STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (CASE DIGESTS 2)

Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. vs.

Intermediate Appellate Court, Sycwin Coating and Wires, Inc.
(General words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance)
(Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish)
(Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos)
Facts:
• Private respondent, Sycwin Coating and Wires, Inc. filed a complaint for the
collection of a sum of money against Varian Industrial Corporation.

• Private respondent, through posting of a supersedeas bond during pendency of

the case succeeded in attaching some of Varian Industrial Corporation’s properties.

• Said properties were released when Varian Industrial Corporation, thru the
petitioner, its insurer, Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. posted a counterbond.

• The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, which Varian
Industrial Corporation appealed in the Intermediate Appellate Court.

• Private respondent then filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the
properties of Varian Industrial Corporation, which the respondent court granted.

• Varian Industrial Corporation, thru the petitioner, filed before the Supreme Court
a Petition for Review on Certiorari the respondent court’s decision.

• The Supreme Court, without giving due course to the petition issued a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order complaint.

Issue: Whether an order of execution pending appeal maybe enforced on the petitioner’s
counter bond?

Ruling: Yes.

• The Supreme Court declared that it is well recognized rule that where the law
does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.

• Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos. The rule, founded on
logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a statute
should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance.

• The rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts
and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the
operation of the law.

• In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a

statute where none is indicated. For courts are not authorized to distinguish
where the law makes no distinction.
 • They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they
find it and without regard to consequences.

• A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any
exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling
reason apparent in the law to justify it.

• Thus where a statute grants a person against whom possession of "any land" is
unlawfully withheld the right to bring an action for unlawful detainer, this Court
held that the phrase "any land" includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural,
residential, or mineral.

• Since the law in this case does not make any distinction nor intended to make any
exception, when it speaks of "any judgment" which maybe charged against the
counterbond, it should be interpreted to refer not only to a final and
executory judgment in the case but also a judgment pending appeal.

• The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in
accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall
be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied.

• It covers not only a final and executory judgement but also the execution of a
judgment pending appeal.

• Based on these principles, the Supreme Court ruled that the order of
execution pending appeal of any judgment is enforceable to the
petitioner’s counterbonds.

Cecilio S. De Villa vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals

(When the law does not make any exception courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to
justify it)

Facts:
• Petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region (Makati, Branch 145) with violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22.

• Petitioner moved to dismiss the Information on the following grounds: (a)

Respondent court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That no
offense was committed since the check involved was payable in dollars, hence, the
obligation created is null and void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to
Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency).

• A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the RTC ruling was filed by
the petitioner in the Court of Appeals.

• The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with costs against the petitioner.
 • A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the petitioner but
the same was denied by the Court of Appeals, thus elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the check in question, drawn against the dollar account of
petitioner with a foreign bank, is covered by the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P.
Blg.22).

Ruling: Yes.

• Exception in the Statute.

• It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish courts should not distinguish.

• Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any exception, courts
may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British
Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]).

• The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the
lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof.

• The discussion on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this view.

Colgate-Palmolive Philippine, Inc. vs. Hon. Pedro M. Gimenez

(General terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by
specific language which indicates the statute's object and purpose. The rule is applicable only to cases wherein,
except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific case)

Facts:
• The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines imported from abroad various
materials such as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate
precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and
flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures.

• For every importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central
Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used
for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange
Tax Law.

• The petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17%
special excise tax it had paid.

• The auditor of the Central Bank, refused to pass in audit its claims for refund fixed
by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory that
toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange
Tax Law.

• Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter affirmed the ruling of the
auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining that the term “stabilizer and flavors”
 mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the
preparation or manufacture of food or food products.

• Not satisfied, the petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court thru the
present petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of
dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax
imposed by the Exchange Tax Law (Republic Act No. 601).

Ruling: Yes.

• General and special terms.

• The ruling of the Auditor General that the term “stabilizer and flavors” as used in
the law refers only to those materials actually used in the preparation or
manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of
statutory construction that “general terms may be restricted by specific
words, with the result that the general language will be limited by the
specific language which indicates the statute’s object and purpose.”

