Peej - Case Compilation

Project Report on
JOURNAL WRITING: CASES ON “DISCIPLINARY

ACTIONS”, “PROFESSIONAL ETHICS” & “SECTIONS 16,
17, 24, 24-A & 26-A OF THE ADVOCATES ACT, 1961”
Submitted by
OISHI SEN
Division A
PRN 19010323076
Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad Symbiosis International (Deemed) University, PUNE
In
August, 2023
Under the guidance of
Dr. Sanu Rani Paul
Assistant Professor
Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad
8
CERTIFICATE
The Project- Journal Writing pertaining to compilation of cases pertaining to various facets of
the legal profession, more specifically, cases on “Disciplinary Actions”, “Professional
Ethics” and “Sections 16, 17, 24, 24-A, 26-A of the Advocates Act, 1961” submitted to the
Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad as part of Internal assessment on Professional Ethics and
Professional Accounting System is based on my original work carried out under the guidance
of Dr. Sanu Rani Paul from 10 th July, 2023 to 21st August, 2023. The instant compilation has
not been submitted elsewhere for the award of any degree.
The material borrowed from other sources and incorporated in the thesis has been duly
acknowledged.
I understand that I myself could be held responsible and accountable for plagiarism, if any,
detected later on.
Signature of the candidate: Oishi Sen
Date: 21/08/2023
II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I am indebted to my guide, Dr. Sanu Rani Paul, for being understanding, cooperative and
helping me very patiently with even the tiniest doubts I had. The duration of this journal inter
alia case report has been extremely difficult for me pertaining to certain issues. I sincerely
thank my best friend for being an immaculate source of strength and inspiration. I would
extend my gratitude to my friends and my roommates for their constant love and support.
This paper would not have been possible without the aforementioned people. I once again
thank them from the bottom of my heart. If any mistakes remain, I take solely responsibility
for the same.
III
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SL NO. CASE NAME CITATION PAGE NO.

I. List of Abbreviations --- VII
(A) CASES ON DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS

1. Vikas Deshpande v. Bar Council of India AIR 2003 SC 308 1-2
2. Bar Council Of Andhra Pradesh v. Kurapati AIR 2003 SC 175 3-4
Satyanarayana
3. P.R. Adikesavan v. Registrar General, High 2022 SCC Online 4-6
Court of Madras & Anr SC 700
4. P.D. Gupta v. Ram Murti & Anr. 1997) 7 SCC 147 6-7
5. Ajitsinh Arjunsinh Gohil v. Bar Council of (2017) 5 SCC 465 8-9
Gujarat & Anr.
6. Hikmat Ali Khan v. Ishwar Prasad Arya & (1997) 3 SCC 131 10-12
Ors.
7. Narain Pandey v. Pannalal Pandey (2013) 11 SCC 435 12-13
8. O.P. Sharma & Ors. v. High Court of Punjab (2011) 6 SCC 86 14-15
& Haryana
9. Dhanraj Singh Choudhary v. Nathulal (2012) 1 SCC 741 15-16
Vishwakarma
10. Noratanmal Chaurasia v. M.R. Murli (2004) 5 SCC 689 17-18
11. Jaipur Vikas Pradhikaran v. Sri Ashok Kumar (2011) 14 SCC 105 18-20
Choudhary & Ors.
12. High Court of Madras v. R. Krishnamurthy 2021 SCC OnLine 21-24
Mad 6383
13. Central Bureau Of Investigation, Hyderabad (2012) 9 SCC 512 24-25
v. K. Narayana Rao
14. Shambhuram Yadav v. Hanumandas Khatri AIR 2001 SC 2509 25-27
15. Bhupinder Kumar Sharma v. Bar Association, (2002) 1 SCC 470 27-28
Pathankot
16. Harish Chandra Tiwari v. Baiju (2002) 2 SCC 67 29-30
17. Rajendra Pai v. Alex Fernandez AIR 2002 SC 1808 31-32
18. O.N. Mohindroo v. The Bar Council Of Delhi (1968) 2 SCR 709 32-33
19. D.P. Chadha v. Triyugi Narain Mishra & Ors. AIR 2001 SC 457 34-35
20. An Advocate v. B.B. Haradara & Ors. AIR 1990 SC 245 35-37
21. Bapurao Pakhiddey v. Suman Dondey AIR 1999 SC 916 37-38
IV
22. V.P. Kumaravelu v. The Bar Council Of (1997) 4 SCC 266 38-39
India, New Delhi
23. D.S. Dalal v. State Bank Of India AIR 1993 SC 1608 40-41
24. M. Veerabhadra Rao v. Tek Chand (1984) Supp SCC 41-43
571
25. T.A. Kathiru Kunju v. Jacob Mathai (2017) 5 SCC 755 43-45
(B)CASES ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

1. N.G. Dastane v. Shrikant S. Shivde AIR 2001 SC 2028 46-48
2. R.D. Saxena v. Balram Prasad Sharma AIR 2000 SC 2912 48-50
3. A.S. Mohammed Rafi v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 2011 SC 308 50-52
4. Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India AIR 2018 SC 95 52-54
5. B. Sunitha v. State of Telangana (2018) 1 SCC 638 54-56
6. Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India AIR 2003 SC 175 56-57
7. Chandra Prakash Singh Chauhan v. State of (2011) 15 SCC 235 57-59
Uttar Pradesh
8. Rakesh Tiwari, Advocate v. Alok Pandey, (2019) 6 SCC 465 59-61
Chief Judicial Magistrate
9. In Re: Prashant Bhushan & Anr. (2021) 3 SCC 223 61-62
10. Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of AIR 1998 SC 1895 63-65
India
(C) CASES ON-

(I) SECTION 16 OF ADVOCATES ACT, 1961
(II) SECTION 17 OF ADVOCATES ACT, 1961
(III) SECTION 24 OF ADVOCATES ACT, 1961
(IV) SECTION 24-A OF ADVOCATES ACT, 1961
(V) SECTION 26-A OF ADVOCATES ACT, 1961
1. Indira Jai Singh v. Supreme Court of India (2017) 9 SCC 766 66-68
Through Secretary General & Ors.
2. S. Lawrence Vimalraj v. Registrar 2022 SCC OnLine 68-70
Mad 6088
3. Supreme Court Bar Association v. B.D. (2011) 13 SCC 774 70-73
Kaushik
4. Joginder Singh v. The Bar Council Of India. AIR 1975 Del 192 73-75
5. V. Sudeer v. Bar Council of India & Ors. (1999) 3 SCC 176 76-78
6. Bar Council Of India v. Bonnie Foi Law 2023 SCC OnLine 78-80
College & Ors. SC 130
V
7. Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of U.P. (2016) 8 SCC 335 80-83
8. Hemlata Pradhan v. State of Chhattisgarh AIR 2020 Chh 45 83-85
9. Bal Dev Singh Dhingra v. Madan Lal Gupta (1999) 2 SCC 745 85-88
10. Anand Kumar Sharma v. Bar Council Of (2019) 14 SCC 398 89-91
India & Ors.
VI
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATION FULLFORM
DC Disciplinary Committee
BCI Bar Council of India
SC Supreme Court
HC High Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
AIR All India Reporter
Mad Madras
Chh Chhattisgarh
Del Delhi
IPC Indian Penal Code, 1860
CrPC The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Const. The Constitution of India, 1950
NI The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
v. Versus
u/s Under Section
u/a Under Article
S. Section
Art. Article
Ors. Others
Anr. Another
& And
VII
(A) CASES ON DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
1. VIKAS DESHPANDE V. BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA

CITATION: AIR 2003 SC 308
JUDGEMENT BY: SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Facts: -
The Appellant herein, Vikas Deshpande, is an Advocate who sold off the complainants’
property without any authorization. The complainants herein were accused of murder and
sentenced death penalty by Sessions Court. The Appellant extended an olive branch and took
their thumb impression on certain papers assuring that he would not charge any fees in
consideration of the poor financial stature of the complainants. However, the Appellant
defrauded them and gained power of attorney through misrepresentation, which he utilized
while selling the property off. The Appellant urged that he had sold the property to
appropriate his legal fees. The complainants filed a complaint with the State Bar Council of
Maharashtra who took suo moto cognizance of the complaint and held the Appellant guilty of
professional misconduct. The matter was further referred to Bar Council of India.
Disciplinary Committee of BCI permanently debarred the appellant from practicing law
owing to professional misconduct and imposed costs of Rs. 25,000/-. Aggrieved by this
ruling, Appellant filed the instant appeal in the Supreme Court u/s 38 of the Advocates Act.
Issues: -
i. Whether the Appellant’s conduct constitute professional or any other kind of

misconduct?
ii. Whether the Appellant justified in fraudulently selling the complainant’s land to
recover legal fees?
Rules: -
i. Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961

ii. Section 36 of the Advocates Act, 1
1
iii. 961
iv. Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961
Judgement: -
The Supreme Court did not find any anomaly in the order of the Bar Council of India. Hence,
the appeal was dismissed. The appellant failed to produce any evidence to show the
genuineness of the Power of Attorney or that he was legally entitled to legal fees by selling
off the complainants’ property. The Court directed that the Appellant’s property was kept in
lien to recover the expenses. The court found that the Appellant had taken advantage of the
appellant’s dire circumstances and gained power of attorney in his favour by
misrepresentation to discard off the complainant’s property for his own benefit. Thus, the
Apex Court held the Appellant guilty of professional misconduct.
Analysis: -
The association amongst a lawyer and the person he represents is based on confidence, it is
essential that they have that confidence firmly established. This professional misbehavior
upsets and worries public, as does its regularity. To prevent the present court system in the
nation from collapsing and failing, it is crucial that the lawyer and the client maintain each
other’s confidence. The moment is upon us for the community as an entire entity, the
individual State Bar Councils, and the Judges to make sure they pay heed to the warning
signs and act quickly to set a suitable structure.
Conclusion: -
Greed must never cloud a legal practitioner’s zest for justice and bringing a positive change
in the society. Advocates are the pillars of the roof of justice. We saw how the complainants’
situations were taken advantage of and looted by the Appellant, whereas the Appellant is in a
profession that ensures and safeguards civilians against such opportunistic and cruel people.
Hence, it can rightly be said that the Appellant had besmirched the reputation of the legal
community and the Supreme Court was justified in upholding the order of the BCI.
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2. BAR COUNCIL OF ANDHRA PRADESH V. KURAPATI SATYANARAYANA
Facts: -
The original Plaintiff and de-facto complainant, Gutta Nagabhushanam had hired the
delinquent, the Respondent herein, to represent his case before the Additional District Munsif
Magistrate and the case was decreed in favour of them. The Respondent had received a sum
of Rs. 14,600/- in the execution proceedings, however, did not hand over the amount to the
Complainant. A complaint against this act was filed before the Additional District Munsif
Magistrate and was referred to Disciplinary Committee of State Bar Council, which found it
guilty of professional misconduct and removed his name from the State’s roll of advocates.
On appeal to Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council of India, it affirmed the order of State
Bar Council regarding failure to pay Rs. 14,600/-. However, it held that it is due to
negligence and does not amount to professional misconduct. Hence the State Bar Council of
Andhra Pradesh filed this appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issues: -
i. Whether the Respondent is guilty of professional misconduct or negligence?
Rules: -
Judgement: -
The Apex Court treated this case with utmost importance. It held that the observation of
BCI’s observation that the conduct of the delinquent advocate was mere negligence and not
professional misconduct is wrong. The court while reiterating the strict codes of professional
conduct in the legal field held that an advocate having garnered an experience of more than 3
decades cannot be susceptible to negligence of this kind.
Analysis: -
The Bar Council of India’s conclusion that the failure to pay or stealing of the
litigant's money just amounts to carelessness needs thoughtful consideration, which is
unwarranted coming from the most senior organization in charge of ensuring the integrity of
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the profession of law throughout the entire nation. By failing to render a competent decision
regarding the matter and concentrating only on the Respondent’s erroneous or unsupported
claims, such as his severe fiscal hardship, has nothing associated to the matter at hand, it fell
short in its quasi-judicial duties. At this point in this instance, there's an obvious dereliction of
integrity that a lawyer with their client ought to uphold.
Conclusion: -
In the author’s opinion, the Bar Council of India will use this judgment as a wake-up call
regarding the significance of thoroughly investigating a claim of professional misconduct
before rendering a judgment. The offender violated BCI Rule No. 15 in this instance by
clearly breaching credibility, and he also transgressed the tenet of truthfulness, which
constitutes one of the many crucial cornerstones supporting the respectability of the legal
profession as a whole.
3. P.R. ADIKESAVAN V. REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF MADRAS &

ANR.
CITATION: 2022 SCC ONLINE SC 700
Facts: -
P.R. Adikesavan, an advocate and the Appellant herein, had been requested to be present in
court vide issuance of a non-bailable arrest warrant by the High Court of Madras. When
police officers attempted to execute the warrant, the appellant alongwith 50 other advocates
gathered and prevented the appellant from being arrested thereby resulting into chaos and
obstruction of police officers’ duty. On the same note, personal attacks and comments were
made against the Judge who had directed the issuance of the arrest warrant. Notifying this
incident, a letter was addressed to the Registrar General of the Madras HC, whereafter,
proceedings were initiated against the Appellant u/s 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
The Appellant was found to be guilty and sentenced to 2 weeks of imprisonment and fine of
Rs.2000/-. Also, his advocates’ license was disqualified for 1 year; aggrieved by this order he
filed the instant appeal before the Supreme Court.
4
Issues: -
i. Whether the Appellant’s conduct constitutes contempt against Court?
Rules: -
i. Section 2(c)(iii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

ii. Section 12(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
iii. Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
iv. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
Judgement: -
The Madras HC opined that the Appellant, being a member of the Bar and no common man,
had behaved rashly and was highly disrespectful in his conduct. The Bar and Bench are two
wheels of the vehicle of justice and any disruption would cause the vehicle to break down. It
was also held that all the Advocates including the Appellant who had prevented the police
from fulfilling their duty had caused obstruction of justice by resisting arrest. The wanton
allegations against the Single judge who had issued the arrest warrant are unacceptable and
shameful. The Court also found that the Appellant had deliberately delayed the resolution of
the case by asking for adjournments only to file frivolous applications alleging wrongdoing
against 2 sitting judges. Such actions are unbecoming of an Advocate.
Analysis: -
The Court rightfully held the Appellant accountable of his wrongdoings. Alongside awarding
him punishment, the Court, in its findings, recorded that he had asked for recusal of Judges in
subsequent hearings which were wholly baseless. Furthermore, he had withdrew the
applications alleging wrongdoings on part of 2 judges. In fact, he had asked for subsequent
adjournments only to file the aforesaid applications against the judges. Thus, he had
obstructed justice not only by his conduct outside court but also inside the court. As such,
both the verdict as well as the punishment awarded by the Court are apt and deserving. The
Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s order and dismissed the appeal.
Conclusion: -
The Appellant’s conduct was even more insulting and improper because he was an active
member of the court. He had impeded the execution of justice by refusing to submit to arrest.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the appellant in this case acted without thinking about
5
the repercussions or how his actions would affect other people. Given this, the judgment and
punishment handed down by the High Court and upheld by the SC were accurate and not at
all disproportionate. In fact, it is clear that the punishment’s application was required to teach
the appellant a lesson and keep him from committing the same error again.
4. P.D. GUPTA V. RAM MURTI & ANR.

CITATION: (1997) 7 SCC 147
Facts: -
The case deals with the conduct of an advocate named ‘P.D. Gupta’ who was representing the
appellant, one named Vidyawati. The appellant, Vidyawati claimed to be the sole living heir
to the property of the deceased, Sri Kishan Das. Vidywati sought an injunction against the
respondent, Ram Murti and 2 other people to restrain the respondents from trespassing onto
the suit property.
During the pendency of the suit of injunction, the appellant’s advocate, P.D. Gupta,
purchased the disputed property from Vidywati and sold the same to one named Suresh
Kumar for a sum of Rs. 3,60,000/-, accruing profit and keeping some of it to himself. A
complaint was filed against the said Advocate in the Bar Council of India.
Issues: -
i. Whether the appellant’s advocate has the right to purchase and/or sell the disputed
property at the time of pendency of suit wherein the property is subject of dispute
between parties?
ii. Whether the conduct of the advocate is in compliance with the code of professional
ethics?
Rules: -
i. Section 36B of Advocates Act, 1961

ii. Section 276 of Indian Succession Act, 1925
iii. Indian Electricity Act, 1910
6
Judgement: -
The Bar Council of India held advocate P.D. Gupta’s conduct to have breached the code of
professional ethics and thus termed the same to be professional misconduct. It held that
although lawyers are not barred from purchasing property, but as far as common prudence
goes, especially of a person learned of the law, would never support purchasing a property,
especially if the title of the property is under dispute in a court of law.
BCI’s order was upheld by the Apex Court, which further went on to emphasize an
advocate’s professional duty to ensure justice to its client, to the court’s time as well as to the
rights of the opposite party in the case. The Supreme Court further asserted that
administration of justice is not only the concern of the court but also of the bar. Quoting an
advocate’s professional ethics, the Supreme Court held the advocate to be guilty of
professional misconduct and suspended him from practicing law for 1 year.
Analysis: -
In cases where advocates demonstrate such conduct leads to the conclusion of professional
misconduct. The profession of a lawyer is guided by the compliance and adherence to a set of
accepted professional standards, so those who practice this profession should do so ethically.
In this case, however, P.D. Gupta has broken the rules because he sold the disputed property
while the lawsuit was pending, which is against law and hence is amiss. As a result, the
advocate’s primary responsibility is to refrain from engaging in contentious situations for his
or her own benefit and to always abide by the rules established by the BCI.
Conclusion: -
P.D. Gupta was clearly aware of pendency of decision of court regarding title of the suit
property. That fact indicates PD Gupta’s execution in handling his client's case has
commanding status and has exerted undue influence on his client. In such a scenario, the BCI
as well as the Apex Court were correct in holding P.D. Gupta guilty of professional
misconduct.
7
5. AJITSINH ARJUNSINH GOHIL V. BAR COUNCIL OF GUJARAT & ANR.
Facts: -
A complaint was filed against the Appellant which was being heard by the Disciplinary
Committee of Bar Council of Gujarat. However, the DC of the State Bar Council failed to
pass an appropriate order within 1 year, which is the statutory time limit and hence the matter
stood transferred to the Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council of India, which again
remanded the matter back to the State Bar Council for resolution. Aggrieved by this, the
Appellant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court contending that BCI could not have
remanded the matter back to the State Bar Council.
Issues: -
i. Whether BCI was justified in remanding the case back to the Disciplinary
Committee of State Bar Council for final disposition, after transfer of case from
Disciplinary Committee of State Bar Council to Disciplinary Committee of BCI as
per the mandate u/s 36B of the Act?
Rules: -

