CRIMINAL LAW- AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE

Pablo vs Pp, G.R. No. 152481, Apr 15, 2005

Pp vs Villamor, G.R. Nos. 140407-08, Jan 15, 2002
On board a motorcycle brothers Jerry and Jerold Velez were on their way home from their
friend’s house when they heard a speeding motorcycle fast approaching from behind. They
ignored the it at rst but as they were about to cross the bridge leading to their home,
gunshots rang out from behind them. They abruptly turned the motorcycle around towards
the direction of the gun re. The light of their motorcycle's headlamp fell on their attackers
aboard the second motorcycle. The assailants red at them a second time and then the
attackers ed. Jerry sustained gunshot wounds but survived. Jerold however, died on the
spot during the rst gunburst.
The accused were identi ed by the victim Jerry, PO3 Renato F. Villamor, public o cer and
Jessie "Joy" Maghilom, likewise a public o cer was charged with the crime.
"Did the accused abuse his o ce to commit the crime?"
The court ruled that in Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. To appreciate this
aggravating circumstance, the public o cer must use the in uence, prestige or ascendancy
which his o ce gives him as a means by which he realizes his purpose. The essence of the
matter is presented in the inquiry.
In this case, there was no showing that accused-appellant took advantage of his being a
policeman to shoot Jelord Velez or that he used his "in uence, prestige or ascendancy" in
killing the victim. Accused-appellant could have shot Velez even without being a policeman.
In other words, if the accused could have perpetrated the crime even without occupying his
position, there is no abuse of public position.
US vs Torrida, G.R. Nos. 7450, 7451, 7452, September 18, 1912
Damaso Rabilas lost one carabao, Bonifacio Rante one, Santiago Rante two, and Felipe
Rante one (those of Santiago and Felipe were included in the same complaint. The
respective owners of these animals reported their death to the appellant. Upon the receipt of
this information the appellant informed these owners that they must pay a ne of P5 for each
animal, these fees to be turned into the municipality by him. The owners, believing that the
municipality had provided for the payment of such nes, turned over to the appellant ve
pesos for each animal that died. There was no provision whatever made by the municipality
or any other entity for the imposition of such nes.
The court ruled that, The fact that the appellant was councilman at the time placed him in a
position to commit these crimes. If he had not been councilman he could not have induced
the injured parties to pay these alleged nes. It was on account of his being councilman that
the parties believed that he had the right to collect nes and it was for this reason that they
made the payments.
Diosdada Montecillo and her brother Mario Montecillo were standing at the corner of a street
while waiting for their ride home when a mobile patrol car of the Western Police District with
three (3) policemen on board stopped in front of them. The policeman seated on the right at
the front seat alighted and without a word frisked Mario. He took Mario’s belt, pointed to a
supposedly blunt object in its buckle and uttered the word "evidence." Then he motioned to
Mario to board the car. The terri ed Mario obeyed and seated himself at the back together
with another policeman. Diosdada instinctively followed suit and sat beside Mario. The driver
then asked Mario why he was carrying a "deadly weapon," to which Mario answered, "for
self-defense since he was a polio victim." The driver and another policeman who were both
seated in front grilled Mario.
As they approached Ospital ng Maynila, the mobile car pulled over and the two (2) policemen
in front told the Montecillos that the bailbond for carrying a "deadly weapon" was
₱12,000.00. At this point, the driver asked how much money they had. Without answering,
Mario gave his ₱1,000.00 to Diosdada who placed the money inside her wallet. Aside from
money the police o cers also demanded her any piece of jewelry that could be pawned.
Ruefully, she removed her wristwatch and o ered it to him. The driver declined saying,
"Never mind," and proceeded to board the car. Diosdada, still fearing for the safety of her
brother, followed and sat beside him in the car. The police o cers told them to disembark
after.
The court ruled that, There is an aggravating circumstance that the lower court erred in
appreciating. The mere fact that the three (3) accused were all police o cers at the time of
the robbery placed them in a position to perpetrate the o ense. If they were not police
o cers they could not have terri ed the Montecillos into boarding the mobile patrol car and
forced them to hand over their money. Precisely it was on account of their authority that the
Montecillos believed that Mario had in fact committed a crime and would be brought to the
police station for investigation unless they gave them what they demanded.
Pp vs Magayac, G.R. No.126043, April 19, 2000.
One evening, some individuals including the victim Jimmy, were on the shore preparing for
night shing. Jimmy was sitting on the kamarote when Tino Magayac, father of the accused,
pushed Jimmy for no apparent reason. When Jimmy asked, "Bakit mo ako tinabig (Why did
you push me)?" Tino answered, "Bakit, lalaban ka baga (Why, do you want to ght)?" Tino
then hit Jimmy at the back (dinagukan). Before they could come to blows, cooler heads
intervened.
Two hours later, Tino once more approached Jimmy and without any preliminaries hit him at
the collar and at the stomach. Accused Manuel Magayac also advanced towards Jimmy and
tried to box him with his right hand. 3 Again, the ght was averted with the captain
threatening to drop them into the sea if they did not stop. When Jimmy's Uncle Kanuto

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 asked, "Why are you ganging up on my nephew?" the accused answered, "Bakit, lalaban ba
kayo, bukas lagot kayo sa akin. (Why, do you want to ght? Tomorrow, you will see)."
Early next morning, Jimmy Lumague and the accused met again and exchanged blows. In
this one-on- one ght, it seemed that Jimmy was the better ghter. The protagonist was
once more separated; it was however apparent that the accused was furious for having
obviously been beaten.
6:00 o’clock the following evening, the accused went to nd the victim who was then sitting
on a bench. Shot him and went to Mobile force where he surrendered himself.
The court ruled that, he is guilty of murder. The accused-appellant was a member of the
dreaded CAFGU, used his government issued M-14 ri e to kill Jimmy does not necessarily
prove that he took advantage of his public position to commit the crime. His voluntary
surrender was appreciated as a mitigating circumstance. Nevertheless, he was sentenced to
death.
Pp vs Fallorina, G.R. No. 137347, Mar 4, 2004.
Vincent, the victim asked permission from his mother Felicisima if he could play outside. She
agreed. Together with his playmate Whilcon "Buddha" Rodriguez, Vincent played with his
kite on top of the roof of an abandoned carinderia. Beside this carinderia was a basketball
court, where fourteen-year-old Ricardo Salvo and his three friends,were playing backan, a
game of basketball. Ricardo heard the familiar sound of a motorcycle coming from the main
road across the basketball court. He was nonplussed when he looked at the person driving
the motorcycle and recognized the appellant. Ricardo knew that the appellant abhorred
children playing on the roof of the carinderia and berated them for it. His friend Ong-ong had
previously been scolded by the appellant for playing on the roof.
Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from the roof. When the appellant saw
Vincent and Whilcon, the former stopped his motorcycle and shouted at them. After hearing
the shouts of the appellant, Whilcon immediately jumped down from the roof. Vincent,
meanwhile, was lying on his stomach on the roof ying his kite. When he heard the
appellant's shouts, Vincent stood up and looked at the latter. Vincent turned his back, ready
to get down from the roof. Suddenly, the appellant pointed his .45 caliber pistol towards the
direction of Vincent and red a shot. Vincent was hit on the left parietal area. He fell from the
roof, lying prostrate near the canal beside the abandoned carinderia and the basketball
court. The appellant approached Vincent and carried the latter's hapless body in a waiting
tricycle and brought him to the Quezon City General Hospital. Vincent was pronounced dead
on arrival.
The court ruled that, There is no dispute that the appellant is a policeman and that he used
his service rearm, the .45 caliber pistol, in shooting the victim. However, there is no
evidence on record that the appellant took advantage of his position as a policeman when
he shot the victim. The shooting occurred only when the appellant saw the victim on the
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rooftop playing with his kite. The trial court erred in appreciating abuse of public position
against the appellant. The accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
Pp vs Herrera, G.R. Nos. 140557-58, Dec 5, 2001
Enrique Ganan was sitting on a steel chair at his home eating shballs while cuddling his
youngest child. He was engaged in a conversation with Ma. Rizza Aguilar and his brother
Edwin. His wife, Mariel was situated a few meters away. At the same time, Corazon Cajipo
was chatting with a friend about ten (10) meters away. The calm evening air was shattered
when the accused armed with a .38 caliber revolver suddenly approached Enrique from
behind and red at close range. Although wounded, Enrique managed to pass his child to
his brother in the ensuing uproar and attempted to crawl to safety. His attacker, however,
followed and pumped more bullets into him. After ring the sixth shot, the assailant casually
walked away. When the smoke cleared, Enrique Ganan and Corazon Cajipo, who caught a
slug in her temple, lay bloodied and fatally wounded.
"Did the accused abuse his o ce to commit the crime?"
The court ruled that, in this case, there was no showing that accused-appellant took
advantage of his being a policeman to shoot Ganan or that he used his "in uence, prestige
or ascendancy" in killing the victim. Accused-appellant could have shot Ganan even without
being a policeman. In other words, if the accused could have perpetrated the crime even
without occupying his position, there is no abuse of public position. The mere fact that
accused-appellant is a policeman and used his government issued .38 caliber revolver to kill
Ganan is not su cient to establish that he misused his public position in the commission of
the crime. Furthermore, since the information failed to allege this aggravating circumstance,
the same cannot be appreciated against accused-appellant. A generic aggravating
circumstance must be alleged in the information if its appreciation would result in raising the
penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.
Pp vs Gapasin, G.R. No. 73489, Apr 25, 1994
Prosecution witness Alberto Carrido, he and Rodrigo Ballad left the house of Enteng
Teppang at about 2:00 P.M after attending the "pamisa" for the deceased father of Teppang.
Jerry Calpito followed them. While they were walking along the barangay road, Calpito was
shot by appellant with an armalite ri e. When Calpito fell on the ground, appellant red more
shots at him. Thereafter, accused Amor Saludares planted a .22 caliber revolver on the left
hand of Calpito. Upon hearing the shots, Faustina Calpito ran to succor her fallen husband.
Accused Nicanor Saludares pointed his gun at Faustina while accused Soriano red his gun
upwards. Saludares warned that he would kill any relative of Jerry Calpito who would come
near him. Faustina and the other relatives of the victim scampered away as the Saludares'
group chased them.
Appellant's claim of self-defense is belied by the nding of the trial court that the victim was
shot by someone who was standing on his right side. Appellant's version that he was in front
 of the victim when the latter red a shot at him and that he retaliated while dropping on the
ground, crumbles in the face of the physical evidence that the victim sustained two gunshot
wounds which entered the right side of his body and a gunshot wound on the right side of
his head.
The information alleged three other generic aggravating circumstances: ignominy, abuse of
superior strength and taking advantage of public position. The trial court correctly ruled out
ignominy on the strength of the autopsy conducted by the doctor who failed to nd any
other injuries such as bruises and contusions which may indicate that the victim was kicked
by his assailants. It also correctly held that treachery absorbed abuse of superior strength
(People v. Moral, 132 SCRA 474 [1984]).
The trial court properly appreciated taking advantage of public position as an aggravating
circumstance. Appellant, a member of the Philippine Constabulary, committed the crime with
an armalite which was issued to him when he received the mission order (People v. Madrid,
88 Phil. 1 [1951]).
Voluntary surrender may be considered in appellant's favor but this is o set by the
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position. Therefore, only the generic
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation may be appreciated against appellant.
As such, the correct penalty would have been death in accordance with Articles 248 and
64(3) of the Revised Penal Code Were it not for the fact that such penalty is constitutionally
abhorrent. Hence, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.
Garong y Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 172539, November 16, 2016.
Silverio Rosales (Silverio) and Ricar Colocar (Ricar) went to the home of the petitioner in the
early morning of September 18, 1989 to seek his help in the judicial reconstitution of
Silverio's Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 40361 issued by the O ce of the Register of Deeds
of the Province of Oriental Mindoro (Register of Deeds). The petitioner, then a court
interpreter, agreed to help, and instructed Silverio to prepare the necessary documents,
namely: the certi ed survey plan, technical description of the property, tax declaration, and
the certi cation from the Register of Deeds. He xed the amount of P5,000.00 as processing
fee, but later reduced it to P4,000.00. 3 Silverio and Ricar produced the amount and
submitted the requested documents to the petitioner.
The petitioner delivered to Ricar a copy of a court order bore the stamp mark "ORIGINAL
SIGNED" above the printed name of Judge Mario de la Cruz, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), and the words "CERTIFIED TRUE COPY" with a signature but no
printed name appeared beneath the signature. Upon the petitioner's instruction, Silverio and
Ricar brought the said documents to the Register of Deeds for the issuance of the owner's
duplicate of Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 40361. Ricar handed it to Meding Nacional, the
person-in-charge of receiving court orders in the Register of Deeds.
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On September 26, 1989, Nacional informed Ricar that Atty. Ricardo Legaspi, chief of the
O ce of the Register of Deeds, had returned Exhibit B because he had found some
sentences thereof erroneous. Thereafter, it was proven that the documents were falsi ed.
The court ruled that, the falsi cation by the petitioner could have been committed without
taking advantage of his public position as the court interpreter. His work for the court that
had supposedly issued Exhibit B was of no consequence to his criminal liability, for the
crime could have been committed even by any other individual, including one who did not
work in the court in any o cial capacity. In his case, the petitioner committed the simulation
of Exhibit B despite his not having the duty to make, or prepare, or otherwise intervene in the
preparation of court orders.
Pp vs. GUTIERREZ, G.R. No. 116281, Feb 8, 1999
The prosecution presented two other witnesses to the shooting: Dante Pajaron, a supplier of
gravel and sand, and his helper Jose Advincula.
According to Jose Advincula, On that afternoon, he went with Dante Pajaron to deliver gravel
and sand to a certain Evelyn. While their truck was parked and he was on top of the sand
loaded on it, he heard a commotion. Looking to his right, he saw two persons, one had a
gun (whom he identi ed as accused-appellant), while the other (whom he identi ed as
Mercene, Jr.) had none. Advincula said that while Mercene, Jr. was lighting a cigarette,
accused-appellant kicked him, causing him to fall to the ground with both hands touching
the ground. As Mercene, Jr. tried to stand up, accused-appellant boxed him, causing him to
fall again to the ground. Again Mercene, Jr. tried to get up, but accused-appellant hit him on
the shoulder, causing Mercene, Jr. to fall with his hands and knees to the ground. Accused-
appellant then aimed his gun (about two inches away) towards the back of Mercene, Jr.'s left
ear and red. Mercene, Jr. fell face downwards. In fright, according to Advincula, Dante
Pajaron backed out the truck around 12 meters and then they unloaded their cargo of gravel
and sand as fast as they could. Testifying in his turn, Dante Pajaron corroborated the
testimony or his helper.
The court ruled that, Treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength so the same need not be appreciated separately. 50 Neither can the aggravating
circumstance that the crime was committed with insult to public authority be appreciated as
the crime was committed against the public authority himself. 51 The aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of one's public position, however, is present since the gun
used by accused-appellant was the service revolver issued to him. The crime, therefore, is
murder with the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of accused-appellant's o ce.
Pp vs. Mangsant, G.R. No. 45704, May 25, 1938
The defendant appealed from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila nding
him guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The information
against him alleged that on April 7, 1937, in the City of Manila, with evident premeditation,
 disregard of sex and taking advantage of superior strength, and with the deliberate intention
to kill, the said accused did then and there attack Demetria Ferrer, a girl 14 years of age,
stabbing her from behind with a knife and in icting upon her various wounds in di erent
parts of the body which produced her instantaneous death.
The court ruled that, there was no premeditation according to the description or account of
the crime given in the information. The aggravating circumstance disregard of sex cannot be
considered because it has never been proved nor admitted by the defendant that in
committing the crime he had intended to o end or insult the sex of the victim.
Pp vs. DELA CRUZ, G.R. Nos. 154348-50, Jun 8, 2004
The three cases were consolidated and tried jointly upon agreement of the parties.
1. The murder of Victoriano Francisco, a sickly old man aging 81 years.
2. Frustrated murder of Felipe Pajunar.
3. Frustrated murder of William Tacaldo.
One afternoon, at a public market. Felipe Pajunar, one of the victims bought biscuits and
candies for his child’s exchange gift. When he was about to leave the market, he was
summoned by his cousin, Paulino Tabuay, to join his group for a round of local wine ("tuba"),
to which Felipe acceded. The other men in the group were Victoriano Francisco, the victim in
Criminal Case No. 12445, and Agaton Rubia. All three of them were seated outside the store
of a certain Julie Calidquid.
While the group was conversing, two unidenti ed men approached their table. One of the
men, whom Felipe later identi ed as appellant Pablo dela Cruz, asked for a glass of "tuba"
from Paulino. Paulino willingly obliged but appellant refused to accept the glass o ered to
him, saying it might contain poison. To show appellant that it did not, Paulino drank the glass
of "tuba" he was o ering and re lled it for appellant, who then drank without hesitation.
Appellant joined the group and sat with Felipe on his right and Victoriano on his left.
Suddenly, appellant placed his right arm around Felipe and, with his left hand, stabbed him,
whispering, "Pinaskuhan nako nimo Brod." (This is my Christmas gift to you, Brod.) Felipe
was wounded on his left chest and fell down. Immediately thereafter, appellant turned to
Victoriano and stabbed him. Victoriano was rushed to the Bayawan District Hospital where
he was declared dead on arrival. Felipe recalled that appellant used a hunting knife, more or
less six inches long. He also recalled having seen victim William Tacaldo with Juan Florencio
inside the public market stall typing some documents.
For his injuries, Felipe was brought to the hospital where he was con ned for four days. The
accused was charged of three separate crimes thereafter.
The court ruled on three separate crimes committed by the accused:
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the crime committed by appellant involving Victoriano Francisco is Murder which is
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion perpetua to death.
Considering that there was no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the
lesser penalty of the two indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua, is proper.
The court ruled that, In the case involving William Tacaldo, the alleged aggravating
circumstance in this case, that is, disregard of respect due the o ended party on account of
age, cannot be appreciated since it was not shown that appellant deliberately intended to
o end or insult the age of the o ended party. Hence, the penalty must be applied in its
medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term for the
indeterminate sentence shall be within the range of prision mayor while the maximum term of
the sentence shall be within the range of reclusion temporal medium. Thus, the court nd the
penalty imposed by the trial court in this case to be in order.
In the case involving Felipe Pajunar, appellant should be convicted of the crime of Attempted
Murder which, under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, is punishable with the penalty
two degrees lower than that prescribed for the consummated felony. Accordingly, the
imposable penalty is prision mayor. Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
penalty should be applied in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the minimum of the penalty to be imposed should be within the range of prision correccional,
and the maximum of the penalty to be imposed should be within the range of prision mayor
in its medium period. Hence, for the crime of Attempted Murder, appellant should be
sentenced to su er the penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and
One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.
People v. Tubongbanua y Pahilanga, G.R. No. 171271, August 31, 2006.
Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho since 1998. The latter
worked as the managing partner of the Lawyer’s Advocate Circle, a law rm operated as a
sole proprietorship, and located at 2302 Atlanta Center, 31 Anapolis St., Greenhills, San
Juan, M.M. Accused was initially paid P6,000.00 a month as wages, aside from boarding,
food, overtime and extra pay, which he received when he did extra driving and other work for
Atty. Sua-Kho’s family.
On February 12, 2001, around 6:00 o’clock in the evening, the accused drove Atty. Sua Kho
to her condominium. After handing his employer’s bag to Marissa Hiso, the housemaid,
accused proceeded to the kitchen where he drank a glass of water. Also in the condominium
unit were Atty. Sua-Kho’s three year old daughter Issa and her nanny. After talking and
playing with her daughter for a few minutes, Atty. Sua-Kho emerged from the bedroom to
talk with the accused. Shortly thereafter, Marrisa heard her employer screaming, and she
saw the accused stabbing her with their kitchen knife. She tried to stop the accused,
shouting "Kuya Bert!", but the latter continued to stab Atty. Sua-Kho. Meanwhile, Nelie also
heard her employer’s screams, and locked herself with Issa in the master’s bathroom. When
 she peeped-out from her hiding place, she saw Marissa, whom she signaled to go
downstairs for help. The latter did so, and sought help from the security guard. Nellie,
meanwhile called Atty. Sua-Kho’s father, Marcelino Sua, and husband, Daniel Kho, on the
bedroom phone.
When Marcelino Sua arrived, he saw Marissa and a security guard in front of the
condominium unit. When they entered, they saw the bloodied and unmoving body of Atty.
Sua-Kho sprawled on the oor. Marcelino then brought his daughter to the Cardinal Santos
Memorial Hospital, where doctors tried to revive her, but failed. The accused, meanwhile,
ed, using the victim’s car. He was arrested soon afterwards in Calapan, Mindoro, while on
his way to his home province.
The court stated that, there is no dispute that Atty. Sua-Kho was killed in her home.
Appellant could have killed her elsewhere but he decided to commit the crime at her home;
thus the court appreciate the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. However, it was not
convincingly shown that appellant deliberately intended to o end or disregard the respect
due to rank, age, or sex of Atty. Sua-Kho. The motive for the murder was his grudge against
the victim and not because she was a lawyer and his employer. Neither did appellant took
into consideration the age of Atty. Sua-Kho and the fact that she is a woman when he killed
her.
Pp vs. HERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 139697, Jun 15, 2004
At about 7:00 a.m on that day, a forty-four-year-old sweepstakes ticket vendor, went to the
Rural Health Center to seek medical treatment for his ailment. After receiving his daily
medication from the nurse, he left the health center and went to a nearby store to wait for a
ride back to his house in Barangay Mahabang Parang, San Luis, Batangas. When no public
utility jeepney passed by, he started walking towards the direction of Barangay Mahabang
Parang. It was about 11:00 a.m. Upon reaching the boundary of Banoyo and Mahabang
Parang at around 12:00 noon, he saw his cousin-in-law, the appellant, and Catapang
dragging his seventy-two-year-old auntie, Natividad Yuzon Mendoza, in the direction of a
forested area where there were also mango and coconut trees. Cesar shouted, "Hoy, bakit
ninyo kinakaladkad ang aking tiya?" Catapang and the appellant approached and told him
not to interfere. Then Catapang pointed a knife at Cesar and, with the appellant, warned him
not to reveal what he saw to anyone; otherwise, they would kill him and his family, including
his children.
The appellant and Catapang then returned to the place where Natividad was. Cesar followed
them and concealed himself behind a mango tree about ten arm’s length away, and saw
them forcibly taking money, a pair of earrings and a necklace from the bag of his aunt, who
was lying prostrate on the ground. Catapang and the appellant positioned themselves at
Natividad’s right and left side, and strangled her with the use of a white rope made of buri or
vine string. She pleaded, "Huwag po, huwag po," to no avail.
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Cesar hurriedly left the place on foot and went home. He kept the gory incident to himself for
fear of retaliation from the accused and the appellant.
That afternoon, Natividad’s son, Nemensio Mendoza, had already started looking for his
mother. Cesar joined the search at 5:00 p.m. together with the barangay captain and some
of the barangay folks. The cadaver of Natividad was found at about 11:00 p.m.
Cesar’s fear was heightened when Catapang and the appellant warned him anew on
Christmas Eve that if he divulged to anyone what he had witnessed on December 19, 1994,
they would kill him and his children.14 However, on February 7, 1995, Cesar nally decided to
tell his cousin, Nemensio, how Natividad died and who the perpetrators were. He narrated
how he saw Catapang and the appellant rob Natividad of her money and jewelry, and then
strangled her to death. He and Nemensio forthwith went to the police station where they
gave their respective sworn statements to SPO3 Macatangay.
The court disagreed with the lower courts ndings, that abuse of superior strength, disregard
of sex and age, were attendant in the commission of the crime. Section 8, Rule 110 of the
2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure now explicitly requires the complaint or
information to "state the designation of the o ense given by the statute, aver the acts or
omissions constituting the o ense, and specify the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances." Under the old rule, only the qualifying circumstances were needed to be
alleged in order to be considered by the court. The present rules, however, require even the
aggravating circumstances to be alleged in the complaint or information. The information in
the present case failed to precisely aver that abuse of superior strength and disregard of age
and sex attended the commission of the crime. Although the rule took e ect only on
December 1, 2000 and it was the old law that was in e ect at the time of the commission of
the crime, the same may be applied retroactively insofar as it bene ts the accused.
Moreover, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and disregard of age
and sex cannot be appreciated as no evidence was presented to prove the same. To
establish the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, there must be a
deliberate intent on the part of the malefactors to take advantage of their greater number.
They must have nefariously selected and made use of superior strength in the commission
of the crime. As an aggravating circumstance, what should be considered is not that there
are two or more assailants as against one victim, but whether the aggressors took
advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the o ense.
With respect to disregard of age and sex, the Court has pronounced in the case of People v.
Collado that the same may be appreciated only in crimes against persons or honor. It is not
correct to consider this aggravating circumstance in crimes against property. Besides,
robbery with homicide is principally a crime against property and not against persons.
Homicide is a mere incident of the robbery, the latter being the main purpose and object of
the criminal. Moreover, it has not been proven that in committing the crime, the appellant
determinedly intended to o end or insult the age and sex of the victim.
 Pp vs Evangelio, GR No. 181902, August 31, 2011
One evening, while AAA, a 17-year-old househelper, was cooking in the kitchen of the house
of BBB situated in Tacloban City, four persons, one of whom was armed with a handgun
while the other three with knives, suddenly barged inside the house through the open
kitchen door. The four men accosted her, warned her to keep quiet, and brought her to the
living room. There, they herded all the other members of the household whom they caught
and bound their hands and feet, and thereafter, placed masking tapes over their captives’
eyes. With her eyes partially covered by the tape, AAA was brought by the appellant inside
the comfort room and thereat, appellant and one of the robbers stripped o AAA's clothes
and removed her panty. AAA resisted and fought back but they slammed her head twice
against the concrete wall, causing her to lose consciousness. When she regained her
senses, appellant and the other robbers were already gone, and she found herself lying on
the side on the oor of the comfort room with her feet untied and her hands still tied behind
her back. She saw her shorts and panty strewn at her side. She su ered pain in her knees,
head, stomach, and her vagina, which was bleeding. Later on, AAA was freed from the
comfort room by the other occupants of the house, who were earlier freed.
Prosecution witness Evelyn was in the living room when the incident happened. She was
tutoring her nieces when the four men barged inside the house. She testi ed that she could
not be mistaken as to the identity of the accused Edgar, who was armed with a handgun,
because he is a friend of her husband and who used to work for him. Appellant and accused
Noel are also familiar to her because they previously stayed in Sampaguita, Tacloban City,
where she lives. Upon the instruction of accused Edgar, Edelyn was divested of her earrings,
bracelet, watch, and ring. Thereafter, appellant tied her hands and feet, and blindfolded her
with masking tape. She was hit on the head with a rearm, causing a cut and her losing
consciousness. When she regained her senses, she found herself in the maids' room. She
heard accused Edgar ask her nieces where their father kept their pieces of jewelry and
rearm. When her nieces told him that the valuables were kept upstairs, accused Edgar
brought one of them there. The accused were able to take the valuable item from the
residence.
The court ruled that, the commission of the act in night time is considered an aggravating
circumstance only when it is deliberately sought to prevent the accused from being
recognized or to ensure escape. There must be proof that this was intentionally sought to
ensure the commission of the crime, and that the accused took advantage of it to insure his
immunity from captivity. Here, there is a paucity of evidence that nighttime was purposely,
deliberately, and especially sought by the accused. The mere fact that the o ense was
committed at night will not su ce to sustain a nding of nocturnity.
Further, the phrase, "forcibly enter the inhabited house" does not comprise the aggravating
circumstance of "unlawful entry." Verily, evidence showed that all the accused freely entered
the [victims'] residence through the open kitchen door, which is clearly intended for ingress
and or egress. The trial court and the CA correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance
of the commission of a crime by a band. In the crime of robbery with rape, band is
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considered as an aggravating circumstance. The prosecution established that one of the
accused was armed with a handgun, while the other three had knives when they committed
the crime.
The aggravating circumstance of dwelling was also attendant in the present case. Dwelling
aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the o ended party
provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor.39 In this case, robbery with
violence was committed in the house of the victims without provocation on their part. In
robbery with violence and intimidation against persons, dwelling is aggravating because in
this class of robbery, the crime may be committed without the necessity of trespassing the
sanctity of the o ended party's house. It is considered an aggravating circumstance
primarily because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to the human abode. He
who goes to another’s house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who o ends
him elsewhere.
PP vs. ALCALA, G.R. No. L-18988, December 29, 1922
On one evening, the deceased Eugenio Rubion was in his house in company with his wife
and children. The deceased's mother-in-law with her husband was also there. After having
taken their supper, the deceased and Ciriaco Aguinaldo drank some wine, and afterwards all
retired to sleep. The deceased went to the hand-rail of the door and rested there. About
midnight, his wife, Emeteria Eje, who was sleeping within the house, was awake by the noise
produced by a blow. She got up, looked out, and saw the accused Valentin Alcala upon
Eugenio Rubion, holding the latter by the neck, while the appellant, Paulo Alcala, who had a
club in his hand, held the knees of the deceased. Upon seeing this, Emeteria Eje exclaimed:
"Jesus Christ! What have you done with my husband?" The accused warned her to keep
quiet, and she ran within the house, stepping the hand of her mother who woke up and
called her husband, who said: "Eugenio, what is that? Eugenio, light," to which Emeteria
answered: "They are Valentin and his brother." Ciriaco Aguinaldo went downstairs and found
Eugenio Rubion at the base of the staircase with his face downward and between the two
accused, one of whom, Valentin, who had a leather scabbard on his waist, said, "take care
not to say anything of what has happened."
Then, Valentin and the herein appellant, brought the corpse of Eugenio Rubion to the house,
placed the body with his face downward over a pillow, within the mosquito net, where
Emeteria Eje had slept, whom Valentin Alcala abused after all other persons who were there
had run away. Finally, Valentin left after threatening Emeteria Eje, saying, "If you report all
that has happened, I will kill you; and if you are obliged to testify, you must testify against
Tranquilino and Catalino, tenants of Kalaw."
Emeteria Eje remained in the house watching over the corpse of her husband until the
following morning, when she looked for the lieutenant of the barrio. The day next following
the corpse was taken to the town. The sanitary inspector, who examined the body of the
deceased, found a contusion on the lower lips, an ecchymosis in the hypogastrical region
extending to the last rib of the left side and another ecchymosis on the abdomen which
 caused internal hemorrhage. He found the nose bleeding. According to him, all of these
contusions were mortal.
During the rst days following the event, Emeteria Eje gave the authorities di erent versions
of the a air but after she learned that the accused were already arrested, she testi ed to the
facts above stated.
The court ruled that, the presence of the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of the
crime having been committed in the dwelling of the o ended party. While it does not
positively appear that the accused sought the nighttime for the perpetration of the crime, the
fact is that they at least took advantage of it, for they approached the house at an early time,
and yet they did not commit the crime until late in the night. This is su cient in order that the
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity may be held to exist. (U. S. vs. Billedo, 32 Phil., 574.)
As to whether the crime must be held to have been committed in the dwelling of the
o ended party, we take it that, although the accused were found with the deceased at the
foot of the staircase of the house, that place must be regarded as an integral part of the
dwelling of that family. The porch of a house, not common to di erent neighbors, is a part of
the dwelling. (Decision of the supreme court of Spain of January 8, 1884.)
Therefore, hold that the crime proven in this case is homicide with two aggravating
circumstances, to wit, nocturnity and that of the act having been committed in the dwelling
of the o ended party, and we nd the herein appellant guilty of such a crime, his other
assignments of error having no merit.
US vs. LICARTE, G.R. No. 6784, August 15, 1912
There had been some trouble between the family of the appellant and that of the o ended
party prior to the occurrences which form the basis of this action. On the 18th of September,
1910, the o ended party. Benita Soyso, sent her small son to the house of the accused for
the purpose of obtaining a bolo which her husband had loaned to the husband of the
accused. On arrival of the messenger at the house, he found that neither the accused nor
her husband was there, and asking Filomena, daughter of the accused, for the bolo,
Filomena replied by saying that she knew nothing about it. The o ended party, on hearing
this reply (her house and that of the accused being opposite and very near each other)
began abusing Filomena, calling her vile names. The accused and her husband being in a
neighbors house nearby, heard these insulting words, and thereupon the accused left the
house where she was and appeared in front of that of Benita Soyso and demanded of the
latter an explanation of the insult to her daughter Filomena. A quarrel ensued between Benita
and the accused becoming very angry and very much excited, and having in her hand at that
time a short working bolo, entered the house of Benita and began striking her with the bolo.
As a result of the wounds in icted, Benita was incapacitated and required medical
attendance for a period of fteen days.
The court ruled that, vile language was not directed at the accused, but to her daughter. This
was, however, a su cient provocation to cause the accused to demand an explanation why
her daughter was so grossly insulted. So, under these facts, it was error to hold that the
aggravating circumstance of morada existed. (Decision of the supreme court of Spain,
October 24, 1894.)
The accused was a woman about fty years of age. She heard of her single daughter grossly
insulted. She appeared in front of the house of Benita and demanded an explanation. The
explanation was not forthcoming, and a quarrel immediately ensued between these two
women. The accused was laboring under great excitement and passion when she entered
the house of Benita and in icted the wounds. These facts should be considered as a
circumstance mitigating the o ense. (Art. 9, No. 7, Penal Code.) There being no aggravating
circumstances present, and one mitigating circumstance, the penalty should have been
imposed in its minimum degree.
PP vs. DEQUIÑA, G.R. No. 41040, August 09, 1934
As to the rst assignment of error that the lower court erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstances of ensa amiento and alevosia, it is to be observed that the trial judge did not
make any express nding as to these or any other circumstances, but merely stated that in
view of the circumstances of the case the defendant was sentenced to su er reclusion
perpetua, or the medium degree of the penalty provided by law. Although it does not appear
that the crime in question was committed with ensa amiento or cruelty, by deliberately and
inhumanly augmenting the su ering of the victim, or outraging or sco ng at his person or
course, it is clearly proved that the defendant availed or corpse, it is clearly proved that the
defendant availed himself of alevosia or treachery, because taking advantage of the
nighttime the defendant entered the house of the deceased and attacked him with a bolo
while he was asleep. There is treachery when the o ender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the o ended party might make (article 14, subsection 16, of the Revised Penal Code).
It has been repeatedly held by this court that there exists the qualifying circumstance
ofalevosia or treachery when one takes the life of a person who is asleep.
The attorney for the appellant next maintains that the lower court erred in taking into account
the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and dwelling.
Nocturnity in this case is included in the qualifying circumstance of treachery, and should not
be regarded as an aggravating circumstance.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Spain in the case of robbery cited by appellant's
attorney is not applicable by analogy to the facts of the present case. As this court said in
the case of the United States vs. Cas (14 Phil., 21, 22), ". . . the fact that the crime was
committed in the house of the o ended person should not in our opinion be taken into
consideration as an aggravating circumstance in xing the penalty to be imposed, because

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 the commission of the o ense in an inhabited house is an essential element of the crime,
de ned and penalized in article 508 of the Penal Code, of which the defendant was charged
and convicted, and it would not be proper to take into consideration the fact that it was
committed in an inhabited house so as to bring it under the comparatively severe penalties
prescribed by that article, and then to take into consideration a second time the fact that it
was committed in an inhabited house, to wit, that of the owner of the stolen property, to still
further increase the penalty," while in the case of the United States vs. Turla (38 Phil., 346),
where the appellants were convicted of robbery through intimidation upon the inmates of the
house and punished under article 503, No. 5, instead of article 508, it was held that the
aggravating circumstance of morada was present and should be taken into account.
Although the Code provides that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling cannot be
properly taken into account if the provocation was given by the o ended party, this is only
true when there exists a close relation between the provocation and the commission of the
crime in the dwelling of the person from whom the provocation came. For example, in the
case of the United States vs. Licarte (23 Phil., 10), the house of the o ended party was very
near that of the accused, and while in her house the o ended party began to abuse the
daughter of the accused and to call her vile names. The accused heard the insulting words
and appeared in front of the o ended party's house and demanded an explanation. A quarrel
ensued, and the accused becoming very angry and excited entered the house of the
o ended party and struck her with a bolo. This court held that under the circumstances the
aggravating circumstance of morada did not exist. In that case the invasion of the privacy of
the o ended party's home was the direct and immediate consequence of the provocation
given by her.
In the case at bar the circumstances are, however, quite di erent. The provocation was not
given immediately prior to the commission of the crime and had no particular relation to the
house of the deceased. If the defendant had entered the house of the deceased and
surprised the deceased and the wife of the defendant in the act of adultery, the aggravating
circumstance of morada would not exist.
The lower court found, and the evidence justi es the nding that the deceased had been
maintaining illicit relations with the defendant's wife. This fact was su cient to have
produced passion and obfuscation in the mind of the defendant, and it may be inferred that
the accused was impelled thereby to commit the crime. He is accordingly entitled to the
bene t of this mitigating circumstance.
The other facts urged by the attorney for the appellant in the mitigation of the o ense do not
constitute extenuating circumstances. Neither the fact that the deceased reproved the
accused because he had no means of supporting his wife and children, nor the fact that the
deceased urged the chief of police to le a complaint against the accused for failure to pay
his cedula tax, nor the relation existing between the parties because the accused was a
tenant or had been a retainer of the deceased constitutes a mitigating circumstance.
Since the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is o set by that of passion and obfuscation,
the penalty was properly imposed in its medium degree, or reclusion perpetua.
The decision appealed from is therefore a rmed, with the costs against the appellant.
PP vs. AGONCILLO, G.R. No 138983, May 23, 2001
The victim, is 14 years old at the time of rape. In that evening, her father and mother went to
the river to catch sh; that her only companions in their house during that night were her
three (3) younger brothers. They went to bed at 8: 00 PM, that 11:00 PM, she roused to look
at their wall clock if it is already time to prepare their breakfast; that suddenly, somebody
covered her mouth and told her not to shout or else, he will cut o her head; that the said
person was armed with a scythe; that she was then dragged to the banana plantation where
she was ordered to lie on the ground and not to shout under threat that if she will not obey,
he will sickle her neck; that the said person then started to kiss her; that because of the
frequent ashes of light in the sky (caused by lightning), she was able to recognize that
person as the herein accused; that she knows the accused since the latter was always
passing near their house; that the accused kissed her lips and vagina; that he spread her
legs, placed himself on top of her and tried to insert his penis into her vagina; that because
the accused found it di cult to insert his penis into her vagina, he instead inserted his nger
until such time that he was able to insert his penis; that the accused then pushed and pulled
his penis in her vagina; that it was painful; that after several minutes, the accused stood up
and wiped his sweat; that thereafter, she was accompanied by the accused up to the
bamboo plantation and warned her that he will kill them all if she will tell her parents on what
happened to her.
The court ruled that, Dwelling is considered as an aggravating circumstance primarily
because of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to the human abode. However, in the
present case, Rosalyn was not raped therein. Although she was abducted therefrom,
accused-appellant was not charged with forcible abduction with rape but only with rape.
Considering that she was not raped in her home, dwelling cannot be appreciated.
The trial court also erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nighttime and
uninhabited place. For nocturnity to properly attend the commission of a crime, it must be
shown that it facilitated the commission of the o ense and that it was purposely sought by
the o ender. The fact that the o ense was committed at night will not su ce to sustain
nocturnidad.In the present case, there was no evidence to prove that accused-appellant
purposely sought the cover of night when he raped Rosalyn. In the same vein, the
aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place cannot also be appreciated in the absence of
proof that solitude was purposely sought or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission
of the crime. The term uninhabited place does not refer to the distance of the nearest house
to the locus criminis for the more important consideration is whether the place of
commission a ords a reasonable possibility for the victim to receive some help. The
evidence on record before us fails to provide any basis to conclude that the speci c
circumstances surrounding the scene of the rape were such that its state of being
uninhabited prevented any reasonable possibility that the victim could have possibly
solicited assistance to fend o her attacker.

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 PP vs. CALISO, G.R. No. 37271, July 01, 1933
SPANISH
People v. Collado, G.R. Nos. 135667-70, March 1, 2001
Messeah is the daughter of Jose Noli Dumaoal, a seaman. His household was composed of
his wife Julie, and their three (3) children, Reggie, Messeah and Metheor. The accused Jessie
Ventura Collado, son of Jose Noli's cousin Benjamin, was living with them since 1989. While
waiting for an opportunity to become a seaman himself like his uncle Jose, Jessie served as
the family driver. Aside from driving Julie, Jessie would also drive the school service vehicle
operated by the Dumaoal spouses. Since Jose was almost always at sea and having no
househelp, their children were oftentimes left in the care of Jessie. But, instead of taking
care of them as their surrogate father, he took advantage of Messeah by sexually molesting
her at home, and worse, even in the presence of her younger brother.
The rst of four (4) unfortunate occasions was on 27 April 1993 when Julie and her oldest
son Reggie went to Cubao. Messeah was resting in her bedroom upstairs when Jessie
suddenly barged into her room. "What are you doing here?" she demanded, knowing fully
well that he was not allowed upstairs without her parents' permission. Jessie simply smiled
and said, "Wala," and added that her mother was not around to get mad at him. Then he left
only to return after three (3) to ve (5) minutes with a straw rope in hand. Messeah asked him
why he was holding the rope, and Jessie told her to keep quiet and not to ask questions or
else he would hurt her. Alarmed, Messeah rushed to the window and screamed for her
brother Metheor, but Jessie reached out to cover her mouth with one hand while he closed
the window with the other. She heard Metheor call out from downstairs, "What's going on?"
but Jessie stopped her from answering. This occasion was unfortunately happened three
separate times after this incident until such time where the victim told her parents the truth.
They sent Jessie to the province. Due to the threats of Jessie, they transferred residence but
it was found out that Jessie had been seen drinking in front of the house (new residence).
This prompted the spouses to press charges against the accused.
The court ruled that, a rmative testimony is far weightier than a mere denial, especially
when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Jessie's alibi that he was driving the
family car on the disputed occasions cannot stand up to his positive identi cation as the
perpetrator of the crime by both Messeah and Metheor. Moreover, we agree with the
Solicitor General that the only reason why the Dumaoal spouses agreed to let Jessie go
home to the province instead of ling charges against him was because they were "torn
between seeking justice for their daughter and preserving her and the family's reputation.
There was also the Christian desire to forgive and give a blood kin a new chance at life
knowing the gravity of the penalty that would be meted out to him. To interpret their
actuation any other way would be most unfair to parents who are equally su ering with what
befell their only daughter." The accused-appellant JESSIE VENTURA COLLADO is
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and twenty (20) days of arresto
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mayor maximum as minimum, to four (4) years six (6) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional maximum as maximum, in each count of Acts of Lasciviousness.
PP vs. LIBRANDO, G.R. No. 132251, July 06, 2000
Edwin Labandero brought his eight (8) year old daughter Aileen to market. While on their way
home, Edwin, Aileen and a relative, Fernando de los Santos, traversed a hilly portion of the
trail when they met accused-appellants Raelito Librando, Larry Surdillas and Eddie Purisima.
Raelito inquired from Edwin the whereabouts of Fernando and without any warning hit Edwin
with a piece of wood. Eddie Purisima followed suit and delivered another blow to Edwin.
Edwin ran but he was chased by Raelito. Thereafter, the three men took turns hitting Edwin
with pieces of wood until the latter fell and died. Although it was already dark at that time,
Aileen had no trouble identifying the accused-appellants since Edwin was carrying a lighted
torch. While the men took turns in mauling the deceased, Edwin, Fernando took Aileen with
him and ran to report the incident to the Barangay Captain.
The court ruled that, since the accused voluntary presented themselves to the authority they
all enjoy the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. However, is not inclined to
consider the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self defense in Raelito Librando’s
favor.To avail of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self defense, there must be
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. In the case at bar, prosecution witness Aileen
testi ed that it was in fact the said accused-appellant who after inquiring from Edwin the
whereabouts of Fernando, delivered the rst blow without any warning to the deceased. The
severity of the injuries in icted on the deceased as well as the fact that Raelito who admitted
that he was of bigger built than the deceased, could hardly present any evidence of injuries
allegedly in icted on him by the deceased belie his claim of self defense. Moreover, The trial
court did not err in considering the nighttime and uninhabited place as just one aggravating
circumstance.
In the case of People vs. Santos it has been held that if the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime, uninhabited place or band concur in the commission of the crime, all will
constitute one aggravating circumstance only as a general rule although they can be
considered separately if their elements are distinctly perceived and can subsist
independently, revealing a greater degree of perversity.
PP vs. SILVA, G.R. No. 140871, August 8, 2002
One evening of Edmundo Ceriales, passed by his brother Manuel’s house. There, he saw
Boy Tagalario, Jimmy Tagalario, Marlon Flores, Mardie Alejandro, a certain Onoy, and Pogi
Salvador. Some of these men were playing a card game known as "tong-its" while the others
were merely watching the game. Suddenly three men arrived. One pointed an armalite gun
to all those present and ordered them to lie on their stomach. Another ordered brothers
Edmundo and Manuel to get out of the house.
As soon as they were out, they were made to lie face down. Upon the orders of a person
whom Edmundo later recognized as appellant Resty Silva, he and his brother were tied by
 two armed men whom he also recognized later as Rodolfo Sandangao, also known as
Dupong and Jun-jun Flores. Thereafter, they walked towards the highway. An incoming
vehicle light enabled Edmundo to recognize Sandangao at this point. They hid and
continued walking after the vehicle left. Since Edmundo and Manuel were tied together, they
walked side by side. It was at this point that Edmundo whispered to his brother that he
recognized Sandangao to be their childhood neighbor. Although there were houses along the
way, the brothers were prevented from asking help because they were threatened with bodily
harm by the three men. When they reached a coconut plantation owned by a certain
Almonte, appellant Silva cut his T-shirt and stuck some of its portion to Edmundo’s mouth. It
was removed later by appellant Silva after being assured that they would not ght back. As
they continued walking, they reached the plantation of a certain Henyo who happened to be
Edmundo’s godfather. Edmundo tried to convince their abductors to kill them there and not
to bring them away anymore. Jun-jun Flores was about to stab him but his brother Manuel
begged Flores not to do it.
When asked if they knew them(the abductors), Manuel positively answered hence Silva
retorted "Papano yan Dupong, kilala pala tayo, obligado na nating patayin."
Edmundo was thereafter separated from Manuel. He was brought twenty meters away from
Manuel by Sandangao and herein appellant while Flores was left to take care of Manuel.
After appellant Sandangao tied his feet, appellant left them. He then pleaded to Sandangao
to set him free and promised to forget the incident. But Sandangao refused. After which,
Sandangao left him. He then tried to free himself jumping away from where he was until he
fell into a hole. While there, he tried to untie his hands and feet till he heard the scream of
Manuel followed by sound akin to the cutting of a tree. When Edmundo was already untying
his feet he was given a warning to come out or they would kill Manuel if he failed. Manuel
went to his godfathers home and spent the night there. The next day Manuel went to check
the family of Edmundo, thankfully they were unharmed. Later that day, the headless body of
Edmundo was found while its head was recovered in Baler, Aurora.
The court ruled that, nighttime is aggravating only when: (1) it is especially sought by the
o ender; or (2) it is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the
crime by ensuring the o ender’s immunity from capture. In this case, the trial court correctly
appreciated nighttime as aggravating considering that nighttime facilitated the abduction of
the Ceriales brothers, the killing of Manuel Ceriales and the attempt to kill Edmundo
Ceriales. Evidence shows that accused-appellants took advantage of the darkness to
successfully consummate their plans. The fact that they brought with them a ashlight
clearly shows that they intended to commit the crime in darkness. The accused will enjoy the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder.
PP vs. CARIÑO, G.R. No. 131117, Jun 15, 2004
Leopoldo Cariño and his brother, Nelson Cariño, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio (Boy) Corcolon, Lito
Calong-Calong, Domingo Banhaon, "Boy Pansit" and Norberto Ongjuatco were bodyguards
of Mayor Antonio Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna. Leopoldo was gunned down by an unknown
assailant.
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Nelson Cariño was reported to have killed Bernardo Velecina, while Recto Aniceto was
reportedly shot by the group of Lito Calong-Calong. Norberto Ongjuatco, one of the
bodyguards of Mayor Sanchez, secretly warned Valentin to be careful. When apprised of the
impending peril to their lives, Valentin, Ruben and their mother, Atanacia, were afraid that
they would be killed next on orders of Mayor Sanchez.
A pre-nuptial party where the parties are invited, Edwin noticed a white Ford Fiera with plate
number 777 stop in front of the alley leading to Roger’s house, about twenty (20) meters
from where he and his friends were drinking Tanduay. The Fiera was followed by a tricycle
and a galvanized owner-type jeep driven by "Boy Pansit." Edwin saw that Mayor Sanchez
was inside the Fiera, along with two others who were seated at the backseat; beside "Boy
Pansit" was Lito Corcolon. The latter alighted from the jeepney, approached Edwin and
asked him if Ruben and Roger, the fathers of the persons to be wed, were inside the house.
Edwin replied in the a rmative. Thereafter, Lito Corcolon returned to the Ford Fiera and
whispered something to Mayor Sanchez. The Ford Fiera then drove away.
Lito Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Nelson Cariño, "Boy Pansit," Lito Calong-Calong and
Domingo Banhaon then alighted from the jeepney and entered the alley leading to the Perez
residence. They posted themselves near the kitchen. When Valentin Velecina saw Mayor
Sanchez’ men arrive, he posted himself in a dark place near the chicken coop, about seven
(7) meters from the western side of the house. Valentin could see the kitchen from where he
was. He could also see the bodyguards of Mayor Sanchez, all of whom were armed with
short handguns.
Meanwhile, Ruben went to the comfort room which was near the kitchen sink and was
covered by bamboo slits. As he emerged from the comfort room, Nelson Cariño, Lito
Calong-Calong, Rogelio and Lito Corcolon aimed their guns at the kitchen and red
successively. "Boy Pansit" and Domingo Banhaon pulled out their guns and acted as
lookouts.
Ruben was shot and later died. His brother Valentin, went to hid and later sought help for the
killing of his brother.
The court ruled that, The requisites of this aggravating circumstance are: (1) that armed men
or persons took part in the commission of the crime, directly or indirectly, and (2) that the
accused availed himself of their aid or relied upon them when the crime was committed. In
this case, while the appellants were all armed, all of them acted in conspiracy with one
another. All of the appellants acted in concert to ensure the commission of the crime. Hence,
the aggravating circumstance cannot be appreciated. Even if it were so, the same could not
be appreciated separately as it is deemed to have been absorbed by treachery.
The records reveal that the crime was committed during nighttime. This circumstance is
considered aggravating only when it facilitated the commission of the crime, or was
especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of impunity. The
 essence of this aggravating circumstance is the obscuridad a orded by, and not merely the
chronological onset of, nighttime. Although the o ense was committed at night, nocturnity
does not become a modifying factor when the place is adequately lighted and, thus, could
no longer insure the o ender’s immunity from identi cation or capture. In the case at bar, it
was not shown that nighttime was especially sought for or used to insure the o ender’s
immunity from identi cation or capture.
PP vs. RUBIA, G.R. No. 28792, October 06, 1928
One night, the four defendants, Floro Rubia, Macario Teoxon, Eduardo Rubia, and Juan
Rubia went in a good-sized boat to Malindong Island, in Lagonoy Bay, of the said
municipality, where Pedro Suino lived. The following morning they went in search of Pedro
Suino in this house. As Suino was still asleep, they went away intending to return later, as, in
fact, they did, and Floro Rubia asked Pedro Suino if he was going shing, and having
received an a rmative reply, they invited him to go with them, since they, too, were going
shing. At about noon they left for the sea, Pedro going alone in his banca, while the four
went in theirs. At about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, one Pantaleon Cordial, of the same barrio,
while shing, saw a banca a short distance away, but without any occupant. Fearing that the
owner of the boat had met with an accident, he returned home in haste and told Pedro's
wife of what he had seen. The woman begged two men to go and see what had happened
to her husband, and they found Pedro Suino dead in his banca, which was anchored, with
scartches around his neck, on the left side of his chest and on his left arm. The men whom
Suino's wife had called upon, Geronimo Lopez and Graciano Castor by name, rowed
Suino's banca to the shore. Undoubtedly Pedro Suino was the victim of a criminal assault.
The defense alleges that Pedro Suino died of an electrical shock. But the body of the
deceased was examined by a health o cer who performed an autopsy on October 11th,
and he positively a rmed that death was not produced by an electrical shock, but by
strangling or some other violent means. Not a single trace of an electrical discharge has
been found either in the banca or on the deceased's body.
Who killed Pedro Suino?
Pedro and Juan Delloro, brothers, substantially testi ed that while they went about in their
banca at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon in question, they saw Pedro Suino in the
defendants' boat, while Suino's banca lay alongside of it; that Floro Rubia struck Suino in
the chest with an oar and Macario Teoxon strangled him, after which they lay in the bottom
of their boat, and remained out of sight because at that time it was thundering and raining
hard; and that the said witnesses were about 20 brazas from the defendants' banca but they
were afraid to go near it.
another banca, namely, that belonging to the witnesses, the Delloro brothers was also at
sea, there is no argument against said circumstance being taken into consideration. (U.S. vs.
Angeles, 6 Phil., 480; U.S. vs. Maharaja Alim, 38 Phil., 1.)
The aggravating circumstances of craft and abuse of superior strength cannot be considered
in this case; the rst, because the mere invitation extended by the defendants to the
deceased to venture out to sea with them, but itself alone does not constitute a deceitful
means leading to the commission of the criminal act; and the second, that is, abuse of
superior strength, because there is no proof that the two accused simultaneously asssaulted
the deceased with their oars, with the object of weakening whatever defense the assaulted
party might put up. And there being no extenuating circumstance present, the penalty must
be imposed upon the defendants in its maximum degree, that is, seventeen years, four
months, and one day, to twenty years' reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law.
PP vs. LUMANDONG, G.R. No. 132745, Mar 9, 2000
At about 2:00 o'clock in the morning, Rebecca was awakened by the cry of her youngest
child. She lit the lamp inside the house and noticed that Analou was missing.
Rebecca immediately went to the house of her parents-in-law which was just fteen (15)
meters away from her house to inquire about her daughter but she was told that Analou was
not there. Initial search for Analou in the neighborhood, led by the barangay captain, proved
futile. It was already 8:00 o'clock in the morning when the lifeless and naked body of Analou
was found by a couple in the grassy portion of the village near the Iponan River.
Ruben Obsioma, Barangay Captain of Sitio Bolihon, Taglimao, Cagayan de Oro City
instructed Kagawad Osias Pabilona to prepare a list of the persons who attended the
birthday party of a certain Bonifacio Daang which was held in the same evening when
Analou Eduave was killed. Appellant Romeo Lumandong was among the persons included in
the list that was subsequently forwarded to the police. The accused went to the Barangay
captain’s house. The Barangay captain asked if he was the one who killed Analou, he initially
gave no answer and merely bowed his head. After having been asked for the third time,
appellant admitted the killing of Analou Eduave allegedly because her parents withheld his
past earnings in the farm. In addition, appellant revealed that it was actually Analou's father
whom he intended to kill, but he was not in the house that fateful evening and that he
stabbed Analou with a double bladed knife only ve (5) times, the other wounds being mere
exit wounds. He also said that he did not rape Analou and undressed her only to confuse the
investigators about the motive for the killing.

