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Measuring Four Perspectives of Justice Sensitivity With

Two Items Each
a b c a c
Anna Baumert , Constanze Beierlein , Manfred Schmitt , Christoph J. Kemper ,
d e c
Anastassiya Kovaleva , Stefan Liebig & Beatrice Rammstedt
a
Department of Psychology , University of Koblenz-Landau , Germany
b
School of Psychology , University of Western Australia , Perth , Australia
c
Department of Survey Design and Methodology , GESIS—Leibniz Institute for the Social
Sciences , Mannheim , Germany
d
Department of Didactics of Biology , University of Bielefeld , Germany
e
Department of Sociology , University of Bielefeld , Germany
Published online: 25 Sep 2013.

To cite this article: Anna Baumert , Constanze Beierlein , Manfred Schmitt , Christoph J. Kemper , Anastassiya Kovaleva ,
Stefan Liebig & Beatrice Rammstedt (2014) Measuring Four Perspectives of Justice Sensitivity With Two Items Each, Journal of
Personality Assessment, 96:3, 380-390, DOI: 10.1080/00223891.2013.836526

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 Journal of Personality Assessment, 96(3), 380–390, 2014
Copyright C Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0022-3891 print / 1532-7752 online
DOI: 10.1080/00223891.2013.836526

Measuring Four Perspectives of Justice Sensitivity With Two

Items Each
ANNA BAUMERT,1,2 CONSTANZE BEIERLEIN,3 MANFRED SCHMITT,1 CHRISTOPH J. KEMPER,3 ANASTASSIYA KOVALEVA,4
STEFAN LIEBIG,5 AND BEATRICE RAMMSTEDT3
1
Department of Psychology, University of Koblenz-Landau, Germany
2
School of Psychology, University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia
3
Department of Survey Design and Methodology, GESIS—Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Mannheim, Germany
4
Department of Didactics of Biology, University of Bielefeld, Germany
5
Department of Sociology, University of Bielefeld, Germany
Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 21:16 11 October 2014

People differ systematically in their vulnerability to injustice. We present two-item scales for the efficient measurement of justice sensitivity
from 4 perspectives (victim, observer, beneficiary, perpetrator). In Study 1 using a quota-based sample of German adults, a latent state–trait
analysis revealed the factorial validity and high reliabilities of the scales. In Study 2 employing a large random sample, we tested for measurement
invariance of the items within the context of our short 2-item scales compared to the original 10-item scales. Multigroup confirmatory factor analyses
confirmed that the validity of the indicators and the internal structure of the assessed constructs did not change across item contexts. In both studies,
correlations with personality dimensions and life satisfaction provide evidence for the validity of our scales. With the presented instrument, future
research can extend scientific knowledge regarding the role of individual differences in reactions to injustice for the explanation of well-being and
physical health.