iii. Section 36B of the Advocates Act, 1961
v. Section 49 of the Advocates Act, 1961
vi. Rule 18 of Chapter I of Part VII of Bar Council of India Rules, 1975
Judgement: -
The Court recognized that the fundamental issue herein pertains to the jurisdiction of BCI. As
statutorily mandated u/s 36B(1) of the Advocates Act, cases from State Bar Councils get
transferred to BCI if an order is not passed by them within 1 year. Thus, the original
jurisdiction that the State Bar Councils had over these respective cases now stand transferred
to BCI wholly and BCI must dispose off these proceedings in a similar manner as withdrawn
for enquiry u/s 36(2) of the Act. The Court also distinguished between original and appellate
8
jurisdictions and held that the latter had a broader scope and could remand matter back to
lower authority for final disposal. However, in the present matter BCI is deemed to exercise
original jurisdiction and cannot remand the matter back to the State bar Council.
Analysis: -
The Court distinguished between original jurisdiction under Section 36B(1) of the Act and
appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act. The court held that the power to remand
matter back to state bar council would rest with BCI had it been operating on appellate
jurisdiction which is not the case here: - “There can be no shadow of doubt that the BCI,
while exercising original jurisdiction on transfer of a complaint, cannot exercise the
appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, the order passed by the disciplinary authority by
placing reliance on its rules is wholly unsustainable. ” The Apex Court further took pain to
reiterate the nobility of the legal profession and re-emphasized that the society has a right to
expect ideal behaviour from advocates/lawyers. It also noted down, expressing
disappointment on the huge number of cases that have stood transferred to the BCI from
various bar councils owing to failure of giving verdict within statutory period of 1 year. It
held that not doing something that one is duty bound to do amounts to irresponsibility and
slacked attitude on part of the state bar councils.
Conclusion: -
In the author’s opinion, this slacked approach of the State Bar Councils is resulting in a huge
backlog of matters that the BCI alone has to look into especially since they are getting
collected from so many bar councils around India. It is highly unfair for the suffering litigants
as well as the accused lawyers to be kept waiting for a resolution. The statistics are quite
disheartening too. Therefore, it is advisable that state bar councils should take an account of
disciplinary proceedings pending, disposed and instituted in each meeting, figure out the
cause of delay and strategize to act expeditiously.
9
6. HIKMAT ALI KHAN V. ISHWAR PRASAD ARYA & ORS.
Facts: -
This instant case is also known as the ‘Advocate Assault Case’. The Respondent herein
assaulted the opponent Advocate with a knife and allegedly even a bullet was fired. The
Respondent was convicted under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, and Section 25 of the
Arms Act. Upon appeal, the High Court upheld the order of conviction under Section 307 of
IPC. He was sentenced to 3 years of imprisonment. However, when the Additional District
and Sessions Judge, who was responsible for execution of the order, proceeded to do the
same, he received a letter from the Deputy Secretary of Ministry of Home, Uttar Pradesh
stating that the Governor had suspended the conviction of the Respondent under Article 161
of the Constitution of India. On further enquiry, the letter was found to be forged and
fraudulent. The Respondent was arrested and sent to jail. Additionally, the Sessions Judge
also forwarded a complaint to the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh for professional misconduct
u/s 35 of the Advocates Act. The Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council found him
guilty of professional misconduct and barred him from practicing law for 2 years. An appeal
was preferred against this order before the BCI under Section 37 of Advocates Act. The BCI
set aside the impugned order due to lack of material facts and evidence.
Meanwhile, the Appellant also lodged a complaint against the Respondent before the State
Bar Council for forging documents to escape arrest. The Appellant brought forth the
Respondent’s conviction u/s 307 of IPC, the police register wherein the Respondent’s name
was captured for bad character. Due to non-appearance of the Respondent, the State Bar
Council passed an ex-parte order barring him from practice for 3 years. The Appellant
appealed before BCI for enhancement of the punishment awarded. Simultaneously, the
Respondent appealed before BCI as well for relief. Both these appeals were disposed off by
the BCI. Thereafter, the Appellant filed an appeal before Supreme Court u/s 38 Advocates
Act.
Issues: -
i. Whether the Appellant’s conduct amounts to professional misconduct under

section 35 Advocates Act?
10
Rules: -
i. Section 24A of Advocates Act, 1961

ii. Section 35 of Advocates Act, 1961
iii. Section 36 of Advocates Act, 1961
iv. Section 37 of Advocates Act, 1961
v. Section 38 of Advocates Act, 1961
vi. Section 42 of Advocates Act, 1961
Judgement: -
The Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the order of the Bar Council of India vide which it had
nullified the punishment of disbarment given by the State Bar Council of U.P. It upheld the
order of the State Bar Council of U.P of disbarment awarded to the Respondent. The supreme
Court also found the Respondent guilty of gross professional misconduct under Section 35 of
Act. The Court a step forward to hold the Appellant guilty of moral turpitude as well which
constitutes a ground for disqualification u/s 24A(1)(a) of the Advocates Act. As such the
Court directed that the Respondent’s name be removed from roll of advocates.
Analysis: -
Advocates are not only officers of the court, but are also regarded as “loco parentis”, which
means “in place of a parent”. In the instant case, the Respondent’s conduct is wrong and
unethical from all perspectives. The Respondent even went so far so as to forge and
fraudulently insert documents by the name of a Ministry’s department so as to evade being
arrested. The conduct of the Respondent falls within the test devised to ascertain misconduct
and is violative of professional ethics. As per Section 42(2) of the Advocates Act,
proceedings before a disciplinary committee of a bar council are judicial proceedings for the
purpose of Sections 193 and 228 of IPC. Additionally, Section 42 of the Act bestows
disciplinary committee with the same status as that of a civil court. This puts an onus on the
disciplinary committees of Bar councils to deal with complaints pertaining to Section 35 of
the Act cautiously and without any preconceptions or bias. However, evidently, in the instant
case, the disciplinary committee of BCI had erred in setting aside the punishment awarded to
the Respondent and had been oblivious to the circumstances and evidences pointing towards
the guilt of the Respondent.
11
Conclusion: -
In the author’s opinion, the Respondent is an Advocate himself and he must have had the
minimum courtesy of respecting bodily integrity of a fellow advocate. By charging at a
fellow advocate with a knife in court premises and threatening his bodily integrity he has
breached the dignity and decorum of the court. Each legal practitioner has an onus to
maintain and uphold the court’s dignity and honor.
7. NARAIN PANDEY V. PANNALAL PANDEY

Facts: -
The Appellant filed a complaint u/s 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961, before the Bar Council of
Uttar Pradesh, against the Respondent, who is a practicing advocate in the district of Sant
Rabidass Nagar, Bhadohi. The allegations pertained to forging and fabricating documents,
including filing fake vakalatnama and settlement documents, without the knowledge of the
parties. The Appellant sought cancellation of the respondent’s practicing license and prayed
that he be booked for professional misconduct.
The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh found the respondent guilty
and barred him from practicing for a period of 7 years. This order of the DC was appealed by
the Respondent u/s 37 of the Advocates Act before the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar
Council of India, vide the order of which the advocate was reprimanded and directed to pay
Rs. 1000/- to the Advocates Welfare Fund.
Subsequent to the latter order, the Appellant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court of
India.
Issues: -
i. Whether the Advocated has breached professional ethics and is guilty of professional
misconduct for forging and fabricating documents?
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ii. Whether the order passed by the Disciplinary Committee of the BCI was just and
proper?
Rules: -

iii. Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961
Judgment: -
The Supreme Court found the Respondent to be guilty of the charges levelled against him. He
was held to be guilty of grave professional misconduct and such fraudulent actions on part of
an advocate of the Bar could not treated lightly, in interest of administration of justice. The
Court opined that:
“Any compromise with the purity, dignity and nobility of the legal profession is surely bound
to affect the faith and respect of the people in the rule of law.”
Therefore, the Supreme Court modified the order of the DC of BCI and punished the
Respondent Advocate for professional misconduct in accordance with the order of the DC of
Bar Council of U.P.
Analysis: -
Sanctions that is appropriate to the level of infractions is well-deserved by an advocate

who humiliated and brought down the legal community by filing Vakalatnamas without
authorization and entering into misleading and fraudulent transactions on the part of the client
lacking any sort of authority to do so. Similar punishment must meet 2 criteria- rehabilitation
and prevention. When deciding the misconduct, the court made reference to Chapter II of the
BCI Rules’ Preamble. Further the Apex Court found fault with BCI’s order as it had treated
such misconduct lightly.
Conclusion: -
This case served to illustrate the dual goals of deterrence and correction, which are intended
to prevent and minimize professional misconduct. The Supreme Court's ruling in this case is
eye-opening because it unequivocally disregarded the errors made by the BCI in reaching its
verdict and examined the case by emphasizing the integrity and honor of the profession of
13
law, as well as the values provided by the seven lamps of advocacy and principle of
professional ethics.
8. O.P. SHARMA & ORS. V. HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA

Facts: -
An Advocate made abusive and derogatory remarks against a Judicial Magistrate in the
courtroom for remanding the accused to police custody. The Judicial Magistrate wrote a letter
informing the same to the Sessions and District Jude who further intimated the Registrar of
the High Court of P&H. Subsequently, the High Court took suo moto action against the
advocate, who thereafter issued unconditional apology before the High Court. However, he
was guilty of contempt of court and awarded punishment of 6 months or 3 months alongwith
fine of Rs. 1000/- or Rs. 2000/-, respectively.
Consequently, the contemnor appealed before the Supreme Court of India.
Issue: -
i. Whether the advocate’s conduct amounted to professional misconduct?
Rules: -
i. Section I of Chapter 2 of ‘Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquettes’

iii. Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
iv. Section 12(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
Judgement: -
The Supreme Court reiterated the importance of adherence to professional ethics on part of
both the bar and the bench. All court, tribunals, lawyers and staff, when in court, must act a
beacon for administration of justice. In light of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and Bar
14
Council of India Rules, 1975, the court observed that it is the sacrosanct duty of courts and
advocates to uphold the rule of law and enable efficient dispensation of justice.
The Supreme Court went on to affirm the High Court’s order and held that an apology on
behalf of the Appellants’ can be accepted only as an exception to the general rule.
Analysis: -
The court evaluated the role of the lawyers, their purpose and professional ethics, as well as
its conduct in court and reiterated the court's responsibility by citing relevant cases.
Lawyers were bound by a simultaneous obligation to uphold the court's honor, etiquette and
order. Consequently, the court ruled that one cannot use the right to liberty of discourse to
bring false accusations against the judicial system. Moreover, the advocates must continue to
act professionally, which is essential to upholding the sacred nature of establishments.
Conclusion: -
An advocate, in my humble opinion, plays a significant part in efficient justice delivery

system. As a result, the advocate is required to uphold the law and obey the judge’s ruling in
the court. Similarly, upholding civility and discipline in court is the court’s job. Although
accepting an apology can vary depending on the individual, it shouldn't become the standard.
9. DHANRAJ SINGH CHOUDHARY V. NATHULAL VISHWAKARMA

Facts: -
The respondent has approached the State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh with a complaint
against the Appellant Advocate, whom he had appointed, claiming that a sale of property was
attested by the appellant advocate. The western side of the property was in complainant’s
occupation. The property was alleged to be transferred to the appellant advocate by the
vendor despite the fact that the father of the vendor has entered into another agreement to sell
the property. It is alleged by the complainant that the advocate was well aware of the
agreement dated November 15, 1991 which was pending. He filed a complaint against the
15
complainant for the eviction stating that the complainant is just a tenant of the building. A
complaint was filed by the complainant before the State Bar Council against the appellant
advocate. The DC has concluded after proper analysis that the appellant advocate is guilty of
professional misconduct and awarded the punishment of reprimanding. The complainant
went before the BCI under Section 37 of the Act as they were not satisfied with the verdict.
The BCI pronounced a decision to suspend the Advocate from practice for one year.
Issues: -
i. Whether the actions of the respondents amount to professional misconduct?

ii. Whether the suit for eviction was deliberately filed against the complainant by the
Appellant Advocate in the name of MR. Jitendra Singh Bhakna?
Rules: -

Judgement: -
The court was of the opinion that in the current case, the act of the Advocate clearly amounts
to professional misconduct. The Apex court agreed with the findings of the Disciplinary
Committee of the Madhya Pradesh State Bar Council and states that professional misconduct
is a grave and very serious offence that is undesirable from the part of a legal professional
and also unethical. The court decided to suspend the Appellant Advocate from practice for a
period of three months as he illicitly tried to get the title of a property on which a suit is
ending in the court and he was the one who is representing a party in the litigation.
Analysis: -
The present case has a great relevance in reference to the judgement of V.C. Rangadurai v. D
Gopalan & Ors. ((1979) 1 SCC 308) as both the cases has similar facts and the DC has come
to a conclusion that acting in bad faith towards the client would amount to professional
misconduct. The Apex Court emphasized on the principle that the legal profession is
something that is very noble in nature and honesty is a main principle that should be followed
16
by legal professionals. The Advocates are only supposed to engage in honest and fair
dealings with his clients and should maintain utmost morality and ethics.
Conclusion: -
The court has come to a proper conclusion by giving the importance of legal profession and
its dignity as of utmost importance. The court draws a decision by stating that an Advocate
who is acting in bad faith towards his or her client also amounts to professional misconduct.
10. NORATANMAL CHAURASIA V. M.R. MURLI

Facts:
The circumstances of the case concerned an advocate (posing as a litigant in the capacity of
the respondent, rather than an advocate in a rent control procedure) assaulting and kicking the
complainant and insisting that the matter be dropped. Vide an order, the Bar Council of India
declined to investigate into a complaint due to lack of evidence of supposed misconduct on
the part of the respondent. This order is challenged in this appeal filed under Section 38 of the
Advocates Act, 1961.
Issues:
i. Whether the act of the advocate amounted to misconduct, the action against which
could be initiated in the Bar Council, even though he was not acting in the
capacity of an advocate?
Rules:

Judgement
The Supreme Court noted the delay in filing of the complaints with the State Bar Council
and held that there was no reason for such delay. Since the Appellant had been vigorous
to file an FIR immediately, he could have shown such vigour and seriousness with respect
17
to initiating proceedings against the Respondent before the Bar Council. Even after filing
of final report by police, the Appellant did not file any protest petition or any other
proceedings. Even in relation to the alleged incidents that occurred outside of courtroom,
nothings had been brought to the notice of the Court. No one had filed a complaint either.
Upholding the decision of the Bar Council of India, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal
and opined that the matter is not required to be pursued further.
Analysis
The respondent, an advocate, inflicted bodily harm on the respondent throughout the trial as a
petitioner in person in a rent control case. As a result, the BCI launched disciplinary actions
against him. The facts of the instances, according to the Bar Council of India, were
untrustworthy. The appellant filed an appeal at the Supreme Court against the issued order.
The Supreme Court ruled that the criteria of proportionality should be used to evaluate the
amount of penalty that can be imposed on an advocate, which would also rely on the nature
of the crimes complained of. As a result, no uniform norm can be established regarding the
beginning of a procedure for misbehaviour.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has held that while the Advocates Act, 1966 does not define misconduct,
it does define a breach of discipline, although it would be impossible to lay down
exhaustively what constitutes misconduct and indiscipline, which is broad enough to include
wrongful omission or commission, whether done or omitted to be done intentionally or
unintentionally.
11. JAIPUR VIKAS PRADHIKARAN V. SRI ASHOK KUMAR CHOUDHARY &

ORS.
Facts: -
18
A complaint was filed by the Jaipur Development Authority u/s 35 of the Advocates Act
before the Bar Council of India stating that they hired an advocate, Respondent no.1, to
represent them before various courts one of which was a case pertaining to section 18 of the
Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act. It was alleged that the respondent had not represented the
Appellant in the case as well as failed to inform the verdict to the Appellant. The verdict
awarded a whooping sum of Rs. 1.25 crores. It was also alleged that the Respondents No. 1, 2
and 3 were connected associates and had entered upon a settlement acquiring rights in the
property, thereby accruing benefits from the property in dispute, tantamounting to
professional misconduct.
Issues: -
i. Whether the actions of the respondents amount to professional misconduct?

ii. Whether sharing the same chamber of one advocate who is guilty and engaging in the
same proceedings make the other Advocates guilty?
Rules: -

ii. Section 36B (1) of the advocates Act, 1961
Judgement: -
The Apex Court stated that it is the advocate’s responsibility to ensure that there are no
conflicts of interest with the client, the subject matter, or the side he is representing, and if
there are, he or she must inform the client of the same and advise the client to seek advice
from another advocate. It is critical that an Advocate does not take a case in which he or she
has competing interests and does not engage in a way that might harm his or her client. If the
Advocate commits such an act, it is definitely unethical unless and until all parties agree after
full disclosure of the facts. Because the connection between the Advocate and the client is
highly fiduciary, trust should not be assigned without prior agreement.
The case’s ratio decidendi is that Respondent No.1 was found guilty of both professional
misconduct and misdemeanor and was ordered to be suspended from practice for six months.
However, the Supreme Court acquitted Respondents No. 2 and 3 since they were not
19
personally involved in the offence and had no personal interest in it, but simply represented
themselves in their function as Advocates.
Analysis: -
The Supreme Court in this case has clearly analysed the facts and circumstances with the help
of some landmark judgements. The Court cited the case of V.C. Rangadurai v. D. Gopalan
[(1979) 1 SCC 308], which established an advocate's roles and responsibilities and relayed
the understanding that a counsel’s primary responsibility is to the client, and if he believes a
conflict of interest exists, he must advise the client to seek the services of another lawyer. It
was also determined that advocating for opposing interests is unethical unless both parties
voluntarily agree after full disclosure of the truth. Second, the court referenced Pawan
Kumar Sharma vs. Gurdial Singh, [(1998) 7 SCC 24] in which the court determined that
because an allegation of professional misconduct is essentially a quasi-criminal accusation, it
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a preponderance of the evidence.
The court established the notion that an attorney should not take up a case in which he has a
conflict of interest or seek to sabotage such a case by taking purposeful negative steps to
guarantee that his own client cannot win the case. The court also tried to punish an advocate
who willfully fails to tell the client about court proceedings in order to secure an undesirable
verdict and risk the client's vested interest in the case.
The court said that advocating for opposing interests is unethical unless both parties
concerned voluntarily agree after full disclosure of the truth. It was also stated that the
lawyer-client relationship is highly fiduciary in nature, with a delicate, exacting, and
confidential nature that necessitates a high degree of loyalty and good faith, and that it is
strictly a personal relationship involving the highest personal trust and confidence that cannot
be delegated without consent. This Court further ruled that when a lawyer is given a brief, he
is obligated to practise professional ethics and seek to preserve the interests of his clients,
with whom he has a trusting relationship.
Conclusion: -
Before agreeing to the verdict, the court, in my opinion, appropriately assessed the facts as
well as the conclusions of the State Bar Council and BCI, and has gone further in assuring the
genuine essence of professional misconduct. The court validated the case in a novel approach
by addressing the issue of professional misconduct by all three respondents.
20
By studying and referring to the complaint’s contents as well as the facts supplied by the
parties, instances of alleged misconducts, misdemeanors, and misdeeds of Respondents 1, 2,
and 3 were brought to light. According to the researcher, the court addressed all of the
concerns at hand and went above and above to ensure that the genuine nature of professional
misconduct was highlighted. The court addressed all three respondents’ professional
misconduct and then examined the judgement of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar
Council of India and the State Bar Council of Rajasthan.
12. HIGH COURT OF MADRAS V. R. KRISHNAMURTHY

