the implementation of the MIFEE
project in Merauke district. The central
government’s promotion of its development
agenda may also be witnessed with the
MIFEE, a project developed over 1.283
million ha of land. This is the first national
project in Papua developed by the Indonesian
Government after autonomy was granted to
the province. The central government con-
siders Merauke an ideal space for agricultural
expansion, as it contains vast, arable areas
(Government of Indonesia 2010).
The MIFEE was launched in Merauke in
2010 as a continuation of a year-long invest-
ment program initiated by Gebze in 2007.
The program was first called the Merauke
Integrated Rice Estate (MIRE) because rice
was the main commodity. To attract wider
investment, the MIRE project was repackaged
as the MIFEE project, which became the focus
of the central government (Government of
Indonesia 2010). In the MIFEE project, Gebze
had given the concession to 36 companies
above 2.5 million ha areas for total land
concession in Merauke district.13
published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
September 2017
The MIFEE is the result of a political deal
between elites in the Merauke district and rep-
resentatives of the central government who di-
rect this project. The formation of a new
province in the southern part of Papua—South
Papua Province—became part of this political
deal (Awas Mifee 2012). Both the MIFEE
and the creation of the new province would
provide advantages for both parties involved.
By creating a new province, the central govern-
ment would be able to justify the increased
presence of military officials.14 This would be
13. John Gluba Gebze (2000–2010) and Romanus Mbaraka
(2010–2015), head of the district, or bupati, gave location
permits to 41 companies for over 2.5 million ha to invest in
the MIFEE project, even though the spatial planning had
not yet been enacted as local regulation. Gebze released
location permits for 36 companies. Mbaraka then released
location permits for 16 companies with the caveat that 10
would replace companies whose location permits had
expired; 3 companies obtained new location permits; 1 com-
pany got an extended location permit; 1 received a new loca-
tion permit to change its coordinates, and 1 obtained a new
location permit for land which it had already received a loca-
tion permit (interview with the head division of investment,
Merauke district investment, 19 August 2014; Board Invest-
ment Board of Merauke District data 2014, unpublished).
14. Even though the central government has failed to create
additional provinces in Papua thus far, this does not seem to
have constrained the deployment of security forces, accord-
ing to several sources. According to a report by Imparsial, in
2011, it was estimated that there were about 14,842 soldiers
to combat about OPM that only 1/10 of army`s number in
Papua (refer to Suara Papua 12 April 2012).
© 2017 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
 Dewi: Hijacking Adat Recognition
one means of exerting control and monitoring
the separatist movement along the Papua and
Papua New Guinea border. Moreover, the con-
testation of such projects amongst tribal elites
would cause further fragmentation within Pap-
uan communities. Lastly, Merauke’s elite, es-
pecially the head of the Merauke district,
could benefit from the creation of a new prov-
ince. Nonetheless, to date, this campaign for a
new province in South Papua has not been
successful.
The agenda of this government project falls
in line with that of the LMA-Merauke, as it
was declared in a meeting in 2007 that, “the
Customary Community Council [LMA-
Merauke] becomes the highest authority for
the leasing of Marind Anim lands” (Lembaga
Masyarakat Adat Suku Marind Anim n.d.). It
can help to reduce the land lease problem from
adat community, which is the main obstacle to
implementing the MIFEE. This clearly contra-
dicts local Marind adat rules, in which the de-
cision to lease land rests with the head of the
clan after consultation with other clan members
and leaders. In response, the resistance of adat
landowners to the LMA-Merauke has
strengthened.
Statements from several village members in-
dicate their disapproval of the LMA-Merauke
in their sub-districts, and others refuse to rec-
ognize its existence due to the negative reputa-
tion of its members. Several individuals told
me that LMA-Merauke members have harmed
the community. Interestingly, Gebze, the for-
mer head of the Merauke district, also stated
that he does not recognize the LMA-Merauke,
saying, “there is no LMA in Marind Anim tra-
dition—I only recognized the adat leader” (in-
terview with John Gluba Gebze on 29 August
2014).
The negative image of the LMA-Merauke in
the Marind Anim community is caused by their
perceptions of elites’ behaviour at the village,
sub-district and district levels, as well as a dis-
trust of their motives being in the interest of the
adat community. The LMA-Merauke is in-
creasingly seen as a supporter of company
and government interests due to its participa-
tion in adat land confiscation. This may be fur-
ther exemplified with the cases of land leasing
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565
in two villages, Duku and Muli, which are de-
tailed in the succeeding texts.