The act proven constitutes the crime of homicide, de ned and penalized in article 404 of the
Penal Code, for which the defendants Floro Rubia and Macario Teoxon are criminally liable
by direct participation. The aggravating circumstance of the crime having been committed in
an uninhabited place must be considered, the incident having taken place at sea where it
was di cult for the o ended party to receive help, while the assailants could easily have
escaped punishment, and the purely accidental circumstance that on the day in question
There was treachery in view of the age of the victim who was only eight (8) years old at the
time of her death. Likewise, the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place under Article
14(6) was correctly appreciated against the appellant. It appears from the evidence that the
appellant deliberately carried his victim to the isolated and grassy portion of the Iponan River
which is about two hundred (200) meters away from her house before killing his said victim

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 thereby facilitating the commission of the crime. The aggravating circumstances of nighttime
and abuse of superior strength are absorbed in treachery. The aggravating circumstance of
cruelty may not be appreciated against the appellant absent any showing that the other
wounds found on the body of the victim were in icted to prolong her su ering before the
fatal wound was delivered.
On the other hand, it appearing that the appellant was only fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months, and fteen (15) days old at the time of the commission of the crime, he is entitled to
a reduced penalty due to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article
13(2) in relation to Article 68(1) of the Revised Penal Code which provides at least two (2)
degrees lower than that prescribed for the crime of murder under Article 248 of the same
code. Consequently, there being one (1) aggravating circumstance, the imposable penalty on
the appellant is prision mayor in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree that is prision
correccional.
PP vs. MAGDAMIT, G.R. No. 118130, Sep 24, 1997
Jou Wen Shiong, also known as Bon Shiong Chiu, a Taiwanese national, together with Ariel
Serrano and other hatchery workers, were inside the compound of the Convote Aquatic
Development Company. At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of said day, Ariel Serrano,
who was then inside the comfort room washing his face, saw several men, all armed, barge
into the compound of Convote Aquatic Development Company. Thereafter, he saw ve of
them chasing Jou Wen Shiong at the basketball court while their two companions posted
themselves at the door as lookouts.
The men chasing Jou Wen Shiong cornered him before he could reach the hatchery. One of
them hit Jou Wen Shiong with a handgun which went o on impact. The bullet hit the latter
on the left temple and pierced the brain area killing him instantly. Then the armed men
rounded up the people who were in the compound and tied the hands of the men behind
their backs, but left the women free. The group of armed men, which included herein
appellants Jury Magdamit and Wilfredo Gerero, proceeded to destroy the doors and
windows of the rooms of the victim and one Manuel Chua, then ransacked said rooms and
carted away some articles of value. After robbing the area, the men left. several valuable
items and cash money, the total value of which amounted to P60,000.00, more or less, were
missing. Jury Magdamit was apprehended by the policemen in his residence.
The court ruled that in the instant case, the conspiracy to commit the crime of robbery was
established by the concerted acts of appellant and his other co-accused. Homicide having
been committed on the occasion or as a consequence thereof, the trial court is correct in
holding appellant liable for the crime of robbery with homicide. The issue of whether or not
he actually participated in the killing of Jou Wen Shiong is immaterial. The consistent
doctrinal rule is that when a homicide takes place by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery, all those who took part in the robbery shall be guilty of the special complex crime of
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robbery with homicide whether or not they actually participated in the killing, unless there is
proof that they had endeavored to prevent the killing.
The aggravating circumstance of band was also properly appreciated by the trial court. An
o ense is committed en cuadrilla when more than three armed malefactors shall have acted
together in the commission thereof. In the present case, there were seven armed
conspirators involved in the commission of the composite crime. However, as already
explained, the death penalty could not then be imposed
PP vs. DINAMLING, G.R. No. 134605, Mar 12, 2002
In an afternoon, Marilyn Pajarillo was in their house lying down in bed with her 2-year old
daughter. Seated beside her was eleven-year old Rosemarie Malalay, who was waiting for
her father Rogelio. Rogelio was then in the patio, outside the house, drinking gin with
Marilyn's husband Charlie Pajarillo and Deogracias Acosta.
Suddenly, a man entered their house and poked a long gun at Marilyn's forehead. The man,
who was subsequently identi ed as accused-appellant Orlando Dinamling, ordered her to lie
prone on the ground. Marilyn merely sat down. Another man with a short rearm entered
their sari-sari store, searched their belongings and took some of their merchandise. Marilyn
recognized the man's face but she did not know his name. In court, Marilyn identi ed the
man as accused-appellant Jose Dinamman.
The two men ordered Marilyn to go out of the house. Marilyn obeyed. Outside, she saw two
other men poking guns at the heads of Rogelio Malalay and Deogracias Acosta, who were
then lying prostrate on the ground. Marilyn was ordered to walk and not to look back. After a
while, she heard two gunshots. Marilyn tried to look back to see what happened, but the
men with her ordered her to continue walking. She was brought near the house of her
neighbor, Arsenio Balaoy, where she saw Arsenio and Pablito Bimmangon. The men told
Arsenio and Pablito not to interfere.
One of the men told Marilyn they would kill her but Marilyn pleaded for mercy. Luckily, they
freed her. When she got home she saw the lifeless bodies and later found out that, the men
who entered their house took more or less P1,500.00 in cash representing her sales, two (2)
rims of Champion cigarettes worth P108.00, one (1) dozen cans of Youngstown sardines
worth P96.00 and one (1) pack of Juicy Fruit chewing gum worth P50.00. She knew what
articles were taken because she had just purchased those items that day.
The court ruled that, The trial court correctly appreciated band as an aggravating
circumstance. Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the
commission of an o ense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. All four
accused-appellants were armed, three with long rearms and the other with a short one.
They all took part in the commission of the robbery with homicide, poking their guns at their
victims' heads, tying them up, ransacking the house, and killing the two victims.
 The crime of robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63
of the Revised Penal Code provides that in cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties and there is only one aggravating circumstance, the
greater penalty shall be applied - in this case, the death penalty.
Every person criminally liable for a person is also civilly liable. The civil liability includes
restitution, reparation of the damage caused and indemni cation for consequential
damages.
PP vs. LOZANO, G.R. Nos. 137370-71, Sep 29, 2003
One evening, the said accused, riding on two motorcycles, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, together with Peter Doe, John Doe and Jane
Doe, whose cases will be separately considered as soon as procedural requirements are
complied with, armed with unlicensed rearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Alden Abiabi by
shooting him with the use of said unlicensed rearms, hitting him on the di erent parts of his
body, thereby in icting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death thereafter.
The Information for the frustrated murder case reads:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1997, at about 9:30 oclock in the evening, in the
City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, riding on two motorcycles, conniving and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, together with Peter Doe, John Doe and Jane Doe, whose cases will be
separately considered as soon as procedural requirements are complied with, armed with
unlicensed rearms, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation and grave abuse of superior strength, did then and there suddenly attack,
assault and use, personal violence upon the person of one Herminigildo Damuag by
shooting him with the use of said unlicensed rearms, hitting him on the di erent vital parts
of his body, thereby in icting upon said Herminigildo Damuag serious physical injuries,
which injuries under ordinary circumstances would cause the death of the victim, thus
performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Murder as a
consequence, but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
the will of the herein accused, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to
said Herminigildo Damuag which prevented his death.
On January 20, 1998, upon learning of the issuance of the warrant for his arrest, accused
PO2 Armando Lozano turned himself to the authorities
The court ruled that, they do not agree in the lower court appreciation of nighttime. This
circumstance is considered aggravating only when it facilitated the commission of the crime,
or was especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of impunity.
The essence of this aggravating circumstance is the obscuridad a orded by, and not merely
the chronological onset of, nighttime.Although the o ense was committed at night,
nocturnity does not become a modifying factor when the place is adequately lighted, and
thus could no longer insure the o enders immunity from identi cation or capture. In this case
at bar, a lamp post illuminated the scene of the crime.
Likewise, we nd that the o enses were not committed by a band. A crime is deemed to
have been committed by a band or en cuadrilla when more than three armed malefactors
take part in its commission. The four armed persons contemplated in this circumstance must
all be principals by direct participation who acted together in the execution of the acts
constituting the crime. The Code does not de ne or require any particular arms or weapons;
any weapon which by reason of its intrinsic nature or the purpose for which it was made or
used by the accused, is capable of in icting serious or fatal injuries upon the victim of the
crime may be considered as arms for purposes of the law on cuadrilla. In the case at bar, the
prosecution alleged that the accused and his three other co-conspirators used unlicensed
rearms in the perpetration of the o enses. However, the evidence on record shows that
only two of them carried rearms. En cuadrilla, as an aggravating circumstance, cannot
therefore be appreciated.
There was also no evidence presented to show that the o enses were committed with the
aid of armed men. Aid of armed men or persons a ording immunity requires that the armed
men are accomplices who take part in minor capacity, directly or indirectly. We note that all
four accused were charged as principal. The remaining suspects --- John Doe, Jane Doe
and Peter Doe--- were never identi ed and charged. Neither was proof adduced as to the
nature of their participation.
There was also a paucity of proof to show that evident premeditation attended the
commission of the crimes.For this circumstance to be appreciated, there must be proof, as
clear as that of the killing, of the following elements: (1) the time when the o ender
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act indicating that he clung to his determination; and
(3) su cient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow himself time to
re ect upon the consequences of his act. Evident premeditation must be based on external
facts which are evident, not merely suspected, which indicate deliberate planning. There
must be direct evidence showing a plan or preparation to kill, or proof that the accused
meditated and re ected upon his decision to kill the victim. No such evidence was presented
to prove the presence of this circumstance.
Pp vs Evangelio, GR No. 181902, August 31, 2011
One evening, while AAA, a 17-year-old househelper, was cooking in the kitchen of the house
of BBB situated in Tacloban City, four persons, one of whom was armed with a handgun
while the other three with knives, suddenly barged inside the house through the open
kitchen door. The four men accosted her, warned her to keep quiet, and brought her to the
living room. There, they herded all the other members of the household whom they caught
and bound their hands and feet, and thereafter, placed masking tapes over their captives’
eyes. With her eyes partially covered by the tape, AAA was brought by the appellant inside
the comfort room and thereat, appellant and one of the robbers stripped o AAA's clothes

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 and removed her panty. AAA resisted and fought back but they slammed her head twice
against the concrete wall, causing her to lose consciousness. When she regained her
senses, appellant and the other robbers were already gone, and she found herself lying on
the side on the oor of the comfort room with her feet untied and her hands still tied behind
her back. She saw her shorts and panty strewn at her side. She su ered pain in her knees,
head, stomach, and her vagina, which was bleeding. Later on, AAA was freed from the
comfort room by the other occupants of the house, who were earlier freed.
Prosecution witness Evelyn was in the living room when the incident happened. She was
tutoring her nieces when the four men barged inside the house. She testi ed that she could
not be mistaken as to the identity of the accused Edgar, who was armed with a handgun,
because he is a friend of her husband and who used to work for him. Appellant and accused
Noel are also familiar to her because they previously stayed in Sampaguita, Tacloban City,
where she lives. Upon the instruction of accused Edgar, Edelyn was divested of her earrings,
bracelet, watch, and ring. Thereafter, appellant tied her hands and feet, and blindfolded her
with masking tape. She was hit on the head with a rearm, causing a cut and her losing
consciousness. When she regained her senses, she found herself in the maids' room. She
heard accused Edgar ask her nieces where their father kept their pieces of jewelry and
rearm. When her nieces told him that the valuables were kept upstairs, accused Edgar
brought one of them there. The accused were able to take the valuable item from the
residence.
The court rules that, the commission of the act in night time is considered an aggravating
circumstance only when it is deliberately sought to prevent the accused from being
recognized or to ensure escape. There must be proof that this was intentionally sought to
ensure the commission of the crime, and that the accused took advantage of it to insure his
immunity from captivity. Here, there is a paucity of evidence that nighttime was purposely,
deliberately, and especially sought by the accused. The mere fact that the o ense was
committed at night will not su ce to sustain a nding of nocturnity.
Further, the phrase, "forcibly enter the inhabited house" does not comprise the aggravating
circumstance of "unlawful entry." Verily, evidence showed that all the accused freely entered
the [victims'] residence through the open kitchen door, which is clearly intended for ingress
and or egress. The trial court and the CA correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance
of the commission of a crime by a band. In the crime of robbery with rape, band is
considered as an aggravating circumstance. The prosecution established that one of the
accused was armed with a handgun, while the other three had knives when they committed
the crime.
The aggravating circumstance of dwelling was also attendant in the present case. Dwelling
aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the o ended party
provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor.39 In this case, robbery with
violence was committed in the house of the victims without provocation on their part. In
robbery with violence and intimidation against persons, dwelling is aggravating because in
this class of robbery, the crime may be committed without the necessity of trespassing the
sanctity of the o ended party's house. It is considered an aggravating circumstance
primarily because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to the human abode. He
who goes to another’s house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who o ends
him elsewhere.
PP vs. ALINCASTRE, G.R. No. L-29891, August 30, 1971
James L. Gordon, City Mayor of Olongapo, was at the ground oor of its city hall, conversing
with a woman, on February 20, 1967, at about 9:30 a.m. appellant Nenito Alincastre shot him
on the right-hand side of the occipital region, thereby in icting therein a fatal bullet wound
that pierced the skull through and through. In the ensuing commotion, Nenito managed to
run away, board a jeep whose driver brought him, at the point of his (Nenito's) gun, to the
public market, where Por rio Layao, Gordon's bodyguard who pursued Nenito, lost track of
him. Thereafter, Nenito proceeded, aboard a tricycle, to the house of appellant Pablo
Salcedo at No. 19, 20th Street, East Bajac-bajac, not far away from the city hall. Soon after,
peace o cers arrested Nenito inside a dug-out under said house of Pablo Salcedo, in one of
the rooms of which they, also, found him and appellant Rogelio Lorenzo. A search, made
that noon by Patrolman Relator, of the local police force, yielded, in said dug-out, the .32
caliber revolver, Exhibit M — used by Nenito in killing Mayor Gordon - containing ve (5) live
bullets. Upon investigation, immediately after their apprehension, Nenito, Pablo and Rogelio
made sworn statements implicating each other as well as appellant Mamerto Lorenzo, father
of Rogelio and former chief of police of Olongapo, who had been relieved of said o ce by
James L. Gordon, when he became the city mayor.
It was later found out that, the plan, to kill the mayor was nalized with Mamerto Lorenzo,
who commented that much time had already been wasted, and reiterated the promises
made to Nenito Alincastre.
The court ruled that, the established rule in the Spanish jurisprudence is to the e ect that the
aggravating circumstance of price, reward or promise thereof a ects equally the o eror and
the acceptor.
In fact, under certain conditions — such as those obtaining in the case at bar — the
circumstance under consideration may evince even greater moral depravity in the o eror
than in the acceptor. At any rate, Mamerto Lorenzo made the o er or promise of reward to
Nenito Alincastre in consideration of a price or reward for himself — the o ce of chief of
police of Olongapo and the "tongs" were expected to go with it.
Although, as contended under the seventh assignment of error, Mamerto Lorenzo had
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, this mitigating circumstance is not su cient to
o set the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, price or reward, and
disregard of the respect due to the o ended party on account of his o ce or rank.
The lower court erred, however, in nding that Rogelio Lorenzo was merely an accomplice.
Considering: that he had actively participated in persuading Nenito Alincastre to escape
from Muntinlupa, as well as in the conspiratorial meetings held in his (Rogelio's) house,

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 where Nenito Alincastre stayed in Olongapo, in urging him, early in the morning of February
20, 1967, to prepare himself for the job he had to perform on that date, and in the checking
of their respective assignments, before leaving the house, that morning; that he went to the
city hall with Nenito, Pablo Salcedo and Narciso Cruz and posted himself near the
grandstand in order to signal Narciso Cruz when the mayor showed up, so that Cruz could,
in turn, transmit the signal to Nenito Alincastre, inside the city hall; that, thereafter, he
(Rogelio) went to and stayed in the house of Pablo Salcedo, evidently to see to it that he did
his (Pablo's) own part of the agreed plan; and that he was a party to the conspiracy to
liquidate the mayor, Rogelio Lorenzo is clearly guilty of the crime charged, not merely as an
accomplice, but, as a principal and, should, accordingly, be sentenced to the extreme
penalty, and to indemnify the heirs of Mayor Gordon, jointly and severally with Mamerto
Lorenzo and Pablo Salcedo, in the sum of P12,000.
PP vs. COMADRE, G.R. No. 153559, Jun 8, 2004
One evening, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday Rey Camat and Lorenzo
Eugenio were having a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Robert’s father,
Barangay Councilman Jaime Agbanlog, situated in Barangay San Pedro, Lupao, Nueva
Ecija. Jaime Agbanlog was seated on the banister of the terrace listening to the conversation
of the companions of his son.
As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio
Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano walking. The three stopped in front of the
house. While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed an object which fell on
the roof of the terrace. Appellants immediately ed by scaling the fence of a nearby school.
The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded ripping a hole in the roof of the
house. Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio
were hit by shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the oor. They were all rushed to the San
Jose General Hospital in Lupao, Nueva Ecija for medical treatment. However, Robert
Agbanlog died before reaching the hospital.
Denying the charges against him, appellant Antonio Comadre claimed that on the night of
the accident he was with his wife and children watching the television in the house of his
father. Appellant George Comadre, for his part, testi ed that he is the brother of Antonio
Comadre and the brother-in-law of Danilo Lozano. He also denied any involvement in the
grenade-throwing incident, claiming that he was at home when it happened.
The court ruled that, when the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of
explosives, the latter shall be considered as a qualifying circumstance. Not only does
jurisprudence support this view but also, since the use of explosives is the principal mode of
attack, reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should qualify the o ense instead of
treachery which will then be relegated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance.
The trial court found appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder with multiple attempted
murder under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
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Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in
its maximum period irrespective of the presence of modifying circumstances, including the
generic aggravating circumstance of treachery in this case. Applying the aforesaid provision
of law, the maximum penalty for the most serious crime (murder) is death. The trial court,
therefore, correctly imposed the death penalty.
US vs. THE MORO MANALINDE, G.R. No. 5292, August 28, 1909
Between 2 and 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th of January, 1909, while Juan Igual, a
Spaniard, was seated on a chair in the doorway of Sousa's store in Cotabato, Moro
Province, he suddenly received a wound on the head delivered from behind and in icted
with a kris. Ricardo Doroteo, a clerk in the said store, who was standing behind the counter,
upon hearing the noise and the cry of the wounded man, ran to his assistance and found
him lying on the ground. Meanwhile the aggressor, the Moro Manalinde, approached a
Chinaman named Choa, who was passing along the street, and just as the latter was putting
down his load in front of the door of a store and was about to enter, attacked him with the
same weapon, in icting a severe wound in the left shoulder, on account of which he fell to
the ground. The Moro, who came from the rancheria of Dupit and had entered the town
carrying his weapon wrapped up in banana leaves, in the meantime escaped by running
away from the town. Both wounded men, the Chinaman and the Spaniard, were taken to the
hospital, where the former died within an hour, the record not stating the result of the wound
in icted on the Spaniard Juan Igual.
When Manalinde was arrested he pleaded guilty and confessed that he had perpetrated the
crime herein mentioned, stating that his wife had died about one hundred days before and
that he had come from his home in Catumaldu by order of the Datto Rajamudah Mupuck,
who had directed him to go juramentado in Cotabato in order to kill somebody, because the
said Mupuck had certain grievances to avenge against a lieutenant and a sergeant, the said
datto further stating that if he, Manalinde, was successful in the matter, he would give him a
pretty woman on his return, but that in case he was captured he was to say that he
performed the killing by order of Maticayo, Datto Piang, Tambal and Inug. In order to carry
out his intention to kill two persons in the town of Cotabato he provided himself with a kris,
which he concealed in banana leaves, and, traveling for a day and a night from his home,
upon reaching the town, attacked from behind a Spaniard who was seated in front of a store
and, wounding him, immediately after attacked a Chinaman, who was close by, just as the
latter was placing a tin that he was carrying on the ground and he was about to enter a store
near by, cutting him on the left shoulder and eeing at once; he further stated that he had no
quarrel with the assaulted persons.
 From the statements made by the accused his culpability as the sole-confessed and self-
convicted author of the crime in question has been unquestionably established, nor can his
allegation that he acted by order of Datto Mupuck and that therefore he was not responsible
exculpate him, because it was not a matter of proper obedience. The excuse that he went
juramentado by order of the said datto and on that account killed only two persons, whereas
if he had taken the oath of his own volition he would have killed many more, because it is the
barbarous and savage custom of a juramentado to kill anyone without any motive or reason
whatever, can not under any consideration be accepted or considered under the laws of
civilized nations; such exhibitions of ferocity and savagery must be restrained, especially as
the very people who up to the present time have been practicing such acts are well aware
that the established authorities in this country can never allow them to go unpunished, and
as has happened a number of times in towns where juramentados are in the habit of
appearing, the punishment of the author has followed every crime so committed.
In the commission of the crime of murder the presence of aggravating circumstances 3 and
7 of article 10 of the Penal Code should be taken into consideration in that promise of
reward and premeditation are present, which in the present case are held to be generic,
since the crime has already been quali ed as committed with the treachery, because the
accused confessed that he voluntarily obeyed the order given him by Datto Mupuck to go
juramentado and kill some one in the town of Cotabato, with the promise that if he escaped
punishment he would be rewarded with a pretty woman. Upon complying with the order the
accused undoubtedly acted of his own volition and with the knowledge that he would in ict
irreparable injury on some of his fellow-beings, depriving them of life without any reason
whatever, well knowing that he was about to commit a most serious deed which the laws in
force in this country and the constituted authorities could by no means permit. Datto
Mupuck, who ordered and induced him to commit the crimes, as well as the accused knew
perfectly well that he might be caught and punished in the act of committing them.
For the above reasons and in view of the fact that no mitigating circumstance is present to
neutralize the e ects of the aggravating ones, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed
from should be a rmed with costs provided however, that the penalty imposed on the
culprit shall be executed in accordance with the provisions of Acts. Nos. 451 and 1577, and
that in the event of a pardon being granted he shall likewise be sentenced to su er the
accessory penalties imposed by article 53 of the Penal Code. So ordered.
Pp vs Duavis, G.R. No. 190861, December 7, 2011
In an afternoon, appellant was in his yard, performing his work as a barber, together with
Ompong Ronquillo, Aton Daong and Romeo Drillos. After an hour, appellant was able to
nish his work and decided to have a drink with his friends.
Dante Largado, Sr. soon arrived and drank tuba with them. A few moments later, Daong and
Drillos left. Largado, Sr. then got angry at appellant, because the latter told the former that
they will have to stop drinking, and Largado, Sr. did not want to stop. Largado, Sr. then
accused appellant of being too choosy of his drinking companions. Appellant explained to
Largado, Sr. that it is not true. Appellant further told Largado, Sr. that they have to stop
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drinking because the former was going to gather more tuba. Largado, Sr. then broke a glass
on the table and pushed it towards appellant who was thrown outside the yard. Appellant
told Largado, Sr. that he would not ght him, but the latter answered back and told
appellant, "Putang ina, papatayin kita pag nahawakan kita."
Appellant then picked up a club and hurled the same at Largado, Sr. He also kicked
Largado, Sr. on the chest, afterwhich, Largado, Sr. ran towards the extension of appellant's
house, picked a bolo and hacked appellant with it. Appellant was able to evade the
onslaught. They then wrestled for the possession of the bolo and the same got thrown away.
Largado, Sr. was able to get hold of a club and he swung it at appellant, who evaded the
blow. Thereafter, appellant ran towards his house, fetched his family and brought them to his
father's house. Appellant returned to his house, got his scythe and barok and proceeded to
gather tuba at the coconut plantation of Romeo Drillos. After gathering tuba, he went home
and stayed at the extension of his house. Appellant was surprised when he saw Largado, Sr.
hiding behind the trunk of a coconut tree preparing to attack him with a scythe. Appellant
was able to evade him because of the noise created by Largado, Sr. when he stepped on a
strew of coconut leaves lying on the ground. Appellant ran towards the direction of his house
and Largado, Sr. followed him. Largado, Sr. was able to overtake him, and since he had no
more place to escape, appellant hacked Largado, Sr. with his scythe, causing the latter's
death.
Afterwards, appellant went back to the house of his father and informed the latter of what
happened and that he wanted to surrender. When he went out of his father's house, the
policemen were already there and he was arrested. The appellant invoked self defense.
It is a hornbook doctrine that when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to
the appellant to prove the elements of that claim,14 i.e., (1) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack
of su cient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. But absent the
essential element of unlawful aggression, there is no self-defense.
In the present case, the appellant failed to prove the presence of unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim. As correctly observed and ruled by the trial court:
From the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses, Dante Largado, Jr. and Alex
Davocol, the unarmed victim was being chased by the accused, armed with a long
bolo, and upon catching up [with] the victim, the accused hacked the victim, hitting
him on the left side of his face and ear, cutting major blood vessels, which caused the
death of the victim instantaneously.
Even assuming arguendo that there was provocation on the part of the unarmed victim who
immediately thereafter ran away, such provocation is not su cient to be repelled with the
use of a long bolo. The defense of self-defense by the accused cannot be appreciated by
the Court, for not having been substantiated by clear and convincing evidence that the killing
of Dante Largado, Sr. was justi ed, hence, must fail.

Clearly, the element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is wanting. It must be
remembered that the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution for, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it cannot
be disbelieved after the accused himself has admitted the killing.
As to appellant's contention that the trial court was wrong in appreciating the testimonies of
the prosecution's witnesses over his claim of self-defense, this Court has consistently
reiterated that basic is the rule that the trial court's factual ndings, especially its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are generally accorded great weight and respect
on appeal. When the issue is one of credibility, the Court will generally not disturb the
ndings of the trial court unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value
that, if considered, might a ect the outcome of the case. The reason therefore is not hard to
discern. The trial courts are in a better position to decide questions of credibility having
heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.
Further, settled is the rule that testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness but must foremost be credible in itself. Hence, the test
to determine the value or credibility of the testimony of a witness is whether the same is in
conformity with common knowledge and is consistent with the experience of mankind.
Based on the ndings of the trial court and the CA, the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution are more credible in itself than the self-serving defense of appellant.
In nding that appellant is guilty of homicide, instead of murder, the CA ruled that there was
an absence of the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery. The
essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded
by cool thought and re ection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a
space of time su cient to arrive at a calm judgment. For it to be appreciated, the following
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his
determination; and (3) su cient lapse of time between such determination and execution to
allow him to re ect upon the circumstances of his act. On the other hand, to appreciate
treachery, two (2) conditions must be present, namely, (a) the employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and
(b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
PP vs. HILARIO, G.R. No. 128083, Mar 16, 2001
At about 8:30,in the evening, Danilo went to Mang Jack's store, 20 meters away to buy
some snacks for his children. There, he saw Berong and the victim Carlos Reyes in front of
the store squatting and talking to each other. Both were wearing white shirts. A little later,
Berong removed his white shirt. Fate must be smiling on him that night because uncannily,
this innocent act would later save his skin at the expense of Carlos.
At this juncture, Danilo saw Rodrigo, Rodolfo and their cum padre approaching from the
other side of the store approximately two arms length from him. Then he saw Rodrigo
handing a bolo to his brother Rodolfo and an ice-pick one foot long to their cumpadre,
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saying at the same time, "The one in white shirt." In a swift, sudden motion, the cumpadre
bluntly stabbed Carlos Reyes on the chest, asking his companions, " Ito ba?" By this time,
Rodrigo was six arms length away watching the whole incident. Meanwhile, Rodolfo, still
holding the bolo, served as a "back-up", standing near his cumpadre. He also shouted
"Walang makiki-alam!" Carlos, wounded and bleeding, fell on his back. After which, the three
ran away in the same direction. Danilo was able to clearly see what transpired because the
place was well-lighted by electric lights emanating from the store and the lamp post.
Hurriedly, Danilo left the place out of sheer fright. He went back to his house, feeling
confused and shocked. Moments later, somebody knocked at his door. It was Greg Reyes, a
business associate, and the father of the victim. A loving parent that he was, Greg just could
not accept and understand the tragedy that befell his son as he asked: "Why did your uncles
do that to my son?" Danilo could only surmise and said, "It was only a case of mistaken
identity, they thought it was Berong, they intended to kill Berong." The next day Greg
returned to his house and asked the same question. Danilo gave the same response.
The next few days saw Greg frequenting the house of Danilo. His visits, however, were totally
not related to the incident anymore. He would come to discuss their business venture. Still,
this arose the suspicion of the brothers Hilario who feared that Danilo would blow the whistle
on them. He realized the thickening suspicion when one day Rodrigo brusquely warned him,
"Huwag kang makikialam, huwag kang tetestigo." He gave the assurance that he would not
favor anyone because they are the brothers of his mother. He also told them that Greg's
visits were purely for business. His explanation failed to allay the suspicion of his uncles. On
the contrary, it only became more intense. On April 22, 1991 at about 8 o'clock in the
evening, Rodrigo waited in ambush and hacked him repeatedly on the head, and left and
right arms.
Sensing that the situation was becoming too hot for comfort, Danilo decided to transfer his
residence to a far-away place (Balagtas, Bulacan). But he did not permit Rodrigo to avoid his
criminal liability. He instituted a case against him for the hacking. Furthermore, he, together
with Greg, went to the NBI to le a complaint against Rodrigo and RodoIfo Hilario and their
cumpadre for stabbing to death Carlos Reyes.
the trial court rendered a judgment convicting the accused.
The SC a rm the conviction.
Murder is committed by any person who shall kill another, provided that the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, and provided further that the killing is not parricide or homicide. The evidence on
record reveals that all the three accused, including the appellant, were positively identi ed by
the prosecution witness Danilo Manzanares as the ones who participated in the killing of
Carlos Reyes. He could not have been mistaken in ascertaining the identity of the brothers
Hilario for the simple reason that they are his uncles. Danilo assured that he could identify
the third accused, the cumpadre of the two, if he sees him again.

The evidence also su ciently demonstrates the existence of conspiracy in the execution of
the crime. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Although as a rule, conspiracy is not a
crime, the existence of a conspiracy is decisive in determining whether two or more persons
who participated in the commission of an o ense are liable as co-principals or accomplices
or are exempt from criminal liability. If an express or implied conspiracy is proven, then all
the conspirators may be regarded as co-principals regardless of the extent of their
participation in the execution of the crime. Their liability is collective or joint.
Thus, all their acts tend to manifest a common purpose and devise. The familiar rule in
conspiracy is that "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is
responsible, when the conspiracy is proven, for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance
of the conspiracy. In a conspiracy, every act of the conspirators in furtherance of a common
design or purpose, is in contemplation of the law, the act of each one of them." In legal
contemplation, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, all the three accused are liable as
principals for the death of the victim Carlos Reyes.
The fact that the accused killed a person other than their intended victim is of no moment.
According to Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be di erent from that which is intended.
One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may
naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of
the rule is found in the doctrine, el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado or he
who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. The accused performed
voluntary acts. Their purpose was to kill. Hence, notwithstanding the mistake in the identity
of the victim, the accused are still criminally liable.
It is to be noted that the lower court, in nding the appellant guilty of murder, quali ed the
killing by evident premeditation. Evident premeditation, however, may not properly be taken
into account when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was di erent from the
one who became his victim. When the person decided to kill a di erent person and
premeditated on the killing of the latter, but when he carried out his plan he actually killed
another person, it cannot properly be said that he premeditated on the killing of the actual
victim. Thus premeditation was not aggravating in the case of People vs. Guillen, where the
accused had deliberately intended to assassinate former President Manuel Roxas but he
killed instead Simeon Varela and wounded others. This doctrinal rule applies here.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the appellant's crime will be downgraded to homicide.
Despite the absence of evident premeditation, it clearly appears on record that the assault
was attended by treachery. There is alevosia when the o ender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
o ended party might make. The essence of treachery is the suddenness and
unexpectedness of the assault on the part of the person attacked. The manner of attack
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employed by the appellant together with his co-accused was deliberate and unexpected. It
never gave Carlos Reyes, the victim, an opportunity to defend himself or retaliate in fact,
Carlos was sitting when he was stabbed. He was just relaxing in front of a store. So too, the
accused purposely sought the cover of darkness (nighttime, which is absorbed by treachery)
in nally e ecting their plan.
All told, treachery was su ciently alleged in the information and was proven in the course of
the trial. Hence, this modifying circumstance may be appreciated to qualify the crime to
murder.
THE PP vs. MICHAEL NUÑEZ, G.R. No. 112429-30, July 23, 1997
in the afternoon of January 21, 1993 inside the compound of a school, accused Nuñez
persuaded the victim, fourteen-year old high school student Joseph Rivera, to go with him
on the pretext that he would turn over the proceeds of the sale of a gun to the latter's father.
He was likewise able to persuade Joseph Rivera to bring along the latter's classmate,
another fourteen year-old student Neil Patrick Quillosa on the pretext that Neil would be
Joseph's companion in going home later. The two boys were brought to a nipa hut in the
middle of a shpond in Dampalit, Malabon to await a certain "Ka Tony." As the two boys
attempted to go home, they were told to go back as "Ka Tony" was coming. When they were
asked in jest about their preference if they were to be killed either with a knife of with a gun,
Neil answered that he would prefer a gun pointed at his head.
Thereafter, accused Nuñez told them that "Ka Tony" would not enter the hut unless they
were blindfolded and tied. They protested but were assured by accused Nuñez that they
would not be harmed. Both victims' hands and feet were tied with wire and rope. Accused-
appellant came and checked if the two victims were tied securely, after which, accused
Nuñez played a tape demanding three million pesos in ve hundred and one thousand peso
bills from the parents of Rivera in exchange for his release. Rivera was likewise made to
record his own voice pleading to his parents to pay the ransom demanded. Thereafter,
accused Nuñez, who was then in possession of a gun, red the same towards the window,
hitting the casette recorder.
The victims were then brought to the river by accused and accused-appellant. Accused
Nuñez dragged Neil by the neck towards the middle of the river and left him there to drown
while accused-appellant stood guard over Rivera. Quillosa's cries for help and Rivera's pleas
for their captors to save Quillosa went unheeded.
In the nipa hut, Rivera was made to record his own voice saying, "Mommy, Daddy, para
makilala ninyo na sanay silang pumatay, pinatay na nila si Neil." Thereafter, he managed to
untie his feet and asked accused-appellant to remove the wire around his hands on the
assurance that he would not escape. The following morning, accused Nuñez went to deliver
the tape to Rivera's house.
While accused-appellant was busy cutting grass near the river, Rivera escaped the
proceeded to the house of accused Nuñez where he called up his grandmother. Thereupon,
he was fetched by his grandmother and with his father, they proceeded to the Malabon
 Police Station and reported the kidnapping. The policemen who responded recovered the
casette recorder from the nipa hut but failed to nd both accused and accused-appellant.
Neil Patrick Quillosa's body was recovered on January 23, 1993 at Chungkang Rivera,
Malabon with both hands and feet still bound with wires and his mouth gagged. Dr. Juanito
Sacdalan testi ed that the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation and that the
wire tied around the hands of the victim was the same wire tied around the neck. Accused
denied all the allegations against him.
The court ruled that, the crime committed by accused Nuñez and accused-appellant with
respect to the victim Quillosa should be Homicide and not kidnapping with Murder since
they never intended to hold Quillosa for ransom. Nuñez' query as to Quillosa's preference on
the manner of his death shows the formers' intention to kill the latter. As treachery was not
alleged in the information, then it could not have quali ed the crime to murder.
However, treachery should be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Article 14,
Paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code states that there is treachery when the o ender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the o ended party might make. In the instant case,
treachery was evident when the accused Nuñez led the victims to believe that it was
necessary for them to be blindfolded and tied rst with wires and a rope before a certain Ka
Tony would agree to meet them. Having thus placed the victims, particularly Quillosa, in a
helpless condition, accused Nuñez and accused-appellant were able to carry out with ease
their common design to kill Quillosa without any risk to themselves arising from any struggle
the boy might make.
Craft should also be appreciated as aggravating the crime of homicide since it was shown
that the victims, particularly the unsuspecting Quillosa, were lured by the accused into
coming with them on the pretext that the former would only accompany Rivera to accept the
proceeds of the sale of a gun.
PP vs. REYES, G.R. No. 118649, Mar 9, 1998
This is an appeal regarding the decision of the lower court. The facts are the following: about
7:00 o'clock in the evening of February 15, 1990, the witness and the the victim, Meynardo
"Jun Boy" Altobar, Jr., together with another prosecution witness, Joel Apundar, were seated
in front of the sari-sari store of Edwin Laborde.They were talking with each other when
suddenly a "bemoustached" man approached them and asked Altobar, Jr., "Ikaw ba si Jun
Boy?" When the latter replied by nodding his head, the man, who was later identi ed as
herein appellant, immediately pulled out a gun from something which looked like a book
tightly held under his left armpit and shot the victim, hitting him in the neck.
Broas was able to push the wounded victim aside before the assailant pulled the trigger for a
second shot. Thereafter, appellant pointed the gun at the group and pulled the trigger, but
the gun jammed and did not re. Appellant thereupon ran towards the opposite direction,
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obviously to avoid being caught or identi ed by them. The group rushed to the aid of the
victim who sat slouched on the pavement, bathed in his own blood, about a meter away
from where they were seated. They hailed a tricycle and brought the victim to the hospital
where he expired.
Prosecution witness Joel Apundar corroborated the testimony of Broas in its material points.
He testi ed further that when appellant escaped by running towards the direction of the P.
Guevarra Memorial High School, he shouted, "Habulin ninyo iyan, habulin ninyo!" which was
heard by several persons within the vicinity. Broas and Apundar both testi ed that the man
was wearing a piece of lady's stocking as a mask, RayBan type sunglasses, a "sure t" cap,
black pants and a white t-shirt.
Another prosecution witness, Johnny Abao, testi ed that at around 7:00 o'clock in the
evening of February 15, 1990, he was in the company of Felix Herbosa and Jun Laborte at
Del Pilar Street in the same town. They heard two gunshots and somebody shouted,
"Habulin ninyo." Then, he saw a man running away from the direction where the gunshots
and shouts emanated and going towards them. Their group was about 30 meters away from
the Laborte store. The man ran along Del Pilar Street, turned right to Kamatoy Street, and
then right to P. Guevarra Street. As he ran after the man, he picked up something for his
defense. He only gave up the chase when he saw that the man had boarded a slow moving
tricycle waiting along P. Guevarra Street. He later helped witnesses Apundar and Broas in
bringing the victim to the hospital on board a tricycle driven by Martin Buena.
Another prosecution witness Manolito A. Manuel testi ed that, while riding on his racer-type
bicycle passing along P. Guevarra Street on his way home to Barangay Sto. Angel Sur in the
same town, he heard two gunshots which he ignored. Upon reaching the corner of P.
Guevarra and Kamatoy Streets, he fell from his bicycle because he was nearly sideswiped
by a passenger jeep. While sprawled on the street with his bicycle, he saw a man running
towards a slow-moving tricycle and who then boarded the same. Inside the tricycle, the man
removed his mask and put a gun on the passenger seat. 13 When Manuel stood up and rode
his bicycle again, he noticed that the man was staring at him. He was more or less ve
meters away from the said tricycle and the place was illuminated by a lamppost.
Just as he reached the big bridge, he noticed that the said tricycle, with the same driver and
passenger, was moving behind him. Upon reaching a street corner, he made a full stop and
again he noticed the driver and the passenger of the said tricycle giving him an intimidating
look. He thereafter proceeded towards his home and the tricycle went in the direction of
Patimbao. He later identi ed the passenger as appellant, and the driver as Ernan Reyes, a
son of Ely Reyes who is a cousin of appellant. Appellant, as expected, denied having killed
the victim.
The lower court ruled that, while appellant reportedly had a sort of a mask and was using
sunglasses, these clumsy accouterments could not constitute the aggravating circumstance
of disguise. Legally, disfraz contemplates a super cial but somewhat e ective dissembling to
avoid identi cation. Here, even if it is true that he assumed that masquerade, appellant was
 readily recognizable because his face could easily be seen together with the identifying
feature of his mustache. Thus, there was no mention of his having used a disguise, whether
in the information or by the trial court, the prosecution or the Solicitor General. Why
appellant resorted to that juvenile gaucherie is an example of the delusive quirks of the
criminal mind which defy rational explanation.
What is instead in issue is the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. Appellant
claims that the trial court erred in appreciating this as another qualifying circumstance, on
the ground that the prosecution failed to prove all the requisites thereof. Appellant is correct.
The prosecution failed to prove (a) the time when the o ender determined to commit the
crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination and (c) a
su cient interval of time between the determination and execution of the crime to allow him
to re ect upon the consequences of his act. These elements of evident premeditation must
be established with equal certainty and clarity as the criminal act itself before it can be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. The SC a rmed this decision.
People v. Sibbu, G.R. No. 214757, March 29, 2017
Bryan Julian (Bryan), the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 11722 and a common
witness to all the cases, testi ed that between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m. of December 6, 2004, he
was with his three-year old daughter, Trisha May Julian (Trisha), the victim in Criminal Case
No. 11721; his mother Ofelia Julian (Ofelia), the victim in Criminal Case No. 11723; and his
father, Warlito Julian (Warlito), the victim in Criminal Case No. 11724 in the azotea of his
parents' house in Barangay Elizabeth, Marcos, llocos Norte when he saw from a distance of
about ve meters a person in camou age unifo1m with a long rearm slung across his chest
and a black bonnet over his head. When the armed man inched closer to the house, he tried
to x his bonnet thereby providing Bryan the opportunity to see his face; Bryan had a clear
look at the armed man because there were Christmas lights hanging from the roof of their
porch. Bryan recognized the armed man as the appellant. Brian also saw two men in
crouching position at a distance of three meters away from the appellant. Fearing the worst,
Bryan shouted a warning to his family. Appellant then red upon them killing Trisha, Ofelia
and Warlito.
Bryan ran inside the house where he saw his brother, Warlito Julian, Jr. (Warlito Jr.) coming
out of the bathroom. Bryan then proceeded to the pigpen at the back of the house to hide.
Another prosecution witness, Eddie Bayudan (Eddie), testi ed that on December 6, 2004, he
was by a well near his house when he heard gunshots coming from the house of Warlito and
Ofelia. When he turned towards the direction of the gunshot5, he saw a man about ve
meters away wearing a black bonnet and a long-sleeved camou age uniform and holding a
long rearm. He also saw another man crouching on the ground whom he recognized as the
accused Benny. Eddie went inside his house for his and his family's safety. Afterwards, he
heard Bryan shouting for help. When he went out to investigate, he saw the dead bodies of
Warlito, Ofelia, and Trisha.
Warlito Jr. also testi ed that he heard gunshots coming from outside their house. When he
went out of the bathroom, Bryan told him that appellant gunned down their parents and his
niece. In his cross-examination, Warlito, Jr. claimed to have seen the appellant shooting at
the porch of their house.
Police Superintendent Benjamin M. Lusad (P/Supt. Lusad), chief of the provincial intelligence
and investigation branch of Ilocos Norte, testi ed that at 7:00 a.m. of December 7, 2004, he
conducted an investigation and an ocular inspection at the crime scene. He found
bloodstains on the oor of the porch, the cadavers of the victims laid side by side in the sala,
and bullet holes in the cemented portion at the front of the house below the window grill.
During his interview with Bryan, the latter pointed to appellant as the gunman.
The court ruled that, The aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be taken into
account. Although the triggerman red the shot from outside the house, his victim was
inside. For this circumstance to be considered it is not necessary that the accused should
have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the o ense; it is enough that the
victim was attacked inside his own house, although the assailant may have devised means
to perpetrate the assault from without
Moreover, the use of disguise was likewise correctly appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance in this case. Bryan testi ed that the appellant covered his face with a bonnet
during the shooting incident There could be no other possible purpose for wearing a bonnet
over appellant's face but to conceal his identity, especially since Bryan and appellant live in
the same barangay and are familiar with each other.
As for the defense put up by the appellant that he was inside the house of his in-laws during
the shooting, the Court is unconvinced by his denial and alibi. Aside from being the weakest
of all defenses, appellant was not able to establish that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the scene of the crime at the time the shooting incident happened. We have
consistently 1uled that ''for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only
that he was at some other place when the crime was committed, but also that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity through
clear and convincing evidence."
In this case, the crime was committed in the residence of the victims which is located within
the same barangay where appellant resides. In fact, appellant's father-in-law testi ed that
the distance between the crime scene and his house is "more or less 1 kilometer," or two
kilometers as he later amended and that said distance could be traversed in one hour by
foot. Verily, appellant's alibi must fail for failure to show that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
All told, appellant was correctly convicted of three counts of murder considering the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and one count of attempted murder. Since two
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and use of disguise attended the commission of the

