MODULE 9: STATUTES CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE

AQUINO VS QUEZON CITY G.R. No. 137534 March 3, 2006 Tax Delinquency, Notice of Delinquency, Real
Property Tax
OCTOBER 6, 2017
FACTS:
This case involves two petitions for review on certiorari involving the decisions declaring valid the auction sales of
two real properties by the Quezon City Local Gov’t for failure to pay real property taxes.
The first case deals with a lot formerly owned by petitioners Aquino. Petitioners withheld payment of the real
property taxes as a form of protest for the gov’t of then President Marcos. As a result of the nonpayment, the
property was sold by the Quezon City local government, through the Treasurer’s Office, at public auction to private
respondent Aida Linao, the highest bidder. Petitioners claimed that they learned of the sale about 2 years later. They
fixed as action for annulment of title, reconveyance, and damages against the respondents.
The seconds case deals with a property located In Cubao, Quezon City in the name of Solomon Torrado. According
to petitioner heirs, Torrado paid taxes on the improvements on Lot 8 but not on the lot itself because the Treasurer’s
Office could not locate the index card for that property. For failure to pay real property taxes from 1976 to 1982, the
City Treasurer sent a Notice of Intent to Sell to Torrado to his address indicated in the tax register, which simply
states as ‘ButuanCity. The notice was returned by reason of ‘Insufficient Address. Next sent was a Notice of Sale of
Delinquent Property. This was sent to the same address and similarly returned unclaimed. Thereafter, a public
auction was held and the lot was sold to Veronica Baluyot, who mortgaged the property to Spouses Uy who then
sold it to DNX Corp for failure to pay the mortgaged debt. Also, a Notice of Sold Property was subsequently sent to
Torrado which was returned unclaimed.
ISSUE:
Was there a failure on the part of the Quezon City Local Gov’t to satisfy the notice requirements before selling the
property for tax delinquency?
RULING:
Definitely, there is no more logical way to construe the whole chapter on ‘Collection of Real Property Tax (Sections
56 to 85) than to stress that while three methods are provided to enforce collection on real property taxes, a notice of
delinquency is a requirement regardless of the method or methods chosen.
It is incorrect for the respondents to claim that notice of delinquency has limited application only to distraint of
personal property. They mistakenly lumped Section 65 exclusively with Sections 68 to 72 and, in so doing,
restricted its application from the other tax remedies. Section 65 is to be construed together with Sections 66 and 78
and all three operate in reference to tax methods in general.
Petitioners are correct in insisting that two notices must be sent to the taxpayer concerned. Nevertheless, respondents
still prevail because the Court is satisfied that the two-notice requirement has been complied with by the Treasurer’s
Office.

Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation

DOCTRINE: a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly
sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

FACTS: Petitioner Vinzons-Chato was then the CIR while respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entity
engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among which are "Champion," "Hope," and "More"
cigarettes.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993.
Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands ‘Champion," "Hope," and "More" were considered local brands subjected to
an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect,
petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes
bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in effect subjected "Hope," "More,"
and "Champion" cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142, (c)(1) on locally manufactured
cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of "55%
provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack."
On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of
RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco
received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993. The same letter
assessed respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-
93) and demanded payment within 10 days from receipt thereof. On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for
review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the
implementation of RMC 37-93. In its decision dated August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective,
invalid, and unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued
pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals. It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen
short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.

On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioner in her private
capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without
due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. RTC denied the motion. The cse was elevated to the CA, however, the same
was dismissed.

ISSUE: Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code should
govern in determining whether the instant complaint states a cause of action?

HELD: The Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, that a public officer who directly or indirectly
violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
The complaint filed by respondent stated a cause of action and that the decisive provision thereon is Article 32 of the
Civil Code.

A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally
belonging to such class. A special statute, as the term is generally understood, is one which relates to particular
persons or things of a class or to a particular portion or section of the state only.

A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should, accordingly, be read
together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. The rule is that where there are two acts,
one of which is special and particular and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter
and thus conflict with the special act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly
than that of a general statute and must not be taken as intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions
of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all.

The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change the principle. Where
the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act; and where
the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed
expressly or by necessary implication.

The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Considering that bad faith and
malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the
same will not amount to failure to state a cause of action. The courts below therefore correctly denied the motion to
dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a violation of a
constitutional right of the plaintiff.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LUISITO D. BUSTINERA
G. R. No. 148233: June 08 2004: 475 PHIL 190
Offense Involved: Conflict between Qualified Theft and Anti-Carnapping Law
FACTS: Sometime in1996, Edwin Cipriano hired the accused, Luisito Bustinera, as a taxi driver and assigned him
to drive a Daewoo Racer. They agreed that Bustinera would drive the taxi from 6:00 am to 11:00 pm, and would
return it to the garage and remit the boundary of P780.00 per day. However, on Dec. 25, 1996, the accused reported
for work but did not return the taxi on the same day. On the following day, Cipriano went to Bustinera’s house but
did not find the taxi there. The wife of the accused also informed Cipriano that his husband has not yet returned.
Cipriano then went to report his missing taxi. It was only on January 9, 1997 where the taxi was recovered after the
wife of the accused informed Cipriano that the said taxi was abandoned on Regalado street, Quezon City. In his
defense, accused admitted that he did not return the taxi on December 25 as he was short on the boundary fee.
However, he posited that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and signed the record book, which was company
procedure, to show that he indeed returned it and gave his employer P2,500.00 as partial payment for the boundary
fee covering the period from December 25, 1996 to January 5, 1997. After trial, the RTC found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of qualified theft.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether RPC or Anti-Carnapping is applicable in this case?
2. Whether or not accused-appellant violated the Anti-Carnapping Law?
HELD:
1. Anti-Carnapping is applicable in this case. Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310
has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles, by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise
known as “An Act Preventing And Penalizing Carnapping.” When statutes are in pari materia or when they
relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or cover the same specific or
particular subject matter, or have the same purpose or object, the rule dictates that they should be construed
together interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est optimus interpretandi modus. Every statute must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.
 Yes. Accused-appellant violated the Anti-Carnapping Law. The prosecution was able to prove the
existence of all the elements of carnapping, to wit: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to
another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. The argument of the
defense that there was no intent to gain when he failed to return the taxi to its garage holds no merit. Intent
to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle.
Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term gain is not merely
limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or
expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the
owners consent constitutes gain.

