Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PRASHANT YADAV
PRASHANT.YADAV@INSEAD.EDU
TRADITIONAL PATHS TO INNOVATION
New Technology
New Design
INTRO-2
COURSE THEME:
Process Innovation:
existing products with existing technologies to existing markets
INTRO-4 4
WILL THERE BE MATH?
INTRO-5
6
ABOUT ME- PRASHANT YADAV Twitter : Yadav_supplychn
Current roles
Academia- B-School
Academia- Medical School
Policy Think Tank
Board Roles
Advisory Board
Previous Roles
INTRO-6
CLASSROOM NORMS
• Rules of engagement
– Come prepared
– while always behaving tolerantly and with respect towards your peers
– and respecting the role of the professor to ultimately direct the discussion
• Contact
- Professor : Prashant Yadav (Prashant.Yadav@insead.edu)
- Assistant: Magalie NKIANI (Magalie.NKIANI@insead.edu)
- Tutor: Thomas BREUGEM (thomas.breugem@insead.edu)
INTRO-7
COVID-19 Code of Conduct Reminders
Wear mask at all times & properly – cover mouth & nose
Wear your Respect social Avoid physical Wash your Clean as Download contact
mask distancing contact hands you go tracing app
COURSE INFORMATION/POLICY
► Course Components
► Qualtrics Questions
► Not every class
► Counts towards participation
► Home-works – graded for effort
► Class participation – Good citizenship
► Exam
► Exams
► Class – Big Ideas and Intuition– Innovation Exercise
► Tutorials & Review Sheets – The analysis backing the Ideas, Application –
Analysis Exam
► Four review sessions available. Thomas BREUGEM
(thomas.breugem@insead.edu) is a very knowledgeable and helpful tutor
► Class + Tutorials are necessary to ace the exams
INTRO-9
Tools
User Manual Classic Exam Prep Geek Alert!
FOUR LEVERS TO MOVE RISK
MANAGING RISK
WHY: INCENTIVES WHAT: SUBSTANCE
Change Cash Streams Focused vs. Diversified
Align Time Horizons Real Options (Hedge/Complement)
Integrate Reduce/Increase # of Offerings
Flexible/Reactive
INTRO-11
THIS CLASS
MANAGING RISK
WHY: INCENTIVES WHAT: SUBSTANCE
Change Cash Streams Focused vs. Diversified
Align Time Horizons Real Options (Hedge/Complement)
Integrate Reduce/Increase # of Offerings
Flexible/Reactive
INTRO-12
SHOULDICE
WORD OF THE DAY: FOCUS
BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION: FOCUS
Advantages Disadvantages
Leads to more efficient utilization of labor, capital Targets only fraction of market
Leads to specialization and perfection Competencies may not translate to other market
segments
Clear mission and goals for management &
employees Places natural limits and challenges on growth
INTRO-15
SHOULDICE HOSPITAL, NARAYANA HRUDAYALAYA
INTRO-16
PRODUCT PROCESS MATRIX
Choice of Product/Market
High Product Variety Standardized Product
Low Volume/Pdt High Volume/Pdt
Flexible Process
(Functional/ Job Shop)
Choice of Process
INTRO-17
PRODUCT PROCESS MATRIX: FOOD INDUSTRY
Choice of Product/Market
Highly Customized
Product Standardized Product
Low Volume High Volume
Assembly Line
Production
INTRO-18
PRODUCT PROCESS MATRIX: AIRLINES
Choice of Product/Market
Multiple in-flight
procedures, and
aircraft types
Choice of Process
Single in-flight
procedure and
aircraft type
INTRO-19
THE COMMON THREAD?
INTRO-20
KEY LESSONS
► Choosing What your Business Model does is a key lever for Innovation
► Risk Driven Business Models have the potential to change the world
MANAGING RISK
WHY: INCENTIVES WHAT: SUBSTANCE
Focused vs. Diversified
Reduce/Increase # of Offerings
INTRO-21
REALIZING BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATIONS: WHAT-FOCUS
If no, What are the challenges to pursuing a focused strategy in this industry?
What are the operational consequences of focus?
INTRO-22
DIAGNOSING BUSINESS PROCESSES
PRASHANT YADAV
INNOVATION EXERCISE
INNOVATION EXERCISE
(Must be submitted at the course website before the day of the final exam. This is a group project. Please, work in your
MBA pre-assigned groupings).
Provide one example of a setting where one of the innovation concepts discussed
in class can be used to build a business model that may have, or has already had, a
game changing, disruptive impact. Opportunities, which are novel, not mentioned
in the class or in the book and not yet implemented are encouraged. State clearly
the context, provide the traditional way of doing business, describe the innovation
you have in mind and analyze how this could be game changing. You can use any of
the cases or examples used in class to provide a comparison or reference. Your
total answer should be < 2500 words. A precise, focused analysis is preferred. You
don’t need to do any financial or market analysis, but feel free to include it if it
helps your case, or if you are planning on pursuing this idea further (perhaps for
the IVC).
Disruptive Cost
Reduction
Assembly Line
Retailer
Parts
Manufacturing WH Consumer
Manufacturing
WH
Retailer
Logistics
Sales
Marketing
Vertical
Integration
Firm boundary was drawn to cover as many activities as possible
Henry Ford (July 30, 1863 – April 7, 1947) was an American industrialist, the founder of the Ford Motor Company, and
sponsor of the development of the assembly line technique of mass production. Although Ford did not invent the
automobile or the assembly line, he developed and manufactured the first automobile that many middle class
Americans could afford. In doing so, Ford converted the automobile from an expensive curiosity into a practical
conveyance that would profoundly impact the landscape of the twentieth century. His introduction of the Model T
automobile revolutionized transportation and American industry. As owner of the Ford Motor Company, he became one
of the richest and best-known people in the world. He is credited with "Fordism": mass production of inexpensive
goods coupled with high wages for workers. Ford had a global vision, with consumerism as the key to peace. His
intense commitment to systematically lowering costs resulted in many technical and business innovations, including
a franchise system that put dealerships throughout most of North America and in major cities on six continents. Ford left
most of his vast wealth to the Ford Foundation and arranged for his family to control the company permanently .
THE GOAL: 2-10
THE TOYOTA WAY…
Disruptive Quality
Improvements
Continuous
Just In Time
Improvement
70% 30%
Suppliers Car Manufacturer
Maximize Increase
Shareholder Earnings Sales – Operating Expenses – Capital Expenses
Value
►Capacity Utilization is not the Goal, only a possible means to achieve the goal
Economic Value Added (EVA) = NOPAT - Weighted Average Cost of Capital * Inventory
Margin Capital or
Inventory Turns
† Operating Expenses include taxes; Alternately Throughput- Operating expense = Operating Profit
Assuming no change in inventories
Capacity
Bottleneck
Bottleneck Capacity
System Capacity
Utilization at Max
Capacity
Utilization at Max
20/30= 66.67% 20/20=100% 20/60=33.33%
Capacity
Benefit of additional
0 + 0
Resources
Capacity
Bottleneck
System Capacity
Utilization at Max
Capacity
Bottleneck Step I
Utilization at Max
30/30= 100% 18/20=90% 18/60=30%
Capacity
COVID-19 TESTING
PPE
IS IT STATIC?
► While bottlenecks need some inventory to avoid starving, minimize inventory at non-
bottlenecks
► Drum and rope scheduling to let the bottleneck set the pace of the line
► Reduce batch sizes at non-bottlenecks (but not so much that they become a bottleneck)
(more on batches later)
► Baking Cookies requires preparation of each individual cookie and then baking them in
the oven.
► Preparing each cookie takes some time, say p minutes per cookie
► But, the cookies must all also be baked. Irrespective of the number of cookies it takes the same
amount of time to bake the cookies♪, say B minutes every cycle.
♪ This is an assumption which is accurate for reasonable numbers of cookies (that can fit in a commercial oven).
Q cookies are produced every B+Q.p minutes At any point in time, there are Q cookies that are
work in progress inventory.
Capacity =
Inventory Costs will increase linearly in Q
250
1600
150
800
100
50 400
0 0
0 500 1000 1500 0 500 1000 1500 2000
Batch Size, Q
Batch Size, Q
► The Goal of an enterprise is to make money and generate social value. Operationally
that corresponds to increasing Throughput (rate of sales), decreasing Operating
Expenses and Inventory (capital costs)
&
REAL OPTIONS
OUR BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION TOOLKIT- SO FAR
MANAGING RISK
WHY: INCENTIVES WHAT: SUBSTANCE
Focused vs. Diversified
Reduce/Increase # of Offerings
Real Options (Hedge/Complement)
Flexible/Reactive
AdV Oxford/AZ
WHICH ONES SHOULD
I CONTRACT FOR
ADVANCE PURCHASE?
AdV J&J HOW MUCH?
SHOULD I GIVE
MONEY TO ENHANCE
AdV Sinopharm
PRODUCTION
CAPACITY?
AdV Gamaleya
Inactivated Inactivated
virus Sinovac virus BBIL
SESSION 3- COVID-19 VACCINES AND FLEXIBILITY
WHAT INFORMATION DO YOU NEED TO ANSWER THAT QUESTION?
