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Arc Flash in the National

Electrical Code
DO ARTICLES 240.87 AND 240.67 ACHIEVE THEIR INTENT AND GOALS?

XXXXX

By Marcelo E. Valdes, Steve Hinton, and The NaTioNa l elecTr ica l code (Nec) h as
Francisco Martinez included requirements for arc-flash-related labeling for
several code cycles [1]. increasingly rigorous requirements
for specific arc-flash-related protection attempt to reduce
any arc-flash hazards to which personnel may be exposed.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/MIAS.2018.2868354
They may be exposed to arc-flash hazards during planned
Date of publication: 5 November 2018 energized work or accidentally at any time. The risk-control

2 IEEE Industry Applications Magazine œ J A N U A RY / F E B R U A RY 2 0 1 9 1077-2618/19©2019IEEE

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mechanisms added to the Nec in recent times include
additional signage requirements and two articles that
intend to reduce arc-flash hazard by decreasing clearing
time for circuits rated 1,200 a or greater whether pro-
tected by circuit breakers or fuses. This article discusses
these recent protection requirements and their intent and
potential practical effects as well as how to ensure that
the protection this language seeks to provide is included
in the electrical power distribution system.
Overview of Clearing Time Methods
currently, National Fire Protection association (NFPa) 70,
the 2017 Nec [1], has two sections addressing required
minimum arc-energy reduction for low-voltage fuses and
circuit breakers rated 1,200 a and higher. For fuses, sec-
tion 240.67 takes effect 1 January 2020. section 240.87 is
in effect now for circuit breakers. Both sections require
documentation available to those authorized to design,
install, operate, or inspect the installation as to the loca-
tion of the circuit breaker or fuse. Both sections offer
methods to reduce clearing time (for implied arc-flash
reduction) and are shown in Tables 1 and 2.
These methods can be used to reduce clearing time,
but they are all very different solutions. how does a
designer know if the specified method provides the
desired reduction of arc-flash incident energy (ei)? The
methods described may be divided into two categories:
1) those methods that expressly list what is needed to
ensure that the protection threshold will sense the
expected available arcing current
2) those methods that imply such needs but do not
expressly state them.
This is an important distinction because adding a
mechanism to reduce clearing time does not ensure its
effectiveness unless the added protection operates when
needed (i.e., at the full range of expected arcing current
in the protected circuit). To comply with the intent of the
code, the ability for the control measures to operate at
the expected available arcing current is the key operat-
ing parameter that must be determined, regardless if it is
stated in the Nec. To implement one of the stated mecha-
nisms without knowing if it will work may comply with
the letter of the code but not with its intent. in addition, a
robust and reliable solution will use a lower threshold due
to the potential variability of the arcing current.
How to Categorize and Evaluate Solutions
NFPa 70e-2015 [2] describes the hierarchy of risk-control
methods specified in american National standards insti-
tute (aNsi)/american industrial hygiene association Z10
[3], Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems.
The hierarchy lists the following six risk-control measures:
1) elimination
2) substitution
3) engineered controls
4) awareness
Table 1. NEC 240.87
For Circuit Breakers, One of the Following Means Shall Be
Provided:
1) ZSI
2) Differential relaying
3) ERMS with local status indicator
4) Energy-reducing active arc-flash mitigation system
5) An instantaneous trip setting that is less than the available
arcing current
6) An instantaneous override that is less than the available
arcing current
7) An approved equivalent means
Table 2. NEC 240.67
A Fuse Shall Have a Clearing Time of 0.07 s or Lower at the
Available Arcing Current, or One of the Following Shall Be
Provided:
1) Differential relaying
2) ERMS with local status indicator
3) Energy-reducing active arc-flash mitigation system
4) An approved equivalent means
5) administrative controls
6) personal protective equipment (PPe).
The first three methods do not require any specific
action, understanding, or comprehension on the part of
the personnel benefiting from the control measure as
they are automatic or by default. however, the second
three do require active personnel participation, compre-
hension, skill, or training. That makes the second set of
measures fallible and subject to human error. hence, any
hazard control measure in the upper half of the list is
considered more robust or better than those in the sec-
ond half.
The first control measure, elimination, refers to any
measure that fully eliminates the hazard. The second,
substitution, refers to any measure that substitutes less in
lieu of a more hazardous situation. The third, engineered
controls, is any kind of automated system that, when
operational, provides an automatic reduction of the haz-
ard on a continuous basis without any interaction from
the regularly exposed personnel or anyone acting on their
behalf. it is important to note that engineered controls
tend to require maintenance and possibly adjustment to
ensure they operate as expected during the useful life of
the equipment.
The fourth category, awareness, includes all methods
to instruct, advise, warn, or impart skills to operating
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personnel so they can reduce their risk. in this category
are warning signs, job site meetings, training, and so on.
administrative controls, the fifth category, include steps
or actions personnel can do prior to exposure to a hazard
to lower their risk. Turning a switch on or off, positioning
a lever, and ensuring the status of a device or apparatus
prior to the task would fall under this category. The last
category, PPe, entails a person wearing PPe to minimize
the negative effects of any unintentional event that may
occur during exposure.
This article will refer to this hierarchy of risk-control
