38th Annual International Symposium 30 July – 3 August 2007, St.

Louis, MO

OPERATION HORNED OWL--LESSONS LEARNED IN EXPEDITIONARY

FLIGHT TEST
Capt Tyler N. Hague
United States Air Force Academy
Instructor of Astronautics
719-333-1694

Major Jay A. Orson

United States Air Force
Branch Chief
703-808-1714

ABSTRACT

Evolving threats encountered by coalition forces during contingency operations drive the need
for new and improved airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. In many
cases, these items are prototype, one-of-a-kind aircraft systems that have not completed a traditional
course of developmental and operational flight test. Operation Horned Owl is one such experimental
quick-reaction capability, in which an experimental ground-penetrating radar and an off-the-shelf
electro-optical/infrared sensor suite were rapidly integrated onto a C-12 airframe and deployed to
support Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. This paper discusses the practical implications of completing
experimental flight test in a true operational environment – forward deployed combat arenas. Due to
accelerated system employment, the aircraft received only basic stateside testing to characterize sensor
performance. Remaining flight test was conducted concurrent with combat operations to support ground
forces. This nontraditional test approach, when contrasted with traditional developmental flight test,
highlights several areas that challenged successful system development. These areas along with lessons
learned are provided to aid decision makers of future programs when balancing system maturation with
meeting operational demand.
Contents of this paper are not necessarily the official views of, or endorsed by the U.S.
Government, the Department of Defense, or the Department of the Air Force.

Table of Contents
Abstract ....................................................................................................................................................... 1
Body............................................................................................................................................................ 2
Introduction............................................................................................................................................. 2
Motivation............................................................................................................................................... 3
C-12 Horned Owl.................................................................................................................................... 3
Traditional Testing.................................................................................................................................. 4
Nontraditional, In-Theater Testing ......................................................................................................... 6
Challenges............................................................................................................................................... 8
Lessons Learned........................................................................................................................................ 13
Conclusions............................................................................................................................................... 14
References................................................................................................................................................. 15
Biographies ............................................................................................................................................... 15
Copyright © Tyler Hague and Jay Orson

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BODY

Introduction

In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), one of the leading causes of death in coalition troops and
civilians is improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Dr. James Roche, Secretary of the Air Force, was a
strong supporter of rapidly developing and fielding innovative technology to counter evolving threats.
With his support, various government groups such as the Rapid Capabilities Office and the Director,
Security, Counterintelligence and Special Program Oversight, SAF/AAZ, worked to field innovative
systems. The Horned Owl (HO) system was one such quick-reaction capability (QRC) aimed at
providing a viable solution to the enemy’s rapidly changing tactics.
The HO system was developed and fielded in a little over three months to counter the IED threat.
The intent of this paper is not to dwell on system capabilities or mission impact but to share some
lessons learned during HO technology demonstration, which consisted of both experimental flight test
and combat operations. These lessons highlight key issues that any program must address when
considering to field developmental systems. System details and impacts are presented only to aid in
understanding and highlight lessons learned.
The HO weapon system, shown in figure 1, implements a prototype sensor and exploits
emerging intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technology attempting to foster new
battlefield capabilities. Experience gained during developmental flight test of the HO weapon system
during OIF provides concrete examples of challenges common to any program rapidly fielding
prototype ISR systems in an attempt to make immediate, positive impact on the frontlines.
Previous Department of Defense program experience in developing electronic counter-measures
and ISR systems have helped pave the way for a non-traditional development approach for new systems
characterized by in-theater improvements while supporting contingency operations. The success of this
approach in making rapid battlefield impact has made it an attractive option for other programs.
However, the impacts of and special considerations for testing in deployed environments have not been
widely communicated. This paper is intended to provide information and spark dialog regarding the
issues that surround fielding development weapons systems in a combat environment.

Figure 1 – C-12 Horned Owl

Discussion begins by presenting motivation for rapid fielding of the HO weapon system. Then,
after top-level review of the aircraft modifications, an overview of traditional developmental and
operational flight test approach is presented as a basis to contrast against the HO experiences in OIF.

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Next, details of the phases of testing and operational employment of the HO system are recounted, and
the challenges encountered are highlighted. Finally, lessons learned are formalized and presented as key
points for future programs to weigh when considering the advantages and disadvantages of a non-
traditional system development path.

Motivation

Since the start of OIF, insurgent forces have been largely using IEDs to attack coalition ground
forces. Commanders on the frontlines called for solutions to seek out IEDs and the caches of munitions
and materials used to build them. Out of that warfighter need, an array of new technologies surfaced as
possibilities, and projects were initiated and/or accelerated to rush new solutions into action.
The C-12 HO was among the array of candidates to mitigate the effects of insurgent activity [1].
The goal of the project was to employ experimental ISR technology to achieve immediate battlefield
impact. Inherent to this goal, the technology performance, concept of operations, and resulting combat
effectiveness would need to be determined in a new, untested environment. Based on the initial success
of the system, successive system improvements were planned and incorporated to attempt to fully
realize the capability of this technology.
A phased development approach like that used in the HO program is akin to spiral development.
By fielding a baseline performance and implementing phased upgrades in system capability, spiral
development attempts to overcome disadvantages of total system acquisition, which is traditionally
plagued by cost and schedule overruns and takes too long to reach the warfighter [2]. The end goal is
capability that reaches the field faster, allows flexible integration into existing infrastructure, and
enables future growth in both capability and concept of operations.