CITATION: 2021 SCC ONLINE MAD 6383
JUDGEMENT BY: MADRAS HIGH COURT
Facts: -
This case pertains to a suo moto criminal contempt proceeding initiated against the
Respondent who is a practicing Advocate of the Supreme Court. The facts of the case are
such that the respondent recorded his opinion against the Judge of the Sessions Court,
Chennai who was presiding over an anticipatory bail application involving a 4 th year law
student and her mother, Tanuja Rajan, wherein the mother was also an advocate and charges
of unruly and rash behaviour against police officers on duty during COVID-19 pandemic
were pressed upon the mother. The Respondent herein was not the counsel on record for the
accused in the anticipatory bail but was present in the virtual hearing. The Judge impleaded
the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu as Respondents and asked them to file a status report as to
what appropriate measures they had taken in similar cases against errant members of the bar.
During the hearing, the Judge had vented his grievances regarding the increasing complaints
against members of the bar. Aggrieved by this, the Respondent took it upon himself to record
his monologue on his mobile phone personally attacking the Judge and widely circulated it on
WhatsApp, pursuant to which the learned Judge directed suo motu proceedings for criminal
contempt against the Respondent under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. A percept from
the Respondent’s voice recording directed at the Judge states: “So, My Lord, it is our view
that you have taken into consideration, the cross on only one side. Butter in one eye, slaked
21
lime in another. My Lord, consider both the sides. If you ask as to what is the mechanism for
unruly advocate, then you shall call the DGP and ask as to what is the mechanism for the
unruly police, Your Honour, My Lord. Therefore, My Lord, as far as this case is concerned,
you are biased. It is clearly revealed, that Your Lordship Mr. Justice M. Dhandapani is
biased, unilateral and is in favour of the police department. Therefore you shall recuse
yourself from this case, My Lord. I had sent a petition to the Hon'ble The Chief Justice of
Madras High Court, His Lordship Mr. Justice, Sanjib Banerjee, the petition filed by Louisal
Ramesh, requesting to refer this case to some other honorable portfolio; honest, honorable
portfolio Judge. Therefore, it is categorically and clearly evident and imminently transparent
that you are biased and prejudiced. Both sides should be evaluated. That is the duty of the
Judge. Hon'ble Judge, you are traversing in a biased manner. You have leaned towards one
side.”
Issues: -
i. Whether the Respondent has scandalised the Court of the Learned Judge and thus
guilty under Section 2(c)(i) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which is
punishable under Section 12 of the Act?
ii. Whether the Respondent by circulating the speech during pendency of the case, has
interfered with the due course of judicial proceedings, and thus guilty under Section
2(c)(ii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which is punishable under Section 12
of the Act?
iii. Whether the Respondent by circulating the speech during pendency of the case, has
interfered with administration of justice, and thus guilty under Section 2(c)(iii) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which is punishable under Section 12 of the Act?
Rules: -
i. Section 2(c)(i) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

ii. Section 2(c)(ii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
iii. Section 2(c)(iii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
iv. Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
v. Section 438 of CrPC
Judgement: -
22
The High Court held the Respondent guilty u/s 2(c)(i) of scandalising the Learned Session
Judge’s court; but with regards to the 2 nd charge the court acquitted the Respondent since he
had recorded the impugned message only after the court proceedings were over; with regards
to the 3rd charge, the court held the Respondent guilty u/s 2(c)(iii) of the Act by reasoning that
circulation of the WhatsApp audio during pendency of the anticipatory bail application
amounted to obstruction in administration of justice. Reprimanding Advocate Tanuja’s
despicable behaviour with police officials, the Court empathized with the Learned single
judge saying upon seeing such unsavoury incidents caused by members of the bar, the bench
cannot help but act on paternal instincts which may lead to display of anguish and concern
publicly. Nevertheless, if the Respondent was aggrieved by the alleged remarks, he, being a
seasoned Advocate having garnered more than a decade’s worth of experience, ought to have
known that he could have recorded his protest in a dignified manner in the course of the
hearing itself or sought an appointment with the learned judge and thereafter recorded his
protest in a manner worthy of an Advocate. Furthermore, the manner the impugned
WhatsApp audio has been recorded, it evidently indicates and/or calls out the Learned Judge
to be dishonest and biased. The respondent, who is an Advocate of the Supreme Court, is
aware that the learned Judge cannot retaliate or defend himself by recording and circulating
his own audio message in response to the audio message circulated by the respondent. The
respondent's audio message was widely circulated on social media, causing significant
embarrassment to the learned Judge. If an advocate of the Supreme Court behaves in such an
inappropriate manner towards a High Court Judge and this behaviour is viewed leniently and
condoned, it may encourage the advocate to behave similarly towards a Supreme Court
Judge. The High Court directed the Respondent to pay Rs. 2000/- for each of the charges
under Sections 2(c)(i) and 2(c)(ii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Analysis: -
Vide this judgement, the Court defended the status and standard of the bench and re-
established firmly the reverence of the members of the Bench. The Court refused to misplace
sympathy in the Respondent as the latter was an experienced Advocate, unlike what it would
have done if the Respondent would have been a common man, unaware of the procedures of
the Court, in which cases courts usually stretch the longest olive branches. In fact the
behaviour portrayed by the Respondent towards the Bench as well that of the accused in the
anticipatory bail application towards the police are indeed worrisome, especially when the
23
members of the Bench are alleviated from the bar itself. If members of the bar display such
conduct, hope is dim for the future of the bar.
Conclusion: -
This case is a classic example of disruption in bar-bench relation wherein the court re-
establishes the importance of both the segments for smooth functioning and progress of the
institution of justice. In my honest opinion, I am of the view that, although the Respondent
was undoubtedly wrong and overstepping his bounds with regards to the manner in which he
put forth his protest, in my humble opinion, the concerned session judge was wrong in having
had vented his grievances publicly and addressing all advocates ‘unruly’ in general. It seems
that both the judge as well as the Respondent acted sheerly on instincts without putting much
mind towards the consequence. It is not untoward that the Respondent’s sentiments were hurt
by the remarks of the Learned Judge, since it is plausible that many Advocates present there
might have mirrored the sentiments of the Respondent. Although the Court was right in
holding the Respondent guilty under relevant sections and granted punishment for the same, I
personally feel the court might have stretched its reasoning to defend the judge.
13. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HYDERABAD V. K. NARAYANA

RAO
Facts: -
CBI, Hyderabad filed a case against the Assistant Manager and the Branch Manager of the
Vijaya Bank, Narayanaguda Branch, Hyderabad for abusing their positions and for
conspiring with private individuals for sanctioning and disbursing housing loans to 22
borrowers in violation of the bank’s guidelines and rules, thereby causing loss of Rs. 1.27
crores and defrauding the bank.
The CBI, in their charge sheet, enlisted the panel advocate for Vijaya Bank, Shri K. Narayana
Rao (Respondent herein), as an Accused. Allegations on the Respondent inter alia were that
he was involved in criminal conspiracy against the bank and had not discharged his duty
appropriately. The duty of the Respondent, as a panel advocate of the bank, was to verify the
24
documents and give his legal opinion. Allegations were levelled against him that he gave
false legal opinion in respect of 10 housing loans.
Issues: -
a) Whether the Respondent failed to discharge his legal duty by giving false legal
opinion?
b) Whether the Respondent was involved in criminal conspiracy with the bank?
c) Whether the Respondent is guilty of professional misconduct?
Rules: -
a) Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961

b) Section 36 of the Advocates Act, 1961
Judgement: -
The Court held that unless there’s concrete evidence against the Respondent beyond
reasonable doubt, there is no point of hearing the case in the first place. The Court has power
to quash an FIR if the charges aren’t on sufficient grounds. The Court held that although a
lawyer owes an unremitting loyalty to clients’ interests, however merely because his legal
opinion may not be acceptable, criminal charges cannot be fastened upon the lawyer,
especially in absence of tangible evidence of having aided or abetted other conspirators. At
most he may be held liable for professional misconduct and gross negligence. However, in
the present case, in absence of evidence, criminal charges against him are rightfully quashed
and set aside.
Analysis: -
In absence of prima facie evidence against the Respondent, there was no need of proceeding
with the case any further. The duty of the panel advocate is to check veracity of documents.
Although it is clear from the facts that he was not involved in conspiracy against the bank.
Although, truth be told, he could have been more careful while vetting the documents, which
might have been helpful in figuring out if the documents are genuine. That way the whole
scam could have averted. The Court rightfully held that a case of professional misconduct
could have been made out had there been supporting evidence. The Supreme Court was
justified in agreeing with the High Court’s verdict in quashing the criminal charges against
the Respondent.
25
Conclusion: -
The Supreme Court upheld the letter of law and delivered a remarkable judgement. The
decision of the Court to consider admission of a case on the basis of sufficient evidence
deserves appreciation. This decision, firstly, reduces the Court’s burden; and secondly, it
discourages vexatious or malafide cases.
14. SHAMBHURAM YADAV V. HANUMANDAS KHATRI

Facts: -
The Advocate, Respondent, herein had sent a letter alleging that the presiding judge was
incapable of delivering an impartial verdict and is susceptible to giving favorable judgements
upon receiving bribes. The Appellant herein was the client of the Respondent and had filed a
case before the Bar Council of Rajasthan against the respondent on account of professional
misconduct. The Disciplinary Committee of the state Bar Council found him guilty of
professional misconduct and barred him from practicing for 2 years. The Disciplinary
Committee of the Bar Council of India, upon appeal, increased the punishment by completely
removing his name from the roll of advocates, thereby by barring him from practicing law.
Review petition was thus filed wherein the sentence was lowered considering the
Respondnet’s age and prior good record. Hence the instant appeal.
Issues: -
i. Whether the Appellant is guilty of professional misconduct?

ii. Whether complete removal of name from the roll of advocates is a punishment
proportionate to the alleged misconduct?
Rules: -

Judgement: -
26
The Court opined that the Disciplinary Committees had taken due consideration of all
material facts and evidences placed on record and there was no infirmity in its order with
regards to the rules. A review petition cannot be entertained in this matter as the scope of
review petition is limited to cases of admission of new evidence in the record, or in cases of
patent illegality apparent on the face of it, and so on. The instant case does not fall within any
of these scopes. Hence the Court admitted the appeal and pronounced the Advocate to be
guilty of misconduct.
Analysis: -
The Advocates, besides practicing law, must also shoulder the responsibility to uphold the
prestige of a noble profession such as that of a lawyer’s, and as such, these kind of conducts
from advocates are wholly unacceptable. The Bar council supervises in this regard and is
responsible for maintain decorum in the legal community, as such empowered to take
stringent measures upon misconduct. The power of review is vested in the Disciplinary
Committees for furtherance of justice and for redemption in cases of grossly wrong
judgements. Power of review ought not to be misused for overturning pronouncements of
another committee which is entitled to make a decision.
Conclusion: -
In the author’s opinion, the Respondent-advocate breached his client’s trust and confidence
as well as his own duty to his profession. He also infringed his duty towards the court as
stipulated under rule 1 and Rule 2 of BCI Rules. Taking the facts and circumstances and the
decision of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the BCI had been wrong in entertaining a
review petition. Stating a judge is impartial and prone to bribery is severe injustice, attacks
public’s faith in the judiciary and improper conduct on part of the advocate.
15. BHUPINDER KUMAR SHARMA V. BAR ASSOCIATION, PATHANKOT

Facts: -
27
The Appellant in the instant case, Mr. Bhupinder Sharma, an advocate who was registered
with the Bar Council of Punjab & Haryana. Besides practicing as an advocate, he owned was
operating 3 businesses. The Respondent, Bar Association of Pathankot filed a complaint
against the Appellant with the Bar Council of Punjab & Haryana for professional misconduct.
The Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council of P&H concluded that the Appellant’s name be
removed from the Roll of Advocates of the State. Upon an appeal, the BCI upheld the verdict
of the Disciplinary Committee. Aggrieved by these rulings, the Appellant filed an appeal
before the Supreme Court under Section 38 of Advocates Act, 1961.
Issues: -
i. Whether the Appellant is liable for professional misconduct and whether the
disciplinary proceedings are valid?
ii. Whether the punishment awarded is appropriate and proportionate to the alleged
misconduct?
Rules: -
i. Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961.

ii. Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961.
Judgement: -
The Disciplinary Committee’s order directed removal of the Appellant’s name from the state
roll of advocates u/s 35(3)(d) of the Act, due to the professional misconduct on part of the
Appellant u/s 36 of the Act. The Supreme Court reiterated the rules that all enrolled
advocates are prohibited from indulging in full-time salaried jobs or any other occupation or
business; And that each advocate must be well-versed and conform to the Bar Council Rules.
In light of this, the conduct of the Appellant can be construed as professional misconduct. It
affirmed the order of the State bar Council as well as that of the Bar Council of India.
However, considering that the Appellant was handicapped, it reduced the punishment.
Analysis: -
The Court, while appreciating the evidence put on record, found that there’s sufficient
material to hold the Appellant guilty of professional misconduct on cogent evidence and
establish quasi-criminal case beyond reasonable doubt. The Bar Council had also placed on
record the fact that the Appellant had lied and suppressed material facts at the time of
28
enrollment, otherwise he would not have been allowed to enroll at all. In this regard the Court
left the latter matter to be decided by the State Bar Council u/s 26 of the Act since the same
was beyond the scope of reference. By continuously lying and presenting false declaration,
and making false evidence, the Appellant attempted to make a mockery of the legal system of
enrollment into the Bar.
Conclusion: -
In my humble opinion, the Supreme Court took a humane, wise and empathetic approach by
reducing the sentence of the Appellant in view of his disability. The decision of the Court in
affirming the order of Disciplinary Committee and BCI was correct by the book in
accordance to Rule 47 of BCI Rules. However, given the condition of the market and
changing economy, it is my opinion that the stringent rules placing absolute prohibition on a
legal practitioner’s autonomy to have any other occupation must be relaxed and should be
allowed unless it is not adversely affecting anyone else and/or is not disrespectful to the legal
profession, immoral or unjust.
16. HARISH CHANDRA TIWARI V. BAIJU

Facts: -
The Appellant herein, Mr. Harish Chandra Tiwari, was the advocate representing the
Respondent in a land acquisition matter. Mr. Baiju was a helpless, illiterate and aged man.
The respondent won the land acquisition case and was awarded Rs. 8,118/- as compensation.
The advocate withdrew the amount but did not hand over the same to the respondent. The
Respondent came to be aware of this after a long period of time and filed a complaint before
the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh. The Appellant contended that he had collected the money
on behalf of the Appellant and had returned to him the balance amount after deduction of
appellant’s legal fees and litigation expenses. In furtherance to this, during pendency of this
disciplinary proceeding, the Appellant filed an Affidavit on behalf of the Respondent, without
29
the latter’s knowledge or consent, stating that the Appellant had offered a compromise but the
Respondent had rejected the same. The case was referred to Disciplinary Committee of the
BCI under Section 36B(2) of the Advocates act whereby the affidavit was found to be forged.
The Disciplinary committee found the Appellant to be guilty of breaching and misusing his
client’s trust and confidence and of professional misconduct and suspended his license to
practice for 3 years. Aggrieved by this order, the Appellant appealed before the Supreme
Court u/s 38 of the Advocates Act.
Issues: -
i. Whether the penalty is proportionate to the misconduct alleged?

ii. Whether all facets were appropriately considered by the Disciplinary Committee?
Rules: -

ii. Section 36(B) of the Advocates Act, 1961
Judgement: -
The Supreme Court rejected the contention of the Appellant that he had returned the balance
amount to the Appellant was rejected on the ground that he wasn’t able to produce any
evidence to prove his point. The Appellant had been in possession of the amount for more
than 12 years instead of the Respondent’s right to receive his deserving compensation. This
conduct amounts to criminal breach of trust as well as amounts to professional misconduct.
The Apex Court affirmed the order of the Bar Council of India. However, it modified the
punishment awarded by the BCI on grounds that the punishment is much less than the
misconduct of the Advocate. Thus, it ordered omission of the Appellant’s name from the roll
of advocates of Bar Council of U.P. and prohibited him from practicing in any court in India.
Analysis: -
The Supreme Court is empowered to issue a fitting order u/s 38 of the Advocates Act which
includes within its ambit to issue an order modifying order of the Disciplinary Committee of
BCI, subject to reasonable opportunity of hearing is given. When compensation funds enter
into his possession of Advocate, it establishes a trust. It was decided that a lawyer misusing a
client’s finances is not a situation where the penalty of a misdemeanor should be reduced. It
30
was also noted that if the abuse was only temporary, that is, if the advocate restored the sum
of cash prior to the disciplinary action started, it may be reasonable to award a lower term,
since the effects of such an infringement of faith would be mitigated. The Court also
discussed the various remedies available u/s 35 of the Act such as reprimand the advocate or
suspend him for practice for a couple of years. However various factors must be weighed by
disciplinary committees before issuing rulings and punishment for proved misconduct.
Among these is the urgent necessity of cleansing the legal community of people with a
history of stealing from their customers’ monies. Therefore, aversion is a crucial factor. In
addition, in order to maintain the community’s norms, it is essential that no one get the idea
that once they get accepted into the field of law, they will be shielded from punishment and
can engage in whatever heinous or abhorrent they like.
Conclusion: -
In my opinion, the Apex Court increased the appellant’s sentence in light of seriousness of
the offense, plus the persistent attempts made by the appellant to steal the money of the
Respondent. It ordered that his name be removed from the list of attorneys, denying him the
ability to represent clients in Indian courts of law. However, instead of such a harsh
punishment, the license could have been suspended for few years, and a hefty compensation
along with interest should have been awarded to the Respondent. The same would have
served all purposes.
17. RAJENDRA PAI V. ALEX FERNANDEZ

Facts: -
The Appellant herein is an Advocate enrolled in the Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa who
received representative right of many people whose rights were adversely affected by a
largescale land acquisition. However, later, 3 villagers complained that the Appellant was
delivering professional service to them at rates determined by the price awarded and filed a
complaint before the State Bar Council. The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council held
the Appellant guilty of professional misconduct and prohibited him from practicing law.
Thereafter, the Appellant appealed to BCI but his appeal was dismissed. Hence the instant
appeal was brought before the Supreme Court u/s 38 of the Advocates Act.
31
Issue: -

ii.Whether quantum of punishment is justified?
Rules: -

Judgement: -
The initial verdict by the state Bar Council that the Appellant has engaged in unethical
behavior has been supported by the Apex court. The court also noted that if more than one
person out of a total of fifteen hundred individuals thought it was justifiable to file a
complaint against the appellant, there is a significant issue that still has to be resolved.
Furthermore, the Court also asserted, “no advocate can in any instance even attempt at
soliciting professional work or take up matters that involve his personal interest. Similarly,
any act of charging the fees based on the quantum of compensation as would be awarded by
the court would also amount to a professional misconduct.”
Analysis: -
Although the Apex court rarely intervenes in bar councils’ verdicts, in the present instance
the court altered the decision because the severity of the penalty was greatly out of ratio to
the offense, particularly in light of the Advocate's long and successful career as a lawyer. The
court, nevertheless, partially upheld the appeal and stated that the severity of the sentence
must be commensurate with the crime and that a lifelong exclusion from employment is a
severe sentence.
Conclusion: -
It is undisputed that denying someone the chance to practice or engage in their job for the rest
of their lives will have a bearing on them and could have a greater effect than anticipated.
The court's decision to lower the sentence to 7 years of probation is proper. Prior to rendering
32
a decision, the judge, nonetheless correctly dealt with the misbehavior on behalf of the
Advocate.
18. O.N. MOHINDROO V. THE BAR COUNCIL OF DELHI

CITATION: (1968) 2 SCR 709
Facts: -
In an arbitration matter, the Appellant, under the guise of taking a notice for inspection,
willfully tore a portion of it. The Subordinate Judge who was presiding over the matter
brought this to the notice of the District Judge, Delhi, who in turn filed a complaint with the
State Bar Council of Delhi. The Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council found him
guilty of professional misconduct and barred him from practice for a period of one year. The
Appellant filed an appeal before BCI which was dismissed, after which he approached the
Supreme Court u/s 38 of the Advocates Act. Alternatively he also filed a writ petition before
the High Court of Punjab & Haryana which held that the ‘Advocates Act’ partially fell in the
concurrent list and that Article 138 did not empower the High court to deal with an appeal
under section 38 of the Advocates Act; such jurisdiction was vested in consonance with
Article 136 since Bar Councils are quasi-judicial authorities.
Issue: -
i. Whether the Supreme Court the sole court having jurisdiction to preside over an appeal
under section 38 of the Advocates Act?
Rules: -

Judgement: -
33
The Court held that the jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the decision of disciplinary
committees of bar councils rests with the Supreme Court as it falls under the Central list. It
was observed that the primary purpose of conferring jurisdiction on courts is to prevent
multiplicity and duplication of subject matter and courts. Legislature is enabled to confer
jurisdiction on courts regarding matters in their respective lists. With respect to concurrent,
both central as well as state legislatures are empowered to confer jurisdiction on courts,
except for the Supreme Court. The subject pertaining to constitution of High Courts and
Supreme Court and people qualified to practice in these courts is listed as Entry 77 and Entry
78 which falls under the Central list. Thus the power to legislate regarding these matters lies
with the Parliament.
Analysis: -
In elaborating on the Disciplinary Committee’s authority, the court concluded that its
objectives include creating a single national bar and providing the infrastructure for its
controlled operation. The Bar Councils have the authority to control qualified behavior and
protocol, to penalize those who break the norms, and to set up one independent bar as the law
calls for. To ensure that a lawyer gets investigated by his fellow lawyers, the authority for
punishment was given to regulatory bodies. Because it falls within the Central List, the SC
has the authority to consider the appeal for the ruling of a Disciplinary Committee.
Conclusion: -
In my opinion, the court did not err in holding that the appellate jurisdiction rested with the
Supreme court and not the High Court. It ought to be noted that the Central list constitutes of
entries regulating persons entitled to practice before the courts, and hence only the Centre has
the right to govern the same or make laws with regards to that.
19. D.P. CHADHA V. TRIYUGI NARAIN MISHRA & ORS.

