ATTY.
LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
Article 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of
the donor partake of the nature of testamentary provisions, and
shall be governed by the rules established in the Title on
Succession.
Cuevas vs. Cuevas
(G.R. No. L-8327, December 14, 1955)
Digest by: Louis Palma Gil (gwapa)
FACTS:
Antonina Cuevas executed a “Donacion Mortis Causa” ceding
her property in Nueva Ecija to his nephew Crispulo Cuevas. In
the same instrument appears the acceptance of Crispulo Cuevas.
the donation contains:
Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas na samantalang ako ay
nabubuhay, and lupa na ipinagkakaloob ko sa kaniya ay ako pa
rin and patuloy na mamomosecion, makapagparatrabaho,
makikinabang at ang iba pang karapatan sa pagmamayari ay sa
akin pa rin hanggang hindo ko binabawian ny buhay ng
Maykapal at ito naman ay hindi ko nga iya-alis pagkat kung
ako ay mamatay na ay inilalaan ko sa kaniya.
Antonina later executed another notarial instrument entitled
"Revocacion de Donacion Mortis Causa" purporting to set aside
the preceding conveyance.
RTC: The Court of First Instance denied the recovery sought by
Antonina
CA: forwarded the case to SC because Antonina raised only
questions of law.
ISSUE:
IS the deed of donation is a donation inter vivos or donation
mortis causa? – DONATION INTERVIVOS
RULING:
In this case; Donation Inter vivos
The Court held that the donation is a donation inter vivos with
reservation of beneficial title during the lifetime of the donor.
The final phrase to the effect that the donor will not dispose or
take away ("hindi ko nga iya-alis" in the original) the land
"because I am reserving it to him upon my death." By these
words the donor expressly renounced the right to freely dispose
of the property in favor of another (a right essential to full
ownership) and manifested the irrevocability of the conveyance
of the naked title to the property in favor of the donee.
Irrevocability;
irrevocability is characteristic of donations inter vivos, because
it is incompatible with the idea of a disposition post mortem.
In this case;
It is apparent from the entire context of the deed of donation
that the donor intended that she should retain the entire
beneficial ownership during her lifetime, but that the naked title
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
1
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
should irrevocably pass to the donee. It is only thus that all the
expressions heretofore discussed can be given full effect; and
when the donor stated that she would continue to retain the
"possession, cultivation, harvesting and all other rights and
attributes of ownership," she meant only the dominium utile, not
the full ownership.
Had the donor meant to retain full or absolute ownership she
had no need to specify possession, cultivation and harvesting,
since all these rights are embodied in full or absolute
ownership; nor would she then have excluded the right of free
disposition from the "rights and attributes of ownership" that
she reserved for herself.
Anent the issue on acceptance;
The argument that there was no sufficient acceptance, because
the deed "merely recites that (1) the donee has duly read all the
contents of this donation; (2) that he 'shall fully respect all its
terms'; and (3) that 'for the act of benevolence' he is expressing
his gratitude" but there is no show of acceptance (Appellant's
brief, p. 7), is without basis. To respect the terms of the
donation, and at the same time express gratitude for the donor's
benevolence, constitutes sufficient acceptance, If the donee did
not accept, what had he to be grateful about? We are no longer
under the formulary system of the Roman law, when specific
expressions had to be used under paid of nullity.
Anent failure to reserve for own support;
Also unmeritoriious is the contention that the donation is void
because the donor failed to reserve enough for ther own
support. As we have seen, she expressly reserved to herself all
the benefits derivable from the donated property as long as she
lived. During that time, she suffered no diminution of income. If
that was not enough to support her, the deficiency was not dur
to the donation.
As to Ingratitude;
Finally, the donee is not rightfully chargeable with ingratitude,
because it was expressly stipulated that the donee had a total
income of only P30 a month, out of which he had to support
himself, his wife and his two children. Evidently his means did
not allow him to add the donor's support to his own burdens.
Jutic v CA
G.R. No. L-44628 August 27, 1987
Digest by: Louis Palma Gil (gwapa)
FACTS:
Arsenio Seville executed an Affidavit in favor of her brother
Melquiades Seville to which the heirs of the latter claim as a
basis of their claim over lots 170 and 172 in the estate of
Arsenio. Arsenio later mortgaged Lots 170 and 172 to PNB. This
was done with the knowledge and acquiescence of Melquiades
Seville.
AFFIDAVIT
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
I, ARSENIO SEVILLE, of legal age, WIDOWER, Filipino, and a
resident of Anquibit, Cambanogoy, Saug, Davao, Philippines,
after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law do
hereby depose and say, as follows:
That I am the declared and legal owner of a certain parcel of
land otherwise known as Lot Nos. 172 and 170 Cad- 283,
containing an area of 21.6361 has., and situated at
Cambanogoy, Saug, Davao and covered by HA No. V-77791 (E-
69793) and approved by the Director of Lands as per Order
issued on March 5, 1954;
That I am a widower as indicated above and that I have no one
to inherit all my properties except my brother Melquiades
Seville who appears to be the only and rightful person upon
whom I have the most sympathy since I have no wife and
children;
That it is my desire that in case I will die I will assign all my
rights, interest, share and participation over the above-
mentioned property and that he shall succeed to me in case of
my death, however, as long as I am alive I will be the one to
possess, enjoy and benefit from the produce of my said land
and that whatever benefits it will give me in the future I shall
be the one to enjoy it;
That I make this affidavit to make manifest my intention and
desire as to the way the above-mentioned property shall be
dispose of and for whatever purpose it may serve.
xxx xxx xxx
(SGD.) ARSENIO SEVILLE
Affiant
Arsenio Seville died intestate, single, without issue, and without
any debt. The children of Melquiades Seville are now claiming
exclusive ownership of the properties and improvements
thereon on the basis of the instrument executed by Arsenio
Seville in favor of Melquiades Seville and on their alleged actual
possession, occupation, and cultivation of Lots Nos. 170 and 172
since 1954 continuously and peacefully in the concept of owner
up to the time of Arsenio Seville's death.
RTC: rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents that
there was no donation. The document is not a donation inter
vivos or mortis causa but a mere declaration of an intention and
a desire.
CA: affirmed the trial court's decision that there was no
donation.
ISSUE:: WON valid donation exists – NO.
RULING:
In this case
The court held that there was no intention to transfer ownership
to Melquiades. It was a mere intention or a desire on the part of
Arseio that in the event of his death at some time in the future
his properties should go to Melquiades.
Mere expression of an intention is not a promise, because a
promise is an undertaking to carry the intention into effect.
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
2
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
Further the Court held that the fact that Arsenio filed a
homestead application and mortgaged the lots to PNB with the
knowledge of Melquiades shows that indeed there was no
transfer of ownership to the latter.
It is quite apparent that Arsenio Seville was thinking of
succession ("... in case I win die, I will assign all my rights, share
and participation over the above-mentioned properties and that
he shall succeed to me in case of my death ..."). Donations which
are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of the
nature of testamentary provisions and shall be governed by the
rules established in the title on succession (Art. 728, Civil Code).
Document is not a valid donation
The petitioners likewise contend that the document was a valid
donation as only donations are accepted by the donees.
However, the petitioners could not have accepted something,
which by the terms of the supposed "donation" was not given
to them at the time. The affidavit could not transmit ownership
except in clear and express terms.
Arsenio excercised ownership over the land
Furthermore, the homestead application was later prosecuted in
the name of Arsenio Seville and the land, much later, was
mortgaged by him to the Philippine National Bank (Annex 1, p.
100, Rollo) in consideration of a loan. Arsenio dealt with the land
and entered into transactions as its owner. All these happened
with the knowledge and acquiescence of the supposed donee,
Melquiades Seville. Contrary to the petitioners' allegations in
their brief, there was no immediate transfer of title.
Anent the Literacy of Arsenio
It is likewise significant to note the respondents' assertion that
the signed affidavit is a forgery because Arsenio Seville was
illiterate during his lifetime. He could not write his name. He
executed documents by affixing his thumbmark as shown in the
Real Estate Mortgage (Exhibit A-4), which he executed on May
24, 1968 in favor of the Philippine National Bank. The real estate
mortgage came much later or more than five years after the
supposed donation (Exhibit 4) to Melquiades Seville where
Arsenio Seville allegedly affixed his signature. This fact was not
disputed by the petitioners.
During the lifetime of Arsenio Seville, he paid the PNB
amortization out of his personal funds and out of the income on
his property. The payments were not continued by the
petitioners when Arsenio Seville died so much so that the
property was extrajudicially foreclosed and had to be
repurchased by Zoilo Seville, one of the respondents, through
installment arrangements. (Deed of Promise to Sell appended as
Annex 4 to respondents' brief). The actions of the respondents
are in consonance with their claim of co-ownership.
Maglasang vs. Cabatingan
(G.R. No. 131953, June 5, 2002)
Digest by: Louis Palma Gil (gwapa)
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
Conchita Cabatingan executed 4 wills in favor of herein
petitioners containing the following provision:
"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the
DONOR for the DONEE, x x x the DONOR does hereby, by these
presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE
the above-described property, together with the buildings and all
improvements existing thereon, to become effective upon the
death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event
that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present
donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no
further force and effect; x x x
Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations,
respondents as heirs of Conchita filed with the Regional Trial
Court eking the annulment of said four (4) deeds of donation
executed on January 14, 1995.
RTC: ruled that the donations are donations mortis causa and
therefore the four (4) deeds in question executed on January 14,
1995 are null and void for failure to comply with the requisites of
Article 806 of the Civil Code on solemnities of wills and
testaments.
CA: (no mention in case)
Issue:
Is it a donation intervivos or mortis causa – Mortis Causa
RULING:
Characteristics of Donation Mortis Causa
In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition is not
transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive." 12 In
determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the
following characteristics must be taken into account:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee
before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to
the same thing, that the transferor should retain the
ownership (full or naked) and control of the property
while alive;
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable
by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability
may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved
power in the donor to dispose of the properties
conveyed;
and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee.
In this case;
the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the
fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that
intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to
Cabatingan's death.The phrase "to become effective upon the
death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that
Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the
properties to petitioners during her lifetime. In fact herein
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
3
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
petitioners in their acceptance expressly state that they “hereby
accept the foregoing donation mortis causa”
That the donations were made "in consideration of the love and
affection of the donor" does not qualify the donations as inter
vivos because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the
same reason.
“transfer is void if the donor survives done”
Finally, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis
causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor
should survive the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan
provided for in her donations. If she really intended that the
donation should take effect during her lifetime and that the
ownership of the properties donated be transferred to the
donee or independently of, and not by reason of her death, she
would have not expressed such proviso in the subject deeds.
Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortis
causa, the same partake of the nature of testamentary
provisions21 and as such, said deeds must be executed in
accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and
testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.
Deeds are VOID
The deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary
public of the donor and the donee, the documents were not
executed in the manner provided for under the above-quoted
provisions of law.
Ganuelas vs. Cawed
(G.R. No. 123968, April 24, 2003)
Digest by: Erianne Du
FACTS:
Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin (Celestina) executed a Deed of
Donation of Real Property covering seven parcels of land in favor
of her niece Ursulina Ganuelas (Ursulina), one of herein
petitioners.
The Deed of Donation reads as follows:
That, for and in consideration of the love and
affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE, and
of the faithful services the latter has rendered in the
past to the former, the said DONOR does by these
presents transfer and convey, by way of DONATION,
unto the DONEE the property above, described, to
become effective upon the death of the DONOR; but
in the event that the DONEE should die before the
DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
rescinded and of no further force and effect.
After Celestina’s death, Ursulina had been sharing the produce of
the donated properties with private respondents Leocadia G.
Flores, et al., nieces of Celestina. However, Ursulina refused to
give private respondents any share in the produce of the
properties despite repeated demands.
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
Private respondents were thus prompted to file on May 26, 1986
with the RTC of San Fernando, La Union. They alleged among
others that the Deed of Donation executed by Celestina in favor
of Ursulina was void for lack of acknowledgment by the attesting
witnesses thereto before notary public Atty. Henry Valmonte,
and the donation was a disposition mortis causa which failed to
comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities
of wills and testaments, hence, it was void.
RTC: Held the provision in the Deed of Donation that in the event
that the DONEE should predecease the DONOR, the donation
shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect is
an explicit indication that the deed is a donation mortis causa
ISSUE:
Is the donation herein a donation mortis causa or donation inter
vivos—DONATION MORTIS CAUSA
RULING:
Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in
the former, the act is immediately operative even if the actual
execution may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in
the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until
the death of the donor-testator.
The Court held in the case of Alejandro vs. Geraldez that if the
donation is made in contemplation of the donors death, meaning
that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will
pass to the donee only because of the donors death, then it is at
that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a
donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will
and testament.
But if the donation takes effect during the donors lifetime or
independently of the donors death, meaning that the full or
naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties
passes to the donee during the donors lifetime, not by reason of
his death but because of the deed of donation, then the
donation is inter vivos.
In the instant case, the Court took note of the provisions of the
deed emphasizing on the following clause:
to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before
the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically
rescinded and of no further force and effect.
EFFECTS IF THE DONATION IS DONATION MORTIS CAUSA;
As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis
causa disposition, the formalities of a will under Article 728 of
the Civil Code should have been complied with, failing which the
donation is void and produces no effect
Del Roasrio vs. Ferrer
(G.R. No. 187056, September 20, 2010)
Digest by: Erianne Du
FACTS:
In 1968, Spouses Gonzales Executed a document entitled
Donation Mortis Causa in favor of their two children Asuncion
and Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini (who is the
petitioner in this case).
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
4
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
A few months after the execution of the said document, the
donor-wife died and a few months later, the donor-husband
Leopoldo executed a deed of assignment of his rights and
interests in the subject property to their daughter Asuncion.
Leopoldo died in June 1972.
Petitioner Jarabini Del Rosario filed a "petition for the probate of
the August 27, 1968 deed of donation mortis causa" before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. This was opposed by
Asuncion who said that all the rights and interests in the
property were already assigned to her by Leopoldo.
RTC: Held that the donation was a donation inter vivos, and that
being a donation inter vivos, Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment
of his rights and interest in the property in favor of Asuncion was
void since he had nothing to assign anymore.
CA: Held that it was a donation mortis causa. According to the
CA, since no proceeding exists for the allowance of what Jarabini
claimed was actually a donation inter vivos, the RTC erred in
deciding the case the way it did. Finally, the CA held that the
donation, being one given mortis causa, did not comply with the
requirements of a notarial will, rendering the same void.
ISSUE:
Is the donation herein a donation mortis causa or donation inter
vivos—DONATION INTER VIVOS
RULING:
That the document in question in this case was captioned
"Donation Mortis Causa" is not controlling. This Court has held
that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not
altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, he Court held that
"irrevocability" is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea
of conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability" is precisely
the essence of the act. A donation mortis causa has the following
characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee
before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to
the same thing, that the transferor should retain the
ownership (full or naked) and control of the property
while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of
a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor
should survive the transferee.
The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership,
possession, and administration of the property" and made the
donation operative upon their death. But this Court has
consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the
context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors
parted with their naked title, maintaining
only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they
lived.
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the
donation, which acceptance the deed required. This Court has
held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation
is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such
kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
Case Digests
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession III- Manresa
2019
College of Law

