Respondent Moot Court Competition

14TH PRO BONO ENVIRO NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION- 2021
GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE, TIRUCHY

STATE LEVEL (ENGLISH) MOOT COURT COMPETITION- 2023
TEAM CODE: THINAIMOZHI
BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, VARUSA NADU
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. ______ OF 2023
THE APPEAL FILED UNDER SECTION 374(2) OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE, 1973.
IN THE MATTER OF
1. VIRUTHAN (A1) ……………………………....APPELLANT 1

2. THURITHAN (A2) ………………………………APPELLANT 2
3. ARUVAN (A3) ………………………………APPELLANT 3
v.
STATE OF VARUSA NADU & Anr ……………………….RESPONDENT
UPON SUBMISSSION TO THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE,

VARUSA NADU
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATION……………………………………………………………….ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES………………………………………………………………iii
1. CASES REFERRED……………………………………………………………...iii
2. BOOKS REFERRED……………………………………………………………..vi
3. STATUTES………………………………………………………….....................vi
4. ONLINESOURCES…………………………………………………....................vi
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION………………………………………………………1
STATEMENT OF FACTS……………………………….……………...............................2
STATEMENT OF ISSUES………………………….…………..........................................3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS………………………………………..............................4
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED…………………………………………...............................6
1. WHETHER THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED IS A CULPABLE HOMICIDE

AMOUNTING TO MURDER OR NOT? ………………………………………….6
2. WHETHER THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND OTHER EVIDENCES PROVE THE
MURDER BY THE ACCUSED?...............................................................................13
3. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION HAS ESTABLISHED THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED HEREIN BEYOND ALL THE REASONABLE DOUBTS?................18
4. WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS
APPROPRIATE, LEGAL AND VALID?.................................................................24
PRAYER……………………………………………………………...…………………….28
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT Page i

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATION EXPANSION
& And
AIR All India Report
Anr Another
A.P Andhra Pradesh
CS Civil Suit
Cr.P.C Criminal Procedure Code
Cri.L.J./ Cr.L.J. Criminal Law Journal
Ed. Edition
Govt Government
H. C High Court
Hon’ble Honorable
Ibid Ibidem
IPC Indian Penal Code
Ors Others
PW Prosecution Witness
r/w read with
Rev Review
HC High Court
Sec Section
v. Versus
Vol. Volume
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT Page ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
1. CASE REFERED
INDIAN CASES
SUPREME COURT CASES
S. NO NAME OF THE CASES CITATION PG NO
1. Mukesh vs State NCT of Delhi (2017) 6 SCC 1 6
2. State of AP. v. Rayavarappu Punnaya 1977 AIR 45, 1977 SCR 7

(1) 601
3. Santosh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 1975 CrLJ 602 1975 AIR 7
4. Shankar Diwal Wadu. v. State Of Maharastra (2007)2007(2) Supreme 8

1032
5. Vasanta vs State Of Maharashtra AIR 1983 SC 361 9
6. State of Rajasthan v. Dhool Singh (2003) 2003 (8) Supreme 10

850
7. Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2006) 11 SCC 444 10
8. Sarup Singh v. State of Haryana represented by the 1955 CrLJ 4168: 1995 11
Home Secretary AIR (SC) 2452
9. Nathan v. State of Madras AIR 1973 SCC 665 12
10. Lehna vs State Of Haryana, 2002 (2002) 3 SCC 76 13
11. Ashok Laxman Sohani and another v. The State of CILJ 829: 1977 AIR 13
Maharashtra
12. S.D. Soni v. State of Gujarat CrLJ 330 1991 AIR 13
13. Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat AIR 1983 SC 484 14
14. Rajendra PralhadraoWasnik v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 12 SCC 460 14
15. Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam (1998) 8 SCC 635 15
16. Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat AIR 1983 SC 484 15
17. Akhtar Vs State of Uttaranchal (2009) 13 SCC 722 15
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT Page iii

18. State of Maharashtra vs. Damu, S/o Gopinath Shinde 2000 (5) SC 575 15
and Ors
19. Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab 1978, CrLJ 1413: 1978 16
AIR
20. State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad and Ors AIR 1961 SC 1808 16
21. Kishan vs The state of Madhya Pradesh 1974 CrLJ 324:1974 AIR 17
(SC)244
22. Molu and others vs State of Haryana 1976 CrLJ 1895:1976 AIR 17
(SC) 2499
23. Bharvad Bhikha Valu and others vs The state of 1971 CrLJ 927:1971 AIR 17
Gujarat (SC)1064
24. State of Tamilnadu v. P.Muniappan 1998CrLJ 694 18
25. Darshan singh and others v. State of Haryana 1996 CrLJ 4438 18
26. Mohd. Khalid vs. State of W.B. (2002) 7 SCC 334 19
27. K.R. Purushothaman vs. State of Kerala AIR 2006 SC 35 19
28. V. Thiagarajan and Others vs. State rep. by Inspector Crl.R.C.No. 708 of 2007, 20
of Police, SPE/CBE/ACB, Chennai,
29. Suresh Chandra Bahri vs. State of Bihar AIR 1994 SC 2420 20
30. Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P AIR 2011 SC 280 20
31. Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra 2007 AIR SCW 18352007 21

Cri.L.J. 1819
32. State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and another [(1981) 2 SCC 752] : (AIR 21
1981 SC 1390)
33. Myladimmal Surendran and others v. State of Kerala [(2010) 11SC 129]: (AIR 21
2010 sc 3281: 20lO AIR
SCW 5248)
34. Samsuddin Sheikh v, State of Gujarat and another [(2011) 10 SCC 158] : 21
(AIR 2012 SC 37 : 2011
AIR SCW 6486)
35. Amit v. State of Uttar Pradesh; AIR 2012 SC 1433 21
36. Pruthviraj Jayantibhai Vanol v. Dinesh Dayabhai Criminal Appeal No. 177 21
Vala of 2014
37. Rammi v. State M. P 1999 (8) SCC 649 22
38. Babasaheb Apparao Patil v. State of Maharashtra; AIR 2009 SC 1461 22
39. State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and Another; (1981) 2 SCC 752 22
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT Page iv

40. Subodh Nath and Anr. v. State of Tripura; AIR 2013 SC 3726) 23
41. Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat 1983 Cri LJ 1096: AIR 23
1983 SC 753
42. Leela Ram v. State of Haryana AIR 1999 SC 3717 23
43. Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP AIR 1959 SC 1012 23
44. Matru v. State of U.P. (1971 (2) SCC 75) 23
45. Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain (1973 (2) SCC 406) 23
46. Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 11 SCC 768 23
47. John Pandian v. State Represented by Inspector of (2010) 14 SCC 129 24

Police, Tamil Nadu
48. D. R Bhagare v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1974 SC 476 25
49. Ramashraya Chakravarthi v. State of Madhya AIR 197 SC 392 (393) 25

Prakash
50. Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 SCC 648 26
51. Macchi Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) SCC (3) 470 26
52. Rajesh Kumar v. State (2011) 13 SCC 706 27
52. Dhanonjoy Chatterjee v. West Bengal (1994) 2 SCC 220 27
54. State of Maharashtra v. Mohammed Ajmal, Criminal Appeal No. 1899- 27

Mohammed Amir Kasab @ Abu Mujahid 1900 of 2011
55. Inder Singh & Anr v. State of Delhi 1978 AIR 1091; 1978 SCR 27
(3) 393; 1978 SCC (1) 161
56. Om Prakash v. State of Haryana (1993) 3 SCC 19 27
57. Bimla Devi Vs. Rajesh Singh 2016 (92) ACC 902 (SC) 27
HIGH COURT CASES
S. NO NAME OF THE CASES CITATION PG NO
1. Radhey Shyam And Anr. V. State Of Uttar Pradesh 2018 (2018) 08 AHC CK 12
0052
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT Page v

2. BOOKS REFERED
S.NO NAME
1. Batuk Lal, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Law Agency, 2017).
2. Gurkirat Kaur, Criminal Justice System, (2017 Ed 2)
3. K. D. Gaur, Textbook on Indian Penal Code (Universal Law Publications, 6th