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 crime of murder, appellant should be sentenced to death in accordance with Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code.
PP vs. CABATO, G.R. No. L-37400, April 15, 1988
In the evening on or about the 25th day of January, 1971, ... the said accused SABANGAN
CABATO, conspiring, confederating and working together with two (2) other DOES who are
stin at large, all armed with rearms and stones and with intent of illicit gain by means of
force, violence and intimidation against persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter the dwelling house of one VICTOR GUINIT and once inside attack, hold
tight and squeeze the mouth of Id Victor Guinit, and hug his wife Herminia Ames Guinit, and
then rob them of cash money (coins) in the amount of P300.00; ... that in pursuance to (sic)
their evil motives, during and on the occasion of said robbery, the above-named accused
taking advantage of their superior strength and of the darkness of the night to better
accomplish their purpose and with intent to kill by means of treachery and evident
premeditation, did there and then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, strike with
stones for several times said HERMINIA AM-ES GUINIT thereby in icting upon her several
abrasions and contusions... which caused her death on the spot.
The account of the eyewitness are the following:
O ended party Victor Guinit, 69 years old, widower, testi ed that he knows accused
Sabangan Cabato personally; that witness pointed to accused in open court, that on
January 25, 1971, his wife was his only companion in their house; that at around 7:30 p.m.,
three persons came to their house while they were taking supper; that his wife brought food
to their dog; that they have two lamps in the house, one lamp near the bed, and another
lamp brought by his wife; that the two persons [who] hugged him covered his mouth; that
the robber hit his mouth with a stone causing s tooth to fell out (sic); that one of the robbers
grappled with his wife, and the mask covering the face fell out (sic) and his wife recognized
accused Sabangan Cabato; that his wife shouted. 'Sabangan, do not kill us, we will give you
the money,- that the accused was at a distance of three meters from him; that accused
Sabangan Cabato said: "Get your money; that she (deceased) said: "Victor, we will give the
money in the piggy bank"; that his wife went down; that later the deceased said: "Victor I do
not know where you put the money; that the robbers untied him and he went downstairs;
that he got the money and gave the same to one of the bandits; that one of the bandits said,
let us go upstairs, and got (sic) the paper bills, we want P3,000.00; that the money given to
the bandits were their saving (sic) for ve years consisting of coins which were proceeds
from the sale of the bananas; that the deceased and accused Cabato went to the kitchen;
that they told the bandits that we do not have paper bills an of the bandits struck d that they
do not have P3,000.00; that one of the bandits struck him with a pistol while the other boxed
him that one of the bandits struck the back of his head with a stone and his teeth fell out that
the accused and his companions left the house; that he noticed that wife was already dead;
that he gave the stones to the police (Exh. C, C-1, C-2); that after the bandits left, he untied
himself, that he called for held but nobody came; that he went to his two married sons who
were living uphill; that the land owned by them is two hectares; that the two bandits wore
masks. [CFI Decision, pp. 5-6,] (Emphasis supplied.) On the other hand, the accused
vehemently denied his alleged participation in the gruesome crime.
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The Court now addresses itself to the aggravating circumstances alleged by the plainti -
appellee to have attended the commission of the crime.
The prosecution argues that since "the attack was by a robust man of 29 years with a huge
stone against an ageing defenseless woman" (Brief for Plainti -Appellee, p. 15], abuse of
superprior strength should aggravate the crime.
The records of the case are bereft of any information with respect to the physical conditions
of both the accused and the victims. Thus, abuse of superior strength cannot be considered.
This aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties. It is
considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assessing a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the
aggressor which is selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. To
take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of
proportion to the means of the defense available to the person attacked [People v. Cabiling,
L-38091 Dec. 17, 1976, 74 SCRA 285, 303].
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that there was indeed a notorious inequality
between the ages, sizes and strength of the antagonists and that these notorious
advantages were purposely sought for or used by the accused to achieve his ends.
However, the Court considers dwelling as an aggravating circumstance since it has been
proven that, indeed robbery with homicide was committed inside the house of the o ended
parties. Dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation because this class of
robbery can be committed without the necessity of trespassing the sanctity of the o ended
party's house [People v. Mercado, L-39511, April 28,1980, 97 SCRA 232; People v.
Dajaresco, L-32701, June 19, 1984, 129 SCRA 576; People's vs. Gapasin, G.R. No. 52017,
Oct. 27, 1986, 145 SCRA 178].
Likewise, the Court considers disguise as another aggravating circumstance. The accused,
together with two others, wore masks to cover their faces. There could have been no other
purpose for this but to conceal their Identities particularly for Cabato who was very much
known to the o ended parties. The fact that the mask subsequently fell down thus paving
the way for Cabato's Identi cation will not render this aggravating circumstance
inapplicable. In a recent case, the Court held 'that Darwin Veloso and his ve (5) companions
wore masks [which eventually fell down] to conceal their Identities during the commission of
the crime constitutes disguise" [People v. Veloso, L-32900, Feb. 25, 1982, 112 SCRA 173,
182].
Robbery with homicide under Art. 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code is punishable with
reclusion perpetua to death. However, in view of Sec. 19 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution
the supreme penalty of death can no longer be imposed.
 WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the judgment
sentenced the accused to su er the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA but is MODIFIED
insofar as the civil indemnity is concerned which is hereby increased to P30,000.00.
PP vs. CUNANAN, G.R. No. L-30103, January 20, 1977
This is a murder case. on August 30, 1960 Isaac Tanglao, a forty-three-year old hacienda
overseer, was feloniously killed in a rice eld located at Barrio Sucluban, Mexico, Pampanga
by three armed persons wearing army fatigue uniforms. Tanglao sustained eight gunshot
wounds and three incised wounds. His eyes were eviscerated.
Two incised wounds a ected the brain tissue. The third incised wound was on the "plantar
surface" of the right foot. Death was due to hemorrhage brought about by the eleven
wounds.
According to Jacob Tanglao, the victim’s fteen-year old son, he and his father, together with
Leocadio Dionicio, a tenant, were in the rice eld of Quintin Magat at Barrio Sucluban in the
morning of August 30, 1960. Isaac was Magat’s overseer. Jacob and Dionicio were repairing
the rice paddles (pilapil).
While engaged in that task, they heard shouts of "Hoy! Hoy!", emanating from the bamboo
groove about sixty meters away, Jacob saw three men in army fatigue uniforms, with caps
and combat shoes and armed with ri es, emerging from the bamboo thicket. They ran
towards the spot where Isaac and his son were working. They were ring their guns.
Sensing danger, Jacob lay down on the ground near a rice paddy. Dionicio scampered and
concealed himself in the sugarcane plantation nearby. Isaac tried to ee in the same
direction but he stumbled and fell face down on the eld about eight paces away from his
son Jacob.
The three malefactors, one of whom was later identi ed by Jacob as Benjamin Cunanan,
approached Isaac. Cunanan kicked him and turned his face up. Cunanan asked Isaac
whether Jacob was his son. Isaac shook his head or denied that Jacob was his son. (He did
so in order to save his son’s life, as surmised by the trial court)
Then, Cunanan and his two companions repeatedly red their guns at Isaac. One of the trio
red at Isaac’s eyes and then remarked "Patay na." Cunanan took Isaac’s bolo from the
latter’s waist and, with a laugh, hacked Isaac on the forehead and slashed his toe. After
Cunanan had warned Jacob to stay put for an hour, the three men left the eld. Jacob
noticed that Cunanan had a sharp nose, a mustache and a gold tooth.
Isaac moaned with pain. His head and face were bloodied. Jacob embraced his father. The
back part of his head was soft. Jacob could not recognize him anymore.
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At this point, Francisco D. Lingad, a thirty-year old jeepney driver, takes up the thread of
Jacob Tanglao’s story. Lingad, in his sworn statement (Exh. F), declared that in that morning
of August 30, he was in Barrio Suclaban. His jeepney was parked on the roadside near the
Pasudeco railroad track and the rice eld of Quintin Magat (p. 12, Record). While waiting for
passengers, he heard gunshots. About ten minutes later, three armed persons in fatigue
uniforms accosted him and asked him to drive them to the Constabulary headquarters at
Angeles City. They apprised him that they had killed a Huk. Lingad was taken aback. The
smallest of the trio had a regular build and a fair complexion. The second was slightly taller
than the rst. The third, who was as tall as Lingad but with a heavier build, was brown and
had a sharp nose and a mustache (Exh. F).
One of the three persons poked a carbine at Lingad and ordered him to proceed to Angeles.
After the jeepney had travelled a short distance, he was ordered to stop in front of the
combination warehouse and residence of Isaac Tanglao which was near the chapel (p. 12,
Record). Two of the malefactors alighted from the jeepney and talked with Ursula Pangan,
the wife of Isaac Tanglao, who was in front of the warehouse. They asked her about the gun
of Isaac. When she did not answer, they entered the bodega and went up the house. A few
minutes later, they came down from the house with two carbines, a Garand ri e and a pistol
(Exh. F) or one carbine and a Garand ri e (pp. 6-7, Record).
Lingad heard the two men telling Ursula Pangan that they had killed her husband. The three
men repaired to the nearby house of Menen Miranda and asked for water. Then, they
instructed Lingad to drive them to the Magat hacienda where they alighted. Lingad went to
the Constabulary headquarters at Angeles and reported the incident (Exh. F).
Ursula Pangan, the victim’s widow, testi ed that at around nine o’clock in the morning of
August 30, 1960, while she was in the bodega of Quintin Magat, where her family had living
quarters, she heard gunshots. Some minutes later, a jeepney stopped in front of the bodega.
She noticed that the three armed passengers in the jeepney were wearing fatigue uniforms
with big pockets. They jumped out of the jeepney, approached her, held her wrists and
pointed their guns at her breast. One of them held her left shoulder.
The person who held her wrists was Benjamin Cunanan. One of the malefactors went up the
house and seized the carbine and the Garand ri e of her husband, Isaac Tanglao. Cunanan
told her: "We are going to kill you also now because we killed already your husband." She
did not make any reply. The malefactors left.
Mrs. Tanglao declared that she and the deceased had seven children of whom the youngest
was six months old at the time he was killed. Her husband earned sixty to seventy pesos a
week as overseer. She spent P625 for the funeral.
On September 15 and 22, 1960 Jacob Tanglao and his mother, Ursula Pangan, were
investigated by Constabulary agents. They were shown a photograph (Exh. C). One of the
three persons in that photograph, who was Benjamin Cunanan (he was in uniform and he
had a mustache) was ngered by Jacob and Mrs. Tanglao as one of the three persons whom
 they saw in the morning of August 30, 1960. That was the rst time that they learned that
one of the assailants of Isaac Tanglao was Cunanan, alias Commander Hizon.
On September 27, 1960 an investigator of the Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service
(CIS) led a complaint for murder against Cunanan and two John Does in the justice of the
peace court of Mexico. Jacob, Lingad and Mrs. Tanglao testi ed at the preliminary
examination. A sketch of the scene of the crime was attached to the record (p. 12).
On September 30, 1964 Fiscal Antonio P. Fausto led an information for murder against
Cunanan and two John Does in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, San Fernando
branch. Cunanan pleaded not guilty at the arraignment. After trial, during which Cunanan
pleaded an alibi, the trial court convicted Cunanan of murder, sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of Isaac Tanglao in the sum of six thousand
pesos (Criminal Case No. 4872). Cunanan appealed questioning the credibility of the witness
while adding that he was one of those malefactors who killed the victim.
But, after a conscientious evaluation of the evidence, the court is convinced that the trial
court did not err in concluding that Cunanan participated in the killing of Isaac Tanglao.
The unwavering identi cation of Cunanan, which was made by the eyewitnesses, Jacob
Tanglao and Ursula Pangan and which dovetails with the statement of another eyewitness,
the jeepney driver, Francisco Lingad (Exh. F), establishes Cunanan’s guilt to a moral
certainty.
The killing was quali ed by abuse of superiority. Cunanan and his comrades took advantage
of their manifest superiority in liquidating Isaac Tanglao, their unarmed and defenseless
victim (Arts. 14[15], Revised Penal Code).
The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and craft, which were alleged in the
information and were appreciated by the trial court, were not clearly established.
The malefactors resorted to a disguise. That circumstance did not facilitate the
consummation of the killing. Nor was it taken advantage of by the malefactors in the course
of the assault. According to the prosecution’s version, at the incipiency of the attack,
Cunanan and his companions did not camou age their hostile intentions. They announced
their presence at the scene of the crime with shouts and gunshots. That mode of attack
counteracted whatever deception might have arisen from their disguise. It even negated the
existence of treachery since the element of surprise, which marks the presence of treachery,
was absent.
There being no modifying circumstances, reclusion perpetua, the medium period of the
penalty for murder, was properly imposed by the trial court (Arts. 64[1] and 248[1], Revised
Penal Code).
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The trial court’s judgment is a rmed with the modi cation that the indemnity should he
increased to twelve thousand pesos. Costs against the Appellant.
PP vs. DREW, G.R. No. 127368, Dec 3, 2001
The prosecution's evidence established that on November 3, 1991 , at around 11:00 P.M.,
the victim, Antonio Cordial, Jr., was walking towards an eatery when suddenly, appellants
Drew and Ramos, with the 11 other accused waylaid him. Drew was armed with a 2" x 2"
piece of wood with which he clubbed the unarmed Cordial. Ramos then struck him on the
back of his head with a lead pipe, followed by several blows on the body. The victim fell. As
he lay prostrate on the ground, the others joined in beating him with blows and kicks.
Appellants and their co-accused then ed. Prosecution witnesses Junjun Sopeña and
Conrado Militante witnessed the incident. Militante approached the victim and brought him
to the Cordial residence in Kaliraya Street, Tatalon Estate, Quezon City. He was later rushed
to the National Orthopedic Hospital. Cordial sustained contusions, abrasions, hematoma,
lacerated wounds and abscess formation. He died the next day. An autopsy performed by
Dr. Alberto M. Reyes of the National Bureau of Investigation showed that Cordial died of
"pneumonia, hypostatic, secondary to traumatic head injuries."
Appellants denied any involvement in the incident. Ramos testi ed that on November 3,
1991, he came home at 6:00 P.M. after attending his classes and never left the house. He
went to sleep at 10:00 P.M. and woke up at 7:00 A.M. the following day to go to school.
SPO3 Roque Lopez of the Philippine National Police corroborated his testimony. Lopez
claimed that he frequently bought sh in the house of Domingo Rivera, father of accused
Gerry Rivera, in Taguko, Tatalon Estate. On November 3, 1991, Lopez said he arrived at the
house of Domingo at around 9:00 P.M. and saw appellant Ramos with his brother, already
asleep, while accused Gerry Rivera was watching TV. Lopez then drank beer with Domingo.
He left Domingo's house at around midnight and saw that Ramos was still asleep.
The Solicitor General, for the State, replies that the prosecution duly established the
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength so as to qualify the killing
to murder. He points out that appellants, aided by 11 others, ganged up on the victim and
employed their superiority in number and strength to prevent his escape and in ict fatal
injuries upon him.
For the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength to be appreciated,
we have repeatedly held that the prosecution must show that the accused were physically
stronger than the victim, and that they abused such superiority by taking advantage of their
combined strength to consummate the o ense. In the present case, we nd that appellants
and their 11 confederates took advantage of their collective strength to in ict fatal injuries
upon the victim by rendering him defenseless and preventing his escape from the attackers.
The unarmed victim could not match the combined strength of the 13 maulers. Appellants
Drew and Ramos, who were armed with a wooden club and a lead pipe, respectively,
reduced the unarmed victim into helplessness. The weapons used by appellants negated
any defense the victim could put up. Alone and unarmed, the victim was no match to
appellants and their co-accused. Thus, we agree that the circumstance of taking advantage
 of superior strength quali ed the killing to murder, and no error could be attributed to the trial
court on this score.
In conspiracy, the commission of a crime is through the joint act or intent of two or more
persons. To establish conspiracy, however, it is not essential that there be proof of a previous
agreement to commit the crime. It is su cient that the form and manner in which the attack
was accomplished clearly indicate unity of action and purpose or a community of interest.
In the present case, the court nd that conspiracy can be deduced from the circumstances
surrounding the crime. Appellants and their co-accused performed concerted acts in pursuit
of a joint purpose: they waylaid and surrounded the lone and unarmed victim, ganged up on
him, and through blows delivered with a wooden club and a lead pipe, in icted fatal injuries
on him. Appellant Drew's contention that his neighbors and friends only surrounded the
victim to protect and aid Drew is patently preposterous. True Drew ran o upon seeing the
victim, but he immediately returned armed with a wooden club. But why he should arm
himself against the victim who was showing no signs of harming him is not explained. The
records do not show any sign of provocation or aggression on the part of the victim against
Drew. Nor does the evidence show why Drew needed the aid and assistance of his friends
and neighbors since the victim was not making any trouble for Drew. Instead, the records
reveal that the victim, Cordial, Jr., was immediately surrounded by appellants and their
companions. Without provocation, appellants fell upon the hapless victim with a wooden
club and a lead pipe. Their companions then joined in to deliver kicks and blows. In People
v. Datun, 272 SCRA 380 (1997), we found that there was conspiracy when the accused and
their companions surrounded the victim and, without warning, in icted fatal wounds upon
him. In the present case, after the victim fell prostrate, appellants and their confederates ed
the scene together. The acts of appellants before, during and after the incident indubitably
point to a joint purpose, intent, and design to e ect a common unlawful objective. Action in
concert to achieve a common design is the hallmark of conspiracy. Hence, the act of one is
the act of all the conspirators and the precise extent of participation of each of them
becomes secondary.
People v. Cortez, G.R. No. 239137, December 5, 2018
The prosecution alleged that in the evening of May 19, 1988, eyewitness Janet Quiambao
(Janet) was sleeping with her cousins, namely, Baby Mesina (Baby) and Jocelyn Mesina
(Jocelyn), in a room at the back of "Minda's Bakery" owned by her sister, Minda Punzalan
(Minda), and brother-in-law, Mario Punzalan (Mario), located along Old Remedian Barbeque
Place in Angeles City. Minda and Mario were occupying the other room of the bakery, while
their bakers, Cezar and Froilan, were staying in another room upstairs. At around two (2) to
three (3) o'clock in the morning of the following day, Janet was awakened by a banging
sound on the wall. She then peeped through the door of her room and saw Cezar hitting
Mario on the head with an object similar to a rolling pin while the latter was asleep.
Subsequently, she witnessed Cezar stabbing Minda with a knife and Froilan stabbing his co-
baker, Efren Villanueva (Efren). Shortly thereafter, Cezar and Froilan forcibly entered Janet's
room and proceeded to stab and kill Baby and Jocelyn. Fortunately for Janet, she was able
to immediately hide under a table just before Cezar and Froilan barged in, leaving her
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unscathed. After Cezar and Froilan left, Janet came out of her hiding place and saw the
dead bodies of her relatives. Janet's assertions were then corroborated by Mario and
Minda's son, Richard Punzalan (Richard), who was able to hide with his sister at the back of
an electric fan during the whole ordeal.
Meanwhile, Mario's brother, Leonardo Punzalan (Leonardo), also corroborated Janet and
Richard's testimonies, stating that on the day of the incident, he dropped by "Minda's
Bakery" before going to the market to check if they needed anything. Upon arrival thereat,
he saw Janet crying, with the latter telling him that Mario, Minda, Efren, Baby, and Jocelyn
are already dead. Leonardo then went to inspect the dead bodies, noticing that Mario's
watch was missing. Leonardo and Janet then went to report the matter to the police, who in
tum, conducted a manhunt for Cezar and Froilan, killing the latter in the process.
Consequently, they inspected Froilan's body and recovered the missing watch of Mario.
Finally, Leonardo claimed that Cezar was initially apprehended but was able to escape.
On December 28, 1988, the case was archived for failure to apprehend Cezar, but the same
was revived after his arrest in 2010.
In his defense, Cezar invoked denial and alibi, maintaining that at the time of the incident, he
was working for the husband of his sister, Salvador Pineda, as a stay-in "tinapa maker" in
San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac. He claimed that he did not know Froilan or any of the ve (5)
victims. He also insisted that he only learned of the case against him when he was arrested
in 2010, which arrest was allegedly conducted without the bene t of a warrant.
The RTC ruled that, the accused is beyond reasonable doubt not of the crime charged.
Meanwhile, CA a rmed Cezar's conviction. Therefore, accused appealed further to SC.
SC denied guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court deems it proper to modify
Cezar's conviction to one (1) count of Homicide, for the killing of Efren, and four (4) counts of
Murder, for the killings of Mario, Minda, Baby, and Jocelyn, as will be explained hereunder.
To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following elements must be established:
(a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing is not Parricide or
Infanticide; and (d) the killing was accompanied with any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC. Notably, if the accused killed the victim without the
attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances of Murder, or by that of Parricide or
Infanticide, a conviction for the crime of Homicide will be sustained.
As it is undisputed that Cezar and Froilan were responsible for the killing of Efren, Mario,
Minda, Baby, and Jocelyn, the Court is left to determine whether or not the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and/or abuse of superior strength, as alleged in the information,
obtains in this case.
Case law instructs that "[t]here is treachery when the o ender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
 tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the o ended party might make." In other words, to appreciate treachery, it
must be shown that: (a) the means of execution employed gives the victim no opportunity to
defend himself or retaliate; and (b) the methods of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted; indeed, treachery cannot be presumed, it must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.
On the other hand, abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority
of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by
him in the commission of the crime. The fact that there were two persons who attacked the
victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior
strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. The
evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they
had the deliberate intent to use this advantage.
To recall, the RTC ruled that neither of the aforesaid circumstances attended the killings of
Efren and Mario, while abuse of superior strength was present in the killings of Minda, Baby,
and Jocelyn. However, a more circumspect review of the records reveals that: (a) Mario's
killing was attended by treachery; (b) Minda, Baby, and Jocelyn's killings were quali ed into
Murder not by abuse of superior strength, but by treachery; and (c) neither circumstance
attended Efren's killing.
Anent Mario's killing, records clearly show that Cezar killed Mario by hitting him on the head
with an object similar to a rolling pin while he was sleeping, thereby indicating that Cezar
purposely sought such means of attack against Mario so as the latter would have no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate and thus, ensuring the execution of the criminal
act.[24] Hence, contrary to the courts a quo's ndings, there is su cient factual basis to
support the existence of treachery, and therefore, the same may be properly appreciated.
As to the killings of Minda, Baby, and Jocelyn, the courts a quo opined that abuse of
superior strength attended their killings, considering that Cezar and Froilan used deadly
weapons, i.e., knives, in killing them. Although there have been cases where abuse of
superior strength was appreciated where a male equipped with a deadly weapon attacked
an unarmed and defenseless woman, jurisprudence nonetheless provides that for abuse of
superior strength to be appreciated, "[t]he evidence must establish that the assailants
purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage.
To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked." In this case, it does
not appear that Cezar and Froilan speci cally sought the use of deadly weapons so as to be
able to take advantage of their superior strength against Minda, Baby, and Jocelyn. In fact,
their criminal design to raid the house and consequently, to use deadly weapons in killing
whomever they encounter therein was applied indiscriminately, regardless of whether their
victims were male (Mario and Efren) or female (Minda, Baby, and Jocelyn). Therefore, there is
reasonable doubt as to whether abuse of superior strength may be appreciated in this case.
Nevertheless, the Court nds that the qualifying circumstance of treachery may be
appreciated in this case, considering that Minda, Baby, and Jocelyn - similar to Mario - were
attacked in the middle of the night while they were sleeping, unarmed, and defenseless.As
such, their killings were still correctly classi ed as Murders.
Finally, su ce it to say that the killing of Efren was properly classi ed as Homicide absent
any factual averment showing that the same is attended by treachery and/or abuse of
superior strength.
PP vs. PADILLA, G.R. No. 75508, Jun 10, 1994
SGT. FELIX PADILLA was a member of the Philippine Air Force (PAF) assigned to U-2, the
intelligence unit of General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines (GHQ-AFP), then
under the Eastern Command, now Regional Uni ed Command (RUC-8) stationed at Camp
Lukban, Catbalogan, Samar. He was charged together with his Senior O cer, Maj. Ildefonso
de la Cruz, before the then Court of First Instance of Catbalogan, Samar, with the crime of
murder quali ed by treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of his public
position, for the fatal shooting on 5 May 1981 of his comrade-in-arms, Pfc. Edino Ontuca,
O cer-in-Charge of the Talalora Police Sub-Station. Two aggravating circumstances were
alleged to have attended the commission of the o ense, namely, the aid of armed men, and
abuse of superior strength.
On 28 March 1983, upon motion of the prosecution, a re-investigation was granted by the
trial court. As a result, the charge against Maj. de la Cruz was provisionally dismissed but
trial proceeded as to accused Padilla.
After trial, the court a quo convicted Sgt. Padilla of murder quali ed by treachery with the
generic aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of his public position, but
appreciating at the same time the mitigating circumstance of su cient provocation in favor
of the accused. After o setting the two attendant circumstances, the court imposed the
medium of the penalty prescribed for murder, which is reclusion perpetua, and ordered the
accused to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P30,000.00, and to pay the
costs.
Accused-appellant now comes to us claiming that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Speci cally, he imputes the following errors to the court a quo: (1)
in nding that he shot and killed the victim when no clear evidence supports it; (2) in nding
that the deformed slug, Exh. "I," was the same slug extracted from the cadaver of the victim
and basing its conviction thereon; and, (3) in giving high probative value to the testimony of
Pat. Daniel Q. Omega notwithstanding his apparent bias for the victim who was his superior
in the police force.
The court a rmed the conviction of accused-appellant, the court take exception to the
ndings of the court a quo on the attendant circumstances. They do not agree that there
was treachery in the killing of the victim to qualify it to murder. There was no treachery or
alevosia because the accused did not deliberately employ means, methods or forms in the

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 mode of his attack which tended directly and specially to insure his safety from any o ensive
or retaliatory act the victim might make. Appellant did not consciously adopt a particular
method or manner of killing the victim that would eliminate any risk to himself, for it was not
until Pfc. Ontuca and the woman he was holding hostage accidentally fell to the ground that
appellant was accorded the instant opportunity to kill his victim with facility.
Moreover, the assault on the victim was not made in a sudden and unexpected manner. Pfc.
Ontuca apparently sensed the sinister plan of his malefactors when he ed and forcibly took
a woman hostage to use as a human shield. Clearly, the victim was forewarned of a graver
evil when accused and his companions mauled him, and when Maj. de la Cruz had to
summon an armed military man purportedly to bring him and Pat. Omega to the hospital for
a "liquor test."
The absence of treachery or alevosia notwithstanding, the crime committed by accused-
appellant is still murder. The killing was quali ed by the aggravating circumstance of abuse
of superior strength which was alleged in the information and proved during the trial. 30
Abuse of superior strength is present not only when the o enders enjoy numerical
superiority, or there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor,
but also when the o ender uses a powerful weapon which is out of proportion to the
defense available to the o ended party. The accused was armed with a powerful pistol
which he purposely used, gaining him an advantage over his victim who only had a piece of
plywood to cover himself after he was disarmed.
The accused did not abuse his public position in committing the crime. For this
circumstance to be appreciated as aggravating, the public o cial must use his in uence,
prestige and ascendancy which his o ce gives him in realizing his purpose. It could not be
said that the accused purposely used or took advantage of his position or rank in killing the
victim because he could have committed the crime just the same by using another weapon
not necessarily his service rearm. Besides, Pfc. Ontuca, himself a military man, resisted the
assault on his person and did not adhere to the accused, nor to C1C Belino, neither to Maj.
de la Cruz, who was a ranking o cer of the Philippine Air Force.
Su cient provocation could neither mitigate the criminal liability of the accused. He cannot
claim that he was provoked by Pfc. Ontuca when the latter ran away from him because,
understandably so, the hapless victim feared for his life having been beaten up twice by his
assailants that same evening. To ee when danger lurks is human and can never be
regarded as a source of provocation su cient to come within the ambit of The Revised
Penal Code. In fact, when an o ended party ees from his aggressor, the latter has no
reason to pursue and attack him.
All told, the crime committed by accused-appellant is murder quali ed by abuse of superior
strength. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal maximum to death. In the absence of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be, as correctly imposed by
the court a quo, reclusion perpetua, which is the penalty for murder.
Pp vs Amodia, G.R. No. 177356, November 20, 2008.
On June 10, 2003 at about 3:00 a.m., Richard Avila Roda, an Assistant Manager of Nognog
Videoke Restaurant in Quezon City, went out of the restaurant to invite customers. Once out
of the restaurant, he saw seven persons mauling someone. He noticed that three of the
attackers, whom he later identi ed as accused-appellants Amodia, Marino, and Lo-oc, were
regular customers of their restaurant. The other four were unknown to him; so was the
victim. He saw Lo-oc hold the shoulders of the victim while Marino and Amodia took turns in
beating the victim. One of their companions had a knife, who, upon seeing Roda, threatened
to kill him. As a result of the beating, the victim fell on the ground. Roda immediately
approached the victim and saw blood oozing out of the back of his head. One of the maulers
was about to deliver another blow on the victim but Roda was able to stop him by saying,
"Hindi na kayo naawa." Accused-appellants then went inside the restaurant and drank one
bottle of beer each. Roda did not immediately report the incident because he was
threatened by accused-appellants who were still hanging around the area. He later went
home with the owner of the restaurant.
Later, in the early morning of the same day, he saw the body of the victim still in the place
where he fell. There were already some barangay tanods and police o cers investigating the
incident. The victim, later identi ed as Jaime Bartina, was then brought to the Quezon City
General Hospital. Someone then informed Cornelia Bartina, the live-in partner of the victim,
that the latter was brought to the hospital. She immediately went to the hospital where she
found Jaime still alive, but noticed that blood was dripping from his mouth which stained his
clothes. Jaime died at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of June 10, 2003.
RTC nding accused JOHBERT AMODIA y BABA, MARIO MARINO y PATNON, and ROY
LO-OC y PENDANG guilty. The accused hereby appealed the decision to CA.
The appeal is partly meritorious. Accused-appellants' conviction is anchored on the positive
testimony of the prosecution eyewitness which accused-appellants dismiss as full of
inconsistencies. They allege that it was unbelievable that a person who had witnessed a
crime and who was genuinely willing to help the victim should simply go home without
immediately reporting the matter to the authorities. Moreover, they claim that it was
improbable that the assailants would hang around within the area of the crime to drink three
rounds of beer instead of immediately eeing.
We are not convinced. Delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not
necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, especially where su cient explanation is
given. In this case, the prosecution eyewitness explained that he did not immediately report
the incident to the police because the assailants threatened to hurt him. What made this
threat appear so real was the fact that accused-appellants lingered within the vicinity of the
crime for a couple of hours after the mauling incident. After the authorities had discovered
the victim, however, he volunteered to relate what he had seen. It took him only two days
before giving his statement. This delay, if it can be considered as one, is hardly unreasonable
or unjusti ed under the circumstances.

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 Also untenable is accused-appellants' contention that non- ight of the assailants signi ed
innocence. Unlike ight of an accused, which is competent evidence against the accused as
having a tendency to establish the accused's guilt, non- ight is simply inaction, which may
be due to several factors. It cannot be singularly considered as evidence or as a
manifestation determinative of innocence.
CA do not, however, agree that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength
had been su ciently proved. To appreciate the attendant circumstance of abuse of superior
strength, what should be considered is whether the aggressors took advantage of their
combined strength in order to consummate the o ense. Mere superiority in number is not
enough to constitute superior strength. There must be clear proof that the assailants
purposely used excessive force out of proportion to the defense available to the person
attacked.
In this case, although the victim was unquestionably outnumbered, it was not shown that
accused-appellants deliberately applied their combined strength to weaken the defense of
the victim and guarantee the execution of the crime. Notably, accused-appellants took turns
in boxing the victim. When the victim fell, the prosecution witness was able to hold him,
preventing accused-appellants from further hurting him. Then accused-appellants simply
turned away. To be sure, had accused-appellants really intended to use their superior
strength to kill the victim, they would have nished o the victim, and probably even the lone
prosecution eyewitness.
To stress, qualifying circumstances must be proved as clearly as the crime itself. In order to
appreciate the attendant circumstance of abuse of superior strength, not only is it necessary
to evaluate the physical conditions of the protagonists or opposing forces and the arms or
objects employed by both sides, but it is further necessary to analyze the incidents and
episodes constituting the total development of the event.
Pp vs Ventura, G. R. Nos. 148145-46, 5 Jul 2004.
The spouses Jaime and Aileen Bocateja were, in the early hours of February 23, 2000, fast
asleep in their room on the ground oor of their two-storey house at Alunan-Yulo in Bacolod
City, Negros Occidental. The room had a glass wall with a glass sliding door which was
closed but not locked. The kitchen light was open, as was the light in the adjoining room
where the couple's young children, Jummylin and Janine, were sleeping. Their niece, Aireen
Bocateja, and Jaime's elder daughter, Rizza Mae, were asleep in their rooms on the second
oor.
At around 2:00 a.m., Jaime was roused from his sleep by appellant Ventura who, together
with his nephew appellant Flores, had stealthily entered the couple's room after they gained
entry into the house by cutting a hole in the kitchen door.
As established by the testimonial and object evidence for the prosecution, the following
transpired thereafter:
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Appellant Ventura pointed a revolver at Jaime's face, announced a hold-up, hit Jaime on the
head with the gun and asked him for his keys.
When appellant Ventura struck him again, Jaime called out for help and tried to grab the
revolver. The two men then struggled for possession of the gun. As Jaime almost succeeded
in wresting possession of the gun from him, appellant Flores shouted to appellant Ventura to
stab Jaime. Using the knife he was carrying, appellant Flores stabbed Jaime three times.
Jaime thereupon released the gun, threw a nearby plastic stool at the jalousy glass window
causing it to break and cried out for help.
In the meantime, Aileen who had been awakened, began shouting for help as she saw her
husband in mortal danger. Appellant Flores stabbed her, however, with his knife, and
although Aileen tried to defend herself with an electric cord, appellant Flores continued
stabbing her.
Awakened by the commotion, Aireen descended the stairs and saw the knife wielding
appellant Flores whom she recognized as a former employee of the butcher shop of the
Bocataje spouses. Pleading with appellant Flores not to harm her, Aireen ran back upstairs
into Rizza Mae's room, and the two called to their neighbors for help.
Appellants Ventura and Flores thereupon ed the Bocateja house, bringing nothing with
them. Soon members of the Central Investigation Unit (CIU) of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) arrived in response to a ash report. Some of the police o cers took the spouses to
the Western Visayas Regional Hospital, while other elements of the CIU team intercepted
appellants Ventura and Flores who were being pursued by neighbors of the spouses at the
corner of Araneta-Yulo. Recovered from appellant Ventura was a .38 caliber revolver with ve
(5) live bullets, and from appellant Flores a blood stained knife measuring 14½ inches from
tip to handle with a 10-inch blade.
Shortly after their arrest, appellants were interviewed by reporters from Bombo Radio to
whom they admitted responsibility for stabbing Jaime and Aileen. In response to questions
from the reporters, appellant Ventura explained that he suspected his wife was carrying on
an a air with Jaime.
The court ruled that, very long line of cases has consistently held that an attack made by a
man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the
circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act
a orded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself. Thus, in People v.
Molas, where the accused was convicted of murder for stabbing to death two women and
an eight year old boy, this Court discoursed:
While treachery was not appreciated as a qualifying circumstance against Molas, the killing
of the three victims was raised to murder by the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength. There was abuse of superior strength when Molas in icted
several mortal wounds upon Soledad. Molas, besides being younger and stronger, was
 armed with a weapon which he used in seriously wounding her. That circumstance was
also present when he hacked eight-year old Abelaro and also Dulcesima who, besides
being a woman of lesser strength was unarmed. (Emphasis supplied)
And in the more recent case of People v.Loreto, this Court opined:
The contention of accused-appellant is barren of merit. Article 14, paragraph 15 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that a crime against persons is aggravated by the accused
taking advantage of superior strength. There are no xed and invariable rules regarding
abuse of superior strength or employing means to weaken the defense of the victim.
Superiority does not always mean numerical superiority. Abuse of superiority depends upon
the relative strength of the aggressor vis-à-vis the victim. There is abuse of superior strength
even if there is only one malefactor and one victim. Abuse of superiority is determined by the
excess of the aggressor's natural strength over that of the victim, considering the position of
both and the employment of means to weaken the defense, although not annulling it. The
aggressor must have advantage of his natural strength to insure the commission of the
crime. In this case, accused-appellant was armed with a knife and used the same in
repeatedly stabbing Leah, a young wisp of a girl, no less than eighteen times after
overtaking her in the sala of Dan's house. Irrefragably, then, accused-appellant abused
his superior strength in stabbing Leah. In a case of early vintage [People v. Guzman,
supra. at 1127], the Court held that:
There is nothing to the argument that the accused was erroneously convicted of murder. An
attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless
woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the
weapon used in the act a orded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend
herself (U.S. vs. Camiloy, 36 Phil. 757; U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; People vs. Quesada,
62 Phil. 446). The circumstance of abuse of superior strength was, therefore, correctly
appreciated by the trial court, as qualifying the o ense as murder. (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)
By deliberately employing a deadly weapon against Aileen, appellant Flores clearly took
advantage of the superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave him over his unarmed
victim.
As for appellant Flores' claim of self-defense, it cannot be sustained. As in defense of a
relative, one claiming self defense must prove by clear and convincing evidence both
unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed or injured and reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. As a third requisite, he
must also prove lack of su cient provocation on his part.
Indeed, since they deliberately planned to attack Jaime in the sanctity of his bedroom where
his wife Aileen was also sleeping, appellants cannot now claim that the latter's violent
resistance was an unforeseen circumstance. Hence, neither of them can escape
accountability for the tragic consequences of their actions.
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In determining appellants' criminal liability, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating
circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and breaking of door in connection with both crimes.
Dwelling is considered aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to
human abode.
Thus, it has been said that the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows greater
perversity in the accused and produces greater alarm. Here, dwelling was correctly
appreciated since the crimes were committed in the place of abode of the victims who had
not given immediate provocation.
Appellants and the Solicitor General also argue that nocturnity should not have been
considered since Jaime himself testi ed that their bedroom was well-lit and there was light
coming from the kitchen and the adjoining bedroom of their children.
In determining nocturnity, two tests are employed in the alternative: (1) the objective test,
under which nighttime is aggravating because the darkness facilitated the commission of the
o ense; and (2) the subjective test, under which nighttime is aggravating because the
darkness was purposely sought by the o ender. Applying these tests to the established
factual circumstances, this Court concludes that nocturnity was correctly appreciated in
connection with both crimes.
While the bedroom where the crimes occurred was well-lit, the evidence shows that, in
furtherance of their murderous intent, appellants deliberately took advantage of nighttime, as
well as the fact that the household members were asleep, in order to gain entry into the
Bocateja residence. Indeed, their own testimony indicates that while they were already
outside the Bocateja house at around 11:00 p.m., they purposely waited until 2:00 a.m.
before breaking into the residence so as not to call the attention of the Bocatejas and/or
their neighbors. It is thus clear that appellants deliberately took advantage of the darkness of
the night, not to mention the fact that the Bocatejas were fast asleep, to conceal their
actions and to facilitate and insure that their entry into the victims' home would be
undetected.
While jealousy may give rise to passion or obfuscation, for the appreciation of this mitigating
circumstance it is necessary that the act which produced the obfuscation was not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which
the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. In the same vein, while "immediate"
vindication should be construed as "proximate" vindication in accordance with the
controlling Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code, still this mitigating circumstance cannot
be considered where su cient time elapsed for the accused to regain his composure.
In these cases, appellant Ventura's suspicions were aroused as early as February 17, almost
a week before the stabbing incidents on February 23, when he rst confronted his wife about
her ring. Moreover, as previously noted, ten hours had elapsed from the time appellants left
Murcia, Negros Occidental, weapons in hand, to the time they entered the Bocateja
 residence in Bacolod City. Within that period appellant Ventura had opportunity to change
his clothes at a relatives' house in a neighboring barangay and both appellants were able to
take their dinner at the Burgos Market in Bacolod City. They even waited three hours outside
the Bocateja residence before carrying out their plan. Without question, su cient time had
passed for appellants' emotions to cool and for them to recover their equanimity.
In ne, for stabbing Jaime, appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted
murder quali ed by evident premeditation with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling
and nighttime. However, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the trial court erred in
imposing the sentence of Eight (8) Years of prision mayor as minimum to Eighteen (18) Years
of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a penalty two degrees lower than that
prescribed for the consummated penalty shall be imposed upon the principals in an
attempted felony. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty two degrees
lower is prision mayor. Applying Section 1 of Act No. 4103, as amended, otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and considering the presence of two aggravating
circumstances, the proper imposable penalty falls within the range of prision mayor in its
maximum period (from Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day to Twelve (12) Years) as maximum and
prision correccional (from Six (6) Months and One (1) Day to Six (6) Years) as minimum.
Accordingly, this Court hereby sentences appellants to an indeterminate penalty of Six (6)
Years of prision correccional as minimum to Twelve (12) Years of prision mayor as maximum.
For fatally stabbing Aileen, appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
quali ed by abuse of superior strength with the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, dwelling and nighttime. As already noted, the penalty for murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the law
prescribes two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be imposed when, in the
commission of the deed, one aggravating circumstance is present. Consequently, the trial
court's imposition of the supreme penalty of death must be sustained.
Ocampo v. People, G.R. No. 163705, July 30, 2007.
Misayah testi ed that on 14 November 1995, at around 8:10 p.m., he was walking along San
Nicolas Street on his way home when three male individuals approached him. As the place
was su ciently lighted by a nearby post, he was able to identify the trio as accused Cruz,
Ocampo and Miranda. When the three accused were already near him, Cruz grabbed
Misayah’s neck and choked him while Miranda held his shoulder and got his shoulder bag.
Ocampo meanwhile was in the middle, holding a knife, warning him not to ght back.
Sensing that he would be harmed anyway, Misayah fought back by pushing the hands of the
accused and trying to parry their blows. He and Cruz then fell on the ground with Cruz on
top of him. When the handle of his shoulder bag snapped, all of the accused ran away with
the shoulder bag. By reason of the incident, Misayah sustained wounds in his hands caused
by the bladed weapon held by Ocampo when he attempted to evade Ocampo’s blows. The
shoulder bag taken from Misayah contained the items enumerated in the aforequoted
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Information. At the nearby Municipal Hall, Misayah reported the incident to Police O cers de
Leon, Mon Mendoza, and Catalino Mutuc. Misayah was brought to Balitucan Emergency
Hospital for treatment and thereafter proceeded to the precinct. After further investigation,
he then executed a statement before Sr/Insp. Catalino Mutuc and SPO4 de Leon.
The ruling of the court:
It is a well-settled rule that the dispositive portion of the decision prevails over the opinion,
the former being the nal order while the opinion is an informal expression of the views of
the court, thus forming no part of the judgment.50 Following this rule, the appellate court
thus found the presence of abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance but
not conspiracy.
The appellate court is correct in ruling out conspiracy. The existence of conspiracy cannot
be presumed. The elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.51
Conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the
o ense itself. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred from the
conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. All taken
together, however, the evidence therefor must be reasonably strong enough to show a
community of criminal design.
In the case at bar, there is no convincing evidence that all of the accused had resolved to rob
Misayah prior to the actual robbery. What is evident is that the robbery that transpired was a
spur of the moment decision among the three accused. For one, Miranda and Ocampo were
consistent in their statement that they were on their way to have a drink at the common time
of the incident. For another, they saw Misayah by chance. Still for another, there was no
evidence that all of the accused knew beforehand that Misayah would be passing by the
street where the robbery occurred that fateful evening. Neither was it shown that the street
was part of Misayah’s regular route on his way home.
According to Misayah in his testimony, Cruz grabbed his neck and choked him while
Miranda held his shoulder. Ocampo meanwhile was in the middle, holding a knife and
warning him not to ght back. While the evidence did not prove the existence of conspiracy,
it indelibly established that the accused took advantage of their superior strength.
Article 294, paragraph (5) of the Revised Penal Code xes the penalty for simple robbery at
prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, the range
of which is from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years.56
Considering the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the penalty should
be imposed in its maximum period while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree, which is arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium in any of
its periods, the range of which is four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months.
PP vs. DUCUSIN, G.R. No. 30724, August 08, 1929

On the date of the crime and prior thereto, the deceased Cesareo Tadefa lived with his wife
Teodora Vergara in the village of San Jose, municipality of Caba, Province of La Union. The
defendant, who was Teodora’s rst cousin and Cesareo’s second cousin, lived in the same
village of which he was second lieutenant. The defendant Mariano Ducusin had been making
love to Teodora Vergara for about a month before August 12, 1928, but she had rejected him
saying: "I cannot accept your love for I am a married woman." The defendant then replied
that he would do everything in his power that her husband might die, that she might be able
to marry him. Teodora Vergara related to her husband what the defendant had said and he
became angry and said: "Why does he do that, being a relative of ours?"
On the morning of August 12, 1928, Cesareo Tadefa went to the defendant’s house to have
his hair cut as usual, free of charge. Cesareo Tadefa returned home after mid-day, and as it
was time to pasture his carabaos, he led them out to graze in Mariano Ducusin’s land.
As Cesareo Tadefa failed to return home that night, his wife went to the house of her brother-
in-law, Eugenio Domondon, which was a few meters away from her own, and told him that
her husband had not returned from pasturing his carabaos. That same night Eugenio
Domondon went in search of Cesareo Tadefa where Teodora Vergara had pointed out, but
failed to nd him. Very early the next morning they informed Cesareo Tadefa’s father of what
had happened, and all of them, together with Teodora’s mother, went to the eld in search of
him. They found Cesareo’s dead body that same morning on a hillside covered with cogon
grass on the defendant’s land, a kilometer away from the deceased’s house, lying face
downwards under an adaan tree with a severed piece of vine wound about his neck with a
slipknot at the back. When the vine was untied, it left a mark on the neck. From one of the
branches of the adaan tree, they found a piece of vine dangling, apparently of the same kind
as was found around the deceased’s neck, one end of which was tied to this branch. No
other marks of violence were found upon the corpse. Ceferino Tadefa and his companions
did not want to touch the corpse and went back to the village to inform the defendant, as
second lieutenant of that barrio, that they had found the deceased’s body. On hearing the
news from Ceferino Tadefa, the defendant said to him: "Let us not inform the authorities of
this for if we did so, they would not be able to take the body either to-day or to-morrow, and
as decomposition would set in, no one would be willing to help us take it away." On
receiving this advice, Ceferino Tadefa went to his son-in-law, Eugenio Domondon’s house.
Later, the defendant also went there and on arriving, said: "Now prepare something in which
to carry him and let us take him to town for burial. When the body arrives prepare something
in which to take it to town for burial, and I shall advance the funeral expenses and defray the
charges for the burial rites of the Church; I shall pay this and secure the required license."
Having said this, the relatives of the deceased gave the defendant some money for those
expenses.
Upon reaching the town, the defendant sought out the municipal secretary and told him that
Cesareo Tadefa had died of a headache and fever, and the municipal secretary issued a
death certi cate stating that the deceased had died of malaria. After the defendant had so
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informed the authorities, he said to Ceferino Tadafa: "It is better that we say that he died of
headache."cralaw virtua1aw library
As Teodora Vergara suspected that the defendant was responsible for her husband’s death,
she went to San Fernando, La Union, with her father after the funeral novena (novena
funebre), that is, about September 17, 1928, and informed the Constabulary of her
suspicion. In view thereof, several Constabulary soldiers, together with the chief of police of
Caba and some policeman, went to the village of San Jose, the chief of police and his
companions took the defendant Mariano Ducusin from his house to that the defendant
Mariano Ducusin was responsible for his death, they took him to the town of Caba on the
following Thursday, September 20, 1928, and con ned him in the municipal jail.
At about 4 o’clock that same afternoon the sergeant on guard sent a policeman to call the
chief of police because Mariano Ducusin had confessed. At nightfall, the chief of police went
to the municipal jail and was alarmed to nd everything so quiet in the cell occupied by the
defendant. He then went in front of the window of said cell, and called out: "Lieutenant Ano!"
Receiving no reply, he called again and again. As no one answered, he opened the little
window and saw the defendant on his knees facing southwards, who said to him: "Let me
nish my prayer rst, chief, and we shall talk afterwards." After praying, he said: "What is
this, chief? How serious are the things I hear my enemies are saying about me." The chief of
police answered: "Well, think it over. If you really did it, say so; if not, tell us you should not
be blamed for it." While the chief of police and the defendant were talking, they brought in
the latter’s food and the chief of police told him to eat it while he went home to get his
supper. Later on, the sergeant on guard again sent for the chief of police because the
defendant had made a confession. On arriving at the jail, the chief of police said to the
defendant: "Yes, sir." Upon being asked what his confession consisted in, Mariano Ducusin
related the following: "At about 5 o’clock in the afternoon on Sunday, I saw Cesareo Tadefa
going to the pasture. So I took the wind I had bought on purpose and followed him. When I
saw him on the north side of the hill grazing his beast, I called him and took him near an
adaan tree and there I said to him: ’My brother, I have brought this wine and want you to
taste it; and that you may have no misgivings, I shall drink it rst." And I did so, drinking it
rst. After taking a little I gave it to Cesareo, who drank it, leaving a little. After we had
spoken for some time, I again o ered him the remaining wine and he drank it. When I saw
that Cesareo Tadefa was drunk and could hardly articulate, I got up and held him by the
neck and shook him until he fell to the ground. When I saw that Cesareo Tadefa was about
to die I took a vine and bound it tightly around his neck. When I saw that he was already
dead, and that thirty minutes had elapsed, I twisted the vine until it broke, tying the severed
portion to one of the branches of the adaan tree so as to make it appear that the deceased
had hanged himself, breaking the vine and falling to the ground." The defendant made this
statement before some Constabulary soldiers and policemen. The chief of police had the
statement reduced to writing in document Exhibit C, which defendant signed the next day at
about 9 o’clock in the morning in the presence of the justice of the peace of Caba after the
latter had read it and asked him whether its contents were his own statement, to which he
answered in the a rmative, and whether he had been maltreated by any policeman or
received any promise of leniency to which he answered in the negative.