will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donor’s which parcel of land is more or
lifetime less described and bounded as
follows:
Villanueva vs. Froilan
(G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011) 1. Bounded North by Amambajag River;
Digest by: Erianne Du East, Benito Picao; South, Teofilo Uyvico;
and West, by Public land; 2. It has an area
FACTS: of 3,492 square meters more or less; 3. It is
Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner), here represented by his heirs planted to coconuts now bearing fruits; 4.
sued spouses Froilan and Leonila Branoco (respondents), in the Having an assessed value of P240.00; 5. It is
Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran (trial court) to recover a now in the possession of EUFRACIA
3,492 square-meter parcel of land. RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962 in the
In their Answer, respondents similarly claimed ownership over concept of an owner, but the Deed of
the Property through purchase in July 1983 Donation or that ownership be vested on
from Eufracia Rodriguez (Rodriguez) to whom Rodrigo donated her upon my demise.
the Property in May 1965.
The deed of donation executed by Rodrigo in favor of Rodriguez That I FURTHER DECLARE, and I reiterate
contains the following provisions: that the land above described, I already
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: devise in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ
since May 21, 1962, her heirs, assigns, and
That I, ALVEGIA that if the herein Donee predeceases me,
RODRIGO, Filipino, of legal age, the same land will not be reverted to the
widow of the late Juan Arcillas, a Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of
resident of Barrio Bool, EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ
municipality
of Culaba, subprovince of Biliran, RTC: ruled in favor of the petitioners. It rejected the claims of
Leyte del Norte, Philippines, respondents who said it was a donation mortis causa
hereby depose and say: CA: It reversed the ruling of the trial court. CA found the
following factors pivotal to its reading of the Deed as
That as we live[d] donation inter vivos: (1) Rodriguez had been in possession of the
together as husband and wife Property as owner since 21 May 1962, subject to the delivery of
with Juan Arcillas, we begot part of the produce to Apoy Alve; (2) the Deeds consideration
children, namely: LUCIO, was not Rodrigos death but her love and affection for Rodriguez,
VICENTA, SEGUNDINA, and considering the services the latter rendered; (3) Rodrigo waived
ADELAIDA, all surnamed dominion over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her,
ARCILLAS, and by reason of implying its inclusion in Rodriguezs estate; and (4) Rodriguez
poverty which I suffered while our accepted the donation in the Deed itself, an act necessary to
children were still young; and effectuate donations inter vivos, not devises
because my husband ISSUE:
Juan Arcillas aware as he was with Is the donation herein made by Rodrigo in favor of Rodriguez a
our destitution separated us [sic] donation mortis causa or donation inter vivos such that the sale
and left for Cebu; and from then by Rodriguez in favor of respondents grants respondents a
on never cared what happened to superior title —DONATION INTER VIVOS
his family; and because of that RULING:
one EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, one We examine the juridical nature of the Deed whether it passed
of my nieces who also suffered title to Rodriguez upon its execution or is effective only upon
with our poverty, obedient as she Rodrigos death using principles distilled from relevant
was to all the works in our house, jurisprudence. Post-mortem dispositions typically
and because of the love and
affection which I feel [for] her, I (1) Convey no title or ownership to
have one parcel of land located the transferee before the death of the
at Sitio Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte transferor; or, what amounts to the same
bearing Tax Decl. No. 1878 thing, that the transferor should retain the
declared in the name ownership (full or naked) and control of the
of Alvegia Rodrigo, I give (devise) property while alive;
said land in favor of EUFRACIA
RODRIGUEZ, her heirs, successors, (2) That before the [donors] death,
and assigns together with all the the transfer should be revocable by the
improvements existing thereon, transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
5
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
Case Digests
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession III- Manresa
2019
College of Law