Feelings of injustice have a great impact on psychological well-
being and the physical health of individuals. Perceiving one-
self to be underrewarded can trigger strong negative emotions
and feelings of distress (e.g., Rousseau, Salek, Aubé, & Morin,
2009), impair coping, and foster unhealthy behaviors (Green-
berg, 2010). This perception can act as a substantial risk factor
for developing symptoms of insomnia, burnout, and depression
(Greenberg, 2006; Siegrist, 2002). By contrast, feeling fairly and
respectfully treated can prevent distress and has been shown to
be systematically related to well-being and health (e.g., Elo-
vainio, Kivimäki, Vahtera, Keltikangas-Järvinen, & Virtanen,
2003; Greenberg, 2004; Tepper, 2001). Importantly, persons
have been found to differ in how readily they perceive situ-
ations to be unjust and how strongly they react to subjective
injustice—cognitively, emotionally, and behaviorally (Lovas &
Wolt, 2002; Schmitt, Neumann, & Montada, 1995). These in-
dividual differences in justice sensitivity are consistent across
situations and stable over time (Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, &
Arbach, 2005). In other words, people differ systematically in
their vulnerability to the adverse consequences of injustice.
However, the quality of reactions to injustice depends on the
perspective that a person adopts in an unjust situation. Individu-
als react with distinct emotions and behavioral tendencies if they
perceive themselves to be potential victims of injustice, passive
beneficiaries, active perpetrators, or neutral bystanders (e.g.,
Mikula, Petri, & Tanzer, 1990). Accordingly, justice sensitivity
has been differentiated into victim sensitivity, beneficiary sensi-
tivity, perpetrator sensitivity, and observer sensitivity. Ten-item
Received August 27, 2012; Revised May 23, 2013.
Address correspondence to Anna Baumert, Department of Psychology, Uni-
versity of Koblenz-Landau, Fortstrasse 7, 76829 Landau, Germany; Email:
baumert@uni-landau.de
380
scales have been developed to assess each justice sensitivity per-
spective and evidence for their reliability and validity has been
reported (Schmitt, Baumert, Gollwitzer, & Maes, 2010; Schmitt
et al., 2005). To maximize the convergence of the items, the
strength of specific emotional reactions to injustice (i.e., anger,
outrage, and guilt depending on the perspective), intrusiveness
of thoughts, and general feelings of strain following experiences
of injustice have been employed as indicators of each of the four
perspectives. The scales’ four-factorial structure has been sup-
ported by confirmatory factor analyses (Schmitt et al., 2010).
The factors share common variance that is assumed to reflect
a general concern for justice. They also show distinct patterns
of correlations with external criteria. For example, beneficiary
sensitivity, perpetrator sensitivity, and observer sensitivity are
positively related to modesty and tender-mindedness as facets
of agreeableness (Schmitt et al., 2010) and predict prosocial
tendencies such as solidarity with disadvantaged others (Goll-
witzer, Schmitt, Schalke, Maes, & Baer, 2005) or bystander
intervention against norm violations (Lotz, Baumert, Schlösser,
Gresser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011). By contrast, victim sensitivity
was found to be negatively related to facets of agreeableness and
moderately positively to neuroticism (Schmitt et al., 2010) and
negative interpersonal feelings, such as jealousy, vengeance, and
paranoia (Schmitt et al., 2005). Furthermore, victim sensitivity
predicted rather antisocial tendencies, namely a reluctance to
cooperate and invest in common goods (Gollwitzer, Rothmund,
Pfeiffer, & Ensenbach, 2009; Rothmund, Gollwitzer, & Klimmt,
2011) and, thus, appears to reflect a concern for justice for the
self rather than for others, and the fear of being exploited by
interaction partners (Gollwitzer et al., 2005).
Highlighting the usefulness of this construct, research has
shown that the justice sensitivity perspectives cannot be re-
duced to general personality factors (Schmitt et al., 2005) or
to a combination of personality facets (Schmitt et al., 2010).
 JUSTICE SENSITIVITY SHORT SCALES
Additionally, there is consistent evidence for the predictive
value of justice sensitivity for reactions to injustice above
and beyond alternative constructs such as trait anger or self-
assertiveness (e.g., Mohiyeddini & Schmitt, 1997). The first
empirical studies conducted in this area have shown the impor-
tance of justice sensitivity for explaining health-related justice
effects. For example, Schmitt and Dörfel (1999) showed that
the psychosomatic well-being of people high in victim sen-
sitivity was more strongly impaired by perceived unfairness
at the workplace than the well-being of people low in victim
sensitivity. Hessler, Pretsch, Hillert, and Schmitt (2012) found
that teachers who suffer from burnout symptoms score signif-
icantly higher on victim and observer sensitivity than healthy
teachers.
Beyond these findings, scientific knowledge on justice sensi-
tivity as a risk factor for psychological well-being and physical
health is still scarce. This is at least partially due to the fact
that research on justice sensitivity as a personal determinant
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of reactions to injustice has been conducted predominantly in
the laboratory or has relied on convenience samples and mostly
on student samples. Therefore, it is highly desirable for future
research to include justice sensitivity scales in large-scale sur-
veys of the general population as well as in clinical studies. In
both domains, there is a strong demand for very short measures
due to time and space limitations in surveys and screenings.
Accounting for this demand, ultrashort measures have been de-
veloped, for example, for the Big Five with two items per factor
(Rammstedt & John, 2007), or for social phobia with six items
(Fergus, Valentiner, McGrath, Gier-Lonsway, & Kim, 2012).
These measures have demonstrated good psychometric charac-
teristics despite their brevity.
Accordingly, in this article, our first goal was to develop
ultrashort scales for the economic assessment of justice sensi-
tivity without substantial losses in reliability and validity. As
a second goal, we determined the item stability of the two se-
lected items within the context of the short scales compared
to the context of the original scales. In future research on jus-
tice sensitivity, the question could well arise as to whether re-
sults obtained with our short scales can be directly compared
to results obtained with the original scales. For example, re-
searchers employing German samples of unknown representa-
tiveness might want to compare their results to the normative
data provided by Schmitt et al. (2010) for the original scales.
However, if these researchers use the two-item scales presented
here, it has to be established whether their mean levels can in-
deed be compared to the mean level of these items when used
in the context of the original scales. Additionally, researchers
can conduct different studies concerning one research ques-
tion with either the short scales or the original scales. Direct
comparison of the results is viable only if evidence can be
provided that the two items function similarly within different
scale contexts. This is important because social psychological
research has revealed that various aspects of the measurement
context can affect item characteristics (Knowles & Condon,
2000; Schwarz, 1999). The placement of an item within a scale
has been shown to determine the item’s correlation with the
total score and the variability and mean level of answers to
this item (e.g., Knowles, 1988; Knowles, Coker, Scott, Cook,
& Neville, 1996; Ostrom, Betz, & Skowronski, 1992; Stein-
berg, 1994). Thus, for the creation of new forms of tests, item
stability has to be established empirically to provide a basis
381
for the future comparison of results obtained with different test
forms.
STUDY 1: RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF THE JUSTICE
SENSITIVITY SHORT SCALES
Method
Sample. Participants were recruited in 2010 by the certified
poll agency BIK MARPLAN based on quotas representing pop-
ulation distributions of age, gender, education, and residency in
the 16 federal states of Germany. At Time 1, 536 persons partic-
ipated (52.5% women). Ages ranged between 18 and 88 years
(M = 47.22, SD = 15.15). Regarding education, 23.6% indi-
cated that they had graduated from high school (in Germany
called Abitur, with a minimum of 12 years of school atten-
dance), 30.4% from intermediate secondary school (in Germany
called Realschule, with a minimum of 10 years of school atten-
dance), and 44.7% from secondary school (in Germany called
Hauptschule, with a minimum of 9 years of school attendance).
At Time 2 (approximately 6 weeks later), 338 persons partic-
ipated (i.e., a dropout rate of 37%). People who participated at
both measurement occasions did not differ from those who par-
ticipated only at Time 1 in age, t(534) = 1.02, p = .31, d = .09;
gender, χ 2(1) = 0.07, p = .79, d = .02, or level of education,
χ 2(3) = 1.25, p = .74, d = .10.
