HAZOP STUDY FOR NORPETCO RENTAL HEATING PACKAGE

HAZOP STUDY REPORT

FOR NORPETCO RENTAL HEATING PACKAGE

ABRAR STATION
June, 2023

REV. DATE REVISIONS BY CH’D APPR.

0 26/06/2023 PRELIMINARY ISSUE Osama Abdou Norpetco

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 HAZOP STUDY FOR NORPETCO RENTAL HEATING PACKAGE

CONTENTS

1. Executive Summary

2. Definitions

3. Abbreviation

4. Part A: Introduction

A-1) System Overview

A-2) Scope Of Study.
A-3) HAZOP Objectives
A-4) HAZOP Team

5. Part B: Methodology

B-1) Study Methodology.

B-2) HAZOP Nodes
B-3) Parameter Deviations
B-4) Severity Ranking

6. Part C System

C-1) Design Intent and Normal Operating Conditions

C-2) Norpetco Severity Matrix

7. Part D Output

D-1) HAZOP Action summery

D-2) HAZOP Recommendations
D-3) Conclusion

8. Attachments

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 HAZOP STUDY FOR NORPETCO RENTAL HEATING PACKAGE

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The scope of the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study was to assess APRAR Heating Package
Process, as indicated in Section (A-1) and as detailed in the Process and Instrumentation
Diagrams (P&IDs) and (PFD) (Appendix B).
The HAZOP workshop was performed over two sessions in head office in Cairo, as follows:

 HAZOP Day 1: 5th June 2023.

 HAZOP Day 2: 6th June 2023.

A total of 15 Actions were raised during the HAZOP Workshop. A summary of the HAZOP Actions
is provided in (D-1) table.

The HAZOP worksheets are indicated in appendix (A).

The following generic comments have been made by the HAZOP Chairman:

 There is a significant issue (Errors, Omission, Missing, etc.) with the information provided on
the P&IDs, Flow Diagram and all relevant documents need to be available and updated to reflect
the current design.

 There is a significant issue (Alarm System not connected to area Control Room) and it give only
alarm on local screen for Burner Management System (BMS) and it need quick intervention from
PICO Operator only (NORPETCO Operation is not involved).

 There are many switches not connected according to the original heater design, without any
specific studies being performed; hence, there are many Inherent Safety & Operability concerns,
at all levels (Hardware & Software).

 There are significant design concerns and many HSE Design Principles not accounted for during
the initial package laydown. For example: segregation/separation is very inadequate

 Overall, there is a significant lack of detailed Operational Procedures and even where they
exist, they are not always followed.

In addition, the following HAZOP specific comments have been made by HAZOP Chairman:

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 HAZOP STUDY FOR NORPETCO RENTAL HEATING PACKAGE

 There are no fire system and monitors for rental heating package washing and receiving tank,
only portable fire extinguishers in the area which will be difficult to be used during a major
fire (as the operator has to approach very close to the fire).

 Originally there are no foam system and no foam cart to fight limited HC fire around PICO
rental heater, washing and receiving tank.

 Overall, the active firefighting equipment and procedure had a lot of concern and require
immediate study.

 Operators’ knowledge needs significant improvement

Based on the above, the HAZOP Chairman clearly indicated to the team that the overall FW design
is not acceptable and is not safe.

A total of 15 Actions were raised during the HAZOP workshop.

The nodes of the HAZOP are defined in Section (B-2), the HAZOP findings are indicated in Section
5 and the noded HAZOP P&IDs are provided in Appendix B.

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 HAZOP STUDY FOR NORPETCO RENTAL HEATING PACKAGE

2. DEFINITIONS

HAZARD An inherent physical or chemical characteristic that has the

potential for causing harm to people, property, or the
environment. In the word it is a combination of hazardous
material, an operating environment, and certain events that could
result in an accident.

HAZARD EVALUATION The analysis of the significance of hazardous situations associated

with a process or activity.

QUALITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS It is a qualitative technique to pinpoint weaknesses in the design

and operation of facilities that could lead to accidents.

