A Revolution in the Chinese Iron and Coal Industries During the Northern Sung, 960-1126

A.D.
Author(s): Robert Hartwell
Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Feb., 1962), pp. 153-162
Published by: Association for Asian Studies
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A Revolution in the Chinese Iron and
Coal Industries During the Northern
Sung, 960-1126 A.D.
ROBERT HARTWELL

WO approaches have dominated the study of Chinese industrial history.1

Work of the kind Professor Joseph Needham has done in his Science and
Civilization in China attempts to trace the history of Chinese scientific and tech-
nological achievement from the earliest times.2 Recently some interesting investiga-
tions have also been made of industrialization along modern Western lines since
i8oo.3 Needham has collected valuable data about all periods but neglects the relation
of technology to general economic history. From the other work we get a more or less
comprehensive view of nineteenth century economic development, but this tells us
nothing about an earlier era of significant growth and change. The purpose of this
article is to outline the importance of iron and coal during the remarkable economic
and industrial expansion which took place in the i66 years from 960 to the Jurchen
conquest of North China in II26 A.D.
The precociousdevelopment of the Chinese iron and coal industries is of particular
interest when we bear in mind the critical role these enterprisesplayed in the origins
of industrial civilization in the West. Even in pre-industrial societies, the nature of
iron manufacture generally means that workers depend upon an employer for their
raw materials and market, that they gather together in works, receive wages, and
perform their duties under conditions common to modern times.4 In early modern
England, at least, the expansion of the scale of iron production was a stage leading to
industrialization.5 Ferrous metallurgy is also dependent upon a regular and sub-
stantial source of fuel-wood, charcoal, or coal. In Western Europe, the solution of
the problems associated with the effective substitution of coal for firewood was pre-
requisite to the IndustrialRevolution of the nineteenth century.6

The author is an instructorin Social Sciences at North Park College, Chicago, Illinois.
1 This article follows in general content a paper presented during the annual meeting of the Associa-
tion for Asian Studies at Chicago, March, I96I, under the title, "The Importanceof Iron and Coal During
the Northern Sung: 960-II26."
2 Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, I954,

I956).
3 Albert Feuerwerker, China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuian-huai (I844-I9I6) and Mandarin
Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass., I958); and Ellsworth C. Carlson, The Kaiping Mines (I877-I9I2) (Cam-
bridge,Mass.,1957) are excellentexamples.
4 T. S. Ashton, Iron and Steel in the Industrial Revolution (Manchester, ManchesterUniversity Press,
I95I), p. I.
5ibid.
6 For information on the early British coal industry see John U. Nef, The Rise of the British Coal In-

153

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 154 ROBERT HARTWELL
During the eleventh century, both the technological development and the quantita-
tive expansion of the Chinese iron industry, as well as other metallic and non-metallic
industries was comparable to that during an early industrial revolution of England.
As in England, this process brought about a shortage of timber and increased use of
coal.
Stimulated by the demand for iron currency, iron and steel weapons, agricultural
implements, salt pans, nails, anchors, and armor, Northern Sung mines and smelters
yielded an output of iron probably greater than any other period in pre-nineteenth
century Chinese history.
Estimates of this production have uniformly fallen short of the mark.7 Basing
their figures primarily on the Sung dynastic history8 and thirteenth century en-
cyclopedias,9previous writers have erred in a number of ways. They assume that the
statistics representedtotal output rather than merely the amounts fixed as taxes. They
fail to observe that the "mountain and marsh"'10and the "annual monopoly receipt""
taxes reflectthe production of two entirely different sectors of the iron industry.12And

dustry (London, 1932). Professor Nef's latest statement on the relationship between the earlier and later
industrial revolutions will be found in John U. Nef, Cultural Foundaions of Industrial Civilization (Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, I958). In this paper, I follow ProfessorNef in speaking of "an early
industrial revolution" which took place in England from about I540-i640, and a later "IndustrialRevolu-
tion" which began about 1785.
7 W. F. Collins, Mineral Enterprisein China (London and New York, i i 8), pp. 7, 9; F. R. Tegengren,
"The Iron Ores and Iron Industry of China," Memoirs of the Geological Survey of China, Series A, No. 2,
I92I-23, p. 3I3; Hino Kaisaburo, "Hokus6 jidai ni okeru d6tetsu no sanshutsu-gakuni tsuite (Productions
of Copper and Iron and their Administrationsunder the Northern Sung Dynasty)," Toyo Gakuhc5,22/I:
100-159, I934.
8 Sung-shih, i85:I3b.
9 Wang Ying-lin, Yui Hai (Ch'eng-tu Wang Shih ed.), I 8o:34a; and Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao,I 8:3oa.
10 Sung hui-yao chi-kao, "Shih Huo," 33:27a-29b. Hereafter cited as SHY/SH. Yui Hai, i8o:34a.
l lSHY/SHI, 33:I2b-I4a; Sung-shih, I85:I3b; Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao, I8:3oa.
12 SHY/SH, 33 :27a-29b, I2b-I 4a has "mountain and marsh tax" and "annual monopoly receipt tax"