Probability of
success (At least
Platform 1 approved)
Live-attenuated 0.0%
Protein subunit 86.6%
Inactivated 54.7%
RNA 74.0%
Non-replicating viral vector 53.8%
Replicating viral vector 18.8%
DNA 7.1%
Other 0.03%
All platforms 99.6%
Source: McDonnell, A., Van Exan, R., Lloyd, S., Subramanian, L., Chalkidou, K., La Porta, A., . . . Yadav, P. (2020, October).
COVID-19 Vaccine Predictions: Using Mathematical Modelling and Expert Opinions to Estimate Timelines and Probabilities of
Success of COVID-19 Vaccines
Platform Correlation
Live attenuated virus Medium
mRNA Low
High
Replicating adenovirala
DNA Medium
Source: Anthony McDonnell, Robert Van Exan, Steve Lloyd, Laura Subramanian, Kalipso
Chalkidou, Adrian La Porta, Jiabin Li, Eddine Maiza, David Reader, Julie Rosenberg, Jack
Scannell, Vaughan Thomas, Rebecca Weintraub and VPrashant
SESSION 3- COVID-19 Yadav. 2020
ACCINES AND FLEXIBILITY
FOR WHICH ONES SHOULD I BUILD MORE MANUFACTURING CAPACITY?
REMEMBER WE ARE IN SEP 2020
Excipients, Lipids,
Adjuvants
manufacturing
Syringes
Other
materials for
cold chain?
(e.g. dry ice)
Vaccine
What can wrong with this
manufacturing network?
When would it be OK to
manufacture with this network?
Vaccine Vaccine
Is it feasible?
How expensive to build such flexibility?
SESSION 3- COVID-19 VACCINES AND FLEXIBILITY
NO FLEXIBILITY VS TOTAL FLEXIBILITY
Vaccine Vaccine
UNIVERCELLS
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uadVBWOZxH4
Vaccine Vaccine
Vaccine Vaccine
< << ≈
► Adding flexibility increases capacity utilization, expected sales (and social welfare):
1000
Total flexibility
20 links
950
Expected sales, units
850
No flexibility
800
80 85 90 95 100
Expected capacity utilization, %
20
SESSION 3- COVID-19 VACCINES AND FLEXIBILITY
To wait before taking decision on capacity until more is known
Defer or timing is expected to be more favorable
Chen, JR., Liu, YM., Tseng, YC. et al. Better influenza vaccines: an industry perspective. J Biomed Sci 27, 33 (2020).
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12929-020-0626-6
MANAGING RISK
WHY: INCENTIVES WHAT: SUBSTANCE
Focused vs. Diversified
Real Options (Hedge/Complement)
Reduce/Increase # of Offerings
Flexible/Reactive
► We will look at more kinds of Risk and how it impacts Business Models
XENON-2
EMERGENCY ROOMS AROUND THE WORLD
Brazil – “National Medical Council Canada – "Canada has longest Emergency Room
‘declares’ wait time of at most 120min” wait times among top 11 developed nations"
XENON-4
A SOMEWHAT ODD SERVICE PROCESS
Arrival Inter-Arrival Service Gantt Chart illustrating Service
Patient
Time Time Time
1 7:00 4
2 7:05 5 4
3 7:10 5 4
4 7:15 5 4
5 7:20 5 4
6 7:25 5 4
7 7:30 5 4
8 7:35 5 4
9 7:40 5 4
10 7:45 5 4
11 7:50 5 4
12 7:55 5 4
7:00 7:10 7:20 7:30 7:40 7:50 8:00
XENON-5
A MORE REALISTIC SERVICE PROCESS
Arrival Inter-Arrival Service
Patient Patient 1 Patient 3 Patient 5 Patient 7 Patient 9 Patient 11
Time Time Time
2 7:07 7 6
Time
3 7:09 2 7
6 7:22 4 2 3
7 7:25 3 4
2 2 2
2
8 7:30 5 3
Number of cases
9 7:36 6 4
1 1
1
10 7:45 9 2
11 7:51 6 2
0
2 min. 3 min. 4 min. 5 min. 6 min. 7 min.
12 7:55 4 2
Service times
XENON-6
VARIABILITY LEADS TO WAITING TIME
Arrival Inter-Arrival Service
Patient
Time Time Time
1 7:00 5
2 7:07 7 6
Service time
3 7:09 2 7
4 7:12 3 6
5 7:18 6 5
6 7:22 4 2
7 7:25 3 4
8 7:30 5 3
Wait time
9 7:36 6 4
10 7:45 9 2
11 7:51 6 2
12 7:55 4 2
3
Variability is Evil!
2
1
Inventory
(Patients at lab)
0
7:00 7:10 7:20 7:30 7:40 7:50 8:00
XENON-7
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mygmoUzjrB4
XENON-8
PERFORMANCE
► Throughput
► Cycle time
► Utilization
► Customer service
XENON-9 9
REMEMBER!
► Variability is EVIL
XENON-10
VARIABILITY OR RANDOMNESS
XENON-11 11
WAITING TIMES IN THE EMERGENCY ROOM
XENON-12
WAITING TIMES IN THE EMERGENCY ROOM
XENON-13
WAITING TIMES IN THE EMERGENCY ROOM
XENON-14
WAITING TIMES IN THE EMERGENCY ROOM
Little’s Law
XENON-15
WHAT DOES CV (COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION) MEAN?
Bunched Arrivals
“Fat-Tail” inter-arrival times
10:01 10:10
XENON-16
THE WAITING TIME FORMULA (APPROXIMATION FOR SINGLE SERVER)
CVa2 + CVs2
Wq =
1− 2
Variability effect
Utilization effect
Scale effect
Average flow
time Wq+
Increasing
Variability
0% Utilization 100%
XENON-17
MECHANICS: A SINGLE-SERVER EXAMPLE
1. Find 2. Utilization
2. Find from formula 3. Waiting time in queue
XENON-18
HOW TO ADD EXTRA CAPACITY?
AVG. WAIT TIME
UTILIZATION
A 2 SERVER SYSTEM
XENON-19
LOOKING UP THE TABLE FOR MULTIPLE SERVERS (APPENDIX 1)
LOOKUP S, # OF SERVERS
ON HORIZONTAL AXIS
LOOKUP ρ, COMPUTED
UTILIZATION, TO GET LQ
XENON-20
THE POWER OF POOLING Waiting
Time Tq
70.00
2 SINGLE SERVER SYSTEMS 2X (S=1) s=1
60.00
50.00
40.00
s=2
30.00
20.00
Waiting Time for Patients is 27 Hours* s=5
10.00 s=10
0.00
60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95%
A 2 SERVER SYSTEM S=2
Utilization, ρ
Implications:
+ Balanced utilization
+ Shorter waiting time (pooled safety capacity)
Waiting Time for Patients is 12.78 Hours* - Changeovers and set-ups
XENON-21
THE CUSTOMER CONTACT CENTER INDUSTRY
Wide variability in demand during a shift Labor intensive: low cost countries
Shifts are Staffed to manage peak demand Relatively low talent labor
XENON-22
THE LIVEOPS BUSINESS MODEL
XENON-23
THE LIVEOPS BUSINESS MODEL: RESEQUENCING
XENON-24
LIVEOPS: THE SUCCESS STORIES
HTTPS://WWW.YOUTUBE.COM/WATCH?V=VZE8JL-IGAU
XENON-25
BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION
Traditional model
XENON-27
HOW MICHAEL DELL REVOLUTIONIZED THE PC INDUSTRY
XENON-28
THE COMMON THREAD?
XENON-29
THE COMMON THREAD: RESEQUENCING WHEN DECISIONS ARE MADE
NEW TIME-LINE
XENON-30
WORDS OF THE DAY
► Variability is EVIL
XENON-31
REALIZING BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATIONS: TEMPLATE WHEN-RESEQUENCING
XENON-32
INNOVATION TOOLKIT
MANAGING RISK
WHY: INCENTIVES WHAT: SUBSTANCE
Focused vs. Diversified
Real Options (Hedge/Complement)
Reduce/Increase # of Offerings
Flexible/Reactive
XENON-33
NEXT TIME
XENON-34
BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION IN ACTION
HOW TO RESEQUENCE?
FOUR LEVERS TO MOVE RISK
MANAGING RISK
WHY: INCENTIVES WHAT: SUBSTANCE
Change Cash Streams Focused vs. Diversified
Align Time Horizons Real Options (Hedge/Complement)
Integrate Reduce/Increase # of Offerings
Flexible/Reactive
NEW TIME-LINE
The “Most Wanted” painting in America, according to Conjoint Analysis conducted by Komar and Melamid.
See Komar and Melamid’s website on paintings based on attribute surveys: http://www.diacenter.org/km
www.Timbuk2.com
Source: Dell
MASS CUSTOMIZATION-9 9
INSEAD
LOWER INVENTORY: OTHER ADVANTAGES
“If I’ve got 11 days of inventory and my competitor has 80, and Intel comes out with a new
… chip, that means I’m going to get to market 69 days sooner” - Michael Dell
Inventory Velocity ?