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION The pinpointing of material system, process and plant characteristics
that can produce undesirable consequence through the occurrence
of an accident.

EVENT An occurrence related to equipment performance or human action,

or an occurrence external to the system upset.

RISK The combination of the expected frequency (event / year) and

consequence (effect / year) of a single accident or a group of
accidents.

RISK ASSESSMENT The Process by which the results of a risk analysis is used to make
decisions, either through relative ranking of risk reduction strategies
or through comparison with the risk targets.

HUMAN ERROR Any human action that exceeds some limits of acceptability (i.e., an
out of tolerance action) where the limits of human performance are
defined by the system. Includes actions by designers, operators, or
managers that may contribute to or result in accidents.

LIKELIHOOD A measure of the expected probability or frequency of an

event’s occurrence.

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 HAZOP STUDY FOR NORPETCO RENTAL HEATING PACKAGE

3. ABBREVIATION

API American Petroleum Institute

DP Design Pressure
ESD Emergency Shutdown
FW Firewater
H&MB Heat and Material Balance
HAZID Hazard Identification
HAZOP Hazard and Operability (Study)
HP High Pressure
IA Instrument Air
LP Low Pressure
OP Operating Pressure
PFD Process Flow Diagram
PCV Pressure Control Valve
PSV Pressure Safety Valve
P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams
RAM Risk Assessment Matrix
SOW Scope of Work

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 HAZOP STUDY FOR NORPETCO RENTAL HEATING PACKAGE

4. PART A : INTRODUCTION
A-1): System Overview
The main purpose of the rental heater packages facility is to partially treat the crude oil received
from the production wells, increase the crude temp. up to set point to separate water and gas
from the crude oil (three phase heater) then send it to wash tank and then to oil receiving tank
which send it to NORPETCO storage tank via pumps.
The produced gas sent to the cold vent and the produced water send to skimmer tank then to
lined drain pit.

Rental Heating Package area are:

1- Abrar area.
2- Abrar South West.
3- Ferdous
4- Gana
5- Sedra
6- Rawda

The component of Rental Heating Package is:

a) Heater.
b) Washing Tank.
c) Oil Receiving tank.
d) Shipping Pumps.
e) Skimmer Tank.
f) Washing Water tank.
g) Air Compressor.

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 HAZOP STUDY FOR NORPETCO RENTAL HEATING PACKAGE

A-2) SCOPE OF STUDY:

NORPETCO assigned MODERN INTEGRATED SYSTEMS to provide HAZOP study for rental heating
packages.
The scope of the HAZOP study was to assess the rental heating package facilities and utilities, as
indicated in the HAZOP P&IDs and PFD (Appendix B) and summarized below:

 Process: NORPETCO rental heating package has a significant impact in the company
production.

Hence, in order to simplify the HAZOP Study, NORPETCO selected a number of typical importing
activities sections for the assessment.

 Utilities: fuel system, washing water, burner air, drains, etc.

A-3) HAZOP OBJECTIVES

The study objective was to perform the HAZOP workshop for rental heater package facilities, in
accordance with the BS IEC HAZOP Guidelines and in more detail:

 Identify the potential hazards from the operation of the Heater & Equipment;
 Assess whether the reaction of the plant or equipment to upsets will produce effects which are
harmful to People, the Environment, Assets;
 Investigate the operability of the Heater & Equipment; and
 Recommend corrective actions which will mitigate or eliminate the identified hazards.

A-4) HAZOP Team:

The workshop was chaired by MODERN INTEGRATED SYSTEMS and attended by personnel from
NORPETCO and PICO.

The signed attendance sheets, from the two workshops, are presented in Appendix (C)

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 HAZOP STUDY FOR NORPETCO RENTAL HEATING PACKAGE

Part B: Methodology

B-1) STUDY METHODOLOGY

HAZOP study is a formal Qualitative technique used to identify hazards in a planned or existing
process so that their associated risks to personnel and/or equipment and/or environment can be
evaluated and prevented.

