It Don’t Make Sense NC (OBLIGATIONS

NC)
 Framework

[Value] I negate and value a Coherent Concept of Justice, which means establishing a

system of internally consistent ethical rules. Since ethics is meant to be action-guiding,

this value precludes generic justice, as it determines our ability to be just in the first

place.

[McConnell] Actions that create moral dilemmas generate conflicting obligations,

making it impossible for actors to behave justly.

McConnell: McConnell, Terrance. [Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Greensboro] “Moral Dilemmas.”
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, revised July 25, 2022. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-dilemmas/ CH

While the examples from Plato and Sartre are the ones most commonly cited, there are many others. Literature abounds with such cases. In Aeschylus’s

Agamemnon, the protagonist ought to save his daughter and ought to lead the Greek troops to Troy; he ought to do each but he cannot do both. And

Antigone, in Sophocles’s play of the same name, ought to arrange for the burial of her brother, Polyneices, and ought to obey the pronouncements of the

city’s ruler, Creon; she can do each of these things, but not both. Areas of applied ethics, such as biomedical ethics, business ethics, and legal ethics, are

also replete with such cases. 2. The Concept of Moral Dilemmas What is common to the two well-known cases is conflict. In each case, an agent regards

herself as having moral reasons to do each of two actions, but doing both actions is not possible. Ethicists have called situations like these moral

dilemmas. The crucial features of a moral dilemma are these: the agent is required to do

each of two (or more) actions; the agent can do each of the actions; but the agent cannot do both

(or all) of the actions. The agent thus seems condemned to moral failure; no matter

what she does, she will do something wrong (or fail to do something that she ought

to do). The Platonic case strikes many as too easy to be characterized as a genuine moral dilemma. For the agent’s solution in that case is clear; it is
more important to protect people from harm than to return a borrowed weapon. And in any case, the borrowed item can be returned later, when the owner

no longer poses a threat to others. Thus in this case we can say that the requirement to protect others from serious harm overrides the requirement to repay

one’s debts by returning a borrowed item when its owner so demands. When one of the conflicting requirements overrides the other, we have a conflict

but not a genuine moral dilemma. So in addition to the features mentioned above, in order to have a genuine moral dilemma it must also be true that

neither of the conflicting requirements is overridden (Sinnott-Armstrong 1988, Chapter 1).

He adds: McConnell, Terrance. [Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Greensboro] “Moral Dilemmas.” The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, revised July 25, 2022. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-dilemmas/ CH
And this is understandable. It is certainly no comfort to an agent facing a reputed moral dilemma to be told that at least the rules which

generate this predicament are consistent because there is a possible world in which they do not conflict. For a good practical example,

consider the situation of the criminal defense attorney. She is said to have an obligation to hold in confidence the disclosures made by

a client and to be required to conduct herself with candor before the court (where the latter requires that the attorney inform the court

when her client commits perjury) (Freedman 1975, Chapter 3). It is clear that in this world these two obligations often conflict. It is

equally clear that in some possible world—for example, one in which clients do not commit perjury—that both obligations can be

satisfied. Knowing this is of no assistance to defense attorneys who face a conflict between these two requirements in this world. It is

equally clear that in some possible world—for example, one in which clients do not commit perjury—that both obligations can be

satisfied. Knowing this is of no assistance to defense attorneys who face a conflict between these two requirements in this world.

Ethicists who are concerned that their theories not allow for moral dilemmas have more than consistency in mind. What is

troubling is that theories that allow for dilemmas fail to be uniquely action-guiding. A

theory can fail to be uniquely action-guiding in either of two ways: by

recommending incompatible actions in a situation or by not recommending any

action at all. Theories that generate genuine moral dilemmas fail to be uniquely

action-guiding in the former way. Theories that have no way, even in principle, of

determining what an agent should do in a particular situation have what Thomas E.

Hill, Jr. calls “gaps” (Hill 1996, 179–183); they fail to be action-guiding in the latter

way. Since one of the main points of moral theories is to provide agents with

guidance, that suggests that it is desirable for theories to eliminate dilemmas and

gaps, at least if doing so is possible. But failing to be uniquely action-guiding is not the only reason that the

existence of moral dilemmas is thought to be troublesome. Just as important, the existence of dilemmas

does lead to inconsistencies if certain other widely held theses are true. Here we shall
consider two different arguments, each of which shows that one cannot consistently acknowledge the reality of moral dilemmas while

holding selected (and seemingly plausible) principles.