figures for ca. I078 broken down by circuits and prefectures. Although the totals for both types of taxes
are similar, there are great disparities in the production statistics for circuits. The Yiu Hai, i8o:34a has
the total national figure for the "mountain and marsh tax," and the Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao, i8:3oa, the
national total for the monopoly receipts. Since neither of these works break down their figures by circuits,
later writers have assumed that both reflected receipts from the same source. In addition, the Yu Hai has
"mountain and marsh receipts" (jua) rather than the "mountain and marsh tax" (shuib) which appears
in the Sung hui-yao; and the Sung-shih, i85:13b, probably basing its information on the Wen-hsien
t'ung-k'ao, merely has receipts (shouc), rather than the "monopoly tax receipts" (sui_k,od) which appears
in the Sung hui-yao and the Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao. This has led later investigators to believe that these
figures represented complete production rather than a tax percentage of the total output. In addition,
statistics for several important iron producing prefecturesare missing from the monopoly tax receipt lists
and must be interpolated.
My estimate of I078 iron output at 75,000 tons was calculated in the following manner. A comparison
of the circuit (lue) receipts from the sui-k'od tax on iron (SHYISH, 33:I2b-14a) with the circuit re-
ceipts from the "mountain and marsh tax" (SHYISH, 33:27a-29b) reveals a disparity which can only
indicate that the two sets of figures are concerned with two different sectors of the iron industry. For ex-
ample, according to the sui_k'od statistics, the receipts from Ching-hu Nan Lu equaled about one-third
ton, while the "mountain and marsh tax" figures for the same Circuit reflect receipts of over 203 tons. A
similar situation exists in the case of the other circuits. The sui_k'od receipts are dated I078. Although the
"mountain and marsh tax" figures are not dated, these statistics come from the Kuo-clh'aohui-yao and
use circuit names only established in I059, indicating that they were collected between i059 and I077.
(For dating of the various hui-yao see T'ang Chung, Sung hui-yao yen-chiu, Shanghai, I932). Hino
Kaisabur5, in "Hokus6 jidai ni okeru d5tetsu no sanshutsu-gaku ni tsuite (Productions of Copper and
Iron and their Administrationsunder the Northern Sung Dynasty)," TJyJ Gakuh3 22 (I934) p. III, argues
for the later date. It may be concluded from the above that the iron tax receipts for about I078 equal

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NORTHERN SUNG IRON AND COAL INDUSTRIES 155
these authorsdo not take into accountthe considerablelegal and illegal production
that was not taxed and thereforenot recordedin officialdocuments.13 A morecareful
examinationof contemporarysourcesindicatesthat by I078, from 75,000 to I50,000
tons of iron were being producedannually,a figurefrom 20 to 40 times that usually
quoted. Three centurieslater the output had apparentlyfallen by half,'4 and even
,duringI930-34, onlyI40,000 tonsof pig ironperannumwasproduced in Chinasouth
of the GreatWall.'5The NorthernSung yield to
appears have been two and a half to
five times that of Englandand Wales in i640,16and compares favorablywith a total
Europeanproduction(includingEuropeanRussia) of from I45,000 to i8o,00o tons at
the beginning of the eighteenthcentury.'7The rate of growth was even more re-
markable.While Englishproductionslightlymore than quadrupledduring the two
centuriesfrom I540 to I740,18 Chineseiron output increasedtwelve-foldin the 200
yearsfrom85o to io5o.19
Currencyneedsabsorbeda substantialpercentageof the yield.By io8o, about4300