C-12 Horned Owl

The C-12 HO was a highly modified version of an RC-12D Guardrail. The Guardrail was used
by the Army to perform signal intelligence and electronic surveillance missions. Two Pratt and Whitney
PT6 turbo prop engines power the high-performance, fixed-wing, T-tail, pressurized aircraft
manufactured by Raytheon Aircraft Company [3]. To provide space for HO modifications, Guardrail
specific electronics were removed from the airframe.
The primary HO modifications were the additions of ground-penetrating radar (GPR) and an
electro-optical, infrared (EO/IR) sensor turret. Other modifications included upgraded communications
equipment, the addition of blue force tracking equipment, increased onboard power generation, armor,
and the incorporation of a defensive systems suite.

Figure 2 – Ground-Penetrating Synthetic Aperture Radar

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The primary sensor on the HO aircraft is the PENRAD 6 radar developed by SRI International.
The system is a synthetic aperture, continuous wave radar. Pulse compression techniques in conjunction
with the natural ground penetrating properties of a radar waveform produce a system capable of
geolocating buried objects with a high degree of accuracy [4]. The GPR modification of the aircraft
consists of radar antenna mounted to the underside of the aircraft covered by a fiberglass shell (figure 2)
and two large system racks mounted inside the aircraft.
A single radar operator is required to run the GPR system. Basic operator tasks include power-up
and initialization, health monitoring, data collection and transfer, navigation, communication with
ground forces, and power-down. Additional differential global positioning system (GPS) systems are
operated to provide the GPR time and position information to reconstruct target images during post
processing.
The secondary sensor on the HO aircraft is the WESCAM 14 Skyball EO/IR turret manufactured
by L-3 Communications/Wescam [5]. The sensor suite includes daylight EO, spotter EO, and IR
capability. Real-time downlink capability is incorporated to allow ground units to view imagery on
Rover handheld displays. The turret is mounted to the aft, underside of the aircraft (figure 3) and a large
system rack is mounted inside the aircraft.

Figure 3 – Wescam 14 Skyball EO/IR Sensor

A single EO/IR camera operator is required to control the rotating turret. Basic tasks are very
similar to the radar operator position and include power up and initialization, health monitoring, data
collection and transfer, navigation, communication, and power down. Independent GPS systems provide
the Skyball with image coordinates and allow GPR and EO/IR image comparison.
The modifications increased the gross weight of the aircraft, shifted the location of the aircraft
center of gravity, and changed the aircraft outer mold line. Each of these changes had the potential to
affect basic aircraft performance and flying qualities. Additionally, integrated performance of each new
sensor system and ancillary equipment required evaluation and characterization. Tactics, techniques, and
procedures were also needed to employ the system modifications.

Traditional Testing

Given the significance of modifications made to the C-12 to create the HO weapon system, it is
important to review the scope of testing required to perform its test and evaluation. To provide a
framework for understanding some of the difficulties involved in quick-reaction capability development,
it is necessary to understand what testing and resources would have been encompassed by a more
traditional flight test approach. The traditional approach would have included developmental tests (DT)
and operational tests (OT) to identify and correct system deficiencies and develop preliminary tactics for
employing the system prior to fielding.

