1

Interpretation: Debaters must disclose the advantage areas when pairings blast.
Violation: They didn’t – I’ll send screenshots if you want to see them.
Standards—
1] Clash- not disclosing incentivizes surprise tactics and poorly refined positions that
rely on artificial and vague negative engagement to win debates. Their interpretation
discourages third- and fourth-line testing by limiting the amount of time we have to
prepare and forcing us to enter the debate with zero idea of what the affirmative is.
Negatives are forced to rely on generics instead of smart contextual strategies
destroying nuanced argumentation.
2] Truth testing – when we deny debaters the ability to effectively engage with
arguments through pre-round preparation, they are losing the ability to practice
logical reasoning skills. That spills over into real-world violence because dogmatic
conspiracy theories and discrimination are built upon a lack of logical reasoning and
critical thinking skills.
On-the-spot thinking isn’t a voting issue – its pointless as real advocacies in the world
that people consider or certain potentially violent ideologies far outweigh arguments
with friends or witty retorts – that outweighs on magnitude because violence
outweighs ephemeral happiness and scope because policy proposals affect the
international community.
DTD – deters further abuse and is the best at norm setting; DTA doesn’t make sense
because you’d just drop the aff
Competing interps – minimizes judge intervention – that’s k2 stopping pre-fiat
psychological violence when judges insert violent biases into rounds – that’s a prereq
to weighing other voters because when some debaters are excluded from the activity
you can’t weigh other voters.
No RVIs – you don’t win for stopping pre-fiat violence and it incentivizes baiting by
good theory debaters which decks topic ed.
 2
Vote neg to endorse the aff. The counterplan disrupts their Western understanding of
scholarship as property and shatters imperial control of the academy.
Jones and Reddy 04 Dr. Mike Reddy and Ms. Victoria Jones [University of South Wales] “TOWARDS A SOCIAL MODEL OF
PLAGIARISM” Paper for the International Integrity and Plagiarism Conference. 2004. IB

