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    PUBLIC PROSECUTOR v VISUVANATHAN

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    10 views3 pages

    PUBLIC PROSECUTOR V VISUVANATHAN

    Uploaded by

    haqim

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
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    1MLI. tat Sg Fok hea ESE 19 containing an offer of a new tenancy 2s from July 1. 1971 a A the appellant determining the tenancy on February 28, Sn increased rent. The appellant who continued to pay the Feat agreed to pay the incfeased rent from December 1974 ‘The tent receipt was then issued in his name. In January 1995 the respondent served on the appellant a notice to quit, addressed to the appellant determining the tenancy on February 38, 197, The teamed District Judge found that the appellant by paying. rent to the respondent after the expiration of the Sia notice to qt had accepted the offer of new tenancy ‘accordingly gave judgment for the respondent appellant's appeal 10 the High Court was dismissed and he ‘appealed to the Court of Appeal. It was argued that the Tpondent could not create a new tenancy with the appellant 3: fe rigial tenancy of Madam ‘Tang was sil subsisting and had not been effectively determined by the notice to quit. Held: (1) the appellant in continuing to pay the rent 10 the respondent after the doath of Madam Tang and to receive the rent from the subtenants could, only lawiully do so as agent for the Chiet Justice in whom the estate of the deceased ‘Was vested by operation of law. "A notice to quit served on the agent is 2 notice to the principal; (2) the learned District Judge was correct on the facts in finding that the appellant. was the respondent’ tenant’ when hhe paid rent to the respondent after the expiration of the first notice to quit. Cases referred to:- () Harrowby v, Snelson [1951] 1 AN ER. 140, @ Egerton v. Butter {1951} TLR. 58, COURT OF APPEAL. Tan Bar Tien for the appellant. 5. Vellupiliai for respondent. Wee Chong Jin CJ. (delivering the judgment of the Court): The respondent, Tang Kong Low, instituted proceedings in the District Court against the appellant, Lai Seng Fook, for possession of premises known as No, 29 Race Course Lane, arrears of rent and mesne profits. ‘The premises were not subject to the Control of Rent Act and the only issue was whether the appel- Jant was the respondent's tenant. The facts as found by the District jude, were these. The respondent let the premises in 1954 to ‘one Madam Tang Siew who did not personally occu, the premises but sublet the whole of it to several sut tenants. Madam Tang Siew died in 1967 to 1968. One, oF two years before ber death the appellant, ber son-in-law, paid the rent on her behalf. 7 the appellant continued to pay the rent to the respon- dent and to receive the rents from the sub-tenants. ‘He requested the respondent to issue the rent receipt in his name but was told by the respondent that until ‘he obtained letters of administration to the deceased’s estate the rent receipts would continue to be made out in the name of the deceased. In May 1971 the res- pondent, with knowledge that Madam Tang Siew had died, through his solicitors served a notice to quit addressed “To Madam Tang Siew...” on the a] it determining the tenancy on June 30, 1971. m- Panying ‘the notice to quit was a letter also addressed to Madam Tang Siew containing an offer of a new tenancy as from Ist July 1971 at an increased rent. ‘Thereafter the aj it continued to pay rent to the respondent. In November 1974 the appellant agreed to bay an ingeaed rent from December 1974 and in Decemt id the respondent the agreed December rent and oe teat receipt was issued in the appellant's name. In Jan 1975 the recpondent served on the appellant a notice to quit addressed to 1975. On these facts the District Sudge found that the appeliant by paying rent to the respondent after the expiration of the first notice to quit had accepted the offer of & new tenancy and accordingly gave judgment for the respondent. The appellant appealed unsuccess- fully to the High Court. It is submitted on his behalf that the respondent could not create a new tenancy with the appellant as the original tenancy of Madam Tan Siew was still subsisting and had not been effectively determined by the first notice to quit. It is submitted that the notice to quit should have been served on the Chief Justice in whom the interest of the deceased Madam Tang Siew was vested from her death until a grant of administration. We do not accept this submission. In our opinion, on the facts as found by the District Judge the appellant in continuing to pay the rent to the respondent after the death of Madam Tang Siew and to receive the rents from the sub-tenants could only lawfully do so as agent for the Chief Justice in whom the estate of the deceased was vested by opera- tion of law. A notice to quit served on the agent is 4 notice to the principal (see Harrowby v. Snelson"? and Egerton v. Rutter).® In our judgment the District Judge was correct on the facts of the present case to find that the appellant was the respondent's tenant when he paid rent to the respondent after the expiration of the first notice to quit. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. Solicitors: Boey, Ng & Wan: Donaldson & Burkinshaw, PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ¥. VISUVANATHAN {0.C¢.. (Choor Singh & Rafah J1) February 16, 19771 {Singapore — Criminal Case No. 31 of 1976) 1 Sgt Cede, a, 209 ond 300 Murder — Clause () Gon andthe body injury intended to be inflered ie supicent ihe ornary course o} nature Tce deat — Meaning “The accused was charged with having murdered one Madikum Puspanathan on January 23, 1970 at 7 Pim, The agowed had carler that day been drinking. liquor’ with the nod tome, oes i 4” bar atthe junetion 9f alan Besar and Upper Weld Road, Singapore. , The accused became ve, pulled the deveaied "Gy the hand and_challenged ‘eceaied to'a fight, They were. separated. Soon alter, the accused again set the deceased's hand and pulled ing ‘out on to the Toad and there started a Aight with the deceased {nthe course of which tho. accused pulled outs. concealed ile, stabbed the deceased in the chest and ran away. The Geoessed collapsed on the road and died in 2 pool of blood. At the autopsy, the pathologist found a fatal gaping stab wound. Below the lett Gavicle which. was. 8 cms seep and Hic" hroygh the, Sd and 4th ibs penetrated the et Sid produced 2 em. cut a the anterior surface o fart "Tye cause of denih was certiied as "stab wound ato the heare™ At the trial of the accused, the prosecution relied on iause (Gp of ection 200 of the Penal” Code and contended at as the accused's, get of scabbing Was done with the {n- tention of causing bodily injury and the bodily injury intended Public Prosecutor v. Visuvanathan (Ghoor Singh & Rajah J) 160 [1978] to be inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, be was guilty of murder. Counsel for the defence submitted that thefe was no evidence that the, accused Inflicted the fatal Wound with the intention of causing, such Injury as would in the ordinary course of nature cause death Countel cited Mohamed Yasin v. Public Prosecutor.() and Feld on the pescage in Lord Diplock’s judgment, at page 197 ‘Sthich reads “the. prosecution must also prove that the accused intended, by to cause some” bodily Injury to the Victim of @ kind which is sufficient in the ‘ordinary course Sfnature to equse death.” The trial judges in rejecting. this Submission and convicting the accused, (1) there isa clear distinction between the inten 10 be present and. the ae tion to cause the bodily Sufficient in the ordinary course of The prosecution do not have to. prove the latter intention; (2) for the application of clause (6) of section 300 of the jury found ay Penal Code, ail that the prosecution need prove is — J." that the accused did an act which caused the den of the Secsased 2. that the said act was done with the intention of causing. bodily injury: 3, that the injury caused — (a) was intended and was not Accidental or otherwise unintentional: and_(b) Was suf ‘ent in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; 3) the dictum of Lord Diplock, relied upon by counsel for $2 defen ats fctaly sppropiste i) Mohamed Fase, SMUT iP hat of uavettal tppieation When consaered Ridaton ik hve diferent meaning to the third limb of Soon 50 tui ler rom a fend the ole og Ein ip Mohamed’ Yrs cae ta the Pry” Couns a Biff the views of the Supreme Case of Indes Weise Sight tae where the, core egal postion as Regars“ue'Bsd nb ot secon S00" of the Penal Code has Eel se out {Baltoviat Note: This cate is reported on point of tw Minh Ging rid Sin thea i, ure coe TNS aed on ihe Seah o¢ Lord ‘Diplack in Mohamed Yas’ cae” he loses judges bave deat wit Ut very iiy'n Be folonng repr, The apen ty toe cere dent to the Court of Siminal Appel (Criminal Appea! Het of'tote Wee Chong lin Cfo Chus & Kuaslaram 139 Sas alontiod on bamtary 16, i978 Sass referred to: (©) Mohamed Yauinv. Public Prosecuor 1976) 1 MAJ. ® @ Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab ALR. 1988 S.C. 465. Rafoant Singh v. Site of Kerle ALR. 1966 SC. Mimi Wong & Anor. v. Public Prosecutor {1972} 2 Mis. 73. CRIMINAL CASE, Sant Singh (Deputy Public Public Prosecutor. AB. Netto for the accused. (Chor Singh and Rajah JJ: The next submission of counsel for the defence was that there was no evidence that the accused in- flicted the fatal wound with the intention of causing such injury as would in the ordinary course of nature cause death, To appreciate this submission it is neces- sary to look at the definition of murder as laid down in the Penal Code. The relevant sections are sections 299 and 300: “299, Whoever. causes death by doing an act with the in- teation of causing death, or with the intention of causing Such bodily injury as is"likely to. cause death, of with the Knowledge that be is likely by such act to cause death, com- mits the offence of culpable” homici 300, Except in the cases Ivereinafter excepted culpable homi- ide is murder— Prosecutor) for the A. a) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention. of causing death; or () if itis done with the intention of causing such bodily Injury ss the ‘offender knows 70 be likely to. cause the

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