methods to explain the measures in the Nec articles.
Arcing Current: How Low Is Low Enough?
ieee 1584-2002, IEEE Guide for Performing Arc Flash
Hazard Calculations [4], and ieee 1584.1 provide formu-
las and methods for calculating arc-flash currents to deter-
mine arc-flash incident energy and arc-flash boundaries.
The formulas are used to calculate a value referred to as
100% arcing current and another at 85% of the first value.
The calculations are based on three factors used as vari-
ables within the equations:
● system voltage (nominal)
● available three-phase short circuit current
● equipment bus/conductor gap.
The first parameter, system voltage, is easily deter-
mined. The second is often estimated at preliminary
phases of a project design. and even in the later stages
of a project, the short circuit current value may depend
on several assumptions, switching or operating scenarios,
and worst-case tolerances. For the short circuit evaluation
of equipment, power system engineers performing short
circuit calculations purposely drive any potential error
toward higher values because that is conservative from
an equipment-rating perspective. ensuring properly rated
equipment, per Nec 110.16, involves calculating maxi-
mum short circuit fault current and evaluating it against
the withstand and interrupting ratings of the electrical
distribution and protection equipment. conservatism
from the equipment ratings perspective is not necessar-
ily appropriate from an arc-flash calculation perspective.
For arc-flash calculations, it is important to have the cor-
rect value of fault current. it is best to have the expected
range of fault current available because it may vary during
the day due to different topologies used, either by the
Table 3. A portion of IEEE 1584 Table 4, from p. 12
System Typical Gap Between
Voltage (kV) Equipment Type Conductors (mm)
0.208-1 Open air 10–40
Switchgear 32
MCC and panels 25
Cable 13
4 IEEE Industry Applications Magazine œ J A N U A RY / F E B R U A RY 2 0 1 9
serving utility or the end user. higher fault current will
cause higher incident energy for fixed clearing times pro-
portional to available fault current. lower arcing current
can result in protection operating more slowly and higher
incident energy due to the increased operating time of the
protective device.
The third parameter in arcing current calculations is
the equipment bus/conductor gap. The arc current must
sustain itself across the gap. ieee 1584-2002 provides
a table of typical gaps for various equipment types (see
Table 3).
Most arc-flash studies use a combination of these
values. in equipment, however, different values could
be found, both larger and smaller, and this provides an
additional source of variation in arcing current calcula-
tions. The 100–85% range defined in ieee 1584-2002 for
arcing current only attempts to account for the variance in
the experimental data from the arc-flash research prior to
2002. all other potential sources of variance are not con-
sidered in the current ieee model.
sources of arcing current variance may include but are
not limited to
● the chaotic nature of an electrical arcing fault
● variable system topology and varying short circuit cur-
rent
● incorrect assumptions regarding conductor impedances
● conservative utility high-fault-current assumptions
● conservative fault study methods by power systems
engineers
● incorrect measurements of system conductors
● incorrect assumptions about regenerating sources
● a variance in source voltage due to system loading
● incorrect assumptions about bus/conductor gap or arc
environment (i.e., size of equipment enclosure or com-
partment).
These sources of variance and others can yield arc-
ing current that is slightly higher or lower than expected.
slightly higher current can yield proportionately higher
arc-flash incident energy, but slightly lower arcing cur-
rent can yield significantly higher incident energy if the
protection reacts more slowly because it does not sense
the arcing fault as expected. The more sensitive protection
is, the more robust it may be considered, which means
it is more likely to operate for the actual arc fault cur-
rent. ieee 1584.1 [4] instructs that, to calculate arc flash,
consideration should be made for overly conservative
source fault current and whether motors are turned on
or off. it important to note that ieee 1584 is undergoing
revision, and the revised version will include additional
sources of variance both in arcing current and incident
energy. When the new model becomes available, the
reader is encouraged to consider it within the context of
this article.
Figures 1 and 2 show the ieee 1584-2002 calculated
85% arcing current as a percentage of short circuit cur-
rent for various gap assumptions. Table 2 in ieee 1584
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lists typical bus gaps for different equipment classes. For
low-voltage switchgear, the commonly used value is 32
mm. For switchboard and motor control centers (Mccs),
the typical value suggested is 25 mm, and most engineers
performing studies use this value in switchboards and
Mccs. Most moderately sized commercial and industrial
power systems tend to operate with available short circuit
currents between 30 and 50 ka. a conservative assump-
tion (i.e., biasing toward a low arcing current value) for
arcing current could be approximately 40% for 480-V
systems and 20% for 208-V systems. however, it is best to
have a study done for short circuit, protective device coor-
dination, and arc-flash so the values for arcing current can
be used to determine protective device settings.
the line side of the main device [5]. But when the main
device is fed from a utility-owned transformer, options
are limited. Generally, it is best to isolate the main device
to minimize 1) exposure when energized work is being
performed on the load side of the main device and 2) the
possibility of an arcing fault on the load side (location 2 in
Figure 3) propagating to the line side.
Solution Types
The hazard controls listed in the Nec articles are either
engineered or administrative controls per the hierarchy
identified in NFPa 70e [2] and aNsi Z10 [3]. The energy-
reducing maintenance switch is an administrative control.
The other measures are engineered controls.