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Developmental Flight Test. Developmental flight test can be characterized as a controlled and
disciplined environment that implements scientific method to test and evaluate system capability.
Through rigorous application of the “predict, test, validate” philosophy, tests allow for data collection in
precise and repeatable conditions so system anomalies can be identified, diagnosed, and corrected.
Throughout DT, extreme effort is made to document results.
A typical DT program for a system like HO would consist of tests in three main areas:
performance, flying qualities, systems integration. Prior to entering DT, each independent system would
complete a series of functional bench tests. Additional tests in a system integration laboratory would
verify integration into the aircraft architecture. Ground tests would be performed to assess compatibility
and interference issues, as well as perform final checks of the aircraft prior to flight.
Once in the air, aircraft performance tests to include takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, landing, and
single engine would be accomplished. Flying qualities test points like lateral/directional stability and
minimum controllable airspeeds with single engine would be critical. Structural loads, vibration, and
acoustic loads would also be addressed for the new aircraft configuration. System integration would
focus on collecting GPR and EO/IR returns to determine if the system could identify legitimate targets
and begin to focus on the usefulness of the imagery by the intelligence analyst.
Critical to the performance of these tests are a multitude of test-unique resources. Aircraft
instrumentation would capture flight conditions to help recreate system anomalies. Special data
recorders and data pumps would be integrated into the sensor systems to gain access to raw signals as
well as message traffic to help capture and identify system anomalies. Telemetry would send these
parameters to a control room full of contractor and government system experts to provide real-time
analysis of performance. Specially constructed target ranges would be used to provide a highly
controlled data collection environment.
The end goal of DT is to produce a system that performs to specification, identify and correct as
many deficiencies as possible, and to validate and/or produce documentation for the proper operation of
the system. As previously mentioned, this traditional approach inherently takes a long time and has high
costs associated with execution [2]. However, this approach may be impractical for QRC insertion.
Operational Flight Test. Operational flight test is similar to DT in its disciplined approach to
assessing the system. However, the focus shifts to the application of the system in an operationally
representative environment. Key areas addressed are operational suitability, operational effectiveness,
and interoperability. Given that DT produced a system that operates correctly and performs to
specification, OT looks to evaluate mission utility and develop initial tactics, techniques, and procedures
to exploit new system capabilities.
Critical to OT efforts is the ability to immerse the system into an operationally representative
environment. Though the system is still exercised in loosely scripted scenarios to focus on particular
aspects, placing the system in the intended environment of operation highlights the mission utility of the
system and any deficiencies. It is this environment where interactions with other military weapon
systems indicate interoperability and where these interactions help to define a concept of operations.
Thorough evaluation in OT identifies necessary improvements in suitability, effectiveness, and
interoperability. Just as important, OT provides the guidelines for how the system will be initially
employed once fielded. In many cases, OT provides training for the initial cadre to man the system. The
bottom line is that OT reduces much of the uncertainty in how to field and operate the system.

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Nontraditional, In-Theater Testing

HO was fielded as a quick-reaction capability and implemented spiral development to achieve

desired end goal capability. Most of the baseline capability was well understood and system maturity
allowed rapid fielding. The majority of predeployment and deployed test centered on upgrades to the
GPR and EO/IR systems.
Predeployment testing. Prior to deploying in support of OIF, a small set of testing was
performed to assess GPR performance in geological conditions similar to those expected in the Iraqi
theater. From previous operation, it was well understood that soil composition and moisture content
directly impacted GPR performance. The results of the test were positive and the decision was made to
field the experimental ISR platform.
Additional tests were performed to verify operation of the EO/IR sensors, communication
equipment, and defensive systems. Modifications were also made to equip and ruggedize the aircraft for
combat operations. All predeployment testing was completed in two months from GPR installation to
overseas deployment. Since limited testing was conducted in an effort to rapidly deploy the HO
capability, heavy emphasis on contractor involvement and system experience was required. Results from
tests on similar system sensors were highly leveraged. The contractor team was fundamental to the rapid
development and a vital component of what was a planned 60-day demonstration.
Deployed Testing. HO bed-down occurred at a forward location within Iraq assigned as a tenant
unit to the 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing. Conditions at the base were austere, and the base received
direct fire from insurgent forces on nearly a daily basis. The Combined Forces Air Component
Commander (CFACC) maintained oversight of the operation through daily briefings at the Combined
Air Operations Center (CAOC) by an HO liaison officer and through routine visits to the unit in the
field. The unit received support from co-located communications and operational functions within the
air expeditionary wing.
Test and evaluation (T&E) occurred in two phases during which several system improvements,
or spirals, occurred. Concurrent with T&E, HO conducted combat operations to support ground forces.
In fact, combat operations were T&E opportunities, and every prosecuted target was a test point.
Phase 1: Initial Operation. The initial deployment plan for HO was 60 days of operations in
theater to analyze the operational impact of the GPR. Previous testing stateside had indicated acceptable
performance. Now the goal was to validate those results in an actual combat environment. So, the
Horned Owl team deployed to OIF and flew combat sorties to identify suspected IEDs to ground troops.
Local ties to ground forces were developed to elicit feedback on points of interest to attempt to
assess system performance. Efforts to integrate with the ground units were successful, and coordination
of HO operations with ground force movements improved the availability of feedback. Although
feedback was not available for all points found, it was possible to determine at some level what HO was
capable of detecting.
Furthermore, a limited radar test range was constructed to provide a set of targets in a controlled
environment. The radar test range consisted of a small set of inert munitions placed at different depths
and orientations. Due to constraints of the battlefield environment, the range was located within the
defensive perimeter of the air base. The type and number of targets were limited, but reflected IEDs
generally encountered by ground units. The radar range provided a more precise measurement of system
geolocation accuracy.

