Romulo Cantimbuhan, Malana, Lucila vs.

Judge Cruz & Fiscal Quilatan

Facts: Petitioner Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints against two police officers for
less serious physical injuries in the municipal court of Paranaque

Petitioners Malana and Lucila, were the senior law students of the UP, assisting the needy clients
in the office of legal aid. They filed their separate appearances as friends of complainant
petitioner Cantimbuhan which was opposed by Fiscal Quilatan and sustained by Judge Cruz and
disallowed the appearances if petitioner Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said
criminal cases. The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners was also denied.

It was contended by the respondents that pursuant to Sec. 4 and 15 of Rule 110 of ROC, the
fiscal is empowered to determine who shall be the private prosecutor and the exercise of the
offended party to intervene is subject to the direction and control of the fiscal and that his
appearance requires the prior approval of the fiscal.

The basis of the petitioner on the other hand is section 34 of Rule 138 of the ROC which
provides that in the court of the justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid ofan agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by the aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Issue: W/N Malana and Lucila are allowed to appear as friends of party litigant Cantimbuhan.

Yes, there is merit in the petition.

The court held that pursuant to Sec. 34 Rule 138 ROC in a municipal court a party may conduct
his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him for that purpose.

In the case of Laput vs. Bernade, a law student was allowed to represent the accused in a case
pending before the Manila Municipal Court, who was charged for damages to properly through
reckless imprudence.

Further, the court held that the permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his
appearance as private prosecutors because the low does not impose this condition. What the
fiscal can do if he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the private prosecutor's
participate, whether he be a lawyer or not. On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active
participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that the private
prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under his supervision and
control. Furthermore, the court held that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense council or as
friend of the accused in a case before the MTC, with more reason that he allowed to appear as
private prosecutor under the supervision and control of their fiscal.
Wherefore, the orders issued by the respondent Judge disallowing the appearances of petitioners
Malana and Lucila were set aside and Judge Cruz was ordered to allow the appearance and
intervention of Malana and Lucila as friends of Catimbunan.

G.R. No. L-62909 April 18, 1989

HYDRO RESOURCES CONTRACTORS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LABOR ARBITER

ADRIAN N. PAGALILAUAN and the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
public respondents, and ROGELIO A. ABAN, private respondent,

On October 24, 1978, petitioner corporation hired the private respondent Aban as its "Legal
Assistant." He received a basic monthly salary of Pl,500.00 plus an initial living allowance of
P50.00 which gradually increased to P320.00.

On September 4, 1980, Aban received a letter from the corporation informing him that he would
be considered terminated effective October 4, 1980 because of his alleged failure to perform his
duties well.

On October 6, 1980, Aban filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal.

The labor arbiter ruled that Aban was illegally dismissed.

This ruling was affirmed by the NLRC on appeal.

Aban was employed by the petitioner to be its Legal Assistant as evidenced by his appointment
paper (Exhibit "A"). The petitioner paid him a basic salary plus living allowance. Thereafter,
Aban was dismissed on his alleged failure to perform his duties well. (Exhibit "B").

Issue:,whether or not an employer-employee relation exists between the contending parties or

whether or not the private respondent was hired on a retainer basis.

Held: Considering that the private respondent was illegally dismissed from his employment in
1980, he is entitled to reinstatement to his former or similar position without loss of seniority
rights, if it is still feasible, to backwages without qualification or deduction for three years, (D.M.
Consunji, Inc. v. Pucan 159 SCRA 107 (1988); Flores v. Nuestro, G.R. No. 66890, April 15,
1988), and to reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00. Should reinstatement prove
no longer feasible, the petitioner will pay him separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. (City Trust
Finance Corp. v. NLRC, 157 SCRA 87; Santos v. NLRC, 154 SCRA 166; Metro Drug v. NLRC,
et al., 143 SCRA 132; Luzon Brokerage v. Luzon Labor Union, 7 SCRA 116). The amount of
such separation pay as may be provided by law or the collective bargaining agreement is to be
computed based on the period from 24 October 1978 (date of first employment) to 4 October
1983 (three years after date of illegal dismissal). [Manila Midtown Commercial Corporation v.
Nuwhrain 159 SCRA 212 (1988)].
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The petitioner is ordered to
reinstate the private respondent to his former or a similar position without loss of seniority rights
and to pay three (3) years backwages without qualification or deduction and P5,000.00 in
attorney's fees. Should reinstatement not be feasible, the petitioner shall pay the private
respondent termination benefits in addition to the above stated three years backpay and
P5,000.00 attorney's fees.