HAZOP studies are conducted via the use of structured and systematic examinations based on
guide-words.

A HAZOP study is a systematic technique for identifying potential hazards and operability
problems Industries.

The overall objective of a HAZOP is to identify possible causes leading to Hazards and
Operational concerns and to identify the need for appropriate corrective actions.

The following are the main aspects of the procedure:

 A Multi-disciplinary team methodically "Brainstorms" the plant design focusing on deviations

from the design intention. The method aims to stimulate responses and generate ideas;

 Hazard identification process relates strongly to the interaction of the team and the individual
diverse backgrounds of the personnel involved;

 The ultimate objectives are to facilitate smooth, safe and prompt plant start-up, to minimize
extensive last-minute modifications, and ultimately to ensure trouble-free long-term operation.

HAZOP Procedure takes a full description of the process and systematically questions every part
of it to discover how deviations from the design intent can occur, the consequences of such
deviations are then determined and if significant are reviewed and remedial action either
recommended or flagged for further study.

The study is performed by a team of people who are familiar with the plant design and operation,
working under the guidance of a leader who is experienced in the use of the HAZOP method.

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 HAZOP STUDY FOR NORPETCO RENTAL HEATING PACKAGE

The method involves several repetitive steps:

1- Identify a NODE on the P&ID and PFD (Appendix B).

2. Define the design intent and normal operating conditions included in Part (C).
3. Identify a deviation from design intent or operating conditions by applying a system of
guidewords,
4. Identify possible causes in the node, and consequences/safeguards anywhere, of the deviation.
A deviation can be considered meaningful if it has credible cause and can result in harmful
consequences.
5. For a meaningful deviation decide what action is necessary if it is considered that inadequate
safeguards are in place.
6. Record the HAZOP Proceedings in HAZOP WORK SHEET.

B-2) HAZOP Nodes

Rental Heating package was divided in to 4 nodes is as the followings:

Node A1: Heater Burner

Node A2: From Heater inlet to Heater Outlet (Water/Gas /Oil).

Node A3: From Heater outlet to Washing Tank and Receiving Tank.

Node A4: From Receiving Tank to Norpetco Oil Tank via Pumps.

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 HAZOP STUDY FOR NORPETCO RENTAL HEATING PACKAGE

B-3) Parameter Deviations

The list of guidewords and parameters used during the HAZOP is provided in the following table:

Parameter Deviation

Flow No
Less
More
Reverse

Pressure High
Low

Temperature High
Low

Level High
Low

As well as Contamination

Other Corrosion
Erosion
Relief
Utility failure

B-4) Severity Ranking

All consequences were severity ranked in accordance with NORPETCO RISK Matrix indicated in
appendix (D) for People, Asset, Community and/or Environment, as summarized below.

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 HAZOP STUDY FOR NORPETCO RENTAL HEATING PACKAGE

Part C System

C-1) Design Intent and Normal Operating Conditions

Node Design & Operating Parameter Fluid Phase

NODE 1:  Burner Pressure 7.8 bar max. to 180 Mbar Fuel Gas

Heater Burner  Max Pressure 500-750 Mbar.

NODE 2:  Working Pressure 10 PSI Water/Gas/Oil status

From Heater Inlet to Heater outlet  Testing Pressure 105 PSI

 Safety Relief Valve 65 PSI

Node A3:  Crude oil

From Heater Outlet to Washing  Minor water

Tank and Receiving Tank
Node A4:  Crude oil

From Receiving Tank to Norpetco  Minor water

Oil Tank via Pumps

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C-2) Norpetco Severity Matrix