Arcing Current Where?

The last question regarding arcing current is where is
the arc? For a main circuit breaker, the arcing current 50%
may be the bus protected by the main circuit breaker. in 13 mm, 85%
25 mm, 85%
most cases, the entire bus is considered to have the same 40% 32 mm, 85%
arc-flash incident energy value. however, for a feeder in Ia as % Ibf 40 mm, 85%
a switchboard, the arcing current could be at the circuit
breaker’s load-side terminals (location 3 in Figure 3) or 30%
at the far end of the feeder conductor (location 4 in Fig-
ure 3). That downstream arcing current (location 4) is 20%
probably much lower due to the conductor impedance.
it is also possible that the load-side equipment is more
10%
likely to be serviced while energized than the overcur-
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
rent protection’s secondary terminals (location 3) if it is
Ibf (kA)
distribution equipment feeding multiple loads. hence, the
protection should consider the lower-arcing current at the
far end of the conductors. FIGURE 2. A plot of 85% arcing current (I a) as the percentage of
available bolted fault current (I bf) for a 208-V system, per the IEEE
another concern is the arc-flash current at the line
1584-2002 model.
side of main devices (location 1 in Figure 3). When the
main device is fed from a source such as a substation
transformer within the owner’s system, there are several
measures that can be taken to provide protection for
Source

70%
1 Switchboard
60%
2,000 A
2
Ia as % Ibf

50%

40% 1,200 A 1,200 A

3
13 mm, 85%
30% 25 mm, 85%
32 mm, 85%
40 mm, 85%
20% 4
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105

Load
Ibf (kA)

FIGURE 1. A plot of 85% arcing current (I a) as the percentage of

available bolted fault current (I bf) for a 480-V system, per the IEEE FIGURE 3. Possible arcing fault locations relative to overcurrent
1584-2002 model. protection in equipment.