.R. No. 127608 September 30, 1999

GUADALUPE S. REYES, pet, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JUANITA L. RAYMUNDO,

respondents.

Petitioner Guadalupe S. Reyes sold to respondent Juanita L. Raymundo on 21 June 1967 one-
half (1/2) of a 300 — square meter lot located at No. 4-F Calderon St., Project 4, Quezon City,
denominated as Lot 8-B, for P10,000.00. Consequently, a new title, TCT No. 119205, was issued
for the whole lot in the name of original owner Guadalupe S. Reyes and vendee Juanita L.
Raymundo in equal shares.

Thereafter respondent was granted a P17,000.00 loan by the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), where she was employed as records processor, with her one-half (1/2) share of
the property as collateral. On 24 September 1969 petitioner sold her remaining interest in the
property to respondent for P15,000.00 as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale, Exh. "E," 1 and
TCT No. 149036 was issued in the name of respondent in lieu of TCT No. 119205.

Since 1967 the house standing on the property subject of the second sale was being leased by the
spouses Mario Palacios and Zenaida Palacios from petitioner. In December 1984 petitioner
allegedly refused to receive the rentals thus prompting the Palacios spouses to file o8n 13 March
1985 a petition for consignation before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. Later, the
parties entered into a compromise agreement principally stating that the Palacios spouses would
pay to petitioner the accrued rentals and that the leased period would be extended to 24
November 1986. On 28 May 1985 the compromise agreement was approved and judgment was
rendered in accordance therewith.

On 23 August 1987 petitioner filed a complaint against respondent before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for cancellation of TCT No. 149036 and reconveyance with damages.
Petitioner alleged that the sale of 24 September 1969 was simulated since she was merely
constrained to execute the deed without any material consideration pursuant to an agreement
with respondent that they would construct an apartment on the property through the proceeds of
an additional loan respondent would secure from the GSIS with the entire 300 — square meter
property as collateral. But should the loan fail to materialize, respondent would reconvey the
property subject of the second sale to petitioner. After petitioner learned that the loan was
disapproved she repeatedly asked respondent for reconveyance but to no avail. Their true
agreement was embodied in a private writing dated 10 January 1970.

WON Petitioner alleged that the sale of 24 September 1969 was simulated since she was merely
constrained to execute the deed without any material consideration pursuant to an agreement.

Held:The trial court found that the second deed of sale was indeed simulated as it held that since
the date of its execution respondent allowed petitioner to exercise ownership over the property
by collecting rentals from the lessees until December 1986. It was only in 1987 when respondent
intervened in the contempt case that she asserted ownership thereof. Likewise, the trial court
sustained petitioner's claim that she was only prevailed upon to transfer the title to the whole lot
to respondent in order to obtain a loan from the GSIS which, after all, did not materialize. Thus,
on 29 May 1992 the trial court cancelled and declared null and void TCT No. 149036 as well as
the second deed of sale. It ordered respondent to reconvey subject property to petitioner and to
pay P25,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages, P10,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the
costs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of respondent Court of Appeals of 19

July 1996 ordering the dismissal of the complaint of petitioner Guadalupe S. Reyes and the
Resolution of 22 October 1996 denying reconsideration are SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, of 29 May 1992 cancelling and declaring null
and void TCT No. 149036, as well as the second deed of sale dated 24 September 1969 between
petitioner and private respondent Juanita L. Raymundo ordering the latter to reconvey the
property subject of the second deed of sale to petitioner, and further ordering private respondent
to pay petitioner P25,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages, P10,000.00 as attorney's fees,
and to pay the costs, is REINSTATED and ADOPTED as the Decision in this case.1âwphi1.nêt