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 HAZOP STUDY FOR NORPETCO RENTAL HEATING PACKAGE

Part D Output

D-1) HAZOP Action Summery

Ser. HAZOP Action Action place Responsible

1 All burner parts to be maintained regularly (Generic Node A-1-1 PICO Maintenance
Action).
2 Connecting TSSH 105 to BMS. Node A-1-2 PICO Operation/Maintenance
3 Install audible alarm connected to Area Control Room. Node A-1-4 PICO Maintenance /NORPETCO
4 Connect level switch to BMS. Node A-2-5 PICO Maintenance /NORPETCO
5 Mechanical lock out applies to All Manual valves Node A-2-5 PICO Operation/NORPETCO
(Generic Action).
6 Protect Heater against carry over to cold flare due to Node A-2-6 PICO Operation/NORPETCO
high level.
7 All Heater function switches to be connected to BMS. Node A-2-6 PICO Maintenance/NORPETCO
Review the connection.
8 Ensure Check Valve functioned properly. Node A-2-7 PICO Maintenance /NORPETCO
9 HH pressure alarm should connected to NORPETCO Node A-2-8 PICO /NORPETCO Maintenance
control room.
10 Ensure integrity of PSV. Node A-2-8 PICO Maintenance /NORPETCO
11 Regular check on Tank Level (Generic Action). Node A-3-1 PICO Operation/NORPETCO
12 Study installing Low Level Alarm on the Tank. Node A-3-3 PICO Maintenance /NORPETCO
13 Study installing High Level Alarm on the Tank. Node A-3-4 PICO Maintenance /NORPETCO
14 Study installing low flow switch for the Pump. Node A-4-1 PICO Maintenance /NORPETCO
15 Study installing High Pressure Shut Down Switch for Node A-4-2 PICO Maintenance /NORPETCO
the Pump.

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 HAZOP STUDY FOR NORPETCO RENTAL HEATING PACKAGE

D-2) HAZOP Recommendations

From the HAZOP Worksheet (attached), there were (10) Actions (Recommendations) to be considered
for implementation according to the above-mentioned HAZOP action which are:

1. Install Audible Alarm connected to Area control room.

2. Protect heater against carry over to cold flare due to high level.
3. All Heater function switches to be connected to BMS.
4. Maintain check valve periodically to ensure functioned properly.
5. HH pressure alarm should connected to NORPETCO control room.
6. Maintain PSV to ensure integrity of the PSV.
7. Study installing low level alarm on the tank.
8. Study installing high level alarm on the tank.
9. Study installing low flow switch for the pump.
10. Study installing high pressure shut down switch for the pump.
In addition to Generic Actions which are:
1. Ensure all burner parts are maintained regularly.
2. Mechanical lock out applies to All manual valves.
3. Regular check on tank level.
4. Update Operating and Maintenance procedures.
5. All the Drawing Documents to be available and up to date.
D-3) Conclusion
Packages P&IDs should be completed as the only available P&IDs were for Heater(s) and the rest of
the system has Flow Diagram only.
The standard operating procedure for Heating Package should be reviewed and updated to cover all
activities including maintenance activities.
The contractor should connect all the heater control switches and alarms to BMS and control panel
of the heater to reduce staff intervention.
PICO engineering should review the design of the package and all the control facilities to protect the
system against any of the high consequences which may raise due to override of this facilities.
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 HAZOP STUDY FOR NORPETCO RENTAL HEATING PACKAGE

ATTACHMENTS
 HAZOP Worksheet.

 Heater (P&ID).
 Rental Package PFD
 Risk Matrix.
 HAZOP Members sheet.