MASS CUSTOMIZATION-10 10
INSEAD
NO FG INVENTORY and CUSTOMER EXPERIENCE
Merge in Transit
DELL
Limerick Plant
A A A
A B C
Keyboard
Supplier
MASS CUSTOMIZATION-11 11
INSEAD
SHOULD WE HAVE FINISHED GOODS INVENTORY OR NOT ?
Final
Demand Demand Final Product
Product
Ex. Airplanes
Ex. Ready to wear clothes
Tailored Suits
Fast Food
Gourmet Restaurant
Buffet Table
Dell Computers
Circored
A La Carte
Goal
Services
Product
Wait Waste
Variety
BTF (FGI) Shorter (Good) Small (Bad) High (Bad)
Lost Sales in BTF are also a kind of waste (Mismatch between Supply & Demand)
150
Standard products (BTF)
100
Demand for Custom
50
Custom products (BTO)
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Day
Cattani, K., E. Dahan, and G. Schmidt. 2007. Spackling: Smoothing Built-to-Order Production of Mass-Customized Products with Build-To-Forecast production of Standard Items..
Choice of Product/Market
High Product Variety Standardized Product
Low Volume/Pdt High Volume/Pdt
Flexible Process
(Functional/
Job Shop)
High Unit Cost
Choice of Process
MASS CUSTOMIZATION-18 18
INSEAD
ASSORTMENT CHOICES: THE COSTS OF CUSTOMIZATION
► Variety of products has increased dramatically due to COSTS OF AN ADDITIONAL DIMENSION
customer preferences
► Mismatch costs: Demand Pooling
► This implies at the SKU level demand uncertainty has
effects are diminished by having
become higher
too many products#
THE LONG
TAIL EFFECT
THE INNOVATION
► Identify underserved market segments that you can
address by mass-customization, Sell less of more.
► Provide Recommendations, customization tools
► Increase Revenue and Cost
Dyeing Knitting
Knitting Dyeing
► In an early differentiation process, dyeing and knitting quantities have to be decided on the basis of individual
demand for colors.
► In a delayed differentiation process, knitting quantities can be decided on basis of total demand.
► Total Demand has lower variance than the sum of variances of individual demand. This will reduce total mismatch
costs and increase profits
Delayed Differentiation also leads to pooled demand, and reduces mismatch costs!
Anand K. S. and K. Girotra, “The Strategic Perils of Delayed Differentiation,” Management Science, 53:5, May 2007, pp. 697-712.
► Campbell Soup:
► Manufacturers brand name and private label soup (same soup)
► Problem: many different private labels (Giant, Kroger, A&P, etc)
► Solution: Hold inventory in cans without labels, add label only when demand is realized.
► Nokia:
► Customers want different color phones.
► Design the product so that color plates can be added quickly and locally.
► Hewlett Packard
► Sells printers in different countries. Different markets have different power supply
conventions and require different product labeling.
► Designs and produces generic printers with special power supply modules that can be
plugged in after demand is realized.
► Components and subassemblies may incur lower tariffs than completed goods
► Some of the localization material can be locally sourced (cheaper)
► Compliance with local content laws
MASS CUSTOMIZATION-26 26
INSEAD
SUMMARY
► Optional reading: Chapter “What” from the “Risk Driven Business Model”
INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT ISSUES: DECISIONS MADE WITH SELF INTEREST (AS OPPOSED TO TEAM INTEREST)
Newsvendor-2
MANAGING RISK: THE NEWSVENDOR MODEL
Demand Forecast
0.12
0.10
0.08
Frequency
Probability
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00
40000
44000
48000
52000
56000
60000
64000
68000
72000
76000
80000
84000
88000
Newspaper Demand
Daily output (thousands of barrels)
0 200 400
SITUATION
The local newsstand purchases copies of the weekly paper Progessivo at the start of every week.
The observed sales (demands) during each of the last 52 weeks are :
15 19 9 12 9 22 4 7 8 11
14 11 6 11 9 18 10 0 14 12
8 9 5 4 4 17 18 14 15 8
6 7 12 15 15 19 9 10 9 16
8 11 11 18 15 17 19 14 14 17
13 12
Newsvendor-4 4
DISTRIBUTION OF DEMAND
0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
Newsvendor-5 5
“TOO MUCH” AND “TOO LITTLE” COSTS
► Co = overage cost
► The consequence of ordering one more unit than what you would have ordered had you
known demand.
► Suppose you had left over inventory (you over ordered). Co is the increase in profit you would have
enjoyed had you ordered one fewer unit.
► Cu = underage cost
► The consequence of ordering one fewer unit than what you would have ordered had you
known demand.
► Suppose you had lost sales (you under ordered). Cu is the increase in profit you would have enjoyed
had you ordered one more unit.
Newsvendor-6
CONTINUOUS APPROXIMATION
0.12
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26
Newsvendor-7 7
KEY INPUT PARAMETERS
► p = sale price
► s = outlet or salvage price
► c = purchase price
► g = loss of goodwill cost
► D = demand ----mean, variance, distribution
► Q = order quantity
Newsvendor-8 8
HOW MUCH DOES THE NEWSVENDOR SELL ON AVERAGE ?
D if D Q
Sales =
Q if D Q
E[min{Q, D}] = min{Q, d} f (d )
−
Newsvendor-9 9
WHAT IS THE OBJECTIVE?
Newsvendor-10
BALANCING THE RISK AND BENEFIT OF ORDERING A UNIT
► Ordering one more unit increases the chance of overage …
► Expected loss on the Qth unit = Co x Pr(DQ).
► … but the benefit/gain of ordering one more unit is the reduction in the chance of
underage:
► Expected gain on the Qth unit = Cu x Pr(D ≥ Q)= Cu x (1-Pr(D Q)).
► To maximize expected profit, order Q units so that the expected gain on the Qth unit is the same as the
expected loss on the Qth unit:
Co Pr( D Q) = Cu (1 − Pr (D Q ))
Expected loss Expected gain
Newsvendor-11
A MORE GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SETTING
Newsvendor-12 12
THINKING BROADLY ABOUT ALTERNATE APPLICATIONS OF THE NEWSVENDOR MODEL
The Expected Profit Maximizing Bet balances the too-much and too-little costs
Newsvendor-13
WORDS OF THE DAY:
Newsvendor-15
NINTENDO: A WII BIT CAUTIOUS!
Newsvendor-16
A YEAR LATER: TWO SIDES OF THE STORY
Newsvendor-17
APPLYING THE NEWSVENDOR MODEL TO THE NINTENDO WII
► Organizational Culture
► Risk Aversion, meeting street forecasts.
Newsvendor-18
PERFORMANCE METRICS FOR THE NEWSVENDOR PROBLEM
For Self Study
► For any order quantity we would like to evaluate the following performance
metrics:
► Expected lost sales
► The expected number of units by which demand will exceed the order quantity
► Expected sales
► The expected number of units sold.
► Expected left over inventory
► The expected number of units left over after demand (but before salvaging)
► Expected profit
► For the Normal distribution, we have tables that help us get the Lost Sales
Newsvendor-19
COVID-19 CAPSULE
Q1
► You are the head of vaccine purchasing for a large regional country bloc. Demand is
uncertain. How many COVID-19 vaccines would your purchase?
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Q2
► Pfizer/BioNTech’s COVID-19 Vaccine is packaged in a specialized container with ~1000
doses
► After opening the container, vials inside can be used for 48hours
► After opening a vial, you have use all of the doses within 6 hours
► You run a small rural clinic/pharmacy in Southern France which is offering this vaccine to
its patients/customers
► Last time you offered flu vaccines to your customer population, you had approx. 5 walk-
ins each day and 2 scheduled
► How many units will you pre-order?
Newsvendor-20
KEY LESSONS
► The Newsvendor model provides the intuition for making bets in the face of uncertainty
► Essentially, in making these decisions we must take into account the relative
consequences of betting too high or too low. This tells us if we bet more or less than the
mean
► Further, how much more or less than the mean we go, depends on the uncertainty
involved
► Incentive alignment is key and different people in your organization will perceive
underage and overage differently.
Newsvendor-21
NEXT TIME
► For the remainder of the course, we will draw on the learnings from the Newsvendor
model, so make sure you understand the intuition well
Newsvendor-22
FORECASTING DEMAND
DEMAND FORECASTING AND THE PUSH-PULL BOUNDARY
Forecasting-2 2
EXAMPLE I – TACO BELL BURRITO
Push/Pull Interface
Forecasting-3 3
EXAMPLE II – BURRITOVILLE BURRITO
Push/Pull Interface
Forecast Driven
Order Driven
Forecasting-4 4
DEMAND FORECASTING & DEMAND MANAGEMENT
Historical Data
Forecasting Promotions calendar
Forecast
Forecast Inventory
Promotion Calendar
Information
Forecasting-5 5
FORECASTING--MATCH TYPE OF METHOD WITH TYPE OF PRODUCT
Forecasting Methods
Forecasting-6
METHODS
Qualitative
► Grass Roots - Talk to Sales Force, Talk to Customers
► Market Research - Surveys of Customers, Experimental Test Markets
► Panel Consensus - Bring in Experts
► Executive Judgment - Surveys or Formal Input from Executives
► Historical Analogy - For New Products/ Technology, Find a Similar Product
► Delphi Method - Formal, Sequential Method of Polling and Pooling Expert Opinions
Quantitative
► Time Series Analysis - THE PAST WILL REPEAT
► Causal Relationships (Regression)
► AI methods
Forecasting-7 7
WHAT DO COMPANIES DO?*
► Customer/market research– 57%
► Jury of executive opinion – 44%
► Sales force composite – 39%
► Looks-like analysis – 30%
► Trend line analysis – 19%
► Moving average – 15%
► Scenario analysis – 14%
► Exponential smoothing – 10%
► Delphi method – 8%
► Linear Regression – 7%
► Decision trees – 5%
► Simulation – 4%
► Others: Quant Methods – 9%
Forecasting-9
AI, ML AND ADVANCED ALGORITHMS FOR SALES FORECASTING
Forecasting-10
WHAT LEVEL TO FORECAST AT ?