may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if
the transferor should survive the transferee
[4] [T]he specification in a deed of
the causes whereby the act may be revoked
by the donor indicates that the donation
is inter vivos, rather than
disposition mortis causa[;]
[5] That the designation of the
donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the
deed to the effect that the donation is to take
effect at the death of the donor are not
controlling criteria; such statements are to be
construed together with the rest of the
instrument, in order to give effect to the real
intent of the transferor[;] [and]
nevertheless corroborates the express irrevocability of
x x x [inter vivos] transfers.
In no less than seven cases featuring deeds of donations styled
as mortis causa dispositions, the Court, after going over the
deeds, eventually considered the transfers inter vivos, consistent
with the principle that the designation of the donation
as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the
donation is to take effect at the death of the donor are not
controlling criteria [but] x x x are to be construed together with
a the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real
intent of the transferor. Indeed, doubts on the nature of
dispositions are resolved to favor inter vivos transfers to avoid
uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the
deed.

(6) That in case of doubt, the

conveyance should be deemed
donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa,
in order to avoid uncertainty as to the
ownership of the property subject of the deed

It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked

title to Rodriguez under a perfected
donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that if the
herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will not be
reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of
x x x Rodriguez, signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title
to Rodriguezs estate, waiving Rodrigos right to reclaim title. This
transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of
Rodriguezs acceptance of the disposition which, being reflected
in the Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3 May
1965. Rodrigos acceptance of the transfer underscores its
essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only
donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient. Indeed,
had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she
could have easily stipulated, as the testator did in another case,
that the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or
entity the properties here donated x x x or used words to that
effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property
in case Rodriguez predeceases her.

Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the

beneficial title to the Property, evident from Rodriguezs
undertaking to give one [half] x x x of the produce of the land
to Apoy Alve during her lifetime. Thus, the Deeds stipulation that
the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise,
taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to
Rodrigos beneficial title.