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Engineered Controls
Instantaneous Overcurrent Function and
Override Function Below Estimated Arcing Current
in North america, circuit breakers are listed under two
industry standards:
● Underwriters laboratory (Ul) 489, Molded-Case Circuit
Breakers, Molded-Case Switches, and Circuit-Breaker
Enclosures [6]
● Ul 1066, Standard for Low-Voltage AC and DC Power
Circuit Breakers Used in Enclosures [7]
The molded-case class may also be divided into
traditional molded-case circuit breakers (MccBs; see
ieee 3004.5 [8, p. 2]) and insulated-case circuit break-
ers (iccBs; see ieee 3004.5 [8, p. 2]). MccBs always
have instantaneous protection. For some larger MccBs,
manufacturers may state instantaneous protection may
be turned off, but an instantaneous override will always
be present at a relative low multiple of the frame size,
typically not higher than 15 times the frame size. low-
voltage power circuit breakers (lVPcBs; see ieee 3004.5
[8, p. 2]) may have a high range of adjustability in their
instantaneous function, maybe more than 15 times the
sensor rating. Most lVPcBs will allow the adjustable
instantaneous protection to be turned off. however, many
will have a fixed override that cannot be turned off. some
will not have an override; hence, when the user-adjustable
instantaneous function is turned off, no instantaneous
protection is present. iccBs share MccB and lVPcB
characteristics but always implement an adjustable instan-
taneous protection or override or both.
regardless of the type of circuit breaker, it is possible
that the instantaneous function could be set above the
available arcing current, resulting in higher clearing times,
especially in smaller, weaker, or lower voltage systems
and when circuit breakers are larger. in terms of device
selectivity expectations for the system, if lVPcBs are used
within multiple coordination tiers, then it is more likely
that there will be a desire to set instantaneous protection
to a high (insensitive) level or to disable it. This will be
Switchboard
2,000 A Main
Restraint
Fault 1 Signal
Current
1,200-A Feeder
1,200-A Feeder
2
FIGURE 4. A simple three-circuit breaker ZSI scheme with two 1,200-
A feeders providing a restrain signal to a single 2,000-A main.
6 IEEE Industry Applications Magazine œ J A N U A RY / F E B R U A RY 2 0 1 9
especially true if the designer is not taking advantage of
modern instantaneous selective coordination methods
recently introduced by manufacturers into the Ul and
National electrical Manufacturers association markets
[9]–[11].
Zone-Selective Interlocking
Zone-selective interlocking (Zsi) is commonly avail-
able from all circuit breaker manufacturers. in all cases,
enabling the feature allows circuit breakers at the sec-
ond and higher tier to operate faster than if they did not
implement Zsi. however, the lowest-tier devices will not
operate any faster. regardless if Zsi is implemented, it is
required that the protection thresholds be set sufficiently
sensitive enough to detect the expected arcing current for
the entire protection zone.
Zsi is a way to improve clearing time without sacri-
ficing system selectivity. Manufacturers may implement
Zsi in different ways so the actual capabilities may vary,
but the basic principles are consistent. Figure 4 shows
a simple Zsi scheme. The basic premise is that lower-
and upper-tier devices detect the same fault current; the
lower-tier device (fault location 2 in Figure 4) simultane-
ously initiates its protection logic, sending a signal to
the upper-tier device indicating that it is in the process
of asserting a trip and protecting. The upper-tier device
receives the signal (also known as a restraint signal) and
shifts its timing from unrestrained (in-zone protection) to
restrained (backup protection). depending on the device,
the restrained protection may be adjustable by the user,
whereas the unrestrained protection is automatic, or
both may be user adjustable. When the fault location is
in position 1 in Figure 4, the 2,000-a main should oper-
ate its protection at the faster unrestrained timing point
since no restraint signal was received. The Zsi scheme
improves the protection provided by the main with the
assistance of the Zsi function in the 1,200-a feeders.
however, the protection provided by the 1,200-a feeders
is not improved, even though the devices are part of a Zsi
scheme. The 1,200-a feeders may meet the letter of the
code text but not its intent.
Modern Zsi offers significant enhancements for pro-
tection [12]. Zsi implementations in advanced trip unit
systems may provide various ways to test the Zsi system,
which has traditionally been a concern when installing
such systems. When installing a Zsi system, it is impor-
tant to verify that it is wired correctly and signals are
getting to the correct devices. Generally, if the wiring is
damaged upstream, devices will revert to the unrestrained
timing and, hence, protect well, but selectivity may be
compromised.
Bus Differential Protection
Bus differential protection works on the simple concept
known as Kirchhoff’s current law. simply stated, for this
application, it means that all of the measured currents into
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a bus must balance the measured currents leaving it. any
imbalance in current, above the programmed threshold,
must be a fault. in a differential protection scheme, the dif-
ferential relay is connected to current sensors that measure
all of the power coming in, sources, and power going out
to loads. a fault below a feeder, such as fault 2 fed by the
1,200-a feeder shown in Figure 4, has power measured
going into the main bus and going through the feeder. The
differential relay will not sense that current as a fault. a
fault in location 1 on the bus in Figure 4 will cause power
to flow into the bus and be measured at the main circuit.
however, neither feeder is carrying the power out of the
bus, and the differential relay will sense the bus fault
and signal the main circuit breaker to open. like the Zsi
scheme described previously, a differential scheme that
includes the three circuits shown in Figure 4 will provide
additional protection for the main bus but not for the
feeder circuits. To determine the exact zone of protection
provided, the equipment drawings must be examined,
with the exact location of current transformers and circuit
breakers noted. again, the letter of 240.87 may be satis-
fied, but the intent is not. like any other protection, the
threshold for operation must be below the available arcing
current fault expected within the target zone of protection.
Use of shunt trips and lockout relays can add to the total
clearing time, negatively impacting the arc-flash reduction.
Administrative Controls
Within the hierarchy of hazard control measures, admin-
istrative controls are second to last (with last being least
effective). The reason for this is that they are very depen-
dent on the behavior of the person implementing the con-
trol. For example, a person
● could forget to implement it
● might not be sufficiently trained to know how to oper-
ate it
● might not be sufficiently trained to know the need to
operate it
● might not know that his or her work task could have
been incorrectly planned with the administrative con-
trol accidentally omitted
● could operate the incorrect control
● could operate it at the wrong time
● might not know the control could be inoperative.
The possibility of human error will lower the value of
an administrative control, relative to fully automated solu-
tions, regardless of how effective the control is in mitigat-