Facts: -
The Complainant had hired the Appellant Advocate for to represent him in an eviction
lawsuit. The complainant was himself engaged in contesting election in U.P. and it wasn’t
34
possible for him to be physically present at all hearings. The Appellant had received blank
vakalatnamas from the complainant along with his signature and some documents. The
Appellant utilized this to fabricate a petition for settlement which ultimately led to the
eviction of the complainant. Later it was found that the evidence revealed that the Appellant
advocate had tried to prevent the complainant from attending court proceedings so that he can
get the compromise done. The complainant filed a complaint before the state bar council
alleging professional misconduct. The Advocate contended that he had done no such
fabrication and that a party’s presence is not mandatory for reaching a compromise. The
Disciplinary Committee found the Appellant guilty of professional misconduct and
suspended his license to practice for 5 years, which was increased to 10 years by BCI upon
appeal. Aggrieved by this ruling, the instant appeal was filed before the Supreme Court u/s 38
of the Advocates Act.
Issue: -

ii. Whether the quantum of punishment is reasonable and just?
Rules: -

Judgement: -
The Court found the Appellant advocate guilty of professional misconduct. It considered
minute details of the case and the decision of the State Bar Council before reversing the
ruling of the Bar Council of India of suspension of 10 years and emphasized on the ruling of
the State Bar Council. It reasoned that the BCI failed to observe proper procedure of fair
hearing and that all charges pointing towards professional misconduct needs to be proved
before deciding on quantum of punishment. Although the bar Council is empowered to
overturn decision of the State Bar council, but it should do so only after giving the Appellant
proper opportunity to represent his case.
Analysis: -
The court stated that it is crucial to prove intentional misconduct prior to rendering a
judgement because doing so might jeopardize an advocate’s dignity, livelihood, even
35
his/her very being. The Supreme Court additionally stressed how crucial it was that
BCI gives the accused lawyer an opportunity prior to stiffening the penalty, something that it
did not do in this particular case. In the present instance, the Supreme Court of India made it
abundantly apparent that it's the responsibility of an advocate to uphold the genuine course of
the law, whereas failing to accomplish the same by the advocates' actions constitutes
misconduct in the profession.
Conclusion: -
This situation does not comply with Rule 15 of the BCI guidelines, which requires legal
practitioners to defend their clientele’ interests using legitimate methods. Yet, everybody
ought to be allowed the opportunity to express their viewpoint because everyone has a
fundamental entitlement to have one’s voice heard. The Apex Court makes it abundantly
evident that BCI neglected to offer the Advocate this opportunity. The Court thoroughly
considered all relevant information before reaching the appropriate verdict.
20. AN ADVOCATE V. B.B. HARADARA & ORS.

Facts: -
The instant case pertains to money recovery suit of valuation Rs. 30,098/-. The Appellant
advocate had taken up the case of the Respondent upon request of one of his old clients. The
Appellant had asked his junior to file this suit. Thereafter, the Respondent raised allegations
that the Appellant without the knowledge of his client, i.e., the Respondent, had filed a memo
in court informing that the parties have settled the case outside the court and got the case
dismissed. Additionally, the Respondent claimed that he had not been informed about the
dates of hearing and instituted a complaint before the State Bar Council. Since the State Bar
Council could not reach a verdict within a year, it was transferred to the Bar Council of India,
wherein the Disciplinary Committee found him guilty and barred from practice for 3 years,
impugning which the instant appeal was brought before the Supreme Court.
Issue: -
36
i. Whether the Appellant’s conduct amounts to professional misconduct or
negligence?
ii. Whether the Disciplinary committee established all allegations against him before
deciding on the quantum of punishment?
Rules: -

Judgement: -
It was opined by the court that the Advocate had not been provided with a reasonable
opportunity to be heard and the charges against him haven’t been informed to him. BCI failed
to apply the and reasonably establish the doctrine of benefit of doubt as well as could not
establish motive and intention of the advocate. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the
Disciplinary Committee of BCI and remitted the matter back to BCI for proper consideration,
and allowed to hear the matter afresh on the same evidence, while giving discretion to admit
new-found relevant evidence. Furthermore, the Supreme court asserted that since the matter
is still sub-judice, the name of the advocate must not be reflected in the cause title.
Analysis: -
The stance that the Apex Court took herein was that there should be no scope of reasonable
doubt in a judgement delivered, especially when the quantum of punishment is so heavy. A
detailed enquiry is also not outside the scope of powers bestowed upon BCI. The evidence,
when properly appreciated, does not reveal any mens rea or negative intentions towards the
client. The principles of natural justice were also violated in the instant case, in view of which
the punishment seems highly unfair. The conclusion should be drawn from both the evidence
as well as by proper enquiry.
Conclusion: -
In my opinion, the Advocate Act and rules are solely responsible for regulating the
machinery and mechanisms of the legal profession and standards of professional conducts.
There should not be too many technicalities in the mechanisms of bar councils more
specifically when the honour and professional ethics are on line. This case, similar to the
O.N. Mohindroo matter, was significant because it addressed issues of ethical behavior in
37
law. If the apex court refused to remand the case to the BCI, it would be against the rules of
fairness and encourage dubious proceedings.
21. BAPURAO PAKHIDDEY V. SUMAN DONDEY

Facts: -
The Respondent had filed a complaint against the Appellant Advocate for illegitimately
receiving certain amount of funds from the Treasurer of the Welfare Society. These funds
were allotted for other backward people, scheduled caste, and handicapped persons. The
Appellant contended that this had no connection with his profession and challenged the
maintainability of the complaint under section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. He denied
misappropriating the money and stated that he was the treasurer during the alleged period. He
was held guilty of professional misconduct by both the disciplinary committees of the State
Bar Council as well as Bar Council of India. Thereafter, in respect of that, an appeal was filed
in the Supreme Court.
Issue: -
i. Whether the Appellant Advocate’s conduct can be construed as professional

misconduct?
Rules: -

Judgement: -
The Court emphasized on the principle that an Advocate should not be convicted of
professional conduct until the evidence proves the same beyond reasonable doubt. The
Supreme Court reversed decision of the BCI and acquitted the Appellant of charges levelled
against him.
38
Analysis: -
The Court noted that the books of accounts of the Welfare Society were not made available
during the proceedings before the BCI. It was rather surprising how the BCI came to the
conclusion that the Appellant had misappropriated money from the treasure of the Society.
The court rightly upheld the contention of the Advocate that the allegations had no
connection with his legal profession.
Conclusion: -
It is impertinent to ensure that the allegations are proved beyond reasonable doubt before
declaring anyone guilty of such allegations. Therefore, in the author’s opinion, in absence of
valid and legitimate proof, it was unjust and unfair on part of BCI to hold the Appellant guilty
and award him punishment, and the Supreme Court correctly pointed out and corrected the
same.
22. V.P. KUMARAVELU V. THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA, NEW DELHI

Facts: -
The Appellant was the government pleader by the state of Madras for all civil suits in 1978.
The Appellant was required to prepare written statements and appear in a civil suit for which
all documents and records were put before him. However, the Appellant failed to submit the
written statements as well as file the Memorandum of Appearance, resulting into passing of
an ex-parte order, which further resulted in substantial loss for the government. In another
matter wherein date of birth of an employee of Directorate of Education was challenged, he
failed to attend hearings and ex-parte order was passed. A complaint was filed against the
Appellant in the state bar council on account of gross negligence amounting to professional
misconduct. The State Bar Council failed to pass verdict within the statutory time period of 1
year, owing to which the case was transferred before the BCI. BCI held the Appellant guilty
of professional misconduct and suspended his license for a particular period.
Issue: -
i. Whether the conduct amounts to negligence or professional misconduct?
39
Rules: -

ii. Section 36B(1) of the Advocates Act, 1961
Judgement: -
The court opined that professional misconduct must be critically overviewed from case-to-
case basis and malafide intention, motive and turpitude must be established. Malafide
intension is missing in the instant case. When affirming guilt, it must be ensured that the
same is beyond reasonable doubt. The court recorded in its findings that the Appellant is not
guilty of professional misconduct. Non-appearance was not willful or intended but was
caused by failure to provide him with all necessary papers.
Analysis: -
The instant case was another example wherein court had upheld the importance of proving an
alleged act of professional misconduct beyond reasonable doubt. In order to say that an
Advocate is guilty of misconduct, he or she must have some malicious intent which could
result in some adverse effect which clearly absent in the present case. The Court held that the
Appellant was not guilty of professional misconduct because his act of negligence was
neither intentional nor motivated by malice, citing ‘P.D. Khandekar v Bar Council of
Maharashtra’. Likewise, it was not the result of moral turpitude or delinquency, as held in
‘Re: A Vakil’.
Conclusion: -
The clear stance herein is that in absence of mens rea and adverse motives or intentions, no
one could be held liable or guilty, more specifically in the case of an Advocate u/s 35 of the
Advocates Act. Negligence must not be equated with professional misconduct all the time
and the punishment awarded must be proportionate to the professional misconduct so alleged.
40
23. D.S. DALAL V. STATE BANK OF INDIA
Facts: -
The Appellant, an advocate, and his associates, were hired by the Respondent, the State Bank
of India, for filing a suit for recovery of money. Necessary papers and funds for filing such
lawsuit were also handed over by the Respondent. However, the Appellant did not disclose to
the Respondent whether the lawsuit had been filed or not, and if so, at what stage the suit
was. Finally, upon writing a letter to the Appellant, the Respondents became aware that the
suit had been filed and is pending before the High Court of Delhi. Thereafter, despite
numerous reminders, the Respondent never heard back from the Appellant Advocate.
Subsequently, the respondents hired another advocate, who upon following up on the
previous lawsuit filed got to know that the suit so filed was sent back to the Appellant for
removal of objections. However the same was not done by the Appellant. Witnessing such
gross irresponsibility on part of the Appellant, the Respondents filed a complaint before the
Bar Council of Delhi alleging that the Appellant had engaged in professional misconduct by
failing to discharge his professional responsibilities pertaining to the entrustment of a client.
However, the issue remained pending before the State Bar Council for over a year, thereby
getting transferred to the BCI. After conducting proper hearing and hearing both sides, the
Disciplinary committee of BCI found the Appellant Advocate guilty of professional
misconduct. Aggrieved by this decision, the Appellant filed an appeal before the Supreme
Court.
Issues: -
i. Whether the decision of the BCI finding the Appellant Advocate guilty of
professional misconduct was fair and just?
Rules: -

Judgement: -
41
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal thereby upholding the judgement of the BCI.
Holding that there was clear evidence of the Appellant having received money as well as all
important paperwork for filing the lawsuit, it observed that the intention of the Appellant
Advocate was apparent on the face of it, which was to steal the client’s money. The Appellant
had also tried his best to keep his client, i.e., the Respondent in dark, obstructing their access
to justice and resolution of lawsuit. As such he has rightly been held guilty of professional
misconduct.
Analysis: -
The Supreme Court had carefully analyzed all facets of the case. It had considered every
issue that had been framed and addressed the same while delivering the judgement. It held
that the charges against the Appellant had been proved beyond doubt. The evidences such as
receipt of money, i.e., legal fees and litigation expenses, that had been recovered from the
Appellant alongwith pertinent paperwork under the guise of filing a lawsuit, were established
beyond reasonable doubt. The Court therefore inferred that the Appellant Advocate had acted
against his client’s interests, breached and infringed trust and confidence of the Respondent
and as such had engaged in professional misconduct.
Conclusion: -
Section II of the BCI Rules clearly establishes the duties that an advocate owes his/her
clients. An Advocate is obligated to uphold the clients’ best interests as per Rule 15 of BCI
Rules. In the author’s opinion, this has been violated in the instant case. The lamp of
‘honesty’ has also not been followed by the advocate owing to his dishonest modes of
operating. Besides, he also blamed procedural lapses for his own shortcomings. Therefore,
the verdict of the Supreme Court that he has committed grave professional injustice and is
deserving of proportionate punishment.
24. M. VEERABHADRA RAO V. TEK CHAND

CITATION: (1984) SUPP SCC 571
Facts: -
42
An Advocate was evicted by the respondent, his landlord due to huge dues of rent and an
eviction suit was also filed with respect to this. The Respondent entered into an oral
agreement of sale of his house with another party and received Rs. 10,000/- as deposit inter
alia consideration. Additionally, the respondent was also required to obtain IT clearance
certificate for the purpose of the sale, however, since the buyer did not pay the remaining
amount, the Respondent refused to give him the certificate. Thereafter, the respondent had
alleged that the buyer obtained a forged clearance certificate by convincing the tenant
advocate’s junior (the junior is the Appellant herein) to attest and verify that signature on the
clearance certificate belonged to the Respondent. A complaint for professional misconduct
was lodged against the Appellant before the State Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh. He was
found guilty and suspended from practicing law. This verdict was challenged before the BCI,
wherein it was upheld, and then the latter verdict was challenged in a second appeal before
the Supreme Court.
Issues: -
i. Whether the Appellant’s act of attesting the affidavit without gathering proper
knowledge about the same amounts to professional misconduct or is just a mere
lack of professional etiquettes?
Rules: -

Judgement: -
The Hon’ble Apex Court decided that the certification of a declaration comprising misleading
data harmful for the welfare of the individual constituted negligent conduct on behalf of the
appellant in the present matter. In light of this, the court found appellant responsible and
issued a suspension order barring him from practicing law for 5 years. As a result, the court
fined him and suspended him. A legal practitioner who commits a profession-related or other
violation can be punished under Section 35 of the Advocates Act of 1961 if the accused act
was committed by the lawyer while acting in a professional office. The fact that an affidavit
shows that the signer has taken a serious oath testifying to the correctness justifies its
admissibility in court.
Analysis: -
43
In the present scenario the Appellant had not witnessed the respondent signing the affidavit
and despite being aware that the contents of the affidavit were false, the Appellant falsely
attested that the Respondent had signed the affidavit infront of him. This indicates towards
fraudulent intentions of the appellant to falsely acquire sale deed of the respondent’s
property. The Court found that the Appellant had failed the standards of the noble legal
profession and held him liable for professional misconduct.
Conclusion: -
In the author’s opinion, this kind of an act perpetrated by a person who is expected to uphold
noble ideals is highly disheartening. The advocate violated the 7 lamps of advocacy and
attempted to cause injustice to an innocent man. In light of the same suspension of his license
was an appropriate punishment.
25. T.A. KATHIRU KUNJU V. JACOB MATHAI

Facts: -
The instant case pertains to an appeal u/s 38 of the Advocates Act against an order of the
Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India dated 15 th October, 2006. The Appellant
was engaged by Respondent-Complainant in a matter pertaining to matrimonial dispute.
However, the wife of the Respondent who was party to the matrimonial dispute expired due
to kidney failure. Since there was no justification for pursuing the matrimonial dispute
(divorce case) any further, the Appellant advised the Respondent to withdraw the petition for
divorce. In the meanwhile, the Respondent engaged the Appellant for filing a complaint u/s
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 as a cheque issued by one named Ramahandran
in favour of the Respondent was dishonoured. Admittedly, the Appellant advised to file a
complaint u/s 420 of the Indian Penal Code before a competent Magistrate instead of filing a
S. 138 complaint. An investigation was instituted by the Magistrate, the report of which had
not been brought on record. At this juncture, the Respondent filed a complaint against the
Appellant before the Bar Council of Kerala primarily alleging that the Appellant had not
returned the cheque that was handed over to him to institute a criminal complaint under
Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. It was alleged that the said Ramachandran had
44
bribed him so as to convince him against filing charges. Disciplinary proceedings were
initiated against the Appellant and the Disciplinary Committee framed charges against the
Appellant. As the bar Council of Kerala was unable to dispose off the complaint within a
period of one year, the matter stood transferred to BCI. The BCI, on account of lack of
evidence proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, adverted from awarding harsh punishment
and held the Appellant Advocate guilty of gross negligence and directed to pay to the
Respondent Rs. 5000/- within 2 weeks. Against this, the instant appeal has been filed u/s 38
of the Act.
Issues: -
i. Whether the Appellant is liable for negligence in discharge of his professional

service to client?
ii. Whether the punishment awarded by BCI is adequate and just?
Rules: -

Judgement: -
The Supreme Court partially set aside the verdict passed by the Disciplinary Committee of
Bar Council of India holding the Appellant accountable for “gross” negligence in discharging
his professional duties towards a client. However, it allowed the payment of Rs. 5000/- to the
Respondent. The Supreme Court further held that the Advocate cannot be held liable for
“gross” negligence. There has been no delineation in the fact that the impugned cheque was
handed over to the police in the course of the investigation ordered by the Magistrate. The
Order of the Committee of BCI puts the blame of gross negligence on the Appellant on the
tenor that he failed to receive an acknowledgement of returning the cheque. Thus, the Apex
Court did not concur with the conclusion arrived at by the Bar Council of India.
Analysis: -
The Hon’ble Apex Court rightly held that an error of judgement or mere negligence on part
of an Advocate cannot be termed as professional misconduct. Furthermore, it is impractical to
believe that such an error can be completely eliminated in human affairs. The distinction
45
between “gross negligence” and “mere negligence” has been emphasized by the Court. It is
quite clear that honesty of an advocate is very significant and it is what makes an Advocate
worthy of being part of the noble legal fraternity. The assessment of gross negligence
requires an evaluation of whether there is an involvement of moral turpitude or delinquency.
The interpretation of moral turpitude or delinquency should not be limited in scope. Any
behavior exhibited by a lawyer that contradicts honesty, good morals, or ethical standards
would be categorized as involving moral turpitude. The Court also took note of the fact that
in an appeal under section 38 of the Act, the Court cannot interfere with concurrent findings
of disciplinary committees of the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India, save for
when the findings of these disciplinary committees are without substance, based on surmises
and conjectures, and lacks appreciation of evidence. Thus, mere negligence without moral
turpitude on part of an Advocate in his professional capacity would not amount to
professional misconduct.
Conclusion: -
Neglecting the client's interests in a reckless manner can be characterized as conduct that is
not appropriate for a lawyer. Any behavior that renders a lawyer unworthy of being a part of
the esteemed community of legal professionals or deems them unsuitable to be entrusted with
the responsible duty of safeguarding the interests of litigants should be considered as
behavior involving moral turpitude. In the instant case, the Supreme Court rightly held that
every action or omission on part of a lawyer should not be construed as professional
misconduct. There will always remain a probability of some error in human conduct or
dealings. Thus before labelling an advocate of gross negligence or professional misconduct,
which has an adverse effect on his life-long career and stays on record for all to see, careful
scrutiny is required as to the alleged act and circumstances surrounding it.
46
(B) CASES ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS: -
1. N.G. DASTANE V. SHRIKANT S. SHIVDE

