Electrical Power and Energy Systems 136 (2022) 107720

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijepes

A specialized review on outlook of future Cyber-Physical Power System

(CPPS) testbeds for securing electric power grid
Rajaa Vikhram Yohanandhan a, 1, Rajvikram Madurai Elavarasan b, *, 1, Rishi Pugazhendhi c,
Manoharan Premkumar d, Lucian Mihet-Popa e, Junbo Zhao f, Vladimir Terzija g
a
Department of Electronics and Instrumentation Engineering, SRM Institute of Science and Technology, Kattankulathur - 603203, Chengalpattu District, Tamil Nadu,
India
b
Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Thiagarajar College of Engineering, Madurai 625015, India
c
R&D(Power and Energy Unit), Nestlives Pvt Ltd, Chennai 600091, India
d
Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Dayananda Sagar College of Engineering, Bengaluru, Karnataka 560078, India
e
Faculty of Engineering, Østfold University College, NO- 1757 Halden, Norway
f
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Mississippi State University, Starkville, MS 39759, USA
g
Center for Energy Science and Technology, Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology, Bolshoy Boulevard 30, bld. 1, Moscow 121205, Russia

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: The Cyber-Physical Power System (CPPS) is a new type of system in which the traditional energy system is
Critical infrastructure protection integrated into the information network with control systems, communication networks, and computational
Cyber attack units. CPPS is the foundation of a long-term transformation of energy management that will fundamentally alter
Cyber-Physical Power System testbed
the perspective and application pattern of traditional energy research. The strong interactions between systems
Cyber security
Real-time testbed
in a CPPS introduce new challenges in maintaining high supply security, as new factors can affect the overall
Smart grid security of the power system. Such factors include cybersecurity, the behaviour and constraints of neighbouring
energy systems, and the dynamics of interactions between the various systems. Integrating computing, com­
munications, and control at all levels of electrical energy generation, transmission, distribution, utilisation, and
storage in CPPS increases vulnerabilities and complicates security. Security studies must reflect the character­
istics of the CPPS infrastructure in actual testing environments that support the interfacing of real-world hard­
ware devices. CPPS testbeds are effective in this context because they provide testing capabilities for evaluating
the synergistic relationship between physical and virtual components in controlled environments. Security-
oriented CPPS testbeds are invaluable for performing cybersecurity and cyberattack analyses, identifying sys­
tem threats and vulnerabilities in various layers of CPPS, implementing intrusion detection and prevention al­
gorithms, and evaluating the efficacy of mitigation techniques without imposing excessive economic burdens or
posing safety risks. This paper provides a comprehensive review of CPPS testbeds from the standpoint of the
physical power system layer, cyber system layer, and cyber-physical fusion layer. Following a brief description of
the importance of testbeds for cybersecurity research in CPPS, and a brief classification of existing CPPS testbeds
for cyberattacks, and cybersecurity analysis in CPPS is presented. A detailed overview of the outlook for future
CPPS testbeds in terms of communication, control, computing, and educational perspective is provided. Finally,
the work is concluded with future research directions for developing a secure electric power grid.

communication technologies for computerized monitoring, protection,

1. Introduction
The Cyber-Physical Power System (CPPS) is a next-generation power
system that is designed to modernize the traditional electric power grid
[1]. CPPSs are electric systems that combine two-way cyber-secure
and real-time control across all power system sectors to create clean,
secure, resilient, safe, and sustainable energy systems [2-4]. The CPPS’s
real-time operations rely on improved connectivity between sensors and
equipment. The communication network acts as the backbone of the
CPPS and is also necessary for cost savings, energy conservation, greater

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: rajvikram787@gmail.com (R.M. Elavarasan).
1
Equally Contributed.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2021.107720
Received 30 August 2021; Accepted 17 October 2021
Available online 29 October 2021
0142-0615/© 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
R.V. Yohanandhan et al. International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 136 (2022) 107720

Nomenclature LMS Learning Management System

MITM Man-in-the-Middle
ADC Analog to Digital Converter NASPI North American SynchroPhasor Initiative
AI Artificial Intelligence NERC North American Electric Reliability Corporation
AMI Advanced Metering Infrastructure NESCOR National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization
API Application Programming Interface Resource
ARTEMiS Advanced Real Time Electromagnetic Simulation Solver NFV Network Function Virtualization
ATT&CK Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
C2M2 Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model NS Network Simulator
CIL Controller-In-the-Loop NSF National Science Foundation
CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection NVD National Vulnerability Database
CPPS Cyber-Physical Power System OLTC On-load tap changer
CPS Cyber-Physical System OT Operational Technology
CPU Central Processing Unit PDC Phasor Data Concentrator
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures PLC Programmable Logic Controller
DAC Digital to Analog Converter PMU Phasor Measurement Unit
DER Distributed Energy Resource PHIL Power Hardware-In-the-Loop
DFR Digital Fault Recorder PSS Power System Stabilizer
DoS Denial of Service QoS Quality of Service
DT Digital Twin QR Quasi Realistic
DUT Device Under Test R&D Research and Development
EMS Energy Management System RCP Rapid Control Prototyping
EPIC Experimentation Platform for Internet Contingencies RTDS Real-Time Digital Simulator
ERIGrid European Research Infrastructure Grid RT-Lab Real-Time Lab
EV Electric Vehicle RTU Remote Terminal Unit
FACTS Flexible AC Transmission System RTW Real-Time Workshop
FCTaaS Federated Cybersecurity Testbed as a Service SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
FDI False Data Injection SDN Software-Defined Networking
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array SDR Software-Defined Radio
GDP Gross Domestic Product SDG Sustainable Development Goal
GENI Global Environment for Network Innovations SDSG Software-Defined Smart Grid
GUI Graphical User Interface SG Smart Grid
HIL Hardware-In-the-Loop SIL Software-In-the-Loop
HITL Human-In-The-Loop STATCOM Static Synchronous Compensator
HVDC High Voltage Direct Current STEM Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics
I/O Input/Output SVC Static VAR Compensator
ICS Industrial Control System TNT Trinittrotoluene
ICT Information and Communication Technology VM Virtual Machine
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission VPN Virtual private Network
IED Intelligent Electronic Device WAC Wide-Area Control
IoT Internet of Things WAMC Wide-Area Monitoring and Control
ISO Independent System Operator WAMPAC Wide-Area Monitoring Protection and Control
IT Information Technology WAMS Wide-Area Measurement System
LAN Local Area Network WSN Wireless Sensor Network

efficiency, and power grid resilience [5,6]. Utilities participate in energy
markets and collaborate with Independent System Operators (ISOs),
which are in charge of power grid operations. There has been an attempt
in recent years to modernize the present grid by securely building cyber-
physical infrastructure to increase grid robustness and efficiency [7,8].
The conceptual view of CPPS is depicted in Fig. 1. Since it relies on cyber
system information, CPPS’s sophisticated communication capabilities
for monitoring and control applications are extremely sensitive to
cybersecurity threats, as demonstrated in Fig. 1. The major issue is to
leverage ICTs for CPPS while limiting susceptibility to cyber-attacks by
guaranteeing long-term CPPS cybersecurity [9]. Because a considerable
number of CPPS control devices are connected to the internet, network
assaults pose significant cybersecurity threats, providing important
difficulties for CPPS information security [10]. Adoption of ICTs for
CPPS modernization has produced a favourable environment for cyber
intrusions in the CPPS’s cyber component. Cyberattacks cause power
system security and sustainability concerns in the CPPS [1]. According
to recent study findings, a deliberate cyberattack was conducted against
the CPPS, causing significant disruptions in the stability and perfor­
mance of power system operation and control. Cyberattacks on shunt
FACTS devices such as STATCOM and SVC, have lowered the system’s
stability margin [11]. Cyberattack behavior such as False Data Injection
(FDI) or nodal pricing manipulation can potentially mislead the state
estimate process [12,13]. This had a disastrous effect on the CPPS
market’s economic functioning [14,15]. A Denial of Service (DoS)
intrusion in the cyber system may have an impact on the dynamic per­
formance of CPPS [16,17]. To avoid any unpleasant outcomes, it is also
critical to test the device settings, algorithms, and applications before
deploying in the real CPPS. False tripping of circuit breakers, for
example, will occur in CPPS owing to relay malfunctioning, which might
result in cascade failures. Previous studies, literature surveys, and offi­
cial publications all point to a rise in the number of cyberattacks on
electric power grid infrastructure [18,19]. In 2016, a breach in the
power system domain accounted for 20% of reported cyberattack
occurrence, and hackers are creating new cyberattack techniques with
the power grid in mind [20-22], such as exploiting weaknesses in power