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 HAZOP WORK SHEET
Client NORPETCO Date 15/06/2023 Node Description Heater Burner Node No. A1
Working Burner Max. Pressure 7.8 bar reduced to 180 mbar. P&ID N0.
Parameters Max Operating pressure 500-750 mbar.
HAZOP ACTION
Deviation Cause Consequence Safe Guards S P R Action Responsibilities
1.1 Fuel line shutdown 1.1.1 Process upset/ off - BMS shut down burner. 2 D M - All burner parts to be maintained PICO
1. No Gas Flow 1.2 PCV 108 fails close spec. product - Low pressure Alarm. regularly.
1.3 SOV 601 fails close - Maintenance procedure
2. High Gas 2.1 Feed gas line Fails 2.1.1 Process upset - Shut down valve on gas line. 3 C M - Connecting TSSH 105 to BMS
Flow open. 2.1.2 may lead to - BMS shut down burner - All burner parts to be maintained PICO
2.2 PCV 108 stuck open. burner bundle rapture/ - TSHH 105 alarm regularly.
2.3 Low oil level inside deformation - PCV 108 close the inlet gas. - Install audible alarm connected to
heater. - Maintenance procedure Area control room.
2.4 feed reach with
condensate
3. Low Temp 3.1 Flam off 3.1.1 Process upset/ off - BMS shut down burner. 2 D M -- All burner parts to be maintained PICO
3.2 PCV 108 fails close spec. product - Maintenance procedure regularly.
3.3 SOV 601 fails close
4. High Temp 4.1 Poor fuel air ratio 4.1.1 Process upset - Shut down valve on gas line. 3 C M - Connecting TSSH 105 to BMS PICO
4.2 PCV 108 stuck open. 4.1.2 may lead to - BMS shut down burner - All burner parts to be maintained
4.3 Low oil level inside burner bundle rapture/ - TSHH 105 alarm regularly.
heater. deformation - PCV 108 close the inlet gas. - Install audible alarm connected to
4.4 feed reach with - Maintenance procedure Area control room.
condensate
Client NORPETCO Date 15/06/2023 Node Description Heater (water/gas/oil). Node No. A2
Working Parameters Working pressure 10 PSI, Testing pressure 105 PSI P&ID No.
Safety relief valve 65 PSI
HAZOP ACTION
Deviation Cause Consequence Safe Guards S P R Action Responsibilities
1. Low 5.1 Manual inlet valve close. 5.1.1 Operation upset. - Low level alarm. 4 D H - Connect level switch to BMS PICO
Level 5.2 Low inlet feed. 5.1.2 Damage to heater - BMS shutdown burner. - Mechanical lock out applies to All PICO/NORPETCO
5.3 Manual drain valve keep open. bundle due to overheat. manual valves.
2. High 6.1 V-401 close. 6.1.1 Process upset. - Level alarm HH only 3 D M - Protect heater against carry over to cold PICO/NORPETCO
Level 6.2 High feed in. 6.1.2 Carry over to cold - Firefighting equipment. flair due to high level. - NORPETCO review
6.3 manual valve before & after V- flair leads to - All Heater function switches to be the connection.
401 closed. environmental impact connected to BMS.
and possible fire.
3. Low 7.1 Low feed gas. 7.1.1 Operation up set. - Pressure alarm low. 2 D M - Ensure check valve functioned properly. PICO
Pressure 7.2 PV 100 fail open. 7.1.2 Carry over to cold - Check valve before - Mechanical lock out applies to All