Material. For all measures, we aggregated the items by cal-
culating individual mean values. Note that response options var-
ied across instruments because scale ranges were employed as
originally published to secure comparability of our results with
those of previous studies using the respective instruments. How-
ever, to minimize inconsistencies, all response scales started
with 1 (disagree strongly) at the lower end.
Justice Sensitivity Short Scales: Two items were selected
from each of the original 10-item scales based on the following
criteria. To achieve maximum content validity, we selected items
that covered two of the three theoretical indicators employed in
the original scales: the strength of emotional reactions (i.e.,
anger, outrage, or guilt, depending on the perspective of justice
sensitivity) and subjective strain felt in response to injustice. As
a further criterion, we chose items that promised to provide the
expected four-factor structure of victim, observer, beneficiary,
and perpetrator sensitivity. Based on exploratory factor analyses
of data from Schmitt et al. (2005) and Schmitt et al. (2010), we
selected items that loaded clearly on the expected factor with
minimal secondary loadings on other factors. Note that the third
indicator (intrusiveness of thoughts) is not represented by the
short scales because the respective items met this latter criterion
less optimally than the items of the other two indicators.
The final set of items can be found in the Appendix. In our
study, items were presented in German. The Appendix presents
an English-language equivalent. These items were taken from
the English version of the original justice sensitivity scales
(Schmitt et al., 2010), which is the result of the translation
by a native German speaker fluent in English, and of the inde-
pendent discussion with two native English speakers, experts in
the domain of justice research.
Like the original scales, each set of items representing one
justice sensitivity perspective was introduced by a short instruc-
tion (see Schmitt et al., 2010), for example, “First, we will
look at situations to the advantage of others and to your own
 382
disadvantage” (victim perspective) or, “Finally, we will look at
situations in which you treat someone else unfairly, discriminate
against someone, or exploit someone” (perpetrator perspective).
Response options ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 6 (totally
agree).
Personality: As very short scales were employed in this
study to capture the relevant personality dimensions, high in-
ternal consistencies are not expected. As a better estimator of
reliability, we provide retest correlations (rtt ) across the 6-week
interval in our study.
The Big Five Inventory BFI–10 (Rammstedt & John, 2007)
was used to assess extraversion (α = .63, rtt = .59), agreeable-
ness (α = .53, rtt = .50), conscientiousness (α = .58, rtt = .59),
neuroticism (α = .42, rtt = .49), and openness (α = .30, rtt = .62)
with two items per dimension. Response options ranged from
1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly). Despite the brevity
of their scales and, consequently, low internal consistencies,
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Rammstedt and John (2007) obtained satisfactory retest relia-
bilities as well as evidence for structural validity and convergent
validity with peer ratings and other Big Five measures.
Furthermore, interpersonal trust was measured with three
items taken from the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP-
trust: “In general, you can trust people,” “Nowadays, you can’t
rely on anybody” recoded, and “When dealing with strangers it
is better to be cautious before trusting them” recoded; α = .59,
rtt = .57; Naef & Schupp, 2009). The authors provided evidence
for the satisfactory retest reliability as well as for the construct
and criterion validity of their measure. Response options ranged
from 1 (disagree strongly/not trust at all) to 4 (agree strongly/a
lot of trust).
General self-efficacy was measured with 10 items (e.g., “I can
always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough”;
α = .92, rtt = .49; Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995) that have
been successfully employed in prior research, for example on
personal determinants of job stress and burnout among teachers
(Schwarzer & Hallum, 2008). Further studies have provided
evidence for its validity (e.g., Scholz, Gutiérrez-Doña, Sud, &
Schwarzer, 2002). Response options ranged from 1 (disagree
strongly) to 4 (agree strongly).
Internal locus of control and external locus of control were
assessed by means of three-item short scales developed specif-
ically for use in population surveys (Jakoby & Jacob, 1999;
internal: e.g., “I find it best to make decisions myself, rather
than to rely on fate”; α = .76, rtt = .65; external: e.g., “I often
have the feeling that I have little influence over what happens to
me”; α = .61, rtt = .53).1 The authors reported satisfactory evi-
dence for the validities of both scales. Response options ranged
from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly).
Life Satisfaction: We employed the German version of the
Satisfaction with Life scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin,
1985), which consists of five items (e.g., “In most ways my life
is close to my ideal”; α = .89, rtt = .66). The authors reported
high internal consistency of the scale. Pavot and Diener (1993)
provided evidence for the discriminant and convergent validity
of the scale. Response options ranged from 1 (disagree strongly)
to 7 (agree strongly).
1Translation of the original German scales provided by us.
BAUMERT ET AL.
Procedure. German citizens aged 18 and older were ap-
proached on the streets of different German towns and invited to
participate in a survey on various psychological topics. Among
those who agreed to participate at two times of measurement
that were 6 weeks apart and who provided their contact details
to be contacted again at the second time of measurement, the
sample was drawn based on population quotas (see earlier). Re-
sponses at both measurement times were recorded anonymously
and matched by means of an anonymous personalized code. Par-
ticipants were rewarded 8 Euro for their repeated participation.
Our measures of interest were administered as part of a larger
questionnaire either in computer-assisted personal interviews
(CAPIs; 76% of participants at Time 1; 67% of participants
at Time 2) or in a self-administered paper-and-pencil version.
CAPIs were conducted by trained interviewers who helped to fill
out the questionnaire on a computer. Self-administered paper-
and-pencil questionnaires were handed out to the participant,
filled out individually, and returned to the interviewer. The mea-
sures were presented in the following order: BFI–10, general
self-efficacy, interpersonal trust, life satisfaction, victim, ob-
server, beneficiary, and perpetrator sensitivity.
Results
Bivariate correlations among justice sensitivity scales.
Table 1 displays means, standard deviations, and correlations
of the justice sensitivity scales at Time 1 and Time 2. The retest
correlations show a moderate stability of the scales (between
.44 and .56).
Simultaneous latent state–trait analysis. A simultaneous
latent state–trait analysis (LSTA; Steyer, Ferring, & Schmitt,
1992; Steyer, Schmitt, & Eid, 1999) of our four justice sensitiv-
ity short scales provides an error-free estimator of the scales’ re-
liabilities. Moreover, in LSTA, three sources of systematic vari-
ance in the manifest variables can be distinguished. First, trait
consistency (stability) is defined as the proportion of variance
explained by variance in the stable latent trait. Second, occasion
specificity is the proportion of variance explained by systematic
unstable variance at one measurement occasion. Third, method
specificity is defined as the proportion of variance explained by
nonequivalent indicators of a construct (Schmitt et al., 2005).
The LST model for our four short scales is depicted in Fig-
ure 1. As explained by Eid, Schneider, and Schwenkmezger
(1999) and confirmed by simulation studies (Geiser & Lockhart,
TABLE 1.—Means, standard deviations, and interscale and retest correlations of
justice sensitivity short scales in Study 1.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 JS-Victim (T1)
2 JS-Observer (T1) .45∗∗
3 JS-Beneficiary (T1) .26∗∗ .46∗∗
4 JS-Perpetrator (T1) .22∗∗ .45∗∗ .72∗∗
5 JS-Victim (T2) .56∗∗ .14∗ .18∗∗ .14∗
.25∗∗ .44∗∗ .30∗∗ .24∗∗ .40∗∗
6
7
JS-Observer (T2)
JS-Beneficiary (T2) .24∗∗ .38∗∗ .54∗∗ .40∗∗ .26∗∗ .47∗∗
8 JS-Perpetrator (T2) .24∗∗ .40∗∗ .40∗∗ .47∗∗ .30∗∗ .54∗∗ .69∗∗
M 3.26 3.36 2.15 2.36 3.17 3.07 2.07 2.31
SD 1.51 1.32 1.16 1.30 1.50 1.29 1.08 1.26
Note. N = 539 (Time 1). N = 338 (Time 2). JS-Victim, JS-Observer, JS-Beneficiary,
JS-Perpetrator = justice sensitivity from the victim, observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator
perspectives. The mean reported is the arithmetic mean of individual scale means. Response
options ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 6 (totally agree).
∗
p < .05. ∗ ∗ p < .01.
 JUSTICE SENSITIVITY SHORT SCALES 383