Third. The existence of consideration other than the donors

death, such as the donors love and affection to the donee and
the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises,
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
6
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
Article 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of
which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the
value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or others either by his will or by operation of
law.
CORONEL VS CORONEL
(G.R. No. 103577 October 7, 1996)
Digested by: April John Latorza
*Dates are material.
FACTS:
January 19, 1985: CORONELs executed a document entitled
"Receipt of Down Payment" in favor of RAMONA which is
reproduced hereunder:
RECEIPT OF DOWN PAYMENT
P1,240,000.00 — Total amount
50,000 — Down payment
———————————
P1,190,000.00 — Balance
“ between the CORONELs and RAMONA) because they were then
The CORONEL’s received from RAMONA, through
CONCEPCION, the latter’s mother, the down-payment of the
purchase price of the INHERITED HOUSE AND LOT.
CONDITIONS TO THE SALE
1. CORONELS bind theirselves to effect the transfer in
their names from deceased father, Constancio P.
Coronel, the transfer certificate of title immediately
upon receipt of the down payment.
2. So on upon presentation of the TCT already
CORONELs’ name, they will immediately execute the
deed of absolute sale of said property and Miss
Ramona Patricia Alcaraz shall immediately pay the
balance of the P1,190,000.00.
FEBRUARY 6, 1985: the property originally registered in the
name of the CORONELS' father was transferred in their names.
FEBRUARY 18, 1985: the Coronels sold the property intervenor-
appellant Catalina B. Mabanag (CATALINA) for P1,580,000.00
after the latter has paid P300,000.00.
CORONELS cancelled and rescinded the contract with RAMONA.
So, CONCEPCION,et., filed a complaint for specific performance
against the Coronels.
APRIL 25, 1985: the CORONELS executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale over the subject property in favor of CATALINA and a new
title was issued in the name of the latter.
RTC: It ruled the specific performance case in favor of
CONCEPCION, et.:
 Execution of deed of sale in favor of RAMONA
 Issuance of new title under the name of RAMONA
upon payment of the full price by RAMONA
 Ordered CATALINA AND CORONELS to vacate the
property
MR: DENIED
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
7
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
CA: DENIED
ISSUE:
WHAT IS THE REAL NATURE OF THE CONTRACT? IS IT CONTRACT
TO SELL OR CONTRACT TO SALE?
RULING: Contract of Sale
When the “Receipt of Down Payment” document was
prepared and signed by Romulo Coronel, the parties had agreed
to a conditional contract of sale the consummation of the
contract is subject only to the successful transfer of the
certificate of Title. The receipt of down payment document
manifests a clear intent of the Coronel’s to transfer the title to
the buyer, but since the title is still in the name effect the
transfer even though the buyers are able and willing to
immediately pay the purchase price. The agreement as well
could not have been a contract to sell because the seller or the
Coronel’s made no express reservation of ownership or the title
of the land. On Feb. 6, 1985, the Contract of Sale between the
Coronel’s and the Alcaraz’ became obligatory.
ISSUE RELATED TO OUR TOPIC
ARGUMENT OF THE CORONELs: There was no perfected
contract on JANUARY 19, 1985 (when the transaction happened
not yet the absolute owners of the inherited property.
WON THE CORONELS WERE THE ABSOLUTE OWNERS OF THE
PROPERTY
ISSUE: NO! THE ARGUMENT IS UNSUSTAINABLE
Article 774 of the Civil Code defines Succession as a mode of
transferring ownership as follows:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition
by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to be extent and value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others by his
will or by operation of law.
CORONELs, sellers in the case at bar, being the sons and
daughters of the decedent Constancio P. Coronel are
compulsory heirs who were called to succession by operation
of law. Thus, at the point their father drew his last breath,
petitioners stepped into his shoes insofar as the subject property
is concerned, such that any rights or obligations pertaining
thereto became binding and enforceable upon them. It is
expressly provided that rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil
Code; Cuison vs. Villanueva, 90 Phil. 850 [1952]).
ANOTHER CLAIM BY THE CORONEL:
Be it also noted that CORONEL’s claim that succession may not
be declared unless the creditors have been paid is rendered
moot by the fact that they were able to effect the transfer of the
title to the property from the decedent's name to their names on
February 6, 1985.
DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL APPLIES IN THIS CASE
Aside from this, CORONELs are precluded from raising their
supposed lack of capacity to enter into an agreement at that
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
time and they cannot be allowed to now take a posture contrary
to that which they took when they entered into the agreement
with RAMONA.
Having represented themselves as the true owners of
the subject property at the time of sale, CORONEL cannot claim
now that they were not yet the absolute owners thereof at that
time.
BALUS VS BALUS
(G.R. No. 168970 January 15, 2010)
Digested by: April John Latorza
FACTS:
CELESTINO (petitioner) and SATURNINO AND LEONARDA
(respondents) are the children of the spouses RUFO and
SEBASTIANA Balus.
SEBASTIANA died on September 6, 1978, while RUFO died on
July 6, 1984.
January 3, 1979: RUFO mortgaged a parcel of land, which he
owns, as security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank.
RUFO failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property
was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the
sole bidder. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the
Bank.
October 10, 1989: herein petitioner and respondents executed
an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of
them a specific one-third portion of the subject property
consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement
also contained provisions wherein the parties admitted
knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject
property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same
at the soonest possible time.
1992: Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial
Settlement, herein SATURNINO AND LEONARDA bought the
subject property from the Bank.
October 12, 1992: a Deed of Sale of Registered Land was
executed by the Bank in favor of SATURNINO AND LEONARDA.
Subsequently, new TCT was issued in the name of the latter.
Meanwhile, CELESTINO continued possession of the subject lot.
Later on, SATURNINO AND LEONARDA filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Possession and Damages against CELESTINO,
contending that they had already informed CELESTINO of the
fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property,
but the CELESTINO still refused to surrender possession of the
same to them.
RTC: Ruled in favor of CELESTINO
It ordered SATURNINO AND LEONARDA to execute a Deed of
Sale in favor of the CELESTINO, the one-third share of the
property in question, presently possessed by him. The RTC held
that the right of CELESTINO to purchase from the SATURNINO
AND LEONARDA his share in the disputed property was
recognized by the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate, which the parties had executed before the SATURNINO
AND LEONARDA bought the subject lot from the Bank.
CA: REVERSED THE DECISION OF RTC
The CA ruled that when petitioner and respondents did not
redeem the subject property within the redemption period and
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
8
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a
new title in the name of the Bank, their co-ownership was
extinguished.
ARGUMENTS BY CELESTIONO
1. Despite the RESPONDENTs’ full knowledge of the fact
that the title over the disputed property was already in
the name of the Bank, they still proceeded to execute
the subject Extrajudicial Settlement, having in mind the
intention of purchasing back the property together with
petitioner and of continuing their co-ownership
thereof.
2. That the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is, in and by
itself, a contract between him and respondents,
because it contains a provision whereby the parties
agreed to continue their co-ownership of the subject
property by "redeeming" or "repurchasing" the same
from the Bank. This agreement, petitioner contends, is
the law between the parties and, as such, binds the
respondents. As a result, petitioner asserts that
respondents' act of buying the disputed property from
the Bank without notifying him inures to his benefit as
to give him the right to claim his rightful portion of the
property, comprising 1/3 thereof, by reimbursing
respondents the equivalent 1/3 of the sum they paid to
the Bank.
ISSUE
WON THE PROPERTY FORMS PART OF RUFO’S (father) ESTATE
RULING: NO. It is owned by the bank
The siblings are arguing on the wrong premise that, at the time
of the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject
property formed part of the estate of their deceased father to
which they may lay claim as his heirs.
FACTUAL OBSERVATION BY THE SC: There is no question that
the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot
during the lifetime of Rufo.
1. There is no dispute with respect to the fact that the
subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner
and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was
mortgaged in 1979.
2. Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale13 was
issued in favor of the Bank on January 25, 1984, after
the period of redemption expired.
3. There is neither any dispute that a new title was issued
in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984.
Hence, the rights to a person's succession are transmitted
from the moment of his death 14 In addition, the inheritance of a
person consists of the property and transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those
which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession
(ARTICLE 774).
In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the
subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the
time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed
part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. STATED
DIFFERENTLY,
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
Case Digests
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession III- Manresa
2019
College of Law

PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS NEVER INHERITED THE
SUBJECT LOT FROM THEIR FATHER.
Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming
that they became co-owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue
arising from the supposed right of petitioner as co-owner of the
contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes
of the law, the disputed lot did not pass into the hands of
petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any
given point in time.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTELEMENT IS AN
INDEPENDENT CONTRACT - - - which gives him the right to
enforce his right to claim a portion of the disputed lot bought by
respondents
property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial
Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of
having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning
to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion
of the same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance
of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. It
seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner,
vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and
giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or
interference from the other.20 In other words, the purpose of
partition is to put an end to co-ownership, 21 an objective which
negates petitioner's claims in the present case.

RULING:

NO
HERE, there is nothing in the subject Extrajudicial Settlement to
indicate any express stipulation for petitioner and respondents
to continue with their supposed co-ownership of the contested
lot.
For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an
agreement between him and his siblings to continue what they
thought was their ownership of the subject property, even after
the same had been bought by the Bank, is stretching the
interpretation of the said Extrajudicial Settlement too far.

In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership

to talk about and no property to partition, as the disputed lot
never formed part of the estate of their deceased father.

Moreover, petitioner's asseveration of his and respondents'

intention of continuing with their supposed co-ownership is
negated by no less than his assertions in the present petition
that on several occasions he had the chance to purchase the
subject property back, but he refused to do so. In fact, he claims
that after the Bank acquired the disputed lot, it offered to re-sell
the same to him but he ignored such offer. How then can
petitioner now claim that it was also his intention to purchase
the subject property from the Bank, when he admitted that he
refused the Bank's offer to re-sell the subject property to him?

In addition, it appears from the recitals in the Extrajudicial

Settlement that, at the time of the execution thereof, the parties
were not yet aware that the subject property was already
exclusively owned by the Bank. Nonetheless, the lack of
knowledge on the part of petitioner and respondents that the
mortgage was already foreclosed and title to the property was
already transferred to the Bank does not give them the right or
the authority to unilaterally declare themselves as co-owners of
the disputed property; otherwise, the disposition of the case
would be made to depend on the belief and conviction of the
party-litigants and not on the evidence adduced and the law and
jurisprudence applicable thereto.

Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings

intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
9
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
Case Digests
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession III- Manresa
2019
College of Law