• The rule, however, is applicable only to cases where, except for one general term,
all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class (ejusdem
generis).

• In the case at bar, it is true that the term “stabilizer and flavors” is preceded by a
number of articles that may be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise
true that the other items immediately following it do not belong to the same
classification.

• The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and
limited by particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not require
the rejection of general terms entirely.

• Therefore, the law must be seen in its entirety. The rule of construction that
general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by a particular recital does
not require the rejection of general terms entirely.

• Since the law does not distinguish between "Stabilizers and Flavors", the
court is not authorized to make any distinction when the law does not
distinguish, neither do we distinguish.

• It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and

is to be taken in connection with other rules of construction.
 Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrino
(Ejusdem Generi, where the general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular, and
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned)

Facts:
• The New Armed Forces Anti-Graft Board (Board) under the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) recommended that private respondent
Lt. Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No.
3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended.

• Private respondent moved to dismiss.

• The Board opposed.

• Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with
the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila.

• According to petitioners, the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause the
prosecution of private respondent because he is a "subordinate" of former
President Marcos.

• Respondent alleged that he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in

Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A as the alleged illegal acts being imputed to
him, that of alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal means while Finance Officer
of the Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his own alone, not connected with his
being a crony, business associate, etc. or subordinate as the petition does not
allege so.

• Hence the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him.

Issue: Whether or not private respondent acted as a "subordinate" under E.O. No.1 and
related executive orders.

Ruling: No.

• PCGG was created by EO No.1 with the task of recovering "the ill-gotten wealth
amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close
associates both in the country and abroad."

• This is a close reading of EO No. 1 and it shows what is contemplated by the term
"subordinate," as also shown in EO No. 2 which freezes "all assets and properties
in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and his wife... their close
relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have
any interest or participation."

• Applying the rule in statutory construction knows as ejusdem generis, that is,
where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by
words of particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to
 be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only
to persons of things of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned.

• The term "subordinate" would refer to one who enjoys a close association or
relation with former Pres. Marcos and with his wife.

• It does not suffice that the respondent is or was a government official during the
Marcos administration.

• There must be a prima facie showing that he unlawfully accumulated wealth by

virtue of his close association with the Marcoses. Otherwise, respondent's case will
fall under existing general laws and procedures on the matter.

San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

(Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a
meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed
therein)

Facts:
• San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) is a domestic corporation engaged
in the business of milling, manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other
allied products.

• It was assessed and ordered to pay by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue

miller’s tax and manufacturer’s sales tax, among other deficiency taxes, for taxable
year 1987 particularly on SPMC’s sales of crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals,
Inc. (UNICHEM) while the deficiency sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and
edible oil as manufactured products.

• SPMC opposed the assessments.

• The Commissioner denied its protest.

• SPMC appealed the denial of its protest to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) by way
of a petition for review.

• It insists on the liberal application of the rules because, on the merits of the
petition, SPMC was not liable for the 3% miller’s tax.

• It maintains that the crude oil which it sold to UNICHEM was actually exported by
UNICHEM as an ingredient of fatty acid and glycerine, hence, not subject to miller’s
tax pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.

• Since UNICHEM, the buyer of SPMC’s milled products, subsequently exported said
products, SPMC should be exempted from the miller’s tax.

Issue: Whether or not SPMC’s sale of crude coconut oil to UNICHEM was subject to the
3% miller’s tax.
Ruling: No.

• The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code was
clear.

• The tax exemption applied only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil,
copra by-products and dessicated coconuts, whether in their original state or as
an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or
operator of the factory or by the miller himself.

• Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to
be construed as excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentioned.

• Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the
enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is
intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein.

• The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning
and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

• The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of restrictive

interpretation.

• Its application in this case is consistent with the construction of tax exemptions
in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer.

• To allow SPMC’s claim for tax exemption will violate these established principles
and unduly derogate sovereign authority.

Dra. Brigida S. Buenseda vs. Secretary Juan Flavier

(Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by
considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated)

Facts:
• The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court, seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman directing the preventive
suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S. Buenseda et.al.