In the ten years since the first International Plagiarism conference, little
has changed in evolving the view of plagiarism as
more than an academic offence. The importance of plagiarism from a student’s perspective, rather
than that of the existing academy hierarchy, has never been more relevant. This paper builds upon previous
practical work that identified the need for overcoming the power imbalance in Further and Higher Education, and the disruptive force of the
Internet. A social model of plagiarism is proposed that builds upon a practical definition of plagiarism – The Four Cs – and identifies its cause as
products of the power relationships and educational climate in universities and colleges today. This challenges us to simultaneously address the
social and cultural aspects that give rise to the occurrence, identification and regulation of plagiarism. Finally, a call is made for us to recognize
the forces that maintain the status quo in Education, and to take direct action against the „Institutional Plagiarism‟ that this creates. 1
Introduction This paper will be unlike any of the others at this conference, in that the last thing that will be discussed is plagiarism per se. This is
not to make excuses for breaking one of academia’s most enshrined taboos, but to question whether it is a good principle; this should not be
confused with post-modernist thought that anything is fair game. Deeper questions are needed, such as “What is the purpose of assessment?”
and even “What is the purpose of learning?” Therefore, this paper will propose a social model of plagiarism and learning as „political acts‟,
which identifies the potential for improper power relationships and a lack of progress made in formal adult education in the last three decades.
While the definition, identification and occurrence of plagiarism (and other academic offences) has undergone a phase shift in recent years,
little work has been done to address the social and cultural factors that arguably create an environment where it can flourish. Therefore, a
novel, if contentious, redefinition of plagiarism might be necessary. The
power structures in the established culture of
Western academia has constructed systems to safeguard knowledge , but these rules can serve to limit
learning. This „disenabling‟ process needs exploration because it provides a convenient smokescreen for
those in privileged positions to maintain the status quo in education. This social model will attempt to make explicit
novel perspectives of our current education system. This will aid recognition of the hierarchy of power that exists in education, which allows
„institutional plagiarism‟ to occur. 2 It’s a Crime, isn’t it? The idea that plagiarism is an “academic offence” has been
almost universally accepted (Mallon 2001). Although, if it is a crime, it is hard to understand who the victim is, or what has actually
been taken from them. “No concept is truly unique, and all ideas are created in the context of the society and
culture in which they are engendered. Therefore, there cannot be any true ownership, or indeed theft,
of these artefacts as they are an integral part of the environment that learning is taking place within.”
(Reddy & Jones 2004) One argument is that plagiarism, or more simply the act of copying, is academic „self-harm‟, because it removes learning
opportunities for the „plagiarist,‟ even where such behaviour may be justified by financial or personal circumstances. Isserman (2003) argues
that we all stray into grey areas and are, therefore, unqualified to judge without being guilty of self-righteous vindictiveness. A view shared by
Hunt (2002), who is concerned that there is a discrepancy between students and lecturers with regard to citation, because “typically, the
scholars are achieving something positive; the students are avoiding something negative.” Isserman suggests that some acts of plagiarism might
be the least worst solution, when personal and financial constraints apply, and that plagiarists are as much the victims as the perpetrators. So,
in a world where ideas are infinitely reproducible, is taking credit where it is not due actually a criminal act? Maybe this is true for
Western
cultures, such as in the USA and the EU where the free market gives value to the ownership of ideas.
Foucault (1969) labeled this idea of authors creating not just publications but the idea itself as „transdiscursive‟ (p114), but it may be less so for
other cultures where intellectual ownership is not so rigid. This can be a commonly used explanation for non-western students use of
plagiarism. McCabe (1997) suggests there is a grain of truth in this stereotype, but while his survey work is valuable, it does not query the
implicit belief that plagiarism is cheating, rather than being a mere example of cultural norms; the difference being where one draws the line
defining „unacceptable‟. So, if plagiarism is not exactly illegal, is it immoral?
 3
1] ethics are a priori – four justifications –
A] is-ought gap – three justifications –
i] empirical propositions are always theoretical – we can’t observe obligation
Kaza ’13
[Roger Kaza, University of Huston, horn of the Saint Louis Symphony Orchestra, as well as the Chautauqua Symphony in upstate New York. He
has held positions in the Houston, Boston and Vancouver symphonies, and was Assistant Professor of Music at the University of Houston. Kaza
has appeared as a soloist with many orchestras in the United States, Canada and Mexico, and has lectured and performed for the International
Horn Society. He has made a specialty of investigating the natural acoustics of western canyons, and played his horn in Grand Canyon, Santa
Elena Canyon, Black Canyon, and many others. He can be heard on a recent CD, "Texas Horns.", University of Huston, Engines of Our Integrity,
Podcast, November 11, 2013, Accessed 8-4-22, “No. 2912: THE IS-OUGHT PROBLEM”, https://www.uh.edu/engines/epi2912.htm, pg. NA]
//CLSANSTONE

The two examples that open this essay are classic fallacies. The first is the naturalistic fallacy, which
basically says that, “whatever is natural must be good.” Obviously we don’t believe that; cancer is also
“natural.” The second example is a variant of it sometimes called the moralistic fallacy: because we
perceive something as “good,” such as mercy to animals, nature must somehow agree with us. But
this does not follow. For example, what if not eating meat diminishes our own health? (Rhetorical question
only.) Is it still good?

ii] there is no relationship between a priori and a posteriori truths

Hume 1739
[David Hume, Philosopher, “A Treatise of Human Nature”, 1739, Year of Publication: 1978, Editor: L. A. Selby-Bigge Oxford University Press,
London, England, 9780198245889, Edition 2, https://files.libertyfund.org/files/342/0213_Bk.pdf, pg. 469-470] //CLSANSTONE

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and
establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of
propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This
change is imperceptible; but is
however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or
affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained ; and at the same time that a
reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a
deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume
to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of
vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.

iii] the paradox of analysis proves – a posteriori truths collapse to tautologies

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Qualifications NA, “The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction”, Date Not Provided, Accessed 8-4-22, pg. NA,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/#ParAna] //CLSANSTONE