ing the hazard. see aNsi Z10 [3] for further discussion.
Energy-Reducing Maintenance Switching
with Local Status Indicator
Sensitive to What?
energy-reducing maintenance switches are offered by cir-
cuit breaker manufacturers and even by at least one manu-
facturer of fused Ul 977 listed power switches [13]. in the
code-defined requirements for this function, there are no
performance requirements, just that they must be provid-
ed. Protection can only work as intended if it is set sensi-
tive to the available arcing current magnitude. The benefit
of these switches is that they generally have a broad range
of adjustability and should be able to be adjusted to be
sensitive enough to achieve acceptable arc-flash reduc-
tion. however, a responsible party must establish what
the expected arcing current is and ensure the protection is
adjusted correctly. once commissioned, maintenance per-
sonnel should only need to enable and disable the func-
tion as prescribed in the planned task procedures.
Indication and Control Local to What?
Maintenance switches should be used with indicator lights.
The code states that a local indicator must be provided,
but the text is not specific as to what should be local. does
it need to be local to the overcurrent protection device
(ocPd) being affected or to the remote equipment being
protected? Good engineering practice would dictate that it
should exist where the protected equipment is. however,
the switchboard manufacturer, if not given specific direc-
tions to the contrary, will often include it near the ocPd
being controlled by the switch. Most importantly, the per-
son who is relying on that protection should be aware of
its status and what circuit or equipment is being protected.
To facility operators, it may be important to know if the
protection is accidentally left on when not needed.
The maintenance control switch should have test pro-
cedures for confirming that the circuit breaker or relay
being controlled has received the signal and processed it
correctly. These should be followed up on initial start-up
and at regular intervals afterward. This could be referred
to as positive feedback of status. The switch should be
lockable so it can be properly locked in the on state by
maintenance personnel.
This function can temporarily compromise coordina-
tion, until it is disabled. Users are often concerned about
forgetting to turn this off after a task, and an obvious
indication of the status is often designed into the system.
indications, such as tower lights evident through the elec-
trical room, sound alarms, and even e-mails to supervi-
sory personnel, have been used to ensure a maintenance
switch is not left on indefinitely. similar measures should
be used to ensure that a maintenance switch is used
when needed. The manufacturer should be consulted for
device implementation information because wiring and
space requirements may vary.
What About the Arc-Flash Label?
another consideration when relying on an energy-reduc-
ing maintenance switch to provide lower levels of arc-
flash incident energy is whether that lower level should
be reflected on the NFPa 70e defined arc-flash label [2,
sec. 130.5(d), p. 28] installed on the equipment. There
are many opinions about this subject. one argument is
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 This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
that arc-flash labels should not be ambiguous or complex
and should be conservative in case the reader is not fully
aware of proper procedures or inadequately trained.
Administrative Procedures Require Qualified Personnel
and Task Planning
The better protection afforded by the energy-reducing
maintenance switch can be reflected in the data provided
by the arc-flash study and form part of the risk assess-
ment [2, sec. 130.5, p. 25] required to plan an energized
work task [2, sec. 130.2(a), p. 24]. The other argument
is that the maintenance function is embedded in the
equipment and always available to be used, so the better
protection can be reflected in the arc-flash label, or a sec-
ond label, that clearly indicates the incident energy with
the switch turned on or off. however, this may not be
the case for equipment fed by multiple sources involving
multiple energy-reducing maintenance switches, unless
they are coordinated in some manner. a concern may also
be the improper use of an energy-reducing maintenance
switch by unqualified personnel not aware of the system’s
limitations. some of the limitations are the following.
● Neither a circuit breaker nor its load is made safe using
the switch. The protection provided by the circuit
breaker may be improved, but that does not mean the
circuit breaker or the load circuit is electrically safe.
● The arc-flash hazard at the line side of the circuit
breaker is not affected by an energy-reduction main-
tenance setting (erMs) on that circuit breaker. Protec-
tion for the line side depends on an upstream device
that may not be affected by the switch mounted in the
proximity of the circuit breaker.
● a bus, or equipment, may have multiple sources, and,
unless the switch controls all of them, they may need
to be addressed simultaneously to make sure the haz-
ard from each source is minimized.
● When the switch is local to the circuit breaker but the
actual equipment to be worked on is remote, there are
opportunities for mistakes (e.g., setting the switch on
the wrong ocPd or having the switch operated by
other personnel if it’s not properly locked out in the
enabled position).
● The switch may be used properly, but, if the setting is
not sensitive enough, arc-flash protection may not be
improved.
● setting the normal instantaneous protection temporari-
ly lower, and thereby using it as an erMs, may provide
the expected energy-reducing function. however, this
method does not provide the annunciation function
that is described in the code, and, therefore, it is tech-
nically not an acceptable method.
Approved Equivalent Means Solution
and Energy-Reducing Active Arc-Flash Mitigation System
The code does not clearly explain what an approved
equivalent means or what an active energy-reducing
8 IEEE Industry Applications Magazine œ J A N U A RY / F E B R U A RY 2 0 1 9
arc-flash mitigation system is. however, there are sev-
eral possibilities should the authority having jurisdiction
(ahJ) choose to accept them. components of such sys-
tems may include
● for sensing: light-sensing relays as event detectors and
controllers or overcurrent relays to sense arcing current
● for interruption: low-voltage circuit breakers, medium-
voltage circuit breakers, low-voltage fuses, medium-
voltage fuses, crowbars to divert energy and collapse
system voltage, or combinations of these.
arc-flash relays are usually able to directly sense the
light from an arc-flash event near the sensor location [14].
These devices are fast and considered to be very good at
sensing an arcing fault event. however, they have some
drawbacks. They can unexpectedly operate from the light
emanating from a circuit breaker interrupting a remote
fault [15]. Furthermore, they can sense within an equip-
ment enclosure very well but do not sense a fault at the
far end of a conductor feeding remote equipment. in some
cases, it may be possible to prevent a nuisance operation
due to an interrupting circuit breaker within the enclosure
using Zsi restraint from the trip unit controlling the circuit
breaker [12, c, p. 1643] or via other interlocking methods.
overcurrent relays, aNsi 50/51 devices, may be able to
provide additional protection and control over and above
that provided by circuit breaker trip units in some situ-