As he had not prepared the defendant’s rst a davit, Exhibit C, and as he wished to make
sure that the confession was really voluntary, and to ascertain the motive of the crime, the
justice of the peace, Ricardo Ordoña, had the defendant called in and asked him whether he
wished to make any statement before the court. On receiving an a rmative answer, said
justice of the peace submitted him to an examination in the presence of the municipal
president, Constabulary Lieutenant Bravo, Constabulary Sergeant Orpia, Pastor Dulay, and
several other persons, and the defendant answered repeating in greater detail the statement
he had made before the chief of police (Exhibit D).
During the preliminary investigation, when the information was read to him and he was
asked whether he pleaded guilty or not guilty, he answered: "I admit that I caused the death,
but I plead not guilty."cralaw virtua1aw library
After the preliminary investigation, in the afternoon of September 21, 1928, Lieutenant Bravo
of the Constabulary took the defendant to the provincial jail of San Fernando, La Union, in
the Constabulary wagon, and on the way, the defendant said that he had three times tried to
kill Cesareo Tadefa, but that the opportunity did not arrive until the day of the crime; that he
had gone to Aringay to buy a bottle of cognac, and when he saw Cesareo Tadefa go to the
eld between 5 and 6 in the afternoon, he followed him and invited him to drink the wine;
that in order to stir up some courage, he rst drank it himself, and then o ered it to the
deceased, who nished it; that his purpose in o ering the wine to the deceased was to
weaken the latter, so he could easily overpower him; that he tried a vine about the
deceased’s neck to cause it to appear that the latter had committed suicide; that he had
twice had intercourse with the deceased’s wife before killing the deceased, but not
afterwards.
The ruling:
In the commission of the crime, the circumstance of evident premeditation, qualifying the
crime as murder, must be considered, because, according to his own confession, the
defendant three times attempted to take the life of Cesareo Tadefa in order to be able to
marry his widow, with whom he was in love, purchasing cognac in order to facilitate the
commission of the crime. The aggravating circumstance de ned in article 10, No. 9, of the
Penal Code, that is, the employment of means to weaken the defense, consisting in this
case, in having made the deceased intoxicated, must be taken into account. This act cannot
be juridically considered to give rise to the aggravating circumstance may legally exist, it is
necessary that the means employed should tend directly and especially to insure the
execution of a crime against persons, without risk to the perpetrator arising from the defense
which the o ended party might make. The defendant’s confession does not furnish su cient
data as to the state of intoxication of the deceased at the moment of strangulation, and the
fact that he could not articulate is not su cient to determine whether, in his intoxicated state
at that time, it was impossible for him to put up any sort of resistance.
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The aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place is likewise to be taken into account,
inasmuch as the crime was committed in an isolated and unfrequented place overgrown with
weeds.
There is no extenuating circumstance that can be taken into account in favor of the criminal.
Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that the defendant and appellant is guilty of the
crime of murder de ned and penalized in article 403 of the Penal Code, the penalty xed by
law ranging from cadena temporal in its maximum degree to death. Considering the
aggravating circumstances that were present in the commission of the crime, with no
extenuating circumstance to o set them, the death penalty should legally be imposed upon
the defendant; but for lack of unanimity in the vote as to the propriety of imposing the death
penalty, in accordance with section 1, paragraph 2, of Act No. 3104, said penalty cannot be
imposed, and the one next lower in degree, that is, life imprisonment, must be imposed in
conformity with the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 2726.
People v. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-60073, September 23, 1983.
About twelve o’clock midnight, August 15, 1979, appellants Nenito C. Ferrer, Rodolfo
Zulueta and Nelson Maico and one Agapito Maico entered the house of complainant Teresa
Estrella in Guiguinto, Bulacan, by forcibly bending one of the iron grills in the front jalousie
windows, and with faces covered with handkerchiefs and armed with a .38 revolver and a
long knife, forced Narciso, one of the children of Mrs. Estrella to knock at the master’s
bedroom where Mrs. Estrella and her second husband Bernardo Alejo were sleeping. Lena
Estrella was sleeping and her own room and was awakened by a heavy knock at the door.
She stood up and saw her mother, Mrs. Estrella, accompanied by two armed men and they,
together with the other members of the household, were brought to the master’s bedroom
where Bernardo Alejo was. They were gagged with pieces of cloth and hogtied with electric
cords. Thereafter, appellant Rodolfo Zulueta demanded money and jewelry from Mrs.
Estrella, with threat that one of her sons or members of the family would be taken as
hostage if she would not comply. Frightened, Mrs. Estrella yielded to appellants jewelry
worth more than P100,000.00 and cash money amounting to P17,000.00. Rodolfo Zulueta
then brought Lena Estrella, aged 14, to her room and armed with a Caliber .38 gun, removed
one of the straps of the duster Lena was wearing. Lena pushed him o but Zulueta poked
the gun at her and told her to do what she was told, otherwise, he would harm every
member of the household. He removed her other strap and touched her breast. Lena pushed
Zulueta away from her again but he removed her underpants and his own clothes, then
placed himself on top of her and succeeded in sexually abusing her. Appellants Maico and
Ferrer also had carnal knowledge with Lena following which they brought her to the master’s
bedroom and like the rest, her hands were tied at the back and she was made to lie down
with her face towards the oor.
About four o’clock in the morning, appellants boarded the car of Mrs. Teresa Estrella who
was ordered to drive them to Manila. Two of the appellants alighted at the corner of Mayon
Street and España Extension, while the other two got-o at Roxas Boulevard.
 The matter was reported at once to the police authorities of Guiguinto and Pat. Tomas de
Armas conducted the investigation. Lena was physically examined by Dr. Ruperta Caluag
who found the victim in shock and slightly apathetic, with a swelling in her vagina.
Ruling:
The imposable penalty for the crime of robbery with rape is reclusion perpetua to death. In
the case at bar, the aggravating circumstances of night time to facilitate the commission of
the o ense; the use of motor vehicle to facilitate their escape, and the use of means
employed to weaken the defense — all members of Estrella household were hogtied by
electric cords and gagged with pieces of clothes — all having been proved during the trial,
the proper penalty is death under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. However, for lack of
necessary votes the death penalty is commuted to reclusion perpetua.
Pp vs. Gidoc, GR No. 185162, Apr 24, 2009
That on or about the 8th day of April 2001, in Navotas, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed
weapon, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another, with intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one ARNEL PEREZ Y ESPINOSA, hitting the
victim on his body, thereby in icting upon the victim serious wound which caused his
immediate death.
When arraigned on 23 October 2003, accused-appellant entered pleas of not guilty to the
crimes charged. His co-accused Ocenar remained at large.
Upon joint motion of the prosecution and the defense, the cases were consolidated and trial
ensued thereafter.
The prosecution presented witness Bernard Paladin (Paladin) who positively identi ed
accused-appellant as the person who stabbed the brothers Arnel and Cesar. He said that
Ocenar acted as a look-out. He testi ed that at around ten o’clock in the evening of 8 April
2001, his group which included the victims Cesar and Arnel, as well as accused-appellant
and Ocenar, were drinking and singing in a videoke joint at the Bicol Area in Tanza, Navotas.
He disclosed that accused-appellant and Ocenar got involved in a ght with another group
nearby, while he and the victims did not join in the fray. After the ght, accused-appellant
and Ocenar left but returned after about ve minutes armed with bladed weapons. Accused-
appellant, armed with a long knife, approached the group and suddenly stabbed victim Arnel
on the right breast. About ve seconds thereafter, accused-appellant also stabbed victim
Cesar. The victims were sitting side by side and singing when the incident happened. While
the stabbing was taking place, Ocenar stood guard with a bladed weapon on hand and was
watching if somebody would help. After the incident, accused-appellant and Ocenar ran
away while the victims managed to run home. As a result of the stabbing, the victims died
while undergoing treatment in the hospital.
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Accused-appellant denied the accusations against him claiming that it was not him but his
cousin named Rolly Gidoc who killed the victims because his real name is Rolando Gidoc
alias Bayeng. He insisted that at the time of the incident, he was on his way to Bicol Area,
Tanza, Navotas, after coming from his work in Imus, Cavite. When he passed by the group of
Cesar which was having a drinking spree, the latter’s brother, whose name he did not know,
called him. He approached the group but Cesar’s brother suddenly punched him. The other
members of the group joined in mauling him. They only stopped when Paladin arrived and
paci ed them. He said that when he was being mauled, his cousin Rolly Gidoc was with him.
He further claimed that he does not know why Paladin pointed to him as the one who
stabbed the victims. He was later informed by somebody that the victims are already dead
and that it was his cousin Rolly Gidoc who killed them.
Ruling:
As to the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we nd the same to be
present in these cases.
There is treachery when the o ender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the o ender might make.
The essence of treachery is a swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the
slightest provocation on the latter’s part.
In these cases, the circumstances showing how the victims were stabbed reveal that they
had no opportunity to defend themselves. They were unarmed and unsuspecting as they
were just singing and drinking when accused-appellant stabbed them. As properly observed
by the trial court, the swift and unexpected attack by the accused rendered them helpless.
There was also no provocation on their part to justify the ire of appellant. Treachery thus
quali es the killings to Murder.
We now go to the penalties to be imposed on accused-appellant. He is guilty of two counts
of murder quali ed by treachery. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
the penalty imposed for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion
perpetua for each count, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
People v. Petalino, G.R. No. 213222, September 24, 2018.
Eyewitness Franklin Bariquit recalled that on November 30, 1997, he attended a party with
his friend, a certain Carlo, in Barangay Danao, Iznart Street, Iloilo City. There, he met and
befriended Johnny Nalangay, the victim in this case.
At around 1:30 in the morning, he and the victim decided to leave. They then headed
towards the YMCA where they intended to get their respective rides for home. Bariquit
walked behind the victim when the two passed through a narrow alley towards Iznart St.
 While they were walking, Bariquit saw a person, whom he later identi ed as accused Alberto
Petalino alias Lanit, walking towards them from the opposite direction. When accused had
passed the victim, he suddenly turned towards him, grabbed his hair and without warning,
stabbed the victim in the back. The victim tried to run away, but he fell down after running a
distance.
Thereafter, the accused and Bariquit confronted each other, The latter kicked the accused
causing him to fall down and to drop his knife. Bariquit then ran away and proceeded to
PO's Marketing which was located near the Bank of the Philippine Islands. After sensing that
the accused was no longer chasing him, he went back to the alley where he last saw the
victim. There, Bariquit found the victim lying on the ground, face down and bloodied all over.
The victim managed to utter some words but became unconscious when he was taken to St.
Paul's Hospital where he eventually died.
Jaime Nalangay, the father of the victim, testi ed that his son was only twenty (20) years old
at the time of his untimely death. According to him, a police o cer and his friend came over
to their house and informed him that his son was stabbed. Thus, he went to the hospital but
when he arrived there, he found his son dead. Nalangay alleged that he spent Php15,000.00
for the embalming of his son's remains and another Php10,000.00 for his burial although he
could not present receipts as he lost them. He also asserted that his son's death caused him
so much pain which could never be quanti ed into monetary amount.
Ruling:
RTC nd the accused guilty of murder and CA a rmed the conviction. The accused
appealed to SC.
Denial and alibi did not
prevail over positive identi cation
The appeal is partly meritorious. They held that denial and alibi do not prevail over the
positive identi cation of the accused by the State's witnesses who testify categorically and
consistently, and who are bereft of ill-motive towards the accused. Denial, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving defense that
carries no greater evidentiary value than the declaration of a credible witness upon
a rmative matters.Indeed, we have held that denial and alibi, to be credited, must rest on
strong evidence of non-culpability on the part of the accused.
The accused-appellant admitted being at the crime scene, but denied stabbing the victim.
He submitted that the victim had drawn a knife and run after him to stab him; and that they
had then wrestled until he had gotten hold of the knife. He recalled that he had run away
because the victim's two drunk companions had tried to go to latter's succor. He denied
having anything to do with the stabbing of the victim, and having any idea how the victim
had sustained his fatal injury.
As mentioned, the RTC gave scant consideration to the claim of the accused-appellant, and
accorded full credence to Bariquit's positive and categorical identi cation of the accused-
appellant as the assailant who had stabbed and mortally wounded the victim. The RTC's
treatment of the identi cation by Bariquit of the accused-appellant as the assailant who had
stabbed the victim was warranted. Bariquit's credibility as an eyewitness was unassailable
considering that there was no showing or hint of ill-motive on his part to falsely incriminate
the accused-appellant. His identi cation of the latter as the assailant of Nalangay, being rm
and untainted by ill-motive, prevailed over the unsubstantiated denial.
The accused-appellant pointed to the supposed inconsistencies and improbabilities that
rendered the testimony of Bariquit on the incident undependable. According to the accused-
appellant, Bariquit, although stating on direct examination that he and the victim had
attended a birthday party prior to the stabbing incident, later declared on cross-examination
that he and the victim had been at a party that was "not really a birthday party." The
accused-appellant also pointed to the confusion on the part of Bariquit about the exact
place where the party had been held.
The RTC and the CA both ruled out the challenge posed by the accused-appellant against
Bariquit's credibility. We agree with them. The inconsistencies referred to what had
transpired before the crime was committed, and did not to relate to material facts vital to the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused-appellant. The inconsistencies were
also too minor and trivial to have any signi cance in this adjudication. At best, they
concerned credibility, but the adverse ndings by the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses and of their testimonies were entitled to great respect, even nality, unless said
ndings were shown to have been arbitrary, or unless facts and circumstances of weight and
in uence were shown to have been overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied by the trial
judge that, if properly considered or appreciated, would have a ected the outcome in favour
of the accused-appellant. Needless to state, such ndings are now binding on the Court
because the CA has a rmed them. We also remind that minor inconsistencies in testimony
do not necessarily weaken or diminish the testimonies of witnesses who displayed
consistency on material points, i.e., the elements of the crime and the identity of the
perpetrator. Instead of weakening or diminishing the testimonies, the inconsistencies should
strengthen credibility because they discounted the possibility of the witnesses being
rehearsed.16 It is notable that the inconsistencies ascribed to Bariquit did not detract from
his declaration of having personally witnessed the stabbing of the victim by the accused-
appellant.
Treachery was improperly
considered as attendant
Under Article 14, paragraph 16, of the Revised Penal Code, treachery is present when the
o ender commits any of the crimes against a person, employing means, methods or forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which o ended party might make.
For treachery to be appreciated, therefore, the Prosecution must establish the attendance of
the following essential elements, namely: (1) that the means of execution employed gave the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or herself, or to retaliate; and (2) that the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted, that is, the means, method or
form of execution must be shown to be deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the
o ender. It is not su cient for the Prosecution to show that the victim was unable to defend

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 himself, for the Prosecution must also establish that the accused consciously adopted the
mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself.
Both the RTC and the CA concluded that the killing of Nalangay was attended by treachery.
This is where we disagree with the lower courts.
To start with, the acts constituting treachery were not su ciently averred in the information,
which pertinently stated:
x x x herein accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident premeditation, with a
decided purposes (sic) to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally stab, hit
and wound Johnny Nalangay with the said knife, which the said accused was provided at
the time, thereby causing upon the latter injuries on vital parts of his body which caused his
death few hours thereafter x x x.
It is clear from the averments to the e ect that "accused, armed with a knife, with treachery
and evident premeditation, with a decided [purpose] to kill .... stab, hit and wound Johnny
Nalangay with the said knife... causing upon the latter injuries on vital parts of his body
which caused his death" did not state that the accused-appellant had deliberately adopted
means of execution that denied to the victim the opportunity to defend himself, or to
retaliate; or that the accused-appellant had consciously and deliberately adopted the mode
of attach to ensure himself from any risk from the defense that the victim might make.
To merely state in the information that treachery was attendant is not enough because the
usage of the term treachery was but a conclusion of law. As we pointed out in People v.
Valdez:
x x x It should not be di cult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting
him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly and
specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim might make.
Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are
other instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term
treachery constitute a su cient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a
conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances
constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the
informations.
The requirement of su cient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature
and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. It
emanates from the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged
with. Thus, the facts stated in the body of the information should determine the crime of
which he stands charged and for which he must be tried.23 The information must su ciently
give him knowledge of what he had allegedly committed because he was presumed
innocent and unaware of the illegal acts imputed against him.
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Secondly, the nding of the attendance of treachery, assuming the su ciency of the
allegations thereon in the information, should be based on clear and convincing evidence.
The attendance of treachery cannot be presumed.24 The same degree of proof to dispel any
reasonable doubt was required before treachery could be considered either as an
aggravating or qualifying circumstance.25 In short, such evidence must be as conclusive as
the fact of killing itself.
For treachery to be properly appreciated, the State must show not only that the victim had
been unable to defend himself, but also that the accused had consciously adopted the
mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself.26 The fact
alone that the attack mounted by the accused-appellant against the victim was sudden and
unexpected, and did not a ord the latter any opportunity to undertake any form or manner of
defense or evasion did not necessarily justify a nding that treachery was attendant without
any showing that the accused-appellant had consciously and deliberately adopted such
mode of attack in order to insure the killing of the victim without any risk to himself arising
from the defense that the latter could possibly adopt. That showing was not made herein.
For one, the stabbing was committed when the victim was walking together with Bariquit,
whose presence even indicated that the victim had not been completely helpless. Also,
Bariquit's testimony indicated that the encounter between the victim and the accused-
appellant had been only casual because the latter did not purposely seek out the victim. In
this connection, treachery could not be appreciated despite the attack being sudden and
unexpected when the meeting between the accused and the victim was casual, and the
attack was done impulsively. There being no treachery, the crime committed by the accused-
appellant was homicide.
PP vs. YANSON, G.R. No. 179195, October 3, 2011
In the afternoon of May 12, 1991, Elmo Galfo (Galfo) and the victim, Carlito Magan (Magan),
were drinking whisky in the store of a certain Lorna Tamson (Tamson) After a while, they
were joined by appellant and Salcedo. They nished drinking at around 8:45 in the evening
after which Galfo and Magan walked home together.
After traversing a distance of about half a kilometer, Galfo noticed two persons following
them, one of whom suddenly stabbed Magan at the back. Galfo positively identi ed the
appellant as the person who stabbed Magan. Galfo tried to approach the victim but
appellant and his companion, Salcedo, rushed towards him thus prompting him to run away
for safety. While running, however, he managed to look back and saw appellant and Salcedo
stab the victim some more.
According to Dr. Edgardo Jabasa, the Provincial Health O cer of Guimaras, the victim
su ered eight stab wounds, two of which were fatal and were in icted at the back.
Ruling:
Both the trial court and the CA correctly appreciated the qualifying aggravating circumstance
of treachery. "There is treachery when the o ender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and
 specially to insure its execution, without risk to the o ender arising from the defense which
the o ended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a
warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, a ording the hapless, unarmed,
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two
elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons
attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution
were deliberately or consciously adopted."
The prosecution established that appellant suddenly stabbed the victim from behind thereby
giving him no opportunity to resist the attack or defend himself. As correctly observed by the
appellate court:
It is apparent that there was treachery in the killing of [Magan]. As surely testi ed by [Galfo],
[appellant] followed the unsuspecting victim when he was going home and thereafter,
deliberately stabbed him in the back which resulted in the falling of [Magan] to the ground
and rendering him defenseless to [appellant's] further attacks. Verily, [appellant] employed
means which insured the killing of [Magan] and such means assured him from the risk of
[Magan's] defense had he made any. It must also be noted that [Magan] was stabbed four
times in the back and two of these wounds were the proximate cause of his death. Stabbing
from behind is a good indication of treachery x x x
Pp vs Regalado, G.R. No. 177302, April 16, 2009
At around 3:30 P.M. of April 25, 1996, appellant Rogelio Regalado (Regalado), who was
outside Bantogan Tailoring, a tailoring shop at Bandola street corner Villaluz, Hinaruan,
Surigao del Sur, called out: "You let Bonjong come out so we could measure his courage!,"
referring to Edencito Chu (Chu) whose nickname is "Bonjong." Chu thereupon emerged from
his mother’s bakery, Purity Bakery, fronting the tailor shop, put his arms around Regalado’s
shoulders and asked for forgiveness. Regalado, however, pushed Chu’s arms aside, drew a
curved four to ve inches long knife as he uttered "Putang Ina, ka Jong!" and stabbed Chu
below the left nipple.
As Chu ran towards Villaluz street, Regalado chased him and picked up two pieces of
rewood along the way with which he hit Chu.
Appellant Jaime Lopez (Lopez) in the meantime surfaced from a house beside the tailoring
shop and, armed with a hunting knife, joined the chase.
Soon appellant Romeo Aragon (Aragon) also surfaced from the back of the tailoring shop
and also joined the chase.
The three appellants caught up with Chu at the corner of Lindo and Bandola streets at which
Aragon boxed Chu, causing the latter to fall. Aragon kicked Chu. Lopez then stabbed Chu
several times as Regalado looked on. When Chu was no longer moving, the three appellants
left. Chu expired before reaching the hospital.
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Ruling:
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack that renders the victim unable
and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack.
In the case at bar, Chu was caught o -guard when, after he was asking forgiveness from
Regalado, the latter suddenly drew a curved knife and stabbed and pursued the following
victim. And once Regalado and his co-appellants cornered Chu, Aragon kicked and
punched him while Lopez stabbed him several times to thus preclude Chua from defending
himself.
Pp vs Abdulah, G.R. No. 182518, January 20, 2009
It was six in the evening more than a decade and a half ago, or on November 6, 1992, when
the events leading to this case began to unfold. One of the victims, Evelyn Aguirre, was then
visiting in the house of the other victim, her daughter Romelyn Diolago, at Victoria St.,
Intramuros, Manila. With her in the house were her other daughters, Leny and Jovy Aguirre
(another victim), and her granddaughter, Cristy-Lyn. At that time, Romelyn was at a night
club working. Appellant Mohamad "Bong" Abdulah, Romelyn’s brother-in-law, and a
companion, entered the house and asked for the latter.
Informed of Romelyn’s whereabouts, Bong decided to fetch Romelyn at the club. He
dragged Evelyn from the house, out of the alley leading to the house, and to a black car. His
companion, Latip Mangsungayan, poked a .38 caliber gun at Jovy, dragged her and pushed
her inside the car. Three other companions of Bong were already in the car, a certain Racid
alias Lumang Kulog, Bagyo alias Muhammad, and Dhats Kamama. Bong then belted out to
the neighbors who got curious over the commotion, "Kung ano’ng nakikita ninyo, walang
magsasalita, totodasin ko lahat, walang makikialam, totodasin ko kayong lahat!" (You must
not interfere with us, and keep silent over what you are witnessing right now; otherwise, I will
kill all of you!). Bong then drove the car and sped o . Evelyn and Jovy never returned to the
house. That was the last time they were seen alive.
The following day, November 7, 1992, three female dead bodies were found by the police at
the grassy area of the apartment road in Maharlika Village, Taguig, Metro Manila [now, the
City of Taguig]. The bodies had stab wounds, and the necks had ligature marks. The
cadavers were then brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for
autopsy. On November 15, 1992, prompted by a news report, the relatives of the victims
went to Taguig, and there identi ed the dead bodies as those of Evelyn, Romelyn and Jovy.
The police theorized that appellant killed the victims to avenge the death of his brother Rex,
Romelyn’s live-in partner. The police further believed that appellant must have been
convinced of the family’s involvement in the death of Rex, considering that Rex’s killer was
the former boyfriend of Romelyn and hailed from the same hometown as the family.
Ruling:
 In this case, nevertheless, we nd appellant liable only for the death of Evelyn and Jovy,
there being no evidence to show that he also abducted Romelyn. While the prosecution
witnesses testi ed that appellant intended to proceed to the club where Romelyn worked,
no evidence was produced that he, in fact, reached the club and fetched Romelyn from
there.
As in Delim, we also nd, in this case, appellant guilty only of homicide de ned and
penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Treachery and evident
premeditation, the circumstances alleged in the informations, cannot be appreciated to
qualify the killing to murder, considering that these were not proven during the trial. It is an
ancient but revered doctrine that qualifying and aggravating circumstances before being
taken into consideration, for the purpose of increasing the penalty to be imposed, must be
proved with equal certainty as those which establish the commission of the criminal o ense.
It is not only the central fact of a killing that must be shown beyond reasonable doubt; every
qualifying or aggravating circumstance alleged to have been present and to have attended
such killing must similarly be shown by the same degree of proof.
Considering the absence of any modifying circumstance in the commission of homicide, the
indeterminate penalty to be imposed for each of the two counts should be within the range
of prisión mayor, as minimum, to reclusión temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
People v. Enriquez, Jr., G.R. No. 238171, June 19, 2019
On December 30, 2006, at around 9:30 in the evening, Luisa and her daughter, Jessica, were
in their house watching the television when they heard someone moaning at a nearby house.
As they peeped out of the window, they saw a bloodied Dela Cruz corning out of his house
and upon reaching the door got stabbed in the back by Enriquez with a bread knife. Dela
Cruz managed to ask for help from his uncle's house before collapsing. He was then brought
to the hospital but was unfortunately pronounced dead on arrival caused by multiple stab
wounds in the neck and thorax.
On the same date, at around 10:30 in the evening, Barangay Security Development O cer
Obar received a call about a killing incident in Carreon Village. He went to the reported place
and upon arrival, he saw a person being mauled and learned from an unnamed woman [that
said person is] the one involved in the killing. He arrested this person whom he later
identi ed as Enriquez. After bringing him to the barangay, Obar returned to the place and
recovered a knife. Meanwhile, Enriquez was transferred to Camp Karingal.
RTC convicted the accused for the crime of muder, CA a rmed the decision. Hence, the
appeal to SC.
In a catena of cases, the Court has consistently held that treachery cannot be appreciated
where the prosecution only proved the events after the attack happened, but not the manner
of how the attack commenced or how the act which resulted in the victim's death unfolded.
In treachery, there must be clear and convincing evidence on how the aggression was made,
how it began, and how it developed. Where no particulars are known as to the manner in
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which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim
began and developed, it cannot be established from suppositions drawn only from
circumstances prior to the very moment of the aggression, that an accused perpetrated the
killing with treachery. Accordingly, treachery cannot be considered where the lone witness
did not see the commencement of the assault.
In the instant case, the evidence presented by the prosecution only proved the events after
the initial attack had already happened. The prosecution witnesses, Luisa and Jessica, did
not see the manner of how the attack commenced or how the acts which resulted in the
victim's death unfolded as the attack started inside the house of the victim. They merely
saw Dela Cruz, already bloodied, coming out of his house. It was only at this point that
they saw Enriquez stab the victim again with a bread knife. Thus, what happened inside
the house is unknown to the prosecution witnesses.
Moreover, the nding of the trial court, sustained by the CA, that treachery was present
proceeds only from the fact that the witnesses saw Enriquez stab the already bloodied
victim from behind as he was about to exit his house.
There is treachery when the o ender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially
ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the o ended
party might make.
To qualify an o ense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means,
methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission
without risk of himself.
In order to appreciate treachery, both elements must be present. It is not enough that the
attack was "sudden," "unexpected," and "without any warning or provocation." There must
also be a showing that the o ender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime which tended directly to insure
such execution, without risk to himself.
However, the abovementioned elements of treachery were not proven by clear and
convincing evidence in the case at bar. As Luisa and Jessica were only able to witness the
events that transpired after the initial attack inside the house, it was not established whether
Enriquez deliberately or consciously employed the particular method he used so as to
deprive the victim any opportunity to defend himself. Even more telling is the fact that the
victim was able to escape from Enriquez and even ask for help from his uncle's house before
collapsing.
In view of the foregoing, Enriquez should only be liable for the crime of Homicide.
 People v. Diaz, G.R. No. 130210, December 8, 1999.
On 3 December 1996 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening Francis Bart Fulache and his 10-
year old brother Felbart went to Pier 3 to defecate. They were with 30-year old Ralph Velez
Diaz, a friend Francis Bart knew from the hantakan, a gaming place near their store. Francis
Bart then invited his brother Felbart to go with them to Pier 4 but the latter was not inclined
so he went home.
Francis Bart did not return home that evening. But Felbart was not alarmed as his brother
was used to going around and doing anything he wanted to without telling him nor asking
permission from their parents. However when Francis Bart still failed to show up in the
afternoon of the next day their parents got worried and started searching for him.
Meanwhile, at noontime of the same day, SPO2 Ramon Villar received a report that a body of
a boy between ten (10) to twelve (12) years of age was found dead at the Bulacao Bridge.
The body was in a sickening state of nudity and physical abuse. The face was covered with
a big stone in an apparent attempt to hide the body. After the routine taking of photographs
the body was brought to the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes for a post-mortem examination.
The autopsy conducted by the PNP Medico-Legal O cer, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, revealed that
the cause of death was "intracranial hemorrhage, extensive, with skull fracture, traumatic."
The examination also disclosed contusions, abrasions and lacerations all over the boy's
body the most prominent of which was the comminuted and depressed fracture on his head.
There were, quite notably, multiple lacerations in his rectum.
With respect to the injuries in the boy's rectal area, Dr. Cerna opined that a blunt instrument
like a male organ in full erection could have caused them. He claimed that in an attempt to
avoid any violation of his rectum the boy could have su ered more pain considering his soft
and tender skin and the violation would necessarily result in hemorrhage which could cause
instantaneous death.
Before conducting their investigation the police authorities as well as a certain Atty.
Abellanosa apprised accused-appellant of his constitutional rights in Cebuano, a language
known to accused-appellant, in the presence of men from the media who themselves a xed
their signatures in the sworn statement of accused-appellant to attest to the fact that he was
duly informed of his rights under the Constitution. The investigation proceeded where
accused-appellant revealed his sexual perversity by narrating in detail how he perpetrated
the ghastly crime against Francis Bart.
But this extra-judicial confession of accused-appellant was however declared inadmissible
by the trial court on the ground that Atty. Abellanosa who assisted accused-appellant during
the custodial investigation was not an independent counsel of the accused as required
under the Constitution.
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The court ruled that the crime committed by accused-appellant was murder even in the
absence of the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation because treachery and
abuse of superior strength were present - either of which quali ed the crime to murder.
There is treachery or alevosia when the o ender commits any of the crimes against person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
o ended party might make." In the instant case, treachery characterized the killing of eleven
(11)-year old Francis Bart. Well-settled is the doctrine that the killing of children who by
reason of their tender years cannot be expected to put up a defense is considered attended
with treachery even if the manner of attack is not precisely shown. Thus, the killing of Francis
Bart must be deemed ipso facto quali ed by treachery by reason of his inherent
defenselessness.
Likewise, there is a clear case of abuse of superior strength given the blatant inequality of
strength between the victim and accused-appellant. However, this cannot be appreciated
even as a generic aggravating circumstance being necessarily absorbed in treachery.
Anent the second assigned error, we agree with accused-appellant that he should not be
meted the supreme penalty of death. A careful scrutiny of the records shows that the
Information charged him only with murder quali ed by treachery, abuse of superior strength
and evident premeditation. It failed to mention the commission of sexual abuse or "sodomy"
on the victim. The Information designated the crime as "murder in relation to RA 7610," but
as a rule, what controls is not the designation of the o ense but its description in the
complaint or information. The real nature of the criminal charge cannot be determined from
the caption or preamble of the information or from the mere reference to a particular
provision of law alleged to have been violated because they are conclusions of law. On the
contrary, it is determined by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. The
technical name given by the scal appearing in the title of the information does not
determine the character of the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the information.
Thus, even if there is positive proof of sexual abuse accused-appellant cannot be convicted
therefor as it was not so alleged in the information.
We cannot share the view of the Solicitor General that the trial court did not apply the
provisions of RA 7610 in imposing the death penalty but merely made reference to them as
sexual abuse, which was established to have been committed by accused-appellant. He
contends that the sodomy could be considered as an aggravating circumstance for adding
ignominy to the crime as the sexual abuse certainly augmented the wrong done to the victim
thus unduly increasing his pain.
We do not agree. The trial court was clear in declaring that "[c]onsidering the aggravating
circumstance of alevosia and the seriousness of the sexual assault on the victim (in itself a
heinous crime), this court after a soul-searching and prayerful consideration has arrived at a
rm resolution to impose the maximum penalty of death." Moreover, "ignominy is a
circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material
 injury caused by the crime." Thus, for ignominy to be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance in the instant case, it must be shown that the sexual assault on Francis Bart
was done by accused-appellant to put the former to shame before killing him. This is clearly
not the case here for accused-appellant's intention was shown to be the commission of
sexual abuse on the victim as an act of revenge for his similar experience as a child. Surely,
the killing was done to eliminate the only witness to his crime.
We should not be misunderstood for our failure to hold accused-appellant responsible for
committing sexual abuse on his victim despite strong evidence in support thereof. We have
no choice as our hands are tied by the failure of the public prosecutor to le the appropriate
information for accused-appellant's sexual assault on the victim.
VELASCO versus PP, G.R. No. 166479, Feb 28, 2006
The evidence of the prosecution tends to show that on April 19, 1998, at about 7:30 o’clock
in the morning, private complainant Frederick Maramba was cleaning and washing his owner
type jeep in front of his house at Lasip Grande, Dagupan City when a motorized tricycle
stopped near him. Accused Rodolfo Velasco dashed out of the tricycle, approached the
complainant and red at him several times with a .45 caliber pistol. The accused missed with
his rst shot but the second one hit the complainant at the upper arm, causing him to
stumble on the ground. The complainant stood up and ran, while the accused continued
ring at him but missed.
The shooting incident was reported to the police sub-station in Malued District by Barangay
Captain Dacasin of Lasip Grande, describing the suspect as wearing a vest or a "chaleco."
The police, composed of SPO4 Romulo Villamil, PO3 Rolando Alvendo, and SPO1 Soliven
respondent and pursued the accused who proceeded on board a motorized tricycle to the
highway going to Barangay Banaoang in Calasiao town.
The police caught up with the tricycle and brought the accused to the police sub-station. A
rearm (Exhibit "A") protruding from the waistline of the accused, three (3) magazines
(Exhibit "B", "B-1" & "B-2") and fourteen (14) live ammunitions (Exhibits ‘C" to "C-13") were
con scated from the possession of the accused. The police also recovered seven (7) spent
ammunitions (Exhibits "D" to "D-6") at the crime scene. At the City Jail in Dagupan City
where the accused was subsequently brought, the private complainant Frederick Maramba
identi ed and pointed to the accused as the one who red at him, hitting him on the upper
left arm. Complainant identi ed the a davit which he executed naming the accused as his
assailant (Exhibit "H") and who shot him on the morning of April 19, 1998 in front of his
residence at Lasip Grande.
Ruling:
The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without
the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. It was clearly established that private
complainant, while washing his jeep, was suddenly red upon by petitioner for no reason at
all. The suddenness of the shooting and the fact that he was unarmed left private
complainant with no option but to run for his life. It is likewise apparent that petitioner
consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack making sure that private
complainant will have no chance to defend himself by reason of the surprise attack.
Petitioner’s claim that the shooting was not sudden because private complainant was
observing him from the time he alighted from the tricycle is belied by the fact that private
complainant was not able to run when he was rst red upon. Though private complainant
was looking at him, the former was not forewarned by any outward sign that an attack was
forthcoming. It was only after the rst shot that he felt his life was in danger.
Having commenced the criminal act by overt acts but failing to perform all acts of execution
as to produce the felony by reason of some cause other than his own desistance, petitioner
committed an attempted felony. Petitioner already commenced his attack with a manifest
intent to kill by shooting private complainant seven times, but failed to perform all the acts of
execution by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, poor aim and the swiftness of
the latter. Private complainant sustained a wound on the left arm that is not su cient to
cause his death. The settled rule is that where the wound in icted on the victim is not
su cient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, since the accused did not
perform all the acts of execution that would have brought about death.
People v. Taraya y Capinig, G.R. No. 262914 (Notice), [June 14, 2023
Roberto testi ed that on June 25, 2013, he was at his uncle's house — Juanito, Sr. He was
sleeping on the ground while his cousin, the victim Juanito Hao, Jr. (Juanito, Jr.) was
sleeping beside him on a makeshift bed. Around 1:00 a.m., he was awakened by a noise. He
saw Juanito, Jr. being hacked with a bolo by appellant causing Juanito, Jr. to fall on the
ground.
Appellant then ran away, still holding the bolo. While eeing, appellant was joined by two
other men — Japeth and Mark. Out of shock and fear, he was unable to shout for help or
render assistance to Juanito, Jr. He was able to identify appellant, Japeth, and Mark
because he clearly saw their faces in view of the illumination coming from the lightbulb
posted just outside their house. He was familiar with them because appellant was their
neighbor, while Japeth and Mark used to be his co-workers.
Juanito, Sr. testi ed that he could not sleep on the early morning of June 25, 2013 because
of the noise appellant and his drinking buddies were making near his house. He heard a
commotion, so he got up to check what it was. He saw that his son, Juanito, Jr. was hacked
in the neck by appellant. Japeth also posed to strike Juanito, Jr. but he shouted at them,
causing appellant, Japeth, and Mark to scamper out of the house. He was able to recognize
them because the place was illuminated by a lightbulb outside. He knew appellant as he was
their neighbor, while Japeth and Mark were appellant's cousins. After appellant and his
cousins left, he immediately lifted Juanito, Jr. to bring him to the hospital, but the latter
immediately died due to blood loss.
RTC found appellant guilty of murder as charged while Japeth and Mark were acquitted
while CA a rmed. Hence, the appeal.

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 The appeal must fail.
When the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the Court will generally not disturb the trial
court's factual ndings especially when a rmed in full by the Court of Appeals, as in this
case. For indeed, the trial court is in a better position to decide the question as it heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial.
Here, records bear Roberto and Juanito, Sr.'s detailed narration of the incident when
appellant hacked Juanito, Jr. on that fateful night. They were both steadfast in their
categorical and positive identi cation of appellant as the person who fatally wounded
Juanito, Jr. They both testi ed that the situs criminis was illuminated by the lightbulb
outside. This gave them a clear view of what was happening that night and who the attacker
was Both witnesses never wavered in their testimony that appellant was the one who
hacked Juanito, Jr. They both personally knew and were familiar with appellant, as he was
their neighbors.
Lastly, appellant failed to show that Roberto or Juanito, Sr. was motivated by ill will to falsely
testify against him. He even admitted that Juanito, Jr. was his friend and had no bad blood
with him and his family.
here is treachery when the o ender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of
the crime to ensure its commission without risk to himself or herself arising from the defense
which the o ended party might take. It requires: (a) the employment of means of execution
which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate; and (b) said means of
execution be deliberately or consciously adopted. 31 Both elements must be present. It is
not su cient that the attack was sudden, unexpected, and without any warning or
provocation. There must also be a showing that the o ender consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods, and forms in the execution of the crime which
tended directly to insure such execution, without risk to himself or herself.
Here, appellant adopted means of execution which rendered Juanito, Jr. defenseless and
without any opportunity to defend himself. Appellant chose to attack a sleeping victim. It is
an established rule that treachery attends the killing where the accused attacks the victim
while the latter is asleep and unable to defend himself or herself. Obviously, a sleeping victim
is not in a position to defend himself or herself, take ight or avoid the assault, thus ensuring
that the crime is successfully executed without any risk to the attacker.
All told, the Court of Appeals did not err when it a rmed the verdict of conviction for murder
against appellant in accordance with Article 248 of the RPC.
Pp vs Guevarra, G.R. No. 182192, October 29, 2008
Antonette narrated that on 24 August 2002, at about 8:40 p.m., she, together with Godoy
and Imelda, went to a videoke bar owned by Sgt. Vidal at Ebora Road, Barangay Kumintang
Ibaba, Batangas City, to fetch her husband, Anacleto. She and Imelda boarded an owner-
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type jeep driven by Godoy in going to the videoke bar. Upon arriving thereat, she proceeded
to the videoke bar, peeped in its window, and saw Anacleto, Inspector Barte, her father, and
Valiente therein. She signaled to Anacleto that she would wait for them on the jeep outside
the videoke bar. Afterwards, Anacleto, Inspector Barte, Nicasio, and Valiente went out of the
videoke bar. Nicasio boarded a tricycle and proceeded home while Valiente and Inspector
Barte boarded the jeep. Valiente sat beside Imelda at the backseat of the jeep while
Inspector Barte sat beside the driver’s seat then occupied by Godoy. When Anacleto was
about to board the jeep, she heard a gunshot. Upon turning her head towards the direction
of the gunshot, she saw appellant shoot Inspector Barte with a short rearm. Thereafter, she
heard Godoy shouting that Inspector Barte was shot and told her to call the police. She
immediately proceeded to a nearby drug store where she used a telephone in contacting the
police. She saw Anacleto driving the jeep with Inspector Barte on board. Later, she
proceeded to the Batangas Regional Hospital where she saw the lifeless body of Inspector
Barte in a stretcher. She also saw therein Godoy being treated for wounds.
SPO2 Cabungcal, a member of the Batangas City Police Station, Intelligence Division,
testi ed that he was on duty at the said station on the night of 24 August 2002. On that
same night, the station received a report about a shooting incident at Ebora Road, Barangay
Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City. He and several police o cers immediately proceeded to
the crime scene. Upon arriving thereat, they searched the crime scene and recovered four
caliber .45 empty shells, one live caliber .45 ammunition and one deformed caliber .45 slug.
Thereafter, they went to the Batangas Regional Hospital where they were informed that
Inspector Barte was already dead. He turned over to SPO1 Buenafe, the investigator of the
case, the evidence they recovered from the crime scene.
SPO1 Buenafe, a member of the Batangas City Police Station, Investigation Section,
averred that he conducted an investigation in the instant case; that after the incident, he
went to the Batangas Regional Hospital where he was informed that Inspector Barte was
already dead and Godoy was injured; and that SPO1 Cabungcal turned over to him object
evidence recovered from the crime scene.
Dr. Castillo, a surgeon assigned at the Batangas Regional Hospital, recounted that he
attended to Inspector Barte when the latter was brought to the hospital on the night of 24
August 2002. During the initial examination, he observed that Inspector Barte sustained
gunshot wounds and had no blood pressure, cardiac and respiratory rate. He and some
medical sta tried to resuscitate Inspector Barte but to no avail. The gunshot wounds were
located on the left temporal area, left anterior chest, right nipple, and left arm of Inspector
Barte. He considered the gunshot wounds in the left temporal area and left anterior chest of
Inspector Barte fatal. He issued a medico-legal certi cate pertaining to Inspector Barte and
an anatomical chart showing the location of gunshot wounds sustained by Inspector Barte.
Ruling:
SC agree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of
treachery and the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed rearm attended
the killing of Inspector Barte.

It is settled that aggravating/qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information and
proven during the trial before they can be appreciated.
There is treachery when the o ender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defensive or
retaliatory act which the victim might make. The essence of treachery is a deliberate and
sudden attack that renders the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of
the suddenness and severity of the attack. Two essential elements are required in order that
treachery can be appreciated: (1) The employment of means, methods or manner of
execution that would ensure the o ender’s safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the
o ended party who has, thus, no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2)
deliberate or conscious choice of means, methods or manner of execution.
In the case at bar, treachery was alleged in the information and all its elements were duly
established by the prosecution.
Inspector Barte was sitting inside the jeep when appellant suddenly appeared and
approached him. Appellant asked Inspector Barte if he was "Major Barte." However, before
Inspector Barte could respond or utter a word, appellant quickly shot him several times in
the head and chest with a caliber .45 pistol. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the
appellant’s attack rendered Inspector Barte defenseless and without means of escape. There
is no doubt that appellant’s use of a caliber .45 pistol, as well as his act of waiting for
Inspector Barte to be seated rst in the jeep before approaching him and of shooting
Inspector Barte several times on the head and chest, was adopted by him to prevent
Inspector Barte from retaliating or escaping. Considering that Inspector Barte was tipsy or
drunk and he was seated inside the jeep where the space is narrow, there was absolutely no
way for him to defend himself or escape.
Pertinent provision of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294,
states that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed rearm, such
use of an unlicensed rearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Appellant’s use of an unlicensed rearm in killing Inspector Barte was alleged in the
information as a special aggravating circumstance. Such circumstance was also duly proven
by the prosecution during the trial. The prosecution presented a certi cation from the PNP
Firearms and Explosives Division which attests that appellant was not a licensed/registered
rearm holder.
Appellant’s assertion that he was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender is meritorious. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the o ender had not been
actually arrested; (2) that the o ender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3)
that the surrender was voluntary.
All of the foregoing requisites are present in the case at bar. Appellant had not been actually
arrested by the police or other law enforcers. He surrendered unconditionally to the mayor of
Batangas City, a person in authority, thereby saving the police trouble and expenses which it
would otherwise incur in his search and capture. The fact that appellant surrendered two
weeks after the incident is immaterial. We have held that for voluntary surrender to mitigate
an o ense, it is not required that the accused surrender at the rst opportunity. As long as
the aforementioned requisites are met, voluntary surrender can be appreciated.
People v. Matias y Bernardo, G.R. No. 225504 (Notice), January 19, 2018
Appellant was charged under an Information for murder.3 Upon arraignment, he pleaded not
guilty.
The evidence for the prosecution established the following: the accused Reynaldo is the
uncle of the victim, Manuel. On 12 March 2009, at around 3 pm, Manuel and his friend Jopet
Tulagan were reading a newspaper while seated on the gutter of the road in front of a
warehouse on Road 1, Barangay Pag-asa, Quezon City. 5 Accused suddenly appeared and
stabbed Manuel in the abdomen with a knife. The victim managed to run, but Reynaldo
chased him and stabbed him again in the abdomen.
Manuel was immediately brought to the hospital. He, however, died that same afternoon.
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and The CA
a rmed appellant's conviction for the crime of murder.
SC denied the petition. The essence of treachery lies in the nature of an attack done
deliberately and without warning — it must be done in a swift and unexpected manner, giving
the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. Based on the
testimony of Jopet Tulagan, he and the victim were just seated while reading the newspaper
when the latter was stabbed by the accused who had suddenly appeared. The witness even
stated that he was temporarily unable to move because he was shocked by the sudden
assault upon the victim.
Therefore, as correctly held by the CA, there was never an opportunity for the victim to
defend himself or for his companion to protect him from the sudden attack. Further, the fact
that Manuel and Reynaldo had not quarrelled right before the killing was indicative of the
treachery employed by the latter. Hence, the circumstance of treachery is clearly present in
this case.
That Manuel was able to run and subsequently get a hammer after having been stabbed for
the rst time by Reynaldo does not diminish the fact that treachery was committed. As held
in People v. Gabrino, the victim's capability to run after the rst blow does not negate the
treachery employed.