LUMIQUED vs EXEVEA 282 SCRA 125 Mandates of the Different Departments Department
of Justice

FACTS: Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform-
Cordillera Autonomous Region until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that position
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of Lumiqued's death on
May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such
order. The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR CAR Regional Cashier
and private respondent Jeannette Obar Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The
first affidavit-complaint dated November 16, 1989, charged Lumiqued with malversation
through falsification of official documents. From May to September 1969, Lumiqued allegedly
committed at least 93 counts of falsification by pedding gasoline receipts. He even submitted a
vulcanizing shop receipt worth P550.00 for gasoline bought from the shop, and another receipt
for P660.00 for a single vulcanizing job. With the use of falsified receipts, Lumiqued claimed
and was reimbursed the sum of P44,172.46. Private respondent added that Lumiqued seldom
made field trips and preferred to stay in the office, making it impossible for him to consume the
nearly 120 liters of gasoline he claimed everyday.

In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22, 1989, private respondent accused
Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations, alleging that
during the months of April, May, July, August, September and October, 1989, he made
unliquidated cash advances in the total amount of P116.000.00. Lumiqued purportedly defrauded
the government "by deliberately concealing his unliquidated cash advances through the
falsification of accounting entries in order not to reflect on Cash advances of other officials
under code 8-70-600 of accounting rules"

The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15, 1989. charged Lumiqued with oppression and
harassment. According to private respondent, her two previous complaints prompted Lumiqued
to retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without just cause.

The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the Department of Justice (DOJ)
for appropriate action. On May 20, 1992. Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro
issued Department Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the complaints against
Lumiqued.

Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued
was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17,
1992, to enable him to employ the services of counset. The committee granted the motion, but
neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee
deemed the case submitted for resolution

Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered a report dated
July 31 1992, finding Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him. Accordingly, the
investigating committee recommended Lumiqued's dismissal or removal from office, without
prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges against him

On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos himself issued Administrative Order No. 52,
finding Lumiqued administratively liable for dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen gasoline
receipts, and dismissing him from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits.

In a "petition for appeal addressed to President Ramos. Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No. 52 be
reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former position "with all the benefits accorded to
him by law and existing rules and regulations."
Treating the "petition for appeal" as a motion for the reconsideration of A.O. No. 52. the Office
of the President, through Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, denied
the same on August 31, 1993.

Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging, among other things,
that he was denied the constitutional night to counsel during the hearing. On May 19, 1994,
however, before his motion could be resolved Lumiqued died On September 28, 1994, Secretary
Quisumbing denied the second motion for reconsideration for lack of ment

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Committee, the October 22, 1992, Memorandum of then
Justice Secretary Drilon, A.G. No. 52 issued by President Ramos, and the orders of Secretary
Quisumbing. In a nutshell, it prays for the "payment of retirement benefits and other benefits
accorded to deceased Arsenio.

Lumiqued by law, payable to his heirs; and the backwages from the period he was dismissed
from service up to the time of his death on May 19, 1994.

Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to
counsel during the hearing. They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived unless
the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the committee should
have suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a
counsel of his own. If suspension was not possible, the committee should have appointed a
counsel de oficio to assist him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ investigating committee denied Lumiqued of his contitutional
right to counsel during the hearing

RULING: No. These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel, which cannot
be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a
suspect or an accused during custodial investigation, It is not an absolute night and may, thus, be
invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry.
In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have
competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Camiqued, however, was not accused of
any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by
Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held
administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The order issued by
Acting Secretary of Justice Montenegro states thus: "In the interest of the public service and
pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, a Committee to

conduct the formal investigation of the administrative complaint for oppression, dishonesty,
disgraceful and immoral conduct, being notoriously undesirable and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service against Mr. ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED, Regional Director,
Department of Agrarian Reform, Cordillera Autonomous Region, is hereby created."

As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a criminal
prosecution. This was even made more pronounced when, after finding Lumiqued
administratively Rable, it hinted at the filing of criminal case for malversation through
fabification of public documents in its report and recommendation.