sale. In case of failure by the VENDOR to comply with

Article 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and the undertaking provided in this paragraph and the
obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death. VENDEE shall find it necessary to file a case or cases in
court to eject the said lessees, tenants, occupants
MANUEL UY & SONS, INC, VS VALBUECO, INC. and/or squatters from the land, subject of this sale, the
(G.R. No. 179594 September 11, 2013) VENDOR agrees to answer and pay for all the
FULL TEXT: expenses incurred and to be incurred in connection
FD, wala talaga discussion related sa Article 776. with said cases until the same are fully and finally
terminated.
6. That the VENDOR and the VENDEE agree that during
FACTS:
the existence of this Contract and without previous
PETITIONER MANUEL UY & SONS, Inc. is the registered owner of
expressed written permission from the other, they shall
parcels of land located in Teresa, Rizal covered by Transfer
not sell, cede, assign, transfer or mortgage, or in any
Certificate of Title(TCT) No. 59534, covering an area of about
way encumber unto another person or party any right,
6,119 square meters; TCT No.59445, covering an area of about
interest or equity that they may have in and to said
6,838 square meters; TCT No. 59446,covering an area of about
parcels of land. x x x x
12,389 square meters; and TCT No. 59444,covering an area of
8. That it is understood that ownership of the
about 32,047 square meters.
properties herein conveyed shall not pass to the
NOVEMBER 29, 1973: two Conditional Deeds of Sale were
VENDEE until after payment of the full purchase price;
executed by petitioner, as vendor, in favor of respondent
provided, however, that the VENDOR shall allow the
VALBUECO, Incorporated, as vendee.
annotation of this Conditional Deed of Sale at the back
FIRST CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE: it covered TCT Nos. 59534,
of the titles of the above-described parcels of land in
59445 and 59446, and contained the following terms and
the corresponding Registry of Deeds x xx.
conditions:
9. That upon full payment of the total purchase price, a
That for and in consideration of the sum of ONE
Deed of Absolute Sale shall be executed in favor of the
HUNDREDSIXTY-FOUR THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY-
VENDEE and the VENDOR agrees to pay the
NINE(Php164,749.00) PESOS, Philippine currency, the VENDOR
documentary stamps and the science stamp tax of the
hereby agrees to SELL, CEDE, TRANSFER and CONVEY unto the
Deed of Sale; while the VENDEE agrees to pay the
VENDEE xx x the aforementioned properties, payable under the
registration and other expenses for the issuance of a
following terms and conditions:
new title.
1. The sum of FORTY-ONE THOUSAND ONE
10. That it is mutually agreed that in case of litigation,
HUNDREDEIGHTY-SEVEN and 25/100 (Php 41,187.25)
the venue of the case shall be in the courts of Manila,
PESOS shall be paid upon signing of this conditional
having competent jurisdiction, any other venue being
deed of sale; and
expressly waived.5
2. The balance of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-
SECOND CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE: covering Lot No. 59444
THREETHOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-ONE and
provides, thus:
75/100 (Php123,561.75) PESOS shall be paid within a
1. The sum of FIFTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVENTY-SIXAND
period of one (1) year from November 15, 1973, with
37/100 (Php 52,076.37) PESOS, shall be paid upon
interest of 12% per annum based on the balance, in the
signing of this conditional deed of sale; and
mode and manner specified below:
2. The balance of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-SIXTHOUSAND
a) January 4, 1974 – ₱16,474.90 plus interest
TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-NINE and 13/100
b) On or before May 15, 1974 – ₱53,543.43
(Php156,229.13) PESOS shall be paid within a period of
plus interest
one (1) year from November 15, 1973, with interest of
c) On or before November 15, 1974 –
12% per annum based on the balance, in the mode and
₱53,543.32 plus interest
manner specified below:
3. That the vendee shall be given a grace period of
a) January 4, 1974 – ₱20,830.55 plus interest
thirty (30)days from the due date of any installment
b) On or before May 15, 1974 – ₱67,699.29
with corresponding interest to be added, but should
plus interest
the VENDEE fail to make such payment within the grace
c) On or before November 15, 1974,
period this contract shall be deemed rescinded and
₱67,699.29 plus interest
without force and effect after notice in writing by
3. That the VENDEE shall be given a grace period of
VENDOR to VENDEE.
thirty (30) days from the due date of any installment
4. That the VENDOR agrees to have the existing
with corresponding interest to be added, but should
Mortgages on the properties subject of this sale
the VENDEE fail to make such payment within the grace
released on or before May 20, 1974.
period, this contract shall be deemed rescinded and
5. That the VENDOR agrees to have the above-
without force and effect after notice in writing by
described properties freed and cleared of all lessees,
VENDOR to VENDEE.
tenants, adverse occupants or squatters within 100
4. That the VENDOR agrees and acknowledges that any
days from the execution of this conditional deed of
and all payments to be made by the VENDEE by reason
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
10
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
of this presents unless hereafter advised by VENDOR to
the contrary, shall be made in favor of and to the
Philippine Trust Company by way of liquidation and
payment of the existing mortgage on the property
subject of this sale.
5. That after each payment adverted to above the
VENDOR shall issue the corresponding receipt for the
amount paid by the VENDOR to the Philippine Trust
Company.
6. That the VENDOR agrees to have the above-
described property freed and cleared of all lessees,
tenants, adverse occupants or squatters within 100
days from the execution of this conditional deed of
sale. In case of failure by the VENDOR to comply with
this undertaking provided in this paragraph and the
VENDEE shall find it necessary to file a case or cases in
court to eject the said lessees, tenants, occupants
and/or squatters from the land, subject of this sale, the
VENDOR agrees to answer and pay for all the
expenses incurred and to be incurred in connection
with said cases until the same are fully and finally
terminated.
7. That the VENDOR and the VENDEE agree that during
the existence of this Contract and without previous
expressed written permission from the other, they shall
not sell, cede, assign, transfer or mortgage, or in any
way encumber unto another person or party any right,
interest or equity that they may have in and to said
parcel of land.
xxxx
9. That it is understood that ownership of the property
herein conveyed shall not pass to the VENDEE until
after payment of the full purchase price, provided,
however, that the VENDOR shall allow the annotation
of the Conditional Deed of Sale at the back of the Title
of the above-described parcel of land in the
corresponding Registry of Deeds; x xx.
10. That upon full payment of the total purchase price,
a Deed of Absolute Sale shall be executed in favor of
the VENDEE and the VENDOR agrees to pay the
documentary stamps and the science stamp tax of the
Deed of Sale; while the VENDEE agrees to pay the
registration and other expenses for the issuance of a
new title.
11. That it is mutually agreed that in case of litigation,
the venue of the case shall be in the courts of Manila,
having competent jurisdiction, any other venue being
expressly waived.7
Respondent was able to pay petitioner the amount of
₱275,055.558 as partial payment for the two properties
corresponding to the initial payments and the first installments
of the said properties.
At the same time, petitioner complied with its obligation under
the conditional deeds of sale, as follows: (1) the mortgage for
TCT No. 59446 was released on May 18, 1984, while the
mortgages for TCT Nos. 59445and 59534 were released on July
19, 1974; (2) the unlawful occupants of the lots covered by TCT
Nos. 59444, 59534, 59445 and 59446 surrendered their
possession and use of the said lots in consideration of the
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
11
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
amount of ₱6,000.00 in a document9 dated November 19, 1973,
and they agreed to demolish their shanties on or before
December 7, 1973; and (3) the mortgage with Philippine Trust
Company covering TCT No. 59444 was discharged10 in 1984.
However, respondent suspended further payment as it was not
satisfied with the manner petitioner complied with its
obligations under the conditional deeds of sale. Consequently,
on March 17, 1978, petitioner sent respondent a
letter 11 informing respondent of its intention to rescind the
conditional deeds of sale and attaching therewith the original
copy of the respective notarial rescission.
On November 28, 1994, respondent filed a Complaint12 for
specific performance and damages against petitioner with the
RTC of Antipolo City. However, on January 15, 1996, the case
was dismissed without prejudice13 for lack of interest, as
respondent's counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference.
Five years later, or on March 16, 2001, respondent again filed
with the RTC of Manila, Branch 1 (trial court) a Complaint14 for
specific performance and damages, seeking to compel
petitioner to accept the balance of the purchase price for the
two conditional deeds of sale and to execute the corresponding
deeds of absolute sale. Respondent contended that its non-
payment of the installments was due to the following reasons:
(1) Petitioner refused to receive the balance of the
purchase price as the properties were mortgaged and had to be
redeemed first before a deed of absolute sale could be executed;
(2) Petitioner assured that the existing mortgages on
the properties would be discharged on or before May 20,1974,
or that petitioner did not inform it (respondent) that the
mortgages on the properties were already released; and
(3) Petitioner failed to fully eject the unlawful
occupants in the area.
PETIONER’S ARGUMENT:
1. It could not be compelled to execute any deed of
absolute sale, because respondent failed to pay in full
the purchase price of the subject lots.
2. Claiming that it gave respondent a notice of notarial
rescission of both conditional deeds of sale that would
take effect 30 days from receipt thereof. The notice of
notarial rescission was allegedly received by
respondent on March 17,1978.
3. Petitioner asserted that since respondent failed to pay
the full purchase price of the subject lots, both
conditional deeds of sale were rescinded as of April 16,
1978; hence, respondent had no cause of action against
it.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:
1. It denied that it received the alleged notice of notarial
rescission.
2. It also denied that the alleged recipient (one Wenna