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 PP vs. TRINIDAD, G.R. No. L-38930, June 28, 1988
The evidence for the prosecution tends to establish that in the evening of April 16, 1973, one
Cristita Balancio Vda. de Angel was asleep by the balcony of her house situated at Barrio
San Vicente, Umingan, Pangasinan. With her at that time were her son, Juan Angel, her
daughter-in- law and two (2) grandchildren. Suddenly, there was a burst of gun re, rousing
Juan Angel and his wife from their sleep. Juan Angel then peeped out from the window to
nd out what happened as his carabao was tied just below the said window. As Juan Angel
peeped, he saw Isabelo Trinidad, Romeo Condaya, Wilfredo Mitrado and Bonifacio Palding,
about ve (5) to six (6) meters away hurriedly walking towards the North.
Shortly, as Juan Angel's wife shouted. Romeo Condaya who was then holding a gun, Isabelo
Trinidad, Bonifacio Palding, and Wilfredo Mitrado ran farther towards the North.
It turned out that Cristita Balancio Vda. de Angel was hit by her neck which caused her
death. (Exhibits "A" and "A-1"). So, Juan Angel proceeded to call for help. He asked
somebody to fetch Ignacio Dopale, the Barrio Captain of San Vicente, Umingan,
Pangasinan, who immediately responded to Juan Angel's call for help. Initial inquiries from
Juan Angel, revealed the information that Immediately after the burst of gun re, Romeo
Condaya, Wilfredo Mitrado, Isabelo Trinidad and Bonifacio Palding, were seen hurriedly
walking towards the North. So that, Barrio Captain Ignacio Dopale proceeded to the
Umingan Municipal Building in Order to report the matter.
Ruling:
To this enumeration may be added three (3) more circumstances: (1) that the victim was
found dead near the door inside her son Juan Angel's house; (2) that the victim died of
hemorrhage caused by gunshot wounds; and (3) that two pellets were recovered from her
body.
All of these circumstances, eleven (11) in all, have been proven by direct evidence. Together,
these circumstances lead to the conclusion that accused-appellants Trinidad and Condaya
were guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the shooting of Cristita Balancio Vda. de Angel.
Even if the eighth circumstance cited by the Solicitor General — that the shotgun and the
ammunition were recovered in the vicinity of the house of Condaya's parents — is
disregarded on the ground that the recovery was the fruit of the tainted confession, the result
would be the same because of the overwhelming circumstantial evidence.
Two (2) of the circumstances also manifest a community of purpose indicative of a
conspiracy between Trinidad and Condaya, which would make both of them equally guilty of
the crime [People v. Garcia, G.R. Nos. L-26105, February 18, 1986, 141 SCRA 336], although
only one of them may have pulled the trigger and actually red the fatal shot. Where a
conspiracy has been proven, a showing as to who in icted the fatal wound is not required.
[People v. Tala, G.R. Nos. L-69153-54, January 30, 1986,141 SCRA 240].
The rule is that conspiracy must be shown to exist by direct or circumstantial evidence, as
clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself [People v. Vicente, G.R. No.
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L-26241, May 21, 1969, 28 SCRA 247]. In the instant case, the third circumstance cited by
the Solicitor General (that Trinidad pulled Condaya away from Palding and Mitrado to
converse secretly and then gave him the shotgun before they all went to Juan Angel's
house), coupled with the seventh (that Trinidad told Condaya to hide the shotgun as they
were running away from Juan Angel's house), su ciently proves the conspiracy between
Trinidad and Condaya. The conduct of accused-appellants before, during and after the
commission of the crime are circumstances showing the presence of conspiracy [People v.
Cabiltes, G.R. No. L-18010, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 112].
The crime committed was murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, as
characterized by the fact that the victim was shot at close range while she was asleep, thus
ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the assailants [People v. Dequina, 60
Phil. 279 (1934)]. That Juan Angel, and not his mother, was apparently the intended victim is
not incompatible with the existence of treachery. Treachery may be taken into account even
if the victim of the attack was not the person whom the accused intended to kill. However,
evident premeditation may not be considered as a qualifying circumstance as it cannot be
said that the assailants premeditated on the killing of the actual victim [People v. Mabug-at,
51 Phil. 967 (1926); People v. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307 (1950)]. Thus, evident premeditation,
although alleged in the information, may not be considered as a qualifying circumstance.
With the abolition of the death penalty in the 1987 Constitution, murder is now penalized by
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. Absent any modifying
circumstances, the penalty is imposable in its medium period, or from eighteen (18) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the range of the penalty is lowered by one degree to prision mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or from ten (10) years and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
Pp vs Agacer, G.R. No. 177751, December 14, 2011
The prosecution’s version of the events is as follows:
Cesario was a 55-year old farmer and owner of a rice eld situated in Dungeg, Santa Ana,
Cagayan. On April 2, 1998, at around 9:00 a.m., he was clearing a section of his farm and
preparing the beddings for the rice seedlings intended for the coming planting season. Farm
laborers Genesis Delantar (Genesis), his brother Andy, Rafael Morgado and brothers Roden
(Roden) and Ric (Ric) Vallejo were nearby in a separate section of the same rice eld
harvesting Cesario’s palay.
According to prosecution witnesses Genesis and Roden, it was at that moment while
Cesario was tending to his farm when appellants suddenly emerged from a nearby banana
plantation and surrounded Cesario. Visibly intimidated, Cesario moved backwards and
retreated to where the other farm laborers were working. However, Franklin set a re the rice
straws that covered Cesario’s rice seedlings. This prompted Cesario to return to put out the
re and save his rice seedlings. At this point, Franklin and Eric started throwing stones at
 Cesario which forced the latter to retreat again. Thereafter, Florencio, while standing side by
side with Eric, signaled Cesario to come closer. Cesario obliged but when he was just
around ve meters away from the group, Eddie suddenly pulled out a gun concealed inside a
sack and, without warning, shot Cesario hitting him in the left portion of his chest. Almost
simultaneously, Elynor took aim at Cesario with his bow and arrow but missed his mark. As
Cesario fell, appellants ed towards the irrigation canal, where another gunshot rang.
Thereafter, a short rearm was thrown from where the appellants ran towards the direction of
Cesario’s fallen body. Appellants then immediately left the scene of the crime onboard a
hand tractor and a tricycle.
After these events unfolded, Genesis and the other farm laborers scampered away in
di erent directions. Genesis then reached Barangay Capanikian and informed Cesario’s son,
Neldison Agacer (Neldison), of the death of his father. At around 3:00 p.m., Cesario’s friends
in said barangay went to the scene of the crime and retrieved his corpse. During the
autopsy, a total of eight entrance wounds were found, mostly on the chest of Cesario’s
cadaver. According to the Medico-Legal O cer, the fatal gunshot wounds were in icted by
the use of a rearm capable of discharging several slugs simultaneously.
RTC ruled that appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It held that appellants acted in
conspiracy in in icting upon Cesario, in a treacherous manner, multiple gunshot wounds.
However, the trial court did not appreciate evident premeditation as a qualifying aggravating
circumstance for failure to establish its elements as clearly as the criminal act itself. It also
did not consider as aggravating circumstance the use of an unlicensed rearm since the
rearm used in the killing was not presented in evidence.
CA a rmed the ruling in all respects. Hence, the appeal.
SC ruled that the appeal is unmeritorious.
Conspiracy was su ciently established
"Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it." In conspiracy, it is not necessary to
adduce direct evidence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It "may be shown
through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which the o ense
was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such lead to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest." Proof of a previous
agreement and decision to commit the crime is not essential but the fact that the
malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same objective su ces.
Here, while there is no proof of any previous agreement among appellants to commit the
crime and while it was established during trial that Eddie alone shot Cesario, the acts of all
appellants before, during and after the incident establish the existence of conspiracy to kill
Cesario beyond reasonable doubt. First, all of them emerged at the same time from a
banana plantation beside the rice eld. Second, they surprised Cesario by immediately
surrounding him. Third, all of them were armed at the time of the incident. Eddie had a
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shotgun concealed in a sack, Florencio was armed with a bolo, Elynor had a bow and arrow,
while Eric and Franklin had stones in their hands. Fourth, Eric and Franklin struck Cesario
with stones moments before the shooting. Fifth, Eddie immediately shot Cesario at close
range while the latter was approaching the group of appellants upon being summoned by
Florencio. Sixth, Florencio, Franklin, Eric and Elynor stood just a meter away from Eddie
when he shot Cesario, but did not do anything to stop or dissuade Eddie from the assault.
Seventh, after Cesario was shot, all appellants departed from the scene of the crime
together.
Undoubtedly, the acts of the assailants constitute proof of their unanimity in design, intent
and execution. They "performed speci c acts with closeness and coordination as to
unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design"28 to ensure the death of Cesario. We
thus uphold the lower courts’ nding that appellants conspired to commit the crime of
murder against Cesario.
Having established conspiracy, appellants’ assertion that each of them can only be made
liable for his own acts deserves no merit. Evidence as to who among the appellants
delivered the fatal blow is therefore no longer indispensable since in conspiracy, a person
may be convicted for the criminal act of another.29 In a conspiracy, the act of one is deemed
the act of all.
Essence of Treachery; Elements
We are also unimpressed with appellants’ contention that both the trial and appellate courts
erred in ruling that treachery quali ed the killing of Cesario to murder. They maintain that
since the attack on Cesario was frontal, there was therefore no element of surprise on the
victim or suddenness of the assault that characterizes treachery.
"There is treachery when the o ender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the
o ended party might make." Two conditions must concur for treachery to be appreciated.
First, is the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. Second, the means of execution was deliberate
or consciously adopted. "The essence of treachery is the sudden attack by an aggressor
without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real
chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the
aggressor."
In this case, treachery is evident from the same circumstances we have already discussed
above. From the facts, Cesario could not have been aware that he would be surrounded,
attacked and killed by the appellants who were all related to him. He could not have also
been aware that Eddie had a shotgun concealed in a sack because if he was, he would not
have casually approached Florencio when the latter summoned him. Unfortunately, while
Cesario was advancing towards Florencio, Eddie shot him at close range without any
 warning whatsoever. Evidently, the crime was committed in a manner that there was no
opportunity for Cesario to defend himself. Also, the mode of attack did not spring from the
unexpected turn of events but was clearly thought of by the appellants. Hence, it no longer
matters that the assault was frontal since its swiftness and unexpectedness deprived
Cesario of a chance to repel it or o er any resistance in defense of his person.
Appellants failed to discharge their burden to prove Florencio’s claim that he acted in self-
defense and in defense of relatives.
Florencio admits that he shot Cesario but invokes defense of himself and of his relatives to
escape criminal liability.
The Court is not convinced.
While it is the burden of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, this burden shifts when the accused admits the killing and pleads self-
defense by way of justi cation. It therefore becomes vital for the accused to show clear and
convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense. In so doing, he must rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence.
The accused must also prove the following elements of self-defense: (1) there was unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) there was reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) the lack of su cient provocation on the part
of the person defending himself. In the justifying circumstance of self-defense, unlawful
aggression is a condition sine qua non.40 Self-defense, complete or incomplete, cannot be
considered a justi cation, unless the victim commits an unlawful aggression against the
person defending himself.
Here, Florencio failed to prove that he defended himself against the unlawful aggression of
Cesario. He failed to present any evidence to substantiate his claim that there was an actual
or imminent peril to his life or limb. Aside from his unreliable and self-serving claim, there is
no proof that Cesario assaulted and shot him with a rearm during their struggle or, if at all,
that there was indeed a struggle between them. On the other hand, the separate testimonies
of prosecution witnesses Genesis and Roden negate Florencio’s claim of unlawful
aggression. The testimonies of these witnesses established that it was the appellants who
emerged from a nearby banana plantation; that they surrounded Cesario and set to re the
rice straws covering his rice seedlings; that appellants were armed with di erent kinds of
weapons, while Cesario was not; that Franklin and Elynor cast stones upon Cesario; and,
that the one who pulled a gun from a sack and shot Cesario was Eddie, not Florencio. We
thus hold that if there was unlawful aggression here, it came from appellants’ end and not
from Cesario. Hence, there being no unlawful aggression on the part of Cesario, Florencio’s
claim of self-defense must fail.
Another basis for appellants’ conviction is the nding of the medico-legal expert that the
cause of Cesario’s death was multiple gunshot wounds found mostly at the "infero-lateral
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portion of the anterior chest, right side." This corroborates the testimonies of Genesis and
Roden that Cesario was shot in his chest. These dovetailing ndings of the medico-legal
expert and the eyewitness accounts of Genesis and Roden also deserve more credence
than the unsubstantiated claim of self-defense of Florencio, who, interestingly, gave
contradictory testimony. Florencio claimed that he could not see the gun used by Cesario in
shooting him as tall cogonal grass obstructed his view, yet he could clearly recall that he
saw the bullet-riddled Cesario fall. These contradictory statements of Florencio all the more
convince us to believe the testimonies of prosecution witnesses that no exchange of gun re
actually transpired between Cesario and Florencio. Rather, it was only Eddie who wielded a
gun and shot Cesario.
Florencio also invokes the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives, which has three
elements, to wit, (1) there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) there was
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) in case of
provocation given by the person being attacked, the person making defense had no part
therein.43 Like in the case of self-defense, unlawful aggression is also an indispensable
element in defense of relative. As discussed, there is no unlawful aggression on the part of
Cesario. Hence, Florencio’s reliance on this justifying circumstance is likewise unavailing.
Similarly, Florencio’s subsequent presentation of himself at the police station cannot be
considered as a "voluntary surrender" which would mitigate the penalty imposed. "A
surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit
himself unconditionally to the authorities either because (a) he acknowledges his guilt or (b)
he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and
capture."44 Here, Florencio cannot be considered to have surrendered voluntarily since his
act did not emanate from a natural impulse to admit the killing of Cesario or to save the
police o cers the e ort and expense that would be incurred in his search and incarceration.
Although he submitted a medico-legal certi cate purportedly to show that his injuries
prevented him from immediately surrendering to the authorities, same, however, does not
certify as to the period of his incapacity or the period during which he required medical
attendance. Thus, there can be no explanation why he surrendered only on April 16, 1998 or
14 days after the commission of the crime. To us, Florencio’s surrender was a mere
afterthought undeserving of any consideration. Indeed, the failure of Florencio to
immediately surrender militates against his claim that he killed Cesario in self-defense and in
defense of relatives since an innocent person will not hesitate to take the prompt and
necessary action to exonerate himself of the crime imputed to him.
All told, we nd no reason to disturb the conclusion of the trial court, as a rmed by the CA.
The testimonies of the eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution were given in a clear,
natural and spontaneous manner. Their positive identi cation of the appellants as the
persons responsible for the death of Cesario has been clearly, categorically and consistently
established on record. Moreover, we note that no evidence was presented to establish that
these eyewitnesses harbored any ill-will against the appellants or that they have reasons to
fabricate their testimonies. These kinds of testimonies are accepted as true for being
consistent with the natural order of events, human nature and the presumption of good faith.
 US vs. ABAIGAR, G.R. No. 1255, Aug 17, 1903
The testimony of the witnesses and the confession of the accused himself show
unquestionably that the latter stabbed Constantino Nabaonag to death while he was bound,
and therefore unable to defend himself against the aggression. This circumstance
constitutes alevosia, and the o ense is therefore properly classi ed as murder, de ned and
punished by article 403 of the Penal Code. It follows, therefore, that the judgment of the
court below now before us in consultation is correct, in so far as it nds the defendant guilty
of the crime of murder.
This judgment condemns the accused to the penalty of death, the court considering that the
crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of deliberate premeditation, the
employment of means tending to add ignominy to the necessary e ects of the act, and the
commission of the crime with the assistance of armed men.
The opinion of the court in this regard does not meet with our approval. There was no
premeditation, because an examination of the record shows that the purpose of killing
Constantino arose suddenly in the mind of the defendant, and was instantaneously carried
into e ect, upon information that the deceased had spoken ill of the defendant.
The accused says: "As soon as I heard of this I became furiously enraged; I seized my
dagger and killed him at once." This part of the defendant’s testimony was not disproven in
the course of the trial. The determination to kill was, then, followed immediately by the
execution of the crime; and consequently between the determination to commit the act and
its actual commission there was no opportunity for the cold, meditative, and persistent
re ection which constitutes premeditation, which is essentially di erent from a simple
determination of the will, which is always presumed in the commission of every o ense.
The circumstance of ignominy was not present because no means were employed nor did
any circumstances surround the act tending to make the e ects of the crime more
humiliating. Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disagree
and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime. The fact that the deceased was
killed in the presence of his wife certainly could not have such a signi cation, and this is the
circumstance which the court below had in view when declaring that this circumstance had
concurred.
Furthermore, the evidence shows that the crime was not committed with the assistance of
armed men. The testimony of the accused, corroborated by that of the witness for the
prosecution, Francisco Abadiano, is that the crime was committed by the defendant alone,
without assistance from any one. It is true that in the house near the place where the crime
was committed there were ten men armed with daggers, according to the statements of the
witness referred to, and ve without arms, according to the accused, but as these men took
no part, directly or indirectly, in the commission of the crime, and it does not appear that
they heard the conversation which caused the sudden determination on the part of the
accused to will the deceased, and still less that they had in any way participated in this
determination, we can not, within the law, nd that this circumstance concurred in the
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commission of the crime prosecuted for the purpose of augmenting the criminal
responsibility of the accused. The mere casual presence of armed men, more or less
numerous, near the place of the occurrence does not constitute an aggravating
circumstance when it appears that the defendant did not avail himself in any way of their aid,
and did not knowingly count upon their assistance in the commission of the crime.
In the present case, there being no circumstance tending to modify the guilt of the
defendant, the penalty is that prescribed by article 403 of the Penal Code in its medium
grade, to wit, the penalty of life imprisonment, and not the penalty of death imposed by the
court.
For the reasons stated we reverse the judgment in so far as it condemns the defendant to
death, and impose upon the latter the penalty of life imprisonment, and condemn him to the
payment of an indemni cation of 1,000 Mexican pesos to the heirs of the deceased,
together with the costs of this instance.
US vs. DE LEON, G.R. No. 522, Mar 10, 1902
On the 28th of June, 1897, Don Julio Banson was in a small hut with his wife and child. Two
men, called Fabian and Tolome, now deceased, presented themselves, apparently unarmed.
After entering the hut they drew their bolos, bound the said Banson, and compelled him to
go with them. Upon reaching a point near the elds of said Banson where ve servants of his
were working, the two kidnappers forced the said servants to proceed with them. At that
point the defendant joined them, appearing from behind a knoll where he had concealed
himself. Upon so appearing he exclaimed, according to one witness: "It was written that you
were to fall in my power;" according to antoher witness: "Thanks be given that I have caught
you, now you are in my hands;" according to another "Thanks be given that you have fallen
into my power." The defendant then beat him with the butt of a gun which he carried until
they arrived at a place called Bulutong where he made the ve servants place themselves in
single le and ordered Don Julio to kneel before them and maltreated the latter brutally,
saying: "Give me the amount of the cedula which you collected; now you will pay me for the
blows which I received in the tribunal." Not satis ed with torturing the deceased by himself
he ordered Tolome to give him a blow upon the chest with a bolo. Don Julio begging for
mercy, the defendant sent one of the servants to the wife of the deceased to ask for $1,000
for his ransom. After the servant had been sent all were led to a place called Cosme and
upon arriving there the defendant ordered Fabian and Tolome to conduct Don Julio to a
ditch. At the same time the witness and his three companions were given their liberty by the
defendant, who remained with his two companions and with Don Julio. Don Julio was never
afterwards seen alive and his headless body was found two or three days later in this same
place.
No eyewitness has testi ed to the killing of Banson by the defendant, but the violent death
of the former is proved, and that the defendant is responsible for such death as principal
admits of no reasonable doubt. In conformity with an apparently preconceived plan, Banson
was violently taken from his house by two armed servants or dependents of the defendant;
he was bound and cruelly wounded and beaten by the defendant and his henchmen at his
 order, and he was taken by the defendant to the place where a few days later his headless
body was found. This evidence is su cient to convict the defendant as principal.
From the evidence there appears the qualifying circumstance of treachery. To show this it is
only necessary to mention the fact that the deceased was bound. There is present also the
generic circumstance No. 6 of article 10. The evidence shows that the defendant was beaten
into a state of almost insensibility, not with the intention of then killing him but to cause him
unnecessary su ering as a preliminary to the killing. There is present also the twelfth generic
circumstance of article 10, proved by the fact that the deceased, a land owner, was forced to
kneel in front of his four servants drawn up in line before him.
The writer of this decision is also of the opinion that there is present the seventh generic
circumstance, article 10, that of "acting with known premeditation." But it is not necessary to
so decide as the two other circumstances raise the penalty to the maximum grade.
For the reasons above stated the judgment of the court below is reversed and we adjudge
that the defendant is guilty of the crime of murder with the sixth and twelfth aggravating
circumstances of article 10 of the Penal Code, and we condemn him to the penalty of death
with indemni cation of $1,000 to the widow and heirs of the deceased and with costs of
both instances. In case of the non-execution of the penalty imposed through the pardon of
the accused, it shall then be understood that he is condemned to perpetual absolute
disquali cation and subjected to the vigilance of the authorities during his life, unless these
accessory penalties be specially remitted by executive clemency.
The case is remanded to the court below with instructions to proceed therein in accordance
with law.
Pp vs Acaya, G.R. No. L-72998, July 29, 1988
Originally a Petition for Review, the Court resolved instead to consider the petition as an
appeal by accused, Angel "Totoy" Acaya, from the Decision of 18 February 1985 of the
Regional Trial Court of Basco, Batanes, Branch XIII, nding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
From the prosecution viewpoint, the facts are as follows:
"On the evening of July 16, 1983, during a wedding celebration at Barangay San Vicente,
Ibana, Batanes, Victor Abad was stabbed on the left side of the abdomen by Angel Acaya
(pp. 5-6, tsn, Nov. 21, 1984).
"Victor Abad was immediately rushed to the Batanes Hospital where he expired on July 17,
1983 at 3:00 p.m. Cause of death was acute renal shutdown hemorrhage, severe stab would
penetrating; left upper quadrant, abdomen; perforating stomach and lacerating omenta. Dr.
Felipe Cablay, the doctor who operated on the deceased Abad, issued a certi cate of death
(Exhibit G, p. 18, records).
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"Before his death, however, Victor Abad was able to name appellant Acaya as his assailant
(Exhibit T, p. 68, records).
"At his arraignment, Accused, assisted by counsel, voluntary entered a plea of guilty (pp. 2 &
3, tsn, Nov. 21, 1984).
"To establish the degree of culpability of appellant, however, the court required further
presentation of evidence.
"Convicted of the crime of murder as charged in the information, appellant interposes the
present appeal." (Appellee’s Brief, pp. 1-2)
For its part, the defense, which did not present any testimonial evidence, narrates the
following as the.
"Facts of the Case
"On the evening of July 16, 1983 during a wedding celebration at Barangay San Vicente,
Ivana, Batanes, while dancing the fundango with many other participants, Victor Agagan
Abad was stabbed on the left side of the abdomen by the accused Angel Acaya, who was
then under the in uence of liquor.chanrobles law library
"Immediately as soon as Victor Abad was stabbed, two persons seized the right hand of the
assailant Acaya, one Julius Cataluña, a close friend of the victim and whose wife is the
cousin of the victim; and one Roderico Sinag, who wrested the knife. Many others held the
other hand of the accused.
"Victor Abad was lifted from the dancing oor and was taken on a motorcycle by Julius
Cataluña and Ronald Aguto to the rural health nurse at Ivana where Victor Abad was given
rst aid. He was later taken to the Batanes Hospital at Basco, Batanes, was operated on
immediately by Dr. Felipe Cablay, but on the following day, July 17, 1983 at 3:00 P.M., Victor
Abad died.
"From the time the knife was wrested from Angel Acaya’s right hand after he stabbed Victor
Abad, there is a blackout of what happened to the assailant Angel Acaya. The next scene of
which the evidence for the prosecution was able to prove was that Angel Acaya was lying
down at the porch of a home at Barangay San Vicente where the three policemen who were
called from the poblacion, found him sleeping. He was so drunk he could not answer to any
interrogation of the police o cers. Acaya was taken to the poblacion which is a kilometer
away, almost half-dragged and half-carried by the police o cers. Upon their arrival at the
poblacion, no interrogation could be taken from Angel Acaya because his state of
intoxication caused him to fall asleep as soon as they reached the municipal jail.
"In the morning of July 17, the following day, the INP took the sworn statement of Angel
Acaya. He was asked if he remembered where he was on the evening of the 16th day of July,
 1983 and his answer was he did not, because he was drunk. He was asked also if he knew
he was apprehended by the police and his answer was, ‘No, Sir.’ He also gave a negative
answer when he asked if he remembered having met one Victor Abad on the same night.
The Information led against appellant for Murder on 29 July 1983 averred the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and ignominy, the latter because the
accused had committed the crime in a public place and in the presence of many persons.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of guilty. The records disclose that the Trial
Court had advised appellant of, and that he had understood, the consequences of his plea.
Following the rulings of this Court, however, the Trial Court directed the prosecution to
present its evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt and the degree of culpability of
the accused.
Ruling:
Treachery was present considering the suddenness with which appellant stabbed the victim.
The latter was totally unprepared for the unexpected attack. He was dancing at the precise
time of the incident and was given absolutely no chance to defend himself.
Evident premeditation, however, should not be appreciated, the elements thereof not having
been su ciently proven, namely, the time when the o ender determined to commit the
crime; an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his determination; and a
su cient lapse of time between such determination and execution, to allow him to re ect
upon the consequences of his acts. Evident premeditation cannot be considered to qualify
murder where it is not shown when the plan to kill was hatched, or what time elapse before it
was carried out (People v. Corpus, 107 Phil. 44 [1960]).The fact that another knife was found
on the person of appellant aside from the very knife used in the commission of the crime is
no proof of "a cold and deep meditation on the plan and tenacious persistence in the
accomplishment of the criminal act" as the Trial Court had put it. This Court has consistently
held that evident premeditation must be based on external acts and that such must be
evident and not merely suspected indicating deliberate planning (U.S. v. Ricafor, 1 Phil. 173
[1902]; People v. Yturriaga, 86 Phil. 534 [1950]; U.S. v. Cornejo, 28 Phil. 457 [1914]).
The contention that since appellant pleaded guilty to the Information, the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation must be deemed fully established
inasmuch as a guilty plea covers both the crime as well as its attendant circumstances, is
unacceptable, in the light of the evidence negating the presence of those circumstances.
The case of People v. Gravino (G.R. No. L-31327-29, May 16, 1983, 122 SCRA 123) is
authority for the ruling that a plea of guilty cannot be held to include treachery and evident
premeditation where the evidence adduced does not adequately disclose the existence of
those qualifying circumstances.
Neither should the aggravating circumstance of ignominy be appreciated, de ned as "a
circumstance pertaining to the moral order which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material
injury caused by the crime" (U.S. v. Abaigar, 2 Phil. 417 [1903]). The fact that the crime was
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committed in a public place and in the presence of many persons did not necessarily tend to
make the e ects of the crime more humiliating or put the o ended party to shame.
Appellant’s averment that intent to kill was inexistent because the accused was in a state of
intoxication, is unmeritorious. In the rst place, with the plea of guilty, appellant had admitted
the commission of the unlawful act. In the second place, proof is inadequate that appellant
was intoxicated to the point of blurring his reason and depriving him of a certain degree of
control at the precise time of the stabbing. Prosecution eyewitness Cataluña categorically
testi ed that he did not notice that appellant was drunk. The testimony of Sgt. Teo lo de la
Isla, the police investigator, to the e ect that when he arrested appellant at around 11:00
o’clock the same evening of the incident, the latter was very drunk and could not answer
questions, only proves the fact of intoxication after the incident but not at the precise time of
the commission of the crime. As counsel de o cio himself stated in Appellant’s Brief, there
was a "blockout of what happened to the assailant Angel Acaya" after the stabbing. But,
certainly, appellant’s act of stabbing the victim with the use of a deadly weapon such as a
kitchen knife, producing a severe and penetrating wound which caused his death, indicates
no other intention than that of the desire to kill. The rule is unchanged that if it is proved that
the accused committed the unlawful act charged, the presumption is that the act was done
with an unlawful intent and it is up to the appellant to rebut this presumption. That burden
has not been satisfactorily discharged in this case.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender has neither been proven. There is no
showing that the surrender of the accused was made voluntarily or spontaneously. In fact,
the defense stresses that appellant was drunk when apprehended. The mere fact that
appellant did not resist his arrest cannot be equated with voluntary surrender (People v.
Reyes, No. L-33154, February 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 474). A surrender is not voluntary when
forced by circumstances. To be voluntary, a surrender must be spontaneous, that is, there
must be an intent to submit oneself to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his
guilt or because he wishes to save them from the trouble and expense to be necessarily
incurred in his search and capture (People v. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27 [1934]).cralawnad
The crime committed is Murder, quali ed by treachery, attended by the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty.
PP vs. SIAO, G.R. No. 126021, March 03, 2000
Joy Raymundo and private complainant Estrella Raymundo are cousins. They worked as
house maids of appellant's family. Reylan Gimena was also a helper of appellant's family.
Estrella was then a 14-year old "probinsiyana" from Palompon, Leyte (p. 5, TSN, September
16, 1994).
On May 27, 1994, at about 3:00 p.m., in the Siao residence located at 417-A Basak
Brotherhood, Cebu City, appellant ordered Reylan Gimena, a houseboy of the Siaos, to pull
Estrella to the room of the women. Gimena dragged her toward the women's quarters and
once inside, appellant pushed her to the wooden bed (naomog). Appellant pointed a pistol
colored white at Gimena and the face of Estrella (pp. 7-8, TSN, September 16, 1994).

Producing a candle and a bottle of sprite, appellant asked Estrella to choose one among a
pistol, candle or a bottle of sprite. He also told Gimena "Reylan, birahi si Ester." (Reylan do
something to Ester.) Appellant lighted the candle and dropped the melting candle on her
chest (p. 7, TSN, September 20, 1994). Estrella chose a bottle of sprite because she was
afraid of the pistol. She was made to lie down on her back on the bed with her head hanging
over one end. Whereupon, appellant poured sprite into her nostrils as she was made to
spread her arms. While appellant dropped the bottle of sprite into her nostrils, he pointed the
gun at her face. Estrella felt dizzy and her eyesight became blurred (p. 6, TSN, September
20, 1994). She tried to fold her arms to cover her breasts but appellant ordered Gimena to
hold her hands (p. 10-15, TSN, September 16, 1994).
Appellant then tied her feet and hands with an electric cord or wire as she was made to lie
face down on the bed. After that, appellant untied her hands and feet but tied her back with
the same wire (p. 17, TSN, September 16, 1994).
As appellant pointed his pistol at her, he ordered Estrella to remove her pants and T-shirt,
she sat on the bed and did as she was told and when she was naked, appellant commanded
her to take the initiative (ikaw ang mauna sa lalaki.) She did not understand what appellant
meant. At this point, appellant poked the gun at her temple (pp. 19-20, TSN, September 16,
1994).
Appellant then commanded Gimena to remove his shorts. But Gimena refused. Gimena did
not remove his shorts but let his penis out (p. 21, TSN, September 1, 1994; p. 11, TSN,
September 20, 1994).
Appellant spread the arms of Estrella and made her lie down spread-eagled (pp. 4-5, TSN,
September 29, 1994). She felt dizzy and shouted for help twice. Appellant ordered Gimena
to rape Estrella. At rst Gimena refused to heed the command of appellant to rape Estrella
(birahi) because, according to Gimena, he has a sister. Appellant said that if they would not
obey, he would kill both of them (pp. 4-10, TSN, September 20, 1994.)
Appellant told Gimena, "Reylan, do something (birahi) to Ester!" Estrella was made to suck
the penis of Gimena at gunpoint. She complied with the order of appellant and when the
penis of Gimena was inside her mouth, appellant kept looking and pointing his handgun at
them (pp. 11-14, TSN, September 20, 1994; pp. 19-20, TSN, September 21, 1994).
Thereafter, Gimena got on top of Estrella (gisakyan) and did the sexual act (kayatan). She felt
excruciating pain. Gimena made push-and-pull movements for around 10 minutes. Appellant
looked on and said, "why did it take you long to penetrate?" While Gimena was making the
push-and-pull movements, appellant held the legs of Estrella to keep them apart (pp. 21-24,
TSN, September 20, 1994).
After Gimena had sexual intercourse with Estrella, she sat down. Not long after, appellant
said: "You do it again." Gimena said that he could not do it again because he was already
very tired. But appellant pointed the pistol at Gimena's temple. Gimena obeyed the order of
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appellant because the pistol was pointed at him (pp. 25-26, TSN, September 20, 1994). They
were made to lay side by side while appellant kept on pointing the pistol at them. Gimena,
who was behind Estrella made a push-and-pull movements so that his organ would reach
her private part (pp. 27-29, TSN, September 20, 1994).
After the side by side position, they were made to assume the dog position (patuwad).
Appellant commanded her to do it but she refused because she was already tired. Appellant
pointed the pistol at her, so she obeyed his order. Gimena said: "I will not do that because I
am already tired." At that, appellant pointed the pistol at Gimena. Thus, Gimena copulated
with Estrella in the manner dogs perform the sexual intercourse. Gimena shouted for help.
Somebody knocked on the door and they heard the voice of Teresita Pañares, the older
sister of appellant. Appellant ignored Pañares and kept on pointing the pistol at Estrella and
Gimena, as he looked at them with wide-open eyes (siga) (pp. 30-31, TSN, September 20,
1994). Shortly, appellant told them to go to the boy's room. They complied with his order
tearfully, after he followed them laughing all the while. Appellant then warned them: "If you
will tell the police, I will kill your mothers."
At around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Estrella and Joy Raymundo sought
permission to go home. On their way home, they met an old man who saw Estrella crying.
The old man took them to his house. After the incident was reported to the police, Senior
Police O cer Reynaldo Omaña conducted the investigation and arrested Gimena, who was
identi ed by Esrtrella as the one who raped her on orders of appellant. The police o cers
looked for appellant to shed light on the reported rape. But they could not locate him
Ruling:
Accused-appellant was held guilty of rape with the use of a deadly weapon, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. But the trial court overlooked and did not take
into account the aggravating circumstance of ignominy and sentenced accused-appellant to
the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. It has been held that where the accused
in committing the rape used not only the missionary position, i.e. male superior, female
inferior but also the dog position as dogs do, i.e. entry from behind, as was proven like the
crime itself in the instant case, the aggravating circumstance of ignominy attended the
commission thereof.
However, the use of a weapon serves to increase the penalty. Since the use of a deadly
weapon increases the penalty as opposed to a generic aggravating circumstance which only
a ects the period of the penalty, said fact should be alleged in the information, because of
the accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Considering that the complaint (which was later converted into the Information) failed to
allege the use of a deadly weapon, speci cally, that herein accused-appellant was armed
with a gun, the penalty to be reckoned with in determining the penalty for rape would be
reclusion perpetua, the penalty prescribed for simple rape under Article 335, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659. Simple rape is punishable by the single indivisible penalty of reclusion
perpetua, which must be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance
 which may have attended the commission of the deed. Hence, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua imposed by the trial court is correct.
People v. Bacule, G.R. No. 127568, January 28, 2000.
The prosecution built its case for the People on the testimony of the rape victim
corroborated by the ndings of Dr. Joycelyn Gonzales. Complainant recounted that on May
9, 1995, at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, while she was asleep together with the
accused, her common-law father, in their house and while her mother was in Sibonga, Cebu,
she was awakened when the accused undressed her by removing her dress, short pants and
panty. She tried to shout for help but the accused covered her mouth with his hand while the
other hand was pointing a knife on her neck. The accused kissed her arms, face, lips and
nipples and licked her vagina. She was instructed by the accused to spread her legs apart
and the latter inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt the pain but she could do nothing
because of the threat on her life by the accused. A while later, the accused pushed his penis
towards the direction of her anus. She agonized in pain again and felt so tired in her e orts
to free herself. Thereafter, the accused stood up while she remained crying because of the
pain she felt on her vagina and anus. She went to the comfort room and dressed up herself.
Immediately on the following morning, she revealed and narrated the sad experience she
su ered in the hands of the accused to her aunt who occupied the second oor of the
house. On that same day she was brought to the hospital for medical examination.
In her cross-examination, she testi ed that, when she started schooling, she used to live
with her mother and the accused in the same house. Her mother instructed her to call the
accused her "Papa." Upon her mother's return from Sibonga, Cebu, she narrated to her the
whole incident but the latter disbelieved her.
Dr. Joycelyn Gonzales, a resident physician of Lapu-lapu City, District Hospital, testi ed she
conducted a medical examination on the rape victim/complainant. Based on her ndings, a
contusion appeared on the hymenal wall on both sides of the vagina, while the result of the
sperm analysis was negative of the presence of spermatozoa. She stressed that the
contusion of the hymenal wall may have been caused by friction or injury on account of a
hard object. A penis could cause a contusion of the hymen. There was no deep penetration
as to cause the laceration. However, in rare cases, the hymen would still remain intact even if
there is deep penetration. . . .
Genoveva Epe, a Barangay Tanod of Looc, Lapu-lapu City, testi ed that on May 10, 1995 at
5:30 in the afternoon (a day following the incident), she was informed by Magdalena Baring
(aunt of the rape victim) that her niece was raped by the accused. She immediately went to
the residence of the accused together with Barangay Tanod Ricardo Dungog. She
confronted the accused while Ricardo Dungog held the hand of the victim. Because many
people converging at the place wanted to maul the accused, the latter was hurriedly brought
to the police station of Lapu-lapu City for safekeeping.
Another prosecution witness, Magdalena Baring (aunt of the rape victim), testi ed she knew
the accused who is the common-law husband of her cousin (rape victim's mother) who
rented the rst oor of her house. On May 10, 1995, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, she
noticed something unusual in the appearance of the complainant. She was very weak and
refused to eat her meal. When asked about her problems, she narrated to her the sad
experience the night before with the accused. She brought the complainant to the hospital
for medical examination. On the same day, she brought her (rape victim) to the police
headquarters of Lapu-lapu City where an investigation was conducted. A rape charge was
led with the City Prosecutor's O ce of Lapu-lapu City.
She likewise testi ed that, when the accused was confronted by the Barangay Tanod
Genoveva Epe and Ricardo Dungog, she was present together with the rape victim/
complainant. The accused was brought to the police headquarters of Lapu-lapu City for
safekeeping because many people wanted to maul him.
In his defense, the accused testi ed that on May 9, 1995, at 10:00 o'clock in the evening, he
was at home together with the complainant and no unusual incident ever transpired on that
night. On the following day (May 10) when he went home from work, he saw many people
gathered in the vicinity of their house. He was met by Magdalena Baring who advised him to
run away so that nothing would happen to him but he remained afoot until he was arrested
by a Barangay Tanod, whose name he could not remember anymore, and who brought him
to Lapu-lapu City Police Station where he was investigated and subsequently incarcerated.
He likewise testi ed that at the time of the alleged incident, her common-law wife (mother of
the complainant), was in Sibonga, Cebu to attend the wedding of her cousin.
The trial court appreciated the circumstance of ignominy against appellant, apparently in
view of its nding that appellant had sodomized complainant. Ignominy is de ned as a
circumstance pertaining to the moral order which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material
injury caused by the crime. This Court in previous rape cases, has held the following
circumstances ignominious: where the accused ordered the complainant to exhibit to them
her complete nakedness for about ten minutes before raping her; where the rape was
committed in front of the husband of the victim or by two or more persons in view of one
another; where the sexual intercourse was performed in the "dog style" position; and where
the accused plastered mud on the victim's private part. Ignominy was also present in People
vs. Larano, where the victim was pregnant and whose pleas on that ground were ignored by
the accused who went on to force his lust on her. The accused then tied a banana ber
around his penis and inserted it again into her vagina. Thereafter, he pulled out his organ and
forced the victim to suck it.
Thus, complainant claimed that appellant merely "pushed his penis towards (her) anus," not
that he actually inserted his sex organ therein. That complainant had di culty in moving her
bowels could have just as well been the result of the vaginal, rather than anal, intercourse.
Aggravating circumstances before being taken into consideration for the purpose of
increasing the degree of the penalty to be imposed must be proved with equal certainty and
clearness as that which establishes the commission of the act charged as the criminal
o ense. It bears noting that the prosecution never even sought to prove ignominy, and the

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 alleged act of sodomy was brought out only during cross-examination. Worse, the
prosecution did not pursue this matter by conducting re-direct examination. This lapse on
the part of the prosecution can only favor the accused.
The trial court also appreciated "moral ascendancy" as an aggravating circumstance. This is
erroneous since "moral ascendancy" is not listed among the circumstances considered
aggravating by Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 63, supra, when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in
the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Accordingly, the penalty of
death meted by the trial court is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
People v. Bumidang, G.R. No. 130630, December 4, 2000
On September 29, 1996, at around 2:00 a.m. while father and daughter, namely, Melencio
and Gloria Imbat, were already asleep in their house, the accused Baliwang Bumidang y
Baohan aged 19 years and half-naked, loudly called Melencio Imbat and asked the latter to
open the door. Melencio was aroused from his sleep and he opened the door downstairs
because Bumidang threatened to kill them if the door was not opened. Accused Bumidang
entered and asked the old man to bring him upstairs. While they were upstairs, Bumidang
asked him where he was sleeping. When Melencio indicated that he slept at the place where
they were, Bumidang got a spear at the side of his (Melencio's) bed. Pointing the weapon at
him in a threatening manner, the accused ordered him to lie in a prone position which he
obeyed because he was afraid. Then Bumidang asked the room of his unmarried daughter,
Gloria, aged 56. Melencio, 80 years old, pointed the room of his daughter which was in the
same room but separated by an aparador. Bumidang went to Gloria's room, still carrying the
spear. Suddenly, Gloria screamed for help, but the octogenarian remained in a prone
position as Bumidang threatened to kill him if he would help his daughter. Bumidang, a betel
nut-chewing man, approached Gloria and poked the spear at her. She recognized him
because he was lighting the room with a ashlight. The accused ordered her to stand up and
removed her pajama, with the panty going along with it. While the accused was removing
her clothes, she sat and struggled. Bumidang then removed his shortpants and became
completely naked. He used the ashlight to examine her genital. He placed the spear beside
her and whenever she attempted to move, he would point the spear at her. The accused
then went on top of her, inserted his penis into her pudenda. At this instant, Gloria shouted
to her father but the accused pointed the spear at her, and told her, "can you see this?" The
accused then made a pumping motion. After he was sated, having satis ed his lust, the
accused held her breast and kissed her lips. After resting on top of her, he went to the door
and left. Melencio helplessly saw the accused on top of her daughter but he could not move
because he was too afraid and weak. He did not see how the accused consummated his
beastly desire because he was too ashamed to look at what he was doing to her daughter.
Before the accused left, he made the following threat: "If you will report to the authorities, I
will come back and kill all of you." Gloria then put on her dress. She was trembling. So she
went to her father and slept with him as she was afraid to be alone. She did not immediately
report the incident in the morning because they were afraid of the threat. She reported her
ordeal to Kagawad Rodolfo Pontillan who handed a note to be given to the authorities
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(security). The accused was immediately arrested. Gloria submitted herself to the
examination of Dr. Quines on October 1, 1996. Dr. Quines conducted a vaginal examination
which is an internal examination of the vagina. When the physician introduced his index
nger, severe pain was su ered by Gloria. This was due to the laceration of the hymen at
6:00 o'clock. No spermatozoa was [sic] obtained. The laceration was about 3 to 5 days old
at the time of the examination.
The trial court appreciated against BALIWANG the aggravating circumstances of (a)
dwelling, because the crime was committed inside the house of the victim; (b) nighttime,
because the sexual assault was perpetrated at about 2:00 a.m. to facilitate the commission
of the o ense; and (c) ignominy, because he used his ashlight to examine Gloria's vagina
and raped her in the presence of her old father, thereby making its e ects more humiliating.
We shall now dissect the trial court's appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling, nighttime and ignominy.
The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. There was a
clear violation of the sanctity of the victim's place of abode when Gloria, who apparently did
not gave any provocation, was raped in her own house. Dwelling is considered an
aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to
human abode.
Nighttime is an aggravating circumstance when (1) it is especially sought by the o ender; (2)
it is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring
the o ender's immunity from capture. In this case, other than the fact that the crime was
committed at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning, nothing on the record suggests that
BALIWANG deliberately availed himself or took advantage of nighttime nor proved that
BALIWANG used the darkness to facilitate his evil design or to conceal his identity.
The aggravating circumstance of ignominy shall be taken into account if means are
employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the natural e ects of the
o ense; or if the crime was committed in a manner that tends to make its e ects more
humiliating to the victim, that is, add to her moral su ering. It was established that
BALIWANG used the ashlight and examined the genital of Gloria before he ravished her. He
committed his bestial deed in the presence of Gloria's old father. These facts clearly show
that BALIWANG deliberately wanted to further humiliate Gloria, thereby aggravating and
compounding her moral su erings. Ignominy was appreciated in a case where a woman was
raped in the presence of her betrothed, or of her husband, or was made to exhibit to the
rapists her complete nakedness before they raped her.
The crime of rape is de ned and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. In the case at bar, the prosecution established that BALIWANG committed the
crime charged with the use of a deadly weapon, i.e., with a spear. Accordingly, pursuant to
the 3rd paragraph of Article 335, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, a rape committed
with the use of a deadly weapon is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The
 aggravating circumstances of dwelling and ignominy having been duly proven, the greater
penalty of death shall be imposed, applying Article 63, paragraph 2, no. 1, Revised Penal
Code, which provides that when an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission
of an o ense, the penalty for which is composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater
penalty should be imposed.
People v. Catian, G.R. No. 139693, January 24, 2002
Acting on an earlier report that Willy Ondo was missing since 27 December 1996 and was
already believed to be dead, Barangay Captain Admir Sabado sounded the alarm on his
tanods on 2 January 1997 and called them to search for Willy. Their e orts would have been
futile had it not been for the chance discovery on 7 January 1997 of Willy's skeletal remains
by a child who was pasturing his cow near a peanut plantation in Barangay Poo, Lazi,
Siquijor. Upon hearing the information, Barangay Captain Sabado immediately noti ed the
police and went to the site where the cadaver was found. With a throng of onlookers,
Sabado saw the disjoined bones of Willy scattered around. Sabado also noticed marks of a
recent bon re near the vicinity. Those who knew the victim, particularly his uncle Feliciano
Duque, recognized the remains as those of Willy because of a stainless steel found on his
leg which was surgically inserted to support a fractured leg as a result of an accident.
Dr. Franco Arcamo, the Medical O cer of Lazi, examined the skeletal remains of Willy Ondo
and con rmed that there was no noticeable decomposition as the body had probably been
feasted on by animals roaming the area. Dr. Arcamo also found no traces of bloodstains in
the remains; consequently, he surmised that the victim could have been dead ve (5) to
seven (7) days earlier as the bones were already dried up with no foul odor. In his expert
opinion, the principal cause of death was asphyxia secondary to burning.
Jeofrey Abe narrated that on 27 December 1996 at 9:00 o'clock in the evening he went out
of his house to watch a television show at the residence of a certain Anselmo Ymbol. A
couple of hours later or at about 11:00 o'clock that evening Jeofrey returned home
traversing the same route he took earlier. On the way home, he chanced upon a group of
three (3) persons whom he readily recognized as Freddie Catian, Samuel Sumalpong and
Rogelio Calunod. The three (3) were "ganging up" on a man whom he also identi ed as Willy
Ondo. Jeofrey easily recognized them as they were all his barriomates and the road was not
that dark despite the lateness of the hour because it was a moonlit night.
From a distance of about twelve (12) meters, Jeofrey saw Catian repeatedly striking Willy
with a "chako"5 on the head, causing Willy to fall on his knees. Calunod seconded by striking
the victim with a piece of wood on the face. When Willy nally collapsed, Sumalpong picked
him up, carried him over his shoulder, and walked away carrying him to an undisclosed
destination. Overcome with fear, Jeofrey went running towards home.
Jeofrey admitted that he did not inform anybody about the startling occurrence that he
witnessed for fear that the news would spread around and the assailants would hunt him
down.
Ruling:
The presence of alevosia in the attack cannot be disputed. The witness described the killing
in clear terms. There is nary an iota of doubt that the attack, being carried out suddenly and
unexpectedly, a orded the victim no occasion whatsoever to defend himself. Treachery
quali es the killing to murder.
However, the trial court went far astray in its reasoning when it ruled that the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, cruelty and ignominy were also attendant in the
commission of the crime. To authorize the nding of evident premeditation, the prosecution
must establish (a) the time when accused-appellants determined to commit the crime; (b) the
act showing that they clung to their determination; and (c) a su cient interval of time
between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow them to re ect upon the
consequences of their act. Other than a chance encounter between the witness Jeofrey and
the principal antagonists in this case, there is a dearth of information to show that accused-
appellants had deliberately planned to commit the crime and had persistently and
consciously followed it notwithstanding that they had ample and su cient time to allow their
conscience to overcome the determination of their will, if they had desired it, after meditation
and re ection.
Neither does it appear that the murder of the victim was attended by cruelty and ignominy.
Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace and obloquy
to the material injury caused by the crime. The mere fact that accused-appellants burned the
body of the deceased is not su cient to show that the means were employed which added
ignominy to the natural e ects of the act. Nor may we consider the circumstance of cruelty
as found by the trial court because there is no showing that the victim was burned while he
was still alive. For cruelty to exist, there must be proof showing that the accused delighted in
making their victim su er slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical and moral
pain in the consummation of the criminal act. No proof was presented that would show that
accused-appellants deliberately and wantonly augmented the su ering of their victim.
The trial court also found conspiracy "as can be shown by the unity of purpose displayed by
the three (3) accused in ganging up their victim Willy Ondo." Conspiracy in the statutory
language "exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it." Conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence; it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the o ense was
perpetrated. It is su cient that the malefactors acted in concert to attain the same criminal
objective. As a rule, the concurrence of wills, which is the essence of conspiracy, may be
deduced from the evidence of facts and circumstances, which taken together, indicate that
the parties cooperated and labored to the same end. It must be shown to exist as clearly and
convincingly as the commission of the o ense itself.
The evidence clearly shows that the three (3) accused-appellants conspired when they acted
in concert to perpetrate the ghastly incident. Catian and Calunod dealt the fatal blows while
Sumalpong watched in stolid silence, with nary a whimper of protest even when his two (2)
companions smashed their deadly weapons into the body of their defenseless victim. Not
content with his inaction, Sumalpong then carelessly slung the body of their fallen victim