7.3 PSV 200 stuck open. flair leads to wash tank. manual valves. PICO/NORPETCO
7.4 Manual vent valve keep open. environmental impact - Firefighting equipment.
7.5 PV 100 by pass manual valve and possible fire.
keeps open.
7.6 possible reverse flow from
wash tank.
4. High 8.1 PV 100 fail close. 8.1.1 heater body - Pressure alarm HH. 4 D H - HH pressure alarm should connected to PICO/NORPETCO
Pressure 8.2 Gas outlet block manual valves deformation, or possible - PSV 200. NORPETCO control room.
closed. explode. - Ensure integrity of PSV.
8.1.2 Back pressure to
production manifold.
5. High 9.1 H2S. 9.1.1 Pin Hall. - Sacrificial anode, 2 D M
Corrosion/ 9.2 Salinity. 9.1.2 loss of thickness - Chemical treatment
Erosion 9.3 Sand 9.1.3 loss of production &
oil spill.
Client NORPETCO Date 15/06/2023 Node Description Heater outlet to washing tank and oil tank Node No. A3
Working Tanks Working pressure atmospheric, tank volumes 500 BBL each P&ID No.
Parameters
HAZOP ACTION
Deviation Cause Consequence Safe Guards S P R Action Responsibilities
1. Low Level 1.1.1 Tank drain valve keeps open. 1.1.1 Loss of - Operating 2 D M - Regular check on tank level. PICO
(Wash tank) production. procedures. - Mechanical lock out applies to All PICO/NORPETCO
1.1.2 Oil spill to - Lined drain pit. manual valves.
drain pit.
2. High 2.1 Out let valve closed. 2.1.1 Tank overflow. - Operating 3 C M - Regular check on tank level. PICO
Level 2.2 Fresh water pump working while 2.2.1 Oil spill around procedure.
(Wash tank) tank out let closed. tank. - Dick wall around
tank.
3. Low Level 3.1 Low feed from washing tank. 3.2.1 Loss of - Operating 3 C M - Regular check on tank level. PICO
(Receiving 3.2 Side glass damage. production. procedures. - Study install low level alarm on the PICO/NORPETCO
tank) 3.3 Drain valve keeps open. 3.2.2 Oil spill around - Lined drain pit. tank.
3.4 Tank structure damage. tank. - Fire equipment’s - Mechanical lock out applies to All
3.5 shipping pump keep running 3.3.1 Oil spill to drain manual valves.
pit.
3.4.1 Same as 3.2.2.
3.5.1 Damage to the
pump or possible fire.
4. High 4.1 More feed from washing tank. 4.1.1 Over fill the tank - Operating 3 C M - Regular check on tank level. PICO
Level 4.2 Tank out let valve close. led to oil spill & procedures. - Study install high level alarm on the
(Receiving 4.3 Shipping pump not working. possible fire in - Firefighting tank.
tank) addition loss of equipment.
production.
Client NORPETCO Date 15/06/2023 Node Description Receiving Tank to Norpetco Oil Tank via PICO Node A4
Shipping pumps No.
Working Parameters Pump capacity: P&ID N0.
HAZOP ACTION
Deviation Cause Consequence Safe Guards S P R Action Responsibilities
1. No flow 1.1 Upstream block valve closed. 1.1.1 Over heat the pump may - Operating 3 D M - Mechanical lock out applies to PICO/NORPETCO
1.2 Downstream block valve closed. lead to pump damage or procedures. All manual valves.
1.3 No Level in oil receiving tank. possible fire. - Study installing low flow shut PICO
1.1.2 check oil level before down switch for the pump.
shipping