► Time
► Daily, Weekly, Monthly, Quarterly ?
► Guideline: Tailor the level of time granularity to the decisions
► Precondition: Sufficient data must exist to enable forecasts at that level
► Geography
► Store, Sales District, Region, State, Country
► Channel
► Retailer, Wholesaler, Key Accounts, Channel type (online, brick and mortar)
► Product
► SKU, Product Category, Product Line/Product Group, Business Unit, Division
Forecasting-11 11
AGGREGATION
Forecasting-12 12
EXAMPLE: MEN’S WEDDING BANDS--AT THE SKU LEVEL
BandW07
14
12
10
Sales in Units
0
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75
Month Number
Forecasting-13 13
EXAMPLE: MEN’S WEDDING BANDS--AT THE AGGREGATE STYLE LEVEL
BandW
100
90
80
70
60
Sales in Units
50
40
30
20
10
0
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75
Month Number
Forecasting-14 14
EXAMPLE: A PROMINENT ANTI INFECTIVE DRUG--AGGREGATE LEVEL
ALL ALL
0.3
0.25
0.2
Scaled Units
FORECAST
0.15
ACTUAL
0.1
0.05
0
0
2
00
00
01
01
02
02
0
2
-00
-01
-02
v-0
v-0
v-0
l-0
l-0
l-0
n-0
n-0
n-0
ar-
p-
ar-
p-
ar-
p-
ay
ay
ay
Ju
Ju
Ju
No
No
No
Se
Se
Se
Ja
Ja
Ja
M
M
M
Month M
Forecasting-15 15
Scaled Units
Scaled Units Ja
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
n-0
0
Ja
M
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
n-0
0 ar-
00
Forecasting-16
M M
ar- ay
00 -00
M
ay Ju
-00 l-0
0
Ju Se
l-0 p-
0 00
Se No
p-
00 v-0
0
No Ja
v-0 n-0
0 1
Ja
n-0 M
ar-
1 01
M M
ar- ay
01 -01
M
ay Ju
-01 l-0
1
Month
Ju Se
OTH ALL
l-0 p-
1 01
Month
Se No
PC ALL
p- v-0
ALL
01 1
No Ja
ALL
v-0 n-0
1 2
Ja M
n-0 ar-
2 02
M M
ar- ay
02 -02
M Ju
ay l-0
-02 2
Se
Ju p-
l-0 02
2
Se No
p- v-0
02 2
No
v-0
2
ACTUAL
FORECAST
ACTUAL
FORECAST
Scaled Units
Scaled Units
Ja
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Ja n-0
0
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
n-0
0
M
ar-
M 00
ar-
00 M
ay
M -00
ay
-00
Ju
l-0
0
Ju
l-0
0 Se
p-
00
Se
p- No
00
v-0
0
No
v-0 Ja
0 n-0
1
Ja M
n-0 ar-
1 01
M M
ar- ay
01 -01
M Ju
ay l-0
-01 1
Month
Se
ID ALL
Ju p-
l-0 01
1
No
Month
ALL
Se v-0
UR ALL
p-
01 1
Ja
No n-0
2
ALL
v-0
1 M
ar-
Ja 02
n-0
2 M
ay
-02
M
ar-
02
EXAMPLE: A PROMINENT ANTI INFECTIVE DRUG- SEGMENT LEVEL
Ju
l-0
M 2
ay
-02 Se
p-
02
Ju
l-0 No
2 v-0
2
Se
p-
02
No
v-0
2
ACTUAL
FORECAST
16
ACTUAL
FORECAST
FORECASTING BASED ON HISTORICAL SALES DOES NOT ACCOUNT
FOR VARIABLES WHICH ARE CHANGING
e.g. PRODUCT PROMOTIONS
FOR ESTABLISHED PRODUCTS WITH SUFFICIENT HISTORY, NOT
CAPTURING THE IMPACT OF PROMOTIONS IS A KEY REASON FOR
POOR FORECASTS
Forecasting-18 18
FORECASTING WITH PROMOTIONS
► Baseline sales
► Sales Lift
► Hysteresis
► Pantry Loading
► Holdover
► Cannibalization
► Halo Effect
Forecasting-19 19
“HYSTERESIS”
If you push on something, it will yield: when you release, does it spring back completely ?
If not, it is exhibiting hysteresis
Time
Forecasting-20
DELAYED RESPONSE OR HOLDOVER
Time
Forecasting-21
WEAR OUT
Time
Forecasting-22
PANTRY LOADING
Time
Forecasting-23
CANNIBALIZATION
Halo Effect
Forecasting-24
RETAILER FORECASTING AND REPLENISHMENT PROCESS IN CPG RETAIL
?
Decision - Is
manufacturer able
discuss other
options
to meet retailer’s
purchase order?
MANUFACTURER
Yes
Forecasting-25
WHY WOULD FORECASTS BE DIFFERENT?
► One forecast is based on information that the other forecast did not consider
► One forecast makes a different assumption about the nature of relationship between
the variables
Forecasting-26 26
WITH COLLABORATIVE FORECASTING
Historical Data
Retailer Manufacturer
Collaborative
Forecast
Forecasting-27
FORECAST SIGNAL DIVERSITY
National
Promotion Advertising
Capacity
Local Events Constraints
.. ..
.. ..
ZURICH
Assumption: Both generate the same baseline forecast ?
Forecasting-28 28
PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE AND FORECAST SIGNAL DIVERSITY
Less forecast
Sales
Moderate to high diversity
growth
High forecast diversity
forecast
diversity
Maturity
Decline
Growth
Launch
Forecasting-29
NEW PRODUCT FORECASTING
NEW PRODUCT FORECASTING
► A recent survey shows that almost 30% of company revenues from new products
launched in the previous three years (study by Cooper & Edgett 2012).
► Starts many months or years before the launch date. Very high information risk!
► A study found the average forecast accuracy across all types of new products to be 58%.
(Kahn 2002)
► Has become more relevant due to the increasing rate of new product introductions
but also because of the drive of technology advances, product life cycles are
shortening.
Forecasting-31
NEW PRODUCTS LAUNCHED MORE AND MORE
Forecasting-32
METHOD #1: USE SIMILAR PRODUCTS (LOOKS-LIKE ANALYSIS)
PROCEDURE
► Find a similar product with demand history.
► Use this to forecast the new product’s demand.
ASSUMPTIONS
► The product is not completely new (as opposed to, say,
Nintendo Wii)
► Market conditions are similar.
PROS/CONS
► + Data driven, less bias
► - Similar product not always available. May look similar on
the surface but driven by completely different underlying
variables (trial rates, repeat purchase rates, etc.)
Kejia Hu, Jason Acimovic, Francisco Erize, Douglas J. Thomas, Jan A. Van Mieghem (2018) Forecasting New Product Life
Cycle Curves: Practical Approach and Empirical Analysis. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Forecasting-34
METHOD #2: EXPERT OPINION
PROCEDURE
► Identify experts on the uncertainty you want to forecast.
► Ask experts for forecasts, use average forecast as mean and
standard deviation of forecasts by different experts as standard
deviation.
► Example: Retail buyers (consumer goods, fashion),
Pharmaceuticals probability of success of new drugs
PROS/CONS
► + Works for new products, incorporates human judgement
► - People tend to be biased
► - Does not take into account level of confidence or information of experts
2. Proper incentives
• Hold individuals accountable for their accuracy
• Reward each individual on their own performance.
3. Ask independently
• In group settings, personality can play a major part.
Forecasting-36
METHOD #3: CROWDSOURCING/PILOT
PROCEDURE
► Poll a large number of people, the crowd!
► Run a small pilot/experiment
► Example: BestBuy, Google, City of Paris, INSEAD
► Platforms: Kickstarter, mTurk,
Forecasting-37
METHOD #3: CROWDSOURCING/PILOT EXAMPLE
TRADITIONAL TIME-LINE
Invest Sales
NEW TIMELINE
Forecasting-38
CLASSIC EXAMPLES:
PROCEDURE
► Establish a trading platform where participants can buy and sell securities (using
real or play money)
► The value of tradable securities is directly linked to events in the future.
EXAMPLE
► Holder of Security X is paid D$ if demand for product is D units, after demand is revealed.
► This security can be bought and sold now.
► The current price of the security captures the market’s estimates of demand.
► If you believe this is an underestimate, you would like to long (buy) this security, because its fundamental value is
greater than what you have to pay to acquire it.