the sum of both the sui-k'3o and the "mountain and marsh tax" figures. In North China Circuits the
sui-tkod receipts are much greater than the "mountain and marsh tax" receipts, while the reverse is true
of South China. According to Hino Kaisabur6 (Ibid.), government regulations were primarily concerned
with North Chinese iron production. This seems to indicate that the "mountain and marsh tax" was
levied on un-regulated output, and the sui-kod on the yield of officially regulated works, the untaxed
portion of the latter being purchased at fixed rates by the government. According to Hino Kaisaburo,
Ibid., p. I I5 and Kato Shigeru, To SJ jidai ni okeru kin gin no kenkyil (Studies on Gold and Silver during
the T'ang and Sung Dynasties), 527-528, the tax on private production of the base metals was ten per
cent, and on the precious metals, twenty per cent. The total output of private industry would then equal
the "mountain and marsh tax" multiplied by ten. The rate of taxation on officiallyregulated iron produc-
tion seems to have been the same. In this case, however, the iron producers, after paying the ten per cent
tax, sold the remainder to the mining official at a fixed rate. That sui-k'o' statistics merely reflect the tax
receipts, and not the total output of officially regulated works, becomes clear when one examines other
documents concerning the output of iron in specific places. In I084, for example, officials expected to ob-
tain 2,340 tons of iron from the mines and smelters of Hsfi-chou' for the purpose of casting of iron
cash. (Cf. Li Taog,Hsul Tzu-chih-iung-chien Ch'ang-pienh (Chekiang Shu-chii ed., i88i), 97:20a-2ib.
Hereafter cited as HCP.) The I078 sui-k'3o figures,indicate the receipt of only 206 tons, or a little short
of ten per cent the amount expected in I084. Other instances could be cited. In addition, the sui-tkod
statistics are incomplete, in some cases giving only the type and number of industrial units without the
receipts. During the Northern Sung there were five types of officially designated industrial units producing
iron: (i) "place" (ch'u'), having an average annual productionof about 6.5 tons; (2) "market" (ch'angi)
having an average annual production of about 65 tons; (3) "works" (wuk) having an annual production
of about 650 tons; (4) "smelter" (yeh') having an average annual production of about 1300 tons; and
(5) "industrialprefecture" (chienm), containing several of the above units, with an average annual pro-
duction of 65oo tons or more. Interpolating on this basis, one arrives at an additional 2,i66 tons of offi-
cially regulated iron output.
Thus, total taxed iron output includes 35,638 tons (sui-k'od times ten) + 2i66 tons (interpolated
figures) = 37,804 tons of officially regulated iron output + 36,787 tons ("mountain and marsh tax"
receipts times ten) of privately produced iron = 74,591 tons. Untaxed productions (cf. note 13) might
have equaled this taxed output.
18 The output of iron smelters specifically attached to mints, shipyards, salt works, and local military
units appears to have been untaxed, and consequently is not reflected in our tax figures. Cf. below. In
addition, surreptitiousmining and smelting to produce counterfeit iron currency, or to avoid the regular
taxes, seems to have been widespread.
'4Yuian-shih, 94:Ia-8b. This estimate was calculated on the same basis as discussed in note I2.
15 NortonGinsburg (ed.), The Pattern of Asia (New York, I958').
16Dud Dudley, Mettalum Martis (London: i665); John U. Nef, "Note on the Progress of Iron Pro-
duction in England, I540-I640" Journalof Political Economy, 45, 3 (I936), pp. 398-403.
17 John U. Nef, War and Human Progress (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), p. 8o.
18 John U. Nef, "Note on the Progress of Iron Production in England . .
9 Tegengren, p. 313, re-calculatedon the basis of the Sung figures.

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156 ROBERTHARTWELL
tons' annuallywere needed to supply the iron coins circulatingin Szechuanand
Shensi.2"Occasionallythe mints were requiredto supplementthe regularissues.A
I04I decreeorderedthe Yangtse valley mints at Chiang, Jao, and Ch'ih Chou to
cast3,000,000stringsof iron cashto supplythe needsof Shensiarmyexpenses.22This
required29,000tons of iron, three-fourthsof the entire outputof Franceat the be-
ginningof the eighteenthcentury.23 And in I084, a mint was establishedat Hsii-chou
in northernKiangsuto castan additional4600 tons of iron into 400,000stringsof cash
for circulationin Hopei.24
The monetaryuse of iron was not limited to the minting of iron coins. During
the twelfthcentury,iron becamean essentialingredientin coppermetallurgy.Shortly
afterthe move of the Sung capitalsouth,I400 tons of ironn25were consumedannually
in the hydrometallurgicalprocessfor removingcopperfrommine waters-a technique
which involvedthe boiling of coppersulphatesolutionin contactwith iron, the iron
displacingthe copperfrom its salts.26Beforethis,in III4, an officialclaimedthat i870
tons were used for this purposein Kuangtungalone.27By the last quarterof the
eleventhcentury,mintswereusing at least io,ooo tonsof iron perannum,28morethan
the totaloutputof GreatBritainin 1540.29
Besidesthe specialneedsof the Sung monetarysystem,thereis evidenceindicative
of a much greatermarket for iron plough shares,hoes, spades, and sickles than
hithertosupposed.Although we lack quantitativedata, our sourcessuggest an ex-
tensive use of iron in agriculture.An early Sung statesman,in discussingthe ad-
vantagesof replacingthe iron coins circulatingin Chiangnanwith copper cash,
pointedout thatthe old currencycouldbe castinto agriculturalimplements.This was
expectedto causethe returnof vagrantswho had left theirland and fled northto the
river.30Five yearsearlier,in 972, the castingof iron Buddhistimages and pagodas
was prohibitedbecausepious farmerswere melting their tools.3'The importanceof
iron in husbandryis underlinedby the seriousproblemsraisedthroughlegislation
designedto preventthe exportof iron north of the Yellow River. Owing to com-
plaintsthatthe borderpopulationwas in want of farmingimplements,the regulations
were relaxedin the firstmonth of 1005,32 and by the end of the year the remaining
restrictionswere completelyremoved.33The steady rise of iron prices during the