2
R.V. Yohanandhan et al.
Fig. 1. A Conceptual View of the Cyber-Physical Power System (CPPS).
sector protocols. Various attempts and incidents over the years have
shown that Electric Vehicles (EVs), Power System Stabilizer (PSS),
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), Advanced Metering Infrastructure
(AMI), Digital Fault Recorder (DFR), Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA), Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU), and their cyber
connections are vulnerable to cyberattacks and must be protected
against cyber intrusion and cyber-based attacks. As a result, one of the
most significant R&D priorities in the CPPS [18] is to safeguard the
electric power grid against cyberattacks, including attack detection,
mitigation, and prevention. With the emergence of various types of
cyberattacks such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, False Data Injection
(FDI) attacks, Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks, and so on, the
cybersecurity of CPPS has emerged as a hot research topic among power
system researchers due to the catastrophic impact of a power system
security breach as well as other critical infrastructure that must be
investigated a power system security breach [10,23]. Multiple and co­
ordinated cyberattacks against CPPS may cause a chain reaction of
events that results in blackout situations. It is important to strengthen
CPPS cybersecurity and assess both physical and cybersecurity as one
integrated platform to increase the resilience of electric power grids
[24,25]. Strong technological controls, such as hardware and software
components used to detect, prevent, and respond to cyber-attacks, are
required for efficient and effective utility cybersecurity, as are good
cybersecurity management practices. However, researching real-world
contexts is challenging [10], and creating and verifying security and
performance assessments is costly [18]. Large-scale modeling and
simulation are now an option, but they necessitate a comprehensive
mathematical model of the system, which is time-consuming and
incorrect in simulating the interaction mechanism between physical and
cyber systems in CPPS [18,26].
Most programming languages, API and tools do not support the
comprehensive modeling of physical and cyber systems, field devices,
networks, and EMSs. It is generally simplified or abstracted away in
most simulation systems. As a result, such settings cannot enable high-
fidelity verification and validation studies, which must account for the
impacts of various types of cyberattacks or communication delays [27].
Due to privacy and non-disclosure issues, access to realistic power grid
models and data controlled by utility corporations is also exceedingly
challenging. Even if genuine data is available, due to restricted
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International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 136 (2022) 107720
coverage, it may not be adequate in many situations to assess the overall
operation of the power grid [28]. Real-world application of CPPS con­
cepts is required in the power sector, which may be done by prototype
design and execution on genuine testbeds, followed by quick verification
and validation of CPPS concepts to move research results into broader
public usage [9].
1.1. Motivation of research
The social impact of a cyberattack is not addressed in the sustain­
ability concept and requires further consideration within the CPPS’s
cybersecurity. ICT and cybersecurity can help with the implementation
of the sustainable development (SD) concept. The development of
environmentally friendly technology and cybersecurity solutions is one
of the aims of the European Union countries’ sustainable production and
domestic security ideas. This is essential in the development of a robust
and sustainable electric power grid, as well as in the achievement of a
more stable and secure environment. The European Union (EU) created
policies and legislative measures to regulate the cybersecurity and SD
landscape on a sectoral level, as well as to address issues that arise from
the active use of information networks and systems. Increasing DERs
investments can aid in the achievement of the SDGs. They do, however,
rely increasingly frequently on ICT systems and cybersecurity. In this
sense, CPPS security testbeds may be utilized to correctly simulate the
large-scale power system model and assist in understanding the intricate
interaction of physical and cyber systems in CPPS [1]. It acts as a plat­
form for creating and maintaining cybersecurity research and develop­
ment, as well as education in this vital area of national relevance [18]. A
CPPS testbed is a good alternative for collecting realistic cyber (ICTs)
and physical (power system measurements) system data for research and
development purposes [24]. As a result, researchers seek to build the
CPPS Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) testbed to replicate the genuine CPPS
using research needs and realistic capabilities while avoiding access to
real data [10,29]. The testbed is made up of hardware control devices
that account for model quality and a real-time simulator that accounts
for simulation speed. As a result, a credible data flow with complete
closed-loop CPPS is created to design, simulate, verify, and validate real-
world cyber-physical interactions. Several cyber, physical, and coordi­
nated attacks on CPPS can be analyzed with the help of CPPS testbeds.
R.V. Yohanandhan et al.
These testbeds provide a reconfigurable, repeatable, realistic environ­
ment for verifying and validating cybersecurity measures, as well as
helping to identify cybersecurity weaknesses in the existing power sys­
tems [18]. The cyber intrusion detection and mitigation technique are
important in restoring normal operation to the CPPS[24].
The CPPS testbed, which has multi-user access, is also used to teach
power system education to students and researchers, as well as to vali­
date ideation and proof of ideas in several CPPS study fields [9]. The
WAMC systems testbed assists in the development of educational com­
petencies such as power system operation, control, and protection basics
[30]. Conventional testbeds and simulators either mimic the cyber sys­
tem (e.g., SCADA, PMU testbeds) or the physical power system (e.g.,
Real-time simulators). Such one-of-a-kind simulators/testbeds are
insufficient to simulate the interaction and interdependence of physical
and cyber system components, which is required for conducting CPPS
research (e.g., real-time stability analysis, WAMC systems) and
designing and verifying appropriate countermeasures. The examination
of cyber and physical systems separately impedes the creation of a
unified theoretical model of CPPS [23]. In this context, comprehensive
CPPS testbeds help to strike a balance between cheap cost and high
performance to correctly represent real-world system features. The ho­
listic modeling method recounts the internal relationship of the multi-
layer physical and cyber components more constructively and portrays
the interconnectedness of power, communication, computation, and
control devices [18]. Existing testbeds at academic institutions and R&D
labs are only utilized to test certain methodologies and to expand testbed
platforms as needed [9]. The cost of establishing the CPPS testbed is
likewise quite costly, and the testbed requires highly experienced
personnel to operate[27,29]. Only a few testbeds are capable of doing
real-time tests with realistic generation, transmission, distribution,
consumption, communication, and network scenarios [31]. Although
there are very few testbeds accessible in educational institutions and
R&D laboratories, CPPS research has attracted a huge number of aca­
demics and manufacturers. It encourages the rapid creation of new
testbeds with a wide range of capabilities for quickly evaluating and
validating unique CPPS concepts. This paper gives a detailed overview
of upcoming CPPS testbeds for grid security. The significance of cyber­
attack testbeds and long-term cybersecurity studies in CPPS is first
highlighted. The categorization of existing CPPS testbeds is then given.
After that, a thorough forecast for future CPPS testbeds is presented. The
authors think that this review backs up the CPPS researchers and en­
courages additional researchers to join them in this interesting field of
research. This review effort aids researchers in picking the most suitable
testbed for their research objectives to evaluate their thoughts and ideas
and verify their experiments.
1.2. Organization of the review
The rest of the work is organized as follows. The importance of
testbed for cyberattacks and cybersecurity analysis in CPPS are pre­
sented in Section 2. Related literature review works on CPPS testbeds,
and contributions of our work are presented in Section 3. Section 4
provides the core concepts of CPPS. Classification of CPPS testbeds
based on test platform is presented in Section 5. Section 6 presents an
Outlook of the Future CPPS Testbeds. Finally, the work is concluded
with future research directions in Section 7.
2. Importance of testbeds for cyberattacks and long-term
cybersecurity analysis in CPPS
A cyberattack in a large-scale CPPS alters the information flow in the
cyber system, jeopardizing the physical power system’s secure opera­
tion. This is most likely the result of a cascading failure throughout the
CPPS.
It is estimated that 63 different types of advanced cyberattacks tar­
geting monitoring, protection, and control functions are being
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International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 136 (2022) 107720
developed for CPPSs [23]. Table 1 depicts various cyberattack incidents
that have recently occurred in the electric power sector around the
world. The data is gathered from numerous research works and tech­
nical reports [23,32-34], and visualized based on severity and historyto
provide a thorough and concise review of large blackouts caused by
technical faults and cyber-attacks[35-37].
Fig. 2 depicts a summary of these findings[38-40]. According to
Table 1 and Fig. 2, cyberattacks warn the entire world to develop
indigenous firewalls/cybersecurity mechanisms with innovative attack
resilient control algorithms to protect their critical electric power grid
infrastructure from cyberattacks [37,41,42]. Otherwise, the CPPS cyber
breach disrupts the nation’s power supply, causing billions of dollars in
losses and a negative impact on the country’s GDP growth and economy.
As a result, most CPPS R&D initiatives around the world prioritize
cybersecurity research. Cyberattacks will undoubtedly have an impact
on the energy development landscape to reduce carbon emissions and
create a sustainable ecosystem by the United Nations SDGs. It is also
worth noting the significance of cybersecurity in core sustainability
principles. As with most operations today, ICTs increasingly, if not
entirely, support traditional sustainability efforts as specified by the
United Nation Global Compact 10 Principles and the 17 SDGs. Each of
these Principles and Goals necessitates the use of cybersecurity. This
necessitates the creation of a testbed for analyzing various cyberattacks,
modeling attack types, risk assessment, digital forensic analysis, testing
various cybersecurity mechanisms in CPPSs, and ensuring an energy-
sustainable future.
3. Review of related literature on CPPS testbeds and
contributions
According to the previous review works on CPPSs testbeds, a large
number of testbeds have been developed to physically or virtually
emulate or simulate CPPSs, and some relevant reviews have appeared in
the literature. [9] reviewed cyber-physical smart grid (SG) testbeds and
provided classification and intuitive guidelines for the development of
SG testbeds. The testbeds were classified in this review based on their
research objectives, communication infrastructure, test platforms, and
domains. A review of various CPS vulnerabilities [43] and tools and
techniques for determining the system’s efficiency against cyber threats
and attacks is presented [10,44,45] conducted a review of Industrial
Control System (ICS) testbeds and reviewed 16 testbeds, the majority of
which are aimed at recognizing vulnerabilities and threats, educating
power system operators, and testing various cybersecurity mechanisms.
Furthermore, they classified the testbeds based on their fidelity and
objectives. [46,47] provided a non-exhaustive assessment of certain CPS
testbeds used in critical infrastructure, and [48] described the Experi­
mentation Platform for Internet Contingencies (EPIC) testbed. This is an
early example of a cyber-physical range. [49,50] examine in depth the
most recent cybersecurity studies in power systems. It focuses on
research revealing cybersecurity flaws and suggests strategies to
improve power grid security. The Australian Department of Defense
published a detailed overview of (non-CPS, conventional) testbeds up to
2013. [51] supplemented this by examining relevant research up to
2017 and providing a description of the KYPO cyber range. Another such
review can be found in [52]. Furthermore, the majority of works that
describe individual testbeds compare these testbeds to a few others of
similar scope [10,53-55]. However, there are studies [56,57] that focus
on evaluating software and network testbeds for domains other than
CPPSs. [58-60] provide an overview of cyber ranges (a type of software
and network testbed) and their use, with over 100 actives in the United
States alone. [61] discovered a total of 23 testbeds while evaluating
testbeds for experimental IoT research. These testbeds are distinct from
the cyber ranges investigated by [62] in that they focus on specific
networking technologies such as Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). This
scope effectively requires the testbeds to use real hardware before vir­
tualization to a greater extent. [63] shows a few tools and testbeds for
R.V. Yohanandhan et al. International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 136 (2022) 107720