• The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint
filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents
against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

• The Supreme Court required respondent Secretary to comply with the

aforestated status quo order.
 • The Solicitor General, in his comment, stated that (a) “The authority of the
Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to
suspend;” and (b) “Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend
a government official or employee, there are conditions required by law for the
exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in the instant
case”

Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials
and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman,
pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said
officials and employees.

Ruling: Yes.

• When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power “to recommend the
suspension” of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to
“suspension,” as a punitive measure.

• All the words associated with the word “suspension” in said provision referred to
penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure.

• Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word “suspension” should be given
the same sense as the other words with which it is associated.

• Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its

correct construction may be made specific by considering the company
of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated .

• Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to
preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges
before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute.

• The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein
set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.

Manolo P. Fule vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals

(Negative words and phrases regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are mere directory)

Facts:
• The petitioner was convicted of violation of BP Blg. 22 based on the stipulation of
facts during the pre-trial conference which states that on January 21, 1981, the
accused Fule (herein petitioner), an agent of the Towers Assurance Corp., issued
and made out check No. 26741, dated January 24, 1981 in the sum of P2,541.05
to Roy Nadera in remittance of collection.

• The check was presented for payment on January 24, 1981 but it was dishonored
because the checking account was already closed. The accused was identified to
be Manolo Fule.
 • The trial court convicted the petitioner-appellant based on the prosecution's
evidence since the petitioner-appellant also waived the right to present evidence
in the subsequent hearing and, in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum
confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner-appellant.

• On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed
the judgment of conviction.

• Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that the Honorable

Respondent Court of Appeals erred in the decision of the Regional Trial Court
convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that the basis
of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-
trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel.

• In Sec.4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures:

SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made

or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the
accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel. (Rule 118)
[Emphasis supplied]

• Having been effective since January 01, 1985, the above rule is applicable.

Issue: Whether or not the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as
mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in
evidence.

Ruling: Yes.

• By its very language, the Rule is mandatory.

• Under the rule of statutory construction , negative words and phrases are to
be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely
directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]).

• The use of the term “shall” further emphasizes its mandatory character
and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may
be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176).

• And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or

procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government
and liberally in favor of the accused (People vs. Terrado No. L-23625, November
25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).
 Purita Bersabal vs. Honorable Judge Serafin Salvador
(The use of the word "may" in the statute generally connotes a permissive thing while the word "shall" is imperative)

Facts:
• Petitioner Purita Bersabal seeks to annul the orders of respondent Judge and to
compel said respondent Judge to decide petitioner's perfected appeal on the basis
of the evidence and records of the case submitted by the City Court of Caloocan
City plus the memorandum already submitted by the petitioner and respondents.

• The second paragraph of Section 45 of R.A. No. 296, otherwise known as the
Philippine Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by R.A. No. 6031 provides, in part,
as follows:

Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the
evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts: Provided, That
the parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so
requested...

• A decision was rendered by said Court which decision was appealed by the
petitioner to the respondent Court.

• The respondent Judge dismissed petition on August 4, 1971 upon failure of

defendant-appellant to prosecute her appeal, with costs against her.

• Petitioner filed her memorandum.

• The respondent Court denied the motion for reconsideration on October 30, 1971.

• Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file second motion for reconsideration which
was likewise denied by the respondent court on March 15, 1972.

Issue: Whether or not, in the light of the provisions of the second paragraph of Section
45 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended by R.A. No. 6031, the mere failure of an
appellant to submit on time the memorandum mentioned in the same paragraph
would empower the Court of First Instance to dismiss the appeal on the ground of
failure to prosecute.

Ruling: No.

• The above cited provision is clear and leaves no room for doubt. It cannot be
interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional on the
part of the parties.

• Being optional on the part of the parties, the latter may so choose to waive
submission of the memoranda.

• And as a logical concomitant of the choice given to the Parties, the Court cannot
dismiss the appeal of the party waiving the submission of said memorandum the
appellant so chooses not to submit the memorandum, the Court of First Instance
 is left with no alternative but to decide the case on the basis of the evidence and
records transmitted from the city or municipal courts.

• In other words, the Court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the
mere failure of an appellant to submit his memorandum, but rather it is the Court's
mandatory duty to decide the case on the basis of the available evidence and
records transmitted to it.