Facts: -
The Petitioner herein had hired the Respondent, an advocate, to represent him in a case of
theft of electricity before the Judicial Magistrate. The matter was posted for cross-
examination on several subsequent occasions sought for adjournments on frivolous grounds.
On one such hearings the Respondent sought an adjournment by stating that he was unable to
speak due to throat infection and was continuously coughing. Upon this submission the
Judicial Magistrate directed the Respondent to produce medical certificate and imposed costs
on the Appellant. However, the Appellant alleged that on the same day when he was passing
by the corridors he saw the Respondent Advocate “forcefully and fluently arguing” a case
before another bench in the same court complex. The Appellant preferred a complaint against
the Respondent before the Maharashtra State Bar Council. The State Bar Council sought a
report from the Appellant Advocate, based on which the State bar council disposed off the
complaint on the grounds that “the complaint is without any substance”. A revision petition
against this verdict was filed by the Petitioner before the Bar Council of India wherein the
complaint was disposed off for want of substance and that there was no reason to believe that
the Respondent had committed “professional or other misconduct”. Against orders of the
BCI and State Council, the Petitioner preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Apex
Court.
47
Issues: -
i. Whether seeking continuous adjournments on frivolous grounds constitutes

professional misconduct?
Rules: -

ii. Section 36(2) of the Advocates Act, 1961
Judgement: -
The Hon’ble Court noted that the complainant raised a compelling concern, which ideally
should have been handled by the initial review of the State Bar Council’s Disciplinary
Committee. However, due to vague considerations, the issue was not given the necessary
attention even by the Bar Council of India. The Supreme Court emphasized that the Bar
Council of India also erred in its judgment while addressing this complaint. The court
interpreted Section 35 of the Advocates Act as a provision that empowers the Bar Council to
not only identify irresponsible and negligent advocates and legal professionals who breach
their professional responsibilities but also take strict actions against them. Any conduct that
obstructs or undermines the advancement of the administration of justice will be deemed as
an act of professional misconduct. Consequently, the Supreme Court directed that the
complaint would be handled by the Bar Council of India in accordance with Section 36 of the
Advocates Act. Additionally, the decisions of both the State Bar Council and the Bar Council
of India were overturned as they were inaccurately adjudicated.
Analysis: -
It was emphasized that the witnesses are esteemed and accountable members of the country
who dutifully responded to the court’s summons and were present on all scheduled dates.
Such witnesses should not have been treated with any lesser respect by repeatedly requiring
their presence based on the convenience of the lawyers. In case the advocates faced any
unavoidable circumstances, alternative arrangements for cross-examination could have been
arranged. However, this manipulation of court proceedings led to significant delays in
delivering justice and caused unnecessary hardship and distress to the witnesses. In addition
to the professional misconduct, the leniency exhibited by the Judicial Magistrate was also
scrutinized for allowing such significant lapses where adjournment orders were granted
without proper justification. This enlightening verdict, authored by Justice K. T. Thomas,
48
carefully examined the case's details and meticulously detailed the sequence of events that
culminated in such injustice and misconduct by the court officers, who are lawyers. This
particular case underscores the crucial significance of adhering to professional ethics, as their
disregard can result in the abuse of the justice system and infringe upon citizens’ rights to
access justice.
Conclusion: -
In conclusion, the case discussed sheds light on the vital intersection of professional ethics,
legal proceedings, and the pursuit of justice. The court’s firm stance against the abuse of
court proceedings and the undue delays caused by negligent practices emphasizes the
paramount importance of adhering to professional standards. This case serves as a poignant
reminder that the practice of law is not merely a profession but a commitment to upholding
justice and ensuring the rights of all individuals are safeguarded within the legal system.
Frequent and unwarranted postponements of proceedings frequently dampen the fervour for
justice and discourage the society that maintains expectations of a fair legal process.
Therefore, in order to rekindle the optimism for justice, the foremost individuals responsible,
namely, legal practitioners and judicial officials, must uphold and encourage their
commitment to professional ethics and behaviour for the enhancement of society. This is
particularly crucial given that, as commonly acknowledged, “justice delayed is justice
denied.”
2. R.D. SAXENA V. BALRAM PRASAD SHARMA

Facts: -
The Appellant is an Advocate enrolled in the Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh, and was
appointed as the legal advisor for Madhya Pradesh State Cooperative Bank Ltd. The
subsequent year, he was retained owing to his capacity of handling cases. Post the
termination of the retainership, the Bank urged him to hand over all the case files related to
the Bank’s cases. In reply to this, the Appellant sent a bill amounting to Rs. 97,100/- claiming
49
the same to be the legal remuneration due to him by the Bank. In the meantime, he also
claimed that he has right to keep all case files and papers with him until payment of all the
dues pertaining to his legal fees. The Bank countered that no such dues are pending on its
part. Owing to the dispute remaining unresolved, the papers of pending proceedings
pertaining to cases involving the Bank remained in the hands of the Appellant. Thus, the
Managing Director of the Bank was constrained to lodge a complaint before the bar Council
of Madhya Pradesh, which was forwarded to the Disciplinary Committee. Due to failure to
dispose off the complaint within a year’s time, the same stood transferred to the Bar Council
of India. The Disciplinary Committee of BCI found the Appellant guilty of professional
misconduct and is liable for punishment as the complainant is a public institution.
Issues: -
i. Whether an Advocate has a lien or the right to retain clients’ case files that were
entrusted to him?
Rules: -

iii. Sections 148 and 171 of Contract Act, 1872 read with Section 2(7) of Sale of
Goods Act, 1930
Judgement: -
The appellant did not provide the required files, according to the court's conclusion, which
found him to have engaged in an act of professional misconduct. Consequently, as a result of
his intentional wrongdoing, the appellant is responsible for the sanction. The banking
institution is a government organization. An Advocate is responsible for returning the legal
documents to the bank. “Halsbury’s Laws of England” where it Is mentioned that under the
common law, an advocate has 2 rights or “liens”. One of them is to retain property that is
already under possession of a party until the costs due to him in professional capacity are
cleared. The second lien is to right to ask the court to direct personal property to be kept as
security until legal fees is cleared. Thus, the court determined the matter is important to point
out that no encumbrance is laid down for any cases records to be retained by him, despite
providing rules as an entitlement of an advocate to recover his legal fees by subtracting the
funds of the client from the balance of funds he has at the close of the case in which the
50
lawyer was involved. A client has complete freedom to change Advocate if he is of the
opinion that his case is not being represented properly or for any other matter. The Court held
that refusal to return files to the client constituted misconduct within purview of Section 35 of
the Advocates Act. However, the Court modified the punishment in view of the fact that the
Appellant in good faith believed that he had lien.
Analysis: -
The case brought to light that an Advocate has no lien over client’s case files as a method of
recovering legal fees. The documents hold no market value such that the Advocate can sell
them and recover compensation. The Advocate has a lien to approach the court and pray for a
direction to keep personal property of client as security until his legal fees’ dues are
recovered. It is unnecessary to take matters into one’s own hands. Retaining documents will
not benefit either the client or the Advocate, instead it is going to have a negative effect on
both. Such an act also hinders the client’s access to justice. Furthermore, this kind of law
illustrates the idea that there truly are no unjust laws. Although the lawyer's deed was
legitimate, obeying rules is one of the fundamental obligations. As a result, regardless of the
act was justified, the advocate was penalized since the conduct constituted misconduct.
Conclusion: -
In order to retrieve his charges, the advocate shouldn't deviate from the norm or employ any
unethical tactics. He must conduct himself legally and sensibly. When men are good, the law
is meaningless, so it is our responsibility to stand up for what is right. If those in power fail to
do their job, they could face discipline as well. The ethical obligation of lawyers is to set an
example for society by their conduct. Lawyers should not take advantage of the call for
assistance from the ignorant, disadvantaged people in this way.
3. A.S. MOHAMMED RAFI V. STATE OF TAMIL NADU

Facts: -
51
In 2010, in Tamil Nadu, during one of the numerous clashed between the police and the state
Bar Association members, some lawyers were assaulted by the policemen. The matter
worsened and a criminal case was lodged against the policemen owing to the assaults and the
illegal means adopted by them. When the case reached the court, the Bar Association of
Coimbatore, passed a resolution that none of the members of the Association would defend
the accused policemen before the court.
Subsequently, a Special Leave Petition (SLP) was filed before the Supreme Court against the
impugned resolution of the Coimbatore Bar Association.
Issues: -
a) Whether it is mandatory for advocated to abide by the Codes of Ethics and

Professional Standards to defend all accused before the court of law?
b) Whether the impugned resolution passes the check of legality in light of the
Constitution of India and ‘Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquettes’?
Rules: -
a) Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, 1950

b) Section 49(1)(c) of the Advocates Act, 1961
c) Rule 11, Chapter 2 of Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquettes
Judgement: -
The Supreme Court opined that such resolutions as the impugned one are wholly illegal and
against the traditions of the Bar, and as such, against professional ethics. No matter how vile
and depraved an accused is considered by the society, before a court of law they have the
same right to be defended as every other citizen, and it is a lawyer’s duty to defend them.
The Apex Court further held that professional ethics requires that no lawyer can refuse a brief
from a client, if the client agrees to pay the reasonable fees, and the lawyer is not otherwise
engaged. The action of a Bar Association to refuse to defend an accused, whether it be a
policeman, rapist or terrorist, is against the Constitution, the statute and professional ethics. A
lawyer is bound by a duty to defend irrespective of the situation. Consequently, the court held
all such resolutions passed by any Bar Association in the country, to be null and void.
Analysis: -
52
The fundamental principles of the legal sector are ethical behavior and professionalism. The
obligation of loyalty owed by attorneys to their clients is one of the cornerstones of this
profession. The broad principles that forbid conflicts of interest, demand conscientious
representation, and require secrecy codify this principle.
Democracy and the rule of law can be upheld only by equal access to justice, which is
ensured by the legal community. Professional ethics requires every lawyer to defend a client
if the client is willing to pay fees, and the lawyer is not otherwise involved. Such a resolution
is against the standards laid by the Constitution, the legislations, professional ethics, as well
as the Bar’s standards. As such, the impugned resolution is an absolute mockery of the legal
community.
Conclusion: -
Seeing the facts of the case, the impugned resolution violates Article 14 of the Constitution.
Here, the principle laid down in Article 14 was grossly violated as by denying them right to
representation, they were not treated with equality before law.
The resolution is also violative of Article 21 of the Constitution as the policemen were
deprived of their liberty without being able to hire a lawyer to represent and defend them.
The Supreme Court’s decision upholding a person’s right to be defended in the court of law
as well a lawyer’s duty to defend an accused in court, strengthens the cornerstones of the
legal profession as well democracy of the country.
4. ASHWINI KUMAR UPADHYAY V. UNION OF INDIA

Facts: -
A petition was filed by filed by Ashwini Kumar saying that persons who are Advocates and
enrolled in the Bar, and are simultaneously holding offices of Member of Legislative
Assembly or Member of Parliament, then during their tenure as MP/MLA, they ought to be
barred from practice during that particular duration. Reliance was placed on the BCI Rules
which explicitly prohibits advocates from taking up or engaging in any other employment
once rolled as an Advocate of the bar. It was further alleged that being elected as people’s
53
representatives inter alia engaging in duty as a law-maker, is in itself a full-time employment,
and the posts are accompanied with allowances, pension, salaries and other benefits.
Issues: -
i. Whether MPs/MLAs can be debarred from practicing as Advocates while engaged

as member of parliament or state assembly?
ii. Whether holding the aforementioned posts can constitute grounds for
disqualification for specific period?
Rules: -

Judgement: -
In this context, Rule-49 of the Bar Council of India Rules has been under scrutiny. The
court’s analysis determined that Rule-49 doesn't impose unjust or impractical constraints on
Advocates. Consequently, the court rejected the specific petition on the grounds that Rule-49
does not sanction the imposition of any absolute prohibition or unwarranted limitations on
members of legislatures or elected representatives.
State Bar Councils possess the authority to establish regulations governing limitations and
prerequisites for practicing Advocates. Engaging in the profession of law demands a full-time
commitment. To ensure Advocates allocate undivided attention to their clients and legal
matters, provisions may be established to impose restrictions on legal practitioners. The
court’s stance is that if a State Bar Council devises regulations that outline conditions for
practicing Advocates, such measures would not infringe upon their Constitutional Rights
pertaining to the Freedom of Trade. The court considers such regulations reasonable.
Analysis: -
The jurisdiction State Bar Councils hold the responsibility of crafting guidelines that outline
the limitations and prerequisites for practicing Advocates. This dimension of the legal
profession stands as an honorable vocation demanding full-time dedication. The court’s
interpretation of the matter asserts that in the event State Bar Councils establish such
provisions dictating the conditions under which practicing Advocates operate, these
regulations wouldn’t infringe upon their inherent Constitutional Rights associated with the
54
Freedom of Trade. The court’s evaluation deems such regulatory measures to be judicious
and well-founded.
The focal point of discussion is Rule-49 within the framework of the Bar Council of India’s
Regulations. Scrutiny of this rule has been undertaken by the court, leading to the
determination that the stipulations set forth in Rule-49 aren’t marked by irrational or
impracticable demands on Advocates. The outcome of this analysis resulted in the court’s
dismissal of the specific petition in question. The court’s verdict rests upon the foundation
that Rule-49 does not authorize the imposition of an absolute prohibition or unjustifiable
restrictions on elected representatives or the esteemed legislative bodies they constitute.
Conclusion: -
With specific reference to Rule-49 within the construct of the Bar Council of India's
Regulations, a meticulous examination of its contents has been undertaken by the court. The
conclusion derived from this scrutiny is that Rule-49 doesn't impose unwarranted or
impracticable restrictions on Advocates. The court's ruling is grounded in the understanding
that Rule-49 doesn’t confer the authority to impose an outright prohibition or unjustifiable
restrictions upon the elected representatives who constitute the legislative bodies. However,
to optimize the Advocates’ commitment to their clients and legal proceedings, the
formulation of provisions dictating constraints on legal practitioners becomes necessary.
5. B. SUNITHA V. STATE OF TELANGANA

Facts: -
The facts of the case are such that the Appellant had filed for compensation before the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal for the death of her husband and received compensation for the
same. She was represented by an advocate in the above matter, the Respondent herein, and it
was agreed by the client that the fees for his services would depend on the decretal amount.
The Appellant received an e-mail from the Respondent wherein it was claimed by the latter
that a total percentage of 16% of the decretal amount received by the Appellant was supposed
to be his fees, after she had already paid Rs. 10 lakhs to the advocate for his professional
55
services as well as additional Rs. 3 lakhs, despite her informing that she has very low funs in
her account.
A complaint was filed against Appellant before the High Court at Hyderabad u/s 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, stating inter alia that the cheque issued to discharge the
liability has returned for want of funds. The case raised questions against the exorbitant fees
charged by lawyers for their professional service and its legality under the Advocates Fee
Rules and Ethics. The High Court held that there is no statutory cap on the fees charged by
advocates. Subsequently, the Appellant filed an SLP against the impugned order in the
Supreme Court.
Issues: -
a) Whether fee can be determined with reference to percentage of decretal amount?

b) Whether professional ethics require regulation of exorbitant and exploitative amounts
of professional services’ fees charged?
Rules: -
a) Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872

b) Rule 20 of Part VI of Chapter 2, Section 2 of ‘Standard of Professional Conduct and
Etiquette’
c) Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
Judgement: -
The Apex Court, while discussing professional misconduct and whether part of decretal
amount can be charged as fees, observed that the relationship between an advocate and his
client is highly of fiduciary nature and the advocate holds the clients’ trust and confidence;
and that demanding part of decretal award as professional service fee is hit by Section 23 of
the Contract Act and is therefore against public policy and illegal. The Respondent was found
guilty of serious professional misconduct. Further the Court referred to the 131 st Law
Commission Report while emphasizing that the role of a legal professional in administration
of justice must be in the spirit of Article 39A of the Constitution to ensure equal opportunity
and access to justice to all.
Analysis: -
56
The current tendency in the legal profession is illustrated by the issue at hand. The profession
of law is mostly a service industry. The expansion of litigation led to the legal profession
becoming a full-time job. The legal industry has undergone a transformation, practically
turning into a trade. No longer is there a service-orientation. There is mutual trust and
confidence between the client and the attorney. Having accessibility to justice has been
hampered by the exorbitant fees of advocates. Crucial measures in this matter include
prescribing a floor and ceiling limit. The Bench and the Bar are mandated to preserve the
rights of the victim of justice and to deliver swift, affordable justice.
Conclusion: -
The author believes that the Supreme Court’s decision is appropriate. If the Courts deem the
advocate’s fees to be excessive, a cap must be placed on them. Before charging clients any
form of exorbitant costs, it is important to consider their circumstances. The government’s
“parens patriae” ideal must not be compromised by the aforementioned. The government
must play a significant role in safeguarding the interests of the citizens as the watchdog of
society.
6. EX-CAPT. HARISH UPPAL V. UNION OF INDIA

Facts: -
This case pertains to a Special Leave Petition. The Petitioner herein is an ex-army officer.
While being posted in Bangladesh, he was charged with embezzlement and brought before a
military court in India for trial. On being convicted, he was stripped of his position and title
and was sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years. He filed a suit before the civil court and
received the order 11 years later when the limitation period of the survey was over. It was
found later that the same was because of misplacement of documents due a vigorous strike by
lawyers. Hence the SLP was filed by the petitioner to declare the strike as illegal and illicit.
Issues: -
i. Whether strike by advocate amounts to professional misconduct?

ii. Whether advocates have a right to strike?
57
Rules: -
i. Section 34 of Advocates Act, 1961

iii. Section 38 of Advocates Act, 1961
Judgement: -
The Court held that advocates do not have a right to strike. They are also devoid of any
authority to call for boycott of court since the same is an infringement upon their
understanding with their clients and delays resolution of litigants’ interests. A noble
profession is required to maintain and adhere to certain standards at all times in order to
maintain reverence in public eyes. Observing the same however, the Supreme Court held that
if a protest is very much needed, it can be carried out by way of “press explanations, TV
interviews, completion of the Court premises standards and additionally notices, wearing
dark or white or any shading arm groups, peaceful dissent walks outside and away from the
Court premises, going on dharnas or relay facts, and so on”, however, missing hearings
cannot be propounded to be the correct way to strike by advocates. It allowed the petition and
termed the strike to be illegal and illicit.
Analysis: -
Strikes or protest by advocates cause hindrance to even those advocates who want to attend
court or hearing, lest they be shunned by the masses of advocates obeying the strike. Lawyers
cannot not be threatened or coerced in any way, even expelled, as a consequence of their
reluctance to take part in a dharna or protest by group of lawyers, and neither the bar
association nor the Bar Council can enforce any unfavorable repercussions on them. The
Court additionally acknowledged that a lawyer is Court's representative with a distinctive
standing in the eyes of the public. They have a duty to their customer as well as
responsibilities and commitments to guarantee the effective running of the Court. Strikes
jeopardize the well-being of their clients and cause disruptions to court operations and
equitable organization.
Conclusion: -
To sustain the significance of providing justice, it is the responsibility of Advocates to ensure

the efficient operation of the court system. Mounting a strike disrupts the efficient operation,
which is unfair to all those who are seeking redressal in court. Prior to acting, an advocate
58
must consider their responsibility to community and to those they represent. The Court in its
verdict did not say that advocates may not implement any way of showing protest, however it
drew certain lines that must be followed. Peaceful protests that do not hinder the course of
justice is always welcome. By finding the Advocates guilty of professional malpractice and
limiting the ability to strike, the court is, in my humble view, moving in the correct direction.
7. CHANDRA PRAKASH SINGH CHAUHAN V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

Facts: -
The Appellant is an advocate who had filed an application u/s 156(3) of Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973 for his case to be assigned to Civil Court for expeditious hearing of the case. The
Appellate began yelling at the Chief Judicial Magistrate and getting annoyed at the
Magistrate on being asked to wait for a while and for not getting the required order
immediately. The Appellant did not calm down, instead continued hurling abuses and
accusations, following which the Magistrate filed a referral to the High Court to initiate
contempt proceedings against the Appellant. The High Court issued a show cause notice to
the Appellant. After due proceedings, the High Court found the Appellant to be guilty in
accordance to section 12 of the Contempt of Court Act for the use of unparliamentary
language and sentenced him to imprisonment for a period of 4 months alongwith a fine of Rs.
2000/-. Aggrieved by this order he filed the instant appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issues: -
i. Whether the conduct of the Appellant amounts to professional misconduct?