Edition, 2016).
4. P.S.A Pillai, Dr. K. I. Vibhute, Criminal Law (Lexis Nexis, 12th Edition, Re. 2016).
5. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, the Code of Criminal Procedure (Lexis Nexis, 22nd Ed., 2017).
6. S. V. Joga Rao, Evidence: Cases and Materials, (1st Ed 2003)
3. STATUTES
S.NO NAME
1. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1973)
2. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860)
3. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act 18 of 1872)
4. The Indian Medical Council Act, 1956
4. ONLINE SOURCES
S.NO LINK
1. Indian Kanoon, https://indiankanoon.org/
2. Manupatra Online Resources, http://www.manupatra.com
3. SCC Online, http://www.scconline.co.in
4. EBC Reader, https://www.ebcreader.com/
5. Oxford Dictionary, https://www.oxford learnersdictionaries.com/
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT Page vi

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Appellant has approached the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature, Varusa Nadu under
Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction and thereby invoked Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973.
Section 374: Appeals from convictions.
(1) Any person convicted on a trial held by a High Court in its extraordinary original
criminal jurisdiction may appeal to the Supreme Court.
(2) Any person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge
or on a trial held by any other Court in which a sentence of imprisonment for more than
seven years 2 has been passed against him or against any other person convicted at the same
trial], may appeal to the High Court.
(3) Save as otherwise provided in subsection (2), any person,- (a) convicted on a trial held
by a Metropolitan Magistrate or Assistant Sessions Judge or Magistrate of the first class, or
of the second class, or (b) sentenced under section 325, or (c) in respect of whom an order
has been made or a sentence has been passed under section 360 by any Magistrate, may
appeal to the Court of Session.
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT Page 1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the sake of brevity and convenience of this Hon’ble Court the facts of the present case are
summarised as follows:
1. The appellant herein are the three accused namely Viruthan (A1), Thurithan (A2),
Aruvan (A3) are convicted for causing murder of deceased Uthiyanand under Section
120 (B) r/w. Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 in the Additional District and
Session Court. All three accused plead not guilty.
2. After full trial, the Session Court convicted and sentenced all the three accused under
Section 120(B) r/w 302 of I.P.C and impose life imprisonment with a fine of Rs.5,000/-
and in default he shall suffer a further imprisonment of 6 months and sentenced for
further charge u/s 302 r/w 109 I.P.C and shall suffer a Life Imprisonment with a fine of
Rs.5,000/- and in default he shall suffer further imprisonment for Six months.
3. Challenging the said conviction and sentence, all the three convicted accused preferred
a criminal appeal before the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature, Varusa Nadu.
4. The appellant challenges before the Hon’ble High Court stating that the Trial Court has
failed to consider the evidence submitted from their respective; the Trial Court has
failed that the investigation has not been done properly; the Trial Court has failed to
consider that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubts; the
Trial Court has erroneously convicted the appellant on the basis of unbelievable
evidence and the related documents; the sentence imposed by the Trial Court on the
appellant is highly irrational which is not sustainable by law; the judgment of the Court
below is contrary to law, weight of evidence and probability of the case. Thus, the
appellant prays for acquittal of the appellant from all the charges convicted against him.
5. Therefore, the appeal has been taken on filed by the Hon’ble High Court and now the
matter has been taken here for the final disposal.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE: 1
WHETHER THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED IS A CULPABLE HOMICIDE

AMOUNTING TO MURDER OR NOT?
ISSUE: 2
WHETHER THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND OTHER EVIDENCES PROVE

THE MURDER BY THE ACCUSED?
ISSUE: 3
WHETHER THE PROSECUTION HAS ESTABLISHED THE GUILT OF THE

ACCUSED HEREIN BEYOND ALL THE REASONABLE DOUBTS?
ISSUE: 4
WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS

APPROPRIATE, LEGAL AND VALID?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

It is humbly submitted that the death of the deceased is a culpable homicide amounting to
murder. The Sections 299 And 300 Of IPC, 1860 distinct the degree of intention of the
offenders is to be considered. Subsequently, another difference can be that of the chance of
death wherein it is high in case of murder and less under culpable homicide. Another difference
is of mens rea where it is involved with a difference of degree in both the offences. The fact
that which party had assaulted or offered a provocation first is not important. When the Person
Exceeds his Right To Private Defence. Act of private defence can said to have been exercised,
when the act is committed in order to defend oneself from further harm. If the accused
intentionally exceeds his right to private defence, then he is liable to murder.
2. WHETHER THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND OTHER EVIDENCES PROVE

It is humbly submitted that the medical evidences are properly corroborated and clearly
supports the evidences for conviction of accused followed by the laws and procedures. The
function of medical evidence is to guide judges in order to make rational decisions when it
comes to passing the judgements for criminal cases. In the trial of a case of murder,
manslaughter or any bodily harm for that matter, medical evidence or a medical expert's
opinion is relied upon to determine the cause of injuries, their effect as in if the injuries are
capable of leading to someone's death, the plausible weapon that might have been used in
causing the injury etc. All the medical evidences submitted and proved in the session court
stands to be clear and sound to prove the murder of the deceased by the accused.


It is humbly submitted that the Appellant’s (A1 Viruthan & A2 Thurithan) presence has been
proved by two eyewitnesses. It has been proved by the eye witnesses that an ambassador car
stopped near Mattikulam crematorium. A bike stood in front of it. A man(A1-Viruthan) got
down from his bike and slashed the man (Udiyanand) who got out of the Ambassador car with
a scythe. Udiyan fell down. Virudhan slashed at him. The expert witness has also deposed that
all the injuries could have been caused by a sharp-edged weapon like aruval. The chemical
analysis report of the forensic science laboratory indicates that there were stains of human
blood on the Aruval. The prosecution was required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt,
which it has done.

It is humbly submitted that the punishment imposed by the trial court is appropriate, legal and
valid. The Additional session judge have the power to impose life imprisonment for the murder
offence. The proof submitted by the prosecution and the medical evidence shows that the
murder is committed by the appellant in conspiracy. Thus, the trial court impose sentence upon
hearing both sides. Considering beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court imposes life
imprisonment which is valid.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble high court of that the death of the deceased is a
culpable homicide amounting to murder. The Sections 299 And 300 Of IPC, 1860 distinct the
degree of intention of the offenders is to be considered. There are certain ways to differentiate
between these two concepts and it is latent with the term seriousness of intention. The word
likely is used in Section 299 which states one of the probabilities which amount to culpable
homicide but the word sufficient is used in Section 300 which denotes most probably.
Subsequently, another difference can be that of the chance of death wherein it is high in case
of murder and less under culpable homicide. Another difference is of mens rea where it is
involved with a difference of degree in both the offences. The sudden fight is when the fight is
unexpected or premeditated. Both the parties don't have any intention to kill or cause the death
of another. The fact that which party had assaulted or offered a provocation first is not
important. Act of private defence can said to be have exercised, when the act is committed in
order to defend oneself from further harm. If the accused intentionally exceeds his right to
private defense, then he is liable to murder.
In the case of Mukesh vs State (NCT of Delhi)1:- Gang Rape in Bus Case - In this case court
observed that the brutal, barbaric gang rape, unnatural sex and assault leading to death of
victim, principles of balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, applied and death
sentence confirmed even though there were many mitigating factors.
1.1.SECTION 300 IN THE INDIAN PENAL CODE IS FULFILLED BY THE ACT OF

ACCUSED
It is humbly submitted that Culpable Homicide amounting to Murder. Except in the cases
hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder: (i). If the act by which the death is caused
is done with the intention of causing death, or (ii). If it is done with the intention of causing
such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom
1 Mukesh vs State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1

the harm is caused, or (iii). If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person
and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, or (iv). If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous
that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and
commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as
aforesaid.
In the landmark judgment of State of AP. v. Rayavarappu Punnaya (1977)2, the Apex Court
created a comparison table to grasp the key differences between them.
Section 299 IPC Section 300 IPC
A person commits culpable

Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is murder if the
homicide if the act by which the
act by which the death is caused is done –
death is caused is done –
Intention
Intention With the intention of causing death; or with the intention of
With the intent to cause death; or inflicting physical injury that the offender knows will result in
with the intention to cause physical the death of the person to whom the harm is inflicted; or with
damage that is likely to result in the intention to inflict bodily damage on any person and the
death; or physical injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient to cause
death in the ordinary course of nature, or
Knowledge
Knowledge With the knowledge that the conduct is so immediately harmful
Knowing that the conduct is likely to that it must almost certainly result in death or bodily injury that
result in death. is likely to result in death and without any justification or risk
of causing death or injury as described above.
Also, in the case of Santosh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh,3 - Homicide Conviction-The
case must be shown to have fallen within one of the exception-Section 300 to result in
conviction.
2
State of AP. v. Rayavarappu Punnaya 1977 AIR 45, 1977 SCR (1) 601
3
Santosh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 1975 CrLJ 602 1975 AIR

1.2.INGREDIENTS OF MURDER:-
(i) Causing death: There should be an intention of causing death

(ii) Doing an act: There should be an intention to cause such bodily injury that is likely to
cause death or
(iii) The act must be done with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause the death of
another.
In the supreme court case of Shankar Diwal Wadu. v. State Of Maharastra (2007)4, according
to the prosecution, the accused Shankar Wadu is the brother of Mahu Wadu, who was assaulted
by him and died as a result of the assault. The event occurred on October 22, 1996, in Kaimad
Wadu Pada, Laluka Wada, Thane, where both the accused and the victim, as well as other close
relatives, lived. The accused sought to maintain Kamlibai, the widow of his brother Vasant, as
his mistress, according to the prosecution evidence, but she refused. The appellant was
violently dragging Kamlibai to his residence on the day of the occurrence. His brother Mahu
(the deceased) told him at the time that he couldn’t force and pull Kamlibai to his residence.
The accused became outraged by such unsolicited advice and lifted a wooden plank (Pat) and
whacked Mahur on the head with it, as well as kicking and punching him. Mahu died instantly.
Yeshubai, a close relative of both the offender and the victim, filed a complaint alleging his
attack. The investigation was launched after receiving this complaint, and the accused was
detained. The prosecution called up to eight witnesses to establish its accusation of murder
against the accused, and the learned trial judge, after weighing the evidence, found the accused
guilty and sentenced him to life in prison under section 302 / 506 of the Indian Penal Code, as
well as a fine of Rs.50,000.
1.3.INTENTION TO CAUSE BODILY INJURY LIKELY TO CAUSE DEATH
It is submitted that in both the Section 299 clause (b) and Section 300 clauses 2 and 3 deal with
the purpose to inflict physical damage that is likely to result in death. In terms of Section 299(b),
it simply states that if death is caused by an act committed with the goal of causing physical
damage likely to cause death, it is considered a culpable homicide. While clause (2) of Section
300 states that an act must be done with the goal of inflicting bodily damage that is likely to
result in death, it also states that the deliberate causation of bodily injury must be accompanied
by the knowledge that the bodily injury is likely to result in death.
4
Shankar Diwal Wadu. v. State Of Maharastra (2007)2007(2) Supreme 1032

The term ‘likely’ in Section 299(b) refers to a simple possibility or likelihood that the harm
may result in death. However, the word ‘likely’ in clause (2) of Section 300 conveys, to some
extent, death certainty. This is explained in illustration (b) to Section 300. It implies that the
accused has some unique knowledge of the deceased’s state, such as any ailment he may be
suffering from, and that this information adds certainty to the fact that the bodily damage would
result in death. The sole difference between the meanings of the words ‘likely’ in Sections
299(b) and 300(2) is the degree of likelihood.
In the case of clause (3) of Section 300, the purpose to inflict bodily damage is accompanied
by the certainty that such physical injury is sufficient to cause death in the regular course of
nature. The word ‘sufficient’ in the regular course of nature to cause death, like the phrase
‘likely’ in Section 299, imputes the certainty of death to a higher extent (b). Thus, the essential
difference between death under Sections 299(b) and 300(2) and (3) is that under Section 299(b),
the bodily injury caused is less likely to result in death, whereas under Section 300(2) and (3),
the bodily injury caused is more likely to result in death.
1.4.KNOWLEDGE: -
It is humbly submitted that Sections 299(c) and 300(4) deal with situations in which the accused
has information that the act is likely to result in death. The need for knowledge under Section
300(4) is a very high degree of risk of death, similar to the preceding Sections. This high
probability of death is indicated in the clause’s final Section, which states that the act must be
so immediately dangerous that it will almost certainly result in death or bodily injury that is
likely to result in death, and that the act must be performed without any justification for taking
the risk. Both clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of 300 apply to circumstances in which
the accused has no intention of causing death or bodily damage but is aware that the act is
basically dangerous. The degree of risk to human life determines whether the conduct is murder
or culpable homicide. It is culpable homicide if death is a potential outcome; it is murder if
death is the most likely outcome.
There existed prior animosity between the accused and the deceased in Vasanta vs State Of
Maharashtra 5, the accused and the dead were observed fighting. The two were separated by
a few people who were present. The accused then rushed to his vehicle, drove it on the wrong
side of the road and straight into the deceased, knocking him down and driving over him, killing
5
Vasanta vs State Of Maharashtra on 2 February, 1983, AIR 1983 SC 361, 1983 CriLJ 693, 1983 (1) Crimes
728 SC, 1983 (1) SCALE 871, 1984 Supp (1) SCC 648

him. The route on which the accident occurred was broad and lonely. The accused had no cause
or requirement to drive the jeep in the incorrect way. The Supreme Court ruled that the accused
intentionally slammed his jeep into the deceased and ran him over with the purpose to kill him.
It’s worth noting that the first clause of Section 300, ‘act done with the purpose to cause death,’
is the same as the first clause of Section 299, which is likewise ‘performing an act with the
intent to cause death.’ As a result, an act that falls under clause (1) of Section 300 will also fall
under Section 299, and it will constitute culpable homicide amounting to murder in both cases.
In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Dhool Singh 6, the Supreme Court found the accused guilty
of murder for inflicting an incised cut with a sword on the deceased’s neck, resulting in
excessive bleeding and organ failure, on the grounds that he knew the bodily injury he caused
would likely result in death.
1.5.MURDER IS PROVED BY EVIDENCE:-
It is humbly submitted that in the case Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh,7 the
Court outlined the facets that courts should consider when deciding whether an act is
punishable as murder, culpable homicide, or culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and
stated that the Court should proceed with caution when deciding whether the case falls under
Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. As a result, it is the responsibility of the courts to
ensure that instances of murder punished under Section 302 are not changed into offences
punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or that cases of culpable homicide that do not amount
to murder are considered as murder punishable under Section 302. A combination of a few or
many of the following, among other things, can be used to determine the intent to cause death:
(i). The weapon’s properties; (ii). Whether the accused carried the weapon or it was picked
up on the spot; (iii). Whether the strike is directed at a critical bodily part; (iv) The amount of
force used to injure someone; (v). Whether the action occurred during a sudden dispute, a
sudden fight, or a free-for-all brawl; (vi). If the incident happened by coincidence or was it
planned in advance; (vii). Whether there had been any previous animosity or if the deceased
was a stranger; (viii). Whether there was any grave and immediate provocation, and if so, what
caused it; (ix). Whether it was committed in the heat of emotion; (x). Whether the person who
inflicted the harm acted in a cruel and unusual manner, (xi). Whether the accused gave a single
6
State of Rajasthan v. Dhool Singh (2003) 2003 (8) Supreme 850 : 2004 (1) Crimes 165 : 2004 CriLJ 931 :
2003 (10) JT 179 : 2003 (10) Scale 842 : 2004 (12) SCC 546 : AIR 2004 SC 1264 : 2004 AIR(SCW) 24 : 2003
(1) Crimes 165 : 2004 (1) RLW 70
7
Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2006) 11 SCC 444

blow or multiple strokes. Of course, the preceding list of conditions is not complete, and there
may be other particular circumstances in individual situations that provide light on the question
of purpose.
1.6.THE ACCUSSED IS VOLUNTARILY MURDERED THE DECEASED :-
It is humbly submitted that the accused murdered the deceased voluntarily, the following
provision will prove the illegal action of the accused :
(i). Voluntarily causing hurt- section 321.