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 over his shoulder and walked away to an undisclosed location. Inferable from the acts of
accused-appellants themselves was a common design, a community of purpose to attain
their evil objective. Pertinent is the testimony of Jeofrey Abe on direct examination.
PP vs MENDIONA, G.R. No. 129056, Feb 21, 2000
The victim Maricel Capongcol took the witness stand. She testi ed that she is nineteen (19)
years old, single, a laundry woman and a resident of Barangay Batug, Dulag, Leyte. She
knew accused-appellant and Cinco. The latter is her relative. On 7 October 1995, at about 6
o'clock in the evening, she was alone in their house. Her mother happened to be in Tacloban
City. From the window, she saw accused-appellant and Tirso Cinco by the fence. The two
broke into house through the window by kicking its shutter. Once inside, they threatened to
kill her. Cinco had a bolo known in their dialect as "pisao." The two removed her dress,
panty, sando and shorts pants. She shouted three times in protest. Accused-appellant
covered her mouth with his right hand to mu e her voice and threatened her with the
"pisao" which he got from Cinco. 4 Accused-appellant laid her on the oor and mounted her
while Cinco held her thighs. Accused-appellant was able to de ower her. Feeling pain in her
bleeding private part, she shouted calling her mother. He also kissed her cheeks, lips and
private part and touched her breasts. He penetrated her two times. After satisfying his lust,
he threatened to kill her should she mention the incident to his uncle, Matias Teston. 5
Her cousin Felix Naing and Virgilio Malte heard her screams and came. Accused-appellant
and Cinco avoided them by jumping out through the window. Maricel's cousins found her
crying as she put on her dress. She did not inform them of her violation for fear that they
might tell her mother and uncle who, in turn, might punish her. Nonetheless, on 22 October
1995, she revealed to her mother her unfortunate fate.
The court ruled that, in the instant case, the prosecution established that appellant and
Cinco succeeded in de ling Maricel with the use of a deadly weapon, i.e., "pisao."
Accordingly, the range of penalty imposable on appellant is composed of two indivisible
penalties, i.e., reclusion perpetua to death. Following Article 63 (1) of the same Code, which
provides the rules for the application of indivisible penalties, appellant was correctly meted
the supreme penalty of death since the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and unlawful
entry attended the commission of the rape. The attendance of these aggravating
circumstances is not contested by the accused-appellant.
On a nal note, we correct the trial court's erroneous classi cation of the award of
P50,000.00 as moral damages. In People v. Prades, we explained that ". . . the award
authorized by criminal law as civil indemnity ex delicto for the o ended party . . . is
mandatory upon the nding of the fact of rape; it is distinct from and should not be
denominated as moral damages which are based on di erent jural foundations and
assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion." Further, our more recent rulings
hold that the indemni cation for the victim shall be in the increased amount of P75,000.00 if
the crime of rape is committed or e ectively quali ed by any of the circumstances under
which the death penalty is authorized by law. Applying the foregoing rulings, the civil
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indemnity to be awarded to the complainant should be seventy ve thousand pesos
(P75,000.00).
The People having established the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt, his
conviction and the death penalty imposed by the trial court must be a rmed. Withal, four (4)
members of this Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659 insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty is unconstitutional; but they nevertheless submit to the ruling of
the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be imposed in
this case.
PP vs. ESPEJO, G.R. No. L-27708, December 19, 1970
At about 9:25 o’clock in the evening of May 14, 1963, while Claudio A. Bagaoisan, the Chief
of Police of Batac, Ilocos Norte, was driving his jeep on his way to the municipal hall, his
attention was attracted by the headlights of vehicle running along the municipal dirt road
leading to the national highway. He stopped at the junction to observe, a recent robbery in
the locality having made him suspicious of vehicles going around at night. Upon reaching the
highway the vehicle, which turned out to be a jeep, proceeded northward at a fast clip.
Sensing something unusual, Bagaoisan gave chase and signalled its driver to stop by
blowing the police siren and ring a warning shot. The jeep slowed down somewhat, and as
he was about to overtake it, one of the passengers looked back and shouted a question at
him. Instead of stopping, however, the jeep shot forward and left him behind. But the brief
interlude enabled the Chief of Police to observe that one of the passengers occupying the
front seat was a woman and to note the facial appearance Of the passenger who shouted at
him. He also noted the jeep’s registration plate No. 22274, Series 1963.
Realizing the futility of further pursuit Chief Bagaoisan turned back, drove to a police station
and then proceeded to the municipal hall. There he was informed by the guard that Petronilo
Espejo of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte had called up by phone, requesting the Batac police to
be on the look-out for a jeep with plate number 22274, which had allegedly been stolen from
its owner. It was also requested that the message be relayed to the PC detachment at
Badoc. Shortly after midnight Petronilo Espejo, Jovencio Tabios, a certain Ching
Macadangdang and another unnamed companion arrived at the municipal hall Espejo
inquired whether a jeep with plate number 22274 had been seen in Batac. Bagaoisan related
what he had seen earlier that evening and even described the passenger who had shouted
at him, eliciting a remark from Espejo that he could surmise who that passenger was. The
group then bade good night and left.
The following morning, May 15, 1963, between six and seven o’clock, Ko Pian (also referred
to as Co Piang in the record) a Chinese merchant, was found stabbed to death inside his
garage located at the back of his store just across the public market of Batac. The local
police department was immediately noti ed and the initial investigation at the scene revealed
that one of the dead man’s steel safes and two (2) axes displayed at the store were missing,
while the other steel safe had been slightly pulled forward from its place and found with a
piece of rope still tied to it.
 Ruling:
The information recites that the crime was committed with several aggravating
circumstances, one of which was "use of motor vehicle." Since a plea of guilty admits all the
material averments in the information including the aggravating circumstances alleged
therein 5 the appellants cannot now question the actuation of the trial court in appreciating
"use of motor vehicle" as an aggravating circumstance. Besides, it has been established
during the trial that the accused used the motor vehicle in going to the place of the crime in
carrying away the e ects thereof, and in facilitating their escape.
The two appellants claim that the trial court misapplied Article 63, paragraphs 2 and 4 of the
Revised Penal Code 6 by o setting only the aggravating circumstance of treachery (which
according to the trial court absorbed "nighttime" and "superior strength") with the mitigating
circumstance of "plea of guilty" leaving the aggravating circumstance of "use of motor
vehicle" to justify the imposition of the death penalty. They maintain that said plea should
have been weighed against both aggravating circumstances, considering its importance and
moral value.
We nd no error in the application of the article cited by the appellants. The facts of the
case, particularly the manner the victim was repeatedly stabbed and the utter senselessness
of the killing itself show the correctness of the court’s ruling. Since there is still one
aggravating circumstance left the penalty of death was properly imposed by the trial court
on the two appellants.
Moreover, the court stated that "To establish conspiracy, it is not necessary to prove
previous agreement to commit a crime if there is proof that the malefactors have acted in
concert and in pursuance of the same objective. This Court has repeatedly decided that
conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such acts point
to a joint purpose and design. Their action must be judged by what they do and not
altogether by what they say; for what men do is the best index of their intention."
Tabios now contends that even granting that he was aware of the plan of his co-accused to
commit the crime of robbery, he should not be held liable for the crime of robbery with
homicide because the killing of the Chinaman was not a part of the conspiracy, invoking the
case of People v. Basisten, Et Al., 47 Phil. 493, wherein this Court held:
"Where it appears that only one of the defendants committed homicide at the time of
perpetrating the robbery said homicide not having been the subject of the conspiracy, nor
the others having had any intervention in said homicide, the author of the homicide is the
only one responsible for the complex crime of robbery in band with homicide, the other
defendants being responsible only for the robbery in band."
Since it has been established that the appellant in the instant case was a co-conspirator and
that he performed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy the lower court correctly held
that he was liable for the crime of robbery with homicide as a co-principal.
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When a group of malefactors conspire to commit robbery and arm themselves for the
purpose, no member of the group may disclaim responsibility for any act of violence that is
perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. Such violence is always reasonably
to be expected either to overcome active opposition or to forestall it altogether by disabling
the victim at the very outset, or even to silence him completely thereafter. In the instant case
the group that set out for Batac to rob Ko Pian was provided with lethal weapons — a
dagger, an ice pick and a gun. These instruments were intended to facilitate the commission
of the robbery, and if their use resulted in homicide, the liability therefor attaches to the entire
group. The only exception recognized in the decisions of this Court, presumably drawing an
analogy with the situation provided for in Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code, concerning
robbery by a band, is when a co-conspirator in the crime of robbery tried to prevent the
homicide or the other acts of violence committed by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery. In robbery by a band punished under the said Article, of course, proof of conspiracy
is not required so as to hold all members of the band liable for any of the assaults committed
on the occasion of the robbery, whereas such proof is necessary where several accused, not
constituting a band, are charged with the o ense of robbery with homicide under Article 294.
With this view we take of the case of appellant Jovencio Tabios, strictly speaking he should
su er the same penalty as that imposed upon Anselmo Tolentino and Julian Arzadon. Some
members of the Court, however, are of the opinion that a distinction should be made as far
as the penalty is concerned, considering that Tabios although co-conspirator, was not in the
immediate scene of the crime but guarding the jeep some distance away, and had no direct
hand in the killing of the victim. For lack of the required number of votes to impose the
maximum penalty, that meted out by the trial court on this appellant stands a rmed.
People v. Punzalan, Jr., G.R. No. 199892, December 10, 2012
In August 2002, Seaman 1st Class (SN1) Arnulfo Andal, SN1 Antonio Duclayna, SN1 Evelio
Bacosa, SN1 Cesar Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya, and SN1 Erlinger Bundang were among the
members of the Philippine Navy sent for schooling at the Naval Education and Training
Command (NETC) at San Miguel, San Antonio, Zambales. On August 10, 2002, at around
5:00 or 6:00 in the afternoon, they went to the "All-in-One" Canteen to have some drink.
Later, at around 10:00 in the evening, they transferred to a nearby videoke bar, "Aquarius,"
where they continued their drinking session. Shortly thereafter, a heated argument between
SN1 Bacosa and appellant ensued regarding a ickering light bulb inside "Aquarius." When
SN1 Bacosa suggested that the light be turned o ("Patayin ang ilaw"), appellant who must
have misunderstood and misinterpreted SN1 Bacosa’s statement belligerently reacted
asking, "Sinong papatayin?," thinking that SN1 Bacosa’s statement was directed at him. SN1
Cuya tried to pacify SN1 Bacosa and appellant, while SN1 Bundang apologized to appellant
in behalf of SN1 Bacosa. However, appellant was still visibly angry, mumbling unintelligible
words and pounding his st on the table.
To avoid further trouble, the navy personnel decided to leave "Aquarius" and return to the
NETC camp. They walked in two’s, namely, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo in the rst
group, followed by the group of SN1 Bacosa and SN1 Cuya, and SN1 Andal and SN1
 Duclayna in the last group, with each group at one arm’s length distance from the other.
Along the way, they passed by the NETC sentry gate which was being manned by SN1 Noel
de Guzman and F1EN Alejandro Dimaala at that time. SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna even
stopped by to give the sentries some barbecue before proceeding to follow their
companions.
Soon after the navy personnel passed by the sentry gate, SN1 De Guzman and F1EN
Dimaala agged down a rushing and zigzagging maroon Nissan van with plate number DRW
706. The sentries approached the van and recognized appellant, who was reeking of liquor,
as the driver. Appellant angrily uttered, "kasi chief, gago ang mga ‘yan!," while pointing
toward the direction of the navy personnel’s group. Even before he was given the go signal
to proceed, appellant shifted gears and sped away while uttering, "papatayin ko ang mga
‘yan!" While F1EN Dimaala was writing the van’s plate number and details in the logbook, he
suddenly heard a loud thud. Meanwhile, SN1 De Guzman saw how the van sped away
towards the camp and suddenly swerved to the right hitting the group of the walking navy
personnel prompting him to exclaim to F1EN Dimaala, "chief, binangga ang tropa!" SN1 De
Guzman then asked permission to go to the scene of the incident and check on the navy
personnel.
ruling:
The court ruled that, the allegation of treachery in the Information is su cient.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases wherein we found the allegation of treachery
su cient without any further explanation as to the circumstances surrounding it."
Clearly, We nd that the information is su cient as it not merely indicated the term treachery
therein but also described the act itself constituting treachery. Such statement, without a
doubt, provided the supporting facts that constituted the o ense, su ciently alleging the
qualifying circumstance of treachery when it pointed out the statement, "smash and hit from
behind." (Emphases supplied; citations omitted.)
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on
unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby
ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation
on the part of the victims. The six navy personnel were walking by the roadside, on their way
back to their camp. They felt secure as they have just passed a sentry and were nearing their
barracks. They were totally unaware of the threat to their life as their backs were turned
against the direction where appellant’s speeding van came. They were therefore defenseless
and posed no threat to appellant when appellant mowed them down with his van, killing two
of them, injuring three others and one narrowly escaping injury or death. Beyond reasonable
doubt, there was treachery in appellant’s act. This was su ciently alleged in the Information
which not only expressly mentioned treachery as one of the circumstances attending the
crime but also described it in understandable language:
[T]he said accused, with intent to kill, while driving and in control of a Nissan Van with plate
no. DRW 706, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, bump, overrun, smash
and hit from behind with the use of said van, the following persons: Antonio Duclayna,
Arnulfo Andal, Evelio Bacosa, Danilo Cuya, Erlinger Bundang and Cesar Domingo, x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Use of motor vehicle was also properly considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Appellant deliberately used the van he was driving to pursue the victims. Upon catching up
with them, appellant ran over them and mowed them down with the van, resulting to the
death of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and injuries to the others. Thereafter, he continued to
speed away from the scene of the incident. Without doubt, appellant used the van both as a
means to commit a crime and to ee the scene of the crime after he committed the felonious
act.
People v. De Asis y Cureg, G.R. No. 258767 (Notice), [July 3, 2023]
At around 6:00 p.m. on May 8, 2010, Michael, Zaldy Carag (Zaldy), Islaw Carag (Islaw), and
Rosauro were conversing in front of the house of Solano Mayor Meynard Carag (Mayor
Carag) along the Provincial Road while waiting for supper. At the other side of the Provincial
Road were Arnel, Robert Cristobal, Romy Cristobal, Rodel Cristobal, Rod Antonio, and Mark.
A white ambulance suddenly stopped in their immediate vicinity and along the Provincial
Road. Michael and Arnel recognized the ambulance, which is owned by Barangay Bauan
East, Solana, Cagayan. Upon stopping, the occupants of the ambulance simultaneously
red successive shots on the group who were on opposite sides of the road. On one side of
the road, Michael, Zaldy, and Islaw were hit, while Arnel was hit on the other side. Rosauro
caught Zaldy when he was shot.
Renato Carag (Renato) who was in the driver's seat red at them with a pistol; Carlo Mark
Carag y Pagulayan alias Macmac (Macmac) who was beside Renato also red using a pistol;
accused-appellant who was seated at the back likewise red using a long rearm. Rosauro
testi ed that Romeo De Asis (Romeo) and a certain Edgar were beside accused-appellant.
Michael could see Renato, Macmac, and accused-appellant since the front window was
lowered and it was still bright; however, he did not see the persons in the back portion of the
ambulance since it was tinted. Michael, Rosauro, Arnel, and Ernald testi ed that they
recognized accused-appellant Roldan during the shooting since they knew him prior to the
incident. 39 Arnel and Ernald identi ed Roldan in open court.
Immediately after the occupants of the van red at the victims, the ambulance sped away
and stopped in front of the house of Renato. Subsequently, seven persons alighted and
scampered to di erent directions. When Michael tried to stand so that he could go to the
hospital, he saw Roldan who was left behind and holding a long rearm. Rosauro also
testi ed that after the shooting, Roldan was left behind. Michael, Rosauro, and Arnel testi ed
that the sudden ring took them by surprise and that they could not defend themselves.
Michael su ered an injury in the upper portion of his left arm, leaving a scar measuring one
inch of a peso coin. Arnel was hit on his right hand, right leg, and below his right ear. Ernald
was grazed on his right thigh. The injured were all brought to St. Paul Hospital for treatment.

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 Michael and Rosauro testi ed that Zaldy died as a result of the wounds he sustained from
the shooting incident.
The RTC found accused-appellant Roldan and Renato guilty of one count of Murder and four
counts of Attempted Murder. Upon review, the CA upheld Roldan's conviction. Hence, the
appeal.
SC nds the appeal has no merit.
Jurisprudence dictates that the elements of Murder are the following: (a) that a person was
killed, (b) that the accused killed him or her, (c) that the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248, and (d) that the killing is not parricide or
infanticide. Thus, for the charge of Murder to prosper, the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable doubt that: (1) the o ender killed the victim, (2) through treachery or by any of the
other qualifying circumstances, duly alleged in the Information. In addition, the essential
elements of an attempted felony are: (1) the o ender commences the commission of the
felony directly by overt acts; (2) he or she does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony; (3) the o ender's act be not stopped by his or her own
spontaneous desistance; and (4) the non-performance of all acts of execution was due to
cause or accident other than his or her spontaneous desistance. In turn, the essential
element of attempted or frustrated murder is the assailant's intent to kill the person attacked,
which must be proved in a clear and evident manner to obviate doubt as to the homicidal
intent of the aggressor. The following factors are considered to determine the presence of
intent to kill, namely: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and
number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during,
or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime
was committed and the motives of the accused.
The Court nds that the foregoing elements for the Murder of Zaldy and the attempted
murder of Robin, Arnel, Michael, and Ernald were established beyond reasonable doubt. The
details of the shooting incident on May 8, 2010, the accused-appellant's participation in the
crime, and the existence of conspiracy among accused-appellant and his other co-accused,
were duly proven by the prosecution. The swift and coordinated ambush of accused-
appellant and his other co-accused in riding the ambulance, stopping in front of Mayor
Carag's house, and simultaneously shooting the persons at the scene with several rearms
before quickly eeing the scene through the ambulance undoubtedly established the
existence of conspiracy to kill Mayor Carag, Robin, Arnel, Michael, and Ernald. Verily,
accused- appellant and his other conspirators are equally liable for the crimes committed
during the shooting incident.
The crime was attended with treachery. As testi ed to by Michael, Rosauro, and Arnel, the
swift ambush and sudden ring took them by surprise, and they could not defend
themselves since they did not expect to be red upon. Similarly, the aggravating
circumstance of use of motor vehicle was duly established. The use of a motor vehicle is
aggravating when it is used either to commit the crime or to facilitate escape. Here, the
ambulance was used as a means by accused-appellant and the other perpetrators to
commit the crime and to facilitate their escape after the consummation of their plot to
ambush and shoot the victims.
THE PP vs. SITCHON, G.R. No. 134362, Feb 27, 2002
Five witnesses testi ed for the prosecution, namely, Lilia Garcia, a neighbor; the victim's
eight-year old brother Roberto; the investigating o cer, PO3 Paul Dennis Javier; Dr. Manuel
Lagonera, medico-legal o cer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); and Felicisima
Francisco, a forensic chemist of the same agency.
Appellant lived in the second oor of a three-square meter house located at 2001
Batangas Street, Tondo, Manila. His neighbor of two months, Lilia Garcia, resided in the rst
oor of the same house.
At about 10:00 in the morning of June 12, 1996, Lilia was in front of the house attending to
her children when she heard the sound of a boy crying. Curious, Lilia went up the stairway,
her children in tow. The open door of the upper oor allowed Lilia to witness appellant
beating two-year old Mark Anthony Fernandez. From a distance of less than three arms’
length, Lilia saw appellant hit various parts of the boy’s body with a piece of wood, about 14
½ inches in length and 2 ½ inches in diameter. Appellant also banged the head of the boy
against the wooden wall.
The beating went on for about one hour. Lilia then saw appellant carry the boy down the
house to bring him to the hospital. The two-year old was “already black” and no longer
moving.
Eight-year old Roberto Fernandez is the elder brother of the victim, also known as Macky.
According to Roberto, Macky had scattered his feces all over the house. Appellant, whom
Roberto called Kuya Chito, thus beat Macky with a belt, a hammer and a “2x2” piece of
wood. Roberto could not do anything to help his brother because he was afraid Kuya Chito
might also beat him up. When Kuya Chito brought Macky to the hospital, his little brother,
who could barely talk, was not crying anymore.
The RTC nds the accused, Emelito Sitchon y Tayag, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder and is sentenced to su er the death penalty. The court appealed the
decision.
The Court entertains little doubt that appellant is guilty of the killing of Mark Anthony
Fernandez. Appellant’s guilt was adequately established by the testimonies of Lilia Garcia
and Roberto Fernandez, who both saw appellant beat Macky. These testimonies were
further corroborated by those of PO3 Paul Dennis Javier, Dr. Manuel Lagonera and
Felicisima Francisco, as well as the various pieces of object evidence. Indeed, appellant in
open court admitted beating the poor child, which beating resulted in the latter’s death.

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 That appellant purportedly did not intend to kill the toddler would not exculpate him from
liability. Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be
incurred by any “person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
di erent from that which he intended.” The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine that
“el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado” (he who is the cause of the cause is
the cause of the evil caused)
Thus, where the accused violently kicked the sleeping victim in vital parts of the latter’s
body, the accused is liable for the supervening death as a consequence of the injuries.
Assuming, therefore, that appellant merely intended to in ict physical injuries upon the boy,
he is nevertheless liable for the death of the victim caused by such injuries.
The killing in this case was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the o ender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the o ended party might make. It is beyond dispute
that the killing of minor children who, by reason of their tender years, could not be expected
to put up a defense, is treacherous.
Evident premeditation is absent. For the court to appreciate evident premeditation, the
prosecution must prove: (a) the time the accused decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt
act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (c) su cient lapse of time
between the decision and the execution to allow the accused to re ect upon the
consequence of his act. The prosecution failed to establish any of these requisites.
The trial court incorrectly appreciated cruelty against the accused. The test in appreciating
cruelty as an aggravating circumstance is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically
augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or
inhumanly increased the victim’s su ering or outraged or sco ed at his person or corpse.
The nature of cruelty lies in the fact that the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim
su er slowly and gradually, causing him moral and physical pain which is unnecessary for
the consummation of the criminal act which he intended to commit. The sheer number of
wounds, however, is not a test for determining whether cruelty attended the commission of a
crime.
The prosecution did not show that appellant enjoyed in icting injuries upon the victim. The
inordinate force employed by appellant appears to have been caused not by any sadistic
bend but rather by the drugs that diminished his capacity.
The trial court also considered intoxication as an aggravating circumstance. The Solicitor
General defends this ruling, contending that appellant’s habitual drug addiction is an
alternative circumstance analogous to habitual intoxication under Article 15 of the Revised
Penal Code:
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Intoxication of the o ender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance
when the o ender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not
habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but when the intoxication is
habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
The Court does not agree. Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code provides a list of mitigating
circumstances, which work to reduce the accused’s penalty. Article 13(10) allows courts to
consider “any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those” mentioned
therein. Neither Article 14 of the same Code on aggravating circumstances nor Article 15 on
alternative circumstances, however, contain a provision similar to Article 13(10). Accordingly,
the Court cannot consider appellant’s drug addiction as an aggravating circumstance.
Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed and no person should be brought within their
terms who is not clearly within them.
People v. Catian, G.R. No. 139693, January 24, 2002.
Acting on an earlier report that Willy Ondo was missing since 27 December 1996 and was
already believed to be dead, Barangay Captain Admir Sabado sounded the alarm on his
tanods on 2 January 1997 and called them to search for Willy. Their e orts would have been
futile had it not been for the chance discovery on 7 January 1997 of Willy's skeletal remains
by a child who was pasturing his cow near a peanut plantation in Barangay Poo, Lazi,
Siquijor. Upon hearing the information, Barangay Captain Sabado immediately noti ed the
police and went to the site where the cadaver was found. With a throng of onlookers,
Sabado saw the disjoined bones of Willy scattered around. Sabado also noticed marks of a
recent bon re near the vicinity. Those who knew the victim, particularly his uncle Feliciano
Duque, recognized the remains as those of Willy because of a stainless steel found on his
leg which was surgically inserted to support a fractured leg as a result of an accident.
Dr. Franco Arcamo, the Medical O cer of Lazi, examined the skeletal remains of Willy Ondo
and con rmed that there was no noticeable decomposition as the body had probably been
feasted on by animals roaming the area. Dr. Arcamo also found no traces of bloodstains in
the remains; consequently, he surmised that the victim could have been dead ve (5) to
seven (7) days earlier as the bones were already dried up with no foul odor. In his expert
opinion, the principal cause of death was asphyxia secondary to burning.
Jeofrey Abe narrated that on 27 December 1996 at 9:00 o'clock in the evening he went out
of his house to watch a television show at the residence of a certain Anselmo Ymbol. A
couple of hours later or at about 11:00 o'clock that evening Jeofrey returned home
traversing the same route he took earlier. On the way home, he chanced upon a group of
three (3) persons whom he readily recognized as Freddie Catian, Samuel Sumalpong and
Rogelio Calunod. The three (3) were "ganging up" on a man whom he also identi ed as Willy
Ondo. Jeofrey easily recognized them as they were all his barriomates and the road was not
that dark despite the lateness of the hour because it was a moonlit night.
From a distance of about twelve (12) meters, Jeofrey saw Catian repeatedly striking Willy
with a "chako"5 on the head, causing Willy to fall on his knees. Calunod seconded by striking
the victim with a piece of wood on the face. When Willy nally collapsed, Sumalpong picked
 him up, carried him over his shoulder, and walked away carrying him to an undisclosed
destination. Overcome with fear, Jeofrey went running towards home.
Jeofrey admitted that he did not inform anybody about the startling occurrence that he
witnessed for fear that the news would spread around and the assailants would hunt him
down.
Ruling:
The presence of alevosia in the attack cannot be disputed. The witness described the killing
in clear terms. There is nary an iota of doubt that the attack, being carried out suddenly and
unexpectedly, a orded the victim no occasion whatsoever to defend himself. Treachery
quali es the killing to murder.
However, the trial court went far astray in its reasoning when it ruled that the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, cruelty and ignominy were also attendant in the
commission of the crime. To authorize the nding of evident premeditation, the prosecution
must establish (a) the time when accused-appellants determined to commit the crime; (b) the
act showing that they clung to their determination; and (c) a su cient interval of time
between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow them to re ect upon the
consequences of their act. Other than a chance encounter between the witness Jeofrey and
the principal antagonists in this case, there is a dearth of information to show that accused-
appellants had deliberately planned to commit the crime and had persistently and
consciously followed it notwithstanding that they had ample and su cient time to allow their
conscience to overcome the determination of their will, if they had desired it, after meditation
and re ection.
Neither does it appear that the murder of the victim was attended by cruelty and ignominy.
Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace and obloquy
to the material injury caused by the crime. The mere fact that accused-appellants burned the
body of the deceased is not su cient to show that the means were employed which added
ignominy to the natural e ects of the act. Nor may we consider the circumstance of cruelty
as found by the trial court because there is no showing that the victim was burned while he
was still alive. For cruelty to exist, there must be proof showing that the accused delighted in
making their victim su er slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical and moral
pain in the consummation of the criminal act. No proof was presented that would show that
accused-appellants deliberately and wantonly augmented the su ering of their victim.
The trial court also found conspiracy "as can be shown by the unity of purpose displayed by
the three (3) accused in ganging up their victim Willy Ondo." Conspiracy in the statutory
language "exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it." Conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence; it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the o ense was
perpetrated. It is su cient that the malefactors acted in concert to attain the same criminal
objective. As a rule, the concurrence of wills, which is the essence of conspiracy, may be
deduced from the evidence of facts and circumstances, which taken together, indicate that
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the parties cooperated and labored to the same end. It must be shown to exist as clearly and
convincingly as the commission of the o ense itself.
The evidence clearly shows that the three (3) accused-appellants conspired when they acted
in concert to perpetrate the ghastly incident. Catian and Calunod dealt the fatal blows while
Sumalpong watched in stolid silence, with nary a whimper of protest even when his two (2)
companions smashed their deadly weapons into the body of their defenseless victim. Not
content with his inaction, Sumalpong then carelessly slung the body of their fallen victim
over his shoulder and walked away to an undisclosed location. Inferable from the acts of
accused-appellants themselves was a common design, a community of purpose to attain
their evil objective. Pertinent is the testimony of Jeofrey Abe on direct examination.
People v. Florendo, G.R. No. 136845, October 8, 2003
The records show that on 28 August 1996 at around 2:30 in the afternoon appellant and his
wife Erlinda were inside their house engaged in an animated conversation. Living with them
in the same house in Barangay Bulbulala, La Paz, Abra, was appellant’s father Agustin
Florendo. After Erlinda was heard to have told Imong to go to sleep, the latter all of a sudden
and without any provocation hacked Erlinda with a bolo in the head and other parts of her
body. The victim could only exclaim, "Patayennak met ni Imong ngen (Imong is going to kill
me)!"
Agustin, who was resting at that time, witnessed the incident. Instead of stopping appellant,
Agustin left the house for fear that his son would also attack him. Agustin sought help from
his immediate neighbor, Ernesto Anical, and told him, "Kasano Erning, patayen yen met ni
Imong ni baketnan (How is this Erning, Imong is killing his wife)!"3 Ernesto too became
frightened and did not go out of his house; instead, he told Agustin to go to the barangay
captain for assistance.
Agustin went to the house of Barangay Captain Godofredo Apuya to report the incident but
the latter was not there. Thus, the wife of the barangay captain, upon being apprised of what
happened, hurriedly went out to look for any available barangay tanod for assistance and
was able to contact Barangay Tanod Felipe Adora. Agustin, on the other hand, restrained by
fear and shock, stayed at the barangay captain’s house and when he nally returned at
about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon Erlinda was already dead.
In the meantime, appellant ran to the house of the barangay captain after hacking his wife.
When Barangay Tanod Felipe Adora arrived at the house of the barangay captain, he found
appellant there holding a bloodied bolo, his hands and feet dripping with blood. Felipe
advised appellant to yield his bolo but the latter did not respond. This prompted Felipe to
grab his hand and take away his bolo. When Barangay Captain Godofredo Apuya arrived, he
asked appellant why his hand and feet were covered with blood but the latter did not
answer. Appellant was later taken to the La Paz District Hospital for treatment of his wound
and the police authorities of La Paz thereafter took him into custody pending investigation of
the incident.
 Ruling:
The SC cannot sustain the ruling of the trial court that cruelty aggravated the killing simply
because according to the autopsy report the victim’s body bore sixteen (16) wounds all in all,
four (4) of which were severe, deep and fatal. The number of wounds is not a test for
determining cruelty; it is whether appellant deliberately and sadistically augmented the
victim’s su ering. Thus, there must be proof that the victim was made to agonize before
appellant rendered the blow which snu ed out her life. Although Erlinda received sixteen (16)
wounds in all there is no showing that appellant deliberately and inhumanly increased her
su ering. At any rate, even if cruelty is proved, it cannot be appreciated against appellant to
raise the penalty to death as this was not alleged in the Information. Under Sec. 9, Rule 110,
of The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took e ect on 1 December 2000,
aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information or complaint, otherwise, they
cannot be properly appreciated. Being favorable to appellant, this procedural rule must be
given retroactive application.
As to the marriage of the victim and appellant, the trial court properly upheld its legitimacy.
In parricide, the best proof of relationship between appellant and the deceased is the
marriage certi cate, and in the absence thereof, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be
considered. The testimony of appellant that he was married to the deceased is an admission
against his penal interest. It is a con rmation of the sem per praesumitur matrimonio and the
presumption that "a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Even if the marriage certi cate was not
presented, that the victim was the legitimate wife of appellant is evident from the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses. In open court, appellant himself volunteered the information in
his o er of evidence through counsel and on direct examination that the victim was his
legitimate wife.
Appellant was properly convicted of the crime of parricide. Parricide not being a capital
crime per se, as it is not punishable by the mandatory death penalty but by the exible
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death which are two (2) indivisible penalties, the application
of the lesser or the greater penalty depends on the presence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance appreciated for
appellant, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed. Nonetheless, clinical ndings
at the time of evaluation of the psychological and psychiatric condition of appellant show
that despite maintenance of anti-psychotic medication he remains to be symptomatic. It is
imperative that there should be continuous maintenance of his anti-psychotic medications
and regular psychiatric follow-up to achieve and sustain remission of psychotic symptoms.
Pp vs Regala, GR No. 130508, 5 Apr 2000
On September 11, 1995, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening at Barangay Bangon, Aroroy,
Masbate, then 16-year old victim Nerissa Tagala and her grandmother (Consuelo Arevalo)
were sleeping, when appellant Armando Regala and his two other companions entered the
former's house. (pp. 6-7, TSN, August 26, 1996).
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Appellant and his companions entered the house through the kitchen by removing the
pieces of wood under the stove. Appellant went to the room of Nerissa and her grandmother
and poked an 8-inch gun on them, one after the other. (p. 8, TSN, August 26, 1996)
Nerissa and her grandmother were hogtied by appellant and his companions. Thereafter,
Nerissa was raped by appellant Armando Regala in bed while her grandmother was on the
oor. After the rape, appellant and his two companions counted the money they took from
the "aparador." (pp. 9-10, TSN, August 26, 1996)
Appellant and his companions then ran away with P3,000 in cash, 2 pieces of ring valued at
P6,000 and two wrist watches worth P5,000. (pp. 11-13, TSN, August 26, 1996)
The following day, September 12, 1995, Nerissa went to the Rural Health Clinic of Aroroy,
Masbate for medical examination. In the Medical Report presented by Municipal Health
O cer Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, it was shown that Nerissa sustained laceration of the hymen
at 4:00 o'clock and 7:00 o'clock positions (fresh wounds), indicating a possible sexual
assault upon the victim. (p. 16, TSN, August 26, 1996)
Ruling:
The victim in the case at bar was raped twice on the occasion of the robbery. There are
cases holding that the additional rapes committed on the same occasion of robbery will not
increase the penalty. In People vs. Martinez, accused Martinez and two (2) other unidenti ed
persons, who remained at large, were charged with the special complex crime of robbery
with rape where all three raped the victim. The Court imposed the penalty of death after
considering two (2) aggravating circumstances, namely, nocturnidad and use of a deadly
weapon. However, the Court did not consider the two (2) other rapes as aggravating holding
that "(T)he special complex crime of robbery with rape has, therefore, been committed by
the felonious acts of appellant and his cohorts, with all acts or rape on that occasion being
integrated in one composite crime."
There are likewise cases which held that the multiplicity of rapes committed could be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. In People vs. Candelario where three (3) of the
four (4) armed men who robbed the victim "alternately raped her twice for each of them",
this Court, citing People vs. Obtinalia, ruled that "(T)he characterization of the o ense as
robbery with rape, however, is not changed simply because there were several rapes
committed. The multiplicity of rapes should instead be taken into account raising the penalty
to death."
It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s
should be considered as aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating
circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the
enumeration in Article 13 of the same code regarding mitigating circumstances where there
is a speci c paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for analogous circumstances.
It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide on the occasion
of the robbery) would result in an "anomalous situation" where from the standpoint of the
 gravity of the o ense, robbery with one rape would be on the same level as robbery with
multiple rapes. However, the remedy lies with the legislature. A penal law is liberally
construed in favor of the o ender and no person should be brought within its terms if he is
not clearly made so by the statute.
In view of the foregoing, the additional rape committed by herein accused-appellant should
not be considered as aggravating. The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial
court is proper.
Pp v Calongui, 3 Mar 2006, GR # 170566
Marinel testi ed that she was 5 years old when her family took in appellant, who is her rst
cousin and who was then 21 years old, to live with them and help in the upkeep of the
family's farm.
On January 1, 1998, at 2:00 a.m., then 13-year-old Marinel, who slept in the same room as
the appellant and her three siblings, awoke to nd that appellant had removed her shorts
and panties. The latter threatened to kill her and her siblings if she resisted his sexual
advances. She tried to repel the sexual assault by moving her body and kicking the
appellant's thighs but appellant succeeded in having sexual congress with her. The next
morning, she learned that her 12-year old brother, Noel, witnessed the incident but
pretended to be asleep because the appellant might harm him. Marinel told Noel not to tell
anyone about what he saw. She also did not report the matter to her parents for fear that
appellant would make good his threats.
On September 26, 1998 at 3:00 a.m., appellant again raped Marinel which was likewise
witnessed by Noel. She was undressed from the waist down and threatened that she and
her siblings would be killed if she resisted.
Shortly after the second rape incident, appellant stayed at the B-Meg barracks where he
worked as a laborer. Emboldened by his absence, Marinel told her mother of her ordeals
which led to the ling of the instant criminal cases.
Noel testi ed that he saw how appellant raped his sister on both occasions but pretended to
be asleep out of fear. He did not report the matter to their parents upon instructions of
Marinel and also because of the threats of the appellant.
Gracia, Marinel's mother, testi ed that Marinel informed her of the rape incidents on
November 15, 1998. She thereafter accompanied her daughter to the police authorities.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the prosecution satisfactorily proved beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant had carnal knowledge of Marinel through force, threats and intimidation on
January 1, 1998 and September 26, 1998. Under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, simple
rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Since the appellant is guilty of two counts of
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simple rape, the trial court correctly meted out the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count of rape.
However, with respect to the award of exemplary damages, the trial court failed to cite any
factual and legal bases therefor. In People v. Catubig, we held that the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the o ended party to an
award of exemplary damages. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took e ect on
December 1, 2000 now provides that aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the
information in order to be validly appreciated by the court. However, the acts of rape and the
ling of the two informations in the instant case occurred prior to the e ectivity of these
rules. Pursuant to People v. Catubig, the retroactive application of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure cannot adversely a ect the rights of a private o ended party that have
become vested before the e ectivity of these rules.Thus, aggravating circumstances which
were not alleged in the informations but proved during the trial may be appreciated for the
limited purpose of determining the accused's liability for exemplary damages.
This notwithstanding, a review of the records shows that there are no aggravating
circumstances present in the case at bar. Dwelling cannot be appreciated because Marinel
and the appellant lived in the same house at the time of the rape incidents. As a result, the
rationale for considering dwelling as an aggravating circumstance, i.e., the violation by the
o ender of the sanctity of the home of the victim by trespassing therein to commit a crime,
is absent. Night time cannot likewise be appreciated because there is no proof that the
appellant deliberately sought the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime.
Similarly, relationship is not aggravating because the relationship between Marinel and the
appellant as rst cousins is not within the concept contemplated in Article 15 of the Revised
Penal Code. Abuse of con dence is likewise absent because the prosecution did not
establish that it facilitated the attainment of the rape. Finally, use of a deadly weapon cannot
be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because Marinel's belated assertion on
cross-examination that the appellant used a knife to perpetrate the two rapes raised doubts
as to the knife's existence. She also stated on cross-examination that what she saw was an
object that "looked like a knife." In view of the foregoing, the award of exemplary damages
by the trial court should be deleted.
PP, vs. CAPAREDA, G.R. No. 128363, May 27, 2004
Rizalyn Torres Lufera was born on June 19, 1979. She and her younger brother Ricardo
Torres and their mother Jocelyn Torres Lufera resided in the two-storey house of the latter’s
parents, the spouses Cariño and Victorina Torres, at Zone 4, Pasil, Kauswagan, Cagayan de
Oro City. Rizalyn’s parents had been separated since she was still an infant. She grew up
under the joint care of her mother and her grandparents, as well as her aunts and uncles.
The ground oor of the house had two bedrooms, one occupied by Rizalyn’s grandparents
and the other occupied by her three unnamed uncles who were then still studying. Rizalyn,
her mother and her younger brother Ricardo, occupied one of the three rooms in the second
oor.

The appellant Emiliano Capareda was the brother-in-law of Cariño Torres, being the second
husband of Anita Torres Vda. de Dagsang, Cariño Torres’ sister. The couple resided in
Banlag, Valencia, Bukidnon. Sometime in the last week of May 1992, a relative of Anita and
Cariño died. The appellant, together with his wife Anita and her son by her previous
husband, Almor Dagsang, attended the interment and, thereafter, stayed for some time in
the house of Cariño Torres. The couple occupied the living room in the second oor, as the
two other rooms were respectively occupied by Rizalyn’s uncle and her two single aunts.
Nevertheless, Emiliano and Anita had their clothes placed in Rizalyn’s room and had access
therein.
In June 1992, Rizalyn was thirteen years old and a rst year high school student at the
Misamis Oriental General Comprehensive High School. She was a bright student and
belonged to the rst section of the science class.17 To maintain her academic status, every
night, after taking dinner and doing her part of the household chores, Rizalyn would go up to
their room and study her lessons.
At around 8:00 p.m. on June 10, 1992, while Rizalyn was studying her lessons, the appellant
entered the room to get some things and to change his clothes. Ricardo, Rizalyn’s brother,
and the other occupants of the house were on the ground oor. Rizalyn was shocked when
suddenly, the appellant held her by her shirt collar and poked his right clenched st at her.
He gave Rizalyn dagger looks and warned her, saying, "Hoy, ‘Zalyn bantay lang kon mutug-
an ka sa imong Mama" ("Hoy, ‘Zalyn beware if you will report to your mother"). He then
pushed her to the oor and laid on top of her. The appellant removed his short pants and
briefs and pulled down Rizalyn’s shorts and underwear. He spread her thighs, inserted his
penis into her vagina and made push and pull movements. Rizalyn felt severe pain in her
vagina and cried. Satiated, the appellant stood up and wiped his penis. He put on his briefs
and short pants and left the room, leaving the sobbing Rizalyn alone. She kept the shocking
experience to herself because of the appellant’s warning.
At around 8:00 p.m. on June 12, 1992, Rizalyn was in her room studying. She was reading a
book while lying prostrate on the oor, face down. The appellant collared her anew. She was
more terri ed this time because the appellant was armed with an eighteen-inch bolo. The
appellant warned her that if she reported the matter to her mother, he would kill all of them.
Fearing for her life, as well as those of her mother and brother, Rizalyn complied when the
appellant ordered her to lie at on the oor. The appellant undressed himself, then Rizalyn,
and again inserted his private organ into her vagina.
Ruling:
Established is the rule that the testimonies of rape victims, especially child victims, are given
full weight and credit. It bears emphasis that the victim was barely thirteen when she was
raped. In a litany of cases, this Court has applied the well-settled rule that when a woman,
more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says, in e ect, all that is
necessary to prove that rape was committed, for as long as her testimony meets the test of
credibility. No young girl, indeed, would concoct a sordid tale of so serious a crime as rape
at the hands of a close kin, undergo medical examination, then subject herself to the stigma
and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive were other than an earnest desire to seek
justice. This holds true especially where the complainant is a minor, whose testimony
deserves full credence. Certainly, Rizalyn’s testimony is entitled to great weight especially
when she accuses a close relative of having ravished her. For there can be ascribed no
greater motivation for a woman abused by her own kin than that innate yearning of the
human spirit to declare the truth to obtain justice.
In the review of rape cases, we are almost invariably guided by the following principles: (1)
an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is di cult to prove but more di cult for
the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of
rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.
In a prosecution for rape, therefore, the victim’s credibility becomes the single most
important issue, and when her testimony satis es the test of credibility, an accused may be
convicted solely on the basis thereof. In the instant case, we nd no reason to doubt that
Rizalyn was telling the truth when she declared that the appellant had sexually ravished her
on four separate occasions in the months of June and July 1992. Rizalyn’s credibility was
not successfully assailed by the appellant.
The essence of rape as de ned under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is carnal
knowledge of a woman against her will. The appellant failed to show that Rizalyn consented
to have sexual intercourse with him. On the contrary, the evidence showed that the carnal
acts were done against her will.
Finally, the "sweetheart defense" pro ered by the appellant is barren of factual
consideration. The alleged "illicit love a air" angle appears to be a mere fabrication of the
appellant’s, to exculpate himself from the rape charges led against him. Having admitted to
having had carnal knowledge of the complainant on the dates and times in question, the
appellant bears the burden of proving his a rmative defense by clear and convincing
evidence. The appellant, however, failed to discharge his burden. A "sweetheart defense"
should be substantiated by some documentary and/or other evidence of the relationship.
Other than his self-serving assertions and those of his biased stepson, there is no support to
appellant’s claim that he and complainant were lovers. The appellant failed to adduce in
evidence any mementos, love letters, notes, pictures, or any concrete proof of a romantic
nature. Moreover, even if we were to assume that the appellant and the private complainant
were indeed lovers, this fact would not have precluded rape, as it did not necessarily mean
there was consent. A love a air could not have justi ed what the appellant did – subjecting
Rizalyn to his carnal desires against her will. The Court has previously taken judicial
cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in this country, young ladies by custom and
tradition act with circumspection and prudence, and that great caution is observed so that

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 their reputation remains untainted. It is unbelievable that Rizalyn would have participated in,
much less initiated, these alleged romantic trysts.
The appellant’s reliance on the testimony of his stepson Almor is desperation personi ed
with the nding of the trial court and this Court that Rizalyn’s testimony as to when and how
the appellant despoiled her is the truth. The testimony of Almor in defense of the appellant
cannot prevail over that of Rizalyn.
It is basic that where there is no showing that the complainant was impelled by an improper
motive in making the accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled to full faith
and credit. Considering her young age, it would have been highly improbable for Rizalyn to
fabricate a charge so humiliating to her and her family, had she not been truly subjected to
the painful experience of sexual abuse. We additionally consider the fact that it is hard to
believe that a mother would sacri ce her own daughter and present her to be the subject of
a public trial if she, in fact, has not been motivated by an honest desire to have the culprit
punished. It is quite unnatural for a parent to use her o spring as an engine of malice,
especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment and even stigma.
More telling of the appellant’s culpability is his ight after the charges against him had been
led. The appellant himself on cross-examination admitted that although he had known that
charges had already been led against him, he did not le a counter-a davit in all the four
complaints upon his wife’s instructions. His wife promised to talk to her brother Cariño
Torres to convince them to withdraw the complaints.The appellant also testi ed that he knew
that a subpoena was served at their address at Banlag, Valencia, Bukidnon on October 5,
1992 which was received by his wife. The appellant, however, ignored the subpoena and
continued to stay in Kipulot, Bukidnon, under the pretext of preaching for the Seventh Day
Adventist Church. He managed to elude arrest for more than a year until he was nally
arrested in February 1994. The appellant cannot feign ignorance of the warrant for his arrest
which was issued as early as November 1992. The policemen tried to serve the warrant of
arrest on the appellant but the latter was nowhere to be found. The appellant himself
testi ed that while he was in Kipulot, his wife Anita Torres frequented the residence of her
brother Cariño Torres to persuade them that she and the appellant would be the one to
shoulder the expenses of Rizalyn’s delivery, and to give support for the child. The appellant
was, therefore, constantly communicating with his wife, Anita Torres, and as such, the
issuance of the warrant for her husband’s arrest could not have escaped her attention. The
appellant was fully aware of the pending charges against him. In fact, in the rst week of
September, he and his wife went to Rizalyn’s residence for the purpose of pleading for
forgiveness, in the hope that the latter would withdraw her complaint against the appellant.
But Rizalyn and her family were resolute in prosecuting the case against the appellant.
While we a rm the appellant’s conviction, the trial court’s decision must be modi ed with
respect to the award of damages. We note that the trial court failed to specify and
particularize the damages given to Rizalyn.
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PP versus ORILLOSA, G.R. Nos. 148716-18, Jul 7, 2004
Appellant was charged with three counts of Rape committed against his daughter, Andrelyn
Orillosa, in three separate Informations.
Sometime in December 1997, at around 10:00 in the morning, while Andrelyn Orillosa was
on the ground oor of their house, her father, appellant Salvador Orillosa, called her upstairs.
Appellant closed the door of the room and mashed his daughter's breasts. He whispered to
her not to tell anybody. Appellant then ordered Andrelyn to lie down on the oor, then he
removed her t-shirt and pulled down her short pants. He mounted the victim and tried to
force his penis into her daughter's genitalia. Despite his e orts, appellant failed to fully
penetrate the organ of Andrelyn. When appellant stood up, Andrelyn saw his penis dripping
with a whitish substance. Andrelyn could do nothing but to whimper in protest. After her
ordeal, she ran away from home and sought refuge in the house of a relative. Before long,
her mother fetched her and brought her back home. She told her mother about her
harrowing experience, but the latter chided her instead for making up stories.
On July 27, 1999, Andrelyn slept in the upper room of the house. Earlier that day, her parents
had a quarrel, which caused her mother to leave. At 2:00 in the morning, appellant entered
Andrelyn's room and carried her to the ground oor. There, he took o her clothing, and laid
her on the oor. He then straddled her, and kissed her repeatedly on the neck. After
undressing himself, he forced his penis into her vagina, but only a portion thereof penetrated
Andrelyn's organ. His lust satiated, appellant dressed up and left for work. Andrelyn ran
upstairs crying because of physical and emotional anguish. Her Kuya Leandre saw her and
asked why she was crying. She did not tell him what happened for fear that her father might
vent his anger on her Kuya.
Sometime in August 1999, Andrelyn told herLola Iging about her father's sexual assaults, but
the latter did not believe her and even rebuked her for causing embarrassment to her father.
With no one to turn to, she personally reported the matter to the barangay captain who
accompanied her to the police where she gave a written statement.
Ruling:
Be that as it may, the conviction rests not on the failure by appellant to put up a respectable
defense, but on the credible and straightforward testimony of the private complainant. Her
testimony, given in a spontaneous and candid manner, withstood the searing cross-
examination by the defense and carried no earmarks of fabrication. We sense no cogent
reason or circumstance of note to nullify the truth of her assertions. Oft repeated is the
truism that being a woman of tender age, shy and ignorant of the sophistication of city life,
by no stretch of imagination can we believe that considering her innate modesty, humility
and purity as a young Filipina, Andrelyn would have allowed herself to be the object of public
ridicule, shame and obloquy as a victim of sexual assault or debauchery. Verily, it takes an
extreme sense of moral depravity for a daughter to accuse her very own father of a heinous
crime, such as rape, and expose him to the perils attendant to a criminal conviction if only to
exact revenge on her father who allegedly maltreated her. As earlier held by the Court, a true
Filipina would not go around in public unravelling facts and circumstances of her de oration
 for no reason, if such were not true. We nd that there exists no convincing reason to
disturb the trial court's assessment of the witnesses' credibility.
On the matter of force or intimidation, we have ruled that in incestuous rape of a minor,
actual force or intimidation need not even be employed where the overpowering moral
in uence of appellant, who is private complainant's father, would su ce. The moral and
physical dominion of the father is su cient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly
desires. The instant case is no exception. Appellant took advantage of his overpowering
moral and physical ascendancy to unleash his lechery upon his daughter.This principle was
reiterated inPeople v. Cea, where, although the information alleged that the appellant was
armed with a knife, the private complainant never testi ed that he was so armed when he
sexually abused her. In any case, this Court sustained the nding of force or intimidation on
the ground that it may be replaced by moral ascendancy in cases of incestuous rape.
On the imposable penalty, we agree with appellant that the courta quo erroneously imposed
the death penalty in Criminal Cases Nos. 2701-M-99 and 2702-M-99. In a plethora of cases,
we have invariably ruled that in incestuous rape, it is essential that the relationship and
minority be conjointly alleged in the information and duly proved. In the cases at bar,
although the victim's relationship with appellant is unquestioned, the minority of the victim
has not been proved with moral certitude. The Informations in Crim. Cases Nos. 2701- M-99
and 2702-M-99 allege that the victim was 16 years old at the time of the rape incidents, yet
the prosecution failed to present the birth certi cate of the complainant or any other similar
independent evidence to prove the same.
The alternative circumstance of relationship underArticle 15 of the Revised Penal Code
should be appreciated against appellant. In crimes of chastity such as acts of
lasciviousness, relationship is considered as aggravating. Inasmuch as it was expressly
alleged in the information and duly proven during trial that the o ended party is the daughter
of appellant, relationship, therefore, aggravated the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
U n d e r Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of acts of lasciviousness is
punished by prision correccional.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and appreciating relationship as an aggravating
circumstance, appellant could be sentenced to su er an indeterminate prison term of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years ofprision correccional, as maximum,
and to pay the victim P30,000.00 as moral damages.
and whenever she resisted, he would hurt her by squeezing her arms. Appellant undressed
Maricel, laid on top of her and then inserted his penis into her vagina. Maricel felt pain in her
vagina while she was being sexually assaulted and for some time thereafter, she just kept
crying.
Subsequently, she narrated the incident to her boyfriend, Raymundo Galvez. It was
Raymundo and his mother, Milagros Galvez, who accompanied Maricel in reporting the
incident to barangay o cials. On November 13, 1997, Maricel executed a handwritten
complaint for rape against her father before the barangay o cials who summoned appellant.
At the meeting before the barangay o cials, appellant rst denied that he raped Maricel, but
upon repeated questioning by the barangay o cials, appellant admitted his dastardly act.
Such admission was made in writing as shown by Exhibit "D," the Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated November 14, 1997, executed by appellant before the Barangay Secretary and the
Barangay Captain. Maricel and her companions then proceeded to the police before whom
she executed a sworn complaint. SPO1 Celso Cruz who took down the statement of Maricel
on November 14, 1997, observed that while she was narrating the incident to him, she had a
very serious deportment and did not cry but there are times that her voice would crack. At
the time Maricel executed her Sinumpaang Salaysay before the aforementioned police
o cer, she stated her age as 15 years old. Thereafter, Maricel was instructed to go to the
medico legal o cer who conducted a physical examination on her.
Ruling:
In this case, we nd that the prosecution has successfully established the elements of
violence, force and intimidation in the commission of the crime of rape by appellant.
The court nd appellant's argument that Maricel's credibility is clouded by her failure to
report the alleged previous incidents of rape, to be unmeritorious. As a mere child of eleven
or twelve years at the time the rst rape was committed, Maricel could hardly be expected to
know how to go about reporting the crime to authorities without the help of an adult. Verily,
we see how Maricel must have felt absolutely hopeless, believing that there is nobody to
defend her since all the people around her are siblings of her father who would naturally
prefer to keep such incident a secret because of the humiliation the whole family might su er
in the community. Thus, Maricel's long silence in not reporting and ling the appropriate
case against appellant for his previous sexual assaults on Maricel is su ciently explained. In
People vs. De Taza , the accused therein likewise used the argument that the victim's delay
in ling the rape case against him casts doubt on the victim's credibility, but we found such
argument unmeritorious.