[Burden] Thus, the sufficient affirmative burden is to prove that requiring open

borders avoids creating moral dilemmas – i.e., that affirming does not generate

conflicting ethical obligations. You can treat the burden the same as you would treat a

value criterion.
 Thesis/Contention

[Thesis] My thesis and sole contention is that we can’t have two conflicting moral

duties, since that makes one of them impossible to fulfill. Affirming violates the

burden, since:

[Arnaiz 1] First, an unconditional obligation to open borders, abbreviated “OB,”

inevitably conflicts with other duties of statehood, since no state could reasonably accept

all migrants – e.g., Greece, which is on the brink of economic collapse, exacerbated by a

refugee crisis.1 2

Arnaiz 1: Arnaiz, Borja Niño. [Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos]
“Should we open borders? Yes, but not in the name of global justice.” Ethics & Global Politics, Volume 15. May 2, 2022.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16544951.2022.2081398 CH

One might criticize this conception of justice for being too narrow. But no conception of justice, not even the

most ambitious one, could plausibly demand an unrestricted freedom of movement,

nor does it include the right to choose one’s country of preference (Blake 2020). One
can have access to a sufficient range of means to develop an autonomous life without having free rein to move all over the globe, so it

is difficult to derive the principle of freedom of movement from the requirements of global justice. If freedom of movement is to be

defended, it cannot be done by appeal to global justice. In conclusion, the remedial or instrumental argument fails at justifying

unrestricted migratory rights for everyone, especially for those who already have access to an adequate set of opportunities. What is

more, as we will argue in the next section, global justice may run counter to the very idea of open

borders. Two contradictory concepts The proposal of open borders as a remedy of

justice stands in an unsolvable contradiction with the idea of open borders understood as

an unrestricted right to freedom of movement between countries. This is because the

1
Marans, Daniel. [Reporter, Huffington Post] “Greece’s Economy Is Getting Crushed Between Austerity and the Refugee Crisis.”
Huffington Post, February 2016. CH
2
https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-11-27/greeces-refugee-crisis-creates-strain-already-fragile-ecosystem
obligations of justice are not unlimited, as enshrined in the Latin legal principle

ultra posse nemo obligatur (no one is obliged beyond what she is able to do). Under

normal circumstances, an act of justice should not place the duty-bearer (that whose

interests and freedom are reduced) in a comparatively worse situation than that of

the rights-holder (that who is benefited by the act).12 If we apply this maxim to

distributive justice, the obligations of the rich towards the poor should not exceed the

point of absolute equality among the parties,13 unless that inequality was the result

of a relation of exploitation or past grievances. This is not to defend radical

egalitarianism, but to notice how any demand for justice (distributive or otherwise)

has its limits. Therefore, if we try to reduce poverty and/or inequality by opening

borders, considering that there are limits to redistributive duties, borders cannot be

always open. If distributive obligations (X) from A to B are discharged in the form of open borders (Y), then borders need not
remain open after a certain point in redistribution has been reached (X ≥ Y). At issue here is the stringency of distributive obligations,

but on no account can they be unlimited. Several objections can be levelled against this approach: 1. The first objection is that open

borders do not significantly alter the final distribution of goods, or else produce the desired effects in terms of redistribution, and so it

would not be necessary to restrict freedom of movement for the sake of justice. In its more modest version, if open borders do not

make a significant change in the final allocation of resources, then what is the point in keeping them open? The ideal scenario would

be that the free flow of individuals by itself (without the intervention of the state) produced fair results over which no adjustment was

necessary. But notice that this implies acknowledging the redundancy of justice, and it is most certainly not what defenders of global

distributive justice hold. In fact, they are usually quite sceptical of nation states and the free will of individuals assigning resources

fairly. They advocate instead for the establishment of supranational democratic institutions with jurisdiction over a number of areas,

including (but not necessarily restricted to) migration and distributive justice.
[Arnaiz 2] Second, OB often conflicts with the stated reasons for opening borders, like

reducing poverty or achieving util. Using those types of goals can obligate states not to

open borders, since we sometimes better reduce poverty or achieve util with closed

borders.