(ii). Voluntarily causing grievous hurt- section 322.
(iii). Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means- section 324.
(iv). Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means- section 326.
(v). Voluntarily causing hurt to extort property or to constrain to an illegal act- sec
327.
(vi). Voluntarily causing grievous hurt on provocation- section 335 of Indian Penal
Code of India, 1860.
The Hon’ble Supreme court, in the case of Sarup Singh v. State of Haryana represented by
the Home Secretary,8 - Homicide-Knowledge of injury-Accused gave single blow on the head
of the deceased-Accused can be clothed with the knowledge that such injury likely to cause
death of the deceased though without any intention to cause death-The offence would therefore
squarely fall under Section 304, Part II of the IPC-Accused convicted and sentenced
accordingly.
1.7.ALL CULPABLE HOMICIDES ARE MURDER:-
It is humbly submitted that the word “HOMICIDE” comes from Latin where homo means
man and cede means I cut. Thus, homicide means the killing of a man by man. The homicide
may be lawful or unlawful. Culpable homicide means death through human agency punishable
by law. All murders are culpable homicide but not all-culpable homicide is murder. So
practically, there is no difference between culpable homicide and murder. The question that
arises is whether an offence is a murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Lawful
homicide will set the culprit free. Culpable Homicide Amounting to Murder: Known as simple
murder- Culpable homicide not amounting to Murder: There is necessarily a criminal or
knowledge in both. The difference does not lie in quality; it lies in the quantity or degree of
8
Sarup Singh v. State of Haryana represented by the Home Secretary 1955 CrLJ 4168: 1995 AIR (SC) 2452

criminality closed by the act. In murder, there is greater intention or knowledge than in culpable
homicide not amounting to murder.
In the case of Nathan v. state of madras9, - court observed that the landlord was trying
forcefully to evict the accused. The accused killed the landlord while exercising his right to
private defense. There was no fear of death to the accused as the deceased was not holding any
deadly weapon that could have caused grievous hurt or death of the accused. The deceased had
no intention to kill the accused, thus, the accused exceeded his right of private defence. The
accused was liable to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
Also, in the case of Radhey Shyam And Anr. V. State Of Uttar Pradesh, 201810- In this case
the- appellant was extremely angry when he got to know that his calf had come to the deceased
place. The appellant started abusing the deceased, when the latter tried to stop him, the
appellant fired at the deceased. The deceased was unarmed at that time; thus, the appellant had
an intention to kill the deceased, hence, he was held liable to murder.
1.8.INTENTION TO CAUSE BODILY INJURY LIKELY TO CAUSE DEATH:-
It is submitted that in both Section 299 clause (b) and Section 300 clauses 2 and 3 deal with
the purpose to inflict physical damage that is likely to result in death. In terms of Section 299(b),
it simply states that if death is caused by an act committed with the goal of causing physical
damage likely to cause death, it is considered a culpable homicide. While clause (2) of Section
300 states that an act must be done with the goal of inflicting bodily damage that is likely to
result in death, it also states that the deliberate causation of bodily injury must be accompanied
by the knowledge that the bodily injury is likely to result in death.
The term ‘likely’ in Section 299(b) refers to a simple possibility or likelihood that the harm
may result in death. However, the word ‘likely’ in clause (2) of Section 300 conveys, to some
extent, death certainty. This is explained in illustration (b) to Section 300. It implies that the
accused has some unique knowledge of the deceased’s state, such as any ailment he may be
suffering from, and that this information adds certainty to the fact that the bodily damage would
result in death. The sole difference between the meanings of the words ‘likely’ in Sections
299(b) and 300(2) is the degree of likelihood.
9
Nathan v. State of Madras AIR 1973 SCC 665
10
Radhey Shyam And Anr. V. State Of Uttar Pradesh, 2018 (2018) 08 AHC CK 0052

In the case of clause (3) of Section 300, the purpose to inflict bodily damage is accompanied
by the certainty that such physical injury is sufficient to cause death in the regular course of
nature. The word ‘sufficient’ in the regular course of nature to cause death, like the phrase
‘likely’ in Section 299, imputes the certainty of death to a higher extent (b). Thus, the essential
difference between death under Sections 299(b) and 300(2) and (3) is that under Section 299(b),
the bodily injury caused is less likely to result in death, whereas under Section 300(2) and (3),
the bodily injury caused is more likely to result in death.
In the case of Lehna vs State Of Haryana,2002.11, the Supreme Court declared the death
penalty imposed by the trial court and upheld by the high court on the accused of murdering
his mother, brother, and sister-in-law to be unconstitutional and commuted it to life
imprisonment, reasoning that the multiple murders, while brutal, were not the result of diabolic
and sinister planning. Even, Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent
the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact was clearly explained in this case.
It is submitted that the supreme court in the case of Ashok Laxman Sohani and another v.
The State of Maharashtra12, observed that the Homicide-Intention to cause death- Accused
beating his wife death-Recovery of blood stains sari which deceased was wearing at the time
of occurrence-Dead body hastily dis- posed of-The accused apprehending that his wife was
practising witchcraft- Eye witness deposing that accused continued to beat the deceased till she
was silenced-The intention of accused was to cause death-Conviction for murder, affirmed.
Also, in the case of S.D. Soni v. State of Gujarat13, - Homicide-Knowledge of death-Lack of
intention to cause death but knowledge that act in question was likely to cause death-Accused
is liable for. conviction under Section 304 Part II.
Thus, it is humbly submitted that the murder of the accused 1,2 & 3 is culpable homicide
amounting to murder.
2. WHETHER THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND OTHER EVIDENCES PROVE

It is humbly submitted that the medical evidences are properly corroborated and clearly
supports the evidences for conviction of accused followed by the laws and procedures. The
function of medical evidence is to guide judges in order to make rational decisions when it
11
Lehna vs State Of Haryana,2002 (2002) 3 SCC 76
12
Ashok Laxman Sohani and another v. The State of Maharashtra, CILJ 829: 1977 AIR-
13
S.D. Soni v. State of Gujarat, \ CrLJ 330 1991 AIR

comes to passing the judgements for criminal cases. In the trial of a case of murder,
manslaughter or any bodily harm for that matter, medical evidence or a medical expert's
opinion is relied upon to determine the cause of injuries, their effect as in if the injuries are
capable of leading to someone's death, the plausible weapon that might have been used in
causing the injury etc.
Medical knowledge is a whole different subject-matter and it is important to have a specialized

knowledge on the same in order to give an opinion on it which is not possible on the part of a
general being. Thus, medical evidences are provided by medical officers hired as an expert
who provides the court with his/her opinion regarding the same. This expert opinion is
inevitable and comes into play most of the times when criminal cases are being decided.
2.1.EVIDENCE CORROBORATED PROPERLY :-
It is submitted that in the year 1983, the Supreme Court in the case of Chimanbhai Ukabhai
v. State of Gujarat 14 held that the medical evidence that was put forth and examined by the
prosecution had a corroborative value thus declaring it admissible. Further, the court observed
that the medical evidence established that the injuries might have led to the death of the
individual in a natural course as is alleged by the complainant. Also, the medical
evidence proves the validity of the alleged causes of injury in itself and later this can be verified
with the statements of the eye-witnesses and therefore such witnesses' statements can be taken
into record and declared admissible. It is not possible to dismiss eyewitness account on the
basis of apparent contradiction between it with medical evidence, however, unless the medical
evidence extends above and beyond to entirely excluding all prospects of injuries occurring in
the way claimed by eyewitnesses.
In the case of Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra15, wherein even though
the matter at hand related to the death sentence in trials and whether a convict can be reformed
and rehabilitated in the society was considered. To establish that the prisoner cannot be
transformed or redeemed, the prosecution must produce proof in court, said the court. On this
front, a variety of facts can be brought to light, including information on the defendant's
behaviour while in prison and while on bail, medical evidence about his state of mind and
14
ChimanbhaiUkabhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 484, 1983 CriLJ 822, 1983 (1) Crimes 625 SC, (1983) 2
GLR 870, 1983 (1) SCALE 198, (1983) 2 SCC 174
15
Rajendra PralhadraoWasnik v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 12 SCC 460