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Over several months, periodic runs were made over the test range to assess performance and
detect any system degradation. However, these efforts lacked a structured approach. Results, raw data,
and the conditions for collection were not well documented. Test objectives, test methodology and a
data analysis plan did not exist. Yet the HO focus was not on developmental test but on achieving a
positive battlefield impact. During the first 60 days of operation, a large weapon cache was found and
terrorists planting IEDs on the roadside were caught on video surveillance. With these and other
successes the decision was made to extend the HO program beyond the initial 60-day demonstration.
Phase 2: Employment as an Operational Unit. In the early days of January 2005, Operation HO
became an operational unit, the 4th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Flight. The unit was part of the
332nd Expeditionary Operations Group under the 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing. This event marked a
number of significant changes in the manner in which HO executed operations, including how the team
was tasked, how feedback was gathered and how training was performed. Mixed into the daily combat
operations directly supporting ground troops were infrequent test specific events.
With respect to test efforts, it marked the beginning of a disciplined and structured phase, which
incorporated a formalized test plan with objectives and performance measures that would document and
provide structure for HO reports to Air Force leadership. The primary objective was to characterize
radar system position accuracy and detection capability. The plan also aimed to identify factors that
significantly affected performance and to assess the ability of image interpreters to correctly and
consistently process radar images.
To execute the test plan, the number and variety of radar targets on the test range were increased.
The new targets were more representative of the mix of IEDs and weapons caches found by forces in
Iraq. Common debris was also added to assess the ability of the end-to-end system to reject clutter. Civil
engineering support was again utilized to perform GPS surveys of the range, which enabled geolocation
accuracy calculations.
As part of the test plan, a test point matrix was generated to structure data collection in a manner
conducive to identifying key performance factors. Some possible factors were not controllable in an
operational environment, such as soil composition and moisture content. While others like target
orientation, target depth, and aircraft position during collection were adjusted. Information on the
impacts of these factors feed directly into tactics, techniques, and procedures documentation that would
ultimately determine the best manner to employ the HO system.
During this second phase of development, test efforts were also used to support major software
and hardware upgrades to the sensors. First, the GPR had its output power doubled as part of a spiral
improvement. Then, months later, new signal processing software was incorporated to further exploit the
GPR technology and push for end goal capability. During each upgrade, the test plan was executed, data
were collected, and the results were reported to assess the impact of the spiral upgrade on performance.
Because previous results were documented and reported, trend analysis was possible between spiral
configurations.
The end result of the T&E efforts from Phase 1 and Phase 2 testing was a keen understanding of
how HO performed and how it should be incorporated in OIF. Test efforts interspersed in on-going
combat operations allowed for continued impact on the battlefield. The HO flew over 680+ combat
sorties and was responsible for finding 21 IEDs and 24 weapons caches totaling 93,000 pounds of buried
ordnance, saving both coalition forces’ and Iraqi citizens’ lives.

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Challenges

During operations, it became apparent that several significant and unique challenges to T&E
existed. These challenges not only affected the ability to successfully test the HO systems, but also
impacted combat operations. Several of the challenges could be controlled, such as system upgrades,
support infrastructure, and training. Other challenges were unavoidable consequences of choosing to
conduct test in the middle of combat.
Combat Theater versus Controlled Test Environment. A significant challenge and the focus of
most developmental programs is to create an operationally representative test environment. Generating
a combat environment was not a challenge for HO. On the contrary, flying in real combat operations
challenged the very ability to collect system data required to evaluate performance. Using both feedback
gathered from ground force investigation of suspected points and data collected over a test range of
radar targets, attempts were made to quantify and maximize capability. Additionally, combat necessity
restricted HO personnel within the base perimeter, preventing personal investigation of weapons caches
and IED locations, as well as precluding civilian system experts and test infrastructure from collocating
with the operation.
A primary metric used to determine system capability was feedback received from the ground
units that investigated points of interest based on HO intelligence. However, in most cases the feedback
lacked sufficient detail and was routinely just a positive or negative confirmation of whether an IED or
weapon was found at the target location. Valuable data like the presence of large metal debris at the
point of interest was simply omitted. Furthermore, feedback was not provided for a majority of the
points. Difficulty in gathering data from ground units was understandable because no other ISR
platform required such quantity and quality of intelligence feedback be communicated back the
collection platform.
Inconsistency in the quality and availability of feedback made assessing performance difficult
and introduced potentially large errors. To address this challenge, the HO team liaised with and trained
ground forces’ commanders and their troops, emphasizing the importance of their feedback. These
attempts achieved limited success.
After identifying the difficulty in gathering feedback on the validity of threats located by HO, it
became paramount to generate data for a set of known targets. Radar test ranges were built to provide
data from known targets in a semi-controlled test environment. Buried ordnance, calibration targets, and
other objects were arranged in an open space in the middle of the airfield. This location was selected
because it was the only available, positively controlled land that was cleared of unexploded ordnance.
With this resource, multiple test flights were flown over the test range to collect true developmental type
performance data. However, performing these collections directly overhead of a busy airfield was
difficult and time consuming. The large number of radio frequency (RF) emitters inherent to the airfield
environment also produced high levels of RF background noise that interfered with data collection.
Though cumbersome and inefficient, data collection against test range targets was the primary tool used
to quantify GPR accuracy.
Not only were test data hard to collect, but the HO system also lacked standard instrumentation
normally associated with a developmental system. Deployed without support of onboard
instrumentation, telemetry, or a contingent of system experts, the normal process of troubleshooting
errors was increasingly difficult. Errors could be identified through computer halts and poor imagery,
but identifying root causes for these errors was a challenge. From program onset, the need for some