Land transfer in Duku offers an example of
the involvement of LMA-Merauke at the vil-
lage level. The Karya Bumi Papua and
Cenderawasih Jaya Mandiri companies (sub-
sidiaries of the Rajawali Group) were granted
location permits by the head of the Merauke
district in 2010 for over 70,000 ha15 of sugar-
cane plantations. The Rajawali Group also
co-opted the leader of the LMA-Merauke in
Duku to help persuade other community mem-
bers to lease their lands to the company. The
LMA-Merauke leader in Duku actively deals
with outside matters, whereas the adat leader
only addresses internal matters, particularly re-
lating to rituals in the village. In communica-
tions with the company, the LMA-Merauke,
supported by the village secretary (village ad-
ministration), was more proactive than the adat
leader during negotiations, in which the com-
pany promised money to the leaders of Duku.
The LMA-Merauke leader in the village was
able to persuade community members to lease
their land for plantations by promising an in-
come guarantee. As a result, the leaders of the
adat, leader of village LMA-Merauke, and
head of village, as well as other village admin-
istrators, were receiving between 500,000 and
1,000,000 IDR (around US$38 and US$76)
per month from the Rajawali Group (Dewi
2016, p. 96).
Muli provides another example of LMA-
Merauke involvement in the land negotiation
process. The LMA-Merauke recommended
that the adat lands of the Muli village be culti-
vated. The adat community of this village,
which has been actively supported by several
NGOs (Yayasan Pusaka and SKP-KAME),
rejected the proposal of the Astra Company to
create sugarcane plantations on their land.
One of the LMA-Merauke leaders then orga-
nized a meeting between company and govern-
ment representatives with the goal of
persuading landowners to give permission for
15. PT Cenderawasih Jaya Mandiri has a permit for
40,000 ha in the Marind and Kumbe sub-districts; PT
Karya Bumi Papua has a permit for 30,000 ha in the K
sub-district.
© 2017 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
566 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies
the company to use their lands. The LMA-
Merauke leader later brought these officials to
an adat forum, although key non-adat mem-
bers were excluded from the discussion, in-
cluding a pastor who actively participated in
the community. Thus, the forum for negotia-
tion was limited only to company and govern-
ment representatives of the adat communities
of the village. Nevertheless, this negotiation
strategy failed, and adat landowners did not
agree to lease their lands (interview with GG
on 23 August 2014; El on 31 October 2015;
OT on 8 November 2015).
As a result, adat communities in Muli and
other villages have increasingly united against
the existence of the LMA-Merauke. Many neg-
ative comments and perceptions of the LMA-
Merauke have spread throughout adat commu-
nities, who commonly assert that the LMA-
Merauke only operates in favour of land leas-
ing or as a broker of adat lands.
These cases are examples of how the gov-
ernment used a purported adat institution,
LMA-Merauke, to facilitate the implementa-
tion of development projects such as the
MIFEE. In the Merauke district, government
efforts to revitalize and co-opt LMA-Merauke
functions were achieved by providing incen-
tives to LMA-Merauke leaders. Symbolically,
the new LMA of the Papua Province induced
the LMA-Merauke for the second time on 11
December 2015. The first inauguration was
conducted in Jayapura, yet this second inaugu-
ration took place on site in the Merauke district
(interview with MG 30 October 2015). I heard
speculation amongst the communities of
Merauke that a new project by President
Jokowi called Proyek Lahan Sejuta Hektar (1
million ha of land) will soon launch; it will be
a rice estate that will replace the current MIFEE
project (interview with JB 15 August 2014;
P2EB-UGM (unpublished document)).
Marind People’s Perception of the Lembaga
Masyarakat Adat in the Merauke District
Marind people questioned the function and ex-
istence of the LMA in Merauke at both the dis-
trict and village levels. They said that the LMA
was not inaugurated by the adat, and therefore,
published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
September 2017
the LMA could not undermine the authority of
the adat leader. The villagers were disap-
pointed with the LMA. They felt that its com-
mittees did nothing for the Marind people and
only thought of their own interests (interview
with adat community in Alu, Sulu and Duku
villages on 20–23 August 2014). The resis-
tance of the Marind people culminated in the
demand for the LMA’s dissolution in a Marind
elders’ meeting in Wendu on the 2–3 of August
2013 (Wendu Note, unpublished document).
The negative image of the LMA amongst
the Marind was caused by distrust of its mo-
tives and interests. The LMA was increasingly
seen as a supporter of company and govern-
ment interests during the process of adat land
confiscation. One document from the Merauke
district LMA clearly stated that the LMA held
the highest authority to lease adat lands. This
contradicts with local Marind Anim adat rules,
in which the decision to lease land rests with
the head of the clan after consultation with
other clan members and leaders.