communication with his relatives, among other things. Such reports or medical evidence can
also be submitted by the convicts.
In the case of Mukesh and Another v. State for NCT of Delhi and Others16, popularly known
as the Delhi gang rape case, wherein a medical student was gang raped and heinously assaulted
eventually succumbed to her internal injuries. There was absolutely no direct or ocular
evidence in this case. The Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Ranjit Hazarika v. State of
Assam 17: the court utilized its discretionary power of admitting medical evidence that comes
from Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act and relied upon the direct and coordinate evidences
provided by the prosecutrix and her parents as witnesses and thus declared the accused guilty.
Even in the case of Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai V. State of Gujarat 18 The Court stated that
“typically, the significance of medical evidence is only corroborative. It just establishes that
the injuries might have been brought on in the way claimed, nothing more. The medical
evidence can be utilised by the defence to show that the injuries could not have been caused in
the way that is being claimed, so casting doubt on the eyewitnesses. The testimony of the
eyewitnesses cannot be rejected based on an alleged discrepancy between it and the medical
evidence, however, unless the medical evidence goes so far as to fully rule out any possibility
of injuries occurring in the manner claimed by the eyewitnesses.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Akhtar Vs State of Uttaranchal 19, has observed that if
the defence has admitted the genuineness of the post-mortem report before the trial court, the
genuineness and veracity of the document stands proved and shall be treated as valid evidence
under Section 294 Cr.P.C. The relevant portion is quoted. Also, in the case of State of
Maharashtra vs. Damu, S/o Gopinath Shinde and Ors.20, “The basic idea embedded in
Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. The
doctrine is founded on the principle that if any fact is discovered in a search made on the
strength of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is guarantee that the
information supplied by the prisoner is true.
16
Mukesh and Another v. State for NCT of Delhi and Others, (2017) 6 SCC 1
17
Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam,(1998) 8 SCC 635
18
Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai V. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 484, 1983 CriLJ 822, 1983 (1) Crimes 625
SC, (1983) 2 GLR 870, 1983 (1) SCALE 198, (1983) 2 SCC 174
19
Akhtar Vs State of Uttaranchal, (2009) 13 SCC 722
20
State of Maharashtra vs. Damu, S/o Gopinath Shinde and Ors, 2000 (5) SC 575

The expression accused of any offence is descriptive of the person against whom evidence
relating to information alleged to be given by him is made provable by this section. It does not
predicate a formal accusation against him at the time of making the statement sought to be
proved, as a condition of its applicability. In the case of Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab21,
Homicide-Nature of injury-Left lung pierced by injury on chest-Injury given with great force
on most vital part- Both the ventricles punctured-Injury sufficient to cause death-Conviction
for murder affirmed.
2.2.MEDICAL EVIDENCE IS GOVERNED UNDER VARIOUS STATUES IN INDIA:-

i) The Indian Evidence Act, 1872– Section 45 of the Act deals with opinion of experts, and
provides a general exception to the rule that evidence of a third person is not admissible in
court.
ii) The Constitution of India– Article 20(3) talks about the right against self-incrimination, and
Article 21 talks about the right to life. Both these Articles are relevant in this case as well. If
any evidence is derived from the accused through compulsion, it cannot be used in Court, as
stated by the Court in the case of State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad and Ors22.
iii) The Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 is an Act to provide for the re-establishment of
the Medical Council of India, the maintenance of a Medical Register for India, and related
things. Section 20 A of the statute provides for professional conduct consisting of standards for
the same, etiquette, and a code of ethics for medical practitioners, to be prescribed by the
medical council. Regulations adopted by the Council under subsection (1) of the
aforementioned provision define which infractions may constitute notorious behaviour in any
professional respect, that is, professional misconduct, and such provision shall apply
notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force
2.3.CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 :-
It is humbly submitted that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is the procedural law
governing criminal proceedings in India. Sections 53 clauses (i) and (ii), 54, 174, and 176 are
the provisions that need to be taken into account while talking about medical jurisprudence in
India.
i) Section 53 (i): At the request of a police officer who is employing reasonable force, an
accused may be evaluated by a medical professional.
21
Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab 1978, CrLJ 1413: 1978 AIR
22
State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad and Ors (AIR 1961 SC 1808).

ii) Section 53 (ii): When a female accused’s person is to be examined, it must be done by
or under the supervision of a female certified medical practitioner exclusively.
iii) Section 54: A medical practitioner may examine an arrested individual at his/her
request in order to find evidence in his/her favour.
iv) Section 174: Police to enquire and report on suicide, etc.
v) Section 176: Inquiry by Magistrate into cause of death.
2.4. CONVICTION OF MURDER PROVED BY EXPERT OPINION :-
It is humbly submitted that the conviction of murder proved with the medical evidence and
expert opinion by law. As per the opinion followed from the external injuries, internal injuries,
head injury, and other bodily injury proves to be the most undoubtful part of clear evidence
material on law. Hence, it is medically proved that the cause of death was due to origin of
injuries in body of udhayan by the accused 1,2 & 3.
In the case of Kishan vs The state of Madhya pradesh23,Murder--Injury cased on the head of
the deceased -- Medical opinion that death was inevitable --Conviction for murder affirmed.
Also, in the case of Molu and others vs State of Haryana24, Murder -Nature of injuries-
Multiple injuries on various parts of body -Though no injury caused to vital parts of body but
it can be presumed that the accused persons had the knowledge that the cumulative effect of
injuries would result in death of deceased -Conviction for homicide, affirmed.
2.5.MURDER WEAPON IDENTIFIED AND EVIDENCE CORROBORATED :-
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble high court that, there is clear evidence on finding a
40 cm sickle stated in the deposition of witnesses. And the external injuries directly prove the
length, breadth, width of the wound accordingly without any secondary doubt contrary to the
expert opinion.
In the case of Bharvad Bhikha Valu and others vs The state of Gujarat 25,Murder weapon--
Determination of-- The nature of injuries and place of discovery of weapon corroborating the
prosecution case --The weapon of murder rightly identified. Even in the case of State of
Tamilnadu v. P.muniappan, etc.26,medical opinion - homicidal nature of death - two
conflicting views expressed about the nature of death - the medical opinion must be appreciated
23
Kishan vs The state of Madhya Pradesh, 1974 CrLJ 324:1974 AIR (SC)244
24
Molu and others vs State of Haryana, 1976 CrLJ 1895:1976 AIR (SC) 2499
25
Bharvad Bhikha Valu and others vs The state of Gujarat, 1971 CrLJ 927:1971 AIR (SC)1064
26
State of tamilnadu v. P.muniappan, etc, 1998CrLJ 694 :

in conjunction with circumstantial evidence on record. Time and again, in the case of Darshan
singh and others v. State of haryana,27 court observed that the medical opinion - inconsistency
with eyewitness - effect of - evidence of eyewitnesses inconsistent to evidence of doctor on
point as to how injury was caused - evidence of doctor cannot override unimpeachable
testimony of eyewitnesses.