• As a general rule, the word "may" when used in a statute is permissive

only and operates to confer discretion; while the word "shall" is
imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Dizon vs.
Encarnacion, L-18615, Dec. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717). T
• The implication is that the Court is left with no choice but to decide the appealed
case either on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted to it, or on the
basis of the latter plus memoranda and/or brief with oral argument duly submitted
and/or made on request.

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. vs Hon. Court of Appeals
(The word "must" in a statute like "shall" is not always imperative and may be consistent with an exercise of
discretion)

Facts:
• LGVHAI, the association of homeowners and residents of the Loyola Grand Villas,
is registered with the Home Financing Corporation, the predecessor of herein
respondent HIGC, as the sole homeowners’ organization in the said subdivision.

• Sometime in 1988, the officers of the LGVHAI tried to register its by-laws. They
failed to do so.

• Later, it was discovered that there were two other organizations within the
subdivision – the South Association and the North Association, which is registered
with HIGC and has filed its by-laws.

• When the president of the subdivision inquired about the status of LGVHAI, Atty.
Joaquin A. Bautista, the head of the legal department of the HIGC, informed him
that LGVHAI had been automatically dissolved for two reasons.

• First, it did not submit its by-laws within the period required by the Corporation
Code and, second, there was non-user of corporate charter because HIGC had not
received any report on the association’s activities.

• Apparently, this information resulted in the registration of the South Association

with the HIGC and the filing of its by-laws.

• LGVHAI complained and got a favorable result from Respondent HIGC declaring
the registration of Petitioner association cancelled and Respondent CA
subsequently affirmed the said decision.

• Hence, Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not LGVHAI’s failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by
Section 46 of the Corporation Code resulted in the automatic dissolution of
LGVHAI.

Ruling: No.

• The records of the deliberations of the Batasang Pambansa No. 68 suggest that
automatic corporate dissolution for failure to file the by-laws on time was never
the intention of the legislature.

• Taken as a whole and under the principle that the best interpreter of a
statute is the statute itself, reveals the legislative intent to attach a
directory, and not mandatory, meaning for the word “must” in the first
sentence of Section 46 of the Corporation Code.

• Note should be taken of the second paragraph of the law which allows the filing
of the by-laws even prior to incorporation.

• This provision in the same section of the Code rules out mandatory compliance
with the requirement of filing the by-laws “within one (1) month after receipt of
official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the Securities
and Exchange Commission.”

• It necessarily follows that failure to file the by-laws within that period does not
imply the “demise” of the corporation.

• Bylaws may be necessary for the “government” of the corporation but these are
subordinate to the articles of incorporation as well as to the Corporation Code and
related statutes.

• There can also be no automatic corporate dissolution simply because the

incorporators failed to abide by the required filing of by-laws embodied in Section
46 of the Corporation Code.

• There is no outright “demise” of corporate existence.

• Proper notice and hearing are cardinal components of due process in any
democratic institution, agency or society.

• In other words, the incorporators must be given the chance to explain their neglect
or omission and remedy the same.
 Philippine National Bank vs. The Court of Appeals (Final)
(A "week" means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on which it begins)

Facts:
• Two parcels of land under the common names of the respondent Epifanio dela
Cruz, his brother and sister were mortgaged to the Petitioner Philippine National
Bank.

• The lots were mortgaged to guarantee the three promissory notes.

• The first two were not paid by the respondent.

• The third is disputed by the respondent who claims that the correct date is June
30, 1961; however, in the bank records, the note was really executed on June 30,
1958.

• PNB presented under Act No. 3135 a foreclosure petition of the mortgaged lots.

• The lots were sold or auctioned off with PNB as the highest bidder.

• A Final Deed of Sale and a Certificate of Sale was executed in favor of the
petitioner.

• The final Deed of Sale was registered in Registry of Property.

• Inasmuch as the respondent did not buy back the lots from PNB, PNB sold on the
same in a "Deed of Conditional Sale".

• The Notices of Sale of foreclosed properties were published on March 28, April 11
and April 12, 1969 in a newspaper.

• Respondent brought a complaint for the reconveyance of the lands, which the
petitioner allegedly unlawfully foreclosed.