Arnaiz 2: Arnaiz, Borja Niño. [Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos]
“Should we open borders? Yes, but not in the name of global justice.” Ethics & Global Politics, Volume 15. May 2, 2022.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16544951.2022.2081398 CH

Freedom of movement: means or end? The appeal to global justice as the rationale for open

borders instrumentalizes the latter for the advance of the first, whereby freedom of

movement is no longer an end worthy of respect and becomes a sort of remedy to an

imperfect world (Bauböck 2009). This reasoning entails the risk of not only discounting freedom of movement, but
also releasing those states that are already doing their ‘fair’ share (whatever that might be) from the rest of their responsibilities, such

as abstaining from harmfully coercing peaceful immigrants (Huemer 2010). Open borders as an imperative of global

justice pose a second challenge: if they are conceived as a means in the fight against

inequality and global poverty, freedom of movement no longer has significant value,4

becoming a mere instrument of public policy subordinated to the achievement of a

political objective (and thus susceptible of being sacrificed where circumstances

demand). Therefore, in the event of a global redistributive policy, even if freedom of

movement would retain its intrinsic value, it would certainly lose its presumptive

value. It would no longer be the default position nor a prima facie right, and so only

under the ‘right’ circumstances would it be allowed. Were we to apply this at the domestic level, the
consequences for freedom of movement would be devastating, since it could arguably be curtailed for reasons of collective welfare.

This has two further implications that should not be overlooked. The first is that, if the common good or the

general interest so requires, freedom of movement may be suspended (Loewe 2017).

The general interest is an abstract principle that can be interpreted in a number of ways and is therefore subject to political

manipulation and bargaining. It often goes far beyond an imminent danger to national security
or a serious threat to public health – both cases in which internal and external

freedom of movement could reasonably be (temporarily) suspended. As a result, those in

power could abuse their discretion, making a partial interpretation of the general interest as an excuse to limit freedom of movement.

There is a second concern: if the objectives of distributive justice are fulfilled at

some point, would states be entitled to close their borders? In fact, it is not necessary

to imagine such a far-fetched scenario to raise the same question: could an

individual state unilaterally close its borders if it considered that it had already

contributed enough via the transfer of income5? In other words, can a state pay to close its borders? After
having condemned so vehemently the happenstance of borders (Velasco 2016a) and their critical impact on people’s lives (Kymlicka

2001), it is striking to suggest that the opening of borders is a simple currency with which to pay our obligations of justice.6 To

sum up, under this instrumental conception, open borders are nothing but a strategy to

achieve a political goal – the reduction of poverty and global inequality –, subject to

electoral purposes and vulnerable to political manipulation. Moreover, once our

distributive obligations have been realized (wherever the threshold may lie),

freedom of movement would lose its raison d’être, becoming something superfluous

and therefore dispensable. After all, if the reason to open our borders is the concern for

the global poor, what prevents us from closing them once justice has been done? In the
end, we might jump at similar conclusions to those who defend the right to exclude.7

TURNS CASE – if the point of the aff is to promote util/equality, then any time OB

conflicts with that duty, justice would require closing borders, not opening them, which

makes affirming incoherent.

Case
 Framing
The criterion is circular — it begs the question of what “non-arbitrary” means —
they also don’t provide a way of measuring equality — there are tons of different
metrics for that
The burden CONTROLS THE LINK TO JUSTICE — it’s a reason we need a
functional system of getting to equality, not just equality writ large
The burden EXPLAINS how to get the best form of inclusion – if we have a moral
dilemma, there is no inclusion – instead, there is just a political aim that doesn’t
take its people into account
 Contention 1 –
PLACE AN OVERVIEW ON THE AFF: THEY DON’T JUSTIFY OPEN
BORDERS — if you command-F that term in the aff, it only comes up in tag lines
and the definition — they defend a broader policy of ABOLISHING BORDERS,
but that’s not affirmative ground — they have to defend EXISTING borders being
loosened, which is in the minimized text of their Longley definition. Since they fail
their resolutional burden, we can negate on face.
Off Miller – voting with their feet does not work – these citizens aren’t able to vote in
their new countries, because they’re not prescribed citizenstatus. This means instead, we
should eliminate the notions of citizenship.
[Martin] 2] TURN - States obligated to admit a potentially unlimited number of migrants tend

to respond in authoritarian ways.