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onsite support was recognized, and HO deployed with a minimal contractor crew and spare parts
inventory to help provide systems and aircraft maintenance. In fact, the permanent party contractors
were a key reason the HO had the highest operational availability rating of any unit in theater. Even with
this success, the onsite team did not always encompass system knowledge to trace down root causes of
system anomalies, and stateside reach-back became an important factor.
The geographical separation of software and system experts from the HO system slowed the
process of identifying and resolving root causes of anomalies. To bridge this gap, the program relied on
base-provided Internet connectivity to transmit data and information back and forth between U.S.-based
system experts and the deployed team members. However, infrastructures like the Internet that support
command and control activities were high-value assets in combat and were subject to frequent enemy
attacks. On more than one occasion, stateside connections were lost for extended periods of time. In one
instance, lost connectivity delayed receiving software license files that were required to initialize
replacement hardware; this grounded the system for several days.
In a safe and secure, stateside test environment, all critical personnel would have direct access to
the items under test. However in the hostile, deployed environment, the risks to personnel and the costs
associated with deploying and protecting those personnel need to be carefully considered. The impacts
to system development are significant. Geographically separated team members relying on tenuous lines
of communication to pass data could slow development. Care should be taken to plan and provision
resources needed to support the development process, including which personnel and equipment need to
be immediately available. For experimental systems, the speed with which iterations of design and test
can occur is critical, and effort should be made to ensure all vital team members are able to contribute.
In addition, the methods and procedures must be established to transfer large packets of data for
analysis. A plan on how to deal with global data transfer was essential. Communication is the key
between the technical experts back in the states and deployed team members.
Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) Equipment. In an effort to cheaply and rapidly develop and
deploy HO, COTS equipment was used to the maximum extent possible. The GPR and EO/IR sensor
systems were composed primarily of laboratory-grade equipment and commercial computer components
that were not designed for the extreme conditions experienced in sustained combat operations. The
decision to use COTS equipment in the GPR, EO/IR, and multiple GPS systems helped cheap and rapid
deployment of the HO system, but also led to hardware reliability issues after the expeditionary
environment took its toll.
Of the demanding environmental conditions, extreme heat troubled the system during the
summer months when cabin temperatures would routinely exceed 90 degrees Fahrenheit during normal
operations and surpassed the design temperatures of most commercial electronics. As each flight
progressed or after consecutive missions with short turn-around times, the aircraft and its systems
became heat soaked and the tendency of the GPR computers to lock up in flight increased. Barring
major modification of the aircraft environmental control system, several workarounds were implemented
to minimize these impacts. Air carts cooled the GPR prior to taxi and takeoff, aircrew compressed
ground operations to reduce exposure to high temperature operations, and if time and conditions
permitted, HO climbed to high altitudes to cold soak. Even with all of these procedures, the GPR system
could only be continuously operated for about an hour during the hottest of days.
Another condition that stressed system components was the vibration environment. Vibration
levels in aircraft are normally high, but austere airfield conditions meant operation using extremely
rough taxiways and runways. The violent shaking encountered during normal operations stressed

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commercial computer hardware designed for offices and not aircraft. The environmental
incompatibilities of the hardware were highlighted every time the EO/IR suite would lock up during
takeoff as the aircraft encountered a bump in the runway. In most cases, aircrew procedures could be
modified to reduce the impacts of using commercial hardware. Concerning the lockups during takeoff
roll, system startup and initialization was simply delayed until after takeoff.
COTS hardware also led to complications in how the operators interfaced with the mission
systems. Operator interface with the GPR consisted of a commercial computer keyboard. The EO/IR
interface was a keyboard and joystick. Command entry to the system was difficult during light
turbulence, and hardware fragility led to several component failures. These components were
commonplace and easy to replace through standard supply channels.
Another problem frequently occurred during data transfer. A combination of USB memory sticks
and SCSI drives were used to transfer data from the aircraft to post processing facilities. Accessing the
ports for these devices was not easy; they were located near cabling between major components. One
cable interface in particular was a commercial serial cable located next to a USB port that provided GPS
to the GPR. Random vibration and/or routine use of the USB port during data transfer frequently caused
this connection to loosen and caused the GPR to stop functioning. Tracing cable connections became
routine procedures for mission aircrew when troubleshooting GPR system anomalies.
One final, but major environmental impact on the system was the amount of dust and sand
contaminants. Because the aircraft and its equipment could not be stored in environmentally controlled
facilities, contaminants built up within the computer hardware rapidly and led to computer lockups and
data drive failures. To mitigate contamination, the aircraft and mission equipment were routinely
cleaned and vacuumed.
In spite of all the difficulties associated with using COTS hardware in an extreme operating
environment, the aircraft and its experimental systems had tremendous mission availability. In fact, the
HO with one aircraft and one-of-a-kind sensor systems had the highest availability rate of any unit
operating in OIF. The C-12 proved to be an extremely reliable platform to host the GPR and EO/IR
sensors, the experimental systems were normally easy to repair, and failed components were easy to
acquire. Despite the extra level of maintenance required, the system and the personnel responsible for its
operation delivered mission capability on a daily basis.
Spiral Development. The spiral development approach led to a challenge of how to efficiently
and effectively incorporate systems upgrades while sustaining combat operations. Throughout the
duration of Operation HO, several significant upgrades were accomplished. Each of these events acted
as step functions in either sensor performance or mission capability, but also presented opportunity for
program complications. One upgrade in particular, a doubling of the GPR power, highlights a few of
these challenges.
The first of these challenges was providing access for personnel to accomplish the GPR power
improvement. Contractor personnel required to make the modification were not allowed in the theater of
operations. So, the aircraft was flown outside the theater to implement the spiral upgrade. The week-
long modification with no backup HO aircraft meant loss of ISR capability available to support ground
forces’ operations. To minimize down time, only two test flights were conducted with the upgraded
GPR system before it was flown back into theater to continue with combat operations. The end result
was that the air component of the system was upgraded, but refinement of the ground component –
image processing and analysis capability – was left to mature real-time during support of combat
missions.