• The petitioner states on the other hand that the extrajudicial foreclosure,
consolidation of ownership, and subsequent sale were all valid.

• The CFI rendered its Decision; the complaint against the petitioner was dismissed.

• Unsatisfied with the judgment, respondent interposed an appeal that the lower
court erred in holding that there was a valid compliance in regard to the required
publication under Sec. 3 of Act. 3135.

• Respondent court reversed the judgment appealed from by declaring void, inter
alia, the auction sale of the foreclosed pieces of realty, the final deed of sale, and
the consolidation of ownership.

• Hence, the petition with SC for certiorari and intervention.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner bank complied with the requirement of weekly
publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages.

Ruling: No.

• The term “week” was interpreted to mean as a period consisting of seven

consecutive days. The publication effected on April 19 cannot be
construed as sufficient advertisement for the second week because the
period for the first week should be from March 28 to April 3 and April 4
to April 10 (2nd week)

• A “week” means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to

the day of the week on which it begins.

• The first date falls on a Friday while the second and third dates are on a Friday
and Saturday, respectively.

• Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale shall be
"published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks".

• Evidently, petitioner bank failed to comply with this legal requirement.

• The Supreme Court held that the rule is that statutory provisions governing
publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly
complied with, and those even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate
the notice and render the sale at least voidable.

Philippine National Bank vs. The Court of Appeals (Supplementary)

Two parcels of land under the common names of the respondent Epifanio dela Cruz, his
brother and sister were mortgaged to the Petitioner Philippine National Bank, the same
also became the subject of an extrajudicial foreclosure. Epifanio filed a complaint for
reconveyance of the two parcels of land. He alleges that the posting requirements were
not followed in accordance with Act No. 3135, which requires posting of notices of sale
once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
The Court ruled in favor of Epifanio. The Notices of Sale of were published on March 28,
April 11 and April 12, 1969. The first date falls on a Friday while the second and third
dates are on a Friday and Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that
the notice of auction sale shall be "published once a week for at least three consecutive
weeks". Evidently, petitioner bank failed to comply with this legal requirement. The
publication effected on April 11, 1969 cannot be construed as sufficient advertisement for
the second week because the period for the first week should be reckoned from March
28, 1969 until April 3, 1969 while the second week should be counted from April 4, 1969
until April 10, 1969. It is clear that the announcement on April 11, 1969 was both
theoretically and physically accomplished during the first day of the third week and cannot
thus be equated with compliance in law. The rule is that statutory provisions governing
publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and
 those even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale at
least voidable.

Facts:
• Epifanio De La Cruz mortgaged two lots to PNB. The lots were under the common
names of Epifanio, his brother (Delfin) and his sister (Maria).

• The mortgage was made possible because of the grant by the latter to Epifanio of
a special power of attorney to mortgage the lots to the defendant.

• Epifanio defaulted in his payments so PNB foreclosed on the properties and sold it
to third parties.

• Epifanio then filed a complaint with CFI for the reconveyance of the parcels of land
which he mortgaged to PNB.

• He alleged that PNB had unlawfully foreclosed them and that they did not comply
with the requirement of posting notices of sale.

• Under Section 3 of Act No. 3135' on extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate

mortgage, notices of sale are required to be posted for not less than twenty days
in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is
situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notices
shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.

• The CFI dismissed the petition. However, it was reversed by the CA who said:

The Notices of Sale of appellant’s foreclosed properties were published on March

28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 in issues of the newspaper “Daily Record”. The date
falls on a Friday while the dates April 11 and 12, 1969 are on a Friday and Saturday,
respectively. Section 3 of Act. No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale
shall be “published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks”. Evidently
defendant appelle bank failed to omply with this legal requirement.

• Moreover, the CA declared the auction sale as void because PNB was the highest
bidder and purchaser. Hence current petition.

• According to PNB, there is no breach of the proviso since after the first publication
on March 28, 1969, the second notice was published on April 11, 1969 (the last
day of the second week), while the third publication on April 12, 1969 was
announced on the first day of the third week.