Petitioners misconception on the nature of the investigation conducted against Lumiqued appears
to have been engendered by the fact that the DOJ conducted it. While it is true that under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall "administer the criminal justice system in
accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes,
prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system conducting criminal
investigations is not its sole function. By its power to "perform such other functions as may be
provided by law prosecutors may be caled upon to conduct administrative investigations.
Accordingly, the investigating committee created by Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound
to conduct the administrative investigation in accordance with the rules therefor

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal

proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or
may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's
capacity to represent himself and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel In an administrative proceeding such as the one that transpired, a
respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not.

RATIO: The Department of justice shall carry out the declared policy to provide the government
with a principal law agency which sahli be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm. By its
power to "perform such other functions as may be provided by law prosecutors may be called
upon to conduct administrative investigations.

G.R. No. 1203 May 15, 1903

In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from the practice of law.

Solicitor-General Araneta for Government.

W. A. Kincaid for defendant.

PER CURIAM:

Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause in the Court of First Instance,
in the city of Manila, on the 5th day of February, 1903, why he should not be suspended as a
member of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:
First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after he had been
notified that the said organization was made for the purpose of evading the law then in force in
said city; and, Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the time of
and after its organization, which organization was known to him to be created for the purpose of
evading the law.

The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W. A. Kincaid, made answer to
these charges, denying the same, and filed affidavits in answer thereto. After reading testimony
given by said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United States vs. H. D. Terrell,1 wherein he
was charged with estafa, and after reading the said affidavits in his behalf, and hearing his
counsel, the court below found, and decided as a fact, that the charges aforesaid made against
Howard D. Terrell were true, and thereupon made an order suspending him from his office as a
lawyer in the Philippine Islands, and directed the clerk of the court to transmit to this court a
certified copy of the order of suspension, as well as a full statement of the facts upon which the
same was based.

We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the conclusion that they were such as
to justify the court below in arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge and acts of the accused
in connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club were of such a nature and
character as to warrant his suspension from practice.

The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of violating or
evading the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of an attorney, an officer
of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his office, and for which he may
be removed or suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 21.) The assisting of a client in a
scheme which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or the conniving at a violation of law, are acts
which justify disbarment.

In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of the United States, vs. Terrell was
acquitted on the charge of estafa, and has not, therefore, been convicted of crime, and as the acts
with which he is charged in this proceeding, while unprofessional and hence to be condemned,
are not criminal in their nature, we are of opinion that the ends of justice will be served by the
suspension of said Howard D. Terrell from the practice of law in the Philippine Islands for the
term of one year from the 7th day of February, 1903. It is therefore directed that the said Howard
D. Terrell be suspended from the practice of law for a term of one year from February 7, 1903. It
is so ordered.

Case Title: In Re: Petition to Take the Lawyer's Oath by Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.
Facts: Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr. had recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations but was not allowed
to take the lawyer's oath due to a prior conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide. The conviction arose from his involvement in the initiation rites of the LEX
TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity at the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, in September
1991, which resulted in the death of a neophyte, Raul I. Camaligan. He was subsequently granted
probation and discharged from probation on May 10, 1995. In 1997, Cuevas petitioned the
Supreme Court to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath, presenting certifications attesting to his
good character.
Issues: The main issue is whether Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr. should be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath and be admitted to the practice of law, considering his prior conviction for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.
Decision/Held: The Supreme Court, in considering Cuevas' petition, noted the seriousness of his
prior conviction, which involved his participation in the senseless beating of a neophyte resulting
in the neophyte's death. The Court recognized the need to uphold the high standards of
intellectual and moral qualifications for admission to the bar and prevent the entry of
undeserving aspirants or those who have become a disgrace to the profession.
However, the Court also acknowledged that Cuevas had completed his probation without any
infractions and provided certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful, and civic-oriented
character. The Court decided to give him a chance, considering that young individuals can be
rash and uncalculating. It emphasized that taking the lawyer's oath is not a mere formality and
urged Cuevas to conduct himself beyond reproach and uphold the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Case Title: Sally D. Bongalonta v. Atty. Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija
Facts: Complainant Sally Bongalonta filed a sworn letter-complaint against Attorneys Pablito M.
Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, accusing them of unjust and
unethical conduct. Bongalonta had initiated Criminal Case No. 7635-55 for estafa and Civil Case
No. 56934 against Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. Atty. Castillo represented the Sps. Abuel in
both cases. During the same period, Gregorio Lantin filed Civil Case No. 58650 for a sum of
money against the Sps. Abuel, and Atty. Martija represented Lantin.
Bongalonta alleged that Atty. Castillo and Atty. Martija used the same address, professional tax
receipt (PTR), and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) receipt numbers in all three cases,
suggesting a scheme to hinder the execution of a judgment she might obtain in Civil Case No.
56934. She claime