Laurenciana)17 of the letter dated March 17, 1978, which
was attached to the notice of notarial rescission, was its
employee.
3. Assuming arguendo that the notice was sent to it, the
address (6th Floor, SGC Bldg., Salcedo Street, Legaspi
Village, Makati, Metro Manila) was not the given address of
respondent. Further, contended that its address on the
conditional deeds of sale and the receipts issued by it and
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
petitioner showed that its principal business address was
the 7th Floor, Bank of P.I. Bldg, Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal.
RTC: dismissing the complaint, as petitioner had exercised its
right to rescind the contracts.
The trial court stated that the issues before it were:
(1) Did petitioner unlawfully evade its obligation to
execute the final deed of sale and to eject the
squatters/occupants on the properties;
(2) Is the case barred by prior judgment; and
(3) Does respondent have a cause of action against
petitioner.
The trial court said that both conditional deeds of sale
clearly provided that "ownership x x x shall not pass to the
VENDEE until after full payment of the purchase price."
Respondent admitted that it has not yet fully paid the purchase
price. The trial court held that the conditions in the conditional
deeds of sale being suspensive, that is, its fulfillment gives rise to
the obligation, the reasons for the inability of respondent to
fulfill its own obligations is material, in order that the obligation
of petitioner to execute the final deeds of absolute sale will
arise. The trial court stated that the evidence showed that
petitioner had exercised its right to rescind the contract by a
written notice dated March 17, 1978 and notarial acts both
dated March15, 1978. The trial court noted that respondent
denied having received the notice and disclaimed knowing the
recipient, Wenna Laurenciana. However, on cross-examination,
respondent's witness, Gaudencio Juan, who used to be
respondent's Personnel Manager and Forester at the same time,
admitted knowing Laurenciana because she was the secretary of
Mr. Valeriano Bueno, respondent's president at that time,
although Laurenciana was not employed by respondent, but she
was employed by Mahogany Products Corporation, presumably
one of the 14 other companies being controlled by Mr. Bueno.20
The trial court held that the CONDITIONAL DEEDS OF
SALE WERE EXECUTED ON NOVEMBER 29, 1973 AND WERE
ALREADY COVERED BY REPUBLIC ACT (R.A.) NO. 6552,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REALTY INSTALLMENT BUYER ACT.
Under Section 4 of the law, if the buyer fails to pay the
installments due at the expiration of the grace period, which is
not less than 60 days from the date the installment became due,
the seller may cancel the contract after 30 days from receipt of
the buyer of the notice of cancellation or the demand for
rescission of the contracts by notarial act.
COURT OF APPEALS
(Directed the petitioner it to execute deeds of absolute sale over
the subject lots even if respondent admitted non-payment of the
balance of the purchase price.)
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court
of Appeals, and made these assignments of error:
(1) the trial court erred in holding that petitioner did
not unlawfully evade executing a final deed of sale, since
respondent's failure to fulfill its own obligation is material;
(2) the trial court erred in holding that it is unbelievable
and a self-contradiction that respondent was informed of the
mortgage only when it was paying the balance of the properties;
and
(3) the trial court erred in holding that as early as
November 19, 1973, petitioner had already taken necessary
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
12
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
steps to evict the squatters/occupants through the intercession
of the agrarian reform officer.
THE CA REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE RTC: It reinstated the
complaint of respondent, and directed petitioner to execute
deeds of absolute sale in favor of respondent after payment of
the balance of the purchase price of the subject lots.
The Court of Appeals held that the two conditional deeds of sale
in this case are contracts to sell. It stated that the law applicable
to the said contracts to sell on installments is R.A. No. 6552,
specifically Section 4 thereof, as respondent paid less than two
years in installments. It held that upon repeated defaults in
payment by respondent, petitioner had the right to cancel the
said contracts, but subject to the proper receipt of respondent of
the notice of cancellation or the demand for the rescission of the
contracts by notarial act.
However, the Court of Appeals found that petitioner sent the
notice of notarial rescission to the wrong address. The business
address of respondent, as used in all its transactions with
petitioner, was the 7th Floor, Bank of the Philippine Islands
Building, Ayala Avenue, Makati City, but the notice of notarial
rescission was sent to the wrong address at the 6th Floor, SGC
Building, Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati, Metro Manila.
Petitioner served the notice to the address of Mahogany
Products Corporation. It was established that the person who
received the notice, one Wenna Laurenciana, was an employee
of Mahogany Products Corporation and not an employee of
respondent or Mr. Valeriano Bueno, the alleged president of
Mahogany Products Corporation and respondent company.22 The
appellate court stated that this cannot be construed as to have
been contructively received by respondent as the two
corporations are two separate entities with a distinct personality
independent from each other. Thus, the Court of Appeals held
that the notarial rescission was in validly served. It stated that it
is a general rule that when service of notice is an issue, the
person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of
service by a preponderance of evidence. In this case, the Court of
Appeals held that there was no evidence that the notice of
cancellation by notarial act was actually received by respondent.
Thus, for petitioner's failure to cancel the contract in accordance
with the procedure provided by law, the Court of Appeals held
that the contracts to sell on installment were valid and
subsisting, and respondent has the right to offer to pay for the
balance of the purchase price before actual cancellation.
ISSUE
WON THE CONTRACT TO SELL WERE VALIDLY RESCINDED
RULING
YES. THE CONTRACTS WERE VALIDLY RESCINDED
We have here contracts to sell, thus MACEDA LAW IS
APPLICABLE.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the two conditional
deeds of sale entered into by the parties are contracts to sell, as
they both contained a stipulation that ownership of the
properties shall not pass to the vendee until after full payment of
the purchase price.
In a conditional sale, as in a contract to sell, ownership remains
with the vendor and does not pass to the vendee until full
payment of the purchase price.25 The full payment of the
purchase price partakes of a suspensive condition, and non-
fulfillment of the condition prevents the obligation to sell from
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
arising.26To differentiate, a deed of sale is absolute when there is
no stipulation in the contract that title to the property remains
with the seller until full payment of the purchase price.
Ramos v. Heruela27 held that Articles 1191 and 1592 of the Civil
Code28 are applicable to contracts of sale, while R.A. No. 6552
applies to contracts to sell.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that R.A. No. 6552,
otherwise known as the Realty Installment Buyer Act, applies to
the subject contracts to sell. R.A. No. 6552 recognizes in
conditional sales of all kinds of real estate (industrial,
commercial, residential) the right of the seller to cancel the
contract upon non-payment of an installment by the buyer,
which is simply an event that prevents the obligation of the
vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.
RESPONDENT HAD BEEN SERVED A NOTICE OF THE NOTARIAL
RESCISSION
It also provides the right of the buyer on installments in case he
defaults in the payment of succeeding installments30 as follows:
Section 3. In all transactions or contracts involving the sale or
financing of real estate on installment payments, including
residential condominium apartments but excluding industrial
lots, commercial buildings and sales to tenants under Republic
Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred forty-four, as amended by
Republic Act Numbered Sixty-three hundred eighty-nine, where
the buyer has paid at least two years of installments, the buyer is
entitled to the following rights in case he defaults in the payment
of succeeding installments:
(a) To pay, without additional interest, the unpaid
installments due within the total grace period earned
by him which is hereby fixed at the rate of one month
grace period for every one year of installment
payments made: Provided, That this right shall be
exercised by the buyer only once in every five years of
the life of the contract and its extensions, if any.
(b) If the contract is canceled, the seller shall refund to
the buyer the cash surrender value of the payments on
the property equivalent to fifty per cent of the total
payments made, and, after five years of installments,
an additional five per cent every year but not to exceed
ninety per cent of the total payments made: Provided,
That the actual cancellation of the contract shall take
place after thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the
notice of cancellation or the demand for rescission of
the contract by a notarial act and upon full payment of
the cash surrender value to the buyer.
Down payments, deposits or options on the contract shall be
included in the computation of the total number of installment
payments made.
Sec. 4. In case where less than two years of installments were
paid, the seller shall give the buyer a grace period of not less
than sixty days from the date the installment became due.
If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the expiration of
the grace period, the seller may cancel the contract after thirty
days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or
the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act.31
In this case, respondent has paid less than two years of
installments; therefore, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6552 applies.
The Court of Appeals held that even if respondent defaulted in
its full payment of the purchase price of the subject lots, the
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
13
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
conditional deeds of sale remain valid and subsisting, because
there was no valid notice of notarial rescission to respondent, as
the notice was sent to the wrong address, that is, to Mahogany
Products Corporation, and it was received by a person employed
by Mahogany Products Corporation and not the respondent. The