Professor David Martin shows: Martin, David A. [Nonresident Fellow at MPI and the Warner-Booker Distinguished Professor
of International Law at the University of Virginia] “What Makes Migration Control Morally Legitimate?” The University of California, Berkeley,
School of Law, 2017. https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/What-Makes-Migration-Control-Morally-Legitimate_-10-27-
2017_David-Martin.pdf CH

But the political reality is more complex. Expanding populations bring strains. When the expansion derives mainly from the addition of persons

from other cultures and languages, the strains are magnified. In a democracy, those strains can ignite or feed political reactions. This has been a

theme or worry in many philosophical explorations of the morality of immigration control, from Sidgwick through Ackerman, Walzer, Paul

Collier, and others. In various formulations, they warn that at some point the friction from relatively uncontrolled

migration will fuel right-wing or reactionary political movements, potentially resulting not

only in authoritarian government but also significant new restrictions on future migration.
These writers describe a classic instance of where the perfect (exceptionally generous migration openings fully true to the principle of equal

moral worth) is the enemy of the good (maintaining reasonably high immigration levels in a context of law observance, control, and selection).

Back in the 1990s, this theme of democratic political vulnerability (or fragility) evoked a lot of skepticism from my immigration law class. The

Soviet Union had just disbanded, and nations formerly in its bloc were launching new democracies and joining the European Union or the

European Convention on Human Rights. Protesters erected a copy of the Statue of Liberty in Tiananmen Square. Wars were ending in Latin

America, and military governments were yielding to electoral politics. The tide toward democracy, in Europe, Asia, and South America seemed

powerful enough to absorb many blows. And in that environment, some student interlocutors treated these writer’s warnings as a kind of embrace

of the heckler’s veto: Okay, some reactionaries are going to object to immigrants. Big deal. Instead of caving to them and cutting immigration

way back, we just need courageous leadership to face them down. Two reactions: First, the writers were not necessarily making a case for cutting

migration drastically, but merely arguing the legitimacy of deliberate controls chosen and enforced by the receiving society, as a means of

achieving reasonable limits and thereby minimizing political backlash. And second, the writers’ stance generally presupposed a commitment on
the part of political leaders to resisting calls toward radical retrenchment. But courageous democratic leadership, to be effective, still has to be

alert to those concrete steps or background policies that nurture and sustain the support of enough followers to make the resistance successful. If

global trends ran strongly against the political fragility argument in the 1990s, the events of the last three years or so in Europe and North

America now offer much more solid experiential support for the claim. They at least suggest that high levels of migration – or

more precisely the perception of seemingly uncontrolled migration – does contribute toward

dangerous strengthening of reactionary movements, in a way that can present real risks to

rights-protecting liberal democracies. The background setting during this period was dominated by heavy flows

of asylum seekers to Europe, most dramatically by sea to Italy or Greece. A high percentage of the migrants were fleeing the
brutal war in Syria, but the flow was also joined by asylum seekers from Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as sub-Saharan Africa and other source

countries. According to UNHCR statistics, Mediterranean crossings by asylum seekers reached 219,000 in 2014, and then accelerated so that the

same count in the first eight months of 2015 exceeded 310,000 –200,000 to Greece and 110,000 to Italy. The drama of the dangerous sea passage

and the suffering of the travelers received massive world coverage, including chilling photos of the lifeless body of three-year-old Aylan Kurdi at

waterline on a Greek beach. On August 23, clearly moved by the humanitarian plight of the asylum seekers, Chancellor Angela Merkel and other

European leaders announced that they would waive certain treaty restrictions that might have kept all these migrants in Greece and Italy, and

would seek to rally support from throughout Europe to take extraordinary measures for the reception of these large new numbers in countries

throughout the continent. This was a noble and welcome humanitarian departure, but it quickly resulted in an even larger wave of migrants. The

expanded volume exposed the failure of the governments involved to develop even rudimentary systems for efficient handling of the onward

movement from the countries of first arrival. From late August 2015 through the end of that calendar year, Greece alone received 656,000

additional sea arrivals – who were then largely reduced to self-help to make their way north. The determination and the disorder of the migrating

population were captured in startling photos showing thick columns of asylum seekers filling entire lanes of superhighways as they trudged north,

day after day, toward distant towns where they hoped to catch a train to wealthy Germany or its neighbors. Hard-right parties in

many European countries had been gaining support for years by sounding immigration

alarms. The rising flow in the fall of 2015 greatly boosted their efforts. The right-wing Law and Justice

Party came to power in Polish elections in October 2015, and its Parliamentary majority began a steady

campaign of weakening or dismantling democratic checks and balances (to the point that