20 Yu Hai, 180:36b; SHY/SH, II :2a-3a, 8a-ga.

21HCP, 97:20a-2Ib
22HCP, I34:8b; SHYISH, iI:6a.
23John U. Nef, "The Industrial Revolution Reconsidered"The Journal of Economic History, 3, I
(1943), p. 20
24HCP, 344:5a
25 SHYISH, 33:18b-26a.
26 Shen Kuan, Meng-ch'i pi-'an' (Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an ed.), 3:7b-8a; SHYISH, 34:25a-25b, ii :za-3a.
For a detailed discussion of this process during the Sung see S. Nakashima, "Shina ni okeru Senshiki
Shud6 no Enkaku" ("A Study on the Progressof Hydrometallurgyof Copper during the Sung Period"),
Thyo Gakuk6, 27, 3 (1940), p. 88.
27 Sung-shih, i 85:i6b.
28 In Ssuchuianand Shensi, 4300 tons; In Hopei, 4600 tons; and 1400 tons for the
hydrometallurgyof
copper. Cf. footnotes 20, 24, and 25.
29John U. Nef, "Note on the Progressof Iron Production in England, 154o-I64o."
S0HCP, i8:4b; SHYISH, II:4a; Li-tai ming-ch'en tsou-i", 263:6b.
81 HCP, 13:Ia.
82 HCP, 59:Iob; Yu Hai, 178:24a.
38 HCP, 6I:Iob.

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NORTHERN SUNG IRON AND COAL INDUSTRIES 157
early yearsof the eleventhcenturyreflecteda rapidlyincreasingdemandfor metal
farming tools. By IOI4, a string of i,ooo iron cash was selling for twice its nominal
value in terms of copper, and it was necessary to reduce the amount of iron in each
coin by half to prevent the people of Shensi and Szechuan from re-casting the money
into agricultural implements.34The demand for iron to meet the needs of the peasant
continuedto grow duringthe next decade,and as late as I027 cast iron agricultural
tools madein Hopei wereexemptedfromthe commercialtax,35althoughby this time
the increasedoutputof iron was beginningto alleviatethe shortageof farmingimple-
ments.The importanceof the marketfor ironploughshares,wheel-barrow axles,hoes,
and sicklescontinuedto grow, and by I083 it was sufficientlyprofitableto be monop-
olized by the state.From I083 to io86, the iron outputof the industrialprefecturesof
Hsii-chouwas officiallymanaged,the iron being made into tools which were sold to
farmers.36
The scantyinformationavailableprovidesus with no more than a hint of the
quantitativeimportanceof iron in Sung agriculture,but it seems probablethat the
Chinesefarmerof the eleventhcenturyreliedon iron manufactureto a greaterextent
thanhis counterpart in the earlyyearsof the twentiethcentury.
One of the most importantmarketssuppliedby Northern Sung foundrieswas
createdby the necessitiesof war. Continualmilitarypressureby her semi-nomadic
neighborsforcedthe governmentto maintaina substantialarmy along the northern
and westernborders.This armywas equipped,to a surprisingdegree,with weapons
of iron and steel. The importanceof iron for military purposeswas reflectedin
prohibitionsagainstits exportacrossthe frontiers,37 and in the detailedreportson iron
and iron productionmade by envoysreturningfrom missionsto the Khitan.38
Althoughwe lack sufficientdata to establishthe annualiron requirementsof the
military, eleventh century documentsindicate a substantialdemand. In I084, to
protect Min-chouand Ho-chou to the northwestalong the Hsi Hsia border,the
governmentsupplied35,oooswords,8,oooiron shields,io,ooo iron spears,and about
one million arrowsof variouskinds.39Swordsand spearsrangedin weight from 20
to I20 pounds,40the averagelength of a spearbladebeing two feet.4'All arrowheads
were made of steel.42Even assuming a minimum of twenty pounds for swords,
shields,and spears,and two or threeouncesfor arrowheads,at least 6oo tons of iron
and steelwereneededto supplythe weaponsfor the defenseof this one area.Ironwas
also used in the manufactureof warningbells,armoredgates, watchtowers,bridges,
and carts.43The raw metalwas even usedoccasionallyas a weaponitself.An eleventh
centurytreatiseon the art of war, the Wu Ching Tsung Yao,rdescribesa smallblast