ii. Whether use of unparliamentary language against the Chief Judicial Magistrate
amounts to criminal contempt of Court?
Rules: -
i. Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

ii. Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
Judgement: -
59
The Apex Court in the present matter dismissed the appeal and affirmed the penalty and
sentence levied on the Appellant by the High Court in consideration of the appellant’s
disrespectful behaviour by usage of derogatory remarks and conduct in court premises and
against a court official. In the current case, it can be seen that the appellant blatantly violated
Section 12 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 by using foul language with the explicit
intention of obtaining a particular cure from the Magistrate, discarding principles and values
of dignity, respect and expectations bestowed on law professionals. The Apex Court came to
the conclusion that the appellant’s behaviour as a member of the court and previous
participation in numerous criminal matters required prudence. As a result, it called on Bar
Councils to exercise reservations when admitting like people to the legal profession and
stressed the importance of carefully reviewing such applicants.
Analysis: -
The Judges stressed the duties of lawyers as representatives of the legal system when
determining the Appellant liable for committing contempt of court. The judges also
emphasized a lawyer’s twofold obligation, firstly to the courts and then to the broader public.
Being a lawyer is honourable, and lawyers are regarded as the protectors of the rule of law.
The Judges correctly identified the Appellant's use of crude and unparliamentary words
towards the magistrate and his oblivious disposition and observed that his conduct ought
to be condemned and was unjustifiable. Advocates must not only adhere to the 7 lamps of
advocacy but also maintain the sanctity and dignity of the court.
Conclusion: -
Since explicitly abusing a magistrate is a severe offense that transgresses the ethical standards
and respectability that ought to be stood by towards the judiciary and its personnel, the Apex
Court's determination to agree to the High Court’s ruling and assign the appellant to jail time
and a monetary penalty on grounds for mockery of the courtroom is entirely justifiable in the
current case. Additionally, the 2nd rule of the BCI Rules mandates that a lawyer be respectful
of the courts. Thus, it can be seen that the appellant in this case violated Rule 2 of the BCI
Rules as well as the honour of the honourable practice.
8. RAKESH TIWARI, ADVOCATE V. ALOK PANDEY, CHIEF JUDICIAL

MAGISTRATE
60
Facts: -
The Appellant, who is an Advocate, and his fellow advocates entered the chambers of the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, the respondent herein, and began insulting him rampantly. The
Respondent was questioned as to why he has not issued an order for filing an FIR despite
being requested in this regard. The Appellant also raised his hand to strike the Respondent
and warned him of dire consequences if the desired order is not issued soon. The Appellant’s
attitude remained arrogant and oblivious without a streak of remorse. The High Court held
him guilty of criminal contempt under section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act and he was
instructed to not set foot in the premises of the District Judge for a period of 6 months as well
as placed under supervision of the district judge. Aggrieved by the ruling of the High Court,
the Appellant approached the Supreme Court.
Issues: -
i. Whether the Appellant is guilty of Contempt of Court u/s 2(c) of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971?
Rules: -
i. Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
Judgement: -
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of criminal contempt by the High Court and
modified the sentence granted to the Appellant in view of the gravity of misconduct. SC held
that the Appellant shall not enter the premises of the District Judge for a period of 3 years, in
addition to the period of restraint he has already undergone, subject to him maintaining good
and proper behaviour and conduct. He was also sentenced to imprisonment for 3 years and
directed to pay fine of Rs. 2000/-. The Court opined that the deliberate attempt of the
Appellant to damage and discredit a judge of lower court will definitely contribute to an
extent of loss of public’s faith in the judiciary.
Analysis: -
61
The foundation of our legal system is the judges’ autonomy, integrity, and commitment to
dispense justice. He shouldn't be threatened in any manner, or be shouted at to disrespect
him. The autonomy of the courts will be in jeopardy if people lose faith in the judges and its
fairness are undermined. The appellant in this instance offered no regrets for humiliating and
smearing the lower court. He even categorically denied it and showed no sorrow for what he
had done. Additionally, he failed to fulfil his obligations and provided an undesirable
precedent for others, harming the magistrate’s and the judiciary’s reputations. His reckless
behaviour thus undermined the public's faith in the legal system.
Conclusion: -
In my humble opinion it is allowed for an advocate to get in touch with superior officials;
however, not a single member of the bar may behave in a way that degrades the court’s
honour or puts it in disrepute. It is improper for one in an honourable position like advocate
to act in such a way, hence this kind of behaviour ought to be ceased as quickly as feasible.
The Hon’ble Apex Court's judgement to affirm the appellant’s conviction and adjust the
sentence while taking into account the extent of the misbehaviour may therefore be regarded
as the correct one.
9. IN RE: PRASHANT BHUSHAN & ANR.

JUDGEMENT BY: SUPREME COURT
Facts: -
The Alleged Contemnor herein, Mr. Prashant Bhushan, is a seasoned senior advocate whose
‘tweets’ on the social media platform called ‘Twitter’, were called to the Supreme Court’s
attention in a petition filed against him by one Adv. Mahek Maheshwari. The impugned
tweets were directed criticising the performance of the judiciary for the last 6 years as well as
passed remarks directed at the Chief justice of India (CJI), discussing the falling standards of
the judiciary’s autonomy and its capability of protecting democracy. Twitter brought down
the posts, however, the Supreme Court issued suo moto contempt proceedings against the
alleged contemnor for undermining the respectability of the CJI’s office as well as the entire
Supreme Court as a whole, thereby adversely impacting administration of justice.
62
Issues: -
i. Whether tweets of the alleged contemnor constitute criminal contempt of court?

ii. Whether the contemnor, vide his tweets scandalised or tarnished authority of the
SC as per Section 2(c)(i) of the Contempt of Courts Act?
iii. Whether the tweets falls within the ambit of fundamental rights envisaged under
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India?
Rules: -
i. Section 2(c)(i) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

ii. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, 1950
Judgement: -
The messages on Twitter that were tweeted were false, nefarious and inappropriate, and they
ran risk of undermining public confidence in the legal system as a whole, the office of the
CJI, and the prestige associated with the supreme court’s administration of justice.
The Contemner was consequently convicted u/s 2(c)(i) of the Act and given the appropriate
punishment. The Hon’ble Court further found that litigants had been discouraged by the
tweets and possibly begun to abandon optimism regarding the legal system and the CJI.
Furthermore, it was claimed that if it did not stand up for it from vicious accusations like
those made in the present instance, it would expose judges everywhere to identical assaults.
Furthermore, the court also drew a distinction between exercising fundamental rights u/A
19(1)(a) of the Constitution, by mentioning that the fundamental rights are not absolute and
subject to reasonable restrictions; fair criticism isn’t contempt, but it is to contempt when the
institutions of the judiciary are disparaged in a manner to cause hindrance to administration
of justice.
Analysis: -
The confidence and faith of the public in the court's capacity to provide unbiased,
uncompromising judgment is its bedrock. As a result, when efforts are put forth to erode the
fundamentals of the legal institution by fostering discontent and disdain for the legitimacy of
the judiciary by seeding uncertainty regarding the way it functions, the legal framework is
susceptible to degeneration. In this particular instance, the whole the Supreme Court’s
proceedings throughout the preceding 6 years were targets of the Contemner's harmful
assaults, rather than merely a select few justices. It is impossible to ignore this sort of
63
onslaught, whose purpose is to erode esteem for and confidence in this Court’s competence.
The tweets in this instance indisputably spread the notion that the Supreme Court, the nation's
top judicial authority, had been a major factor in eroding and dismantling Indian democratic
government over the previous 6 years. Given this, it is undeniable that the tweet tends to
reduce public confidence in the legal system.
Conclusion: -
The Contemnor’s tweets undeniably created a dissatisfactory notion in the hearts and minds
of the general public, especially since these remarks were coming from a senior advocate.
Although the Supreme court in several instances had safeguarded fundamental right to speech
and expression and recognised constructive criticism and had distinguished fair criticism
from contempt; it is the author’s opinion that certain categories of people in a profession
ought not to be dragged through the mud, like Justices and magistrates of Hon’ble Courts and
Learned Tribunals, since the general public look up to them as law makers, interpreters of
law, and justice givers. Thus the Supreme Court rightly refused to misplace its sympathies
and convicted the Contemnor.
10. SUPREME COURT BAR ASSOCIATION V. UNION OF INDIA

Facts: -
The instant case was filed challenging the verdict passed by the Supreme Court in “Re:
Vinay Chandra Mishra” [(1995) 2 SCC 584]. In the abovenamed case, Mr. Vinay Chandra
Mishra (referred to as the ‘Alleged Contemner’) faced a question from the Judge during the
proceedings. However, he responded by launching a verbal attack on the Judge.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court (SC) took initiative to address the matter on its own accord.
Utilizing the authority vested in it by Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme
Court imposed a sentence of six weeks’ imprisonment on the Alleged Contemner.
Furthermore, he was stripped of all positions he held as an advocate and was prohibited from
practicing law for a duration of three years.
In response to the decision that the Alleged Contemner would be barred from practicing for
three years, the Supreme Court Bar Association (referred to as the ‘Petitioner’) filed a
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The petition sought a writ stating that the
64
exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and suspend an advocate from practicing due to
professional misconduct rested solely with the Disciplinary Committees of the Bar Councils
established under the Advocates Act, 1961.
Issues: -
i. Whether, vide the powers granted under Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution,
the Supreme Court can revoke an Advocate’s license to practice law?
Rules: -
i. Article 129 of the Constitution of India, 1950

ii. Article 142 of the Constitution of India, 1950
iii. Article 215 of the Constitution of India, 1950
iv. Section 12 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971
Judgement: -
The Apex Court reversed the verdict passed by it in “In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra”. The
matter before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra
revolved around contempt of court. Nevertheless, the penalty enforced was appropriate for
professional misconduct. In this particular instance, the Bench expressed the view that while
the authority to penalize for contempt of court is extensive, it is not so vast so as to
encompass the authority to determine if an advocate has engaged in professional misconduct
or not. The Bench with expertise also emphasized that the exclusive power to impose
penalties for professional misconduct is vested in the Bar Council of India (BCI) under
Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. Additionally, even the suspension or revocation of a
license is subject to a specified process outlined in the Advocates Act, 1961.
It was also further noted that the Supreme Court is exclusively authorized to hear appeals of
decisions made by the Disciplinary Committees of Bar Councils; it is not authorized to
handle such cases under its original jurisdiction.
Analysis: -
The court ruled that the authority to dispense justice serves as a remedy and upholds fairness
alongside legal principles. However, this authority must not be abused to deprive an advocate
of their rightful due process under the law. The Supreme Court mandates that statutory bodies
and other state entities fulfill their obligations in accordance with legal provisions.
65
Nonetheless, the Court lacks the jurisdiction or authorization to assume the roles of these
entities and perform their functions. Despite the expansive scope provided by Article 142 of
the Constitution, the Supreme Court could not disregard or assume the jurisdiction of
statutory bodies like the Bar Council in determining cases of professional misconduct. The
Bench’s decision in the current situation, wherein it upholds procedural law and specifies that
the Supreme Court is exclusively authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of the
Disciplinary Committees of Bar Councils, aligns with reason and accuracy.
In the current situation, the Supreme Court reversed its decision in the case of In Re: Vinay
Chandra Mishra after realizing that, even when invoking jurisdiction under Article 142 in
conjunction with Article 129, it lacks the capability to impose an additional penalty of license
suspension for a practicing advocate. Furthermore, it observed that such a severe penalty
cannot even be imposed through the Supreme Court's appellate powers under Section 38 of
the Advocates Act, 1961, especially when dealing with contempt of court matters.
Conclusion: -
In my opinion, the case of “In re: Vinay Chandra Mishra” was fundamentally flawed since
established legal principles indicate that a court can issue orders or directives solely within
the scope of the matters presented before it. In that particular case, the issue pertained to
contempt of court, not professional misconduct, yet the penalty imposed pertained to
professional misconduct. The assertion that the Supreme Court lacks the original jurisdiction
to hear such cases, as the power to do so is conferred upon the Bar Council of India by the
Advocates Act, 1971, is correct and justifiable. Given that the central concern in that case
was professional misconduct rather than contempt of court, the Supreme Court's decision to
overturn the verdict issued in the “In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra” case appears appropriate
and seems to have been taken in the pursuit of justice.
66
(C) CASES ON-
(I) SECTION 16 OF ADVOCATES ACT, 1961

(II) SECTION 17 OF ADVOCATES ACT, 1961
(III) SECTION 24 OF ADVOCATES ACT, 1961
(IV) SECTION 24-A OF ADVOCATES ACT, 1961
(V) SECTION 26 OF ADVOCATES ACT, 1961
1. INDIRA JAI SINGH V. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA THROUGH

SECRETARY GENERAL & ORS.
Facts: -
In this case, the constitutionality of Section 16 of the Advocates Act, 1961 was challenged. A
PIL was filed by Indira Jai Singh, Senior Advocate and former Additional Solicitor General
of India, in 2015, wherein she termed the system of designation of senior advocates as non-
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transparent, discriminatory and arbitrary. She pleaded that the system be made more
democratic. The petitioner contended that the prevalent practice violated Articles 14 and 15
of the Constitution and led to lobbying and undue power among senior advocates.
Similar cases were filed by other stakeholders before the High Court Advocates Association
of Gujarat and Meghalaya, which were eventually clubbed with Jai Singh’s PIL. As per the
Petitioners, creating a differentiation amongst Advocates vide provision of Section 16 of the
Act of 1961, provided neither a reasonable classification nor a nexus with the object it sought
to achieve. It was also contended that using the ‘Senior Advocate’ designation was against
Article 18 of the Constitution, which effectively abolished granting titles to Indian citizens.
Issues: -
i. Whether Section 16 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and provisions of the Supreme Court
Rules, 2013 was unconstitutional and violate Articles 14, 15 and 18 of the Indian
Constitution?
ii. Whether present system of designation of a lawyer as ‘Senior Advocate’ is arbitrary
and discriminatory?
Rules: -

ii. Order IV- Advocates: Supreme Court Rules, 2013
Judgement: -
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 16 of the Advocates Act. It
opined that as long as the basis of the classification is founded on reasonable grounds which
can be introduced by way of uniform guidelines laid down by the Apex Court. The Court
held that power of designation conferred by Section 16 of the Act is not constitutionally
impermissible.
The purpose of the classification is to recognize merit and ability of the Advocates,
demonstrated by their in-depth knowledge regarding intricate questions of law. As such, there
is no violation of Article 14. The Court further held that the designation of ‘senior advocate’
is not merely a title, but a distinction, recognition of talent and special skills of a person
which has been proved and tested over time. As such Section 16 of the Advocates Act does
not violate Article 18 of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court noted that the
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discretionary authority that Section 16 granted to the different Courts in India when selecting
seniors, had to be applied on the basis of verifiable facts and had to be consistent throughout
India. The Supreme Court based this conclusion on applicable rulings as well.
Previously, in the Supreme Court was eligible to apply for being a Senior Advocate provided
he was in practice for 20 years, whilst some High Courts provided for minimum years of
practice to be 15 years. The Court laid down an eligibility criterion that any Advocate who
has completed a minimum of 10 years of practice as Advocate after his/her enrollment with
the bar. Furthermore, the Supreme Court also laid down guidelines for establishment of a
Permanent Committee for designation of Senior Advocates as well as the constitution of the
Committee.
Analysis: -
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 16 of the Act on the basis that
distinction drawn by the section has its root on the canons of ability, standing at the bar, and
special knowledge or experience in law. Given these parameters, there was a tangible reason
for making such a classification as it was not an “uncontrolled, unguided, uncanalised
power” power conferred upon the courts.
The judgement in this case has been successful in laying down an objective criterion for
designation. However, if the number of senior designations is kept very limited it might lead
to a feeling of discontent amongst both senior members of the Bar who are not being
designated as well as the younger members who aren’t getting an opportunity to grow in the
profession.
Conclusion: -
The legal profession, unlike other conventional jobs, does not allow for any recognition in
terms of designation save for the recognition of ‘Senior Advocate’. Such a designation also
comes only once in a long and arduous career of an Advocate and every legal practitioner
who walks into the courts as a young graduate, dream of wearing the robes of a senior
advocate one day. The effective outcome of the present case led to the administrative sides of
Supreme Courts and High Courts to modify their designation procedures to conform with the
aforementioned blueprint.
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2. S. LAWRENCE VIMALRAJ V. REGISTRAR
CITATION: 2022 SCC ONLINE MAD 6088
JUDGEMENT BY: HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Facts: -
The petitioner filed a writ petition for mandamus asking for at least 30% of the female
advocates on the PSDSA’s list who were applying for Senior Advocate titles to be accorded
equal standing.
Issues: -
i. Whether it is legal to set up reservation for Women in senior advocate Titles

ii. whether an Advocate can consider it to be his right to be declared as a Senior
Advocate or can he claim as a matter of right to be declared as a Senior Advocate?
Rules: -
Judgement: -
According to the court, they would not consider this writ petition. The court ruled that the
person filing the writ petition is neither an applicant nor someone whose rights have been
violated. Additionally, it stated that as the rank of senior advocate is conferred by Section 16
of the Advocates Act, 1961, any requests for reservations will not be considered. The court
ruled that the aforementioned rule did not imply any reservations. According to the court,
appointing an advocate as a senior advocate is a question of honor that belongs to the member
of the bar, not to the reservation. The writ petition was rejected by the court.
Analysis: -
In the case S Lawrence Vimalraj v. the Madras High Court. The court rejected the argument
for the reservation of women in the designation of Senior Advocate after the Registrar
(Judicial) and others pointed out that bestowing the status of Senior Advocate on an Advocate
is a privilege rather than a position. According to the court, granting an advocate the title of
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Senior Advocate pursuant to Section 16 of "The Advocates Act, 1961 (25 of 1961)" is
unquestionably a privilege and not a position. Therefore, every prayer offered for reservation
is pointless. When a petition asking for 30% of the designation of Senior Advocates to be
reserved for women attorneys was being heard, the bench made a comment. When dismissing
the case, the court noted that the petitioner lacked locus standi to proceed because he was
neither an applicant nor a harmed party whose rights had been violated. The petitioner has no
jurisdiction over the captioned writ petition, according to the court, because he is not an
applicant and has asserted that the captioned writ petition is not a Public Interest Litigation.
Out of the 161 applicants who submitted applications for the position of Senior Advocate, the
court further noted that only nine of them were women.
As a result, the court has declared that the argument about reservations is unavailing. The
Supreme Court of India's decision in the case of Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India,
which makes no mention of any form of discrimination, has also been cited by the court as
evidence that the issue against reservations is moot. The bench noted that recognizing an
Advocate as a Senior Advocate is a matter of honor and privilege bestowed upon a Member
of the Bar in a separate but concurring judgment. Furthermore, the bench that such honor and
privilege cannot be founded on discrimination. The same must solely be determined by talent,
aptitude, and a successful career.
Conclusion: -
The bench noted that the intervenor's arguments fell entirely beyond the purview of the main
writ petition and that the petitioner's locus standi was absent because he is neither a woman
nor an applicant. By itself, this puts an end to the situation described in the caption, but the
judges chose to pursue it. It was agreed that granting an advocate the title of Senior Advocate
pursuant to Section 16 of "The Advocates Act, 1961 (25 of 1961)" (hereafter referred to as
“said Act” for convenience and clarity) is unquestionably a privilege rather than a position.
Any prayer for reservation is therefore unnecessary.
3. SUPREME COURT BAR ASSOCIATION V. B.D. KAUSHIK