It is humbly submitted that the prosecution was required to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt, which it has done.
3.1. ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF CRIME HAS ESTABLISHED BY THE

PROSECUTION
3.1.1. Essential ingredients of murder are fulfilled
When the prosecution succeeded in showing the possibility of some ire for the accused towards
the victim, the inability to further put on record the manner in which such ire would have
swelled up in the mind of the offender to such a degree as to impel him to commit the offense
cannot be construed as a fatal weakness of the prosecution. It is almost an impossibility for the
prosecution to unravel the full dimension of the mental disposition of an offender towards the
person whom he offended.
Since in this case, the motive has been mentioned in Annexure 3 stating that Iyakkan owned
the farmland of Maraiyur Zameen. Iyakkan did not properly measure the lease of the zamin
farm. Therefore, the said land was handed over to my husband from Zameen farm. My husband
used to measure the lease every year and hand over the account properly. While measuring,
there was a problem between the Iyakkan and the Iyakkan's son Vridhan and my husband. Then
the director's son Vridhan said, "Anytime your death is in my hands." [மைற ர் ஜ ன்
பண்ைண நிலத்ைத இயக்கன் என் பவர் ைவத் ந்தார். இயக்கன்
ஜ ன் பண்ைணக் சரியான ைற ல் த்தைக அளக்க ல் ைல.
எனேவ, ஜ ன் பண்ைண ல் இ ந் ேமற் ப நிலத்ைத என
27
Darshan singh and others v. State of Haryana, 1996 CrLJ 4438

கணவரிடம் ஒப்பைடத்தனர். என கணவர் வ டாவ டம் த்தைக
சரியாக அளந் கணக் ஒப்பைடத் வந்தார். அளக் ம் ேபாேத
இயக்கன் , இயக்கன் மகன் தன் ஆ ேயா க் ம் என
கணவ க் ைட ல் ரச்சைன ஏற் பட்ட . அப்ேபா இயக்கன்
மகன் தன் , "எப்ேபா இ ந்தா ம் உன் சா என் ைக ல் தான் "
என் னார்] and the ingredients regarding the murder namely:
i) Causing death: There should be an intention of causing death;

ii) Doing an act: There should be an intention to cause such bodily injury that is likely to
cause death or;
iii) The act must be done with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause the death of
another were present in the instant case. The same has been established by the
prosecution and the occurrence in question at the instance of accused persons is proved
by the eye witness account of two eyewitnesses which is duly corroborated with
medical evidence on record.
3.1.2. Essential ingredients of conspiracy are proved
It is humbly submitted that the essential ingredients of criminal conspiracy are present in the
instant case. In the case of Mohd. Khalid vs. State of W.B.28 the court held that “For an offense
punishable under section 120-B of IPC, the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the
perpetrators expressly agreed to do or caused to be done an illegal act, the agreement may be
proved by necessary implication.”
The Hon'ble Apex Court was held in K.R. Purushothaman vs. State of Kerala,29 as follows:
“To constitute a conspiracy, meeting the mind of two or more persons for doing an illegal act
or an act bi illegal means is the first and primary condition and it is not necessary that all the
conspirators must know each and every detail of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary that
every one of the conspirators takes an active part in the commission of each and every
conspiratorial act. The agreement amongst the conspirators can be inferred by necessary
implications. In most of the cases, the conspiracies are proved by the circumstantial evidence,
as the conspiracy is seldom an open affair. The existence of conspiracy and its objects are
usually deduced from the circumstance of the case and the conduct of the accused involved in
28
Mohd. Khalid vs. State of W.B. (2002) 7 SCC 334
29
K.R. Purushothaman vs. State of Kerala - AIR 2006 SC 35

the conspiracy."- V. Thiagarajan and Others vs. State rep. by Inspector of Police,
SPE/CBE/ACB, Chennai.30
In Suresh Chandra Bahri vs. State of Bihar,31 the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that Section
120-A reveals that a criminal conspiracy envisages an agreement between two or more persons
to commit an illegal act or an act which by itself may not be illegal but the same is done or
executed by illegal means. Thus, the essential ingredient of the offense of criminal conspiracy
is the agreement to commit an offence.
In the instant PW.5 specified below the agreement between the parties regarding doing an
unlawful act which is an essential ingredient of conspiracy under the IPC.
[“நாங் கள் க்கம் த் ட் காப் ரில் லக்கைட ல் உள் ள

கைடக் ெசன் ட்ேடாம் . அப்ேபா த ம் , ரித ம் ஒ
இ சக்கர வாகனத் ல் காப் ரில் இ ந் லக்கைட க்
வந்தார்கள் . தன் , ைரவர் அ வைன ப் ட் "நாம் ேப க்
ெகாண்ட சயத்ைத நாம் நிைறேவற் டலாமா" என் ேகட்டார்.
அ வன் “நீ ங் கள் ெசான் ன இடத் ல் வண் ைய நான் ெகாண் வந்
நி த் ேறன் , உங் கள் ேவைலைய நீ ங் கள் பார்த் க்
ெகாள் ங் கள் " என் ெசால் ேமலண்ைட பக்கத் ந்
ழண்ைட பக்கத் ல் உள் ள பள் ளிவாசல் ஓரமாக வந் ட்டார்.”]
Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P,32 it was observed that merely because the witnesses were
closely related to the deceased persons, their testimonies cannot be discarded. Their
relationship to one of the parties is not a factor that effects the credibility of a witness, more
so, a relation would not conceal the actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent
person.
In Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra case,33 the Apex Court held that a witness who is a relative
of deceased or victim of the crime cannot be characterized as “interested”. The term
“interested” postulates that the witness has some direct or indirect “interest” in having the
30
V. Thiagarajan and Others vs. State rep. by Inspector of Police, SPE/CBE/ACB, Chennai, Crl.R.C.No. 708 of
2007, Crl.R.C.No.1490 of 2007, Crl.R.C.No.1656 of 2007 Crl.O.P.No.16711 of 2007.
31
Suresh Chandra Bahri vs. State of Bihar-AIR 1994 SC 2420
32
Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P.; AIR 2011 SC 280
33
Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra; 2007 AIR SCW 18352007 Cri.L.J. 1819

accused somehow or other convicted due to animus or for some other oblique motive. 34 An
interested witness must have some direct interest in having the accused somehow convicted for
some extraneous reason and a near relative of the victim is not necessarily an interested
witness.35 The Apex Court also observed that a close relative cannot be characterized as an
“interested” witness. He is a “natural” witness. His evidence, however, must be scrutinized
carefully, if on such scrutiny, his evidence is found to be intrinsically reliable, inherently
probable and wholly trustworthy, conviction can be based on the “sole” testimony of such a
witness.
3.2. NO INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE OCULAR AND MEDICAL EVIDENCE
Pruthviraj Jayantibhai Vanol v. Dinesh Dayabhai Vala,36 Justice Navin Sinha stated that
Ocular evidence is considered the best evidence unless there are reasons to doubt it. In the
present case, there was no inconsistency between the ocular and medical evidence. Although
the Supreme Court has held that the ocular evidence may only be disbelieved if there is a clear
conflict between medical evidence and oral evidence.
The Doctor opined that the cause of death was bleeding and shock caused by the injuries
[உட ன் பல் ேவ இடங் களில் ஏற் பட்ட ெவட் க் காயங் களா ம் ,
அதனால் ஏற் பட்ட இரத்த இழப் னா ம் , அ ர்ச் னா ம் இறப்
ேநர்ந் க்கலாம் என ம் சான் அளித்ேதன் ]. The expert witness has also
deposed that all the injuries could have been caused by a sharp-edged weapon like aruval.
The chemical analysis report of the forensic science laboratory indicates that there were stains
of human blood on the Aruval. On a careful and cautious scrutiny of the evidence of PW-2 and
PW-3, the trial court found that evidence concise, precise and satisfactory on the point that they
had seen the appellant. The evidence of these two eyewitnesses is neither embellished nor
embroidered. In the instant case, the evidence of the eyewitnesses does not suffer from any
infirmity or any manifest defect on its intrinsic merit…” There is nothing palpable or glaring
in the evidence of the two eye-witnesses on the basis of which we can take the view that they
are not true or reliable eye-witnesses.
34
State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and another [(1981) 2 SCC 752] : (AIR 1981 SC 1390), Myladimmal Surendran
and others v. State of Kerala [(2010) 11SC 129]: (AIR 2010 sc 3281: 20lO AIR SCW 5248) and Samsuddin
Sheikh v, State of Gujarat and another [(2011) 10 SCC 158] : (AIR 2012 SC 37 : 2011 AIR SCW 6486)
35
Amit v. State of Uttar Pradesh; AIR 2012 SC 1433
36
Pruthviraj Jayantibhai Vanol v. Dinesh Dayabhai Vala36 [Criminal Appeal No. 177 of 2014]