Table 1 Table 1 (continued )

Major Cyber-Physical Attacks on the Energy Sector. Year Location Attack Objects Attack Type Impact
Year Location Attack Objects Attack Type Impact
Northeastern assets of the load opportunities
1982 Russia Gas pipeline Code 3 kilotons TNT regions of dispatch centres for economic
control system Manipulation equivalent India espionage.
software explosion
1999 Bellingham, Slowdown of Code Huge fireball simulating and modeling cyber-attacks, as well as defensive responses to
USA SCADA system of Manipulation that killed 3
a gasoline pipeline people and
those attacks. Although there are many literature reviews on CPPS
injured many testbeds, this is the first to discuss the outlook and various requirements
others of future CPPS testbeds, as well as how they solve real-life problems
2003 Ohio, USA Slammer worm Malware Parameter faced by utilities by providing feasible solutions. The purpose of this
penetrated the Injection display system
review work is to improve understanding of developing new testbeds
nuclear plant was off for 5 h
control system and to advocate for standardizing a realistic cyber-physical testbed with
2007 Idaho National Aurora attack False Data Exploded lower costs and better performance to enable real-world deployments.
Laboratory, manipulated a Injection generator This review will be beneficial in addressing future research in this area
USA circuit breaker of as well as new researchers interested in the CPPS domain. This study can
a diesel generator
2008 Turkey Attackers False Data Oil explosion
be expanded in the future by adding additional testbeds to the website to
manipulated Injection and 30 k barrels create a database of useful material that the research community can use
control system are spelled in for future research and studies in this critical sector.
parameters of the water To that end, the following are the main contributions of this review
oil pipeline
article:
2010 Iran Stuxnet worm Malware At least 14
penetrated the Injection industrial
nuclear power locations in Iran • A thorough overview of CPPS concepts, as well as how testbeds can
plant SCADA were infected, aid in the actual implementation of CPPS in existing utilities is
system including a provided.
uranium
enrichment
• The significance of cyber-sustainability or cybersecurity consider­
plant. ations as key design characteristics of SDGs technology imple­
2012 Saudi Arabia & Malware affected Malware Generation and mentations was emphasized.
Qatar Aramco and Injection delivery of • The outlook for future CPPS testbeds in terms of communication,
RasGas energy have
control, computing and educational perspective is thoroughly
been affected.
2015 Ukraine Attack on the False Data For a few hours, examined.
breaker’s settings Injection 225 k customers
in 3 distribution were without 4. A brief history of the Cyber-Physical Power System (CPPS)
companies service.
2016 Ukraine Malware Malware It amounted to a
industroyer Injection one-fifth
The integration of a cyber system with a physical power system [64]
intrudes into reduction in results in a tightly coupled CPPS. Integrating a cyber system with a
transmission power use at physical power system improves electric power system efficiency and
substation control that time of security [23]. The CPPS, as shown in Fig. 1, includes the traditional
systems night.
electric power grid areas of generation, transmission, distribution, and
2017 Saudi Arabia Malware Triton Malware It triggers the
Oil Refinery affected safety Injection plant’s utilization. A CPPS is a system of systems that integrates and coordinates
systems of a emergency the physical power and internet systems. These are distributed networks
power station shutdown comprised of embedded and control systems that regulate and monitor
system to go the physical power system in real-time while operating in extreme
into action.
2019 Power Utilities Communication Denial of For a short time,
conditions. CPPSs are made up of interconnected and interacting parts,
@ California & network Service electrical as well as physical input and output. This isn’t about combining
Wyoming, USA bombarded with system communication and computing technologies with conservative in­
network traffic operations ventions that preserve the individuality of both sides. This combines
would be
networking and computation with physical power systems to create one-
disrupted, but
this would not of-a-kind inventions, technical abilities, and scientific discoveries.
result in a A cyber system combines control, computer, and communication
blackout. functions. Physical power systems are natural and man-made power sys­
2019 Kudankulam Virus having Man-In-The The infected tems that are managed and governed by physics rules and operate in real-
Nuclear Power infected the Middle attack systems were
time. Physical and cyber systems in CPPSs are those that are inextricably
Plant, Tamil systems at the segregated from
Nadu, India power plant the vital linked at all stages and dimensions. CPPS communicates, computes, and
internal organizes physical power system actions using networks and embedded
network, and computers. A CPPS collects feedback on how physical power system
the rest of the
events affect both control and computations. CPPS’s alter how physical
system’s
functionality power systems around the world interact with us in the same way that the
was unaffected. internet altered how humans communicate with one another. CPPS isn’t
2020 Mumbai, India Malware affected Malware For a few hours, an intellectual problem about the intersection of cyber and physical
safety systems of Injection customers were power systems; it’s about the intersection. It is not necessary to separate
the power grid without service.
and understand the computational and physical power system compo­
2021 Western, Malware affected Malware Targeting the
Eastern, various power Injection Indian energy nents. Instead, as shown in Fig. 1, we must understand their interaction.
Southern and sector provides To design such systems, it is necessary to understand the coupled dy­
namics of physical power systems, networks, software, and computers.