Court of Appeals stated that the allegation that Mahogany
Products Corporation and respondent have the same President,
one Valeriano Bueno, is irrelevant and has not been actually
proven or borne by evidence. The appellate court held that there
was insufficient proof that respondent actually received the
notice of notarial rescission of the conditional deeds of sale;
hence, the unilateral rescission of the conditional deeds of sale
cannot be given credence.
However, upon review of the records of this case, the Court finds
that respondent had been served a notice of the notarial
rescission of the conditional deeds of sale when it was furnished
with the petitioner's Answer, dated February 16, 1995, to its first
Complaint filed on November 28, 1994with the RTC of Antipolo
City, which case was docketed as Civil Case No.94-3426, but the
complaint was later dismissed without prejudice on January15,
1996.32
It appears that after respondent filed its first Complaint for
specific performance and damages with the RTC of Antipolo City
on November 28,1994, petitioner filed an Answer and attached
thereto a copy of the written notice dated March 17, 1978 and
copies of the notarial acts of rescission dated March 15, 1978,
and that respondent received a copy of the said Answer with the
attached notices of notarial rescission. However, to reiterate, the
first Complaint was dismissed without prejudice.
Five years after the dismissal of the first Complaint, respondent
again filed this case for specific performance and damages, this
time, with the RTC of Manila. Petitioner filed an Answer, and
alleged, among others, that the case was barred by prior
judgment, since respondent filed a complaint on November 28,
1994 before the RTC of Antipolo City, Branch 73, against it
(petitioner) involving the same issues and that the case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3426, was dismissed on January 15,
1996 for lack of interest. Respondent filed a Reply33 dated July
18, 2001, asserting that petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
first case filed on November 28, 1994 (Civil Case No. 94-3426) on
the ground of improper venue as the parties agreed in the deeds
of conditional sale that in case of litigation, the venue shall be in
the courts of Manila. To prove its assertion, respondent attached
to its Reply a copy of petitioner’s Answer to the first Complaint in
Civil Case No. 94-3426, which Answer included the written notice
dated March 17, 1978 and two notarial acts of rescission, both
dated March 15, 1978, of the two conditional deeds of sale.
Hence, respondent is deemed to have had notice of the notarial
rescission of the two conditional deeds of sale when it received
petitioner’s Answer to its first complaint filed with the RTC of
Antipolo, since petitioner’s Answer included notices of notarial
rescission of the two conditional deeds of sale. The first
complaint was filed six years earlier before this complaint was
filed. As stated earlier, the first complaint was dismissed without
prejudice, because respondent’s counsel failed to appear at the
pre-trial. Since respondent already received notices of the
notarial rescission of the conditional deeds of sale, together with
petitioner’s Answer to the first Complaint five years before it
filed this case, it can no longer deny having received notices of
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
the notarial rescission in this case, as respondent admitted the
same when it attached the notices of notarial rescission to its
Reply in this case. Consequently, respondent is not entitled to
the relief granted by the Court of Appeals.
Under R.A. No. 6552, the right of the buyer to refund accrues
only when he has paid at least two years of installments.34 In this
case, respondent has paid less than two years of installments;
hence, it is not entitled to a refund.35
Moreover, petitioner raises the issue of improper venue and lack
of jurisdiction of the RTC of Manila over the case. It contends
that the complaint involved real properties in Antipolo City and
cancellation of titles; hence, it was improperly filed in the RTC of
Manila.
Petitioner's contention lacks merit, as petitioner and respondent
stipulated in both Conditional Deeds of Sale that they mutually
agreed that in case of litigation, the case shall be filed in the
courts of Manila.36
Further, petitioner contends that the action has prescribed.
Petitioner points out that the cause of action is based on a
written contract; hence, the complaint should have been
brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues
under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Petitioner argues that it is
evident on the face of the complaint and the two contracts of
conditional sale that the cause of action accrued in 1974; yet, the
complaint for specific performance was filed after 27 years.
Petitioner asserts that the action has prescribed.
The contention is meritorious.
Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Defense and objections not pleaded. - Defenses and
objections not pleaded whether in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the
pleadings that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, that there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the
claim.37
In Gicano v. Gegato,38 the Court held:
x x x (T)rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an
action on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings
or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred;
(Francisco v. Robles, Feb, 15,1954; Sison v. Mc Quaid, 50 O.G. 97;
Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961;Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14,
1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958;32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v.
Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a
motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer
which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5,
Rule16), or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the
merits, as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84
SCRA 705); or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as
where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings (Garcia v.
Mathis, 100 SCRA 250;PNB v. Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA
766; Chua Lamco v.Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821);
or where a defendant has been declared in default (PNB v. Perez,
16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts
demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period, be otherwise
sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in
the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise
established by the evidence.39
Moreover, Dino v. Court of Appeals40 held:
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
14
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
Even if the defense of prescription was raised for the first time
on appeal in respondent's Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration of the appellate court's decision, this does not
militate against the due process right of the petitioners. On
appeal, there was no new issue of fact that arose in connection
with the question of prescription, thus it cannot be said that
petitioners were not given the opportunity to present evidence
in the trial court to meet a factual issue. Equally important,
petitioners had the opportunity to oppose the defense of
prescription in their Opposition to the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration filed in the appellate court and in their Petition
for Review in this Court.41
In this case, petitioner raised the defense of prescription for the
first time before this Court, and respondent had the opportunity
to oppose the defense of prescription in its Comment to the
petition. Hence, the Court can resolve the issue of prescription as
both parties were afforded the opportunity to ventilate their
respective positions on the matter. The Complaint shows that
the Conditional Deeds of Sale were executed on November 29,
1973, and payments were due on both Conditional Deeds of Sale
on November 15, 1974. Article 114442 of the Civil Code provides
that actions based upon a written contract must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Non-
fulfillment of the obligation to pay on the last due date, that is,
on November 15, 1974, would give rise to an action by the
vendor, which date of reckoning may also apply to any action by
the vendee to determine his right under R.A. No. 6552. The
vendee, respondent herein, filed this case on March 16, 2001,
which is clearly beyond the 10-year prescriptive period; hence,
the action has prescribed.
SC GRANTED THE APPEAL.
LIU vs. LOY
G.R. No. 145982, September 13, 2004
Digested by: Erven John Claros
FACTS:
Teodoro Vaño, in his capacity as Attorney-in-Fact of Jose Vaño,
sold Lot Nos.5 and 6 to BENITO LIU and Cirilo Pangalo on 13
January 1950, or prior to the death of Jose Vaño on 28 January
1950. (Note: Contracts to Sell)
On 22 April 1966, Benito Liu sold the lots to Frank Liu.
Later Cirilo Pangalo sold his shares (Lots 11, 14 and 15) to FRANK
LIU.
On August 19, 1968, Teodoro Vaño sold Lot No. 6 to Teresita Loy
while Lot No. 5 was sold to Alfredo Loy, Jr. on 16 December
1969.
Prior to the sale of the above-mentioned lots to the Loys,
Teodoro Vaño wrote Frank Liu a letter and it was apparently
shown that the latter offered to settle the whole balance of the
lot should the title be immediately transferred in his brother’s
name and Mr. Pangalo’s.
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
The letter also informed Liu of Supreme Court’s decision
regarding all the sales Vaño had made over the properties of his
father to be legal.
The Loys, on the other hand, insisted that the transaction
between Teodoro Vaño and Benito Liu was a contract to sell
while the transaction between the former and Teodoro Vaño
was a contract of sale and that the contracts of sale in favor of
the Loys transferred ownership as the conveyances were
absolute.
ISSUE:
W/N the sale of the lots by Teodoro Vaño to Benito Liu was valid.
HELD:
YES. The SC held that a prior contract to sell made by the
decedent during his lifetime PREVAILS over a subsequent
contract of sale made by the administrator without probate
court approval.
It is immaterial if the prior contract is a mere contract to sell and
does not immediately convey ownership. Moreover, Frank Liu’s
contract to sell became valid and effective, upon its execution
and bound the estate to convey the property on full payment of
the consideration.
The orders of the probate court dated 19 and 23 March 1976
approving the contracts of sale to the Loys are VOID and did not
ratify the sales because there was already a prior order of the
probate courted dated 24 February 1976 approving the sale of
Lot Nos. 5 and 6 to Frank Liu. Hence, the probate court had
already lost jurisdiction over Lot Nos. 5 and 6 since the lots no
longer formed part of the Estate of Jose Vaño.
SC ruled in favor of LIU.
TSN: The decedent, during his lifetime, was bound to respect the