TABLE 2.—Coefficients (Spearman–Brown corrected) of the four short scales

and factor correlations as estimated from the accepted latent state–trait model
in Study 1.

JS- JS-
JS-Victim JS-Observer Beneficiary Perpetrator

Reliability .89 .88 .91 .93

Trait consistency .54 .43 .54 .47
Occasion .33 .42 .34 .44
specificity
Method specificity .02 .02 .03 .02
Correlations among trait factors
JS-Observer .46
JS-Beneficiary .39 .68
JS-Perpetrator .37 .66 .81
Correlations among latent state residuals
JS-Observer .55
JS-Beneficiary .14 .33
JS-Perpetrator .18 .39 .75
Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 21:16 11 October 2014

FIGURE 1.—Latent state–trait model for four justice sensitivity perspectives (V

= Victim; O = Observer; B = Beneficiary; P = Perpetrator) measured with two
indicators each, at two occasions of measurement (LSR = latent state residual;
Half 2 = second test half).
2012), one method factor is sufficient to account for the specific
variance of one item in distinction from the other item. Similar to
Schmitt et al. (2005), several restrictions were imposed to secure
identification of the model. First, all factor loadings were set to
1. Second, the variances of the latent state residuals (LSRs) of
the same construct were set to be equal for the two times of mea-
surement. Third, the covariances of the LSRs of one construct
with the LSRs of another construct were also constrained to be
equal for the two times of measurement. Fourth, error variances
of one construct were set to be equal. Thus, 25 parameters were
estimated (4 trait variances, 6 trait covariances, 4 variances and
6 covariances of LSRs, 4 error variances, 1 method variance).
To evaluate model fit, we employed the root mean square error
of approximation (RMSEA; acceptable fit < .08; see Browne
& Cudeck, 1993), the standardized root mean square residual
(SRMR; acceptable fit < .08), and the Comparative Fit Index
(CFI; acceptable fit > .95) according to recommendations by
Hu and Bentler (1999) and Beauducel and Wittmann (2005).
We also report results of χ 2 tests, but because of this test’s
sensitivity to sample size, we do not employ the significance
test for rejection of a model.
Analyses with Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2010) and
maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors
(MLR) yielded an acceptable fit of our model, χ 2(111) =
226.16, p < .01, RMSEA = .044 (90% CI [.036, .052], CFI =
.966, SRMR = .05). Table 2 displays the (Spearman–Brown
corrected2) LST coefficients of the four scales. To determine
method specificity, occasion specificity, and trait consistency,
we divided the estimated method variance, the respective esti-
mated trait variance, and the respective estimated LSR variance,
respectively, by the manifest variance as implicated by the model
parameters (i.e., sum of method variance, and respective LSR,
trait, and error variance). Reliabilities are the sums of consis-
tency, occasion, and method specificity.
2The Spearman–Brown correction is appropriate for accounting for the fact
that uncorrected coefficients apply to single items and thus underestimate the
reliability of the two-item scales.
Note. N = 338. JS-Victim, JS-Observer, JS-Beneficiary, JS-Perpetrator = justice sensi-
tivity from the victim, observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator perspectives.
Estimated reliabilities were good given the brevity of the
scales. Method specificity was very low. Trait consistencies of
our short scales were lower than those reported for the 10-
item scales (Schmitt et al., 2005). Comparing trait consistencies
and occasion specificities, the scales captured about the same
proportion of stable and unstable variance. Table 2 also displays
the correlations among the trait factors and among the LSRs.
The LSRs reflect systematic but unstable sources of variance
due to situation main effects and Person × Situation interaction
effects. For the trait factors, the pattern of correlations was very
similar to the pattern found in the LSTA of the original scales
(Schmitt et al., 2005). However, the correlations among the
LSRs were lower than those reported by Schmitt et al. (2005)
for the original scales.
The high correlation between the trait factors beneficiary sen-
sitivity and perpetrator sensitivity raises the question of whether
a four-factor model is necessary to account for our data. To an-
swer this question, we tested a more parsimonious model in
which the beneficiary and perpetrator items loaded on com-
mon state factors, which in turn loaded on a single trait factor.
The model fit was not acceptable, χ 2(120) = 616.88, p < .01,
RMSEA = .088, SRMR = .068, CFI = .855. Additionally, a
Satorra–Bentler-scaled chi-square difference test showed that
the fit of the three-factorial model was significantly worse than
that of the four-factorial model, χ 2(9) = 308.36, p < .001.
Thus, four factors are necessary to appropriately model our
data.
Correlations with personality dimensions and life satis-
faction. Bivariate correlations of our justice sensitivity scales
with the personality measures and life satisfaction are presented
in Table 3. With the Big Five personality factors, each jus-
tice sensitivity perspective had a specific pattern of significant
correlations. Victim sensitivity was negatively correlated with
extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness,
and positively correlated with neuroticism. Observer sensitivity
was uncorrelated with conscientiousness and openness, neg-
atively correlated with extraversion, and positively correlated
with agreeableness and neuroticism. Beneficiary sensitivity had
a pattern of correlations similar to that of observer sensitivity.
 384 BAUMERT ET AL.

TABLE 3.—Means and standard deviations of personality and life satisfaction tim(s) of the unfairness, correlated highest. By contrast, both
and correlations with justice sensitivity short scales in Study 1. correlated only lowly with victim sensitivity, reflecting the fact
JS- JS- JS- JS- that outcomes of victims, on the one hand, and beneficiaries or
M SD Victim Observer Beneficiary Perpetrator perpetrators, on the other hand, are negatively interdependent.
Extraversion 3.50 0.90 –.14∗∗ –.15∗∗ –.14∗∗ –.07
Second, correlations of the justice sensitivity short scales
Agreeableness 2.46 0.81 –.18∗∗ .10∗ .13∗∗ .15∗∗ and the Big Five factors were low to medium, corroborating the
Conscientiousness 3.46 0.71 –.16∗∗ .00 –.06 –.02 notion that justice sensitivity is not independent from, but cannot
Neuroticism 4.07 0.71 .20∗∗ .12∗∗ .12∗∗ .06
Openness 3.36 0.72 –.19∗∗ .04 –.05 .08
be reduced to global factors of personality. Third, our results are
Interpersonal trust 2.95 0.66 –.25∗∗ –.05 –.04 .02 highly similar to those reported by Schmitt et al. (2005) for
General self-efficacy 3.14 0.49 –.24∗∗ .01 –.12∗∗ –.05 the original victim, observer, and beneficiary scales with the
Internal locus of control 2.62 0.73 –.15∗∗ .01 –.06∗ .03
External locus of control 3.76 0.73 .18∗∗ .05 .11∗∗ –.08∗ Big Five factors measured with the BFI and NEO–FFI. Our
Life satisfaction 3.23 0.83 –.23∗∗ –.07∗ –.12∗∗ .06 results are also largely consistent with those found by Schmitt
et al. (2010) for the original victim, observer, beneficiary, and
Note. N = 539. JS-Victim, JS-Observer, JS-Beneficiary, JS-Perpetrator = justice sen-
sitivity from the victim, observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator perspectives. The mean perpetrator scales and the Big Five facets measured with the
reported is the arithmetic mean of individual scale means. Response options for extraver- Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI–R). Fourth, the
sion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, openness, internal and external locus correlations found with further personality dimensions and life
of control ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly). Response options for
interpersonal trust and general self-efficacy from 1 (disagree strongly/not trust at all) to satisfaction are consistent with theoretical assumptions and thus
4 (agree strongly/a lot of trust). Response options for life satisfaction from 1 (disagree support the validity of our short scales.
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strongly) to 7 (agree strongly).