Poland was placed under EU sanctions in July 2017). And the new waves of migration were

exploited by Viktor Orban’s increasingly authoritarian government in Hungary to tighten his

grip (as his military strung razor wire along the borders where asylum seekers might
venture on their way north). Polls showed considerable early strength for hard-right anti-immigrant parties in other countries facing
upcoming elections, suggesting strong early chances to win control of the government in Austria and the Netherlands. Although the welcoming

policy adopted in August 2015 by European leaders responded to real humanitarian needs and had enjoyed varying degrees of domestic support,

its open-ended nature triggered growing concern and opposition. Chaotic arrivals placed visible strains on receptive capacity and raised doubts

about security screening at a time of deadly terrorist activity in France, Belgium, and other countries. Increasingly aware that European domestic

politics were being poisoned by the perception of uncontrolled migration, EU leaders were moved to change policy. On March 18, 2016, they

announced an EU agreement with Turkey, the primary starting point for most of the northbound Syrian refugee flow, which succeeded in sharply

reducing the flow. Controversy persists over the terms of that agreement and its consistency with human rights and refugee treaties. But the new

policy produced a highly visible impact on the numbers. Greece’s total of sea arrivals in 2016 fell to 173,000, still quite high but nearly 700,000

below the previous year’s experience. The slowed traffic also enabled better management and reception. This reassertion of stronger migration

control appears to have had important political impact. The candidate for the anti-immigrant Freedom Party in Austria gained a strong plurality in

the first round of Presidential elections in April 2016, but in May’s runoff election between the two top vote-getters, he fell just short of victory,

with 49.7 percent. Immigration alarms also played a role in the Brexit referendum of June 2016. Though concerns in the United Kingdom were

focused less on refugee flows and more on job competition from workers migrating from elsewhere in the EU, worries about unconstrained

migration certainly contributed to the surprising and narrow win for the Leave faction. In the Netherlands, the party of the bitterly anti-immigrant

and anti-Muslim leader Geert Wilders led in polls through most of the campaign leading up to parliamentary elections in March 2017. In the end,

his party fell short of a majority, though it did gain five seats. (Wilders said that despite the outcome, “the genie will not go back into the bottle,”

and he bragged that his efforts had pushed many right-leaning parties to adopt tougher stances on immigration.) In France, Marine LePen’s

National Front party showed considerable strength in polling, highlighting alarms over immigration, and she became one of the two finalists in

the Presidential vote May 2017. By that time the EU actions had abated the large-scale flow of migrants to Europe, and she ultimately lost to

Emanuel Macron, who received 66 percent of the vote. This still marked the highest total of votes that a French far-right party had received in

presidential elections. In Germany, any backlash against the unruly flow that Merkel had helped to create with her August 2015 announcements

was mitigated by the results of the March 2016 policy change and the resultant switch to more orderly and far smaller-scale refugee reception.

Although Merkel’s party did lose some ground in the September 2017 parliamentary elections, she will remain Chancellor. Meantime, however,

a right-wing nationalist party gained a foothold in the Bundestag for the first time in 60

years, as the anti-immigrant AfD party won the third-highest party total, with 13.5 percent of the vote.

And perhaps the most immediately worrying outcome, based on actual electoral victories,

came in the United States in November 2016. This happened even though, objectively, the U.S. system in recent years has not been
subject to nearly the same magnitude of irregular arrivals nor to the same immigration strains as Europe. Indeed, the net unauthorized population

in the United States has not grown for 10 years, and the average unauthorized flow across the southern border for the last five years is at its

lowest level since the 1970s. But those scenes from the European superhighways played on Fox News as

well as CNN and MSNBC in 2015 and 2016. And comprehensive immigration reform
legislation, despite gaining 68 votes in the Senate in 2013, had never come up for a vote in the House. This

failure left the field open for attack slogans disparaging what is widely called (but for highly disparate reasons) a

failed immigration system. A surge of Central American asylum seekers in 2014 and 2016

provided a basis for more alarmism, and Donald Trump beat those drums expertly to expand

and energize his base. His grossly distorted but electorally savvy claims about Democratic failures to

assert effective control over migration certainly contributed to his shocking electoral victory.

And in the wake of that victory, in the name of reasserting control, he has proposed

dramatic retrenchments in immigration policy. Further, his victory significantly threatens the

social safety net for citizens, and it also presages regressive public policy in dozens of other

unrelated arenas.