34HCP, 82:4b.
35 SHY/SH, 17:2Ia-2Ib.
36 Wen-hsientung-k'ao, I8 :32a-32b.
37HCP, 59:Iob; YIdHai, 178:24a.
38 HCP, 79:4a-4b.
39 HCP, 343:i2b-13a.
40HCP, 47:4a; I26:x8b-iga; Tseng Kung-liangq and others, Wu-ching :sung-yao9 (Ssu-k'u chu'iian-
shu chen-pen ed.) 13:i8a-2oa. Hereafter cited as WCTY.
41 WCTY, 12:36a-37a.
42 WCTY, 13:36b.
43 Cf. WCTY, I 1-I3-

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158 ROBERT HARTWELL
furnacethat was used to preparemolten iron to be pouredfrom the top of fortress
wallson the headsof the attackingenemy.44
The locationof militaryworkshopsillustratesthe growing importanceof iron in
the manufactureof instrumentsof destruction.At the beginningof the dynasty,raw
iron was carriedto arsenalsin Kaifeng where it was worked up into arms.45The
increaseduse of iron and steel in swords,lances,spears,and arrowheadssoon made
this policy uneconomical.A decreeof 983 orderedthat armoriesbe establishedin
mining areasand only the completedweaponstransportedto the capital.46 This new
policyreducedcarriagecosts by half, since the final productweightedonly 40 to 50
per cent as much as the raw materials.47 During the eleventh century,the manu-
factureof weaponswas carriedon at greaterand greaterdistancesfrom Kaifeng,48
and in I075 Wang An-shih extendedthe decentralization of militaryworkshopsto
South China by setting up a plant to make "horse-decapitating-swords" (chan ma
tao)U employing a hundred artisansin eastern Kiangsi near the iron producing
centers of Shangjao.49 Local military commanders were also expected to supplement
materialssuppliedfrom arsenalsdirectlymanagedby the central governmentby
requisitioningraw iron from nearbyworks;50by buyingiron goods in borderprefec-
tures with salt vouchers;51 or, in some cases, by setting up their own mines and
smelters,and employingtroopsin the mining of the ore, the productionof the metal,
and the workingup of the finishedproduct.52
Ironand steelprovidedSung armiesthe sinewsof war, and the loss of the mining
areasof North Chinato the Jurchenin II26 was importantin pavingthe way for the
Mongolconquestof SouthChinain i279.
Althoughcurrency,agriculturalimplements,and weaponswere probablythe three
most importantsingle sourcesof the demand for iron, its aggregateuse in other
industriespossiblyequaled or surpassedthese three taken together.The salt, con-
struction,shipbuildingand artistic (religious architecture,images, etc.) industries
providedan expandingmarketfor the productsof Sung mines and smelters.Large
amountsof iron must havebeen usedin castingthe heavysalt pansthat were needed
to evaporatethe so-called"blue-whitesalt."These cast iron pans were increasingly
used during the Sung, replacingbamboocontainerswhich had the disadvantageof
producinga yellowcoloredand thereforecheapergradeof salt.43At times,iron works
were actuallyrun in connectionwith the salt producingcenters,their sole function
being the productionof iron for thesepans.54The expandingshipbuildingindustry55
relieduponthe forgesandfurnacesfor anchors,nails,andin the caseof militaryships,

44 WCTY, I2:63a.
45HCP, 24:I5b; SHYISH, 4I:39a; Ch'ien Jo-shui and others, T'ai-tsung Huang-ti shih-lut, 26:I3b.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Wen-hsien tzung-k'ao, 18:32a; Sung-shih, i85:17b.
49 HCP, 262:33a-33b.
50HCP, 44:I ia.
61 HCP, I3 5 :2b, I 65: I ob.
52 HCP, I9I:4a.
53HCP, 230:i6b-I7b; Ch'en Ch'unT,Ao Po Tu Yung' (Chi-shih-an ts'ung-shu ed.)
54HCP, I34:IIb; SHYISH, 70:i63a-i63b; Su Shihz, Tung-p'o chih-linT (Hsiieh-ching t'ao-yiian ed.)
4:3b-4a.
66 For the importance of shipping see Jung-pang Lo, "The Emergence of China as a Sea Power Dur-
ing the late Sung and Early Yiian Periods,"FEQ, I4, 4 0955), pp. 489-503.