∗
p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01.
Perpetrator sensitivity was significantly positively related only
to agreeableness.
Regarding the other personality correlates, only victim sensi-
tivity was significantly negatively correlated with interpersonal
trust. Victim sensitivity and beneficiary sensitivity were nega-
tively correlated with self-efficacy and internal locus of control.
In turn, these perspectives of justice sensitivity were positively
related to external locus of control. By contrast, perpetrator sen-
sitivity was negatively correlated with external locus of control.
Regarding potential outcomes of justice sensitivity, victim
sensitivity and beneficiary sensitivity were negatively related
to life satisfaction. Similarly, for observer sensitivity a nega-
tive correlation with life satisfaction was found. By contrast,
perpetrator sensitivity was nonsignificantly correlated with life
satisfaction.
Discussion
The main goal of Study 1 was the construction of ultrashort,
but satisfactorily valid and reliable measures of victim, observer,
beneficiary, and perpetrator sensitivity that can be employed in
large-scale surveys and clinical screenings where time and space
limitations apply. Our results indicate good psychometric quali-
ties of the two-item justice sensitivity scales. We found evidence
for the instrument’s factorial validity and high reliabilities in an
LSTA. Importantly, trait consistency and occasion specificity
estimated in our LSTA suggest that the short scales are more
sensitive to change than the original 10-item scales. The short
scales appear to capture about the same amount of stable and
systematic variable variance.
Moreover, correlations among the trait factors of justice sen-
sitivity as well as correlations with measures of personality
dimensions support the construct validity of the scales. First,
reflecting the pattern of manifest scale intercorrelations, factor
correlations are in accordance with results reported by Schmitt
et al. (2010) for the original scales as well as with the theo-
retical elements that the justice sensitivity perspectives share.
For example, beneficiary and perpetrator sensitivity, that share
the elements of (a) guilt as emotional response, (b) a tendency
toward self-punishment, and (c) a desire to compensate the vic-
In detail, the negative correlation of victim sensitivity with
agreeableness and interpersonal trust and the positive correlation
with neuroticism matches prior findings that victim sensitivity
specifically involves a concern for justice for the self rather
than for others and reflects a fear of being exploited by inter-
action partners (Gollwitzer et al., 2005). By contrast, the other
justice sensitivity perspectives were positively correlated with
agreeableness, capturing prosocial tendencies and a concern for
justice for others (Schmitt et al., 2005; Schmitt et al., 2010).
Whereas these results are fully in line with previous studies
and corroborate the construct validity of our short scales, some
correlations deviate from those found for the original scales.
Strikingly, the observer sensitivity short scale was negatively
correlated with extraversion. This contradicts the finding that
observer-sensitive persons are more assertive as indicated by a
positive correlation of the original observer-sensitivity scale and
extraversion (measured with the BFI; Schmitt et al., 2005), and
the assertiveness facet (measured with the NEO-PI-R; Schmitt
et al., 2010). It is possible that dropping intrusiveness of thoughts
about an observed unfairness as an indicator of justice sensitiv-
ity in the short scales slightly changed the content of the as-
sessed construct. However, as an alternative—and potentially
more plausible—explanation, it can be argued that (different
from the BFI and NEO PI–R) the two extraversion items on the
BFI–10 reflect sociability more than assertiveness.
Besides this inconsistency, the correlations of the justice sen-
sitivity perspectives with self-efficacy and locus of control are
fully in line with theoretical assumptions. Victim and beneficiary
sensitivity share the tendency to perceive injustice as being in-
flicted on them as victims or passive beneficiaries, respectively.
Accordingly, both justice sensitivity perspectives were nega-
tively correlated with self-efficacy and internal locus of control
and positively with an external locus of control. By contrast, per-
petrator sensitivity was negatively related to an external locus
of control, reflecting the tendency to take on personal respon-
sibility for committed injustice that is captured by perpetrator
sensitivity.
Finally, the justice sensitivity perspectives proved to be rel-
evant predictors of life satisfaction. The negative correlation
between victim sensitivity and life satisfaction is highly plausi-
ble as victim-sensitive persons tend to feel disadvantaged and
experience the danger of being exploited in life as dispropor-
tionally aversive (Gollwitzer et al., 2005). As a consequence,
 JUSTICE SENSITIVITY SHORT SCALES
satisfaction with social life in particular should be reduced. For
observer sensitivity and beneficiary sensitivity, we also found
negative correlations with life satisfaction. It seems plausible
that for justice-sensitive persons, perceiving high degrees of in-
justice in the world has the potential of reducing satisfaction
with life because they experience injustice as extremely aver-
sive also when they see themselves as beneficiaries or neutral
observers of injustice.
Interestingly, perpetrator sensitivity was unrelated with life
satisfaction. Perpetrator-sensitive persons are assumed to avoid
committing injustices, and can be expected to prevent their own
feelings of guilt and, thus, threats for life satisfaction. Impor-
tantly, however, specific situational constellations can be as-
sumed where perpetrator-sensitive persons do feel guilty about
their own wrongdoings so that their life satisfaction suffers dis-
proportionally. For example, when faced with unemployment
and forced to rely on welfare, perpetrator-sensitive persons can
be assumed to have lower life satisfaction than less perpetrator-
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sensitive persons because they feel guilty about not contributing
to the workforce. This situation-specific effect of perpetrator
sensitivity among unemployed persons has been recently sup-
ported by evidence obtained with the ultrashort scales presented
in this article (Stavrova, Schlösser, & Baumert, in press). In this
research, for employed persons, like in this study, perpetrator
sensitivity and life satisfaction were unrelated.
Taken together, the pattern of results found in Study 1 supports
the construct validity of the presented two-item scales for victim,
observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator sensitivity, and provides
evidence for the differential relevance of the constructs for life
satisfaction.
STUDY 2: ITEM STABILITY OF THE SHORT AND LONG
SCALES
In Study 2, we further investigated the construct validity of
our short scales by testing the correlations of the justice sensi-
tivity perspectives with the individual inclination toward social
comparison (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999), as well as toward pos-
itive and negative reciprocity (Perugini, Gallucci, Presaghi, &
Ercolani, 2003).
As a second goal of our research, we examined the item sta-
bility across scale contexts. Specifically, we wanted to know
whether results obtained with the two items of our short scales
could be directly compared to results obtained with these items
in the context of the original scales. For this purpose, we em-
ployed data for the short scales in a representative German sam-
ple and compared those data to the representative data obtained
with the original scales by Schmitt et al. (2010). Using multi-
group confirmatory factor analyses (MGCFA), we first tested
(a) for measurement invariance across scale contexts, and (b)
for differences in latent parameters (factor variances, covari-
ances, and means).
Method
Sample. As part of the regular pretest module of the Ger-
man Socio-Economic Panel (G-SOEP), a representative sample
of the German population (N = 1,030; 55.9% women) was re-
cruited by the certified poll agency TNS Infratest in May and
June 2011. The G-SOEP is an annual household panel that has
been conducted in Germany since 1984. Each year, prior to the
385
main assessment, a pretest is conducted to select instruments
for the introduction of new topics into the SOEP.
Ages ranged from 16 to 93 years (M = 53.95, SD = 18.63).
Regarding marital status, 51.2% of the participants reported
that they were married or in a stable partnership; 24.1% were di-
vorced, permanently separated from their former partner, or wid-
owed; and 23.9% were single. Regarding education, 23.8% in-
dicated that they had graduated from high school (Abitur), 30%
from intermediate secondary school (Realschule), and 34.2%
from secondary school (Hauptschule). The remaining partici-
pants indicated that they had no formal education, were still
attending school, or had received formal education in a country
other than Germany.
This sample did not differ from the representative sample
recruited by Schmitt et al. (2010; N = 2,510) regarding gen-
der, χ 2(1) = 0.60, p = .44, d = .03; or marital status, χ 2(2) =
2.04, p = .36, d = .05. However, the samples differed in mean
age (M Schmitt = 47.97, SDSchmitt = 17.79), t = –8.96, p < .01,
d = –.33, and in educational level, χ 2(2) = 30.35, p < .01, d
= .19. In Schmitt et al.’s (2010) sample, relatively more partic-