► If you believe this is an overestimate, you would like to short (sell) this security, because its fundamental value is
lower than what one has to pay to acquire it.
► In equilibrium (no arbitrage), the price of a security should reveal the best estimate of demand.
Forecasting-40
PREDICTION MARKETS: MORE EXAMPLES
PUBLIC MARKETS
SOFTWARE PROVIDER
CORPORATE MARKETS
Forecasting-41
PREDICTION MARKETS: ASSUMPTIONS, PROS, CONS
ASSUMPTIONS
► Efficient Markets create the right incentives for information revelation and aggregation
PROS/CONS
► + Markets also create incentives for confidence weighting for information
► The amount of money you will bet will depend on your confidence.
► + Aggregate information from multiple sources taking into account confidence levels.
► + Can provide precise estimates.
Forecasting-42
WORDS OF THE DAY:
FORECASTING IS A PROCESS!
FORECAST PRINCIPLES
1. Forecast is a distribution - not a number
2. Forecasts should always include measure of error
3. The longer the time horizon, the larger the error
4. A distribution captures all these features.
0.02
0.015 Value
0.01
0.005
0
Now Time
0 200 400 600
Forecasting-44
SUMMARY:
PRELUDE:
► Forecast is a distribution – not a number.
► Match your forecasting method with the context.
EXISTING PRODUCTS:
► Statistical prediction is like driving a car by only looking in the rear mirrors.
► Adjust methods for promotions and other factors
► Beware of generalizability of ML models – take courses at INSEAD related to this
NEW PRODUCTS:
► Method 1: Look-like analysis for for similar products when market conditions don’t change too fast
► Method 2: When using expert opinion: 1. crowd must be ``wise’’, 2. proper incentives, 3. ask
independently.
► Method 3: Crowdsourcing and pilots can help identify if a product is a hit or not
► Method 4: Prediction markets have had a mixed track-record but can work for binary (yes/no)
decisions
► Forecast diversity and forecast combination improves forecast accuracy
EPILOGUE:
► Always hold people accountable for their forecasting mistakes
► To avoid incentive misalignment, share information and consider setting-up a dedicated forecasting
team
► Remember: Forecasting is a process!
Forecasting-45
PREP FOR NEXT CLASS
Forecasting-46
THE WHEN STRATEGY: SPLIT DECISIONS
REACTIVE CAPACITY
SPLITTING DEMAND DECISIONS
DISCOVERY DRIVEN PLANNING
BACK TO THE NEWSVENDOR MODEL: ORIGINS OF THE MODEL
Since
Demand = Sales + Lost Sales,
then,
Sales = Demand – Lost Sales.
If revenue is $r per unit, cost is $c per unit and salvage value is $s per unit, then
Profit = (r-c) × Sales – (c-s) × Leftover Inventory.
When-Split-2 INSEAD
BACK TO THE NEWSVENDOR MODEL
E[Profit] = (r - c) × E[Demand]
When-Split-3 INSEAD
BACK TO THE NEWSVENDOR MODEL
Information
Risk
E[Profit] = (r - c) × E[Demand]
– cu × E[Lost Sales]
– co × E[Leftover Inventory]
► Last time: lower information risk by forecasting better
► Today: lower information risk by injecting flexibility (recourse) into
business models and, more generally, splitting decisions
Innovative business models are not just about minimizing
costs/maximizing gross margins, but about minimizing risk
When-Split-4 INSEAD
WHAT SHOULD WALLY DO?
When-Split-5 INSEAD
SPECULATIVE AND REACTIVE CAPACITY
Speculative
Production Capacity Reactive Capacity
Material LT Prod. LT
New Info
When-Split-7 INSEAD
When-Split-8 INSEAD
COSTUME GALLERY: BUSINESS AND SOURCING FROM CHINA
Ellen Ferreira,
Owner and CEO,
Costume Gallery
► If Ellen sources from China, she must order before the Chinese
new year holiday in January-February.
When-Split-9 INSEAD
BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION: REACTIVE CAPACITY
► In addition to sourcing from China, Ellen decides to also use local sources
PROFITS
When-Split-10 INSEAD
WORD OF THE DAY: SPLITTING
(DECISIONS & BETS)
BET $$$$$ UNCERTAINTY
THE INNOVATION
TRADITIONAL TIME-LINE Time
When-Split-12 INSEAD
SPLITTING DECISIONS: DELAYED DIFFERENTIATION AT BENETTON
Early Differentiation Process
Dyed Yarns Finished Sweaters
Dyeing Knitting
Knitting Dyeing
When-Split-15 INSEAD
DISCOVERY DRIVEN PLANNING: XIAOMI
When-Split-16 INSEAD
THE COMMON THREAD
When-Split-17 INSEAD
INNOVATION TOOLKIT
MANAGING RISK
WHY: INCENTIVES WHAT: SUBSTANCE
Focused vs. Diversified
Real Options (Hedge/Complement)
Reduce/Increase # of Offerings
Flexible/Reactive
When-Split-18 INSEAD
KEY LESSONS
► Right way to go to low cost manufacturing base, while keeping Local production
(Reactive Capacity)
When-Split-19 INSEAD
VALUE CHAIN INNOVATION
Example
While Margins are high for fashion goods, but firm profitability is Very Low! Why?
• Demand for such products is driven by fickle trends and is notoriously hard to predict
• Consequently, firms end up with a lot of excess inventory which must be discounted. At the same time,
many customers don’t find what they want.
ZARA-2 INSEAD
NEWSVENDOR QUIZ
► Three Newsvendors face the following Demand Distributions. On average who will
make the most money? (All Newsvendor act optimally and have the same underage
and overage cost structure)
Demand Distribution
20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
17 18 19 20 21
18 19 20
100%
19
ZARA-3 INSEAD
ZARA’S FAST FASHION BUSINESS MODEL
ZARA-4 INSEAD
RELATIVE POSITIONING
Price +
Benetton
Conventional high street fashion
Gap
Fashion - Fashion +
ZARA
H&M
Price -
ZARA-5 INSEAD
LET’S UNDERSTAND ZARA
► Compare and contrast how each of the above steps (the business process) is different at ZARA
as compared to a regular apparel retailer (think: clothing section at Marks and Spencer, high-
end clothing). Think over and above the market they are targeting.
ZARA-6 INSEAD
CONVENTIONAL BUSINESS MODEL IN FASHION RETAIL
ZARA-7 INSEAD
MARKS & SPENCER: CUSTOMER PROPOSITION AND BUSINESS PROCESS
Business Process
► Design Team defines detailed cloth specifications one year before store delivery.
► Merchandisers decide prices and quantities well before start of selling season.
► Stylists focus on quality improvements of traditional styles.
► Quality: High conformance to specification, quality of stitching, etc.
► Many Distributed Warehouses
► Seven Weeks of Inventory
Customer Proposition
► High “Quality” garments, traditional styles, plus sizes.
Clock-Speed
16 month cycle
ZARA-8 INSEAD
CONVENTIONAL BUSINESS MODEL IN FASHION RETAIL
14
12
10
Inventory Turnover
4 Benetton
Inditex
H&M
2 GAP
0
- 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60
Gross Margin
2003-2006 data
ZARA-10 INSEAD
PRODUCT FLOW AT ZARA/INDITEX
Retail Stores
Fabric and Inditex Sub- Inditex Ironing Spain
Components Factory: contractor: Factory: &
Cutting Sewing Finishing QA Arteixo DC
Portugal
Middle East
Outsourced Finished Goods:
Unironed Apyl
Zaragoza
DC
Rest of
Europe
Outsourced Finished Goods:
Ironed
Tempe
DC Americas
ZARA-11 INSEAD
SOURCING & PRODUCTION
Sourcing
Comditel S.A. -Barcelona~40%
► Fabric -dyeing, patterning, and finishing of
► Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany greige fabric for all of Inditex's chains
--Dying and printing process takes 1
► Glass beads, sequins, crystals, week
other components
► China
► Leather shoes, bags, garments Inditex Asia, Ltd Hong Kong
► Italy, Turkey, Morocco --Synthetics and fashion fabrics
► Silk Zara Asia, Ltd from Hong Kong
S--ynthetics and fashion fabrics
► India, Italy
Source: Zara: El Modelo de Negocio de Inditex, Fernando Fabrega 2004
Production
► 60-80% of all of Inditex’s products produced in Europe
► 20 Inditex factories (capital intensive/automation) and >400 subcontractors (mostly
in Galicia and Portugal, manual sewing ops)
► 20-40% produced in Asia, Africa, Latin America (Basic Items/ Finished Goods)
► More price sensitive than time sensitive
► Commitments made approximately 6 months prior to season
Source: HBR Rapid Fire Fulfillment & Zara: El Modelo de Negocio de Inditex, Fernando Fabrega 2004
ZARA-12 INSEAD
ORDERING AND STORE OPS
► Items unsold within 2-3 weeks are sent out of the store
Source: HBR Zara Fast Fashion, Rapid Fire Fullfillment ,Zara: El Modelo de Negocio de Inditex, Fernando Fabrega 2004
ZARA-13 INSEAD
ZARA: CUSTOMER PROPOSITION & BUSINESS PROCESS
Business Process
► Design Team develops platform models but holds off finalizing detailed design
► Single production. Production often falls short. New styles pick up unsatisfied demand.