3.1 The Paradox of Analysis One problem with the entire program was raised by C.H. Langford (1942)
and discussed by G.E. Moore (1942 [1968], pp. 665–6): why should analyses be of any conceivable
interest? After all, if an analysis consists in providing the definition of an expression, then it should be
providing a synonym for it, and this, then, should be wholly uninformative: if brother is analyzed as
the presumably synonymous male sibling, then the claim Brothers are male siblings should be
synonymous with Brothers are brothers, and thinking the one should be no different from thinking
the other. But, aside from such simple cases as brother and bachelor, proposed analyses, if successful,
often seemed quite non-obvious and philosophically informative. The proposed reductions of, say,
material object statements to sensory ones (even where successful) were often fairly complex, had to be
studied and learned, and so could hardly be uninformative. So how could they count as seriously
analytic?[6

B] resource disparities—a focus on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the
most preround prep which excludes lone-wolfs and small schools who lack huge
evidence files. A debate under my framework can easily be won without any prep
since only analytical arguments are required. That controls the internal link to other
voters because a prereq to debating is access to the activity.
C] a posteriori truths prove – just now, you didn’t decide not to donate to charity, so a
posteriori experiences prove that ethics ought to be a priori because we can’t observe
everything we ought to do
D] uncertainty – ethics derived from a posteriori truths can self-contradict because
individuals draw different conclusions from their experiences
2] humanity is unconditionally good – two justifications—
A] syllogism—
i] our agency is inescapable – two justifications—
1] by asking the question ‘are we reasoners?’ we empirically prove our ability to
reason
2] participating in debate proves our agency because we set and pursued 1] the end of
participating in the activity 2] the end of writing cases
ii] agency is an unconditional good and we carry value conferring status – justifications
–
1] only reason is intrinsically valuable – we can infinitely ask ‘why?’ to all other
standards, until we eventually arrive at ‘why reason?’ – but that requires reason
2] because agency is inescapable, and the capacity to reason is intrinsically valuable,
all humans have value conferring status and must be treated as ends in of themselves
B] when setting any end, one must value that end or else there would be no reason to
take that action. But since there are objectively good ends, there must be a source of
their goodness. It can’t be the object of the action or the needs created by them, since
those are contingent on the agent deciding they’re good. Thus, the ability to will – or
humanity – must be the source of that goodness.

3] contradictions in conception invalidate the morality of maxims – two justifications

—
A] syllogism 1—
i] we know that we are agents, and we know that all other agents and practical
reasoners
ii] if we hold a maxim to be moral to ourselves as reasoners, and we know that all
other agents are reasoners, we must hold that maxim to be true for all agents
iii] thus, actions that are non-universalizable are unethical
B] syllogism 2—
i] ethics must be a priori (justification 1)
ii] a priori moral truths cannot be situational – that’s the definition of ‘a priori’
iii] thus, only maxims can be ethical
iv] thus, if universalizing an action creates a contradiction in conception, is it unethical

Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

Prefer additionally—

1] induction fails – we can only prove induction to be true by induction – it’s circular
2] our standard is the most fair because it can be deduced from pure logic by any
debater so they get infinite prep time
3] we set ends based on practical identities like student or debater but our intrinsic
agency allows for those identities since you chose which roles to take on – impacts: A]
value humanity as an end in of itself – we value our lives based on our practical
identities, and agency is the source of that value B] hijacks ROJ and ROB – judge is a
practical identity, which requires first valuing human identity C] hijacks any fwk – you
can’t introduce a fwk without being an agent
4] the formula of humanity hijacks aff frameworks since in valuing harms and goods,
one must confer that value via humanity
5] freedom is a prereq – in debating you assume autonomy over arguing – autonomy
is a precondition for all of their offense – hijacks ROJ and ROB since in judging or
making a decision, one assumes the value of autonomy.
6] the meta-ethic is bindingness – frameworks must be a priori but intrinsic to agents
—
other frameworks elevate facts to an unreasonable level assuming that perfectly just
solutions will emerge out of “utility” – if this was true there would be no purpose in
debate, proving the meta-ethic to be true
Offense—
1] The aff violates the freedom to choose priority on a case-by-case basis – that
violates the formula of autonomy – they violate a perfect duty which is infinitely
harmful. This analytic stands on its own, but here’s another independent warrant –
Cambridge English Dictionary defines prioritize as:
[Cambridge English Dictionary (CED), No Date, Qualifications NA, CED, Accessed 10-15-22, Title NA, pg. NA,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/prioritize] //CLSANSTONE

to decide which of a group of things are the most important so that you can deal with them first:

2] The aff necessitates taxes – that violates a] the formula humanity by using people
as a means to a profit b] the formula of autonomy by restricting companies’ freedom
by forcing them to spend their income on taxes.
Because of China’s global responsibilities to address climate change, the country has made a commitment
to limiting the growth of future emissions using policy measures, such as funding mitigation research and regulating energy efficiency
requirements directly. Extensions of these policies, such as the measures to improve energy efficiency, use of carbon taxes, and changes
to the mix of electricity generation in the country, are also of interest to China. This article applied a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to
examine the effects of such energy efficiency and climate change policy options in the post-COVID-19 era in the China economy. The study findings show that even
modest measures can have significant effects on emissions with marginal economic impacts, given the current level of development in the China electricity
generation and transportation sectors. It is estimated that a 5 RMB per ton carbon tax will reduce emissions by 4.1% and GDP by 0.27%. Emissions drop by 8.2% and
GDP drops by 0.54% when energy efficiency increases by 2% across the China economy, respectively. As a final result, a 5% shift away from burning coal would
reduce emissions by 9.0%, while GDP would increase by 1.3%. It has been shown that even low carbon taxes can encourage a notable cleaner energy system.

3] Environmental protection is a restriction and economic growth is a freedom.

Limitations always have a risk of perfect duty violations, outweighing anything.
Economic growth provides economic autonomy to civilians, fulfilling a supererogatory
obligation.
4] Fuel subsidies are a link – increased taxes are necessary for
Perfect duties outweigh all of their offense—
1] Not following supererogatory obligations is permissible, not violating perfect duties
is infinitely harmful.
2] The aff has two links to infinite violence – that by definition cannot be outweighed.
Even a risk of offense which is proved by having a debate means infinite violence –
there is 100% probability and infinite magnitude TIMES 2! They can’t win.
3] Because of the is-ought gap, by definition, non-action cannot be morally
impermissible – the categorical imperative says that only imperfect duties can compel
action, but perfect duties always trump supererogatory obligations generated from
imperfect duties. Thus, you must negate.
The Categorical Imperative can only generate negative duties, not positive ones – it's
incoherent to say that universal law mandates a positive obligation to prioritize
something over another.
Yudanin ’15
[Yudanin, Michael. “Can Positive Duties Be Derived From Kant’s Categorical Imperative?.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18. 2015. Web.
August 16, 2022. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10677-014-9546-4#Sec5>.] //CLSANSTONE

The problem with Kant’s Argument: Why Negative Duties can be Derived from the Formula of Universal Law Yet Positive Duties Cannot It seems that the issue with deriving positive duties from
the Formula of Universal Law is not specific to this particular formulation of the Categorical Imperative–on the contrary, it is a principal issue that touches the core of Kant’s moral theory.

The foundation of Kantian ethics is pure reason rather than anthropology. The Categorical Imperative is
pure reason formulated in a way that is comprehensible to the acting agents endowed with it. It is the very
expression of the two main, defining features of pure reason–universality and formality. Requiring every maxim of behavior to be capable of becoming a universal law, a law applying not only
to the particular situation with its specific players for which it was formulated but to any possible situation that involves a thinking self and offers similar behavioral options, is testing its
compatibility with reason–the universal framework of our existence, the outer reach of our capacities. As such, reason must be formal, as it should encompass any possible accidental. In a

In
sense, we can, if not must, conceptualize Kantian ethics as an ethics of rules. All possible rules have to agree with reason. If they do not, we will not be able to follow them.

addition, to be morally valid, rules–considered as maxims–have to pass the test of the Categorical
Imperative. This pertains to the rules of any game we play, chess as interpersonal behavior. And indeed, most rules we know and hold valid would pass such a test: they are universal
and treat all players/participants equally. For example, state laws that are widely considered valid do not discriminate between individuals based on aspects irrelevant to the subject matter;
neither do rules of hockey.

Presumption flows neg –

1] any risk of action violating a perfect duty or causing implications under their
framework means that we shouldn’t do anything – the neg is always permissible