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Table 2 physical and cyber systems in a timely and actionable manner, which is a
Characteristics of Cyber and Physical Systems in CPPS [23]. critical but underdeveloped capability in power systems. Grid modern­
SI. Characteristics Cyber System Physical System ization has received a lot of attention in recent years, but the advance­
No ment of standards and technology has only slightly improved
1. Nature of System Discrete, Static behavior Continuous, Dynamic interoperability. In the CPPS, interoperability is based on an analytical
behavior understanding of the language used to express the requirements and
2. Modelling Difference Equations Differential-Algebraic capabilities of cyber and physical subsystems, components, and devices.
Equations NIST proposed and implemented a CPSs ontology in the power system to
3. System State Information Flow Energy Flow (Operational
(Information Technology Technology (OT))
improve our ability to communicate with stakeholder groups about grid
(IT)) modernization objectives, strategies, and concerns [65]. As a result, the
4. Branch Model Information Flow Power Grid Model – CPPS is a subset of the larger universe of CPSs.
Oriented Model – Data Energy Generation,
Transmission, Data Energy Transmission and
Processing, and Data Pool Energy Distribution
5. Classification of CPPS testbeds based on platform type
5. Components Control Systems, Generator, Transformer,
Computing Devices, Transmission Line, 5.1. Off-line simulation based testbed
Communication Networks Circuit Breaker,
Protective Relay, Load,
Off-line simulation (non-real-time simulation) was used to validate
etc.
6. Condition Interdependent operation Generation and Load the system at an earlier stage of the design process, and once the design
balance among Control, Balance, Power was finalized, the testing of the system will be carried out. This method
Computing, and Transmission Limits has three drawbacks: first, the transition from off-line simulation to real
Communication functions prototype is susceptible to many problems and difficulties related to the
7. Contingency Cyber Contingency Physical Contingency.
8. Types of Cyber Attacks, Line Fault, Generator
interconnection of different subsystems or modules; second, the off-line
Contingency Communication Latency, Outage, Load Outage, simulation takes a very long time to complete the simulation for simu­
Malicious Control effects, Environmental effects, lating a moderately complex system; and third, the off-line simulation
etc. etc. takes a very long time to complete the simulation for simulating a
9. Stability and Networked Control Power System Stability
moderately complex system. Offline simulation testbeds may fail to
Security System Stability and Cyber and Power System
Security Security capture enough real-world phenomena such as measurement error,
10. Event Synchronous Asynchronous control signal error, noise, and disruptions [66]. The only advantage of
Synchronization offline simulation is that results can be obtained as soon as possible [67].
The available computer power and the mathematical model complexity
of the system determine the system’s solving speed.
Table 2 compares the physical system’s and cyber system’s attri­
butes. The significant interdependence and interaction of cyber and
physical systems at various times, locations, and sizes are the main 5.2. Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) or Controller-In-the-Loop (CIL)
characteristics of CPPS modeling. A static system composed of cyber simulation based testbed
components linked by a communication network that allows data to
flow is referred to as a cyber system. The physical system, on the other HIL simulation, also known as CIL simulation, is a technique used to
hand, is dynamic and consists of a generator, transformer, transmission develop and test protection systems and controllers. The goal is to test
line, load, and other physically connected energy-flowing components. and validate the quality, functionality, performance, and safety of the
Because the cyber and physical systems in CPPS are in separate topol­ protective systems and controller software program. This is accom­
ogies, the close relationship between them acts as a critical point of plished by connecting real-world control and protection equipment to a
failure. The failure of one system in a large-scale CPPS causes cata­ real-time simulator through voltage and current interfaces, just like in
strophic cascading failure in the entire system. The performance of one real life. The real-time simulator accurately and precisely simulates the
system is heavily dependent on the performance of another due to the steady-state and transient behavior of the modeled system. By repli­
dependency and interaction nature of physical and cyber systems. cating reality, the controller is “duped” into believing it is connected to
Interoperability refers to the ability to exchange information between the genuine physical system. The protection equipment and controller

Fig. 2. Exemplifications of extreme cyber-physical attacks on the energy sector, where M represents the number of customers without power in millions.

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R.V. Yohanandhan et al.
can be tested under any operational conditions using this approach
[66,68]. HIL testbeds simulate all of the high-power, high-voltage,
potentially dangerous, and costly equipment in real-time. The actual
device controllers are interfaced to this real-time simulation, as opposed
to a pure offline simulation. The main difficulty with this approach was
creating accurate models for the power equipment. HIL simulation en­
ables the variation and repetition of tests under reproducible conditions
on prototyped hardware without putting the system or people at risk. It
can also be programmed and executed automatically [69].
5.3. Power Hardware-In-the-Loop (PHIL) simulation based testbed
The PHIL concept expands on the HIL concept by including power
components. High-power interfaces are required in PHIL simulation to
test generators, FACTS devices, power converters, and other devices. To
implement PHIL and HIL simulations reliably and safely, a robust model,
a fast execution program with running times of less than a few micro­
seconds, and high-speed I/O communication are required, so that the
protection system and controller can be tested under conditions iden­
tical to those found in real life. PHIL testbeds typically test one piece of
power equipment, such as Power Converters, Dynamic Load, FACTS
devices, HVDC, and so on, while simulating the behavior of the rest of
the power system. To provide a stable power exchange interface, this
technique necessitates the careful selection and implementation of
power amplifiers with control and protection [69]. The advantages of
PHIL include i) Allowing the hardware under test to be more robust
across a wider range of parameters, test conditions, and faults. ii)
Incorporating real-world delays, latencies, and cyber-events into
system-level validation; iii) Validating complex, system-level, dynamic
interactions between multiple devices, at-power, without costly field
demonstration or detailed device models; and iv) Enabling tests that are
not feasible or too risky to perform on the real system (e.g., fault on the
feeder, over-speed on motors, etc.)
5.4. Rapid Control Prototyping (RCP) based testbed
The use of distributed energy resources (DERs) in the electrical grid
has grown in the last decade as environmental awareness has grown. With
some companies now incorporating megawatt-scale DERs, the demand
for RCP technology for such systems is increasing. Before integrating large
capacity DERs into vulnerable power networks, more extensive modeling,
simulation, analysis, and control experiments in laboratories are required.
Before integrating real power system networks, the traditional method of
testing, verifying, and validating complex controls entails thoroughly
examining the subsystem and individual component behavior, primarily
through simulation. Because of the power levels, precautions must be
taken at this stage: a minor controller error could destroy the prototype or
real-world power networks, resulting in project delays and significant
losses. In RCP applications, a physical plant is linked to a real-time
simulation controller. To reduce personal injuries, the likelihood of
damage, and the time required for technology transfer to market, as well
as to conduct additional tests in a short period, which is often impractical
or impossible to carry out on real power networks, a more advanced
testing approach, such as RCP, is required. There are numerous advan­
tages to using RCP over a real controller prototype [70]. When using a
real-time simulator, the development and implementation of a controller
prototype can be much faster, more versatile, and easier to debug. To fine-
tune the controller prototype, advanced artificial intelligence (AI) tech­
niques can be used.
5.5. Software-In-the-Loop (SIL) simulation based testbed
In the SIL simulation-based testbed, both the plant and the controller
are modeled in real-time in the same simulator. Because the plant model
and controller are both running on the same simulator, timing with the
real world is no longer critical; it can be faster or slower than real-time
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International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 136 (2022) 107720
with no effect on the simulation results, making SIL ideal for accelerated
simulation. In accelerated mode, the simulation runs faster than in real-
time, allowing a large number of tests to be completed in a short amount
of time [71].
5.6. Human-In-The-Loop (HITL) simulation based testbed
Human-In-The-Loop Cyber-Physical Systems (HITLCPSs) are CPSs
that consider the human response and incorporate humans into the
system. Future CPSs are likely to be much more human-aware, which is
becoming increasingly important. It includes a model, which is an
appropriate representation of human behavior and is treated as an in­
tegral part of the overall system. Through various sensors and mobile
devices, the HITLCPSs infer the user’s psychological states, intents,
emotions, and actions, and use this information as feedback in the
closed-loop to determine the CPSs control actions. When humans are
considered an integral part of the CPS, the accuracy, robustness, and
performance of the control loop can be greatly improved [72]. This
technology is closely related to robotics, machine learning, wireless
sensor networks, and the IoT.
5.7. Co-simulation based testbed
Models from various domains, such as extremely advanced simula­
tion models for ICT or electrical grid system models, are required for
simulations. It is more important than ever to connect many simulation
models to comprehend collective system behavior across multiple do­
mains (Power, ICT, Thermal, etc.). These domain-specific models are
simulated using hybrid simulation or co-simulation techniques in
separate runtime contexts [54,73]. Integrated ICT and power system
simulation methodologies have been a primary motivator for advancing
co-simulations because they are critical for simulating and compre­
hending emerging CPPS concepts. For the advanced development of
CPPS monitoring and protection applications, co-simulations can
simulate the interdependence and interaction between power and ICT
systems [74]. Co-simulations pose significant engineering challenges
due to high time synchronization requirements between ICT systems
(Event-driven) and Power systems (Time-driven) due to fundamentally
different simulation types, and (ii) high computational complexity for
evaluating large-scale systems (e.g., for analyzing WAMPAC systems)
[67]. The emphasis is primarily on real-time co-simulations of ICT and
power systems. The Exata emulation platform was used to model,
simulate, and implement the ICT environment, and the real-time simu­
lator on the RT-LAB platform was used to simulate the power system
[75]. The co-simulation of ICT systems and power system dynamics is
carried out with the proper modeling of delay times and events (e.g.,
communication link failure, cyber-attack, etc.) caused by the ICT system
on the power system, which has a significant impact on the solution’s
performance in WAMPAC applications. Because wide-area remote
measurements and WAC functions or actions fall into this category, the
dynamics of ICT must be considered to arrive at practical solutions. The
most difficult challenge in co-simulation is synchronizing heterogeneous
models and coordinating individual solvers.
5.8. RT-lab real-time platform based testbed
To achieve behavior as close to reality as possible, the interaction
between the simulated model and real-world physical hardware must
take place in a closed-loop, which is made possible by utilizing the RT-
LAB environment’s facilities. RT-LAB is an integrated real-time software
platform that uses RCP and HIL simulation to enable model-based design
and testing of control systems, according to the V-cycle design process
[76]. Real-Time Simulation of MATLAB/Simulink models is possible
with RT-LAB via the Real-Time Workshop (RTW). The models are then
run on a target computer with multicore processors. This enables the
RCP of the application. RT-LAB handles real-world interfacing with I/O
R.V. Yohanandhan et al. International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 136 (2022) 107720