JUDGEMENT: SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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Facts: -
The present petition has been initiated based on the fact that the petitioner successfully
completed her LLB degree. Subsequently, she applied for provisional registration and duly
submitted the required fees and application on 29.03.2019 to the State Bar Council.
Alongside the application, an affidavit was also submitted by the petitioner in which she
declared the existence of an ongoing legal case under Sections 341, 147, 186, 294, 506, Part-
II, 353, 149 & 427 of the Indian Penal Code before the competent court in Sarangarh.
Following this submission, there was a prolonged period during which no decision regarding
the granting of provisional enrollment was made by the Bar Council (Respondent Nos. 2 &
3). As a result of this inaction, the petitioner has initiated the current petition.
Issues: -
i. Whether the disqualification and ban of the petitioner valid?
Rules: -

ii. Section 24-A of the Advocates Act, 1961
Judgement: -
The counsel representing the petitioner asserts that under the Advocates Act, 1961, the sole
disqualification associated with the circumstances outlined in Section 24-A becomes apparent
when an advocate on a State roll is convicted, particularly for an offense of significant moral
wrongdoing. Therefore, it is argued that the petitioner appropriately disclosed the ongoing
criminal case against her. Consequently, it is contended that, given the pending status of the
criminal case, the provision in the Act cannot be invoked until a verdict is reached. The legal
counsel for Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 elucidated the legal ramifications that are pertinent in this
context, emphasizing their potential broader impact.
It is submitted that, in line with the Supreme Court's ruling in (2014) 9 SCC 1 r(AIR 2014
SCW 5287), the principle of implied limitation becomes relevant here. This principle
essentially implies that unless and until a person is convicted, the Court cannot introduce any
stipulations that would entail a person charged with a serious criminal act collaborating with
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advocates from the Bar. Such a situation would undermine and tarnish the reputation of the
bar association in the eyes of the general public. Having considered the arguments from both
sides, and having reviewed the submitted documents, I proceed.
Evidently, the petitioner, subsequent to completing her LLB, submitted an application for
provisional enrollment, along with the complete requisite fees, as per the receipt dated
29.03.2019. Initially, an affidavit was submitted in support of the application, and
subsequently, another affidavit dated 07.02.2019 was presented. In this latter affidavit, she
disclosed the pendency of a criminal case under Sections 341, 147, 186, 294, 506, Part-II,
353, 149 & 427 of the Indian Penal Code in the Sarangarh Court.
She indicated her intention to inform the Chhattisgarh Bar Council once the judgment in the
case was pronounced, and she committed to taking appropriate action based on the outcome.
A close examination of the aforementioned section reveals that disqualification is applicable
only when a person is convicted of an offense involving significant moral turpitude, as
delineated in Clauses (b) and (c). Hence, even if the criminal case is pending, an analysis of
the stated provision makes it evident that pending criminal cases cannot be grounds for
disqualification. This assertion finds further validation in the concept of implied limitation, as
espoused by the Supreme Court in the case of Manoj Narula v. Union of India, documented
in (2014) 9 SCC 1 : (AIR 2014 SCW 5287, para 52).
The Supreme Court delved into similar disqualification scenarios with regards to MPs and
MLAs, concluding that the principle of implied limitation is applicable in constitutional
interpretation. Similarly, a statutory interpretation here clarifies that disqualification is
exclusively linked to convictions, specifically those involving moral turpitude, under Section
24-A of the Advocates Act, 1961. The Supreme Court further emphasized that the doctrine of
implied limitation would be valid in such situations, rendering the Court incapable of
appending any provisions to the statute. The essence of para 62 of the judgment remains
relevant.
Analysis: -
The precedent set by the aforementioned judgment was further applied in the case of Public
Interest Foundation v. Union of India, which can be found in (2019) 3 SCC 224 : (AIR 2018
SC 4550). As a result, adhering to the principles encapsulated in the doctrine of implied
limitation, this Court, in the present circumstances, will refrain from appending any
additional stipulations to the content of Section 24-A of the 1961 Act. This section
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specifically employs the term "conviction." The contention raised by the Bar, asserting that
individuals with criminal backgrounds should generally not be permitted to practice within
the Bar, holds merit. It's evident that in a profession as noble as law, individuals with criminal
histories should not be permitted to associate with Bar members who have earned respect
through their diligent institutional contributions. Allowing individuals with a history of
convictions to coexist among other Bar members can have disruptive consequences and
eventually degrade the overall standing of the profession. The onus lies on the Bar members
themselves to introspect and uphold their own code of conduct. Undoubtedly, if criminal
elements are allowed to permeate the Bar, the repercussions will be felt over time, akin to
tremors after a seismic event. Shifting the focus to the present case concerning the petitioner,
since a conviction has not yet been established, the Bar Council must make a determination
regarding the issuance of provisional enrollment to the petitioner. This directive is
accordingly issued. The Chhattisgarh Bar Council, which pertains to Respondent Nos. 2 & 3,
is tasked with making this decision within a span of 30 days.
Conclusion: -
Similar to a scenario brought before the Supreme Court regarding disqualifications pertaining
to MPs and MLAs, the Court engaged in a comprehensive discourse. In my opinion, it
established a precedent that the principle of implied limitation is relevant within the context
of constitutional interpretation. In this context, applying principles of statutory interpretation
serves to illuminate that disqualification is exclusively associated with conviction,
specifically for cases involving moral turpitude, as specified in Section 24-A of the Advocate
Act, 1961. The Supreme Court further asserted that the doctrine of implied limitation is also
pertinent in such situations. Consequently, the Court's authority to introduce additional
provisions to the statute is curtailed.
4. JOGINDER SINGH V. THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA.

CITATION: AIR 1975 DEL 192
JUDGEMENT BY: HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Facts: -
Joginder Singh, the Appellant Advocate, was aggrieved by his removal from the rolls of the
Bar Council. The Bar Council of India had his enrolment under the Advocates Act of 1961 to
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the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh had been obtained by concealing his prior convictions for
offenses involving moral turpitude. According to Section 26(1) of the said Act, such
concealment constitutes misrepresentation and fraud, resulting in the removal of his name
from the rolls. The Appellant was given a period of three weeks to file his written statement
following the notice, with the assurance that his defense would be considered on a later date,
which would be communicated to him, allowing him to appear either in person or through an
Advocate. Upon the set date, the Appellant and his legal representative appeared before the
Bar Council of India. Despite the Appellant’s request for a postponement of the hearing, he
was subjected to questioning, which led to his conviction under Sections 473 and 411 of the
Indian Penal Code. Dissatisfied with these developments, the Appellant initiated legal action
by filing a lawsuit in court, seeking declarations that the orders issued by the Bar Council of
India were null, void, unconstitutional, ultra vires, devoid of jurisdiction, and non-binding.
A pivotal issue arose concerning whether the Appellant’s enrolment had been secured
through misrepresentation or fraud, or whether he had no obligation to voluntarily disclose
the information, thus not amounting to misrepresentation or fraud. The court’s core
determination hinged on whether the Appellant’s certificate of character had been falsified
and if the Bar Council’s ultimate decision was rooted in such a finding.
Issues: -
i. Whether the advocate had got his enrolment by deception or misrepresentation?

ii. Whether the appellant was at this point bound to specify that had he had been indicted
for offenses?
Rules: -
i. Section 24-A of the Advocates Act, 196

Judgement: -
The court held that the appellant obtained admission as an advocate through fraud or
misrepresentation by concealing his prior convictions. The appeal thus failed and was
dismissed with accompanying costs. While addressing the case, the judge offered additional
observations that, while not directly relevant to the case, were pertinent to the broader issue.
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Taking into account the esteemed traditions of the legal profession and the responsibilities
that its members are expected to uphold, the judge opined that individuals seeking entry into
this profession are obligated to disclose any prior convictions. This holds true, particularly
when it comes to offenses involving moral turpitude. These details are crucial for determining
an individual’s character, and character has consistently been a fundamental consideration in
deciding whether to admit someone as an advocate. This deliberate withholding of
information is deemed to be an act of deceit and fraud as per Section 26(1) of the Act. Such
deception is tantamount to a breach of duty, leading to the removal of the Appellant’s name
from the rolls. This outcome aligns with the justifiable expectation that the legal profession
holds for its practitioners, demanding impeccable standards of honesty and integrity.
Furthermore, the responsibility to regulate advocates’ conduct falls upon the Bar Council of
India.
Analysis: -
The focal point of this scenario lies in the ethical obligation of lawyers to uphold truthfulness.
In the present instance, a critical aspect that warrants attention is whether the appellants
engaged in concealing pertinent facts, contravening Section 24A and Section 26(1) of the
Advocates Act of 1961. The crux of the matter revolves around the Appellant’s omission to
disclose his prior conviction involving dishonesty during his application for enrollment under
the Advocates Act of 1961 with the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh.
Failure to disclose previous convictions, particularly those involving moral turpitude, would
constitute an act of fraud or misrepresentation, as these convictions shed light on one’s
character. (Infringement of Rule 43 of the BCI Rules-Chapter II). Upon careful examination,
the contentions raised by the Appellant were deemed unsubstantiated and untenable, leading
to the dismissal of his appeal.
This case underscores the complexity surrounding issues of misrepresentation, fraud, and the
obligations of disclosure, highlighting the court’s commitment to evaluating evidence and
reaching judgments grounded in the principles of justice and fairness.
As we delve deeper into the heart of the matter, it becomes evident that the overarching
question pertains to whether the Appellant secured his enrollment through deceptive means.
In view of advocates being the bedrock of the judiciary, it is not only imperative for them to
abide by constitutional principles but also to fulfill their responsibility of upholding their
clients’ interests without malice or misrepresentation. The legal system functions optimally
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when each member, including advocates, diligently adheres to their roles and obligations with
transparency, honesty, and dedication. In conclusion, this case highlights the significance of
maintaining the sanctity of the legal profession by embracing the virtues of truthfulness and
ethical conduct, ensuring that the noble purpose of justice remains steadfastly upheld.
Conclusion: -
In conclusion, this case underscores the profound ethical responsibilities that lawyers bear
within the legal ecosystem. The central issue revolves around the accountability of legal
professionals to uphold the tenets of honesty and integrity. The court’s verdict aptly
underscores that concealing relevant information, especially when seeking enrollment under
the Advocates Act, amounts to a breach of trust and a deviation from the ethical standards
demanded by the legal profession. In my opinion, this judgment highlights the pivotal role of
regulatory bodies such as the Bar Council of India in maintaining the integrity of the legal
fraternity.
As we contemplate the implications of this case, it is evident that the legal profession’s
commitment to truthfulness and upholding the rule of law is vital for the successful
functioning of the justice system. Ultimately, the principles of integrity and ethical conduct
underscored by this judgment resonate not only within the legal community but also in the
broader pursuit of justice and societal well-being.
5. V. SUDEER V. BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA & ORS.

Facts: -
The writ petitioners had finished their legal school and graduated from respective universities
with law degrees. They argued that the rules challenged by the Bar Council of India unjustly
denied them the right to practice law and that this violated their fundamental rights
guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution. Under section 24 of the Advocates
Act, 1961, no individual shall be allowed to be enrolled as an advocate unless he has
completed the training as required under these rules, according to the Bar Council of India
Training Rules of 1995, among other things. To successfully complete the training period, it
was necessary for the candidate to regularly visit the guide’s office or chamber, read case
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files and correspondence, draft pleadings, and attend court hearings. It was also necessary for
the candidate to spend a minimum of 225 days per year in court and chambers.
The High Court of Bombay’s ruling upholding the legitimacy and validity of the
aforementioned rules and dismissing the writ petitions was challenged in the civil appeal
resulting from the Special Leave Petition of the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa.
Issues: -
i. Whether or not the impugned rules of the Bar Council of India are ultra vires the rule-
making power of the Bar Council of India as available to it under the provisions of the
act?
ii. Whether or not the impugned rules are arbitrary and unreasonable in nature so as to
violate the article 14 (Right to Equality) of the Constitution of India?
iii. Whether or not the respondent in Bar Council of India’s appeal, who has got his Law
degree prior to the coming into force of these Rules, can be required to comply with
these Rules if he applies for being enrolled as an advocate under the Act after the
Rules came into force?
Rules: -

ii. Article 14 of the Indian Constitution
iii. Article 19 (1) (g) of the Indian Constitution
iv. Bar Council of India Training Rules, 1995
Judgement: -
The court noted that the advocates act aims to update and harmonize the law governing legal
professionals, as well as to establish bar councils and an All-India Bar. The court also paid
attention to the requirements that must be met before someone can be listed as an advocate on
a state roll. The court explained that between 1961 and 1964, the State Bar Council required
an applicant to undergo and finish a course of instruction in law as a condition of enrolling
after considering the original section 24 (d) of the 1961 statute and its later revision in 1964.
However, from 1964 to 1973, the State Bar Council was permitted to require a course of legal
training as a prerequisite for enrollment. The Advocates (Amendment) Bill, 1970's statement
of objects and reasons was also cited by the two-judge panel of the supreme court, which was
led by Hon'ble Justices S.B. Majumdar and S.N. Phukan. This bill's passage finally led to the
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repeal of Section 24 (1) (d) of the 1961 Advocates Act. The third paragraph of the
aforementioned declaration of objects and reasons underlined the justification for the same.
The Bar Council of India had decreed that only after obtaining a Law degree for three years
following graduation could someone enter the legal profession. This indicated that the legal
profession's admission age was higher than that of other professions, negating the need for a
second examination.
Analysis: -
In this instance, the court upheld the writ petitions and invalidated the contested 1995 rules.
The court made it clear that this verdict will only apply going forward in order to prevent
confusionIn invalidating the rules in their entirety, the court made a mistake. It is also
determined that the 1995 training regulations did not violate articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the
Indian Constitution. The ability to practice law does not come with unqualified and
unqualified rights. A training time for new participants would only help them refine their
skills given that in litigation, the clients’ quality of life is at stake. A law degree and a few
professional law courses don’t imply that a person is knowledgeable about the law in
practice. In the legal profession, training is crucial. Given the historical context, the
regulations were a little confusing, but the court may have mandated that the 1995 training
rules' phrasing be amended.
Conclusion: -
The Supreme Court attempted to address the contentious problems surrounding the All India
Bar Examinations for the enrollment of advocates in this case. Since the Bar Council of India
is the top body for attorneys in India, it is concluded that it has the authority to govern the
laws pertaining to the enrollment of advocates. The court is entirely correct in its assessment
of the need for qualified specialists in the legal field. The court's recommendations are
pertinent and ought to be put into practice while taking into account the various conditions
and regulations of each state and law school.
6. BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA V. BONNIE FOI LAW COLLEGE & ORS.

CITATION: 2023 SCC ONLINE SC 130
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Facts: -
A dispute arises between the Bar Council of India and Bonnie Foi Law College concerning
the college’s affiliation. This prompts the appointment of a committee tasked with addressing
issues related to legal education and regulation of law colleges. The committee recommends
the reintroduction of mandatory apprenticeship and a bar examination, restoring requirements
that were initially present but later removed through amendments. The formulation of the
1995 Rules follows, but these rules are subsequently invalidated by the court. A decision is
made to conduct the All-India Bar Examination, with directives for government agencies and
institutions to cooperate with the Bar Council of India. A three-judge bench refers specific
queries regarding pre-enrolment training, examinations, and post-enrolment examinations to
a Constitution Bench to obtain authoritative responses. Notably, some stakeholders resist the
implementation of the All-India Bar Examination in related cases.
Issues: -
i. Whether introducing the pre-enrolment training, examinations, and post-enrolment

examinations in the legal education system are valid and legal, as per the “Bar
Council of India Training Rules, 1995”, under the Advocates Act, 1961?
ii. Whether the previously omitted provisions for apprenticeship and bar examinations
can be reintroduced and enforced?
Rules: -

iii. Bar Council of India Training Rules, 1995,
Judgement: -
The Hon’ble Apex court held the anticipation is that the aforementioned observations, which
assign a more substantial role to the Bar Council of India, will heighten the Bar Council's
awareness of the significance of its responsibilities. This encompasses ensuring that only
individuals possessing a strong grasp of legal principles successfully pass the All-India Bar
Examination. Additionally, considering the evolving legal landscape and the changing nature
of the All India Bar Examinations, the intention is for this judgment to be applied
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prospectively. This is aimed at avoiding disruption to the prevailing circumstances during the
intervening period. It is expected that the Bar Council of India will take the necessary actions
within a timeframe of three months, as indicated above. The learned amici's valuable
assistance is appreciated. Ultimately, it is anticipated that this perspective will contribute to
the enrollment of talented young minds into the legal profession. These individuals will be
better equipped to assist the Court efficiently, thereby benefiting the administration of justice.
Analysis: -
Firstly, the “V. Sudeer v. Bar Council of India & Ors.” [(1999) 3 SCC 176] case
acknowledged the exclusive practice rights for advocates on the State roll. It clarified the Bar
Council of India's role and the conditions for enrolment, deeming pre-enrolment training
unnecessary and declaring the 1995 Rules invalid. Key points criticising the V. Sudeer
Judgement include: (a) The Bar Council's pre-enrolment powers remain unaffected by the
amendment to Section 7(a) of the Advocates Act; (b) Section 24(1) is subject to other
provisions and rules, and legislative intent supports the Bar Council's authority; (c) Section
49(1)(ag) of the Advocates Act empowers the Bar Council to set conditions for enrolment
and examination.
The court’s analysis dismisses the idea that the 1973 Amendment curtailed the Bar Council's
powers. It clarifies that if the Bar Council possessed powers, the amendment didn't revoke
them. The court highlights Section 49(1)(ag) of the Advocates Act explicitly granting power
to the Bar Council to determine the class eligible for enrolment. The court concludes that the
restraining order from the V. Sudeer judgment on the Bar Council's powers cannot stand and
disagrees with its stance. The court asserts that the timing of the All-India Bar Examination—
pre or post enrolment—is within the Bar Council's discretion. The court addresses several
aspects linked to the All-India Bar Examination.
Conclusion: -
The analysis concludes that V. Sudeer’s contrary viewpoints do not survive in light of the fact
that it is not good law. The Bar Council of India is expected to play a more significant role in
legal education and ensuring well-equipped advocates pass the All-India Bar Examination.
The judgment is prospective to avoid disturbing scenarios during the interregnum period. The
setting aside of V. Sudeer doesn't mandate pre-enrolment training. The Bar Council of India
is expected to take necessary steps within three months. The court emphasizes that the
judgment supports a uniform fee structure to avoid imposing oppressive fees. The hope is that
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the observations make the Bar Council of India more conscious of its role and
responsibilities.
7. MAHIPAL SINGH RANA V. STATE OF U.P.

Facts: -
This appeal, filed under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, challenges the order
dated December 2, 2005, issued by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. In the
mentioned order, the High Court found the appellant guilty of committing Criminal Contempt
by intimidating and threatening a Civil Judge (Senior Division) during court sessions on two
occasions. The High Court sentenced the appellant to two months of simple imprisonment
along with a fine of Rs. 2,000/-. In case of failure to pay the fine, an additional imprisonment
of 2 weeks was imposed. Furthermore, the High Court instructed the Bar Council of Uttar
Pradesh to examine the allegations presented in the complaint by the Civil Judge (Senior
Division). The Bar Council was directed to initiate suitable actions against the appellant for
professional misconduct. As per the rules of this Court, the appellant was forbidden from
appearing in courts within the jurisdiction of the Judgeship at Etah until the contempt was
purged.
Moving on to the proceedings in the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court accepted this appeal,
temporarily halting the portion of the judgment that dealt with the imposed sentence. The
appellant was directed not to enter the premises of the Court in Etah, Uttar Pradesh. Notices
were issued to the Supreme Court Bar Association and the Bar Council of India. The case
was referred to a larger Bench, and the Solicitor General of India was called upon to provide
assistance.
On March 6, 2013, the restriction on the appellant’s entry into the court premises was lifted,
allowing the appellant to enter the premises. However, this permission was later revoked.
Subsequently, a notice was sent to the Attorney General, addressing the broader question of
whether an advocate could continue to practice after being convicted under the Contempt of
Courts Act or any other offense involving moral turpitude.
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Issues: -
i. Whether there are grounds to challenge the High Court’s verdict that found the
appellant guilty of criminal contempt?
ii. Whether a person convicted of criminal contempt can retain the privilege to engage in
legal practice?
Rules: -
i. Sections 24A of the Advocates Act, 1961

ii. Sections 34 & 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961
iii. Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950
iv. Section 2(c), 12, 15(2), 19 Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
Judgement: -
The Court ruled that the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court made no mistakes in convicting the
accused and that the accused had attended in court. The court considered the current
appellant's allegations against the aforementioned judge and concluded that it is not a
legitimate defence because the accused's actions and words were disrespectful. It was decided
that the appellant's complaint about limitation was without merit since it is up to the
competent court to take the necessary action under the law. The appellant was found guilty of
contempt, and it was further determined that the purported instances involving the
complainant judge’s malafides were created with the intent of shielding him from contempt
proceedings, and no apology was ever offered. In accordance with Section 24A of the Act,
the appellant's membership in the State Bar Roll was stopped for two years from the date of
the ruling. Furthermore, in light of jurisdiction under Section 38 of the Act, the court ordered
that the petition's licence be suspended for another five years, and the appellant was
forbidden from coming before the court even after the five-year term until he purges out of
contempt.
Analysis: -
This case featured several critical topics concerning the check on the legal profession and
punishment in situations of contempt and professional misconduct. A request was made to the
Law Commission of India to investigate the matter and take necessary actions to regulate the
legal profession as soon as possible. The court expressed its opinion on the court's
jurisdiction in relation to the statutory powers of Bar Councils in light of the judgement in
83
“Supreme Court Bar Association Vs Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 1895”, which held that the
Bar Council must take action against erring Advocates under the provisions of the Act and
that courts cannot take over the exercise of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council in
the exercise of competent jurisdiction.
However, if the relevant Bar Council fails to perform its duties, the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction under Section 38 of the Act.
In light of the current case, it was decided that High Courts can also employ their jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution to take action if the Bar Council fails to do so.
The case underlined the need for Section 24A of the Act to be amended. Section 24A,
Disqualification from Enrolment, has the following proviso: “Provided that the
disqualification for enrolment as aforesaid shall cease to have effect after a period of two
years has elapsed since his [release, dismissal, or, as the case may be, removal.”
So, even if a person is convicted of the most serious crime, he or she can become an advocate
after serving two years of their sentence. Furthermore, the legal notion of the unsuitability of
convicted people performing public functions was considered in light of several Supreme
Court judgements.
Conclusion: -
In this judgement, the Supreme Court emphasised the critical need for a revision of the legal
profession's regulating mechanisms. The significance of the legal profession and its function
in the justice delivery system cannot be overstated. The Court reviewed the malpractices
committed by advocates and also discussed the unsuitability of convicted individuals in this
field because the legal profession is seen as a noble profession and practitioners are required
to conduct properly. According to the decision in this matter, shareholders were encouraged
to submit views, and the Advisory Committee constituted by BCI offered extensive
suggestions. The Law Commission of India submitted a draught Advocates (Amendment)
Bill, 2017 in its 266th Report on The Advocates Act, 1961 (Regulation of Legal Profession),
but no further action has been taken, which may lead to more such instances, and such
persons cannot be completely barred from practising this noble profession.
8. HEMLATA PRADHAN V. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