TURN: more migration decreases racist anti-immigrant sentiment — the exposure

effect means there are fewer opportunities for stereotypes and racism
TURN: OB increases other legislation to safeguard people from racist actions —
there will be more diverse voters and more new citizens
TURN: populists use CLOSED BORDERS to try to insulate their populations and
prevent people from leaving their origin countries — it’s a classic tool of racial
oppression
 Contention 2 –
[Arniaz] TURN – Opening borders just promotes free reign of rich white people that

don’t have a need to immigrate.

Arniaz: Arniaz, Borja N. [Master of Research Applied to Communication Education, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos.] “Should we
open borders? Yes, but not in the name of global justice” Informa UK Limited, May 26, 2022.
https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2022.2081398 EM

However, a human right to migrate must be understood as the right of every human

being, irrespective of their talents, resources or any other circumstances, to travel

and establish their residence in any country. And, as such, ‘it attaches as much to

the rich Canadian wishing to settle in Germany as it does to the desperate Somali

trying to cross the border into Kenya’ (Miller 2016a, 49). We can now clearly see how these remedial policies

come into conflict with the very idea of freedom of movement. In all these cases, the state would be favouring one type of immigration over another, or to put it bluntly, it would

be restricting the freedom of movement of the relatively better-off for the benefit of the least advantaged.10 One could plausibly respond that both kinds of migration (qualified

and unqualified, rich and poor) are in fact compatible, since qualified migrants contribute to the economy of the receiving country, thus compensating for an eventual cost imposed

by less qualified migrants. Thus, all things considered, domestic distributive justice would go unaffected. This makes some sense, but as we

have already said, insofar as migration is subject to terms and conditions, it is not

free. From the moment that borders are placed at the service of redistribution, the

honourable cause of global justice perverts the very idea of open borders, since it

legitimizes the promotion of one type of immigration (that of the relative poor) and

the limiting of another (that of the relative rich). As a result, freedom of movement and open borders become empty

signifiers. By this we do not pretend to suggest that such policies are necessarily unjust, but rather that the idea of open borders is not compatible with that of global distributive

justice. In fact, global justice could under certain circumstances justify the imposition of severe restrictions on mobility and even the obligation to remain in one’s country. If

justice is concerned with the needs of the disadvantaged, just as it would not be

morally wrong to prevent a rich person from entering a soup kitchen or to deny her

the minimum subsistence income, to what extent would a government act badly if it

forbade her entry into the country? Distributive justice, by its very nature, requires us to put needs in order of priority, and to give some
(the most pressing) preference over others (the least pressing). To this end, it might be helpful to distinguish between interests and rights. Just as my interest in a particular thing

does not always give rise to a right to that thing, many of the claims of potential immigrants, however strong and legitimate, are not always adequately captured by the language of

justice. And if what takes us to open our borders are the claims of justice, when there is no such claim, we are under no corresponding obligation to open them. According to Blake

(2020) and Miller (2016b), what justice requires is access to a sufficient range of options.11 In this

sense, a state could not be accused of injustice for prohibiting the entry of persons

whose only motivation was the maximization of their options, provided that they

were already adequately covered in their country of origin. Similarly, it would not be unfair to deny entry to a
person whose claims could be adequately addressed where she was currently living (Wellman and Cole 2011). One might criticize this conception of justice for being too narrow.

But no concep- tion of justice, not even the most ambitious one, could plausibly demand an unrest- ricted freedom of movement, nor does it include the right to choose one’s

country of preference (Blake 2020). One can have access to a sufficient range of means to develop an

autonomous life without having free rein to move all over the globe, so it is difficult

to derive the principle of freedom of movement from the requirements of global

justice. If freedom of movement is to be defended, it cannot be done by appeal to global justice. In conclusion, the remedial or instrumental argument fails at justifying
unrestricted migratory rights for everyone, especially for those who already have access to an adequate set of opportunities. What is more, as we will argue in the next section,

global justice may run counter to the very idea of open borders.

THEY DON’T SOLVE — this is an issue with violence against women being
normalized in societies, not with the existence of borders — they create Band-Aid
solutions without actually resolving the harms

Off Steinberg: TURN: OB MEANS STATES WILL BE MORE SELECTIVE

ABOUT WHETHER WOMEN CAN EMIGRATE
Women seeking to LEAVE authoritarian patriarchies will be told they can’t — if
they seek reproductive rights, states will just arbitrarily make that one of the
conditions that doesn’t let them out — TURNS THE AFF, since states get MORE
control over borders rather than less in their world