Theft – undue taking, force upon things/people

 Under RPC, nakaw ng sasakyan is qualified theft
 Under ACL, carnapping

MODULE 10: MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY STATUTES

Article 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law
itself authorizes their validity. (4a)

Samuel Arnado v Atty. Homobono A. Adaza

FACTS:
Atty. Arnado called the attention of the Court to the practice of Atty. Adaza of indicating
“MCLE application for exemption under process” in his pleadings for the years 2009-2012, and
“MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration” in a pleading filed in 2012. Arnado
inquired from the MCLE office about the status of Atty. Adaza’s compliance and found out that
the latter has not complied with the MCLE requirement for 3 consecutive compliance periods or
from the year 2001-2010 and that his Application for Exemption was denied in 2009.
The court directed that Atty. Adaza be furnished a copy of Atty. Arnado’s complaint and to
file his comment within 10 days from notice. Respondent contended that he did not receive a
copy of the denial of his application and was wondering why his application cannot be granted.
He stated his achievements as a lawyer, the books he wrote and claimed that he had been
practicing law for about 50 years.
The OBC in its report stated that respondent filed an application for exemption for the
first 2 compliance period but was denied because he failed to submit sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing proof to establish his expertise in a certain area of law. The MCLE office has no
record that respondent filed a motion for reconsideration thus his representation in his pleading
is baseless.
The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of the Bar
and guilty of non-compliance with the MCLE requirements, suspension from the practice of law
for six months with a stem waming that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be
dealt with more severely and that he be directed to comply with the requirements set forth by
the MCLE Goveming Board.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent is administratively liable for his failure to comply with the MCLE
requirements.
HELD:
YES Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply with the
MCLE requirement. His application for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods
was filed after the compliance periods had ended. He did not follow-up the status of his
application for exemption. He furnished the Court with his letter asking the office to act on his
application for exemption but alleged that his secretary failed to send it to the MCLE Office. He
did not comply with the Fourth Compliance Period. Respondent's failure to comply with the
MCLE requirements jeopardized the causes of his clients because the pleadings he filed could
be stricken off from the records and considered invalid.
Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the
directives of the MCLE Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP While
the MCLE Implementing Regulations state that the MCLE Committee should recommend to the
IBP Board of Governors the listing of a lawyer as a delinquent member, there is nothing that
prevents the Court from using its administrative power and supervision to discipline erring
lawyers and from directing the IBP Board of Governors to declare such lawyers as delinquent
members of the IBP.
The Court DECLARED Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and SUSPENDED him from the practice of law for 6 MONTHS,
or until he has fully complied with the MCLE requirements for the First, Second, Third, and
Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-
compliance and reinstatement fees.

Lokin Jr. vs Commission on Elections

GR No. 179431-32
Facts: The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under the
partylist system of representation that manifested their intention to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized
national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to participate, CIBAC, through its President
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of 5 nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should
CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The nominees in order that their names appeared in the
certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007, were: 1.) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; 2.) herein petitioner Luis K.
Lokin Jr.; 3.) Cinchora C. Cruz-Gonzales; 4.) Sherwin Tugma; and 5.) Emil L. Galang. The nominees certificate of
acceptance were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC. The list of nominees was later published
in two newspaper of general circulation. Prior to elections, however, CIBAC still through Villanueva filed a
certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007, hereby it withdrew
the nominations of Lokin, Tugma and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees.
Issue: Whether or not the substitution is valid.
Held: No. The legislative power of the government is vested exclusively in accordance with the doctrine of
separation of power. As a general rule, the legislative cannot surrender pr abdicate its legislative power for doing so
will be unconstitutional. Although the power to make laws cannot be delegated by the legislative to any other
authority, a power that is not legislative in character may be delegated.
Under certain circumstances, the legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards the
authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the legislature must declare the policy of
the law and fix the legal principles that are to control in given cases. The legislature should set a definite or primary
standard to guide those empowered to execute the law. For as long as the policy is laid down and a proper standard
is established by statute, there can be no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power when the legislature leaves
to selected instrumentalities the duty of making subordinate rules within the prescribed limits, although there is
conferred upon the executive officer or administrative board a large measure of discretion. There is a distinction
between the delegation of power to make a law and the conferment of an authority or a discretion to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law, for the power to make laws necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall
be.
To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with thr prescribed procedure;
4. It must be reasonable.
The COMELEC, despite the role as implementing arm of the government in the enforcement and administration of
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, has neither the authority nor the license to expand,
extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement. The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose should
always accord with the law to be implemented, and should not be override, supplant or modify the law. It is basic
that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.