3.3. THE DISCREPANCIES WHICH DO NOT SHAKE THE BASIC VERSION OF THE
PROSECUTION CASE MAY BE DISCARDED
In Rammi v. State M.P,37 this Court observed that when an eyewitness is examined at length
it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. No true witness can possibly escape
from making some discrepant details. Perhaps an untrue witness who is well tutored can
successfully make his testimony totally non-discrepant. But courts should bear in mind that it
is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility
of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. By and large people cannot
accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them.
They can only recall the main purpose of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness
to be a human tape recorder. The Court has repeatedly taken the view that the discrepancies or
improvements which do not materially affect the case of the prosecution and are insignificant
cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the prosecution.
Few contradictions in the form of omissions here or there is not sufficient to discard the entire
evidence of the eye-witnesses. That minor discrepancies caused by lapses in memory were
acceptable. The discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution case may
be discarded. Similarly, the discrepancies which are due to normal errors of perception or
observation should not be given importance. The Court by calling into aid its vast experience
of men and matters in different cases must evaluate the entire material on record as a whole
and should not disbelieve the evidence of a witness altogether, if it is otherwise trustworthy.38
As has been held by the Court in State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and Another,39 in the
deposition of witnesses there are always normal discrepancies due to normal errors of
observation, loss of memory, mental disposition of the witnesses and the like. Unless, therefore,
the discrepancies are material discrepancies so as to create a reasonable doubt about the
credibility of the witnesses, the Court will not discard the evidence of the witnesses.40
37
Rammi v. State M.P ; 1999 (8) SCC 649
38
Babasaheb Apparao Patil v. State of Maharashtra; AIR 2009 SC 1461
39
State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and Another; (1981) 2 SCC 752
40
Subodh Nath and Anr. v. State of Tripura; AIR 2013 SC 3726)

3.4. ONE CANNOT EXPECT PEOPLE TO MAKE VERY PRECISE OR RELIABLE
ESTIMATES ABOUT TIME OF AN INCIDENT
In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people
make their estimates by guess work on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And
one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it
depends on the time-sense of individuals which varies from person to person.41
3.5. THE NECESSITY FOR HOLDING AN IDENTIFICATION PARADE CAN ARISE

ONLY WHEN THE ACCUSED ARE NOT PREVIOUSLY KNOWN TO THE
WITNESSES.
It is humbly submitted that PW.2 in her statement mentioned that “No! if they asked me to
identify the enemy by parade” [அைடயான அணிவ ப் ைவத் எ ரிைய
என் ைன அைடயாளம் காண் க்க ெசான் னார்களா என் றால் இல் ைல].
As was observed by this Court in Matru v. State of U.P.,42 identification tests do not constitute
substantive evidence. The identification can only be used as corroborative of the statement in
court.43 The necessity for holding an identification parade can arise only when the accused are
not previously known to the witnesses. Since the eyewitness known about the accused
identification parade is not needed in the case.
3.6. IT IS SUFFICIENT IF THE PROSECUTION SHOWS THAT THE BLOOD FOUND

ON THE ARTICLES IS OF HUMAN ORIGIN THOUGH, EVEN THOUGH THE
BLOOD GROUP IS NOT PROVED
It is humbly submitted that in the case of Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab,44 this Court had
ruled that as the recovery was made pursuant to a disclosure statement made by the accused,
and the serological report had found that the blood was of human origin, the non-determination
of the blood group had lost its significance.
In the case of John Pandian v. State Represented by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu,45 this
Court, on facts, observed that the evidence of recovery of weapons was credible. The Forensic
41
Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, 1983 Cri LJ 1096: AIR 1983 SC 753, Leela Ram v. State
of Haryana, AIR 1999 SC 3717, and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1959 SC 1012
42
Matru v. State of U.P. (1971 (2) SCC 75)
43
Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain (1973 (2) SCC 406)
44
Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 11 SCC 768
45
John Pandian v. State Represented by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, (2010) 14 SCC 129

Science Report (FSL) report had disclosed that the blood was of human origin. The Court
proceeded to conclude that since the evidence of recovery of the weapon was proved to the
satisfaction of the Court, it was sufficient that the prosecution had proved that the bloodstains
were of human origin, even though the blood group could not be ascertained.
In Prabhu Dayal v. State of Rajasthan,46 relying on Teja Ram, had held that the failure to
determine the blood group of the bloodstains collected from the scene of offense would not
prove fatal to the case of the prosecution. In Prabhu Dayal case, although the FSL report could
not determine the blood group of the bloodstains on account of disintegration, the report clearly
disclosed that the bloodstains were of human origin, and the chain of circumstantial evidence
was completed by the testimonies of the other witnesses as well as the reports submitted by the
Ballistic Expert and the Forensic Science Laboratory regarding the weapon used to commit
murder.
It is humbly submitted that the Appellant’s(A1 Viruthan & A2 Thurithan) presence has been
proved by two eyewitnesses. It has been proved by the eye witnesses that the an ambassador
car stopped near Mattikulam crematorium. A bike stood in front of it. A man(A1-Viruthan) got
down from his bike and slashed the man (Udiyanand) who got out of the Ambassador car with
a scythe. Udiyan fell down. Virudhan slashed at him. The expert witness has also deposed that
all the injuries could have been caused by a sharp-edged weapon like aruval.The chemical
analysis report of the forensic science laboratory indicates that there were stains of human
blood on the Aruval. The prosecution was required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt,
which it has done.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature, Varusa Nadu that the
punishment imposed by the trial Court is appropriate, legal and valid. The Trial Court had not
made an erroneous decision, the Court had delivered the adequate sentence based upon oral
and documentary evidence submitted to the trial court.
46
ibid

4.1.THE ADDITIONAL SESSION JUDGE IS AUTHORIZED TO IMPOSE ANY
SENTENCE:
Justice is supreme and justice ought to be beneficial for the society so that the society is placed
in a better off situation. The Court have to impose punishment for the offence committed by
the offender. Sentencing is an important task in the matter of crime. 47 The onerous duty of
sentencing is cast upon Judges, to see that the sentence shall consist of an element of
reformation of the criminal and also the reparation of the victim, along with the elements of
deterrence, prevention and retribution. Thus, the judge has to balance all these conflicting
interests and choose the right and appropriate sentence, for the sentence to be meaningful.
Seriousness of the offence and its general effect on the public tranquility measures the
punishment. Therefore, the measure of guilt is the measure of the punishment. In the case of
D. R Bhagare v. State of Maharashtra,48 the Supreme Court held that the question of sentence
is the matter of judicial discretion. In accordance with Sec 28 (2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, the Additional Session Judge has the power to pass any sentence authorized
by law. Therefore, in the present case, the Additional District and Session Judge No- I of
Karambalur convict all the three accused u/s 120(b) r/w 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and
sentenced for life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5,000. Thus, the Additional District and
Session Judge is authorized to impose the sentence made in the Trial Court which is
appropriate.
4.2.TO DETERMINE THE SENTENCE IS ADEQUATE:
Before sentencing the accused, the Court have to keep in mind the gravity of the crime, motive
for the crime, nature of the offence and all other attendant circumstances. To determine the
sentence, the court should relevant the following consideration which includes the motive for,
and the magnitude of the offence and the manner of its commission. 49 In the case of
Ramashraya Chakravarthi v. State of Madhya Prakash,50 the Supreme Court held that “in
judging the adequacy of a sentence the nature of the offence, the circumstances of its
commission, the age and character of the offender, injury to individuals or to society, effect of
the punishment on the offender, eye to correction and reformation of the offender, are some
amongst many other facts which would be ordinarily taken into consideration by Court”. The
47
(2012) 2 SCC 648
48
D. R Bhagare v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 476
49
AIR 1974 SC 476
50
Ramashraya Chakravarthi v. State of Madhya Prakash, AIR 197 SC 392 (393)