d that Civil Case No. 58650 was part of this scheme.After a hearing, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors found that the charge against the respondents
(representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate judgment execution) had no
basis. The IBP noted that Bongalonta had a superior lien on the property, and the charge was
groundless.
However, Atty. Pablito M. Castillo was found guilty of using Atty. Alfonso M. Martija's IBP
official receipt number through negligence. Atty. Castillo was suspended from the practice of
law for six months for this offense. The complaint against Atty. Martija was dismissed for lack
of evidence.
Issues:
1. Whether Attorneys Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija engaged in unjust and
unethical conduct by representing conflicting interests and obstructing judgment execution.
2. Whether Atty. Pablito M. Castillo's use of Atty. Alfonso M. Martija's IBP official receipt
number constituted professional misconduct.
Decision/Held:The IBP Board of Governors found no basis to support the charge of unjust and
unethical conduct against Attorneys Castillo and Martija. The charge was deemed groundless
because Bongalonta had a superior lien on the property in question, and the allegation of
obstructing judgment execution lacked merit.
However, Atty. Pablito M. Castillo was found guilty of professional misconduct for using Atty.
Alfonso M. Martija's IBP official receipt number. As a result, Atty. Castillo was suspended from
the practice of law for six months. The court emphasized the importance of complete candor and
honesty in the legal profession and stated that lawyers must fulfill their duty to be honest and
truthful in court.

The court warned that a similar offense in the future would result in a more severe penalty for
Atty. Castillo. The resolution was to be recorded in his personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant. The complaint against Atty. Martija was dismissed due to a lack of evidence.

PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan (5th Division), Lucio C. Tan, et. al. 455 SCRA 526 FACTS: Atty.
Estelito P. Mendoza was the Solicitor General until 1986. He resumed his private practice of law.
He appeared as counsel for Lucio C. Tan, et. al. before the Sandiganbayan involving civil cases
of sequestration of properties allegedly ill-gotten wealth. When still the Solicitor General, he
advised the Central Bank on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK which became
saddled with banking problems. GENBANK was later bought by the ALLIED Bank owned by
Lucio C. Tan, et. al. Atty. Mendoza continues defending both the interests of the Central Bank
and Lucio Tan, et. al. PCGG filed a Motion to Disqualify Atty. Mendoza anchored on Rule 6.03
reading --“A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mendoza is disqualified to appear as counsel for Lucio Tan, et. al.
under Rule 6.03.

HELD: Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of
paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase
“investigated and passed upon” with the word “intervened.” It is, therefore, properly applicable
to both “adverse-interest conflicts” and “congruent-interest conflicts.” The case at bar does not
involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no
adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as
counsel of respondents Tan, et. al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case No. 0096-0099 before
the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists a “congruent-
interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents
Tan, et. al. xxx We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to
liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. xxx Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the
prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that
granting disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but
probably in individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. The client with a disqualified
lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter. The effects of
the prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in
denial of due process. xxx No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former
government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law,
the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm.
Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession. It is
however, preferred that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public
confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a
highly speculative exercise at best which can lead to untoward results. No less than Judge
Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have
any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its
attorneys which the canons seek to protect. Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has
been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and some courts have
abandoned per se disqualification based on Canon 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest
exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in
the case, and the public. Atty. Mendoza was not disqualified by the Supreme Court.