CITATION: AIR 2020 CHH 45
84
JUDGEMENT BY: HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH
Facts: -
This particular petition is based on the petitioner’s statement that she has successfully
finished her LLB degree. She then applied for temporary registration, paying the required
money and submitting the application to the State Bar Council on March 29, 2019. Along
with the application, she produced an affidavit in which she divulged the existence of an
ongoing legal process against her at the competent Court in Sarangarh under Sections 341,
147, 186, 294, 506 Part-II, 353, 149, and 427 of the Indian Penal Code. Following this, the
Bar Council (Respondents 2 and 3) remained silent on the subject for an extended period of
time, failing to reach a judgement on temporary enrollment permission. As a result, the
current petition has been filed.
Issues: -
i. Whether the disqualification of the Petitioner is valid?
Rules: -
Judgement: -
The Supreme Court held that an examination of Section 24A of the Advocates Act indicates
that the provisions of the Bar are applicable solely when an individual is found guilty of an
offense related to moral turpitude or other offenses outlined in Clauses (b) and (c). Hence, it
becomes evident from the analysis of this provision that the ongoing status of a criminal case
cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of disqualification.
Analysis: -
The petitioner, subsequent to her completion of LLB, submitted an application for provisional
enrollment on 29.03.2019, accompanied by the full required payment. Initially, an affidavit
was presented in support of the application, and subsequently, another affidavit dated
07.02.2019 was added to the record. In the latter affidavit, she revealed the existence of a
pending criminal case under various sections of the Indian Penal Code before the Sarangarh
Court. She expressed her intention to notify the Chhattisgarh Bar Council of the case’s
outcome and to act in accordance with the judgment once it is delivered. Upon scrutinizing
Section 24-A, it becomes evident that the Bar imposes disqualification solely in cases where
85
a person has been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude or other specified
offenses mentioned in Clauses (b) and (c). Consequently, the mere pendency of a criminal
case does not qualify for disqualification under this provision.
This interpretation finds reinforcement in the principle of implied limitation, as elucidated by

the Supreme Court in the case of “Manoj Narula v. Union of India; (2014) 9 SCC 1”. This
principle restricts the court from extending the statute's scope. The discussion extends to the
application of the doctrine of implied limitation in the context of disqualification. This
doctrine is shown to apply to Section 24-A of the 1961 Advocate Act, and the court would
refrain from broadening the meaning of “conviction” as used in the provision. The argument
put forth by the Bar is deemed reasonable, suggesting that legal practitioners, in general,
should not admit individuals with criminal backgrounds into their ranks. The analysis
underscores the incompatibility of individuals with criminal histories with the dignity upheld
by the rest of the Bar, who have contributed to the profession's institutional enhancement
through their dedicated work. The potential mixing of those with conviction records among
Bar members is predicted to cause turbulence and harm the profession’s standing, thereby
necessitating introspection into the Bar’s own code of conduct.
The potential repercussions of permitting criminalization within the legal profession are
anticipated to manifest over time. Shifting focus to the petitioner's case, given the absence of
a conviction, the Bar Council is directed to decide on granting provisional enrollment to the
petitioner. This instruction is issued to the Chhattisgarh Bar Council, respondent Nos. 2 & 3,
with a deadline of 30 days.
Conclusion: -
In conclusion, the presented analysis delves into the intricate interplay between legal
qualification, criminal proceedings, and professional enrollment within the legal profession.
The case of the petitioner seeking provisional enrollment after completing LLB has
illuminated the nuanced interpretation of Section 24-A of the Advocate Act. This provision
outlines the grounds for disqualification based on convictions involving moral turpitude. It is
evident that upholding the dignity of the legal profession is paramount, and the court's
directive to the Chhattisgarh Bar Council to decide on the petitioner's provisional enrollment
within a stipulated timeframe reflects this commitment. The analysis, having dissected the
complex legal landscape surrounding the petitioner's case, underscores the need for a
86
balanced approach between legal qualification, criminal matters, and the values upheld by the
legal profession.
9. BAL DEV SINGH DHINGRA V. MADAN LAL GUPTA

Facts: -
Respondent number 1 was enrolled as an advocate by the Bar Council of Punjab & Haryana
under the Act in 1963 and began practicing law in Faridkot, Punjab. Later, he transitioned to
becoming a judicial officer selected by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in 1965, during
which time his license to practice was suspended. In 1972, he was posted as Judicial
Magistrate-cum-Sub-Judge 1st Class at Samrala in Ludhiana District of Punjab State. During
his tenure, allegations of bribery and other misconduct were raised against him to the High
Court of Punjab & Haryana. Following an initial inquiry, a formal departmental investigation
was conducted. The Inquiry Officer found Respondent No. 1 guilty of misconduct unfitting
of a judicial officer. The High Court accepted the report and recommended his dismissal from
judicial service to the Punjab Government. Respondent No. 1's legal challenges against this
dismissal were unsuccessful in both the High Court and this Court. Thereafter, Respondent
No. 1 requested the Chairman of the State Bar Council (Respondent No. 3), to allow him to
resume his practice as an advocate and the same was granted. Since then, Respondent No. 1
had been practicing as an advocate at the Taluk Court, where he previously served as a
Presiding Judge. Several members of the Samrala Bar, including its President, objected to the
resumption of Respondent No. 1's license. Despite this, the Chairman of the State Bar
Council reaffirmed the decision. In response, seven members of the Samrala Bar, including
the appellants, filed a Revision Petition before the Bar Council of India, urging the quashing
of the State Bar Council’s order. The Bar Council of India, annulled the State Bar Council’s
earlier decisions, stating that there were indications of criminal misconduct and other charges
against Respondent No. 1. The Bar Council of India directed the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings by the State Bar Council against Respondent No. 1. Subsequently, the appellants
requested the State Bar Council to initiate proceedings under Section 35 of the Act. This led
to the establishment of a Disciplinary Case against Respondent No. 1 before the State Bar
Council’s disciplinary committee. However, the statutory one-year period for finalizing the
87
case by the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council expired. Consequently, the
disciplinary case against Respondent No. 1 was automatically transferred to the Bar Council
of India. After considering the case, the Bar Council of India ultimately dismissed the
disciplinary case. The appellants, who were the original complainants, filed the present
appeal against this decision.
Issues: -
i. Whether a pleader with a certificate who is accused of abusing his position as a

judicial Officer after being appointed as such and was removed for collecting illicit
gratification and inefficiency might be penalized by the High Court?
ii. Whether the appellants’ complaint filed under Section 35(1) of the Act against
Respondent No. 1 was legally maintainable on the reasons indicated therein?
Rules: -

iv. Section 10 in The Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926
Judgement: -
Undoubtedly, it is accurate to acknowledge that in the Andhra Pradesh High Court case, the
accused legal representative, while serving as a Judicial Officer and no longer acting as a
representative, engaged in misconduct. Following the cessation of his tenure as a Judicial
Officer and his resumption of legal practice, he was deemed accountable under Section 13(f)
of the Legal Practitioners Act by the High Court. It's common knowledge that Section 13(f)
of the mentioned Act grants authority to the High Court to suspend or dismiss a
representative for any reasonable cause. The phrase "for any other reasonable cause"
encompasses a broad scope. Consequently, the High Court possessed the authority, under this
provision, to bar any such representative found culpable of misconduct at any stage from
continuing their legal practice. In contrast, Section 35(1) in the current case is not as broadly
phrased. On the contrary, it explicitly indicates the restricted extent of disciplinary
jurisdiction available to the Bar Councils for punishing practicing advocates on their roster
who have committed professional or other misconduct while actively practicing. Therefore,
the aforementioned Andhra Pradesh High Court decision, contextualized within an entirely
88
different statutory framework, is irrelevant to the arguments put forth by the appellants'
learned counsel. Hence, the contested decision in this appeal, which dismissed the appellant's
complaint, is validly upheld and requires no intervention. Consequently, the appeal is
unsuccessful and is dismissed. No costs are awarded.
Analysis: -
The case at hand involves a thorough examination of Section 35(1) of the Advocates Act and
its applicability to the respondent's alleged misconduct. The key issues revolve around the
insertion of Clause 'C' in Section 24A in 1993, the sequence of events surrounding the
respondent's suspension and resumption of legal practice, and the interpretation of Section
35(1) in the context of the respondent's alleged misconduct. Initially, the respondent was
allowed to resume legal practice in 1977, a time when Rule 5, in conjunction with the then-
existing Section 24A, did not encompass the specific scenario under consideration.
It is crucial to underline that the departmental proceedings against the respondent, conducted
by the High Court, pertained to charges involving moral turpitude, specifically corruption.
However, the respondent had not been convicted of such an offense through a criminal act.
This distinction is pivotal, as it's the reason why the appellants' counsel did not rely on
Section 24-A(l)(a) of the Act, which was the relevant provision back then. Consequently,
according to Rule 5 of Chapter III of the Rules, the State Bar Council was not empowered to
deny the respondent's permission to resume legal practice in 1977, even though he had been
dismissed from service due to the departmental inquiry.
Thus, it can be deduced that the only provision argued by the appellants' counsel against the
respondent, Section 35(1), is not applicable since both the prerequisites of this subsection are
not met in the current context. Consequently, there was no valid reason for either the State
Bar Council or the Central Bar Council to proceed with the appellants' complaint against the
respondent. In summary, Section 35(1) can be invoked against a practicing advocate who is
on the State Bar Council's roll and is found guilty of professional or other misconduct
committed during his tenure as an advocate. If the advocate's name has been removed from
the State roll as per Section 26A, then Section 35(1) becomes inapplicable to him, even if he
resumes practice at a later date. Section 26-A empowers the State Bar Council to remove an
advocate's name from the State roll if they are deceased or if a request is received to that
effect, as was the case with the respondent when he joined judicial service. It's also essential
to consider that Section 35(1) needs to be read in conjunction with Section 33, which
89
establishes that only enrolled advocates are entitled to practice in any court or before any
authority. Hence, enrollment as an advocate is intrinsically tied to the right to practice law.
It is evident that Chapter V of the Advocates Act, which encompasses Section 35, is
dedicated to the conduct and punishment of practicing advocates for their alleged
misconducts. This chapter does not extend its purview to the alleged misconduct of non-
practicing advocates who might have committed such actions when they were not actively
practicing. In light of this, the respondent's alleged misconduct as a judicial officer when he
was not practicing, coupled with the suspension of his name on the State Bar Council's roll
alongside his right to practice, renders the complaint filed by the appellants against him
legally unviable under Section 35(1) of the Act.
Conclusion: -
Finally, the complicated interplay of legislative requirements, chronology, and the nature of
the respondent's claimed misbehavior has resulted in the finding that the complaint against
the respondent is not maintainable under Section 35(1) of the Advocates Act. The
respondent's non-practicing status at the time of the alleged wrongdoing, as well as the
suspension of his enrollment, render Section 35(1) inapplicable. As a result, any punishment
imposed by the disciplinary body based on this clause is unjustified.
10. ANAND KUMAR SHARMA V. BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA & ORS.

Facts: -
Appellant enrolled as an advocate in Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh in July 1988. Applied
for transfer of enrollment to Rajasthan, permitted by Bar Council of India in May 1989.
Complaint about suppression of facts led to cancellation of Himachal Pradesh enrollment by
the State Bar Council. The cancellation order was affirmed by Supreme Court. Appellant
90
applied for enrollment exemption due to prior experience, which led to legal proceedings.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Division Bench directed Bar Council of
Rajasthan to reconsider. Bar Council of Rajasthan dismissed enrollment application and the
same was confirmed by Bar Council of India. Thereafter the Appellant filed the instant
appeals challenging the orders refusing enrollment.
Issues: -
a) Whether the appellant’s repeated attempts for enrollment are valid considering past
cancellations, legal challenges, and issues related to his background.
b) Whether subsequent acquittal can nullify the suppression of facts during initial
enrollment.
Rules: -
Judgement: -
The Appellant is a certified medical practitioner who was appointed as a Medical Officer by
the Government of Himachal Pradesh on a contract basis. The Appellant said in his affidavit,
that a FIR was issued against him at Police Station Dhambola. He was arrested and taken into
jail. He further alleged that he was absent from work without permission, and that as a result,
his services were terminated by the Director. The Appellant further mentioned his conviction
by a Judicial Magistrate on January 7, 1988, under Section 419 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860.
He has also filed the judgement of the Sessions Judge of Dungarpur, Rajasthan, which
permitted his appeal under Section 419 IPC. The suppression asserted against the Appellant
when he sought enrolment in the Himachal Pradesh Bar Council is related to his government
work in the state of Himachal Pradesh and his involvement in a criminal case. The Appellant
cannot be saved by a subsequent acquittal. Section 26 of the Advocates Act, 1961 empowers
the Bar Council of India to remove a person's name from the Roll of Advocates who was
admitted by misrepresentation.
The Appellant’s enrollment was revoked as a result of the exercise of this right. The initial
order of the Bar Council revoking his registration as an advocate was upheld by this Court.
The Appellant's repeated attempts later amount to an abuse of process. The Appellant would
91
be wise not to pursue the case concerning his membership as an Advocate. The orders
challenged in the Appeals are upheld since they are without flaws.
Analysis: -
The Appellant, a qualified medical doctor, had been appointed as a contract-based Medical
Officer by the Himachal Pradesh Government. In the affidavit submitted, the Appellant
detailed that he had a First Information Report (FIR) registered against him at Police Station
Dhambola on April 15, 1988. This led to his arrest and subsequent judicial custody.
Additionally, he admitted to being absent from his service without obtaining official leave,
which resulted in the termination of his services by the Director. The Appellant also disclosed
his conviction under Section 419 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by a Judicial Magistrate on
January 7, 1988. He attached the Sessions Judge's judgment from Dungarpur, Rajasthan,
which allowed his appeal against the Section 419 IPC conviction. The accusation against the
Appellant during his application for enrollment in the Himachal Pradesh Bar Council
pertained to his government service in Himachal Pradesh and his involvement in a criminal
case. Despite subsequent acquittal, Section 26 of the Advocates Act, 1961, granted the Bar
Council of India the authority to remove the name of an advocate from the Roll due to
misrepresentation. This authority led to the cancellation of the Appellant’s enrollment. The
initial cancellation order by the Bar Council, which invalidated his advocate status, was
ratified by this Court. The Appellant's repeated efforts for enrollment subsequently could be
seen as an abuse of the legal process. Therefore, it is advisable for the Appellant to refrain
from pursuing his enrollment matter any further. Ultimately, the challenged orders in the
Appeals lack any deficiencies and are upheld.
Conclusion: -
In concluding, a comprehensive analysis has been conducted regarding the Appellant's

endeavors to enroll as an advocate. The examination meticulously covered aspects such as the
Appellant’s professional background as a qualified medical practitioner, his involvement in a
legal case followed by his subsequent acquittal, and his persistent attempts at securing
enrollment. Despite the Appellant's exoneration, the Advocates Act of 1961 provides the Bar
Council of India with the authority to cancel an advocate's enrollment if obtained through
92
misrepresentation. This legal mandate justified the rescission of the Appellant's enrollment, a
decision initially sanctioned by the Bar Council and subsequently upheld by the Court. The
Appellant's continued pursuit of enrollment could be perceived as placing an undue burden
on the legal process. It is advisable that the Appellant refrains from further pursuing this
matter. In the end, the contested orders within the Appeals have been validated as sound and
free from any shortcomings, resulting in their confirmation.
93

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Project Report on

JOURNAL WRITING: CASES ON “DISCIPLINARY

Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad Symbiosis International (Deemed) University, PUNE

Under the guidance of

Dr. Sanu Rani Paul

Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad

Signature of the candidate: Oishi Sen

SL NO. CASE NAME CITATION PAGE NO.

(A) CASES ON DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS

(B)CASES ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

(C) CASES ON-

1. VIKAS DESHPANDE V. BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA

i. Whether the Appellant’s conduct constitute professional or any other kind of

i. Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961

i. Whether the Respondent is guilty of professional misconduct or negligence?

i. Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961

3. P.R. ADIKESAVAN V. REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF MADRAS &

i. Whether the Appellant’s conduct constitutes contempt against Court?

i. Section 2(c)(iii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

4. P.D. GUPTA V. RAM MURTI & ANR.

i. Section 36B of Advocates Act, 1961

i. Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961

i. Whether the Appellant’s conduct amounts to professional misconduct under

i. Section 24A of Advocates Act, 1961

7. NARAIN PANDEY V. PANNALAL PANDEY

i. Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961

Sanctions that is appropriate to the level of infractions is well-deserved by an advocate

8. O.P. SHARMA & ORS. V. HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA

Consequently, the contemnor appealed before the Supreme Court of India.

i. Whether the advocate’s conduct amounted to professional misconduct?

i. Section I of Chapter 2 of ‘Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquettes’

An advocate, in my humble opinion, plays a significant part in efficient justice delivery

9. DHANRAJ SINGH CHOUDHARY V. NATHULAL VISHWAKARMA

i. Whether the actions of the respondents amount to professional misconduct?

i. Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961

10. NORATANMAL CHAURASIA V. M.R. MURLI

i. Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961

11. JAIPUR VIKAS PRADHIKARAN V. SRI ASHOK KUMAR CHOUDHARY &

i. Whether the actions of the respondents amount to professional misconduct?

i. Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961

12. HIGH COURT OF MADRAS V. R. KRISHNAMURTHY

i. Section 2(c)(i) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

13. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HYDERABAD V. K. NARAYANA

a) Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961

14. SHAMBHURAM YADAV V. HANUMANDAS KHATRI

i. Whether the Appellant is guilty of professional misconduct?

i. Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961

15. BHUPINDER KUMAR SHARMA V. BAR ASSOCIATION, PATHANKOT

i. Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961.

16. HARISH CHANDRA TIWARI V. BAIJU

i. Whether the penalty is proportionate to the misconduct alleged?

i. Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961

17. RAJENDRA PAI V. ALEX FERNANDEZ

i. Whether the Appellant is guilty of professional misconduct?

i. Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961

18. O.N. MOHINDROO V. THE BAR COUNCIL OF DELHI

i. Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961

19. D.P. CHADHA V. TRIYUGI NARAIN MISHRA & ORS.

i. Whether the Appellant is guilty of professional misconduct?

i. Section 37 of the Advocates Act, 1961

20. AN ADVOCATE V. B.B. HARADARA & ORS.

i. Section 37 of the Advocates Act, 1961

21. BAPURAO PAKHIDDEY V. SUMAN DONDEY