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NORTHERN SUNG IRON AND COAL INDUSTRIES 159
armor. Like the salt works, shipyards often had iron mines and smelters directly at-
tached to them.56 During the later years of the Northern Sung, these foundries sup-
plied not only anchors and nails, but also iron prows57 and other armor.58 An
expanding population and increasing urbanization59 stimulated the construction of
housing which often required iron.6"Finally, the traditional artistic industries pro-
vided a regular market for cast iron pagodas, Buddhas, and other Buddhist images.61
The iron industry was clearly an important factor in the Northern Sung economy,
and the expansion of ferrous mining and metallurgy was in many respects stimulated
by demands similar to those present during the early industrialization of Europe. Did
this expanding iron industry also exert enough pressure on Sung timber resourcesto
cause a substitution of coal for wood and charcoal as happened in Tudor-Stuart
England?
The answer is yes. The same developments causing the expansion of iron pro-
duction also affected the timber industry. The increase in urban housing construction
and shipbuilding pressed heavily on Northern Sung forests, but fuel requirements
exerted even greater demands. City populations needed vast quantities of wood to
warm their homes during the cold North Chinese winters. In Kaifeng, for emergency
distribution alone, storehousesheld 5,000 to 7,000 tons of charcoal,62equivalent to the
amount that could be processed from 400 to 550 young beech trees, one foot square at
the base.63 The expanding metallic industries swallowed up many hundreds of
thousand tons each year, as did the manufacture of salt, alum, bricks, tiles, and liquor.
In io8o, if only charcoalhad been used, a forest of 22,000 medium sized trees64would
have been needed to mint iron and copper cash alone, although by this time the re-
quired 276,ooo tons65 of fuel included substantial quantities of coal as well as char-
coal.66
The rising price of charcoal reflected this demand. In 983, the mints at Po-yang
paid I3 cash per chkenghh or about I9.5 pounds of charcoal.67This was a 30 per cent
increase over the former price.68Much more serious was the fuel crisis in the cities of
North China. When prices soared to 200 cash per ch'englh during the severe winter of

56 SHY/SHR50:7b.
.57SHYISH, 50:IIb-i2a.
58 WCTY, I I:8a-8b.
59 Cf. E. A. Kracke, Jr., "Sung Society: Change Within Tradition," FEQ, I4, 4 (i955), pp. 479-488.
60 See Li Ming-chungz, Ying-tsao fa-shihaa,for the use of iron in building construction.
61 HCP, I3:ia, I7:9a. For information on cast iron pagodas see Joseph Needham, The Development of
Iron and Steel Technology in China (London, I958).
62 HCP, 79:I4a; SHYISH, 37:6a-6b, 57:5b, 68:34b-35a.
63 Conversions from weight to volume are based upon calculations in John U. Nef, The Rise of the
British Coal Industry, Vol. I.
64 Ibid.
65 HCP, 344:5a; SHYISH, II:3a; Yu Hai, i8o:36b.
66SHYISH, 54:lia-iib. In Northern Sung texts, the terms for coal are shih-t'anbb or k'uang-t'ane".
Charcoal is termed mu-t'andd, hsin-t'anee, or ch'ai-tan". T'angg alone is used for either coal or charcoal
and, in some cases, as a term including both fuels. In the latter case, the usage of the term is usually
made clear by the context. In this article, only those documents have been used where a two character
term or the context makes it clear which fuel is being discussed. It is significant that authors of documents
before about I050 find it necessaryto use the double characterterms to make clear their referencesto coal,
while after I050 it is charcoal which is written most often with clarifying modifiers.
67 A ch'enghh equals about I9.5 pounds. Cf. Wu Ch'eng-lo, Chung-kuo tu-liang-heng shih (A History
of Chinese Measures) (Shanghai, Commercial Press, I936); SHY/SH, 4I:28b.
68HCP, 24:4a; SHYISH, II:4a, 54:i2a; Sung-shih, I8o:3a-3b.