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All spirally developed programs have a vision of end system capability and a plan to reach that
capability. However, the product of the system, actionable intelligence in the case of HO, must be
preserved during successive spirals. To this end, it is critical to consider impacts to the total system
including air and ground components during major changes, and both major updates of the system had
dramatic impact on each.
For example, the increase in GPR power resulted in more radar returns from both desired targets
and undesired clutter. To better understand the implication of increased noise, Figure 4 provides a
sample of test GPR imagery [4]. From this figure it is easy to sense the difficulty an analyst faces when
determining a point of interest from large volumes of GPR imagery. The spiral upgrade to increase radar
power not only increased the sensitivity of the system to buried objects, but also increased clutter in the
imagery. By forcing the analysts to learn to interpret imagery with increased sensitivity real time,
analysts tended to call out more potential points of interest. As a result, more false positive points were
reported until analysts’ procedures and training adjusted to the new capability. By not directly
addressing the impact of the spiral upgrade on the ground component of the system, a period of reduced
system performance resulted and caused a negative impression of the HO system by ground troops and
their leadership.

Figure 4 – Typical Ground Penetrating Radar Imagery

It is the end product that counts; it doesn’t matter if the system can form a return if the analysts
can’t interpret the return and filter out clutter. A program must start with the end in mind, which for HO
was actionable intelligence. To create actionable intelligence, there must be the traditional airframe and
mission systems to collect radar image, as well as processing and analysis tools to interpret the image.
The challenge is to train operators and analysts to exploit new capabilities as the developmental system
is upgraded.
Training. Another challenge in providing successful, rapid deployment of a developmental
system is the inherent lack of training material available to aircrew, maintainers, and analysts. Training
materials are normally developed in conjunction with test activities as system capabilities mature. By
accelerating the HO program, many of these materials were not developed prior to the system reaching
the field.
The initial HO team was deployed with the system design experts and relied upon on-the-job
training for the remaining personnel. Because of the level of expertise in the initial cadre, a lack of
training materials was not a critical issue. After 4 months, the next rotation of Airmen arrived to replace