As explained in the preceding texts, the
LMA attempted to accelerate the transfer of
land rights from the adat community to certain
companies, as occurred in Muli. The LMA rec-
ommended that the company obtain the land
from the people in Muli, and the vice leader
of the LMA was directly involved in the nego-
tiation process for the land leasing, trying to
persuade the adat community to allow the
company to build a plantation on their lands.
This also took place in other villages such as
Muting and Duku where LMA leaders of the
district and village aided the land leasing pro-
cess. The head of Duku village said, “The
LMA leader gave permission to the company
to use their lands” (interview with leader of
Duku village on 22 August 2014). In response,
the resistance of adat landowners to the LMA
strengthened, especially in villages. Many neg-
ative comments about the LMA spread
throughout adat communities, who contended
the “LMA has acted immorally” (interview
with EL on 31 October 2015), “the LMA is
an adat land seller” (interview with MY on
20 August 2014; interview with NN on 1 No-
vember 2015), “the LMA only comes if there
is a land negotiation for land leasing”
© 2017 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
 Dewi: Hijacking Adat Recognition
(interview with SL on 27 August 2014), and
“the LMA is a broker of adat lands” (interview
with GG on 23 August 2014). One negative
statement was directed at the vice leader of
the Merauke district: “Albert is really discour-
teous” (interview with GG on 23 August
2014).
Even though there is resistance from the lo-
cal community to the LMA, the promised sala-
ries and annual budget for the LMA at the
village, sub-district and district levels pro-
moted the formation of the LMA. The local
government of the Merauke district also
enacted local regulation no. 4/2013 to support
the LMA as an adat institution that partners
with the government and to give the LMA the
authority to manage adat rights including lands
and customary rights (hak ulayat).
Conclusion: Old Dynamics, New Packaging
After legal recognition of adat communities
was achieved with the passage of the Special
Autonomy Law, the central government tried
to exert its control through the establishment
of the new LMA from 2010. First, this council
countered the power of the Papua Customary
Council (DAP), stemming from the failure of
the government to maintain the control of the
Papuan Customary Deliberative Assembly
(Lembaga Musyawarah Adat, the former
LMA) under Theys Eluay. Second, this council
has been successfully used as a tool to achieve
the exploitation of land and natural resources in
Papua, thus positioning the new LMA as a de-
velopment broker in Papua.
The LMA in Merauke was initiated by sev-
eral Marind elders to preserve and protect the
culture and land of the Marind people in the
district. Later, this LMA formed branches in
the lower levels—at the sub-district and village
levels—in the Merauke district. Even though
Marind Anim communities at the village level
resisted its presence because the authority of
the LMA overlapped with that of local adat
leaders and would undermine pre-existing adat
structure, the Merauke district government
supported this formation and tried to involve
the LMA at different levels as government
partners to represent the Marind people.
published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
567
This local government support was used to
accelerate further investments in the Merauke
district. This can be seen clearly in the imple-
mentation of the MIFEE project. Several cases
show that this council helped to smooth the
MIFEE project by accelerating the process of
land leasing, which is actually a form of land
grabbing. The involvement of the LMA, which
acted as an adat institution and the Marind peo-
ple’s government representative in the
Merauke district, meant the local government
or company could not be accused of grabbing
adat lands because the land leasing process
was considered to include free, prior, informed
and consent from the Marind people.
This is an example of corrupted recognition
applied in the implementation of the MIFEE
project. The government created a proxy
agency that could serve the structural and cul-
tural function of adat and using it in accor-
dance with government policy orientation.
The new LMA is a relatively peaceful mecha-
nism by which the central government has se-
cured control of Papua. The new LMA of
Papua, as a purported adat organization, repre-
sents the invisible hand of the government
through which specific policies may be
achieved without the violation of human rights.
Furthermore, the new LMA justifies the imple-
mentation of investment policies, which have
supposedly been subjected to a process of com-
munity consent through the representatives of
the new LMA. It helps the government avoid
any severe accusations that is neglecting or
repressing Papuan rights.
Although it may be argued that the establish-
ment of new LMA is a form of government
recognition of Papuan communities, this rec-
ognition is not based on the Papuans’ idea of
adat. In the end, this institutional recognition
of adat is only artificial and has allowed the im-
plementation of the central government’s poli-
cies in Papua in collaboration with a small
segment of opportunistic Papuan elites.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am grateful to Prof. Okamoto Masaaki for his
comments on earlier versions of this article.
The research was supported by the Graduate
© 2017 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
568 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies
School of Asian and African Areas Studies,
Kyoto University, Japan and MEXT Japan.
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