PP versus GLODO, G.R. No. 136085, Jul 7, 2004
At around 11:00 in the evening of November 10, 1997, private complainant Maricel Glodo
(Maricel for brevity) was then sleeping at the top bunk of their double deck bed. She was
awakened by her father, herein appellant. He instructed her to transfer to the lower deck of
the bed. Maricel did not want to go down but appellant forced her to do so by squeezing her
arms, thus, in icting pain. When Maricel was already at the lower deck, appellant told her to
lie down and proceeded to caress her body. Appellant then forced Maricel to lie on her back
Thus, in the present case, the trial court did not err in nding that Maricel's credibility is
untainted by the fact that she failed to report the sexual assaults committed by her father
against her since 1993 and in upholding Maricel's testimony.
Appellant's assertion that Maricel falsely testi ed against him out of resentment for the
physical punishment he in icted on her when she eloped with her boyfriend and to stop him
(appellant) from interfering with her and her boyfriend, is not plausible. In People vs.

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 Cariñaga, we observed that not a few persons convicted of rape have attributed the
charges against them to family feuds, resentment, or revenge. And in People vs. Viajedor, we
held that family resentment, revenge or feud have never swayed the Court from giving full
credence to the testimony of a complainant for rape, especially a minor who remained
steadfast in her testimony, throughout the direct and cross-examinations, that she was
sexually abused.
The alleged motives on the part of a minor victim have never swayed us from lending full
credence to the testimony of a complainant who remained steadfast in her claim that her
father had raped her. The Court does not believe that just to vex her father, a girl would
willingly go through the traumatic experience of narrating the sordid details of a rape and be
grilled and discredited during cross-examination in court. It is truly inconceivable for a girl of
such tender years to be able to concoct a story, provide details of a rape and ascribe such
wickedness to her very own father just because she resents being disciplined by him, since
by thus charging him, she would also expose herself to extreme humiliation, even stigma.
Maricel's credible testimony is unshaken by appellant's implausible claim that she was
motivated by ill-will in accusing him of rape.
PP vs. INGGO, G.R. No. 140872, Jun 23, 2003
On August 15, 1996, about 8:00 o’clock in the morning, Rosemarie Reinante3 requested her
parents-in-law’s house helper, Leonisa Insic,4 to go to her house in Poblacion Katipunan,
Zamboanga del Norte, to do some household chores (p. 3, TSN, July 15, 1997). Leonisa
Insic went to Rosemarie Reinante’s house as bidden (p. 8, TSN, July 8, 1997).
About 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of that day, Leonisa Insic returned to the house of
Rolando Reinante, Sr. where she was living. She proceeded to the kitchen to take her lunch
(p. 10, TSN, July 15, 1997). While she was eating, Leonisa Insic noticed somebody buy a
bottle of beer from Rolando Reinante, Sr.’s store which was then being tended by Lando
Tangga, another housekeeper of Rolando Reinante, Sr. The store was attached to the house
of Rolando Reinante, Sr. Later, Leonisa Insic identi ed that somebody as the appellant (pp.
8-10, TSN, July 8, 1997; p. 15, TSN, July 15, 1997).
Appellant gave the amount of ₱50.00 as his payment for the beer. Since there was not
enough cash to change the fty-peso bill, Lando Tangga asked Leonisa Insic to have the
fty-peso bill changed to smaller denominations. Leonisa Insic consequently went to another
store to have the bill changed to smaller denominations (ibid.).
Leonisa Insic returned to the store moments later after having the fty-peso bill changed to
smaller denominations. She gave the money to Lando Tangga but the latter refused to
accept it. Instead, he told Leonisa Insic to give the change to appellant. Leonisa Insic
obliged. Leonisa Insic then approached appellant and tried to give him his change.
Appellant, however, refused to accept his change and insisted that he should get back the
full amount he gave. Exchange of words, thereafter, ensued between Leonisa Insic and
appellant (pp. 11-13, TSN, July 8, 1997).
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While appellant and Leonisa Insic were having an exchange of words, Rosemarie Reinante
arrived. Consequently, Rosemarie Reinante asked for the money and volunteered to give it to
appellant. Appellant still refused to accept his change from Rosemarie Reinante which led to
an argument (pp. 13-15, ibid.).
While appellant and Rosemarie Reinante were thus arguing, appellant suddenly rushed to
Rosemarie Reinante. When he was already near her, he loosened his belt and removed it
from his waist. Rosemarie Reinante consequently ran. Appellant chased her and when he
caught up with her, appellant stabbed her. Immediately, Leonisa Insic came to Rosemarie
Reinante's rescue. She tried to separate Rosemarie Reinante and appellant by holding the
latter's hands. Leonisa Insic was able to stop appellant which gave Rosemarie Reinante an
opportunity to run towards the road. However, appellant was able to get away from Leonisa
Insic and chased Rosemarie Reinante again. When appellant failed to catch up with
Rosemarie Reinante, he ran towards the direction going to the cemetery of Katipunan (pp.
15-16, ibid.).
Leonisa Insic saw Rosemarie Reinante fall down when she reached the road. She then ran
towards Rosemarie Reinante's house to report the matter to Rolando Reinante, Jr. She did
not nd Rolando Reinante, Jr. in their house. Instead, she found some of the house helpers
(names not on record) of Rosemarie Reinante. When they asked her what happened, she
said that Rosemarie Reinante was stabbed. Leonisa Insic did not anymore return to the
place where Rosemarie Reinante fell down because she was afraid (pp. 16-18, ibid.).
Later, policemen arrived. Together with Leonisa Insic, they brought Rosemarie Reinante to
the Dipolog City hospital. When they reached the hospital, Rosemarie Reinante was
pronounced dead on arrival (pp. 18-19, ibid.)
Ruling:
The court ruled that the alternative circumstance of intoxication inexistent. Intoxication to be
aggravating must have been the source of bravado that propelled the accused to commit
the crime. As we have previously held:
Our penal laws do not look kindly on habitual drunkards, or if the accused already resolved
to commit the crime, then got intoxicated so as to fortify that resolve with false courage
dictated by liquor, his liability should be aggravated. Although there is no hard and fast rule
on the amount of liquor that the accused imbibed on that occasion, but the test is that it
must have su ced to a ect his mental faculties, to the extent of blurring his reason and
depriving him of self-control.
Here, appellant’s degree of intoxication was not proved with certainty. He had allegedly been
drinking tuba earlier that day, and he did buy a bottle of beer at the store of the victim’s in-
laws. But these facts are not su cient to establish that indeed appellant was intoxicated at
the time he committed the crime, much less that he sought intoxication to fortify his resolve
in committing it. Absent clear and convincing proof as to appellant’s state of intoxication, we
 are unable to agree that the alternative circumstance of intoxication was present to
aggravate the o ense.
In any event, intoxication as well as disregard of sex were not alleged in the information,
hence, these may not be considered to aggravate the crime for the imposition of a higher
penalty, whether by degrees or periods. This is pursuant to the amendments made to the
Revised Rules of Court, particularly to Sec. 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (which took e ect on December 1, 2000). This section now mandates that the
complaint or information should state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating
circumstances in order that they may be appreciated. Since this procedural rule is favorable
to the accused, it is proper to give it retroactive e ect in this case.
PP vs. BERNAL, G.R. Nos. 132791 & 140465-66, Sep 2, 2002
Accused-appellant Arnel B. Bernal seeks reversal of the judgment of conviction.
In the evening of February 6, 1995, appellant, Pedrito Beralas, Felix Bernal, Fernando Bernal
and Rey Bernal were on board a tricycle on their way to the Benedisco pub house located
along Zamora St., Zone 5, Bangued, Abra (p. 3, Decision). Upon reaching the pub house,
Pedrito invited the group to go inside to dance. Pedrito, Rey and Arnel went inside while
Felix and Fernando were left outside (pp. 10-13, TSN, September 18, 1995).
Later, Fernando went inside to look for the three (appellant, Rey and Pedrito). He saw them
in a sleeping position inside Benedisco. Upon seeing the three (appellant, Rey and Pedrito),
Fernando returned to where Felix was and told him to start the tricycle engine as they would
bring home appellant, Rey and Pedrito. Fernando rst brought Pedrito out of the pub house
and had him seated at the passenger’s seat inside the tricycle. Thereafter, he returned and
got appellant who was roused when they reached the tricycle. After that, Fernando fetched
Rey. While the two (Fernando and Rey) were already at the gate of Benedisco, Fernando
heard a gunshot. When Fernando looked at the tricycle where his companions were, he saw
appellant holding a gun. Immediately, he rushed to the tricycle where Pedrito was. Then,
Fernando heard a second gunshot. According to Fernando, "he knew that appellant shot
Pedrito." Consequently, Fernando attacked appellant and held him. The two (Fernando and
appellant) grappled for possession of the gun. While they were thus grappling, some
policemen arrived (pp. 13-17, TSN, September 18, 1995).
Police Superintendent Sarte called up the police station and ordered his men to pick up
appellant for investigation (p. 10, ibid.).
Subsequently, Police Superintendent Sarte inspected the tricycle. He saw Pedrito inside who
appeared dead because of the bullet wound at his head (ibid.)
After that, Felix and Fernando brought Pedrito to Seares Clinic. Pedrito was already dead
upon arrival at said clinic (pp. 17-18, TSN, September 18, 1995).
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Ruling:
The general rule is that intoxication may be considered either as aggravating or mitigating,
depending upon the circumstances attending the commission of the crime. Intoxication is
mitigating and therefore has the e ect of decreasing the penalty if the intoxication is not
habitual or attendant to the plan to commit the contemplated crime. On the other hand,
when intoxication is habitual or done intentionally to embolden the malefactor and facilitate
the plan to commit the crime, 10 it is considered as an aggravating circumstance.
In the instant case, Accused-appellant’s intoxication cannot be considered aggravating
because there was no showing that it was habitual or intentional. As testi ed to by
prosecution witness Felix Bernal, their group drink liquor only occasionally, that is, if they
had visitors. His testimony that if they had visitors everyday, they drank everyday does not
su ce to prove that accused-appellant was a habitual drunkard. Nor should such statement
be taken against the Accused-Appellant. Undeniably, Accused-appellant was a mere visitor
at that time. He came to Bangued to attend a hearing and from there went to Barangay
Dangdangla, Bangued to visit his relatives.
Further, the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant got drunk on the day the
murder occurred for the purpose of committing the same. Neither did accused-appellant
initiate the drinking spree. He merely acceded to the invitation of the victim to join his group
in their drinking spree. Thus, in the absence of clear and convincing proof that the
intoxication was habitual or intentional on the part of accused-appellant, it is improper to
consider the same as an aggravating circumstance.
But his intoxication cannot likewise be considered mitigating because accused-appellant
failed to show that his intoxication impaired his will power or his capacity to understand the
wrongful nature of his acts. The person pleading intoxication must prove that he took such
quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur his
reason. 13 This accused-appellant failed to do. No proof was presented by accused-
appellant that the amount of liquor he had taken was of such quantity as to a ect his mental
faculties. The mere claim of intoxication does not entitle him to the mitigating circumstance
of intoxication.
Accused-appellant likewise reasons that the trial court erred in holding that the killing of the
victim was premeditated. He denies that he had any prior plan or preparation to kill Pedrito
Beralas. He points out that the prosecution failed to establish the time when he supposedly
decided to commit the crime or prove the acts manifesting that he clung to his determination
and that there was a su cient lapse of time between determination and execution.
Evident premeditation cannot be deduced from mere presumption or speculation. It must be
proven clearly. Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated without proof of how and when
the plan to kill was hatched or how much time elapsed before it was carried out. The
premeditation must be evident and not merely suspected.
 We nd no evidence directly showing any pre-conceived plan or devise employed by
accused-appellant to kill the victim. Accused-appellant did not go to Barangay Dangdangla,
Bangued to kill the victim but to attend to some important matters. As earlier stated,
Accused-appellant was just invited by his relatives, whom he had not seen for a while after
he changed residence, to have a drinking spree. The probability is that the decision to shoot
the victim was made only right there and then. This should at least cast reasonable doubt on
the existence of a premeditated plan to kill the victim.
The trial court thus erred in holding that evident premeditation attended the killing of the
victim merely on the basis of its nding of a deep-seated and long standing grudge felt by
accused-appellant towards the victim. The mere existence of ill-feeling or grudge between
the parties is not su cient to establish premeditated killing. Even assuming that accused-
appellant felt spite towards Pedrito and harbored a desire to vindicate the death of his father,
such a sentiment does not necessarily translate into a resolution to commit a crime. There
must be an outward act showing or manifesting criminal intent. Such is absent in the instant
case. Hence, it would be erroneous to declare that the killing of the victim was premeditated.
Accused-appellant is convicted of the crime of murder which is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Without any aggravating circumstance, Accused-appellant shall be
meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, the presence of even one aggravating circumstance will send accused-appellant
to lethal injection. If we were to treat the use of an unlicensed rearm by accused-appellant
in killing the victim as an aggravating circumstance therefore, the maximum penalty of death
would have to be imposed. This obviously does not strengthen accused-appellant’s position
and does not at all place him in a more favorable situation. It in fact damns him all the more.
In contrast, Accused-appellant’s separate conviction for the o ense of illegal possession of
rearms and ammunition will spare him his life.
But if we do not consider the use of an unlicensed rearm as an aggravating circumstance in
the accused-appellant’s prosecution for murder, should we not instead convict him for the
separate o ense of illegal possession of rearms and ammunition under PD 1866 — on the
theory that this will spare him his life and is thus favorable to him? We do not think so either.
PP vs. MANGSANT, G.R. No. 45704, May 25, 1938
The defendant appealed from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila nding
him guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
The information against him alleged that on April 7, 1937, in the City of Manila, with evident
premeditation, disregard of sex and taking advantage of superior strength, and with the
deliberate intention to kill, the said accused did then and there attack Demetria Ferrer, a girl
14 years of age, stabbing her from behind with a knife and in icting upon her various
wounds in di erent parts of the body which produced her instantaneous death.
Upon arraignment the defendant pleaded "not guilty," but during the trial and before the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, said plea was changed to that of "guilty."
He was then allowed to testify under oath to the circumstances under which he committed
the crime. He testi ed in substance that the deceased and he, were lovers, having agreed to
marry in the following May; that on the afternoon of April 7, 1937, the date alleged in the
information, he visited his ancee, and as in the course of the conversation, she revealed
that she loved another man, he became so obfuscated that he wounded her with a knife until
she was lifeless.
In view of the foregoing explanation and the allegations of the information, the court found
that in the commission of the crime the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation,
disregard of sex and abuse of superior strength (Nos. 13, 3 and 15, respectively, of article 14
of the Revised Penal Code) were present as were also the mitigating circumstances of lack
of instruction, obfuscation and plea of guilty (par. 1 of art. 15 and Nos. 6 and 7, respectively,
of Art. 13 of the Revised Penal Code) in addition to the aggravating circumstance of
treachery which, in this case, quali es the crime, and o setting one against the other, it
imposed the penalty prescribed in article 248 in its medium period. The attorney de o cio for
the defendant, after analyzing the facts and the law, has recommended that the judgment
appealed from be a rmed for being in accordance with law. The Solicitor-General holds a
view di erent from both consisting in that the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
which were taken into account in the decision of the lower court, with the exception of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
confession, have not been proved; that inasmuch as the defendant was allowed to explain
the circumstances of the crime, he impliedly denied the aggravating circumstances, alleged
in the information, which cannot be taken into consideration unless they have been proved;
and that the mitigating circumstances cannot be deduced from the explanations made by
the defendant nor from the allegations of the information, which he admitted.
As to the mitigating circumstances, it is not proper to consider lack of instruction in favor of
the defendant, inasmuch as he admitted that he had studied in the rst grade in a public
elementary school. Lack of instruction cannot apply to one who has studied in the rst grade
in a public school, but only to him who really has not received any instruction (art. 15, rst
paragraph, Revised Penal Code). Much less may the circumstance that the defendant had
acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced obfuscation be considered
in his favor because the revelation by the deceased that she loved another man, under the
circumstances in which it was made, was not su cient to produce that mental blindness
which article 13, No. 6, of the Revised Penal Code, recognizes as mitigating.
The defendant and appellant is guilty of the crime of murder de ned in article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and penalized by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession is present in its
commission, without any aggravating circumstance to o set it, the judgment appealed from
is hereby modi ed and said penalty imposed in its minimum period. In accordance with the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103), the defendant is sentenced to
the penalty of from ten years of prision mayor to seventeen years, four months and one day
of reclusion temporal, to the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs of both instances. So ordered.

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 PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE
Pp vs. Reyes, GR No. 178300, Mar 17, 2009
The Yao family owns and operates a poultry farm in Barangay Santo Cristo, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan. On 16 July 1999, at about 11:00 p.m., the Yao family, on board a Mazda
MVP van, arrived at their poultry farm in Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan. Yao San alighted from the van to open the gate of the farm, appellant Reyes and a
certain Juanito Pataray (Pataray) approached, poked their guns at Yao San, and dragged
him inside the van. Appellant Reyes and Pataray also boarded the van. Thereupon,
appellants Arnaldo and Flores, with two male companions, all armed with guns, arrived and
immediately boarded the van. Appellant Flores took the driver’s seat and drove the van.
Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts then blindfolded each member of the Yao
family inside the van with packaging tape.
Appellant Flores and his male companion told Yao San to produce the amount of ve million
pesos (P5,000,000.00) as ransom in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert,
Raymond and Abagatnan. Thereafter, appellant Flores and his male companion left the van
and ed; while Yao San, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and Josephine remained inside the van.
Upon sensing that the kidnappers had already left, Yao San drove the van towards the
poultry farm and sought the help of relatives. Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert,
Raymond and Abagatnan were taken on foot by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and
one male companion to a safe-house situated in the mountainous part of San Jose Del
Monte, Bulacan where they spent the whole night.
On the morning of 19 July 1999, appellants again called Yao San via a cellular phone and
threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond because of newspaper and radio
reports regarding the incident. Yao San clari ed to appellants that he did not report the
incident to the police and also pleaded with them to spare the life of Chua Ong Ping Sim and
Raymond. Appellants then instructed Yao San to appear and bring with him the ransom of
P5 million at 3:00 p.m. in the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview, Quezon City. Yao San
arrived at the designated place of the pay-o at 4:00 p.m., but none of the appellants or their
cohorts showed up. Yao San waited for appellant’s call, but none came. Thus, Yao San left.
On 23 July 1999, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were found at the La
Mesa Dam, Novaliches, Quezon CitY.Both died of asphyxia by strangulation.On 26 July
1999, appellant Arnaldo surrendered.
Apropos the second assigned error, appellants contend that the prosecution failed to prove
that they conspired in kidnapping the Yao family.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons
agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes unity of purpose
and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective among the accused. When the accused
by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the other performing
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another part as to complete the crime, with a view to the attainment of the same object,
conspiracy exists.
As can be gleaned from the credible testimonies and sworn statements of Abagatnan,
Robert and Yao, appellant Reyes and Pataray approached and poked their guns at Yao San,
and thereafter dragged the latter into the van. Appellant Flores then took the driver’s seat
and drove the van, while each member of the Yao family was blindfolded by appellants
Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts inside the van. Thereafter, appellant Flores instructed
Yao San to produce the amount of ₱5 million as ransom money in exchange for the release
of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Appellant Reyes and appellant
Arnaldo were among the kidnappers who guarded Abagatnan, Robert, Chua Ong Ping Sim
and Raymond in the safe-house. They also accompanied Abagatnan and Robert in going to
the poultry farm to search for and remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. Further,
appellants Arnaldo and Flores narrated in their respective extra-judicial confessions how
they planned and executed the kidnapping of the Yao family. Their extra-judicial confessions
also detailed the particular role/participation played by each of appellants and their cohorts
in the kidnapping of the family. Clearly, the foregoing individual acts of appellants and their
cohorts demonstrated their unity of purpose and design in kidnapping the Yao family for the
purpose of extorting ransom.
Capuyan y Carmelo v. People, G.R. No. 249622 (Notice), December 10, 2019
Reiterating his argument in his appeal with the CA, the petitioner again raises the arguments
that the group of the complainants sought him, that he was unarmed during the incident,
and that there was no conspiracy between him and the other accused, particularly Fernando
Samarita, Jr.
The arguments do not cast reasonable doubt as to his culpability. Whether the group of the
complainants sought him is immaterial because, even if it is assumed to be true, the group
of the complainants was not alleged to have attacked the petitioner or any of his
companions. In fact, by the petitioner's own admission, the group of the complainants went
to the place of the incident to make amends with the petitioner regarding an incident that
took place a week prior between the petitioner and Eric Transporto. Thus, even if the Court
were to believe the accused-appellant's argument that the group of the complainant sought
him, it was for a purpose that did not in any way justify the attacks.
Ruling:
The Court also nds that conspiracy attended the commission of the crimes.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three requisites:
(1) two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) the agreement concerned the
commission of a crime, and (3) the execution of the felony was decided upon. Once
conspiracy is established, the act of one becomes the act of all. Each of the o ender is
equally guilty of the criminal act.
 In this case, the conspiracy was evidently manifested in the concerted e orts of the
accused-appellant and his co-accused. Raymond Parado clearly testi ed how he was
suddenly punched by Capuyan on the face and stabbed by Fernando Samarita, Jr. twice.
Errol Transporto was also categorical in his statement that after being mauled by accused-
appellant's other companions, Fernando Samarita, Jr. stabbed him twice while the accused-
appellant restrained him by holding on to his clothing. There is no doubt that the acts of the
accused-appellant, Fernando Samarita, Jr. and the other accused showed unity of criminal
design.
As has been held, "The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action and purpose. Direct
proof is not essential to prove conspiracy for it may be deduced from the acts of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime charged, from which it may be
indicated that there is common purpose to commit the crime."
Proof of the agreement does not need to rest on direct evidence, as the agreement may be
inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them
with respect to the commission of the o ense. Corollarily, it is not necessary to show that
two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the
details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out.
To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not
even take part in every act of need not even know the exact part to be performed by the
other in the execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and
di erent tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole
collective e ort to achieve their common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the
act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of
each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.
Accordingly, accused-appellant's argument that he was not armed must perforce, fail.
Therefore, petition is hereby denied.
People v. Tan, G.R. No. 176526, August 8, 2007.
Rogelio Cumla testi ed that on June 3, 1992 at about 7:30 in the evening, he was in Brgy.
Importante, Tibiao, Antique, selling sh when he chanced upon Mercedes Amar wrapping
her arms around the neck of Jessie Dionesio, while Jemuel Tan was twisting and holding
Jessie’s arms at the back. When Jessie was rendered immobile, Charlie Amar stabbed him
on the left side of the breast with a bladed weapon approximately 10 inches long. Rogelio
was able to identify the protagonists as he was only six meters away and the place was
illuminated by the moonlight. The incident happened a few meters from the house of
Mercedes Amar.
Celedonia Dionesio is the mother of the victim. She testi ed that on June 3, 1992 at around
8:30 in the evening, Mercedes Amar informed her that her son Jessie was stabbed to death.
Celedonia, together with Jessie’s twin brother, Jaime, proceeded to the crime scene where
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they saw Jessie lying on the ground about four meters away from Mercedes’ house. They
recovered two rubber slippers from the scene.
The following day, Mercedes went to their house and took back the slippers. Later that day,
Celedonia went to the Municipal Hall then to the health clinic. She alleged that she saw
Mercedes Amar following her. When she went to the Rural Bank of Tibiao, Mercedes
allegedly informed her that Jessie would have been dead earlier or on June 2, 1992, had she
not fetched him from Mercedes’ house.
Appellants insist that assuming they killed Jessie, they could not be held liable for murder
because the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength are not
present. At the very least, they could only be found guilty of homicide.
The court was not persuaded.
As correctly found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, there was conspiracy between
the malefactors in the commission of the crime. Their concerted e orts were performed with
closeness and coordination indicating their common purpose to in ict injury on the victim.
For conspiracy to exist, the evidence need not establish the actual agreement which shows
the preconceived plan, motive, interest or purpose in the commission of the crime. Proof of
publicly observable mutual agreement is not indispensable to establish conspiracy. Hence,
there is conspiracy where two of the accused held the victim's hands and the third stabbed
the victim from behind. Conspiracy may be implied from the concerted action of the
assailants in confronting the victim. In the instant case, the prosecution satisfactorily
established that Jemuel twisted and pinned Jessie’s hands at the back, after which Charlie
delivered the fatal blow.
Since there was conspiracy between the malefactors, the actual role played by each of them
does not have to be di erentiated or segregated from the acts performed by the other
accused. As a conspirator, each would still be equally responsible for the acts of the other
conspirators. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly found Jemuel Tan liable as a principal by
direct participation and not merely as an accomplice.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. The sudden and unexpected stabbing of Jessie while being held by Jemuel,
insured the killing without risk to the assailants.
However, we nd no basis for the lower courts’ nding that the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime. Abuse of superior strength
requires deliberate intent on the part of the accused to take advantage of such superiority. It
must be shown that the accused purposely used excessive force that was manifestly out of
proportion to the means available to the victim's defense. In this light, it is necessary to
evaluate not only the physical condition and weapon of the protagonists but also the various
incidents of the event. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to establish the physical
 condition of the protagonists, much less that appellants deliberately took advantage of their
superior strength.
Pp vs. Amodia, GR No. 173791, Apr 7, 2009
On June 10, 2003 at about 3:00 a.m., Richard Avila Roda, an Assistant Manager of Nognog
Videoke Restaurant in Quezon City, went out of the restaurant to invite customers. Once out
of the restaurant, he saw seven persons mauling someone. He noticed that three of the
attackers, whom he later identi ed as accused-appellants Amodia, Marino, and Lo-oc, were
regular customers of their restaurant. The other four were unknown to him; so was the
victim. He saw Lo-oc hold the shoulders of the victim while Marino and Amodia took turns in
beating the victim. One of their companions had a knife, who, upon seeing Roda, threatened
to kill him. As a result of the beating, the victim fell on the ground. Roda immediately
approached the victim and saw blood oozing out of the back of his head. One of the maulers
was about to deliver another blow on the victim but Roda was able to stop him by saying,
"Hindi na kayo naawa." Accused-appellants then went inside the restaurant and drank one
bottle of beer each. Roda did not immediately report the incident because he was
threatened by accused-appellants who were still hanging around the area. He later went
home with the owner of the restaurant.
Later, in the early morning of the same day, he saw the body of the victim still in the place
where he fell. There were already some barangay tanods and police o cers investigating the
incident. The victim, later identi ed as Jaime Bartina, was then brought to the Quezon City
General Hospital. Someone then informed Cornelia Bartina, the live-in partner of the victim,
that the latter was brought to the hospital. She immediately went to the hospital where she
found Jaime still alive, but noticed that blood was dripping from his mouth which stained his
clothes. Jaime died at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of June 10, 2003.
The court ruled that, Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant
the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to
pursue it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.
Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found; circumstantial evidence is often resorted to in
order to prove its existence. Absent of any direct proof, as in the present case, conspiracy
may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner the o ense was perpetrated, or
inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such acts point to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action, and community of interest. An accused participates as a
conspirator if he or she has performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in
the execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime, or by
exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. Stated otherwise, it is not
essential that there be proof of the previous agreement and decision to commit the crime; it
is su cient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.
Although there was no evidence in the present case showing a prior agreement among
Pablo, Arnold, George, and Damaso, the following chain of events however show their
commonality of purpose in killing the victim: rst, the accused surrounded the victim on all
sides: Damaso at the front, George at the victim’s rear, while Pablo and Arnold anked the
victim on each side; second, Pablo then wrested the right arm of the victim and restrained
his movement, while Arnold did the same to the left arm of the victim; third, George then hit
the victim’s head with a piece of wood; and fourth, Damaso stabbed the victim three times.
In People v. Elijorde, we said: Me-sm
The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered
which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed.
It is therefore required in order to be liable either as a principal by indispensable cooperation
or as an accomplice that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by
direct participation.
In People v. Manalo, we declared that the act of the appellant in holding the victim’s right
hand while the latter was being stabbed constituted su cient proof of conspiracy:
Indeed, the act of the appellant of holding the victim’s right hand while the victim was being
stabbed by Dennis shows that he concurred in the criminal design of the actual killer. If such
act were separate from the stabbing, appellant’s natural reaction should have been to
immediately let go of the victim and ee as soon as the rst stab was in icted. But appellant
continued to restrain the deceased until Dennis completed his attack.
Tested against these, the existence of conspiracy among the four accused is clear; their acts
were aimed at the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing their respective
parts in the series of acts that, although appearing independent from one another, indicated
a concurrence of sentiment and intent to kill the victim. Following the reasoning in Manalo, if
there was in fact no unity of purpose among Pablo and the three other accused, Pablo’s
reaction would have been to let go of the victim and ee after the rst stabbing by Damaso.
The evidence reveals, however, that after the rst stabbing, Pablo still continued to hold the
right arm of the victim, rendering him immobile and exposed to further attack.
Where there is conspiracy, a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another.106
Where there is conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of all.
PP vs. SICAD, G.R. No. 133833, October 15, 2002
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on June 24, 1992, around 4:00 o’clock in the
afternoon, Melchor Sicad went to his parents’ house in Sitio Punta Luis, Concepcion, Iloilo,
to attend to his ailing mother who su ered a stroke. Present in the house were his nephews,
namely, Jimmy Asturias, Rudy Sicad and Camelo Lobaton.
Roberto Asturias, Sr., Melchor’s cousin, also arrived. Melchor o ered Roberto a bottle of
beer, but he refused. This resulted in a verbal clash and an exchange of st blows between

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 them.Roberto nally left at 5:30 in the afternoon, while Melchor returned to the bedside of
his mother who, shortly thereafter, died.
About two (2) hours later, around 7:30 in the evening, Roberto Asturias, Sr. was found dead
near his shing banca in Barangay Loong Poblacion, Concepcion, Iloilo, due to multiple
gunshot wounds.
Roberto Asturias, Jr., the victim’s 11-year old son, and Jimmy Asturias pointed to accused-
appellants Rudy Sicad, Camelo Lobaton, Melchor Sicad, and the latter’s employees, Paquito
Bernil and Johnny Guiñez, as the assailants.
Roberto Asturias, Jr. testi ed that on June 24, 1992, around 7:30 in the evening, while he
was draining water from his father’s banca in Loong Poblacion, he saw Paquito Bernil
throwing a dynamite at his father. The dynamite exploded, hitting his father’s back. He was
more or less three (3) meters away from Paquito. Then, from a distance of fteen (15) meters,
Rudy Sicad red a gun at his father. While his father was already lying on the ground with his
face down, Camelo Lobaton also shot him. All the while, Melchor Sicad and Johnny Guiñez
stood as lookouts under a nearby camachile tree. Thereafter, the ve accused-appellants
escaped toward the house of Melchor.
According to Asturias, Jr., there was an electric bulb hanging from a tree some two (2)
meters away which illuminated the crime scene and enabled him to identify his father’s
assailants. In the course of his testimony, Asturias, Jr. identi ed and a rmed his sworn
statement[10] dated June 26, 1992 narrating the foregoing incidents and stating that the
accused-appellants are the perpetrators of the crime.
Jimmy Asturias (Melchor’s nephew) corroborated the testimony of Roberto Asturias, Jr.. He
recounted that around 7:30 in the evening of June 24, 1992, he met the ve accused-
appellants and saw them proceeding toward the banca of Roberto Asturias, Sr.. Jimmy
stopped at a nearby store, about 15 meters away. While there, he heard the explosion of a
dynamite and saw Rudy Sicad and Camelo Lobaton shoot the victim successively. Then the
ve accused-appellants ran toward the house of Melchor Sicad. He a rmed that three of
them were armed; that the place where he met the group was provided with light that
emanated from the house of Melchor Sicad; and that an electric bulb illuminated the place
where the shooting occurred.
The court ruled that, There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. As a rule, conspiracy must
be proved as convincingly and indubitably as the crime itself. It is not necessary, however,
that conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime.
Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the o ense was
perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused which show a joint or common purpose
and design, a concerted action and a community of interest among the accused.
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This Court holds that the trial court did not err when it found that conspiracy exists in this
case. While there is no direct evidence to show that accused-appellants agreed to commit
the crime, however, their acts and the attendant circumstances surrounding the commission
of the crime disclose a common design that would make all of them co-principals in the
crime committed.
As shown by the records, accused-appellants Paquito Bernil, Rudy Sicad and Camelo
Lobaton threw a dynamite and red at the victim, while accused-appellants Melchor Sicad
and Johnny Guiñez stood guard and acted as lookouts. All of them performed speci c acts
with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose of
bringing about the death of the victim. Moreover, the simultaneous convergence of the
accused-appellants at the crime scene, their speci c acts in the commission of the crime,
and their simultaneous ight toward the house of Melchor Sicad pointed to a conspiracy
among them.
The contention of Melchor Sicad and Johnny Guiñez, who acted as lookouts, that their mere
presence in the scene of the crime did not make them co-conspirators does not persuade
us. One who participates in the material execution of the crime by standing guard or lending
moral support to the actual perpetrators thereof is criminally responsible to the same extent
as the latter. In a conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit
and killed the victim. Indeed, the accused-appellants’ synchronous presence at the place
was not a mere coincidence but was in pursuance of a design to kill Roberto Asturias, Sr.,
with whom Melchor Sicad had a previous ght.
Accused-appellants Rudy Sicad, Camelo Lobaton, Johnny Guinez and Paquito Bernil further
claim that they had no motive to kill the victim as it was only accused-appellant Melchor
Sicad who had an axe to grind against the victim. Again, this argument cannot exculpate
them from criminal liability. Proof of ill-motive on the part of Melchor’s co-conspirators is
irrelevant in view of their having been positively identi ed by the prosecution eyewitnesses.
Motive assumes signi cance only when there is no showing who the perpetrators of the
crime were.
There being conspiracy among the accused-appellants, they are liable as co-principals
regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since, in point of law, the act of
one is the act of all.
With regard to the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, this Court notes
that the same was correctly appreciated by the trial court to qualify the crime to murder.
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the
defense which the o ended party might make. Here, the accused-appellants attacked the
victim from behind in a swift, deliberate and unexpected manner. Without warning and
without risk to themselves, they threw a dynamite at him and shot him even as he had
already fallen to the ground. The attack was thus treacherous, a ording the victim no
opportunity to resist or escape or defend himself.

The trial court’s appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
cannot be sustained. Proof of conspiracy does not imply the existence of evident
premeditation. The rule is that evident premeditation may not be taken into account where,
as here, conspiracy is not based on direct proof but is inferred from the acts of the accused
in the perpetration of the crime.
Thus, this Court sustains the trial court’s nding that the accused-appellants are guilty of
murder, quali ed by treachery.
Pp vs Gensola, September 30, 1969, G.R. No. L-24491
Ru no Gensola was the driver, while Fidelina Tan and Felicisimo Tan were the conductors, of
a passenger truck, Gelveson No. 17 (belonging to Jose Tan, father of Fidelina and Felicisimo)
with station at Guimbal, Iloilo. They suspected Miguel Gayanilo of having punctured the tires
of the truck while it was parked in front of his carinderia on Gerona St., Guimbal, on
November 18, 1958. In the afternoon of the following day, November 19, on the return trip of
the truck, then driven by a temporary driver, Restituto Gersaneva, from Iloilo City, Enrique
Gelario and Enrique Gela were among the passengers of the truck. Before the truck entered
the poblacion of Guimbal, it parked on Gonzales St. to discharge a passenger and his
baggage. Enrique Gelario and Enrique Gela overheard Fidelina Tan mutter to herself,
obviously referring to someone she did not name: "He does not appear because I will kill
him." ("No aparece porque le voy amatar.") The truck then continued on its way and parked
in front of Teodora Gellicanao's carinderia on Gerona St. in the poblacion. All the passengers
got o the truck. Enrique Gelario and Enrique Gela crossed the street towards the carinderia
of Pedro Genciana to await another passenger truck for their respective barrios. The
Gelveson No. 17 then left in the direction of the nearby carinderia of Violeta Garin, returned a
short time later, and parked in front of the bodega of its owner, Jose Tan. The time was about
6:30 p.m. Miguel Gayanilo was crossing the street from the public market in the direction of
his carinderia with Ru no Gensola, holding in his right hand a stone as big as a man's st,
following closely behind. At this time, Felicisimo and Fidelina Tan were standing in the
middle of the street. After Miguel Gayanilo had crossed the middle of the street near the two,
Fidelina Tan shouted, "Ru no, strike him." Upon hearing the shout Miguel looked back and
Ru no suddenly struck him on the left face with the stone. Felicisimo then struck Miguel with
a piece of iron on the back of the head causing serious wounds and fracture of the skull. Not
content with the two blows already given, Fidelina struck Miguel with another piece of iron
on the left forehead causing serious wounds and fracture of the skull. Miguel fell to the
ground near the canal along the side of the street. Ru no Gensola immediately left for his
house situated on Gonzales St. Felicisimo and Fidelina observed the prostrate body for a
few seconds until Fidelina muttered: "He is already dead." ("Ya esta muerto.") The two then
left the scene of the crime.
The lower court found the three defendants guilty as principals of the crime of murder.
Defendants appealed.
The court ruled that, appellants contention is untenable for the following reasons. (1) The
contradictions pointed out involve only the relative locations of the three carinderias near the
scene of the crime, not the acts of commission of the three defendants at a distance of
about seven meters from where the two state witnesses were then standing. (2) The
uncertainties pointed out refer to the description of the pieces of iron used by Felicisimo Tan
and Fidelina Tan, that is, as to the size, length and other details. Considering that the place
was not well-lighted and that there was little time to observe, accurate description of the
weapons used could not be expected three years later when the witnesses testi ed. (3) The
contention that Enrique Gelario and Enrique Gela testi ed against Felicisimo Tan and
Fidelina Tan out of spite because the latter had refused to transport the former to their
respective barrios, is not well-taken. It is not natural for a person to testify under oath
against his neighbor on a matter of life and death just because of a tri ing incident causing
slight inconvenience. (4) We nd the testimonies of the four defense witnesses, Fidelina Tan,
Felicisimo Tan, Elias Gensola and Salvador Gayatao, that Enrique Gelario and Enrique Gela
were not present at the scene of the crime because they had already left Gerona St. walking
to another street to await transportation to their respective barrios, unworthy of credence.
Let us now consider the criminal liability of the three appellants. The lower court found them
guilty as principals of the crime of murder on the assumption that there was conspiracy
among them. We do not agree, for the following reasons: (1) Fidelina Tan's intention revealed
by the words she muttered to herself, "He does not appear because I will kill him," was not
shared by Felicisimo Tan, who kept silent. Silence is not a circumstance indicating
participation in the same criminal design. With respect to Ru no Gensola, he was not even in
the truck at the time. (2) When Miguel Gayanilo was crossing Gerona St., it was only Ru no
Gensola who followed closely behind. Fidelina Tan and Felicisimo Tan were in the middle of
the street. The words shouted by Fidelina Tan, "Ru no strike him," were meant as a
command and did not show previous concert of criminal design. (3) The blows given with
pieces of iron on the back of the head and on the left forehead by Felicisimo and Fidelina
after Ru no had struck with a piece of stone the left face of Miguel, do not in and by
themselves show previous concert of criminal design. Particularly when it is considered that
Ru no immediately left thereafter while Felicisimo and Fidelina remained for a few seconds
observing the prostrate body of Miguel until Fidelina muttered, "He is already dead."
In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the three appellants is individual, that is, each
appellant is liable only for his own act.
Appellant Ru no Gensola is liable only for the lacerated wounds in icted by him on the left
face of Miguel Gayanilo. Such lacerated wounds caused dis gurement ("deformity") of the
face within the meaning of Article 263 (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishable by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium period in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. The o ense having been committed with treachery, the penalty should be imposed in
its maximum period.
Is appellant Fidelina Tan also liable for the o ense considering that she gave the command
"Ru no, strike him"? The second class of principals, according to Article 17 of the Revised