boards, user interaction, and synchronization invisibly. To connect to
the HIL structure, RT-LAB employs a well-equipped I/O system that
includes ADC and DAC converters, digital inputs and outputs, and an
FPGA subsystem [75]. These features ensure that enough computing
power is available to simulate large power grids in the required time
step, which is typically 20–50 s. RT-LAB generates parallel tasks from
the original Simulink models, which it then executes on each core of the
multi-core CPU computer or separate computers.
6. Outlook of the future CPPS testbeds
In this section, the trends and advancements in CPPS testbeds
compelled by the ever-growing requirements of CIP applications is
highlighted. The identified trends are presented in Fig. 3 by comparing
earlier and contemporary research studies for developing secured CPPS.
6.1. Federated CPPS testbeds

For CPPSs, there are several testbeds available, including simulated,

Fig. 3. Future CPPS Testbeds.

Fig. 4. Federated Testbed Concept.

8
R.V. Yohanandhan et al.
virtual, and physical. Furthermore, it is extremely difficult for a single
academic institution or national R&D lab to possess all of the necessary
expertise to conduct cybersecurity research on these heterogeneous
testbeds and manage these testbeds, which necessitates a significant
investment. On the other hand, researchers and educators need com­
plete access to federated CPPS testbeds that effectively simulate their
interdependencies and activities to build cybersecurity solutions and
comprehend cybersecurity challenges.
As a result, it’s critical to combine multiple testbeds into a single
federated testbed, such as cloud systems, CPPSs, cybersecurity, smart
devices and sensors, and WAMC, among others. Federated CPPS testbeds
integrate multiple testbeds located in different sites to facilitate cross-
domain experiments, as shown in Fig. 4. It contributes to the develop­
ment of a large-scale, high-fidelity, multi-user experimental cyberse­
curity testbed for the CPPS environment. There are just a few works that
capture the flavour of a federation in specific applications. Prior to this,
the ISU PowerCyber testbed successfully federated with the DETER
testbed at the University of Southern California’s Information Science
Institute to perform several cyberattack tests on wide-area controllers
[77]. Six testbeds, located at six different institutions in five states (Iowa
State University (ISU), Idaho National Laboratory (INL), United States
Naval Academy (USNA)Army Research Laboratory (ARL), United States
Military Academy (USMA)), and United States Air Force Academy
(USAFA) are working together to develop a federated testbed to address
the cybersecurity challenges in the power system domain [78].
Most of the federated CPPS testbeds involve demonstration of new or
Fig. 5. Federated Cybersecurity Testbed as a Service (FCTaaS) architecture.
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International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 136 (2022) 107720
emerging concepts, such as interoperability of control systems and ar­
chitectures, transactive energy systems, developing novel CPS security
tools, data analytics for cybersecurity framework, providing the scaling
capability to simulate the large-scale system, open data exchange, se­
curity and reliability of the systems at all levels, capturing real-time
communication networks to emulate the real-grid network and attack/
defence experimentation on a WAMC scheme. These federated testbeds
can then be used to teach students and researchers how to analyze CPPSs
normal operations, identify their interactions and interdependencies,
threats, vulnerabilities, and how they can be exploited by sophisticated
cyberattacks, as well as how to develop cyber defence mechanisms and
protect them. There are now several standalone CPPS and cybersecurity
testbeds, but no tools or approaches exist to automatically create a
federated testbed (a testbed of heterogeneous testbeds).
The availability of such a federated testbed as a cloud service can be
used to address important research questions about future CPPS appli­
cations and services, such as i) How do we model and predict in­
teractions, interdependencies, and operations among large, complex,
heterogeneous, and dynamic federations of cybersecurity and CPPS
testbeds? ii) How can we secure and protect CPPS resources, services,
and interactions in both normal and atypical scenarios, such as those
resulting from natural or malicious events?, and iii) How can we design
novel cybersecurity experiments that give students and researchers
hands-on experience discovering existing and freshly created threats and
vulnerabilities in the CPPS infrastructure, as well as detecting and pro­
tecting their operations from cyberattacks?. The main challenges in
R.V. Yohanandhan et al. International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 136 (2022) 107720

Fig. 6. Service-Oriented Architecture for Federated Testbeds.

Fig. 7. International Collaborative Testbeds.

10
R.V. Yohanandhan et al.
Fig. 8. High-Level Cyber-Physical Federation Architecture Inspired by NASPInet Using Geographically Dispersed Testbeds.
federated CPPS testbeds are: i) development of protocols and robust
economic model for sharing access to private resources ii) standardiza­
tion issues iii) communication delay effects iv) data loss v) maintenance
costs vi) interoperability of systems vii) data and information exchange
and analytics and viii) strategies for sustainability. To address the
challenges faced by federated testbeds, an FCTaaS architecture was
proposed by the University of Arizona (NSF Center for Cloud and
Autonomic Computing) [79], as shown in Fig. 5. The design, as shown in
Figs. 6 and 7 provide a service-oriented architecture that allows edu­
cators and researchers to publish security experiments for research and
cybersecurity training. Furthermore, researchers can able to add their
security testbeds to the FCTaaS list of supported testbeds. To keep the
federated security testbed secure and private, the FCTaaS architecture
shown in Fig. 5 will use security technologies and open communication
standards. These services enable disparate testbeds to transmit their data
in a semantic and syntactically consistent manner (to understand the
data semantics and their dependencies).
Users can configure the appropriate testbeds and their interactions,
manage the global time among all testbeds utilized in the experiment,
and adopt these testbeds as required by the experiment goals using the
Experiment management services. Fig. 8 depicts a high-level perspective
of the distributed federation architecture proposed by Iowa State Uni­
versity [80] for CPPS security using various testbeds. This is an industry-
grade CPPS federated testbed infrastructure that enables bidirectional
data sharing among geographically scattered devices in a safe, resilient,
and accessible manner. This architecture is similar to the NASPI net­
work’s conceptual architecture. The two geographically separated test­
beds are remotely connected by VPN and an internet-based
communication medium, allowing for dependable, secure, and real-time
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International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 136 (2022) 107720
communication between the two testbeds. The architecture takes into
account two local control centres, one of which serves as the SCADA
control centre in the testbed 1 network and the other as a
synchrophasor-based control centre in the testbed 2 network. It is vital
to highlight that testbed 1 serves as a cybersecurity experimentation
platform, where various forms of cyberattacks can be used to research
and analyse the cyber-physical behaviour of CPPS in the federated
environment.
In federated CPPS testbeds, the following activities would be carried
out: (i) establishing a repository of standardised models and experi­
mental datasets for power systems and associated cyber systems to assist
researchers in exploiting the testbed capabilities for cybersecurity
experimentation, (ii) expanding the user base, (iii) enhancing
programmability/customization, and (iv) creating sophisticated use
cases.
6.2. Virtual CPPS testbeds
The main disadvantages of the existing physical CPPS testbeds are
too big to fit in a lab, CPPS security researchers rely on small testbeds to
collect data, and small CPPS testbeds may not have all the required data
for cybersecurity research. To overcome this problem, a virtual CPPS
testbed provides a high-fidelity virtual copy of CPPS, gives an accurate
result like a physical CPPS testbed during normal and attack conditions,
and scale-up a virtual testbed to model a full-size CPPS. Compared to
simulation-based testbeds, virtualization testbeds may help to provide
credible, reusable, and can be used to design and develop CPPS security
testbeds in a cost-effective manner. The flexibility and reusability of
scenarios, as well as the fact that training and research may be
R.V. Yohanandhan et al. International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 136 (2022) 107720