ipants indicated that they had graduated from secondary school
(Hauptschule; 42.5%) and intermediate secondary school (Re-
alschule; 34.5%), and relatively fewer had graduated from high
school (Abitur; 17.5%).
Material. Like in Study 1, for all measures, we aggregated
the items by calculating individual mean values. Items and in-
structions were employed in German and English translations
provided here were taken from the original literature.
Our two-item short scales were employed to measure victim
sensitivity (α = .77), observer sensitivity (α = .77), beneficiary
sensitivity (α = .82), and perpetrator sensitivity (α = .85). Re-
sponse options ranged from 0 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally
agree). Note that we accepted a change in response scale from
Study 1 to Study 2 to maximize the comparability of the results
of the short scales with results obtained with the original justice
sensitivity scales in the study of Schmitt et al. (2010).
Furthermore, the G-SOEP pretest sample contained measures
for social comparison and reciprocity. The individual inclination
to engage in social comparison was measured with six items (“I
always pay a lot of attention to how I do things compared with
how others do things,” “I often try to find out what others think
who face similar problems as I face,” “I often compare how I am
doing socially (e.g., social skills, popularity) with other people,”
“I always like to know what others in a similar situation would
do,” “If I want to learn more about something, I try to find out
what others think about it,” and “I am not the type of person who
compares often with others” reverse coded; α = .77). Response
options ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). This
scale is a German short version of the questionnaire developed
by Gibbons and Buunk (1999). As Schneider and Schupp (2011)
showed, the items represent two correlated facets (comparisons
of abilities and comparisons of opinions, r = .50) and are highly
reliable. Known group comparisons and correlations with other
psychological variables supported the validity of the facets. As
in our study, we found a single factor to explain item variance
sufficiently (40.48% explained variance), a finding consistent
with results of Gibbons and Buunk (1999), so we combined
both facets into one scale.
The individual readiness to repay positive interpersonal
behavior reciprocally (positive reciprocity) and to retaliate
 386
negative interpersonal behavior (negative reciprocity) were
measured with three items each (positive reciprocity: “If some-
one does a favor for me, I am ready to return it,” “I am ready to
undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me be-
fore,” and “I go out of my way to help somebody who has been
kind to me before”; α = .79; negative reciprocity: “If I suffer
a serious wrong, I will take my revenge as soon as possible, no
matter what the costs,” “If somebody puts me in a difficult po-
sition, I will do the same to him/her,” and “If somebody offends
me, I will offend him/her back”; α = .78). Response options
ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). Items were
adopted from the questionnaire developed by Perugini et al.
(2003), who provided evidence for its structural validity and the
good reliabilities of the scales. Further empirical results support
the validity of the short scales (Caliendo, Fossen, & Kritikos,
2012). In this sample, in an exploratory principal axis factor
analysis with oblique rotation, we replicated the two-factor so-
lution of the original scale with almost perfect simple structure.
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Procedure. Following a standard random procedure,
households at 250 sample points in Germany were contacted.
Based on a Kish-selection grid, one member aged 16 or older
per household was invited to participate. Items were adminis-
tered in CAPIs with trained interviewers helping to fill out the
questionnaire on a computer. Responses were recorded anony-
mously. The questionnaire covered a broad range of further
topics that are of no interest here. The relevant measures were
administered in the following order: social comparison; victim,
observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator sensitivity; reciprocity.
Results
Bivariate correlations. Means and standard deviations of
our justice sensitivity scales as well as bivariate correlations with
social comparison and positive and negative reciprocity are dis-
played in Table 4. The patterns of significant correlations are
clearly distinct for the different justice sensitivity perspectives.
We found significant positive correlations of victim, observer,
and beneficiary sensitivity with the individual inclination toward
social comparison. Perpetrator sensitivity was uncorrelated with
social comparison. However, perpetrator sensitivity was posi-
tively correlated with positive reciprocity, and negatively with
negative reciprocity. By contrast, victim sensitivity correlated
negatively with positive reciprocity, and in turn, positively with
negative reciprocity. Similar to perpetrator sensitivity, observer
sensitivity was related to positive reciprocity. However, it was
unrelated with negative reciprocity. Finally, beneficiary sensitiv-
ity was unrelated with positive reciprocity and positively related
to negative reciprocity.
Multigroup confirmatory analyses. To examine the stabil-
ity of our items across scale contexts (short scales vs. original
scales), we first tested for measurement invariance in a set of
two-group CFAs using Mplus (Geiser, Crayen, & Enders, 2012;
Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2010) and maximum likelihood (ML)
estimation. MGCFAs allow for the comparison of key proper-
ties of the measurement model across samples. In other words,
we tested whether a four-factor model, with the two respective
justice sensitivity items loading on each factor, fit well in the
context of the short scales (in this sample) and in the context of
the original scales (in Schmitt et al.’s [2010] sample). In a first
BAUMERT ET AL.
TABLE 4.—Means and standard deviations of justice sensitivity short scales and
correlations with validation constructs in Study 2.
JS- JS- JS- JS-
M SD Victim Observer Beneficiary Perpetrator
Social com- 3.47 1.22 .23∗∗ .18∗∗ .22∗∗ .02
parison
Positive 2.91 1.49 –.10∗ .14∗∗ .01 .24∗∗
reciprocity
Negative 5.95 1.00 .31∗∗ .03 .08∗ –.07∗
reciprocity
M 2.93 3.69 2.38 4.23
SD 1.52 1.41 1.30 1.61
Note. N = 1,030. JS-Victim, JS-Observer, JS-Beneficiary, JS-Perpetrator = justice
sensitivity from the victim, observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator perspectives. The mean
reported is the arithmetic mean of individual scale means. Response options for the justice
sensitivity scales ranged from 0 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). Response options for
social comparison, positive and negative reciprocity ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 7
(totally agree).
∗
p < .05. ∗ ∗ p < .01.
step, we tested for configural invariance (with the basic fac-
tor structure constrained to equality across samples), followed
by metric invariance in a second step (with factor loadings re-
stricted to equality across samples), scalar invariance in a third
step (additionally restricting item intercepts to equality across
samples), and strict invariance in a fourth step (additionally re-
stricting error variances to equality across samples; for details,
see Geiser et al., 2012; Milfont & Fischer, 2010; Steinmetz et al.,
2009). As in Study 1, we evaluated model fit by means of the
RMSEA (acceptable fit < .08; Browne & Cudeck, 1993), SRMR
(acceptable fit < .08), and CFI (acceptable fit > .95; Beaudu-
cel & Wittmann, 2005; Hu & Bentler, 1999). To compare the
fits of alternative models, we followed the recommendation of
Cheung and Rensvold (2002) for the case of MGCFAs, stating
that a nested model should be rejected if its CFI is more than .01
lower compared to the preceding, less restricted model. As in
Study 1, we also report results indicating the change in χ 2 tests.
However, due to the sensitivity of these tests to sample size, we
do not employ them for the rejection of a model. Results are
provided in the upper part of Table 5. Scalar invariance (but not
strict invariance) could be assumed.
Scalar invariance is a necessary precondition for the compari-
son of latent parameters across samples because it indicates that
the validity of the indicators and potential response biases are
equal across scale contexts (Steinmetz et al., 2009). Therefore,
in a second set of three MGCFAs, we tested for the equality
of latent factor variances, factor covariances, and factor means
across scale contexts (see middle part of Table 5). As a baseline
model, we used the model of scalar invariance. The model with
equal latent variances and equal factor covariances was accept-
able. The decrease in the CFI was lower than .01 compared to
the baseline model. This finding is important because it suggests
that the constructs’ meaning does not change across scale ver-
sions. However, the model with equal factor means across scale
contexts was not acceptable and showed a substantial decrease
in the CFI.
To test for partial invariance of factor means (Byrne, Shavel-
son, & Muthén, 1989), we tested additional models in which we
restricted latent factor variances and covariances to be equal,
but restricted latent means only for specific justice sensitivity
perspectives to be equal across scale contexts (see lower part
 JUSTICE SENSITIVITY SHORT SCALES 387