ations. one example is sensing faults on the conductors
between the secondary of a substation transformer and
the first secondary low-voltage devices. details of these
implementations are beyond the scope of this article, and
some references on secondary substation protection are
provided in [5].
low-voltage circuit breakers and power switches can
be controlled from various sensing devices. When using a
combination of interrupting devices and external controls,
it is important to understand the full operation time of
sensing, signaling, and switching devices. in many cases,
although the relay sensing may be very fast, the combina-
tion of the various delays provides for slower protection
than the integral instantaneous protection provided by
the circuit breaker. in most cases, external relays should
only be used in special applications that warrant the com-
plexity and cost.
Medium-voltage circuit breakers may be especially
suitable to protect conductors and equipment fed from
a transformer prior to the first low-voltage device. such
circuit breakers may be controlled in many ways. see the
references on secondary substation protection provided in
[5] and [12].
low- and medium-voltage fuses could, potentially, be
accelerated by use of a crowbar to divert energy, collapse
voltage, and force the highest available fault current to
flow through the fuses to ensure they operate in their
current-limiting range. if the current is high enough, it
will flow for under half a cycle, and arc-flash protection
can be very quick with minimal consequences. crowbars
 This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
are shunt devices that divert current and collapse system
voltage by causing a minimum impedance fault some-
where in the system. as arc-flash protection, they should
work very well if the arc fault is detected. however, the
bolted fault current may not be desirable and have seri-
ous consequences to the distribution system. if such a
mitigation system is considered, the manufacturer should
be consulted to fully understand the implications of the
application, how the sensing will operate, and how the
energy diversion device will operate. at the time of this
writing, most crowbar devices seem to be one-time-use
devices, which has implications on the ability to test
them. Because an arc-flash mitigation system is a safety
mechanism, the ability to fully confirm operation for
maintenance purposes is also important.
240.67 Fusible Switches, Improving Protection
in 2017, the Nec added section 240.67, which describes
requirements similar to those found in 240.87 for switch-
es with 1,200-a or higher fuses. The requirements, as
defined, are not necessary to be enforced until 2020. The
existence of the requirements indicates that the code-
making panel perceives a potential hazard and conse-
quential risk to personnel that merit consideration. The
2020 enforcement date seems to be an attempt to delay a
solution having limited commercial availability.
The section allows fuse protection to be evaluated
with the arcing current to investigate if the fuse will
protect sufficiently quickly without additional protective
measures being applied in the system. The requirement
is for fuses to clear in 70 ms or fewer at the estimated arc-
ing current. The authors believe this requirement may be
insufficient for various reasons.
● it forces the ahJ to evaluate complex time–current-
curves. Not all ahJ have the skills to evaluate time–
current curves.
● The time–current curves provided will be for a specific
brand and model of fuse. When a fuse melts, it could
be replaced by one with different characteristics. a
conservative course of action would be to use enve-
lope or test fuses, like fuse-to-circuit breaker series
rating tests do, so not just one manufacturer’s fuses are
considered.
● The 70-ms clearing time exceeds three cycles, and
even a three-cycle clearing time is not the best a fuse
can do. Fuses in this size range are current limiting
and provide best performance when operating in
their current-limiting range. Fuses operating in their
current-limiting range may provide the best arc-flash
incident energy mitigation possible for any overcur-
rent device.
● Fuse curves are drawn as single-phase devices. When
a fuse melts in one phase, the fault current in a three-
phase balanced fault changes to a single-phase fault at
87% of the original fault current, increasing the possi-
bility of the second or third fuse melting more slowly.
The fuse curves an ahJ would review are incapable of
revealing slower melting times.
ieee 1584-2002 (sect. 5.6, p. 13) includes formulas for
fuses based on testing done by the research group for one
brand of fuses. The tests were performed primarily at 600
V. The test data were used to derive several fuse formulas
that could be used in lieu of time–current curves to evalu-
ate arc-flash incident energy performance. The formulas
provide for an energy calculation based on available
bolted fault current regardless of arcing gap and driving
voltage. Both arcing gap and driving voltage are impor-
tant factors affecting arcing current.
Furthermore, the experiments to determine fuse
performance also put a thin wire (trigger wire) in series
with the fuse, which is a weak conductor. The trigger
wire serves as a primitive fuse. When high current is
passed through, both heat up and eventually melt. The
trigger wire should melt first, causing an arc-flash event,
which is interrupted by the fuses. The current causing
the wire to heat also causes the fuse to heat before an
arcing event occurs. This could be interpreted as biasing
the tested fuse to operate more quickly, but no clear data
are available to identify if this is consequential.
an additional concern is that most of the test data are
at 600 V. This means the arcing current is a relatively high
percentage of available short circuit fault current relative
to the percent at 480 or 208 V. The ieee fuse formulas do
not provide any guidance on how to correct the formulas
when applied at lower driving voltages. Figure 5 shows
the identified fuses, 1,200 a and greater, and the pro-
spective fault current at which the fuse seems to reduce
energy to about 8 cal per the formulas provided in ieee
1584-2002.
Figure 6 shows incident energy per the ieee 1584-2002
model for 480-/277- V, 32-mm gap at 18-in working dis-
tance at three clearing times: 0.025 s, typical for a larger
slow MccB; 0.05 s, typical for a large iccB or lVPcB; and
0.07 s, the value specified as sufficient fuse performance
in 240.67, which allows for no additional measures to
be taken to reduce clearing time for a fused switch. as
can be seen in Figure 6, the slower 0.07 s does allow a
bit more energy, although it is lower than 8 cal up to an
available 70- ka short circuit current.
Based on the ieee 1584-2002 fuse arc-flash incident
energy formulas, an attempt was made to transpose
those formulas for 480-V applications (see Table 4). Fuses
above 1,200 a probably need additional means to reduce
incident energy below the commonly desired level of
8 cal/cm2. likewise, at 208 V, 1,200-a fuses would benefit
from the additional protection described in 240.67. an arc-
flash study is the best way to determine if the fuse will
provide the desired protection at the available arcing cur-
rent expected.
Fuses can provide optimum protection if they are
operating within their current-limiting range. The cur-
rent-limiting threshold is defined in the applicable
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IEEE 1584-2002 Fuse Equations Table 5. The current-limiting ratio values, UL fuse
32 standard
Incident Energy cal/cm2