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160 ROBERT HARTWELL
IOI2, the Finance Commission set up special Kaifeng markets in which charcoal was

sold at half price.69To stabilize prices, storehouseson the principle of the ever-normal
granaries were subsequently directed to hold 5,000 to 7,000 tons of charcoal at all
times.7T This situation recurredeach winter71and by IOI7 charcoal had to be rationed
out at one ch'enghh per person.72The crisis was intensified by one characteristicof
Northern Sung frontier strategy. In order to slow down the movements of the semi-
nomadic horsemen who plagued her borders,the government inaugurated a program
of re-forestationin the critical areas of North China.73As a part of this policy, soldiers
were prohibited from cutting firewood and making charcoal,74and these materials
had to be transported from the more populous regions of the South.75The demands
of urbanization, industry, and military strategy combined to produce a chronic fuel
shortage in North China during the first half of the eleventh century. But, by I050,.
coal began to replace wood fuel, the former being from 3o to 50 per cent cheaper.76
The peak of the pre-modern Chinese use of coal came, perhaps,in the period from
I050 to II26. Coal was used as a fuel by the Chinese at least as early as the 4th century
A.D.,77 but there is little evidence of extensive industrial use of the mineral before
the eleventh century..78 It was from about I050 to the end of the Northern Sung that
coal became an important source of heat for all purposes.Early in the dynasty, it was
sold in the fuel markets of Kaifeng on the same basis as charcoal,79and taxed in other
areas according to the system established for wood fuel.80 Most of these early Sung
references indicate that, although it supplemented charcoal in regions in close prox-
imity to collieries, coal still played a relatively minor role in the economy as a whole.
Documents dating from the second half of the eleventh century begin to reflect a
substitution of coal for wood in heating houses and firing the furnaces of the brick,
tile, and iron industries. During the early years of the dynasty, decrees concerning
the pricing and distribution of heating materials sold in the official markets of the
capital8l were almost invariably concerned with charcoal alone,u but by I075 special
markets were established whose sole merchandise was coal.83 From this time, the
importance of the mineral increased, and in io96 special arrangements were made
for its sale without any mention of charcoal.84Two years later an official was ordered
to purchase coal, not wood fuel, for sale at reduced prices to the poor of the capital,85
69 HCP, 79:I4a; SHYISH, 7:6a-6b, 57:5b, 68:34b-35a.
70 Ibid.
71 HCP, 85:2Ia.
72 HCP, go:igb.
73 HCP, I 66: I 4a.
74 HCP, i 66: I4a, I II:3b, ii i:i oa.
75 HCP, I35:2b, I65:Iob.
76 SHY/SH, 55:20b-2ib.
77Thomas T. Read, "The Earliest Industrial Use of Coal" Transactionsof the Newcomen Society, 20
(0939-40), p. II9.
78 T. T. Read's discussion of the pre-Sung coal industry leaves this impression, and the fact that the
"Food and Money" monograph of the Sung-shih is the first place in the dynastic histories to mention
coal seems to confirm this view.
79 SHY/SH, 54:I ia-i ib.
80 SHYISH, I7:I5b, 37:Ioa.
81 SHYISH, 54:IIa-IIb, I7:I5b, 37:Ioa.
82 For examples see SHY/SH, 34:39a, 37:7b; HCP, 79:4a, 85:2Ia, go:igb.
83 SHYISH, 54:IIa-IIb.
84 SHY/SH, 37:33b-34a; Sung-shih, I86:I4a.
85 HCP, 504:4b-5a.