TABLE 5.—Fit indexes for measurement invariance tests and tests of equality of latent parameters in Study 2.

RMSEA
Model Value 90% CI SRMR CFI χ2 df χ 2 (df )

Full configural invariance .070 [.062, .077] .023 .983 268.40 28

Full metric invariance .068 [.061, .075] .024 .982 292.18 32 23.78(4)∗∗∗
Full scalar invariance .071 [.065, .078] .028 .977 360.51 36 68.33(4)∗∗∗
Strict factorial invariance .094 [.088, .100] .038 .952 728.46 44 367.95(8)∗∗∗

Equal latent variances .068 [.061, .074] .029 .977 362.30 40 1.79(4)
+ equal latent covariances .070 [.064, .076] .042 .972 439.03 46 76.73(6)∗∗∗
+ equal latent means .093 [.087, .099] .067 .946 813.25 50 374.22(4)∗∗∗

Equal latent variances and covariances

+ equal latent means for JS-V .069 [.063, .075] .043 .972 442.09 47 3.06(1)
+ equal latent means for JS-V .083 [.077, .089] .064 .959 630.80 48 188.71(1)∗∗∗
and JS-O
+ equal latent means for JS-V .071 [.065, .076] .048 .970 470.02 48 27.93(1)∗∗∗
and JS-B
+ equal latent means for JS-V, .076 [.071, .082] .051 .965 551.56 49 81.54(1)∗∗∗
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JS-B, and JS-P

Note. RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; JS-V, JS-O, JS-B, JS-P = justice
sensitivity from the victim, observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator perspectives.
∗∗∗
p < .001.