24 Fuse Class Ratio

16 Class RK5 65
Class RK1 30
8
Class J 30
0 Class CC 30
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Available Bolted Fault Current (kA) Class L 30 (601–1,200 A)
L-1601-2000 L-1201-1600 L-801-1200 Class L 35 (1,201–2,000 A)
Class L 40 (2,001–4,000 A)
FIGURE 5. A fault current where the fuse limits the incident energy
to 8 cal at 600 V, transposed to 480 and 208 V.
a conservative interpretation of available data. Most
products will perform better than standard allowed
14 maximum thresholds. however, different fuse manu-
0.025 s 0.05 s
facturers and different types of fuses may be installed
12 0.07 s 1.2 Cal/Cm2
4 Cal/Cm2 8 Cal/Cm2 over time, meaning the conservative course of action is
10 to base design decisions on the worst practical scenario
Cal/cm2

8 over the life of the equipment. This also adds some

flexibility to account for other issues that may impact
6
fuse melting times.
4

2 Arc-Flash and Electrical Safety Improvements

That Do Not Address Implied Code Intent
0
Within the industry, many design decisions can be
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Ibf (kA) made that have a positive impact on electrical safety
and arc-flash-hazard mitigation. designers, following
Prevention Through design principles, should consider
FIGURE 6. A graph of incident energy per IEEE 1584-2002 at an
many of these decisions and implement them as much
18-in working distance for a 32-mm arcing gap. The arc-in-a-box
formulas for three different clearing times are shown for 480/277 V, as possible in system designs. among these consider-
32 mm, and 18 in. ations may be
● high-resistance grounding, widely believed to reduce

the probability of an accidental arcing fault [16]

Table 4. An approximate prospective current ● arc-resistant equipment, which provides benefits for
value where the IEEE 1584-2002 fuse formulas personnel working or standing near fully closed equip-
predict 8-cal/cm2 incident energy at 600 V, ment; however, it does not reduce the hazard when
transposed for 480 and 208 V someone is working on live equipment with doors
open or covers removed [17]
Fuse Class kA for kA for kA for
● remote human–machine interface, diagnostics, dis-
and Range 8 cal 600 V 8 cal 480 V 8 cal 208 V
play, and so forth, a good solution that is very easy to
L, 1,601–2,000 96 120 240 implement in modern equipment and provides many
L, 1,201–1,600 41 51 103 benefits; however, it does not address live work hazard
control implied by the code
L, 801–1,200 25 31 63
● remote circuit breaker operation, a very good risk miti-

Determined Transposed Transposed gation method but does not address live work hazard
from graph by 5/4 ratio by 5/2 ratio concerns as the code attempts to do.

standard for those fuses. The ratios and thresholds are Suggested Improvements in the Code
shown in Tables 5 and 6. Fuses will provide the best
possible arc-flash protection after one fuse melts, if the Circuit Application
expected arcing current is larger than the value shown current code sections make no allowances for the applica-
in the current-limiting threshold table, which provides tion of the circuit being addressed. is the circuit a service