Court should not pass a sentence which is disproportionately serve as compared with the nature
of the offence committed. Though no hard and fast rule is laid down for measuring the
adequacy of the sentence, yet the Court observe a desirable proportion between the gravity of
offence and the punishment for it. The sentencing judge shall see the punishment fits the crime
and the criminal.
In Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra51 case the court held that one of the prime
objectives of the criminal law is imposition of appropriate, adequate, just and proportionate
sentence commensurate with the nature and gravity of crime and the manner in which the crime
is done. There is no strait jacket formula for sentencing an accused on proof of crime. The
Court evolved certain principles: the twin objective of the sentencing policy namely: (i)
Deterrence; (ii) Correction.
The three accused had committed an offence, in which one of the accused named Viruthan
murder Uthiyanand brutally with a knife. And the other two accused namely Thurithan and
Aruvan accompanied them in committing a murder although A2 and A3 did not kill the victim.
Consistent with Sec 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, when an act is done by several people in
furtherance of common intention, each of them is liable for the act although if the act is done
by a person alone. Thus, all the accused is liable for the offence as a whole u/s 302 of IPC.
Following the crime committed by the appellant in the present case and the material evidence
submitted by the prosecution is appropriate and the trial had been taken into account through
the principle of sentence policy. If we look upon the above listed conditions, the categories will
relate to the present case. Even though the Court look into certain categories to decide a death
penalty to the convict. The conditions will corelate to the nature of murder committed in the
present case but the trial court impose life imprisonment rather than death penalty to the
accused depending upon the gravity of the offence committed by the accused.
4.3.IMPOSING SENTENCE FOR BEFIT THE CRIME:
In the case of Rajesh Kumar v. State,52 the Court held that the sentencing policy of a state
reflect the progress of a maturing democracy: “These changes in the sentencing structure reflect
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing democracy and which
are in accord with the concept of dignity of the individual one of the core values in our preamble
51
Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 SCC 648
52
Rajesh Kumar v. State, (2011) 13 SCC 706

to the Constitution. In a way these changes signify a paradigm shift in our jurisprudence with
the gradual transition of our legal regime from the rule of law to the ‘due process of law’.”
Also, in the case of Dhanonjoy Chatterjee v. West Bengal,53 it was held that the Court must
not only keep in view the rights of the criminal but also the rights of the victim of crime and
the society at large while considering the imposition of appropriate punishment. Considering
the case of State of Maharashtra v. Mohammed Ajmal, Mohammed Amir Kasab @ Abu
Mujahid,54 the Court held that the punishment must befit the crime. The punishment must
reflect public abhorrence of the crime. The Trial Court had given the judgment based upon the
evidence and probability of the case.
It is necessary that the proof beyond reasonable doubt should be adduced in all criminal cases,
it is not necessary it should be perfect.55 Considering the evidence and documents submitted
by the prosecution, the court awarded the sentence to the appellant. In accordance with Om
Prakash v. State of Haryana56 case, the Court must respond to the cry of the society and to
settle what would be a deterrent punishment for what was an apparently abominable crime.
In a case of conviction u/s 302/34, 201, 148, 452, 323 IPC, the Supreme Court had ruled that
life imprisonment is the rule and death penalty an exception. Death penalty can be awarded
only in rarest of the rare cases. Each case of murder is gruesome. Right of life of even an
accused has to be respected.57 However, in the present case, the court impose life imprisonment
rather than death penalty for committing murder. Thus, indicates that the court is not arbitrary
in nature.
In the present case, where it was proved that the deceased Uthiyanand had been murdered by
the appellant and the prosecution had proved before the Court beyond reasonable doubt that
the appellant is the murderer. On analysing the evidence submitted to the trial court, the court
sentenced the appellant according to the law. Therefore, the punishment imposed by the trial
court is valid.
53
Dhanonjoy Chatterjee v. West Bengal, (1994) 2 SCC 220
54
State of Maharashtra v. Mohammed Ajmal, Mohammed Amir Kasab @ Abu Mujahid, Criminal Appeal No.
1899-1900 of 2011
55
Inder Singh & Anr v. State of Delhi; 1978 AIR 1091; 1978 SCR (3) 393; 1978 SCC (1) 161.
56
Om Prakash v. State of Haryana, (1993) 3 SCC 19
57
Bimla Devi Vs. Rajesh Singh, 2016 (92) ACC 902 (SC).

PRAYER
In the lights of the facts stated, the cases cited, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, it is more humbly prayed and implored before the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature, Varusa
Nadu that it may graciously pleased to adjudge and declare that:
1. To dismiss the case.
Also, pass any other order that the court may deem fit in the interest of
equity, justice, and good conscience.
For this Act of kindness, the Respondent shall duty bound forever pray.
Respectfully submitted,
The Respondent
Place:
Date:

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14TH PRO BONO ENVIRO NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION- 2021

GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE, TIRUCHY

TEAM CODE: THINAIMOZHI

BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, VARUSA NADU

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. ______ OF 2023

THE APPEAL FILED UNDER SECTION 374(2) OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL

1. VIRUTHAN (A1) ……………………………....APPELLANT 1

STATE OF VARUSA NADU & Anr ……………………….RESPONDENT

UPON SUBMISSSION TO THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE,

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

1. WHETHER THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED IS A CULPABLE HOMICIDE

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT Page i

AIR All India Report

A.P Andhra Pradesh

Cr.P.C Criminal Procedure Code

Cri.L.J./ Cr.L.J. Criminal Law Journal

IPC Indian Penal Code

r/w read with

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT Page ii

1. Mukesh vs State NCT of Delhi (2017) 6 SCC 1 6

2. State of AP. v. Rayavarappu Punnaya 1977 AIR 45, 1977 SCR 7

4. Shankar Diwal Wadu. v. State Of Maharastra (2007)2007(2) Supreme 8

6. State of Rajasthan v. Dhool Singh (2003) 2003 (8) Supreme 10

10. Lehna vs State Of Haryana, 2002 (2002) 3 SCC 76 13

13. Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat AIR 1983 SC 484 14

14. Rajendra PralhadraoWasnik v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 12 SCC 460 14

15. Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam (1998) 8 SCC 635 15

16. Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat AIR 1983 SC 484 15

17. Akhtar Vs State of Uttaranchal (2009) 13 SCC 722 15

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT Page iii

26. Mohd. Khalid vs. State of W.B. (2002) 7 SCC 334 19

27. K.R. Purushothaman vs. State of Kerala AIR 2006 SC 35 19

30. Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P AIR 2011 SC 280 20

31. Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra 2007 AIR SCW 18352007 21

38. Babasaheb Apparao Patil v. State of Maharashtra; AIR 2009 SC 1461 22

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT Page iv

43. Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP AIR 1959 SC 1012 23

44. Matru v. State of U.P. (1971 (2) SCC 75) 23

45. Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain (1973 (2) SCC 406) 23

46. Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 11 SCC 768 23

47. John Pandian v. State Represented by Inspector of (2010) 14 SCC 129 24

49. Ramashraya Chakravarthi v. State of Madhya AIR 197 SC 392 (393) 25

51. Macchi Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) SCC (3) 470 26

52. Rajesh Kumar v. State (2011) 13 SCC 706 27

52. Dhanonjoy Chatterjee v. West Bengal (1994) 2 SCC 220 27

54. State of Maharashtra v. Mohammed Ajmal, Criminal Appeal No. 1899- 27

HIGH COURT CASES

S. NO NAME OF THE CASES CITATION PG NO

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT Page v

2. Gurkirat Kaur, Criminal Justice System, (2017 Ed 2)

3. K. D. Gaur, Textbook on Indian Penal Code (Universal Law Publications, 6th

6. S. V. Joga Rao, Evidence: Cases and Materials, (1st Ed 2003)

1. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1973)

2. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860)

3. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act 18 of 1872)

4. The Indian Medical Council Act, 1956

1. Indian Kanoon, https://indiankanoon.org/

2. Manupatra Online Resources, http://www.manupatra.com

3. SCC Online, http://www.scconline.co.in

4. EBC Reader, https://www.ebcreader.com/

5. Oxford Dictionary, https://www.oxford learnersdictionaries.com/