Fig. 9. Network Virtualization.

undertaken from anywhere using an internet-enabled environment, are
all advantages of employing a virtual CPPS testbed. As a result, research
can be conducted not just on-site, but also with virtual and distributed
teams.
The virtual CPPS testbeds mimic or simulate OT and IT networks and
systems and critical cybersecurity incidents on these systems. It is widely
used in cybersecurity competitions and challenges, cybersecurity
training and education, national cybersecurity exercises, and to mimic
various attack vectors in the existing CPPS testbeds. [81] proposes a
unique and modular strategy to virtualizing complex SCADA system
operation. This strategy reduces the cost and size of SCADA testbeds,
promoting CPPS cybersecurity research. Virtualization technology has

Fig. 10. Mapping of cyber physical system (CPS) networks to virtual networks.

12
R.V. Yohanandhan et al.
also been used by certain researchers to create various components of
industrial control system testbeds. GRFICS simulated components such
as PLC devices and I/O modules using virtual machines [82]. Some re­
searchers used virtualization technology to improve the scalability and
reproducibility of the testbed [83]. However, virtualized complex CPPS
operations involve a large number of computations, correspondingly
increasing the computer’s hardware requirements. Currently, virtuali­
zation technology can only install and virtualize open-source controllers
and related software in a virtual system, making testing and verifying
WAC vulnerabilities in the CPPS extremely difficult.
The incorporation of network virtualization into CPPS testbeds is
critical for testbed development in order to allow evaluation and
exploration in future cyber networks. Network Function Virtualization
(NFV) is a novel approach that provides new ways to design, implement,
and manage network services. Network Virtualization for CPPS, as
depicted in Fig. 9, is a type of virtualization that allows many virtual
networks to coexist on a single physical network by multiplexing
hardware capacity. Network virtualization is classified into two types:
link virtualization and router virtualization. A virtual network interface
card enables link virtualization by allowing several virtual links to exist
on a single physical link. The router virtualization technology, which
employs system virtualization, builds a plethora of separate logical
routers on a physical router [84]. It splits resources in order to create
multiple virtual routers from a single hardware router.
The global scale virtual network for CPS is depicted in Fig. 10. It is
made up of two CPS networks, each of which is employed for a different
purpose. Each virtual global CPS network corresponds to a virtual
network that connects a collection of virtual platforms. Virtual global
CPS network 1 is mapped to a virtual network covered by virtual plat­
forms 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, as shown in Fig. 32, whereas virtual global CPS
network 2 is assigned to a set of virtual platforms spanning 1, 3, 4, 5, and
6. A global CPS virtual network comprises one or more local CPS net­
works, each with its own set of sensors, controllers, and actuators. Local
CPS networks 1–1, 1–2, and 1–3 make up the virtual global CPS network
1. Each local CPS network is spread out over a large area. On a combined
wired/wireless LAN, controllers in the same local CPS network
communicate with each other, while controllers in separate local CPS
networks communicate with each other via the global CPS network.
Fig. 11. Graphical User Interface of the Cyber-Resilience Demo [116].
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International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 136 (2022) 107720
6.3. CPPS resilience testbeds
In CPPS operations, fast measures are required in addition to the risk
assessment process to protect the CPPS functionality from threats and
vulnerabilities. For CPPS, the term “risk assessment” should be replaced
with a more thorough, holistic, and dynamic definition of resilience.
Resilience is defined as “The ability to prepare for and adapt to changing
conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions.” Resil­
ience attributes are the capability to withstand, speed of recovery,
ability to adapt, and ability to prepare. Integrating these four capabil­
ities into the system would allow it to continuously handle the four
sustainability-related elements of power and energy systems: “avail­
ability”, “accessibility”, “affordability”, and “acceptability”. The resil­
ience for CPPS is defined as the “system survivability and ability to
maintain continuous power flow to the customers given a certain load pri­
oritization strategy.” In a real-time operating scenario, a resilient CPPS
adapts to cyber and physical disruptions, prevents service outages, and
changes its loads, structure, and resources [85]. The disturbing events in
CPPS can be divided into four categories: i) events in physical systems
such as sensors, grid structure, and grid components; ii) events in soft­
ware systems. iii) correlated events in CPPS components with physical
and cyber characteristics, such as state estimation systems and control
systems, and iv) correlated events in cyber systems, such as data
communication, software applications, and control algorithms.
The graphical user interface (GUI) of the cyber-resilience demo is
shown in Fig. 11. It is a real-time simulation environment for analyzing
digital twins and ICT integration in power systems [86]. In this GUI, the
vulnerabilities of the whole CPPS, including both physical malfunctions
and cybernetic phenomena, are analyzed. This GUI is developed for
educational and research purposes to show how a cyberattack can
disconnect the small electrical distribution system. Furthermore, the
GUI shows how a digital twin of the CPPS can be used to defend and
detect cyberattacks. The GUI is representing a simple medium voltage
(MV) distribution radial feeder connecting two substations: “Substation
1,” which delivers electric power to a residential customer, and “Sub­
station 2,” which is connected to the electric transmission system. The
“Substation 2” consists of an On-Load-Tap-Changer (OLTC) transformer,
which is equipped with a voltage controller with two control modes:
R.V. Yohanandhan et al.
Fig. 12. Overview of the ERIGrid approach
“Remote” and “Local.” During the normal operation, the “Remote” mode
is set and controls the voltage of the remote “Substation 1”, while the
“Local” mode controls the voltage of the local “Substation 2” under
circumstances in which remote information cannot be trusted. The in­
formation about the two substations is digitally transmitted to the
controller through RTUs. Specifically, the controller in “Substation 2”
receives the information of “Substation 1” via IEC 608,705 104 protocol
messages and the information of “Substation 2” locally via IEC 61,850
protocol messages. This GUI demonstrates how a cyber attacker can
exploit the vulnerabilities of the RTU located at “Substation 1” to modify
the information transmitted to “Substation 2” and change its payload.
The cybersecurity measures are carried out by the Defender mechanism
in the transformer’s controller. It consists of two control modes:
“Remote” and “Local.” The “Defender” compares the voltage received
from the “Substation 1” with the estimated voltage in “Substation 2”. If
the difference between the two voltages is very high, the “Defender”
changes the control mode of the controller to “Local,” given that the
remote voltage confidence level is lost. Only when the “Defender” de­
tects matching voltages of “Substation 1” and “Substation 2” at the same
time any cyberattacks are detected and fixed, then the “Defender”
changes the control mode to default “Remote” mode. Finally, the
“Monitoring Centre” receives the information from both substations via
IEC 608,705 104 messages for data analytics and visualization.
6.4. Holistic testing and validation
The future CPPS becoming a more complex system of systems with
the integration of intermittent DERs, technology developments, frequent
changes of regulation and rules, more flexibility on the consumer side
through controllable loads, and the liberalization of energy markets, the
CPPS operations needs adaptation. The existing CPPSs are already in­
tegrated with intelligent automation systems, sophisticated centralized
measurement and control devices at transmission systems, and modern,
scalable ICTs at distribution networks. The use of advanced monitoring,
control, and protection devices to enhance CPPS operation generates a
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International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 136 (2022) 107720
greater coupling of technical areas like as electrical, automation, and IT
where there were previously limited mutual interactions and in­
terdependencies. In response to this change, new strategies, solutions,
technologies, and behaviours must be established. Because the entire
CPPS is considered as a holistic electric energy vital infrastructure, such
new solutions should ensure that traditional real-time operation, high-
fidelity, and regulatory criteria are met in the future. Before deploying
the new CPPS solutions and products in the real-time operating envi­
ronment, they should be tested and validated [86]. The traditional
methods of testing and validation for CPPSs focus only on the compo­
nent and device level while simplifying or assuming the behaviour of
electrical characteristics is only static in nature. The traditional
approach is incompatible with the heterogeneity of CPPS technologies
and domains, particularly the interactions and interdependencies across
the various technologies.
To support the different stages in the overall development process of
CPPS solutions, the test and validation should be done on a system level,
address all relevant test domains, and then proceed for real-world
deployment. To overcome the shortcomings in evaluating CPPS solu­
tions, an ERIGrid approach of holistic testing and validation for CPPS is
shown in Fig. 12. Its main functions are i) development of holistic testing
and validation procedure for CPPSs and corresponding configurations,
ii) Improvement of real-time simulation and experimental-based testing
methods supporting the validation activities, and iii) provision of free