► Internal Raw Material finishing capabilities, allowing for last minute changes
► Production is consolidated in Zara Industrial Areas (close to markets- Mexico, Spain)
► All new products every month
► Word of Mouth Advertising. Location, Location and Location!
Customer Proposition
► Trendy Stylish products, very affordable prices. Buy new styles often, high turnover.
Clock-Speed
21-29 day cycle
ZARA-14 INSEAD
CAPACITY BUFFERS & FLEXIBILITY
ZARA-15 INSEAD
ZARA VS. M&S: KEY BUSINESS PROCESS DIFFERENCES
Quantity Decision made 1 year before sales Quantity Decisions made days before sales
Distant Production Location, Long lead times Close Production Location, Short lead times
ZARA-16 INSEAD
FORECASTING TRUMPET AND FASTER REPLENISHMENT
Demand Forecasts for short time horizons are usually more precise
ZARA-17 INSEAD
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: VALUE OF TIME (INFORMATION)
GRAPHS INDICATE FORECAST ACCURACY, CLOSENESS TO 45O LINE INDICATES HIGHER ACCURACY
0 0 0
0 50 100 150 200 0 50 100 150 200
0 50 100 150
Demand Forecasts become better with time as more information becomes available
ZARA-18 INSEAD
AGGREGATING DEMAND FROM TWO MARKETS (GEEK ALERT)
Market 1 Market 2
20 20
18 20
18 18
16 16 16
14 14 14
12 12 12
10 10 10
8 8 8
6 6 6
4 4 4
2 2 2
0 0 0
0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20
NEGATIVE CORRELATION NO CORRELATION / INDEPENDENCE POSITIVE CORRELATION
ZARA-19 INSEAD
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: VALUE OF CENTRALIZED WAREHOUSE (LOCATION POOLING)
Consider two supply chain designs
Decentralized Warehouses
Demand from Territory 1: Normal (µ, σ)
This is the effective demand for W1. Compute NV Profits
W1 Territory 1
Centralized Warehouses
Demand for Warehouse is sum of Demand from Territory 1 and
Territory 1 Territory 2.
W Effective Demand: Normal (2µ, σ (2(1+ρ))1/2), where ρ is the
Territory 2
correlation between the two markets.
Compute NV Profit for Warehouse.
The Variance in Pooled Demand is less than 2x the variance in original demands!
Having a centralized warehouse, reduces effective demand variance and increases profits
ZARA-20 INSEAD
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: VALUE OF PLATFORM DESIGNS (DELAYED DIFFERENTIATION)
Early Differentiation Process†
Dyed Yarns Finished Sweaters
Dyeing Knitting
Knitting Dyeing
► In an early differentiation process, dyeing and knitting quantities have to be decided on the basis of individual
demand for colors.
► In a delayed differentiation process, knitting quantities can be decided on basis of total demand.
► Total Demand has lower variance than the sum of variances of individual demand. This will reduce total mismatch
costs and increase profits
Delayed Differentiation also leads to pooled demand, and reduces mismatch costs!
Anand K. S. and K. Girotra, “The Strategic Perils of Delayed Differentiation,” Management Science, 53:5, May 2007, pp. 697-712.
ZARA-21 INSEAD
DELAYED DIFFERENTIATION: OTHER EXAMPLES
Paint Industry
ZARA-22 INSEAD
FASHION INDUSTRY: SUBSTITUTABILITY, DISCOUNTS & CONSUMER BEHAVIOR
► Consider the underage and overage costs of the newsvendor model (In all previous
examples, we considered effects of the demand distribution)
► Stocking less reduces the amount of inventory that has to be discounted. Further, in
principle, Zara has very limited sales
► This further modifies customer behavior to buy early rather than wait for the sale.
Customers can also be fashion forward this way.
ZARA-23 INSEAD
ZARA’S SUCCESS
ZARA-24 INSEAD
REDUCING DEMAND UNCERTAINITY (SUBSCRIPTION, PREDICTION, RECOMMENDATION)
ZARA-26 INSEAD
SMALL BATCH MANUFACTURING & CAPACITY BUFFERS
Through a Marketplace (More on this in Session 12)
ZARA-27 INSEAD
KEY LESSONS
► Faster replenishment cycles allow one to use better forecasts and reduces information risk and
inefficiency. Also delayed decisions
► Pooling Demand from various locations (Centralized Warehouse) reduces variance in demand
► Delaying Differentiation of products (platform designs) allows one to bet on joint demand for
different product variants, which has lower variance
► Fewer discounts can change customer behavior and encourage immediate purchases and
substitution.
► Business models are hard to copy; their success is dependent on many BMI working together
ZARA-28 INSEAD
ALIGNING INCENTIVES
AND
SOURCING STRATEGIES
RISK!
INFORMATION RISK: DECISIONS MADE WITH POOR INFORMATION
SESSIONS 3-7:
NEWSVENDOR MODEL, FORECASTING, FLEXIBLE CAPACITY,
“FAST FASHION” BUSINESS MODELS
INCENTIVE RISK: DECISIONS MADE WITH SELF INTEREST (AS OPPOSED TO TEAM INTEREST)
SESSIONS 9-10:
MANAGING SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIPS, SOURCING,
SC CONTRACTING
► What are the key features of how Jiro structures and runs his
entire value chain?
JIRO-3 © VILLE SATOPÄÄ INSEAD
RISKS
SCALEUP POTENTIAL?
Customer Service
Customer Service
Distribution
Distribution
Operations
Marketing
Marketing
Finance
Finance
Operations
MIS
MIS
Sales Buyers
Source: David F. Pyke. M. Eric Johnson. Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth. April 8, 2002. Working Paper
Adapted by Wang 2005, MIT-Zaragoza MS Thesis
Marketing Marketing
Distribution Distribution
Finance Finance
Customer Service
Customer Service
Operations
Operations
MIS MIS
Sales
Buyer
Source: David F. Pyke. M. Eric Johnson. Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth. April 8, 2002. Working Paper
Adapted by Wang 2005, MIT-Zaragoza MS Thesis
► Product quality
► Lead time
► Delivery reliability
► Product costs
► Cost transparency
► Commitment to sustainability
► Technical capabilities of the supplier
► Service after the sale
► Financial strength of the supplier
► Location of the supplier
► Development capability
Easier to
Identify Unit
Price
Freight Duties
Costs
Planning
Warehousing
Purchasing
& Inventory
Quality Control
Keiretsu approach:
► Learn every part of suppliers’
business.
► Maintain joint ventures and
stakes in suppliers.
► Develop suppliers’ technical
and innovation capabilities.
► Supervise and benchmark
suppliers.
http://www.autonews.com/article/20160208/OEM10/302089968/dual-sourcing-dilemma-hits-japan-again
► Treat suppliers fairly and take responsibility for their development and growth
► “All performance-improvement programs are supported by highly qualified Toyota engineers
who work as consultants—often on fast-track management career paths. Significantly, any
cost savings that suppliers achieve do not transfer directly into lower prices to Toyota. And
Toyota typically shares cost savings with the supplier during the next annual cost review.”
(Getting to Win-Win: How Toyota Creates and Sustains Best-Practice Supplier Relationships, BCG report)
► Bose JIT II
► Long term relationships with suppliers
► Information sharing by integrated IT systems and implants
Marianne Barner
► Ecovadis is a sustainability rating agency (>50mm euros in revenue per year) founded
by Sylvain Guyoton (MBA 02D) and Pierre-Francois Thaler (MBA 99D)
► There are lower economies of scale: These increase prices/costs and decrease
investments in R&D (for the component), ability to learn.
► Benefits of Focus are lost. Firms tend to become very diffused and unfocused in their
activities.
► Quality verification is hard for most products. For commoditized or standardized products, it may
be possible (-)
► Timely delivery may be hard to ensure (-)
► Market forecasts and information sharing is often not possible (-)
► Incentives are not aligned. Each firm, the buyer and the supplier want to maximize their own
profits at the expense of the other (-)
► Suppliers have no incentives to invest in capacity for parts for new products with as yet unproven
demand (-)
► Suppliers have no incentive to invest in capacity for custom parts (-)
► Proprietary Information may leak from the supplier to other competitors (-)
► Full benefits of economies of scale. In cost and innovation for supplied components (+)
► Each supplier can be a highly efficient focused firm (+)
► In each period, one can buy at the cheapest price (+)
► Reputational concerns limit the harm to the buyer (+)
In an one-shot interaction, if a supplier can gain by harming the buyer, they would do so!
► Easier to ensure higher quality (as incentives to cheat are smaller) (+)
► Timely and reliable supplies are ensured (+)
► Market forecasts and other Information flows can be shared without fear of leakage
(+)
► The supplying unit has higher incentives to invest in capacity for new products with
unproven demand (+).
► The supplying unit has incentives to invest in producing custom parts (+)
► There are the full benefits of the economies of scale (+)
► Each supplier can be a highly efficient focused firm (+)
► One is stuck with a supplier (-)
► One problem with these relationships: Suppose both firms believe it is a long-term
relationship and make relation-specific investments. Now both firms are stuck with
each other (holdup). They could demand unreasonable terms which the other party
will find preferable to meet than have to incur the cost of setting up a new long-term
relationship (Renegotiation). This can be prevented as long as both firms have made
enough comparable relation-specific investments.