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NORTHERN SUNG IRON AND COAL INDUSTRIES 161
and in the first decadeof the twelfth century,twenty new coal marketswere estab-
lishedin Kaifeng.88Aboutthis time, an observernotedthat Kaifengreliedupon coal
to suchan extentthatnot a singledwellingburnedfirewood.87
While the residentsof Kaifeng were switchingfrom wood to mineralfuel, im-
portantSung industrialenterprises foundthe relativecheapnessof coaloutweighedthe
additionalcostsinvolvedin adoptingnew techniquesnecessaryto preventthe noxious
gasesof the mineralfrom spoilingthe product.88 A brickand tile worksnorthof the
capital replacedfaggots with coal in I074. This enterprise,governmentmanaged,
employedI,200 workmennine monthsa yearto manufactureten and a half million
bricks.89 As the centuryprogressed,coal increasinglyfiredthe forgesand furnacesof
the expandingiron industry.The most importantfactorin determiningthe location
of iron cash mints was the existenceof readilyavailablesuppliesof both iron and
coal,90and the colliersof Hotung (modernShansi) were the first ones suspectedof
using blastfurnacesin the productionof counterfeitiron currency.9'Shipbuildingat
Shan-chou,in southernHopei along the banksof the Pei River,requiredsuppliesof
iron and coal.92And finally,Su Tung-p'omakesit clearthat coal was used with iron
"to make sharp-edgedweaponswhich were better than the ordinary."98 The last
seventy-fiveyears of the Northern Sung dynastywas a period when North China
becamethe center of significant,perhapsrevolutionary,changes in the sourcesof
fuel; a time when coal becamethe most importantsourceof heat for both industrial
anddomesticuse.
The knottiestproblemis to determinehow coalwas used in the productionof iron
and iron products.Since NorthernSung sourcesyield almostno informationon the
exact processof smeltingthe ore, fining the metal,and workingup the iron into the
finishedproduct,any conclusionsare necessarilytentative.The Chinesepossiblyused
mineralfuel in actuallysmeltingthe ore,a processnot discoveredin WesternEurope
until the eighteenthcentury.94 They couldhave used raw coal in the Chinesecrucible
process,95 or they could have reducedthe mineralto coke and employedit to smelt
the ore in blast furnaces,96a techniqueknown to the Chineseas early as the last
quarterof the ninth century.97 It may be argued,of course,that coal was merelyused
blastfurnaceor to work up
eitherto roastthe ore beforesmeltingin a charcoal-fueled
the metal into the finishedproduct,both practicescommon in Europe during the
Middle Ages.98Since often coal was a determiningfactor in the locationof iron

86 Wen-hsienteung-k'ao,i9:I6b; Steng-shih,I79:I7a.
87 Ch'uianHan-sheng, "Pei Sung Pien-liang ti Shu-ch'u-ju Mao-i" ["The Export-import trade of the
Northern Sung Capital"], Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, 8.2(I939)
pp. 265-8.
88 J. U. Nef, Rise of the British Coal Industry, pp. 215-223, I65-I70.
89 SHY/SH, 55:2ob-2ia.
90 H-CP, 279:i6b, I57:IIa.
91 HCP, I 64: I I b-I 3a.
92 HCP, io6:6b.
93 Su Shih, Tung-pgo Hsien-sheng shih [The Poetry of Su Tung-p'o] (Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an ed.) "Shih-
t'an hang" "
94 T. S. Ashton, pp. 24-28.
95 Needham, Iron and Steel Technology ... p. I4.
96 For a discussion of Chinese blast furnaces see Needham, Iron and Steel Technology ... p. I5-I9.
97 K'ang Pien", Chii-tan lukk (Ching-tai pi-shu ed.) hsia:12b-14a.
98 T. S. Ashton, p. 30.

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162 ROBERT HARTWELL
works,99whereaswood was not, it seemsmore probablethat the mineralwas substi-
tuted in all stagesof iron production,from the smeltingof the ore to workingup the
finishedproduct.In any case,it is clearthatthe use of coalplayedan importantrole ir
the industrialdevelopmentof the NorthernSung dynasty.First, the adoptionof the
mineralas a fuel in such non-metallicindustriesas brick and tile and in domestic
heatingreleasedwood for use in the traditionalcharcoaliron furnacesby relieving
some of the pressureon timberresources.100 Second,coal seemsto have replacedchar-
coal in the iron industryitself,with the high probabilitythat it was used to smeltthe
ore.
I have endeavoredin this articleto give a recordof an eleventhcenturyrevolution
in the Chinese use of iron and coal which closely paralleledthe history of these
mineralsduring the early industrializationof Great Britain from I540-I640. The
intriguing questionof why this precociouseconomicand industrialexpansiondid
not lead to developmentssimilarto the laterand more famousIndustrialRevolution
of nineteenthcenturyEuropeis beyondthe scopeof the presentarticle.1'0The answer
seemsto lie partlyin externalfactorssuch as the Jurchenand laterMongolinvasions
and conquests,and partlyin structurallimitationsof traditionalChinesesociety.It is
becomingincreasinglyclear,however,that Chinesesocialand economichistoryfrom
22I B.C.to i8oo A.D. was not a monotonousrepetitionof familiarthemes,but that at
leastin the i66 yearsfrom 960 to II26, therewere radicalchangesin the structureof
the Chineseeconomy,some of which can be termedtruly revolutionary.
99 HCP, 279:1i6b, I15711 ia.
100In The Rise of the British Coal Industry, J. U. Nef discovers a similar trend in early modern
Britain.
101 I am presently engaged in research which
promises to throw light on these problems.

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