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 Penal Code, comprises "those who directly force or induce others to commit it (the act)."
Those who directly induce others to commit the act are called "principals by inducement" or
"principals by induction," from the Spanish "autores por induccion." The word "inducement"
comprises, in the opinion of Viada and the Supreme Court of Spain, reward, promise of
reward, command, and pacto. With respect to command, it must be the moving cause of the
o ense. In the case at bar, the command shouted by Fidelina, "Ru no, strike not," was not
the moving cause of the act of Ru no Gensola. The evidence shows that Ru no would have
committed the act of his own volition even without said words of command.
Pp vs Padrones, 1990 September 13, 1990, G.R. No. 85823
The records of the case disclose that on August 3, 1986, the victim was at the MGR Family
Disco and Restaurant MGR for brevity), at Surallah, South Cotabato, celebrating his birthday
over beer and refreshment with about fourteen nephews and nieces, whereupon the two
accused-appellants arrived, one after the other. Joseph Biare arrived at about 12:30 or one
o'clock in the morning of August 4, 1986, and about ten minutes later, Alex Padrones
appeared. It seems that the two had been old acquaintances who, up to then, had not seen
each other for six months. The two apparently exchanged pleasantries, shook hands, but
separated immediately. Padrones sat at a table where he met certain women with one of
whom he danced. Biare meanwhile sat alone on another table. Padrones also sat alone
subsequently on a table away from the women.
The victim then approached Padrones, squeezed his mouth, and uttered challenging words:
"Are you not afraid of the Sisons?" (In apparent reference to the Sisons of South Cotabato, a
family with a long history of local and national political authority and clout). He parried the
victim's hand and alleged that he saw a knife shining amidst blinking disco lights. He
likewise alleged that the Victim began lunging away at him with his knife, which he was able
to parry with his left hand. Antonio Llaneta, who was with the victim, struck him (Padrones)
on the left cheek. He (Padrones) said that he also su ered a cut at the left wrist. The two
later fought for possession of the knife but the victim managed to punch him and so did a
certain "Neckneck" Sison. He was later ganged upon, so he alleges, for which he su ered
bruises.
The Court also nds the trial judge's conclusions, especially as to the relationship between
the two accused, the factor of conspiracy, and the circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation, to be plainly, conjectures and speculations, and they can not satisfy the legal
requisite of proof beyond reasonable doubt to justify a conviction for an o ense, in this case,
murder. This Court is indeed, genuinely distressed, and has every reason to be so, because
His Honor could not have, by any stretch of logic made out, by simply piecing the evidence
together, his ndings that: (1) the two accused-appellants went to MGR on August 3, 1986 in
a well-planned conspiracy to eliminate the deceased; (2) they pretended that they had just
met there by chance, but had all along plotted to kill the victim; (3) the accused-appellant,
Joseph Biare, deliberately positioned himself so that "no one of the several companions of
the victim who celebrated his birthday could render succor or save him;" (4) the deceased
could not have threatened the accused, Alex Padrones, or accost him challengingly,
because "[dluring one's birthday one is engrossed with his friends and no doubt did never
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(sic) think or prepare for any trouble; and that (5) Padrones could not have been the victim of
a mauling because "he did not submit [himself] for treatment. The Court is at a loss because
none of these inferences are apparent from the evidence, the prosecution's or the accused
What is apparent, on the other hand, is that judging from His Honor's self-righteous
outburst, as it were, His Honor had his own sub-plot on the events, when as magistrate, his
sole and paramount concern was to try facts and apply the law.
The two accused's story that they had actually met by happenstance at the MGR on the
night in question not only stands uncontradicted in the records, this Court nds it, contrary
to the opinion of the trial judge, not to be per se an implausible or impeachable story. What
is more, it can not be justi ably and validly contended that because the two, after bumping
into each other did not act like long-lost friends, it means that they had met previously, of all
things, in order to plot the killing of Lorenzo Sison. This is sheer inference that itself rests on
an inference. It is not fact.
The trial judge portrays the accused-appellants' chance meeting" as an e ort "to establish
no conspiracy between them took place. What he, the trial judge, loses sight of is the fact
that the accused were not called upon to discredit the prosecution's theory of conspiracy. It
was the prosecution's duty to establish the existence of what the prosecution alleged to be
conspiracy.
The trial judge also expresses doubts whether or not the accused, Joseph Biare, indeed
just-minded his own business while the Sisons ganged up on his co-accused. "Would one
permit his friend molested," he inquired, "without raising a voice of protest?" His rich
imagination is fascinating, but that hardly belongs to a judge. As Biare averred, he did come
to the aid of his co-accused, although after the damage had been done and the latter lay
battered on the ground. What the judge would make out, however, from the defense's
version is that either Padrones or Biare merely contrived the whole yarn, and that the melee
never occurred at all (because as he states, if there indeed was one, Biare would have
allegedly stood up for a friend in distress). But the very testimony of Antonio Llaneta, witness
for the prosecution, is arrayed against him, the latter having admitted "that he boxed [sic]
Alex [Padrones].
PP vs. ENRIQUEZ, October 10, 1933, G.R. No. 37408
Prior to October 28, 1931, two rival corporations were engaged in the transportation of
passengers in central Luzon, both using passenger trucks, or busses, propelled by gasoline.
These two lines were the Pampanga Bus Co., operating, among other places, between
Apalit and Masantol, and the Mallorca Transportation, operating from point's in Pampanga to
Manila.
The Mallorca Transportation is owned by Fernando Enriquez, father of the appellant Candido
Enriquez, and the latter was its manager with a garage in Macabebe, Pampanga. For some
time prior to the events with which we are now concerned, the Mallorca Transportation had
been called upon to answer various complaints before the Public Service Commission for
infractions of its rules; and as a consequence of these complaints several nes had been
 imposed upon Fernando Enriquez. One Ciriaco D. Gines, an inspector of the Pampanga Bus
Co. on its Apalit-Masantol line, was supposed to be the person who had supplied the
material for these complaints and, as a consequence, he had incurred the ill-will of Candido
Enriquez. This feeling of hospitality was increased when, on October 26, 1931, Gines was
seen jotting down the number of one of the trucks of the Mallorca Transportation, while
parked near the station of the Manila Railroad Co. in Apalit. This seems to have been too
much for Candido Enriquez, and he decided that Gines must be gotten of the way.
Accordingly in the morning of October 27, he boarded one of his busses at Macabebe
headed for Manila. His purpose, as he explained to an employee in the garage, was to hire
ru ans in Manila who would beat up Gines so that he would not interfere in the future with
the business of the Mallorca Transportation.
Arriving in Manila, Candido Enriquez found one Jose Palacio, formerly a chau eur in the
employment of Enriquez, but who had lost his job by reason of some accident for which he
was supposed to have been responsible as driver. Enriquez told Palacio that he wanted him
to procure some ru ans (butañgeros) and bring them up to Macabebe to beat up Gines.
Palacio accepted the mandate and in the course of the day got into touch with a notorious
gangster, named Marcelo Bonifacio, and four others, Marcelo Franco, Pedro Mocpoc,
Vicente Domingo, and Ambrosio Basa. These ve agreed to undertake the job. Meanwhile
Candido Enriquez had already left Manila for Macabebe and upon his arrival in that place he
told two of his employees to be on the lookout for the gangsters who would be coming up
that night. True to schedule, Jose Palacio and his ve ru ans boarded the last truck of the
Mallorca Transportation which left Manila at about 5 o'clock the same afternoon. On this trip
the six were charged no fares by the conductor.
Arriving in Macabebe near 8 o'clock, the truck was stopped at an old house formerly used
by Fernando Enriquez but now occupied by Maximo Tuazon, a mechanic of the Mallorca
Transportation. Palacio and his ve ru ans there disembarked, and Palacio took them into
this house. Before long Candido Enriquez came in and directed that food be supplied and,
nding that su cient food was not there available, he gave Tuazon money and directed him
to procure more food from a store.
After the men have been fed, Jose Palacio, by direction of Enriquez, showed the house of
Gines to Marcelo Bonifacio. Upon the return of the two from this errand, the six were taken
into kitchen and Enriquez there discussed with them the plan for beating up Gines. Bonifacio
was for doing the work that night, but Enriquez objected saying that an attack made at that
hour would attract the attention of too many people, observing further that Gines was not
accustomed to leave his house at night. It was accordingly decided to wait until early in the
morning when Gines would be leaving his home; and it was at the same time agreed that the
stipulated compensation would be paid on the morning when the work was done.
All then retired to rest, and at about 3 o'clock on the next morning, October 28, Candido
Enriquez awoke his employees Amado San Andres and Francisco Mallari, who were sleeping
in a truck of the Mallorca Transportation in the garage, and instructed them to go that day
with Maximo Tuazon to purchase stone in the barrio of Santa Maria, municipality of Bocaue,
in the Province of Bulacan.
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He then had a conversation with Marcelo Bonifacio, the head of the gang, in which the latter
suggested that his men should be provided with iron bars with which to beat up Gines.
Enriquez agreed and took the men to the garage, where he delivered to them two small iron
bars. Passenger trucks in the garage were then moved out into the street to make way for
truck No. TH-4475, which was to be used by Tuason and his companions in transporting
stone from Santa Maria; but before going on that errand this truck had something more
important to do, which was to transport Jose Palacio and his ve ru ans to the house of
Gines and to take them away on the road to Bocaue, when their work of beating up Gines
should be accomplished.
Accordingly, as daylight approached, Tuason and his companions, as well as Jose Palacio
and his ve, boarded the truck No. TH-4475 and started on their way. Arriving with the house
of Gines, Palacio and his men alighted, and Tuason was instructed to proceed a certain
distance so as not to attract attention, and await Palacio's coming, with the others. Tuason
therefore drove on and stopped the truck a short distance away.
Before the truck left the garage that morning Candido Enriquez delivered to Maximo Tuazon
the sum of P8.50, with which to buy stone in Bocaue, and at the same time he delivered to
him P20 more with directions to give it to Bonifacio and his fellow ru ans when they should
have nished the job of beating up Gines. After the truck had stopped near the house of
Gines, Bonifacio approached Tuazon and asked him for the money which Enriquez had
placed in the former's hands. In response to this request, Tuason gave Bonifacio the P20
above-mentioned, although he had been told to deliver it only after the work of beating up
Gines had been completed. The reason Tuazon did this was that he feared he might be
assaulted in case of refusal.
Meanwhile Jose Palacio, who personally knew Gines and was serving as guide, had posted
himself in front of the house where Gines was having. Presently lights appeared, and as
Gines came out, Palacio that he was the man they were after. Upon being struck, Gines gave
an exclamation and in a moment fell to the ground unconscious. The most serious wound
received by Gines was a cut, four centimeters in length and about seven and one-half
centimeters in depth, on the inner side of the upper part of the calf of the right leg. Other
wounds were three severe contusions, one on an arm and two on the body, and two lighter
bruises on the left side of the back. All of these contusions were evidently caused by the iron
bars which had been provided by Enriquez. The malefactors immediately ed. Jose Palacio
ran to the o ce of Candido Enriquez and reported that the victim was down; the other
assailants ran towards the waiting truck and the driver carried them rapidly towards Bocaue.
Arriving at Bocaue, the ve from Manila got o the truck No. TH-4475 and boarded another
bound for Manila. While still aboard the rst truck, Marcelo Franco threw the iron bar which
he had used in assaulting Gines to the ground near a gasoline station in Bocaue; and
Francisco Mallari threw the other iron bar to the ground in the barrio of Santa Ana. Both of
these bars were presently recovered upon information received from Jose Palacio and were
produced in evidence in court.
 Gines was left unconscious upon the ground as his assailants ed. As he recovered
consciousness, he called for help, and his cries attracted the attention of his father and other
who came to his aid. The seriousness of his wounds, especially the cut on the leg, was
apparently not at rst realized, and it was 6 o'clock before he was gotten to the Pampanga
provincial hospital. At 3.30 p. m. on the afternoon of the same day, he died from shock and
loss of blood.
The court ruled that, the accused had undoubtedly conspired to do grave personal injury to
the deceased, and now that the injuries actually in icted have resulted in death, they cannot
escape from the legal e ect of their acts on the ground that one of the wounds was in icted
in a di erent way from that which had been intended. A blow in icted by one of the small
iron bars used in this assault might well have resulted in the taking of life, and the
circumstance that a knife was also used in striking the deceased does not relieve the
appellants from the consequence of their joint acts. As has been said by the Supreme Court
of the United States. "If a number of persons agree to commit, and enter upon the
commission of a crime which will probably endanger human life such as robbery, all of them
are responsible for the death of a person that ensues as a consequence." (Boyd vs. U.S.,
142; U.S., 450; 35 Law. ed., 1077). In United States vs. Patten, the court said: "Conspirators
who join in a criminal attack on a defenseless man with dangerous weapons, knock him
down, and when he tries to escape, pursue him with increased numbers, and continue the
assault, are liable for manslaughter when the victim is killed by a knife wound in icted by
one of them during the beating, although in the beginning they did not contemplate the use
of a knife." (42 Appeals, D.C., 239.)
But the defense has undertaken to prove, as a matter of fact, that the fatal cut was not
in icted by any of the hirelings brought from Manila, But by Amado San Andres, an
employee of Candido Enriquez. This individual was on the truck No. TH-4475, which carried
Jose Palacio and his gangsters from the garage in Macabebe to the scene of the killing; and
a witness was put on the stand by the defense who testi ed that he saw Amado San Andres
eeing from the scene of the tragedy with a knife in hand just before he climbed into the
truck which was waiting. In addition to this, there was testimony showing a suspicious
bloodstain on the foot of San Andres later in the morning. As against this proof, account
must be taken of the fact that San Andres was taken before Gines a short while before the
death of the latter supervened, and Gines explicitly stated that San Andres was not one of
the men who assaulted him. This circumstance no doubt accounts for the facts that the
name of San Andres was omitted from the information. Upon the whole the defense has not
proved that San Andres was the person who used the knife.
But even supposing that the cut was in icted by San Andres, it would not follow that the
appellants should for that reason be exculpated from the homicide. San Andres was a
employee of Enriquez. He was present when Enriquez announced in the garage that he was
going to Manila to obtain gangsters to dispose of Gines. He was present when the Manila
contingent arrived at the garage in Macabebe at about 8 p.m. on the night of October 27,
and he was on the truck that carried the accused (except Enriquez) the next morning on their
fatal mission. there is no proof that any of the accused objected to his participation in the
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assault upon Gines or that they did anything to prevent such participation. Cooperation can
be inferred not only from proof of actual previous conspiracy, but from the future of the facts
done when the unlawful act is committed. Assuming, then that San Andres was the person
who in icted the fatal cut, the conclusion would be that he was cooperating with the
appellants with their consent, and the appellants are responsible for the consequences.
The crime committed in this case was murder, in which alevosia should be taken as the
qualifying circumstance. This circumstance is conspicuous in the fact that the assault was
characterized by surprise and was e ected by lying in wait for the deceased in the darkness
of the night. The plan adopted was evidently designed to insure the execution of the o ense
without risk to the appellants from any defense which the deceased might make. Nocturnity
and abuse of superior strength may properly be considered as absorbed in the alevosia.
There was present as to all of the accused, except Jose Palacio, the aggravating
circumstance that the o ense was committed for a price in money. There was also present,
as to all the appellants, the circumstance of known premeditation in that the o ense had
been under contemplation overnight, and the appellants had ample time to re ect repeatedly
on the manner in which it could best be accomplished.
People vs. Umale, G.R. No. L-5803 November 29, 1954
Umali, Pasumbal and Capino were found guilty by the CFI of Quizon province of the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery said to
have been committed during the raid staged by armed men in the town of Tiaong, Quezon.
The said raid resulted in the burning down and complete destruction of houses, including
that of Mayor Punzalan. Some of the raiders also engaged in the looting and in robbing one
house and two Chinese stores until dispersed and driven from the town by the Philippine
Army soldiers.
The records revealed that Congressman Umali and Mayor Punzalan were old time friends
and belonged to the same political faction. These friendly relations, however, did not endure.
In the elections of 1951, Punzalan ran for re-election. To oppose him, Umali, picked
Pasumbal, his trusted leader. Punzalan won. Naturally, Umali and Pasumbal were keenly
disappointed. Iyt appears that on the night of the elections, Umali instructed Pasumbal to
contact the Huks so that Punzalan will be killed. The raid was then carried out by the Huk
troops numbering about 50, Armed men with grenades and carbines. Part of the continent
went in the direction of Punzalan’s house and attacked it with automatic weapons, Hand
grenade and even bottled lled with gasoline. It was evident that the purpose of the attack
was to kill him. Fortunately, Punzalan was not there.
The court ruled that, the principal and main, tho not necessarily the most serious, crime
committed here was not rebellion but rather that of sedition. The purpose of the raid and the
act of the raiders in rising publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against the
Government and for the purpose of doing the things de ned in Article 134 of the Revised
Penal code under rebellion. The raiders did not even attack the Presidencia, the seat of local
Government. Rather, the object was to attain by means of force, intimidation, etc. one
object, to wit, to in ict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public
 o cial, namely, Punzalan was then Mayor of Tiaong. Under Article 139 of the same Code
this was su cient to constitute sedition. As regards the crime of robbery with which
appellants were charged and of which they were convicted, we are also of the opinion that it
was not one of the purposes of the raid, which was mainly to kidnap or kill Punzalan and
destroy his house. The robberies were actually committed by only some of the raiders,
presumably dissidents, as an afterthought, because of the opportunity o ered by the
confusion and disorder resulting from the shooting and the burning of the three houses, the
articles being intended presumably to replenish the supplies of the dissidents in the
mountains. For these robberies, only those who actually took part therein are responsible,
and not the three appellants herein. With respect to the crime of multiple frustrated murder,
while the assault upon policeman Pedro Lacorte with a hand grenade causing him injuries
resulting in his blindness in one eye, may be regarded as frustrated murder; the wounding of
Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector should be considered as mere physical injuries.
The crimes committed are, therefore, those of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated
murder and physical injuries. The murders may not be quali ed by evident premeditation
because the premedition was for the killing of Punzalan. The result was the killing of three
others intended by the raiders (People vs. Guillen, 47 O ). The killing may, however, be
quali ed by treachery, the raiders using rearms against which the victims were defenseless,
with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The three murders may be
punished with the penalty of death. However, because of lack of the necessary votes, the
penalty should be life imprisonment.
People vs. De La Cerna, G.R. No. L-20911, October 30, 1967
Early in the morning of February 3, 1958, Rafael Cabizares, accompanied by his wife,
Hospicia, his brothers Margarito and Romualdo, and his sons Gumercindo, Marcelo,
Casiano, Juan and Lamberto, left Barrio Cebuano headed for the poblacion of Tupi,
Cotabato, bringing ve sacks of corn loaded on a bull cart to be milled in Tupi. Juan,
Marcelo and Lamberto, who were all minors, were then going to school. Upon approaching a
hilly part, they had to stop since the carabao could not pull the bull cart uphill. Rafael then
requested his two brothers and his son Gumercindo to accompany him up the hill and carry
on their backs the sacks of corn. With Rafael leading, the four proceeded uphill.
As the four approached Sulpicio de la Cerna's house on top of the hill and were about to put
down the sacks of corn, appellant Sulpicio, who was in the house, red at and hit Rafael,
who fell down. Sulpicio then ordered his companions to burn his house so that they would
have an excuse. Meanwhile, Casiano, Gumercindo, Marcelo and Romualdo brought the
wounded Rafael Cabizares to the house of the latter's father, Demetrio, 100 meters away.
Felisa Bastismo, Rafael's mother, Ursula Cabizares and Segundino Cabizares were there at
the time.
After the group reached the house, Rafael's wounds were washed with hot water and then
he was brought inside the third room of the house. Subsequently, appellant Sulpicio and the
other accused arrived at the premises, armed with rearms, bolos and canes. They stoned
the house and trust their bolos thru the bamboo walls and ooring. Finding that there were
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women inside the house, the accused ordered them to get out or else they would be killed
also. As Felisa Bastismo and Ursula Cabizares alighted from the besieged house, Marcelo
Cabizares followed them, and although held by accused Conrado Pardillo and boxed by
Serapio Maquiling, he was able to escape to the nearby forest.
Serapio Maquiling then climbed up the window of the kitchen, and with the carbine which he
got from appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna, shot at Rafael Cabizares who was sitting in the third
room. At this moment, Casiano Cabizares jumped down from the house thru the kitchen
door and ran away. Serapio Maquiling followed him and shot the latter at the back, killing
him a few meters away from Demetrio's house. Appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna then got back
the carbine, climbed up the house and red once more at Rafael, who was now lying down
on the oor, killing him nally. Thereafter, the cadaver of Casiano Cabizares was tied to a
bamboo pole, carried by accused Ramon Alquizar and one Wilfredo Malias (at large) and
placed near the burned house of Sulpicio de la Cerna, as some of the accused followed
while the rest proceeded to Rafael's house.
The court ruled that, there being a previous direct conspiracy one day before the killing,
evident premeditation is duly established.This qualifying circumstance is further buttressed
by the following actuations of appellant on February 3, 1958: (1) Upon seeing Rafael near his
house, Sulpicio told his companions to get ready since the one they were awaiting was there
already. And then he shot at Rafael. (2) As Rafael was being brought to Demetrio's house,
Sulpicio ordered his companions to burn his house so they would have an excuse already.
(3) With the other appellants, he pursued the wounded Rafael to Demetrio's house where
after they had stoned the same and thrust their bolos thru its wallings, they ordered the
women folk to leave lest they be killed also; and (4) after Serapio had already shot at Rafael,
Sulpicio still red a third shot, nally killing Rafael. All these still overtly show appellant's
determination to end Rafael's life. The killing, therefore, was properly qualify as murder.
However, appellant Sulpicio cannot be held liable for the killing of Casiano Cabizares
notwithstanding a conspiracy between him and Serapio Maquiling. The conspiracy was to
kill Rafael only and no one else. Nothing was said or agreed upon about the members of
Rafael's family. In fact, in executing their plan appellants let the two women inside
Demetrio's house leave unhurt and they did no harm to the remaining companions of Rafael
in the house. Their target was solely Rafael Cabizares. And the rule has always been that co-
conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy. For other acts done
outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the necessary and logical
consequence of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable. Here, only
Serapio killed Casiano Cabizares. The latter not even going to the aid of his father Rafael but
was eeing away when shot.
Although Serapio got the carbine from Sulpicio, the latter cannot be considered a principal
by indispensable cooperation or an accomplice. There is no evidence at all that Sulpicio was
aware Serapio would use the ri e to kill Casiano. Presumably, he gave the carbine to Serapio
for him to shoot Rafael only as per their agreement. Neither is there concrete proof that
Sulpicio abetted the shooting of Casiano. Sulpicio might have been liable if after the
 shooting of Rafael, Serapio returned the carbine to him but upon seeing Casiano eeing,
immediately asked again for the carbine and Sulpicio voluntarily gave it to him. Serapio's
criminal intention then would be reasonably apparent to Sulpicio and the latter's giving back
of the ri e would constitute his assent thereto. But such was not the case. Sulpicio,
therefore, must be acquitted for the killing of Casiano Cabizares.
The prosecution, however, proved that in the early morning of February 3, 1958, Rotor was
with Maximo Caña fetching water in the spring. On their way home, they met appellants
Bautista and Matchoca. The latter gave Rotor a carbine magazine with bullets, saying: "Here
is the magazine of the bullets and give it to Sulpicio de la Cerna." And appellant Bautista
said: "Please hurry. Give it to Sulpicio de la Cerna because we will follow later on." Shortly
afterwards, Caña went with him to Sulpicio's house where he gave the magazine to Sulpicio,
saying: "Here are some bullets supposed to be given to you."
Rotor was seen outside — downstairs of — Sulpicio's house later that morning by Margarito
and Gumercindo Cabizares. After Sulpicio had red at Rafael, Rotor got the pistol from
appellant Libumfacil and red also at Rafael. This appellant was also seen by Romualdo,
Ursula and Segundino Cabizares as among those who arrived at Demetrio's house. When
Ursula Cabizares alighted from the house, she saw Rotor outside holding a pistol which he
gave to Libumfacil commenting that it was stuck. After the killing of the decedents,
Romualdo Cabizares saw him with the group following the cadaver of Casiano Cabizares
which was being brought near Sulpicio's burned house.
In the face of the overwhelming positive identi cation of six prosecution witnesses, Rotors
uncorroborated alibi must fail. Although he was not present or did not participate in the
meeting of February 2, 1968, his presence in the situs of the shootings on February 3, 1958
was not merely passive. His active participation — shooting at Rafael and carrying a pistol
— which has a direct connection with the criminal design against Rafael Cabizares makes
him a principal by indirect conspiracy, not an accomplice only. Motive is not wanting. Rotor
admitted that his wife is the sister of Sulpicio's wife and the evidence shows that his father
had a land dispute with Rafael Cabizares and was a respondent in the case before the
Agrarian Court.
Ambagan, Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 204481-82, October 14, 2015.
Victor J. Patam, a policeman. He testi ed that on July 4, 2004 at 1:00 in the afternoon, he,
with Domingo Bawalan, went to Barangay Litlit, Silang, Cavite, to attend the birthday party
of his son’s kumpadre. From Litlit, they then proceeded at 5:00 in the afternoon to the house
of Edgardo Mamuyac for the birthday party of Mamuyac’s son, where they had singing spree
and a little drink. They stayed there until 11:00 in the evening.
Upon reaching Barangay Biclatan, General Trias, Cavite, Patam received a call from
Reynaldo Santos who was at Mamuyac’s place. Santos requested Patam to go back to
Mamuyac’s house which was already closed, as Santos had no companion there. Santos
arrived late because he came from a follow-up operation in Maragondon, Cavite.
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When Patam and Domingo returned to the place of Mamuyac, they saw Santos in front of
his Space Gear van. After a little chat, Patam invited Santos and Domingo to go home.
Domingo rode with Santos, while Patam took his own car. Santos and Domingo left ahead of
him.
Upon reaching the boundary of Tamacan and Banay-banay, he saw the van of Santos
parked at the side of the street behind another van whose owner he did not know. He
likewise saw Ronnel Bawalan, the brother of Domingo, standing at their gate, looking at the
direction of the vehicles parked.
Patam parked his car behind Santos’ van and alighted therefrom. Immediately, Santos
handed him a baby armalite, which according to Santos, he got from Mayor Ambagan’s
men. Patam placed the baby armalite at the driver’s seat of his car. When he returned to
where Santos was, the latter ordered the four apprehended men to line up at the other side
of the street. Two of them put down their short rearms upon the order of Santos. After
telling the group to step away from the rearms, Santos came near the rearms, but without
touching them. Thereafter, Santos phoned Superintendent Cabillo and informed him of what
happened.
While Santos was talking to Cabillo, somebody called Patam "Kuya Toring." Patam
recognized him to be Alberto Angcanan. Patam told them to just stay put and they would
help them after Cabillo had arrived. After a few minutes, Mayor Ambagan arrived.
Patam went near Mayor Ambagan and greeted him. The Mayor greeted him back, and asked
who was at the other side. Patam told him that it was Reynaldo Santos, a policeman. Mayor
Ambagan then told Santos, "Rey, baka pwede namang pag-usapan natin yan kung anuman
yang problema." Santos replied, "Mayor, wala na hong desisyon akong magagawa dito.
Intayin niyo si GD. Siya na lang ang kakausapin ninyo." Repeatedly, the Mayor made the
same request to Santos, but Santos gave him the same answer. Patam felt that the situation
was heating up, so he asked Mayor Ambagan to go to the house of Patam’s cousin, Miling
Javier.
While Patam was pushing Mayor Ambagan, who was angry and cursing Santos, to Javier’s
house, Patam heard the rst gunshot emanating from where he and the Mayor were, but did
not see anything when he looked back. The Mayor wanted to go back to see what happened
to his men. Patam also wanted to go back to his companions, so he left the Mayor with
Alberto Angcanan and Rosendo Causaren. However, Patam’s gun fell, thus, he instead
proceeded to the house of his brother near the place of the incident. While he was already
near his brother’s house, Patam saw three men with long rearms – two at the back of his
car and the other one in front of the MB100 van, all ring towards the south direction where
he left Rey. Upon reaching the house of his brother, he asked his niece Susan Patam to call
the police. Patam was not able to get out of his brother’s house anymore, because he was
prevented by his mother and brother, as he might be suspected of being responsible for the
killing. Patam called the chief of Police of General Trias, Cavite, Chief Inspector Portento, to
 fetch him because his life was in danger. On July 5, 2004, he executed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay and Karagdagang Salaysay.
Ronnel Bawalan, brother of Domingo Bawalan and cousin-in-law of Reynaldo Santos. He
testi ed that on July 5, 2004 at around 12:00 midnight, he parked his passenger jeepney at
his garage, and prepared it for the next day’s use. When he was about to sleep, at around
1:00 o’clock in the morning, Santos riding in his vehicle with Domingo, entered the garage.
They asked if they could hire his jeepney the following day. When he agreed, Ronnel guided
them from the garage to the road. While outside answering a call of nature, Ronnel looked
towards the south direction and he saw Santos and Domingo about less than 100 meters
from him park the van and alight from their vehicle. He also saw the car of Patam parked
behind Santos’ vehicle. He crossed the road and walked towards them.
When he was already near them, he heard Santos saying to the four men from the van
parked in front of Santos’ vehicle, "Dyan lang kayo, wag kayong aalis."Upon hearing this, he
went to Domingo and inquired why Santos was asking these men to get out of the van.
Domingo told him that these men were carrying rearms.
While Ronnel and Domingo were standing at the right front side of the parked van, Ronnel
heard a sound of a radio coming from the four men accosted by Santos. At that time, Santos
was in the middle of the road, making a call from his cellphone. Thereafter, Mayor Ambagan
with his bodyguards carrying long rearms arrived. Mayor Ambagan told Santos that they
should just talk it out whatever the problem was.
When Domingo saw the Mayor, he directed Ronnel to leave the place as it was dangerous,
and shoved him away. Ronnel walked a few meters towards the southern direction and hid,
lying at on his belly behind the bushes at the entrance of an old poultry house. Being
approximately 10 to 15 meters from where Santos was standing, he heard Santos say to
Mayor Ambagan, "Hintayin nalang natin si GD at sa kanya ka nalang makiusap." Santos did
not agree. From a calm voice when he made his rst request, Mayor Ambagan’s voice
became loud and angry when Santos many times turned him down. At that time, Patam was
just an arm’s length between Santos and Mayor Ambagan.
Then, Ronnel heard the Mayor say, "Sige yan pala ang gusto mo. Mga kasama, banatan na
ninyo yan." After the mayor had uttered these words, Ronnel heard a gun re from Rene
Amparo in the direction of Santos. The men of Mayor Ambagan (referring to Rene Amparo,
Domingo Villasis, Michael Malabanan, Ely Garcia, and Roger Causaren) were spread along
the road, ring their guns at Santos and Domingo. After several gunshots that lasted for
about ve minutes, he saw Mayor Ambagan’s men board their vehicles and left in the
direction of Amadeo, after taking the guns from Santos and Domingo.
Ronnel quickly went home and told his parents that his brother just got killed. They went to
the place of incident after the policemen had arrived. On July 27, 2004, he executed a
Salaysay. It took him long to give a statement because he feared for his life and his family’s.
The court ruled that, in determining the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, We
entertain the probability or improbability of alternative scenarios other than what is o ered
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by the prosecution. For this purpose, We were urged "to view Ronnel Bawalan’s testimony as
a whole"to reconcile the inconsistencies in his statements, but as extensively discussed,
Ronnel Bawalan’s narration of events is not airtight and even brings to fore more reasons to
disbelieve his version. Indeed, there are far too many inconsistencies in the testimony of
Ronnel Bawalan, enough to put us on guard when it comes to accepting the veracity of his
claims. For inconsistencies to not discredit a witness, they must be minor and should not on
material details. But here, we nd that the statements made by Ronnel Bawalan "taken as a
whole" does not foreclose the probability that Ambagan did not initiate the re ght, and
casts reasonable doubt as to his guilt as principal by inducement.
In conclusion, the scant evidence for the prosecution casts serious doubts as to the guilt of
petitioner as principal by inducement. It was not convincingly established, beyond
reasonable doubt, that petitioner indeed ordered his men to open re at Santos and
Domingo Bawalan. The evidence o ered against him in court does not pass the test of moral
certainty and is insu cient to rebut the presumption of innocence that petitioner is entitled
to under the Bill of Rights. And where there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of an
accused, he must be acquitted even though his innocence may be questioned, for it is not
su cient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is
more likely to be true than the contrary. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, more than mere
likelihood, requires moral certainty — a certainty that convinces and satis es the reason and
conscience of those who are to act upon it.
People v. Dulay y Pascual, G.R. No. 193854, September 24, 2012
Private complainant AAA was 12 years old when the whole incident happened. AAA's sister
introduced the appellant to AAA as someone who is nice. Thereafter, appellant convinced
AAA to accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio, Parañaque City. Before going to the
said wake, they went to a casino to look for appellant's boyfriend, but since he was not
there, they went to Sto. Niño at Don Galo. However, appellant's boyfriend was also not
there. When they went to Bulungan Fish Port along the coastal road to ask for some sh,
they saw appellant's boyfriend. Afterwards, AAA, appellant and the latter's boyfriend
proceeded to the Kubuhan located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. When they
reached the Kubuhan, appellant suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known by
the name "Speed" was waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money to appellant and heard
"Speed" tell appellant to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, "Speed" wielded a knife and tied
AAA's hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for appellant's help when she saw the
latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but appellant did not do so. After
the rape, "Speed" and appellant told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or else they
would get back at her.
AAA went to San Pedro, Laguna after the incident and told her sister what happened and the
latter informed their mother about it. AAA, her sister and mother, led a complaint at
Barangay San Dionisio. Thereafter, the barangay o cials of San Dionisio referred the
complaint to the police station.
The Parañaque City Police O ce (Women's and Children Concern Desk) asked the
assistance of the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital, upon which the
 latter assigned the case to Dr. Merle Tan. Consequently, with the consent of AAA and her
mother, and in the presence of a social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), Dr. Tan conducted the requisite interview and physical examination on
AAA. Later on, Dr. Tan issued a Medico-Legal Report stating that there was no evident injury
in the body of AAA, but medical evaluation cannot exclude sexual abuse. During her
testimony, Dr. Tan explained that such impression or conclusion pertains to the ano-genital
examination and also stated that she found multiple abrasions on the back portion of the
body of AAA.
The ruled that, under Revised Penal Code, an accused may be considered a principal by
direct participation, by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by
indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or
unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the o ense by performing
another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Nothing in the evidence
presented by the prosecution does it show that the acts committed by appellant are
indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA, from
the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received money from the
man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could
have accompanied AAA and o ered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA
could still have been raped. Even AAA could have o ered her own services in exchange for
monetary consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable
aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be remembered that in the Information,
as well as in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered and o ered for a fee by appellant,
thereafter, she was raped by "Speed.
It must be clear that this Court respects the ndings of the trial court that AAA was indeed
raped by considering the credibility of the testimony of AAA. The rule is that factual ndings
of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, the review of a
criminal case opens up the case in its entirety. The totality of the evidence presented by both
the prosecution and the defense are weighed, thus, avoiding general conclusions based on
isolated pieces of evidence. In the case of rape, a review begins with the reality that rape is a
very serious accusation that is painful to make; at the same time, it is a charge that is not
hard to lay against another by one with malice in her mind. Because of the private nature of
the crime that justi es the acceptance of the lone testimony of a credible victim to convict, it
is not easy for the accused, although innocent, to disprove his guilt. These realities compel
this Court to approach with great caution and to scrutinize the statements of a victim on
whose sole testimony conviction or acquittal depends.
PP vs. CARRIAGA, G.R. No. 135029, Sept 12, 2003
On December 1, 1993, at around 10:00 in the morning, victim Ernesto de Guzman, Sr.
(Ernesto, for brevity) con ded to his brother, Balbino de Guzman, that appellants Cosme and
Nestor Carriaga were grabbing his (Ernestos) land and that they threatened to kill him.
Ernesto became the object of their ire since he started to improve the river as a source of
livelihood. On one occasion, the appellants Carriaga brothers told Ernesto not to continue
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working the area or else something might happen to him and his family. Appellant Ben Palis
accused Ernesto of informing the police that the Carriaga brothers owned guns.
On December 3, 1993, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, Ernesto was sleeping in their house
in Sitio Nabetangan, Brgy. Canabay, Dupax del Sur, Nueva Vizcaya. His wife Lita was
washing the dishes and his twelve-year old son Ernesto, Jr. was listening to a radio program.
Lita stopped washing the dishes when she sensed somebody enter the house. She then saw
appellants Cosme and Nestor, each holding a bolo, and Palis, standing by the door, with
both hands placed at his back. Lita shouted Apay (Why). Upon hearing the shout, Ernesto,
Jr. peeped and saw the three appellants. Nestor and Cosme went directly to where Ernesto
was sleeping and immediately began hacking him. Cosme rst hacked Ernesto and hit him
on the right leg. Lita tried to help her husband, but Nestor pushed her aside and attempted
to hack her as well. She was able to evade the hacking and exited through the second door
near the wash area. In the meantime, Ernesto, Jr. saw Nestor go to his father and hack the
latters head, followed by Cosme who gave Ernesto another hack on the head. Still not
content, Nestor hacked Ernesto at the back. Ernesto, Jr. became so scared that he jumped
out of the window and scampered away. Lita who was running and crying for help, heard her
son, saying Inay, Inay, wait for me. Thus, she waited for him, after which, they both ran. They
then heard a vehicle approaching. Thinking that the killers might have boarded the same,
Lita and Ernesto, Jr. hid among the tall grasses. When they peeped, they saw the three
appellants in the front seat of a blue passenger jeepney. After the vehicle passed, the two
continued to run until they reached the poblacion. Lita instructed her son to go to his uncle
and report what had happened. As told, Ernesto, Jr. informed his uncle Balbino about the
incident. Lita proceeded to PNP Station Commander Baguidudol of Dupax del Sur and
reported the matter.
SPO4 Johnny Baguidudol, SPO1 Saulo Fontanilla and SPO4 Alfredo Dotimas were at the
police station when Lita reported that her husband was hacked by the appellants. The three
o cers immediately proceeded with her to the crime scene in order to investigate. They saw
Ernesto sprawled on the oor, lying face up near the bed, bathed in blood and undoubtedly
dead. Lita told SPO4 Baguidudol who the perpetrators were and where they were headed.
He called up his co-policemen at the station and instructed them to apprehend the
appellants. SPO1 Fontanilla prepared a sketch of the crime scene. SPO4 Dotimas called on
some neighbors to help in bringing the body of the victim to the poblacion for autopsy and
embalmment. The three appellants were apprehended by SPO4 Alfonso dela Cruz. SPO4
Baguidudol and his companions returned to the station and conducted further investigation.
Upon questioning, Nestor admitted that he hacked the victim, while Cosme and Palis kept
their silence. The following day, the police o cers executed a Joint A davit in connection
with the case.
The court ruled that, in such case, we apply our ruling in People vs. Ubia where we held that
when an accused does not fall under any of the three concepts de ned in Article 17 of the
Revised Penal Code, he may only be considered guilty as an accomplice.
 Before the Court proceeds to resolve the fth issue, it is necessary that the Court should
pass upon the question whether or not appellants are guilty of treachery and abuse of
superior strength.
We hold that the killing of Ernesto was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the
o ender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods, or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the o ended party might make. Two elements
must therefore concur: (1) the means of execution employed gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted.
The essence of treachery is a swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the
slightest provocation on his part.
The victim in this case was caught by surprise when the assailants suddenly entered his
house and attacked him while he was asleep. Thus, he had no chance to ght back or
defend himself. The number of the victims wounds and his relative position when found
dead by the police emphasized further the existence of treachery. The victim was hacked in
the occiput region of his head, on the shoulder, arm, chest, thigh, leg and at the back. The
means, method and form of the attack in this case were, therefore, consciously adopted and
e ectively prevented the victim from employing a defense against his attackers.
The attendant circumstance of treachery quali ed the killing to murder as de ned in
paragraph 1 of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Saldua v. People, G.R. No. 210920, December 10, 2018
From the combined testimonies of its witnesses, the prosecution tends to establish that on
November 11, 2005, at 10:00 a.m., Lalamunan, Wilson Vertudez (Vertudez) and petitioner
Saldua arrived at the kiosk owned by Victor Palalon (Palalon) on board a red XRM Honda
motorcycle. Palalon's son-in-law witness Demetrio Flores (Flores), was also at the kiosk.
Lalamunan introduced himself to Palalon and Flores as a nephew of Palalon. He also
introduced Vertudez and petitioner Saldua to them. Petitioner Saldua was in maong pants,
while Lalamunan was wearing a black long-sleeved shirt and camou age shorts. At around
noontime, they left the kiosk on board the same motorcycle.
On the following day of November 12, 2005 at 10:00 a.m., Vertudez and petitioner Saldua
returned to the kiosk wearing the same clothes. At 6:30p.m., Lalamunan arrived and the
three of them left on foot towards the national highway. Lalamunan walked ahead to where
the motorcycle was parked at a banana grove beside Magallanes Street, while petitioner
Saldua and Vertudez went to the house of the victim, Jill Abella (Abella). Vertudez was next
seen to be ring at the garage of the house of Abella, with an armed Saldua behind him.
Abella was able to shoot back and hit Vertudez. Saldua and Vertudez left the area on foot
towards where the motorcycle was parked. Vertudez collapsed due to his gunshot wound.
Meanwhile, Saldua and Lalamunan left the area on board the motorcycle, leaving Vertudez
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behind. Abella was found dead that day from gunshot wounds. Vertudez was also found
dead the next day at the banana grove from gunshot wound.
The court ruled that, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, the following
requisites must concur: (1) that there be community of design; that is, knowing the criminal
design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2)
that he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of
supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an e cacious way; and (3)
that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the
person charged as accomplice.
At the time the crime of homicide was committed, it was established that petitioner Saldua,
who was armed, was present, as he was behind Vertudez when the latter red his gun.
However, mere presence does not make one a co-conspirator in the crime. The rule is that
the existence of conspiracy cannot be presumed. Just like the crime itself, the elements of
conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Because witnesses are rarely present
when several accused come to an agreement to commit a crime, such agreement is usually
inferred from their "concerted actions" while committing it. Indeed, the line that separates a
conspirator by concerted action from an accomplice by previous or simultaneous acts is
slight. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; but they assent
to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment.
Other than being present, it was not established what petitioner's purpose was when he
stood behind Vertudez bearing a rearm. By merely standing behind Vertudez, it cannot be
ascertained whether petitioner had prior knowledge of the criminal design of the principal
perpetrator or that he was there to give moral support. What was clear is that he was armed
and he did not stop Vertudez from shooting the victim. The mere fact that a person is
present when a crime is committed, when such presence does not have the purpose of
encouraging the criminal and when there is no previous agreement between them as to the
commission of the crime, will make the former responsible only as accomplice in the crime
committed. This conclusion is in keeping with the principle that when there is doubt, such
doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.
It was held that when there is doubt as to whether a guilty participant in a homicide
performed the role of principal or accomplice, the Court should favor the "milder form of
responsibility." He should be given the bene t of the doubt and can be regarded only as an
accomplice. x x x Hence, in the case at bar, the accused x x x should be granted the bene t
of doubt and should be considered merely as accomplices and should be meted a penalty
one degree lower than that to be imposed on accused x x x who is unequivocally the
principal.
Hence, in this case, lacking su cient evidence of conspiracy, and there being doubt as to
whether petitioner acted as principal or just a mere accomplice, the doubt should be
resolved in his favor and, thus, he should be held liable only as an accomplice.
 People v. Montesclaros, G.R. No. 181084, June 16, 2009
The o ended party, ABC, is the daughter of appellant Ida, and was 13 years old at the time
of the incident. Ida worked as a waitress in Bayanihan Beer House in Mabini, Cebu City. On
February 19, 1995, Ida and ABC started to rent a room in a house owned by Tampus, a
barangay tanod. On April 1, 1995, about 4:30 p.m., ABC testi ed that she was in the house
with Ida and Tampus who were both drinking beer at that time. They forced her to drink
beer10 and after consuming three and one-half (3 ½) glasses of beer, she became intoxicated
and very sleepy. While ABC was lying on the oor of their room, she overheard Tampus
requesting her mother, Ida, that he be allowed to "remedyo"or have sexual intercourse with
her. Appellant Ida agreed and instructed Tampus to leave as soon as he nished having
sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida then went to work, leaving Tampus alone with ABC. ABC
fell asleep and when she woke up, she noticed that the garter of her panties was loose and
rolled down to her knees. She su ered pain in her head, thighs, buttocks, groin and vagina,
and noticed that her panties and short pants were stained with blood which was coming
from her vagina. When her mother arrived home from work the following morning, she kept
on crying but appellant Ida ignored her.
ABC testi ed that on April 4, 1995 around 1:00 a.m., she was left alone in the room since her
mother was at work at the beer house. Tampus went inside their room and threatened to kill
her if she would report the previous sexual assault to anyone. He then forcibly removed her
panties. ABC shouted but Tampus covered her mouth and again threatened to kill her if she
shouted. He undressed himself, spread ABC’s legs, put saliva on his right hand and he
applied this to her vagina; he then inserted his penis into ABC’s vagina and made a push
and pull movement. After consummating the sexual act, he left the house. When ABC told
appellant Ida about the incident, the latter again ignored her.
On May 4, 1995, after being maltreated by her mother, ABC sought the help of her aunt,
Nellie Montesclaros (Nellie). She told Nellie about the rape and that her mother sold her.
ABC, together with Nellie and Norma Andales, a tra c enforcer, reported the incident of rape
to the police. On May 9, 1995, Nestor A. Sator , M.D. (Dr. Sator), head of the Medico-Legal
Branch of the Philippine National Crime Laboratory Services, Regional Unit 7, conducted a
physical examination of ABC and issued a Medico-Legal Report. Dr. Sator testi ed that the
result of his examination of ABC revealed a deep healed laceration at the seven (7) o’clock
position and a shallow healed laceration at the one (1) o’clock position on ABC’s hymen.
On September 22, 1995, ABC led two Complaints. She accused Tampus of taking
advantage of her by having carnal knowledge of her, against her will, while she was
intoxicated and sleeping on April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m. She declared in her Complaint that
this was done in conspiracy with accused Ida who gave permission to Tampus to rape her.
And again, she stated that on April 3, 1995, she was threatened with a wooden club by
Tampus, who then succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, against her will.
Tampus denied raping ABC on April 1, 1995. He claimed that at 4:00 p.m. of April 1, 1995,
he left the house to go to the public market of Lapu-lapu City. When he arrived home at 6:00
p.m., ABC and Ida were not there as they usually go to the beer house at 4:00 p.m. or 5:00
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p.m. He denied forcing ABC to drink beer. He also denied asking Ida to allow him to have
sexual intercourse with ABC. Appellant Ida also testi ed that she and ABC left for the beer
house at 4:00 p.m. of April 1, 1995 and they came back at 6:00 a.m. the following day. She
said that she always brought her daughter to the beer house with her and there was never
an instance when she left her daughter alone in the house. She denied forcing ABC to drink
beer at 4:30 p.m. of April 1, 1995, and she denied giving permission to Tampus to have
sexual intercourse with ABC.
Tampus also denied raping ABC on April 4, 1995. He testi ed that he arrived at the Barangay
Tanod Headquarters between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. of April 3, 1995 and that his actual
duty time shift was from midnight to 5:00 a.m. of April 4, 1995. Guillermo Berdin (Berdin), a
defense witness, testi ed that on April 3, 1995, Tampus reported for duty at the police
outpost at 8:00 p.m. and left at 5:00 a.m. of April 4, 1995, as re ected in the attendance
logbook. However, on cross-examination, Berdin could not tell whether the signature
appearing on the logbook really belonged to Tampus. It was noted by the trial court that the
handwriting used by Tampus in the logbook entry on April 2, 1995 is di erent from his
handwriting appearing on April 3, 1995. It was also revealed that the house of Tampus is just
500 meters away or just a three-minute walk from the barangay tanod outpost and that the
barangay tanod on duty could leave the outpost unnoticed or without permission.
The court ruled that, it is urisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the
accomplice should not be indispensable to the commission of the crime; otherwise, she
would be liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The evidence shows that the
acts of cooperation by Ida are not indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus. First,
because it was both Ida and Tampus who forced ABC to drink beer, and second because
Tampus already had the intention to have sexual intercourse with ABC and he could have
consummated the act even without Ida’s consent.
The acts of Ida are closely related to the eventual commission of rape by Tampus. They both
forced ABC to drink beer; when ABC was already drunk, Tampus asked Ida if he could have
sexual intercourse with ABC and Ida gave her consent; and lastly, Ida left ABC alone with
Tampus so that he proceed with his plan to rape ABC. Circumstances a ecting the liability of
the Appellant as an Accomplice.
PP vs. WILFREDO TOLENTINO, G.R. No. 139179, Apr 3, 2002
On February 28, 1996 around 7:30 in the evening, appellant and his cousins, Sheila Guilayan
and Merwin Ledesma, were at their house in Luyahan, Pasonanca, Zamboanga City when
their neighbor Wilfredo Tolentino called them. When asked what was it all about, Wilfredo
simply motioned to them to come to his house located just across the road. Once they were
inside the house, Wilfredo immediately revealed his plan to kill Hernan Sagario, Sheila's
stepfather. Wilfredo explained that it was the only way to free Sheila's mother - appellant's
aunt - of the su erings being caused by Hernan. Wilfredo then instructed Merwin to go back
to the house and get the bolo of Hernan. Merwin obliged, got the bolo, and gave it to
Wilfredo. Thereafter, they were told by Wilfredo to go home and wait for Hernan.
 "Around 8:30 in the evening, Hernan arrived. He went directly to the kitchen and xed the
bag of rice he was carrying. Meanwhile, appellant, together with Sheila and Merwin, just
stayed quiet in the living room. Moments later, Wilfredo with a 2"x2" piece of wood in his
hand entered the house. He then followed Hernan towards the kitchen. When about an
armslength away from Hernan, Wilfredo, without saying a word, immediately walloped
Hernan on the right side of the neck sending the latter unconscious and falling face down to
the ground. Wilfredo immediately instructed appellant and Merwin to help him bring Hernan
out of the house. Lifting Hernan out of the house, Wilfredo held him by the neck while both
appellant and Merwin grasped his feet. They then carried Hernan towards the creek about
seven meters away from the house.
"Upon reaching the creekside, the three stopped and moved closer to the water. At this
juncture, Wilfredo successively stabbed Hernan on di erent parts of the body causing the
latter's instant death. After throwing the victim's lifeless body in the creek, the three
immediately left.

"The post-mortem examination on the victim's cadaver disclosed that the cause of his death
was cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to [a] stab wound
penetrating the chest." (Citations omitted)

The court ruled that, appellant cannot be convicted as an accessory either. Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code de nes an accessory as one who had knowledge of the commission of
the crime and did not participate in its commission as principal or accomplice, yet took part
subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1) pro ting oneself or assisting the
o ender to pro t by the e ects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the
crime, or the e ects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; and (3)
harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the
accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or when the o ender is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime. To convict an accused as an accessory, the following
elements must be proven: (1) knowledge of the commission of the crime and (2) subsequent
participation in it by any of the three above-cited modes.

Under paragraph 2 of said codal provision, the concealment or the destruction of the body
of the crime or of the e ects or the instruments thereof must have been done in order to
prevent the discovery of the crime. That, precisely, is wanting in the present case.

In his testimony, appellant stated that because he was afraid his co-accused would hurt him
if he refused, he agreed to assist the latter in carrying the victim towards the river. The fact
that appellant left thereafter likewise indicated his innocence of the charge. Verily, he
adequately explained his conduct prior to the stabbing incident as one born of fear for his
own life. It is not incredible for an eyewitness to a crime, especially if unarmed, to desist from
assisting the victim if to do so would put the former's life in peril.

The presumption of innocence in favor of appellant has not been overcome by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, he must be acquitted.

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