research infrastructure, tools, and methods for developing training and
educational concepts to support for overall research activities. The up­
coming CPPS testbeds focus on the holistic approach to testing and
validating CPPS solutions and methods.
6.5. SDN based CPPS testbeds
The Communication network management in CPPS is a very chal­
lenging and error-prone task. Currently, the CPPS operation is assisted
by modern data centres with huge volumes of network switches, servers,
and data handled per second. Manual configuration of all these
R.V. Yohanandhan et al.
networking equipment proved very costly and also time-consuming. The
current network infrastructure may not be able to dynamically adapt to
the CPPSs multiple services and business models. It is also very difficult
to implement new protocols, techniques, and emerging services
demanded by the CPPS communication networks with the existing
protocols. The advancement of the CPPS operation demands faster
innovation, adoption, network agility, and flexibility. To meet these
challenges, facilitate deploying new services in CPPS communication
networks and make the network more programmable. According to the
CPPS researchers, the communication technologies for CPPS need to be
developed first. They believe that SDN will enable information inter­
change across several levels and network platforms, as well as the
adoption of new CPPS business models without the need for hardware
replacement [87,88]. Through centralised control and management,
SDN-based CPPS networks provide the best feasible solution and
improve system robustness by improving the optimization and reli­
ability of transmission asset use. SDN is a promising solution for cloud
environments, data centres, and wide-area networks in CPPS applica­
tions. The three fundamental characteristics of SDN are i) A clear sep­
aration of data plane and control plane in which forwarding decisions
are made, ii) The abstraction of the network logic moved from hardware
implementation into software, and iii) The coordination of forwarding
decisions of network devices by network controller [89]. The SDN based
CPPS operations will (i) improves WAMS and WAC in terms of perfor­
mance and resource utilization, (ii) enhances network intelligence
through dynamic protocol adjustments and centralized control, (iii)
enables flexible network operation through cross-layer information (iv)
reallocate the network traffic effectively to meet changing demands and
(v) enhances power system resilience. SDN entails controlling, man­
aging, and configuring all CPPS networking devices from a centralized
controller [90]. The logic of decoupling the data and control planes of
the network is the basis of SDN.
(a) Hybrid SDSG architecture
Fig. 13. Software-Defined Smart Grid Testbed architecture integrates components from both ICT systems and power systems.
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International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 136 (2022) 107720
SDN intends to use CPPS as its primary application scenario. As a
result, the deployment of SDN in CPPS has drawn stakeholder partici­
pation from academia, business, and standardisation groups such as the
IEEE, NIST, and IEC. The existing CPPS testbeds, are more concerned
with the physical power system, while the communication system is
normally handled by simulators such as NS-3, OPNET, OMNET++, and
so on. The performances of CPPS services with real communication
systems continue to be hampered by a lack of support from CPPS test­
beds. As shown in Fig. 13(a), a novel architecture for Software Defined
Smart Grid (SDSG) testbed is presented using a hybrid of real-time
power system simulators and real communication systems. This SDSG
architecture makes use of a combination of hardware and software from
both power and information technology systems. Specifically, three
platforms, including the Software Defined Radio (SDR), computing
platform, and RTDS, are derived from the architecture’s hardware
foundation, as illustrated in Fig. 13 (b). The implemented hardware and
software modules describe the functions of each platform in this archi­
tecture, and all hardware devices are general-purpose in their study
domain. This is the first architecture to combine a hybrid smart grid
testbed with real-time wireless communication networks. This allows
not only for the comparison, evaluation, and selection of various wire­
less communication systems for the CPPS application, but also for the
integration of more sophisticated wireless communication technologies
such as cognitive radio and 5G into the CPPS.
6.6. Edge computing in CPPS
Recently, edge computing has emerged as a promising computing
paradigm in latency-sensitive applications such as CPPS to meet strin­
gent quality-of-service requirements [91]. The fundamental concept of
edge computing is to bring the capabilities and features of cloud
computing to the edge of CPPS networks close to end devices (e.g., PMU,
(b) Modules of each SDSG components
R.V. Yohanandhan et al.
Fig. 14. Edge based CPPS Infrastructure.
PDC, RTU, IED, AMI), thereby not only reducing the latency between
end-to-end devices but also offering a variety of edge applications, and
services as well as creating new business value chains for operators and
application developers in CPPS operation. Furthermore, for imple­
menting 5G networks in future CPPS operations, edge computing is
considered as one of the main keystones of the CPPS computing para­
digm, which helps to achieve ultra-high reliability and low latency.
Fig. 14 depicts a CPPS infrastructure based on edge computing. In
CPPS [92], an edge layer is employed to connect the infrastructure and
operate as a service provider. The cloud is isolated to handle data from
the edge layer and send it to the control centre. This infrastructure
employs a variety of service providers, reducing the pressure on the
cloud centre and integrating the cloud’s primary capabilities to connect
with the management control and control centre. The edge nodes
function as service providers, instantly authenticating and processing
data from smart metres.
Both edge nodes and smart meters have limited computation capa­
bility compared to the cloud computing centre. The edge-enabled CPS
testbed is discussed in [93]. It covers monitoring, data collection, data
analysis, edge-based provisioning, data centre resources, and measure­
ment across edge islands. Existing practical resources, such as the Global
Environment for Networking Innovation (GENI), are suitable as testbeds
but not as operating platforms for high-level applications, particularly
those that require a stable and significant infrastructure with quality-of-
service (QoS) enforcement and end-to-end resource management. This
isn’t to argue that existing testbeds aren’t suited for edge-based CPS
research; it merely means that experimenters have to devise their own
compensating controls, methodologies, and estimates to handle services
that would be better offered at the testbed platform level. In this work,
potential methods for bridging the gap between existing testbeds and
global infrastructure, as well as efforts to address issues such as a)
network and computing resource stability; b) device management; c)
16
International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 136 (2022) 107720
resource management QoS enforcement; d) resource measurement and
monitoring end-to-end; and e) service and application-level experi­
mentation are presented.
6.7. Experimentable digital twins
The increasing integration of DERs in CPPS, the connection of EVs,
and cybersecurity issues posing serious challenges concerning the
operation of CPPS safely and reliably. On top of this, the CPPS are dy­
namic and changing their topology constantly in response to new
sources of generation, breakdowns, and congestion. The Digital Twin
(DT) technology offers reliable solutions for CPPS problems related to
the optimal operation and control of energy assets and the safe and
resilient distribution of electric power. It also provides a better under­
standing of interactions between cyber and physical systems and helps
to make better decisions. The DT leverages the technologies such as big
data analytics, cloud computing, IoT, and machine learning to analyze
the data from various sensors in CPPS and verify the status of physical
assets and extract useful information to predict and optimize the CPPS
performance [94]. The virtual model of the CPPS is developed in the DT
technology then the data analytics was applied to determine the asset
behavior in hypothetical or real situations or to decide on optimization
and control actions. Then the lessons learned can be applied to the
physical system using actuators or manually. DTs can be applied for
digitalizing various CPPS management processes such as wide-area
monitoring, protection, control, and cybersecurity. In addition to this,
the DT technology provides the advantage of accurate modeling of the
CPPS interactions, whose behavior may not be captured with a purely
simulation-based approach. It also provides the ability to run realistic
cyber-attacks outside the real-world CPPS infrastructure, which could
cause infrastructure damage and major service disruptions if run on the
actual CPPS. All the above features make DT as one of the most
R.V. Yohanandhan et al.
Fig. 15. DTs in CPPS applications.
promising emerging technology for CPPS development while supporting
the implementation of the next generation of CPPS services.
Fig. 15 shows an architecture for integrating and using DT in CPPS
applications [95]. The first step is developing the DT model of CPPS
using real-time measurements such as active or reactive power, fre­
quency, current, etc. The second step is to integrate and couple the DT
model with the physical system using CPPS sensors and actuators. The
CPPS sensors are used to acquire various information about CPPS
operation while the actuators enforce actions for control and optimi­
zation. The data monitoring provides the software support for aggre­
gating and processing the data received from the CPPS sensors. The third
step aims to provide technical support for running data-driven analytics
on the data received from CPPS sensors. Data generated from cyber
systems, physical systems, and geographical data can improve the CPPS
operation’s performance. The challenges are efficient storage and
analysis, the velocity at which data is generated and transmitted, het­