• Petitioner thus concludes that there was no violation from the mere happenstance
that the third publication was made only a day after the second publication since
it is enough that the second publication be made on any day within the second
week and the third publication, on any day within the third week.
 • Epifanio, on the other hand, argues that the period between each publication must
never be less than seven consecutive days.

• The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage

foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and those even slight deviations
therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable.

Issue: Whether there was a valid compliance with the required publication.

Ruling: No.

• PNB is of the erroneous impression that the day on which the first publication was
made, or on March 28, 1969, should be excluded pursuant to Article 13 of the New
Civil Code.

• It must be conceded that Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of what

is a "week".

• In Concepcion vs. Zandueta, this term was interpreted to mean as a period of time
consisting of seven consecutive days a definition which dovetails with the ruling in
E.M. Derby and Co. vs. City of Modesto, et al.

• Following the interpretation in Derby as to the publication of an ordinance for "at

least two weeks" in some newspaper that:

...here there is no date or event suggesting the exclusion of the first day's
publication from the computation, and the cases above cited take this case
out of the rule stated in Section 12, Code Civ. Proc. which excludes the first
day and includes the last;

• The publication effected on April 11, 1969 cannot be construed as sufficient

advertisement for the second week because the period for the first week should
be reckoned from March 28, 1969 until April 3, 1969 while the second week should
be counted from April 4, 1969 until April 10, 1969. It is clear that the
announcement on April 11, 1969 was both theoretically and physically
accomplished during the first day of the third week and cannot thus be equated
with compliance.

• Indeed, where the word is used simply as a measure of duration of time

and without reference to the calendar, it means a period of seven
consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on which it
begins (1 Tolentino, supra at p. 467 citing Derby).

• It would have been absurd to exclude March 28, 1969 as reckoning point, in line
with the third paragraph of Article 13 of the New Civil Code, for the purpose of
counting the first week of publication as to the last day thereof fall on April 4, 1969
because this will have the effect of extending the first week by another day. This
 could not have been the unwritten intention of the lawmakers when Act No. 3135
was enacted.

ALU-TUCP vs. NLRC

(Proviso)

Facts:
• Petitioners, as employees of private respondent National Steel Corporation (NSC),
filed separate complaints for unfair labor practice, regularization and monetary
benefits with the NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City.

• The complaints were consolidated and after hearing, the Labor Arbiter declared
petitioners “regular project employees who shall continue their employment as
such for as long as such [project] activity exists,” but entitled to the salary of
a regular employee pursuant to the provisions in the collective bargaining
agreement. It also ordered payment of salary differentials.

• The NLRC in its questioned resolutions modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

• It affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s holding that petitioners were project

employees since they were hired to perform work in a specific undertaking — the
Five Years Expansion Program, the completion of which had been determined at
the time of their engagement and which operation was not directly related to the
business of steel manufacturing.

• The NLRC, however, set aside the award to petitioners of the same benefits
enjoyed by regular employees for lack of legal and factual basis.

• The law on the matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code, where the petitioners argue
that they are “regular” employees of NSC because: (i) their jobs are “necessary,
desirable and work-related to private respondent’s main business, steel-making”;
and (ii) they have rendered service for six (6) or more years to private respondent
NSC.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are considered “permanent employees” as opposed to

being only “project employees” of NSC.

Ruling: No.

• Function of the proviso. (Proviso is a clause or part of a clause in the

statute, the office of which is either to except something from the
enacting clause, or to qualify or restrain its generality, or to exclude
some possible ground of misinterpretation of its extent.

• Petitioners are not considered “permanent employees”. However, contrary to

petitioners’ apprehensions, the designation of named employees as “project
employees” and their assignment to a specific project are effected and
 implemented in good faith, and not merely as a means of evading otherwise
applicable requirements of labor laws.

• On the claim that petitioners’ service to NSC of more than six (6) years should
qualify them as “regular employees”, the Supreme Court believed this claim is
without legal basis.

• The simple fact that the employment of petitioners as project employees had gone
beyond one (1) year, does not detract from, or legally dissolve, their status as
“project employees”.

• The second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted above, providing
that an employee who has served for at least one (1) year, shall be considered a
regular employee, relates to casual employees, not to project employees.