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the initial cadre as part of standard Air Force expeditionary operations. New team members arrived in
theater without prior mission systems training. Thus, much of the system knowledge was passed
verbally and training was conducted in conjunction with operational missions. These procedures were
very atypical of what a normal unit would experience. Risks associated with training in a combat
environment should be carefully assessed.
In early January 2005, the 4th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Flight (ERF) stood up and
incorporated Operation Horned Owl into an operational unit. In doing so, the 4th ERF assumed
responsibility for and began the development of a formalized unit training processes. Dramatic
improvement in training efforts soon followed, and by the time a third rotation of troops arrived in
theater, a two-week course had been developed to train the assorted group of contractors, aircrew, T&E
professionals, maintainers, and analysts as a unit prior to their deployment into theater. Extensive hands-
on system training was provided for everyone except radar operators, as the only operating GPR system
was located in theater. Further training to complete the syllabus was provided per design once in theater
to compensate for limited resources.
Another training challenge already alluded to earlier was the wide spectrum of demographics
within the HO team. The unit was comprised of members with various backgrounds, including Army
Warrant Officers, National Guard members, Air Force special operations officers, laboratory engineers,
flight test engineers, intelligence analysts, and contractor personnel. While this mix of individuals
provided a unique and operational flavor to team, the operational mentality would often conflict with
developmental needs and practices. Developmental testing demands controlled data collection
conditions where operations were fluid and could flex to investigate system capability.
One instance of the operational versus developmental conflict was in the balance of system
ground operations. At times the schedule pressures of the Air Tasking Order to meet times over target
pressed aircraft commanders to take off on schedule with only brief down time between missions. This
decision met operational metrics, but did not provide the GPR system time to cool down and caused the
GPR system overheating and negative mission impacts. In contrast, a program focused specifically on
exploiting and maximizing capability might choose to extend down time between missions to mitigate
heat issues. Operational, combat risk mitigations must be carefully considered and will often be contrary
to developmental objectives and slow T&E. The HO program accepted the risk of slowed development
and successfully managed it to achieve immediate impact on the battlefield, executing over 680 sorties
and finding over 93,000 lbs of explosives and munitions. Future programs must be willing to accept that
QRC development will be hindered due to inefficiencies and compromises in T&E objectives necessary
to mitigate operational risks.
It was not only necessary to train members of the HO team, but it was imperative to educate and
coordinate system improvements with the operational chain of command. HO products, such as tactics,
techniques, and procedures documentation, were not available. Normally, combatant commanders would
rely upon these documents to understand the ISR system capabilities. Furthermore, because each spiral
upgrade inherently changed the concept of operations, commanders had to be made aware of how best to
employ ever-changing capabilities. Training personnel outside the unit was a difficult and daunting task
that drained limited HO resources. This task was exacerbated by the constant rotation of military
personnel and leadership due to expeditionary military practices.
Force Integration. Another significant challenge was determining how to best integrate a
developmental weapons system into an existing force structure in a joint combat environment. As the
HO program matured and the concept of operations evolved, HO officially stood up as 4th ERF. The

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transition occurred rapidly and dramatically changed how HO was tasked to support coalition forces
throughout Iraq. Prior to the transition, the unit was locally tasked by collocated ground units, and after
the transition, all targeting requests were routed through the CAOC. Thus, transition left the HO team
physically separated from the units requesting HO support and from the ground troops that actually
examined points of interest. The result was that ground unit feedback, a critical source of performance
data, was much harder to receive. Also, without close interaction between HO and ground units, it
became difficult to educate the ground troops on HO capabilities so that they could request HO ISR
collection that had highest potential for success.
Another example of difficulty in force integration occurred with the ISR cell at the CAOC. The
ISR cell at the CAOC was the centralized clearinghouse for all ISR collection requests for platforms
operating in OIF and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. This meant the ISR cell personnel filtered all
collection requests and were the first line of contact with ground troops. However, the ISR cell troops
were not HO system experts and lacked training on HO employment and capability. As alluded to
earlier, it was necessary to train those external to the HO team on system capabilities. To remedy their
lack of knowledge of HO capabilities and procedures, ISR personnel were brought to HO operations,
incorporated into day-to-day operations, and trained over the course of a week. Although this training
did not make them experts, it did help to bridge a vast knowledge gap.
Yet another operational challenge with the ISR cell involved differing priorities. As a special
mission prior to becoming operational, mission tasks were executed to investigate and maximize system
capability. After becoming operational, the ISR cell tasked HO based on theater priorities that might or
might not support system development. This disconnect in priorities was not resolved, but became less
of a factor as the concept of operations for HO stabilized over time.

LESSONS LEARNED

Testing of HO during combat operations highlighted many unique challenges – challenges that
are important factors for any developmental program to weigh prior to beginning deployed operations.
The HO team successfully conquered many of these challenges and achieved success by furthering
system capability, all while finding over 93,000 lbs of ordnance and saving coalition lives. These
challenges taught the team some new lessons like how to collect test data from ground troops, as well as
underscored many familiar ones like how important communication and training are to successful
system development.
Always consider the impact of the test environment. There are great differences between
traditional test and combat environments. In an expeditionary situation, data collection can be difficult
and may not be as robust as in a typical developmental test. Teams should make provisions for how and
what data will be collected prior to getting into the field. Additionally, if hostilities limit access of
personnel, measures to provide system access and data transfer will be key considerations.
The COTS equipment is only as good as its design. Off-the-shelf equipment and rapidly
deployed systems may and will encounter many unexpected faults and anomalies. The airborne, combat
environment leads to unique system requirements. Extreme temperatures, vibration, contaminants,
moisture, and rough use by operators require rugged equipment. The COTS equipment might be able to
perform the function, but not provide necessary reliability. If and when components fail, plans need to
be in place to provide the reach-back capability, communication, and infrastructure to trouble shoot and
resolve anomalies and failures.