2. High 2.1 Close Norpetco tank inlet valve. 2.1.1 Pump over heat may - Operating 3 D M - Study install high pressure shut PICO/NORPETCO
Pressure lead to pump damage and procedures. down switch for the pump.
may lead to fire.
 NODE A2

Gas Line
controller

NODE 1A

Water line controller Oil controller

 Chemical
Tank Fresh water tank
To Flare pit

sp

From wells manifold Gas out vent

Node A3

V-1 V-2
Indirect Heater

LG Wash LG recieve
H-1 Tank Tank

Oil outlet

V-3

LG Skimmer
Tank

Produced Water pump 2

To norpetco tanks
pump 3
Pump
1

Node A4
To Water pit

Lab Cabin

LEGEND KEY
Surface Testing Equipment
Fluid SP Sample point
Oil Cold Vent Client : Norpetco Petroleum Company
Line
Gas
Pneumatic Water Drawing : PFD

Severity level People
On-Site Fatalities more than 3
Multiple Permanent disabilities
equal to or more than 35 %
One or more fatality for public
Catastrophic
5 its consequences
1 to 3 on-site Fatalities
Multiple Lost work day cases
onsite
One or more serious injury for
public
Single permanent disabilities
Major
equal to or more than 35%
4 Multiple Occupational illness
IMPACT (On & Offsite)
Single Lost Work Day Case
(LWDC)
Permanent disability (s) less
than 35%
Severe
Multiple reversible
3 occupational health effect
Single occupational illness
Restricted work day case
(RWDC), Medical treatment
Significant
case (MTC) or single reversible equipment isolation
health effects from an incident Cost greater than or equal to
2 and less than 30 days
First aid case (s) (FAC) or health Slight damage, no disruption to Insignificant event where environmental impact is:
exposure causing noticable
irritation
Minor
1 4- Low media attention
High - Intolerable
Asset damage /
Production Loss
Extensive damage
Substantial total loss of plant, or
total loss of operation exceeds 2
weeks
Costs in excess of $5 mm
Major Damage
Partial operation shutdown
exceeding one shift up to 2
weeks
Total shut down less than or
exceed one shift up to 2 weeks
Costs greater than or equal to
$500K and less than or equal to
$5 mm
Local damage
Partial operation shutdown less
than one shift
Costs greater than or equal to
$50K and less than $500K
Minor damage
Production disruption leads to
$2500 and less than $50K
operations, costs less than
$2500
Risk reduction is mandatory
Norpetco Risk Matrix
Rev.1
LIKELIHOOD
A B C D E
Occurs more than once per year in the Occurred more than once a year in the Common in the industry and in
Qualitative Indicator Never occurred in the industry Previously occurred in industry
industry industry and has occurred in Norpetco Norpetco
Quantitative Indicator Less than 1 in 1 million chance per
annum
Between 1 in 100,000 and 1 in 1
million chance per anum
Between 1 in 10,000 and 1 in 100,000 Between 1 in 1,000 and 1 in 10,000
chance per annum chance per annum
Greater than 1 in 1,000 chance per
annum
(Individual Risk per Year) <10^-6 per year 10^-6<X<10^-5 per year 10^-6<X<10^-5 per year 10^-4< X < 10^-3 per year >10^-3 per year
Reputation/ Non financial impact /
Environment
Licence to operate
Highly Unlikely Unlikely Possible Likely Highly Likely
Catastrophic, where environmental Impact is: Major/ International Impact:
1- Uncontained hazardous impact • International public attention
2- Cannot be controlled by company owned resources/ • Extensive negative attention in international media
contracts and national and international policies with severe
3- Requiring major treatment and monitoring for 180 impacts to access new areas and receive license or tax
days legislation
4- Require external international resources to control • Potential loss of license to operate an asset or
intervention from the government
5- Major breach to national and international • Widespread adverse social impact
legislations • Damage to relationships with key stakeholders
6- Significant claims and fines
7- Requires regulatory authority investigation
8- Heightened concern of local community
Major, where environmental impact is: Major Impact:
1- Extensive hazardous impact • National public concern
2- Cannot be controled by company owned resources/ • Extensive negative attention in the national media
contracts and/or regional/national political attention with
3- Requiring long-term rectification, monitoring and potentially restrictive measures and/or impact on
treatment more than 90 days and less than 180 days grant of licenses, mobilization of action groups
4- Requiring External National aids
5- Major breach of number of applicable regulations
6- Considerable and prolonged community adverse
impact and dissatisfaction
7- Requires regulatory authorities intervention and
investigation
Moderate event where environmental impact is: Local Impact:
1- Uncontained hazardous impact • Regional public concern
2- Can be controlled by company owned resources, • Extensive negative attention in local media
specialists and third party contracts • Slight national media and/or local/regional political
3- Can be rectified within a short to medium term attention with possibly negative stance of local
treatment and monitoring more than 30 days and less government and/or action groups
than 90 days • Local adverse social impact
4- Significant medium-term residual effect
5- Regulatory authority concern
Minor event where environmental impact is: Minor Impact:
1- Contained and low impact • Some local public concern
2- Can be controlled by company owned resources/ • Some slight local media and/or political attention
contracts with potentially negative aspects for company
3- Treatment and monitoring requires more than 7 days operations
4- Low profile media attention
5- Likely level of legal claims
Slight Impact:
1- Low impact to isolated area • Public awareness of the incident may exist, but there
2- Treatment and monitoring less than 7 days is no public concern
3- No permanent or significant effect • Isolated and short term complaints from neighbors
(e.g., complaints about specific noise episode)
5- Legal issued managed by routine procedures
6- Slightly to no level of legal claims
Implement risk reduction measures untill ALARP is demonstrated. Maintain systematic controls
Tolerable if ALARP Low
Continous improvement required where practicable. and monitor