► Long Term Relationship if executed correctly, can get all the benefits of buying and
mitigate most of the downsides.
► Information and incentive risks are key to understanding a business model (and
making it work)
► Each raw material, product or service that needs to be sourced should be matched
with an appropriate sourcing strategy
Incentive Risks
in Supply Chains
INCENTIVES -2
INSEAD
DOUBLE MARGINALIZATION
INCENTIVES -3
INSEAD
NOT “SHANGHAI SURPRISE” AGAIN!!
► How many times have you gone to your nearby video rental store and found
that copies of the movie title you are looking for have all been rented out ?
► You wonder why the rental store does not stock more copies of the new
release movies
► Is it because the DVDs are expensive to stock.
► The overstocking risk is high?
► Or is that the rental stores knows that you will rent something else if you didn’t
find what you are looking for and hence they will not lose their margin. The “ If I
don't find Coke I am easily willing to settle for Pepsi” argument.
► The understocking risk is too low?
► Let us think through the cost economics of such a problem more carefully
using a simple example
INCENTIVES -4 4
INSEAD
BLOCKBUSTER
Movie Studio
$65/tape rental 0.10
(Producer) 0.08
Probability
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00
40000
44000
48000
52000
56000
60000
64000
68000
72000
76000
80000
84000
88000
Daily output (thousands of barrels)
► “It was simply too expensive to stock enough copies of every movie the customer
requested… [30%] of people who walked into Blockbuster stores were walking out with
nothing”, Sumner Redstone, Viacom CEO
Source: https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/supply_chain_coordination_with_revenue_sharing_contracts
INCENTIVES -5
INSEAD
ALIGNING INCENTIVES: DOUBLE MARGINALIZATION
r $/unit
s $/unit .
.
+ .
Customers
Manufacturer = Retailer
Production Cost: c $/unit Demand: D units
Sale Price: r $/unit
Salvage value: s $/unit
Underage Cost 𝐶𝑢 = 𝑟 − 𝑐
Overage Cost 𝐶𝑜 = 𝑐 − 𝑠
INCENTIVES -6
INSEAD
ALIGNING INCENTIVES: DOUBLE MARGINALIZATION
r $/unit
.
w $/unit
.
.
INCENTIVES -7
INSEAD
ALIGNING INCENTIVES: DOUBLE MARGINALIZATION
As w increases, Cu ↓
𝐶𝑢 = 𝑟 − 𝑐 𝐶𝑢 = 𝑟 − 𝑤
𝐶𝑜 = 𝑐 − 𝑠 𝐶𝑜 = 𝑤 − 𝑠
As w increases, Co ↑
INCENTIVES -8
INSEAD
DOUBLE MARGINALIZATION: WHAT IS GOING ON?
► The higher the margin of the manufacturer, the less the retailer orders
► In general, if every firm chooses to maximize its own expected profit, the result is
lower sales, and lower total profit compared to the SC’s maximum profit.
INCENTIVES -9
INSEAD
REVENUE SHARING
INCENTIVES -10
INSEAD
TERMS VARY
• 65/35% split (you keep 65%) vs $1.05 minimum transaction fee for full term
• Sell on 29th day (VHS cost = $2.00 vs 35% / DVD cost = $3.50 vs 35% – can sell 50%)
(VHS/DVD)
• 6 month lease term (cost = $0.50) if you want to purchase
• $0.00 up-front fee
• 44/56% split (you keep 56%) vs $1.15 minimum transaction fee for full term
• Sell on 41st day (VHS cost = $2.40 can sell all but one)
• 6 month lease term (cost = $1.20) if you want to purchase
INCENTIVES -11
INSEAD
TERMS VARY
• 61/39% split (you keep 61%) vs $1.15 minimum transaction fee for full term
• Sell on 28th day (VHS cost = $2.00 vs 39% / DVD cost = $3.00 vs 39%)
(VHS/DVD)
• 6 month lease term (cost = $1.50) if you want to purchase
• $0.00 up-front fee
• 58/42% split (you keep 58%) vs $1.25 minimum transaction fee for full term
• Sell on 31st day (VHS cost = $1.70 DVD Cost = $ 3.35)
• 6 month lease term (cost = $1.75) if you want to purchase
INCENTIVES -12
INSEAD
REVENUE SHARING CONTRACT
► The revenue sharing contract transfers part of the demand risk from retailer to
manufacturer
► But since manufacturer has low cost of production, it is better at handling this demand risk
than retailer (Blockbuster) on their own
► Risk is being transferred to the supply chain party that can best handle it
INCENTIVES -13
INSEAD
ORDER MINIMUMS
To illustrate typical structure only. A detailed ordering matrix can be obtained from Rentrak website for each studio
INCENTIVES -14 14
INSEAD
FURTHER DISCUSSION
► If we claim that with revenue sharing the video stores will stock the optimal
quantities, why did the studios have to specify order minimum quantities in
contract structure?
INCENTIVES -15 15
INSEAD
16
REVENUE SHARING VS. FIXED PRICE
A titles
B titles
C titles
INCENTIVES -16
INSEAD
BUYBACK CONTRACTS
► Buyback contracts
► Require an effective reverse logistics system
► May increase logistics costs
► What are the retailer incentives when selling a mix of products under regular wholesale contracts
and under revenue sharing/buyback contracts?
INCENTIVES -17
INSEAD
CONTRACTS: NOT JUST ABOUT COSTS!!!
► When negotiating contracts with a supplier, customer, or any other service provider,
don’t think just about costs. Consider also how the contract is shifting risk between the
parties.
INCENTIVES -18
INSEAD
SERVICIZATION AT ROLLS ROYCE : POWER BY THE HOUR
INCENTIVES -19
INSEAD
SERVICIZATION
THE INNOVATION
► Rather than sell the product, Sell the service that the customer cares about…
► Offer “Power by the hour” Style contracts; lease instead of sale
► Increases Revenues and Increases Risk Exposure, Risk is borne by Party that can best
manage it.
INCENTIVES -20
INSEAD
SERVICIZATION AND SUSTAINABILITY: REDUCING USE OF MATERIALS
► Dupont and Ford UK: paying for painted car instead of paint
► Resulted in less paint use
► Also resulted in higher integration and paint technology innovation
INCENTIVES -21
INSEAD
SERVICIZATION AND SUSTAINABILITY: INCREASING ENERGY ADOPTION
INCENTIVES -22
INSEAD
RISK SHARING IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
Source: https://www.fastcompany.com/40461214/how-novartis-is-defending-
the-record-475000-price-of-its-pioneering-gene-therapy-cancer-drug-car-t-kymriah
Source: https://news.aetna.com/
news-releases/aetna-and-merck-sign-a-
unique-value-based-contract-for-januvia-and-janumet/
INCENTIVES -23
INSEAD
COVID CAPSULE
INCENTIVES -24
INSEAD
KEY LESSONS
► Supply chain contracts can shift risk to the party best equipped to handle it
► SC alignment is NOT a zero-sum game, all parties can be better off!
► Servicization (“x-as-a-service”) can help reduce costs but, more importantly, help both
seller and buyer share risks and align objectives. Works when:
► Customers do not want to own assets, but only want service
► Customers don’t want to bear risk of asset productivity
► You can bear the risk better– Risk Pooling, Private Information, Aligned Incentives
INCENTIVES -25
INSEAD
INTERMEDIARIES/MARKETPLACES
INTERMEDIARIES-2 INSEAD
Sellers Buyers
Product A 50% Product A
50%
50%
Product B 50% Product B
INTERMEDIARIES-3 INSEAD
STATISTICAL POOLING
Sellers Buyers
Fraction of buyers/sellers matched
90
70
60
50
0 10 20 30 40 50
Size of Market
INTERMEDIARIES-4 INSEAD
ON DEMAND SERVICES AND TWO SIDED MARKETPLACES
INTERMEDIARIES-5 INSEAD
ONE SIDED & TWO SIDED MARKETS
Readers Publishers
Large and Growing Share of Global Economy. 60 of the world’s 100 largest companies earn most of their revenue
from platform-mediated networks
INTERMEDIARIES-7 INSEAD
CHALLENGES TO TWO SIDED MARKETPLACES
► Challenges
► Oversimplification is common
► Over- or underestimate strength of network effects
► Price to network’s sides as if they were separate markets
► Failing to scale & the Penguin problem
► Competition among marketplaces (Uber vs Lyft)- Switching costs
► Regulation
INTERMEDIARIES-8 INSEAD
WHY IS SCALING HARD?
► Higher probability of
ride request accepted.
► Higher Revenues
INTERMEDIARIES-9 INSEAD
GROWTH PILLS AND ACCELERATED GROWTH STRATEGIES
Incentivize Riders
► Encourages more Riders
to join
► Encourages more Drivers
to join
Incentivize Drivers
► Encourages more Drivers
to join
► Encourages more Riders
to join
INTERMEDIARIES-10 INSEAD
INTERMEDIARIES-11 INSEAD
INTERMEDIARIES-12 INSEAD
INTERMEDIATION REDUCING SEARCH COSTS: PLAY MATCHMAKER!