erogeneity of data, and lack of reliability in the data acquisition process.
6.8. 21st century CPPS education
The CPPS connects the realms of physical power, computer engi­
neering hardware, and computer science cyberspace. Mathematical
modeling, analysis, design, risk, and uncertainty are fundamental as­
pects of physical power systems. Software programming, communica­
tions hardware systems, embedded computation, and networking are all
covered under computer engineering and computer sciences principles.
Sensors and control theory are particularly vital parts of CPPS because
sensors connect the cyber and physical worlds, and it’s crucial to un­
derstand the strategies for processing the signals they generate and the
features of sensors in their real-world behavior. The relevant elements in
the control theory of CPPS include optimization, distributed control, and
stability. CPPS applications in the future will be more transformational
than the IT revolution of the last three decades. Next-generation CPPS
can achieve superior performance that were previously impossible. The
interdisciplinary skillsets are more necessary than ever before to invent,
17
International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 136 (2022) 107720
design, build and deploy CPPSs. The NSF-sponsored multiyear study
developed criteria for curriculum to address effective CPS education.
Based on the study, it is found that all the engineering and computing
domains must effectively use the CPS and must have access to knowl­
edgeable domain experts in CPS principles. Designing a CPPS degree
program or course is complex and involves a careful balancing of cyber
and physical aspects, general CPS and CPPS knowledge. Based on the
above principles, the foundations for the CPPS curriculum are derived as
follows [96]:
i) Basic Computing Concepts covers advanced programming cour­
ses such as data structures, embedded hardware, software engi­
neering and automata theory.
ii) Computing for the Physical World includes the understanding of
the properties of physical power system, real-time embedded
systems, and computing resource constraints such as memory size
and power.
iii) Continuous and Discrete Mathematics includes beyond linear
algebra, stochastic processes, probability and differential
equations.
iv) Cross-cutting application of Sensing, Actuation, Control,
Computing, and Communication plays a major role in framing
interactions between cyber & physical aspects and the reliance on
control over sensing, data processing, and actuation with real-
time constraints.
v) Modeling of Dynamic and Heterogeneous Systems integrating
Control, Communication and Computing will emphasis on CPPS
heterogeneity and uncertainty, including such techniques as
linear & non-linear models, hybrid models, stochastic models and
associated design methodologies based on dynamic program­
ming, probability theory and optimization.
vi) CPS System Development for resilient, high-confidence, and
safety–critical system such as CPPS requires a complete life-cycle
view from initial requirements to testing, certification, verifica­
tion & validation and adaptable designs.
R.V. Yohanandhan et al.
Fig. 16. Next Generation CPS Testbed-based Quasi Realistic (QR)-GridEx Framework.
Fig. 17. QR-GridEx timeline showing pre-exercise, during the exercise, and post-exercise moves, roles, and resources.
The CPPS testbeds effectively support CPS programs and courses. A
deeper understanding of cross-layer interactions that occur in real-world
CPPS can be achieved with the help of CPPS testbeds. In addition to
educational institutions that support STEM education, contributions
from professional societies and industries can also play important roles
in building such capabilities and resources. NERC created a tabletop-
based GridEx platform enabling North American power companies to
demonstrate how they would respond to and recover from simulated and
coordinated cyberattacks. Every two years, NERC conducts GridEx using
tabletop cyberattack injects and a cyberattack response management
system [97]. GridEx contributes to the physical and cybersecurity de­
fences, as well as support for safer and more secure CPPS operations. It
mimics the worst-case situation, allowing utilities to better assess their
cybersecurity and emergency processes. In 2019, utilities were able to
mimic the loss of control centre functionality, event reporting, cyber­
attack response planning, emergency plans, and alarm systems using the
GridEx-V [98]. The utilities were encouraged to tailor the assault sce­
narios to the operating environment, and to scale them down or up to
meet the utility’s specific requirements. The CPS testbed-based frame­
work for QR-GridEx is depicted in Fig. 16. It includes grid failure sce­
narios developed by NESCOR [99,100], a vulnerability database
18
International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 136 (2022) 107720
developed by NVD/CVE [101], and cyberattack vectors developed by
MITRE ATT&CK [102].The industry standards such as NIST C2M2
[103], NERC CIP [104], cyber defense tools, and attack detection and
mitigation strategies are also incorporated in the QR CPS security test­
bed. Fig. 17 shows the timeline for the procedure that is followed during
the exercise with participants, trainers, and the resources utilized. From
Fig. 16 and Fig. 17, it is inferred that the participants can interact with
the GridEx testbed, and Learning Management System (LMS) can be
used to achieve GridEx objectives.
7. Conclusions and future research directions
This research aims to provide an outlook on future CPPS testbeds for
long-term cybersecurity research in all aspects. CPPS is a novel tech­
nology that combines physical power systems with cyber systems to
efficiently manage future grids. In recent years, there has been a lot of
interest in research on long-term cybersecurity for CPPS. The depend­
ability and stability of the CPPS are dependent on cybersecurity. Threats
and vulnerabilities are becoming more prevalent in the CPPS as a result
of the increased reliance on ICT systems. A major challenge in cyber­
security research is the creation of a realistic testbed that integrates
R.V. Yohanandhan et al.
cyber and physical power systems and responds to network threats. The
realistic CPPS testbed can be used by researchers to validate their
cybersecurity methods and determine whether they meet their re­
quirements. This study summarises a review of future CPPS testbeds
from international academic institutions and national laboratories in
terms of communication, control, computing and educational perspec­
tive. The following are the main contributions to the future CPPS test­
beds review outlook:
• Section 2 briefly discussed the need for a CPPS testbed for cyber­
attacks and a long-term cybersecurity analysis of various cyber­
attacks in the power and energy sectors around the world.
• Section 3 presents a list of review works on the review of CPPSs
testbeds with cybersecurity testing capability.
• Section 4 provides a brief history of the CPPS.
• Section 6 discusses in detail the future CPPS testbeds for critical
infrastructure protection, such as CPPS with industry standards and
requirements.
This review work is expected to be extremely useful for the stake­
holder community in guiding future directions in developing and
operating CPPS testbeds, as well as identifying new opportunities for
valuable interconnections. Academic institutions, national laboratories,
and industries involved in CPPS-related R&D activities, products, and
services, as well as those directly involved with electrical energy gen­
eration, transmission, and distribution integrated with ICTs, may benefit
from this review work. The future directions for CPPS testbeds as
follows:
Communication technology is now the CPPS’s backbone, as it pro­
vides a channel for applications to easily transfer data. The relentless
pursuit of novel, more efficient, low-latency, and cost-effective
communication technologies and networks, such as 5G, wireless
sensor networks (WSN), and their integration in CPPSs, continues.
Because of the potential of sensors collecting data with better coverage
and the communication platform’s power efficiency, these advance­
ments have made many data sources available. Data mining techniques
are commonly used in the collected data now that large amounts of data
are readily available through PMUs in a CPPS. It aids in the identifica­
tion of critical and important data sources in CPPS applications such as
monitoring, control, protection, cyber attack detection, and so on. With
the availability of parallel data sources across multiple CPPS domains,
data fusion techniques that combine cyber and physical data sources are
at the heart of CPPS platform integration. Data fusion’s primary goals
are to address problematic data while improving data reliability and
extracting knowledge from cyber and physical data sources. Section 6
summarises the future testbeds for CPPS applications. The majority of
these testbeds are narrowly focused on a single CPPS domain. However,
no testbed exists to provide a multi-perspectives approach to data fusion
problems in CPPSs, and this literature gap motivates future research
directions. As a result of the expanding scale and scope of cyber and
physical data sources, data collection techniques, and data processing
system architectures, a new way of looking at data fusion testbeds in
CPPS domains is required. In order to cater to ever-increasingly complex
applications, studies in CPPS must use cyber and physical data from
various sources and evaluate their performance across multiple di­
mensions. The growing trend of cyber-physical data fusion in CPPS
applications necessitates the development of new data fusion CPPS
testbeds. A successful CPPS application is built on top of cyber-physical
data (also known as cyber-physical data-driven architecture), and data
fusion has provided a wide range of techniques for improving an ap­
plication’s input data. As a result, the cyber-physical data fusion testbed
has paved the way for various applications to learn more about the
CPPS. This is also the key for a CPPS to better understand and improve
the domains where it falls short.
19
International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 136 (2022) 107720
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
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