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 This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
entrance main, a feeder on an important distribution bus,
or a branch device feeding a single load or machine? is it
an additional device being used as a local disconnect pro-
viding mostly a disconnect function rather than a critical
protective function?
The extra protection mandated by code requirements
seems to address the hazard during energized work (an
energy-reducing maintenance switch is only used during
planned exposure). But a local disconnect, such as a safe-
ty switch, used in a circuit fed from a remote, similarly
sized circuit breaker and feeding a dedicated load is not
exempted from the code requirements. The extra protec-
tion is not needed twice in the same circuit.
System Voltage Considerations
additional protection requirements are necessary at 1,200 a,
regardless of system voltage. as stated previously, key factors
in good protection are 1) having it operate for the available
arcing current and 2) the arcing current as a percentage of
the bolted fault current will vary greatly with system voltage.
if 1,200 a is the proper limit for additional protection at 480
V, then the proper limit for 600-V installations may be 1,600
a, and for 208-V installations, it may be 600 a.
Is the Overcurrent Protection Being Improved or Not?
The code is not sufficiently specific when discussing addi-
tional protection functions, such as bus differential or Zsi.
Those enhancements only provide a benefit if they oper-
ate the overcurrent device(s) for a fault in the zone of pro-
tection and only if the protection is as fast as possible at
expected arcing current levels. in other words, the thresh-
old for operation of the device must meet the same crite-
ria as those control methods having a threshold identified.
it is not sufficient for a device to be installed; it must play
an active protection role to provide benefit.
Arcing Current Location
an additional concern, not addressed by the code when it
states protection will operate at the available arcing cur-
rent expected, is that there is no definition of where the
arcing current is to be determined—at the terminals of
the overcurrent device or at the far end of the protected
conductors? The far end of the conductors may be the
equipment that may be worked on while energized. it
would be reasonable to expect this is where the improved
protection is desired, but that detail is not identified in the
code text, and it should be.
Protection with Fuses
it is well understood that the faster the protection is at
the arcing current level, the better it is. Fuse performance
should be taken from the standards defining the fuse
class, and for arcing current higher than those thresh-
olds, additional protection is not needed. For arcing cur-
rent lower than the thresholds, additional protection is
needed. evaluations using 0.07 s can provide higher E i
Table 6. The current-limiting threshold values,
UL fuse standard
Class L Fuse Size (A) Current-Limiting Threshold (A)
1,200 36,000
1,600 56,000
2,000 70,000
3,000 120,000
4,000 160,000
levels than the code intended, especially when fuses can
perform much better. This eliminates ahJs from having
to confirm overly complex compliance for fuse-protected
circuits, and instead, a specific numerical target for arcing
current versus fuse size should be provided.
Unprotected Conductors
some systems may have conductors not adequately pro-
tected in the case of an arc-flash event, particularly line-
side conductors for service entrance equipment or other
large equipment where the power comes from a gen-
erator or transformer. Between the power source and the
first overcurrent device, there may be no protection, or
the protection operates at a different voltage and is not
adequate for conductors. a recommended practice within
the industry is to isolate such conductors so personnel
working downstream of the local ocPd are not exposed
to them. it is also recommended that the space with the
unprotected energized conductors be isolated such that
the effluent from an arc-flash event localized downstream
of the local ocPd cannot cause a flashover and arc-flash
event at the primary side of the ocPd.
Conclusions
To ensure that the Nec is properly enforced, local ahJs
must be able to reasonably verify the requirements.
ensuring that arc-flash reduction goals are achieved
requires expert knowledge in the application of these
methods described in the code. implementing a method
without understanding if or how it works can create
a false sense of security. it is important that electrical
inspectors examine coordination study documentation,
particularly because the art of circuit breaker selectivity
requires more than just confirming that device time–cur-
rent curves do not overlap. Without a high-quality short
circuit coordination study and arc-flash-hazard analysis
performed by a competent engineer, it is difficult to con-
firm that arc-flash incident energy mitigation has been
suitably implemented. a more practical course of action
may be requiring a competent engineering professional
to provide a report indicating what methods have been
applied to the installation to ensure the devices provide a
reasonable limited level of incident energy. This could be
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 This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
given either as a calories-per-square-centimeter target or
indicating that all devices above a certain size are operat-
ing as quickly as they can at or below the expected mini-
mum arcing current level calculated.
one last note: it is important to remember that equip-
ment-based solutions will be sufficient only if mainte-
nance is properly performed and all appropriate safe
work practices are followed.
Author Information
Marcelo E. Valdes (marcelo.e.valdes@ieee.org) is with
aBB, cary, North carolina. Valdes is a Fellow of the ieee.
Steve Hinton is with schneider electric, lexington, Ken-
tucky. Francisco Martinez is with aBB, Tampa, Florida.
This article first appeared as “arc Flash in the National
electrical code: articles 240.87, 240.67; intent and reality,
does the code achieve its Goals? do You achieve its
Goals?” at the 2017 ias annual Meeting. This article was
reviewed by the ias codes and standards committee.
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