of Table 5). In a first model, we restricted latent means of only
the factor victim sensitivity to be equal, whereas for the other
factors, latent means were allowed to differ across scale con-
texts. In a second model, we restricted the latent means of victim
and observer sensitivity to be equal across scale contexts. This
second model did not have an acceptable fit and had a decrease
in CFI > .01 compared to the preceding, less restrictive model.
Therefore, we tested a third model in which we restricted the
latent means of victim sensitivity and beneficiary sensitivity to
be equal, whereas the latent means of observer and perpetrator
sensitivity were allowed to differ across scale contexts. As this
model was acceptable, we finally tested a fourth model with
equal latent means across scale contexts for victim, beneficiary,
and perpetrator sensitivity. This model yielded acceptable fit in-
dexes and a decrease in CFI < .01 compared to the preceding,
less restrictive model. These results indicate that latent factor
means are unaffected by scale contexts for victim sensitivity,
beneficiary sensitivity, and perpetrator sensitivity, but not for
observer sensitivity.
Discussion
As a first goal of Study 2, we aimed at providing further ev-
idence for the construct validity of our two-item scales for jus-
tice sensitivity by investigating correlations with theoretically
related constructs. Importantly, the distinct patterns of correla-
tions for the justice sensitivity perspectives with the individual
inclination toward social comparison (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999;
Schneider & Schupp, 2011), positive and negative reciprocity
(Perugini et al., 2003) are clearly in line with theoretical as-
sumptions.
First, the constructs of victim and beneficiary sensitivity in-
volve the readiness to compare one’s own outcome or treatment
with that of others. In a related vein, observer sensitivity in-
volves the readiness to draw social comparisons among other
people. Perpetrator sensitivity, by contrast, entails the readiness
to anticipate or detect one’s own transgressions, thus reflecting
a reliance on internalized justice standards rather than on com-
parison with the behavior of others. Consistent with this notion,
in distinction from the other sensitivities, perpetrator sensitivity
was unrelated to social comparison.
Second, perpetrator sensitivity, and to a lesser degree observer
sensitivity, were positively related to the inclination to pay back
favors one received, thus, reflecting the prosocial tendency in-
volved in these justice sensitivity perspectives (Schmitt et al.,
2005). As victim sensitivity is assumed to reflect a rather self-
oriented justice concern (Gollwitzer et al., 2005), the negative
correlation with positive reciprocity is consistent with expec-
tations. Victim-sensitive persons most probably perceive favors
done to them as legitimate compensations of prior disadvantages
that they suffered. Therefore, they should not be motivated to
invest their own resources to return a favor. Interestingly, ben-
eficiary sensitivity was uncorrelated with positive reciprocity.
Prior research using the original scales has demonstrated the
prosocial motivation of beneficiary-sensitive people (Lotz et al.,
2011). However, from a beneficiary perspective, a favor done to
oneself is perceived as an unjust own advantage that potentially
disadvantages a third person. Thus, beneficiary-sensitive per-
sons should be highly motivated to compensate disadvantaged
others, particularly if the disadvantage is causally linked to their
own advantage, rather than reciprocally pay back favors that
they receive.
Third, the correlation of victim sensitivity with the tendency
to negatively reciprocate reflects victim-sensitive persons’ incli-
nation to get even and punish a perpetrator as long as this does
not involve own costs (Gollwitzer et al., 2005). Observer- and
beneficiary-sensitive persons do not share this rather antisocial
tendency to the same degree. Moreover, perpetrator-sensitive
persons are rather reluctant to take revenge assumedly because
this could constitute an own violation of justice standards.
Finally, the correlations revealed in this study are low to
moderate. We argue that the size of the correlations consistently
reflects the degree of conceptual overlap between the justice
sensitivity perspective and the validation constructs. Each cor-
relate captures an aspect of the justice sensitivity perspectives.
However, the validation constructs are clearly different from the
justice sensitivity perspectives in that they are not specifically
related to the strength of emotional reactions to injustice and
they do not differentiate between perspectives toward injustice.
Regarding the second goal of this research, we empirically
tested whether comparisons of results across scale contexts
 388
could be meaningfully conducted for our two justice sensitivity
items. This is crucial because the placement of items within a
scale has been shown to affect item characteristics (Knowles &
Condon, 2000; Schwarz, 1999), including item means (Knowles
et al., 1996). First, measurement invariance was established
(scalar invariance), thus indicating that differences in ratings
across scale contexts are not due to differences in response bi-
ases, but rather actual differences in the latent construct. Second,
we tested for differences in latent variances, covariances, and
factor means. Our analyses are informative for future research
that might aim to compare results obtained with different scale
versions. For such comparisons it is necessary to know about
potential effects that the scale versions might have. We did not
find differences in these parameters across two representative
samples that responded to our sets of two justice sensitivity
items either in the context of the short scales or in the context
of the original scales. This is important because it shows that
the internal structure of the construct assessed by our two-item
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scales does not change across scale contexts.
Additionally, partial invariance of latent factor means could
be established. Thus, except for observer sensitivity, latent fac-
tor means can be considered to be unaffected by scale versions.
This means that samples that responded to the two justice sen-
sitivity items in different scales (short vs. original) can be com-
pared regarding victim, beneficiary, or perpetrator sensitivity,
knowing that potential differences in factor variances, covari-
ances, and latent means are not attributable to effects of the
scale contexts. However, with regard to mean levels in observer
sensitivity, our results show that differences between samples
cannot unambiguously be attributed to sample characteristics or
potential differences in treatment, but that these differences are
confounded with the effects of the scale context.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this research, we created ultrashort scales for the eco-
nomic assessment of justice sensitivity from a victim, observer,
beneficiary, and perpetrator perspective. In Study 1, we pro-
vided evidence in an LSTA for the factorial validity and the
good reliabilities of these scales. Moreover, factor correlations
as well as correlations with the Big Five personality factors,
with interpersonal trust, self-efficacy, and locus of control as
further personality dimensions and with life satisfaction sup-
port the validity of the short scales. In Study 2, these findings
are complemented by consistent patterns of correlations among
our justice sensitivity scales and individual inclinations toward
social comparison and positive and negative reciprocity. In con-
clusion, we provide a very useful instrument for the assessment
of justice sensitivity in large-scale surveys as well as in clinical
screenings. This will allow future research to test the general-
izability of previous findings regarding individual differences
in the perception of injustice and the strength of reactions to
unfairness. Moreover, our instrument opens up opportunities to
gain more insight into the role that subjective injustice plays
in the explanation of psychological well-being and physical
health. For example, justice sensitivity has been shown to be
systematically linked to biases in information processing, such
as attention, interpretation, and memory for unjust information
(e.g., Baumert, Gollwitzer, Staubach, & Schmitt, 2011). Thus,
the assessment of justice sensitivity in studies on health and
well-being promises a more fine-grained understanding of the
BAUMERT ET AL.
psychological processes through which objective constellations
of rewards or characteristics of decision-making procedures can
lead to psychological strain and health impairment.
Importantly, trait consistencies and occasion specificities ob-
tained in the LSTA in Study 1 suggest that justice sensitivity
as assessed with our short scales might be less stable and more
sensitive to change than with the original scales. At the same
time, estimated reliabilities are high and only slightly lower
compared to the original scales (Schmitt et al., 2005). It seems
possible that the short scales are more sensitive to factors that
generate true change because these factors might at least partly
be indicator-specific. If this is the case, occasion specificity will
decrease with the number of indicators that are combined in a
scale. Thus, increased occasion specificity of the short justice
sensitivity scales might be due to employing only two of the
three indicators used in the original scales (and dropping intru-
siveness of thoughts). Future studies could test this speculation
by systematically varying the number of indicators realized in
the scales and comparing occasion specificities. If the greater
sensitivity to true change of the short scales is corroborated in
further research, they will be useful for research on the dynam-
ics of justice sensitivity across time and situations. For example,
decreases in victim sensitivity could be tested as a potential out-
come of therapeutic or preventive interventions in the context
of burnout where victim sensitivity represents a substantial per-
sonal risk factor (Hessler et al., 2012). The short scales should
be handled with caution, however, when the researcher’s main
interest lies in stable effects of justice sensitivity, specifically
across time intervals longer than the 6-week interval chosen in
our Study 1.
When testing the generalizability of previous findings on jus-
tice sensitivity obtained with the original scales, the question
arises as to whether results from the short scales can be directly
compared to the former. Researchers have called for caution
regarding the comparability of test forms (Knowles & Con-
don, 2000). By means of MGCFAs, in Study 2, we tested item
stability across scale contexts to provide an empirical answer
to this question. Our results show that latent factor variances
and covariances obtained from our two-item sets can indeed
be considered to be unaffected by scale contexts. For victim,
beneficiary, and perpetrator sensitivity, in addition, latent factor
means are comparable across scale contexts. For example, mean
results obtained in samples of unknown representativeness can
be compared with the normative data provided by Schmitt et al.
(2010) for the respective two items. By contrast, for observer
sensitivity, latent mean differences will be confounded with dif-
ferences caused by the scale contexts. Thus, it seems advisable
for future research to provide normative data for the short scales.
Limitations
As a limitation of this research, it has to be noted that in Study
2, the representative samples differed with regard to some de-
mographic characteristics. Thus, it cannot be excluded that the
differences in latent factor means of observer sensitivity between
these samples were caused by demographic differences rather
than by item contexts as we suggested earlier. Furthermore, re-
sponse scales of our justice sensitivity items changed from Study
1 (1–6) to Study 2 (0–5). This is important to keep in mind when
comparing scale means between studies (Tables 1 and 4). Po-
tentially, differences in scale means between Studies 1 and 2 are
 JUSTICE SENSITIVITY SHORT SCALES
due to inconsistent response options. Note that we used response
options from 0 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree) in Study
2 to obtain maximal comparability with the study of Schmitt
et al. (2010) employing the original justice sensitivity scales.
In addition, a replication of the LSTA in Study 1 could further
corroborate the high reliabilities of the short scales and test our
speculations on potential causes of the increased occasion speci-
ficities. Finally, particularly for cross-cultural comparisons, the
English translation provided in the Appendix could be validated
by an independent back-translation that has not been undertaken
so far.
Conclusion
Despite these limitations, this research provides important ev-
idence for the high reliability and validity of the ultrashort scales
for justice sensitivity. We are confident that the availability of
these very short scales will trigger much social justice research,
thus making use of the great potential of large-scale surveys as
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well as clinical screenings.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Nadine Knab for literature searches, Kerstin Dorsch
for help in preparing the manuscript, and Jane Zagorski for
helpful comments on this article.
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