THE INNOVATION
► One Stop shop to match two distinct customer segments
► Create Value by reducing Search and trans costs, Share value created
► Reduce Costs, Risk of not finding a partner, Increase Exposure to Opportunism Risks
INTERMEDIARIES-13 INSEAD
COVID CAPSULE
INTERMEDIARIES-14 INSEAD
INTERMEDIARIES & BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION: LI & FUNG LIMITED
120
Sales (HK$ B)
80
40
E. Belavina, and Girotra, K., “The Relational Advantages of Intermediation”, Forthcoming at Management Science
INTERMEDIARIES-15 INSEAD
A HARD CHOICE: FLEXIBILITY VERSUS COMMITMENT
SHORT TERM RELATIONSHIPS LONG TERM RELATIONSHIPS
Intermediary
► Intermediaries relieve the trade-off by allowing for dynamic buyer-supplier matching while keep
all relationships intact. The benefits of relationships flow through a 3 tier system and there is
additional flexibility
INTERMEDIARIES-16 INSEAD
PLATFORMS FOR MATCHING AND LIMITING OPPORTUNISM
THE INNOVATION
► Match two distinct customer segments
► Create Reputation Systems, and Long-Term relationships with both segments
► Create Value by reducing Search costs and Limiting Opportunism Risks
► Reduce Costs, Risk of not finding a partner, Exposure to Opportunism Risks
INTERMEDIARIES-17 INSEAD
SUMMARY
► Successful marketplaces/intermediaries
► Increase the number of matches through statistical pooling
► Secure transactions
► Allow for price discovery
► Reduce transaction costs
► Combine benefits of flexibility and long term relationships
► Network effects (distinct from supply side economies of scale)
► Two sided marketplaces- Cannot price as two separate markers
► Which side to incentivize for early customer acquisition requires careful
consideration
INTERMEDIARIES-18 INSEAD
THE CO$T OF QUALITY
FORD-FIRESTONE
QUALITY MANAGEMENT:
TACTICAL
FORD FIRESTONE-2 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
WHAT IS QUALITY?
FORD FIRESTONE-3 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
SOURCES OF VARIANCE
► Assignable Cause Variance vs. Common Cause (or Random) Variance
Common Cause Variation (low level)
FORD FIRESTONE-5 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
MEASURING PROCESS CAPABILITIES
3 3
FORD FIRESTONE-6 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
WHAT DOES PROCESS CAPABILITY MEAN IN TERMS OF DEFECT RATES?
±4σ 0.0001 63
FORD FIRESTONE-7 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
DEPENDENT COMPONENTS
FORD FIRESTONE-8 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
COVID CAPSULE
LOT TESTING?
PRE-SHIPMENT INSPECTION?
QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM & CERTIFICATION?
HOW TO INCREASE COSTS OF POOR QUALITY FOR SUPPLIER?
FORD FIRESTONE-9 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
QUALITY MANAGEMENT:
STRATEGIC
FORD FIRESTONE-10 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
FORD-FIRESTONE
FORD FIRESTONE-11 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
CASE OVERVIEW
► As the case develops, it becomes clear that the problem is possibly with
one make of tire, made during 1996, and one plant. It is still unclear what
would have happened if the recall had not taken place.
► It is still amazing how difficult it was and still is to trace the root cause of
the problem until one realizes that the problem has several layers, and
very small numbers are involved.
► How can one manage these situations? What principles are available to
managers?
FORD FIRESTONE-12 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
FORD FIRESTONE-13 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
BACKGROUND: 1999
► Ford:
► Profitable;
► Most admired corporation;
► Fatalities: 1 in 100 million pkm1;
► Other SUVs: 1.3 in 100 mil. pkm fatalities;
► Fewer rollovers relative to vehicle population;
► Firestone:
► Global Market leader
► Profitable
► Indy tradition.
► “NHTSA received 46 complaints about Firestone tires. Over the same
period, the agency logged 970 complaints about Goodyear tires and 725
gripes about Michelins.”
1 A passenger-kilometer (pkm) is the product of the distance a vehicle travels times the number of occupants travelling that distance.
FORD FIRESTONE-14 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE DONE? WHEN TO RECOGNIZE?
► August 9, 2000 issued recall notice for 6.5 million tires (went up to 13 million
out of 47 million made in the 1990s)
► RECALL COST
► 6.5 million tires $50 each ($325 mil) + legal costs + liability + lost profits
= $800 million to $1 billion
► Later data shows that these numbers were exceeded.
► Brand Image
► Most profitable segment for Ford
► 40% loss of sales for Bridgestone
► Etc.
Was this a real crisis?
FORD FIRESTONE-16 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
20
40
60
80
0
100
120
140
1/5/1998 160
5/5/1998
9/5/1998
1/5/1999
FORD FIRESTONE-17
5/5/1999
9/5/1999
1/5/2000
5/5/2000
9/5/2000
1/5/2001
5/5/2001
9/5/2001
1/5/2002
5/5/2002
9/5/2002
1/5/2003
5/5/2003
9/5/2003
1/5/2004
5/5/2004
9/5/2004
©
1/5/2005
5/5/2005
9/5/2005
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
1/5/2006
5/5/2006
9/5/2006
1/5/2007
5/5/2007
9/5/2007
1/5/2008
5/5/2008
9/5/2008
1/5/2009
5/5/2009
9/5/2009
1/5/2010
5/5/2010
Ford
9/5/2010
1/5/2011
5/5/2011
9/5/2011
1/5/2012
Toyota
INSEAD
TREAD SEPARATION: INDUSTRY WIDE PROBLEM?
FORD FIRESTONE-18 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
EVALUATE: PARETO CHARTS
Percentage of defects
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Cause 1 Cause 2 Cause 3 Cause 4 Cause 5
Pareto charts are used to graphically summarize the relative importance of various causes of
problems. The charts are based on the Pareto principle, which states that when several factors
affect a situation, few factors will account for most of the impact (80-20 rule).
FORD FIRESTONE-19 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
WHO’S RESPONSIBLE?
FORD RANGER
285 250
3 2
With Firestone With Wilderness With Firestone ATX and With Goodyear
ATX AT Wilderness AT
Source: Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Source: Ford Motor Co.
FORD FIRESTONE-20 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
EVALUATE: WHAT CONTRIBUTES THE MOST TO IT?
FORD FIRESTONE-21 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
MORE RED FLAGS?
FORD FIRESTONE-22 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
Source: Krueger and Mas (2004)
FORD FIRESTONE-23 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
TOYOTA’S SUDDEN ACCELERATION FIASCO – WHAT WILL BE THE FINAL COST?
2004 First claims (139) of sudden unintended acceleration.
9/26/2007 Toyota recalls 55,000 vehicles over floormats
2008 Two accidents involving Camry 2005, two people killed. First lawsuits.
8/28/2009 Four people killed when Lexus ES350 suddenly accelerates
9/29/2009 Toyota recalls additional 3.8M vehicles over floormats (largest Toyota recall ever)
11/3/2009 ABC News investigates Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration
11/6/2009 NHTSA asserts floormats do not address underlying defect
11/25/2009 Permanent solution for recalled floormats announced: reshape, replace pedals
1/12/2010 Toyota announces brake override systems for all vehicles by end of 2010
1/21/2010 Toyota recalls 2.3M vehicles over sticking accelerator pedals
1/26/2010 Toyota halts sales of eight models recalled over sticking accelerator pedal
1/28/2010 Additional 1.1M vehicles added to floormat recall
1/29/2010 Pedal recall expands to include 1.8M vehicles in Europe
1/31/2010 Class action lawsuit filed over recalled Toyotas
2/2/2010 Toyota sales slide 16%
7/13/2010 Early tests pin Toyota accidents on drivers (WSJ)
11/19/2010 Toyota settles lawsuit in fatal crash that launched recall saga
02/22/2011 NASA and NHTSA inquiry: no electronic faults in Toyota cars. Accelerator pedal
entrapments remains a problem. Toyota recalls an additional 2.17 million vehicles
FORD FIRESTONE-24 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/toyota-pay-12b-hiding-deadly-unintended-acceleration/story?id=22972214
FORD FIRESTONE-25 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
http://www.businessinsider.sg/r-toyota-to-recall-362000-camry-other-models-globally-2014-
11/#.VGVk4vnF9hE
FORD FIRESTONE-26 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
60 MILLION CAR BOMBS: TAKATA'S AIR BAG CRISIS
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2016-06-02/sixty-million-car-bombs-inside-takata-s-air-bag-crisis
FORD FIRESTONE-27 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
OTHER INDUSTRIES: CHIPOTLE
FORD FIRESTONE-28 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
SAMSUNG GALAXY NOTE 7: THE IMPORTANCE OF QUICKLY FINDING ROOT CAUSES
FORD FIRESTONE-29 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
CROWD-SOURCING QUALITY CONTROL
FORD FIRESTONE-30 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
RECAP
► Crises can and will happen, need processes to respond quickly and search
for the needle in the haystack
► No silver bullets, think long and hard about your specific situation
FORD FIRESTONE-31 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ
NEXT TIME
FORD FIRESTONE-32 ©
INSEAD
VILLE SATOPÄÄ