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The product is key throughout spiral development. It is the total system concept that matters and
the final product of the system must be foremost in mind as the system evolves. The best operating
system in the world will not help troops if its output cannot be utilized to positively impact the battle
space. Improvements that focus on a single part of the system and ignore impacts to the remaining
components can actually degrade the final product. Keeping the system product central to efforts will
help identify all areas that must be addressed during upgrades. Additionally, careful consideration of
operational risks will help guide improvements and understand where compromises to developmental
objectives are necessary.
Train all of the team. Training will always be instrumental to successfully producing combat
capability. During expeditionary operations, training needs to be considered prior to getting to the field.
This can be a difficult and endless task with four-month rotations for military members. Additional
effort must be exerted to help members not familiar with operating developmental systems or
performing flight test become more aware of their unique considerations and requirements.
Know how the system fits into the big picture. Develop plans of how the program will interact
with all other combat systems in today’s net-centric warfare environment. Expect program results and
opinions to be made swiftly and definitively up and down the chain of command, and make plans to
address the rapid changeover of personnel. Many of the efforts to educate outside organizations on
mission procedures and capabilities go hand-in-hand with unit training, so leverage as much as possible.
Take the time to evaluate training requirements for operators and the entire chain of command.
Know the full impact of fielding the system. In the case of HO, the IED threat was dire and
required immediate action. Leaders had to weigh not only the maturity of the system capability and the
risks to deployed personnel supporting the program, but they had to assess the impact of introducing this
system on the rest of OIF forces. Much like ripples traveling across water, a small perturbation in
normal operations can have far reaching effects. For example, intelligence products generated by HO
required ground troops to go to locations and search for IEDs and munitions. If the system had been
faulty, then troops would have been unnecessarily put in harm’s way and the system would be a
detriment to coalition forces. However, a working system deployed in the field, months or years faster,
could save countless lives. The HO leadership carefully considered these factors and made the decision
to field the system. This decision fielded a system that proved effective in finding insurgents, hindering
their attack methods, and saving coalition lives.

CONCLUSIONS

The Horned Owl operation was a rapidly developed innovative technology fielded in less than a
year to counter the specific threat of improvised explosive devises (IEDs) for Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM. The operation successfully flew over 680 combat sorties with an availability rate of over 95
percent and lost no aircrew. The system was responsible for finding 45 IEDs and weapons caches that
totaled over 93,000 pounds of buried ordnance. These efforts saved countless coalition and Iraqi
citizen’s lives. In spite of these positive results, many challenges to the development of the weapon
system in a combat environment were identified. Assessing system maturity, determining how to collect
data to evaluate system performance, and ensuring actionable intelligence to the warfighter are
fundamental issues that any similar program will face. These challenges and lessons learned were
recounted so that future programs could learn what to consider when deciding to rapidly field a
developmental system into combat operations.

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REFERENCES

Wood, David. The ‘Poo Hunt’: In an Unconventional War, Creative Use of Air Power.
Newhouse News Service, 18 August 2005.
Sidoti, L. Pentagon, Congress Wants to Rein in Cost of Weapons. Aerotech News and Review,
vol. 20, October 2005.
RC-12D Guardrail. Federation of American Scientists, Military Analysts Network. December 24,
1998. Retrieved November 1, 2005 from http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/c-12.htm
Mine Detection Photo. SRI International Website. Retrieved November 1, 2005 from
http://www.sri.com/esd/penetratingradar/
Imaging Products, Products and Services. L3 Communications, Wescam Website. Retrieved
November 1, 2005 from http://www.wescam.com/products_services_1.asp

BIOGRAPHIES

Captain Tyler N. Hague is currently serving as Instructor of Astronautics

and Executive Officer for the Department of Astronautics at the United States Air
Force Academy. Previously, he served as Flight Commander for the 416th Flight
Test Squadron at Edwards AFB, CA, and was involved in avionics integration,
engine operability and response, high angle-of-attack, defensive systems, weapons
integration, and stores certification flight test on various programs for several
fighter aircraft including the F-16, F-15, and T-38. During November 2004 through
April 2005, he was deployed in support of Operation Horned Owl as a radar
operator, camera operator, and flight test engineer. He is a distinguished graduate of the USAF Test
Pilot School Class 03A. He has also been assigned to the Air Force Research Lab Space Vehicles
Directorate as a program manager for satellite solar array and responsive launch technology
development. He has a BS from the United States Air Force Academy in Astronautical Engineering and
an MS from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering.

Major Jay A. Orson is currently serving as a Branch Chief, Advanced

Payloads, in the Washington DC area. He previously served as Flight Commander
and Chief Flight Test Engineer for the 452nd Flight Test Squadron at Edwards
AFB, CA. He was involved in airworthiness, weapons system and reconnaissance
integration and flight test on the Global Hawk and Predator unmanned air vehicles.
He served as a test conductor for the Airborne Laser, Missile Defense Agency flight
test program. During April to July 2005, he was deployed in support of Operation
Horned Owl as a radar operator and flight test engineer. He is a graduate of the
USAF Test Pilot School class 03A. His previous assignment was to the Air Force Research Laboratory
as a program manager for the Satellite Assessment Center specializing in stray light analysis for satellite
reconnaissance platforms. He has a BS from the North Dakota State University in Electrical
Engineering and an MS from Air Force Institute of Technology in Space Operations.

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