contract he executed. He could not sell the property anymore
because he has already contracted to sell it previously. Although
it was only a contract to sell, there were already obligations
attached to it. And when he died, his obligations arising from
that contract were inherited also by his heirs. So the heirs cannot
anymore enter into a subsequent contract of sale over the same
property.
G.R. No. L-4275 March 23, 1909
PAULA CONDE vs. ROMAN ABAYA
Digested by: Erven John Claros
Facts:
Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and
Sabina Labadia died on the 1899.
Paula Conde, as the mother of the natural children Jose and
Teopista Conde, whom she states she had by Casiano Abaya
moved the settlement of the intestate succession.
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
15
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
An administrator has been appointed for the said estate.
However, Roman Abaya brother of Casiano, came forward and
opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as being
the nearest relative of the deceased.
The court declares Roman Abaya to be the sole heir of Casiano
Abaya and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the
property of said estate.
Paula Conde filed a petition wherein she stated that she
acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya but that
she considered her right was superior to his and moved for a
hearing on the matter.
She prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to
the property left by Casiano Abaya.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner may enforce an action in
the acknowledgment of the natural child from Casiano Abaya.
Ruling: The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the
child is of a personal character and generally pertains exclusively
to him.
Only the child may exercise it at any time during his lifetime.
As exception, and in three cases only, it may be transmitted to
the heirs of the child, to wit:
if he or she died during his or her minority, or
while insane, or after action had already been
instituted.
Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his
or her legitimacy lasts during his or her whole lifetime, he or she
may exercise it either against the presumed parents or his or her
heirs.
The right of action which the law concedes to the natural child is
not transmitted to his ascendants or descendants.
G.R. No. L-12379 March 14, 1917
LAO HU NIU vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
(In the syllabus: Junio vs. Collector but I believe this is the
correct name of the case)
Digested by: Erven John Claros
Facts:
This case involves the exclusion from the Philippine Islands of a
Chinese woman and her minor children.
She claims to be the wife of a former resident Chinese merchant
who, prior to the attempt of the appellant to enter, died in the
Philippine Islands owning property therein and leaving as his
only heirs at law and next of kin his widow, the appellant herein,
and her minor children.
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
The board of special inquiry refused them permission to enter
and that refusal was affirmed by the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
Issue: WON the rights of a Chinese merchant is transmissible to
his Widow and children upon his death
Held: No.
We have held in the case of Ng Hian vs. Collector of Customs (34
Phil. Rep., 248) that the widow and minor children of a
deceased Chinese merchant resident and doing business in the
Philippine Islands at the time of his death are not entitled to
enter the Philippine Islands solely by reason of such
relationship.
It may be said that it does not appear in the record of this case
that the applicant is a merchant.
It appears simply that her husband was, at the time of his death,
a resident Chinese merchant doing business in the Philippine
Islands, and that he died leaving property including a mercantile
business.
The assumption of the appellant is that the mere fact of the
death of a merchant makes his wife and children also merchants,
as it leaves to them as heirs and next of kin a mercantile business
as a part of their inheritance. We do not believe that this
necessarily follows.
But if it does, the fact remains that she is not a resident
merchant. She is still outside of the Philippine Islands and has
never held the status of a resident merchant. She must,
therefore, establish her right to enter as a merchant in the first
instance. This she did not do. She did not present the section six
certificate which is the only evidence upon which her right to
enter can be based.
From these observations it necessarily follows that the applicant
is not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands upon the status of
her deceased husband; and that when she seeks to enter upon
her own personal status she must produce the evidence which
the law requires to establish that status.
Not having done this her application to enter was properly
denied. The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So
ordered.
JESUS SAN AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and MAXIMO
MENEZ, JR., respondents.
2001-12-04 | G.R. No. 121940
Digested by: James Cagas
FACTS: On February 11, 1974, the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) sold to a certain Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, a parcel
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
16
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
of residential land with an area of 168 square meters located in
Rosario, Pasig City and denominated as Lot 13, Block 7, Pcs-5816
of the Government Service and Insurance System Low Cost
Housing Project (GSIS-LCHP). The sale is evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale. 2 On February 19, 1974, the Register of Deeds of
Rizal issued in the name of Macaria Vda. de Caiquep. There was
a prohibition to dispose the property within 5 years from the
execution of the contract that was stipulated in the deed of sale.
A day after the issuance of TCT No. 436465, or on February 20,
1974, Macaria Vda. de Caiquep sold the subject lot to private
respondent, Maximo Menez, Jr., as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale. This deed was notarized but was not registered
immediately upon its execution in 1974 because GSIS prohibited
him from registering the same in view of the five-year
prohibition to sell during the period ending in 1979.
On July 8, 1992, private respondent filed a petition docketed as
LRC Case No. R-4659 with the RTC, Branch 154, Pasig, Metro
Manila for the issuance of owner's duplicate copy of TCT No.
436465 to replace the lost one.
ISSUE: Whether PET is entitled to the service of notice as an
heir.
RULING: No, Upon the petition of the registered owner or other
person in interest, the court may, after notice and due hearing,
direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall
contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of
the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled
to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall
thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.
In Office of Court Administrator vs. Matas, A.M. No. RTJ-92-836,
247 SCRA 9, 16-17 (1995), we held:
In the case at bar, the respective certificate of title of
the properties in question on file with the Register of
Deeds are existing, and it is the owner's copy of the
certificate of title that was alleged to have been lost or
destroyed. Thus, it is Section 109 of P.D. 1529 which
was approved on June 11, 1978 that becomes effective
and is applicable, a reading of which shows that it is
practically the same as Section 109 of Act No. 496,
governing reconstitution of a duplicate certificate of
title lost or destroyed.
Consequently, it is sufficient that the notice under Section 109 is
sent to the Register of Deeds and to those persons who are
known to have, or appear to have, an interest in the property as
shown in the Memorandum of encumbrances at the back of the
original or transfer certificate of title on file in the office of the
Register of Deeds. From a legal standpoint, there are no other
interested parties who should be notified, except those
abovementioned since they are the only ones who may be
deemed to have a claim to the property involved. A person
dealing with registered property is not charged with notice of
encumbrances not annotated on the back of the title. (Italics
supplied.)
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
Here, petitioner does not appear to have an interest in the
property based on the memorandum of encumbrances
annotated at the back of the title. His claim that he is an heir
(nephew) of the original owner of the lot covered by the
disputed lot and the present occupant thereof is not annotated
in the said memorandum of encumbrances. Neither was his
claim entered on the Certificate of Titles in the name of their
original/former owners on file with the Register of Deeds at the
time of the filing or pendency of LRC Case No. R-4659. Clearly,
petitioner is not entitled to notice. Noteworthy is the fact that
there was compliance by private respondent of the RTC's order
of publication of the petition in a newspaper of general
circulation. This is sufficient notice of the petition to the public at
large.
GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORP., petitioner vs. COURT
OF APPEALS
AND MEDARDA V. LEUTERIO, respondents.
1999-10-13 | G.R. No. 113899
Digested by: James Cagas
FACTS: A contract of group life insurance was executed between
petitioner Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (hereinafter
Grepalife) and Development Bank of the Philippines (hereinafter
DBP). Grepalife agreed to insure the lives of eligible housing loan
mortgagors of DBP.
On November 11, 1983, Dr. Wilfredo Leuterio, a physician and a
housing debtor of DBP applied for membership in the group life
insurance plan. In an application form, Dr. Leuterio answered
questions concerning his health condition as follows:
"7. Have you ever had, or consulted, a physician for a
heart condition, high blood pressure, cancer, diabetes,
lung,
kidney or stomach disorder or any other physical
impairment?
Answer: No. If so give details ___________.
8. Are you now, to the best of your knowledge, in good
health?
Answer: [ x ] Yes [ ] No."4 [Id. at 37.]
On November 15, 1983, Grepalife issued Certificate No. B-18558,
as insurance coverage of Dr. Leuterio, to the extent of his DBP
mortgage indebtedness amounting to eighty-six thousand, two
hundred (P86,200.00) pesos. On August 6, 1984, Dr. Leuterio
died due to "massive cerebral hemorrhage." Consequently, DBP
submitted a death claim to Grepalife. Grepalife denied the claim
alleging that Dr. Leuterio was not physically healthy when he
applied for an insurance coverage on November 15, 1983.
On October 20, 1986, the widow of the late Dr. Leuterio,
respondent Medarda V. Leuterio, filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, against
Grepalife for "Specific Performance with Damages."5 [Civil Case
10788.] During the trial, Dr. Hernando Mejia, who issued the
death certificate, was called to testify. Dr. Mejia's findings, based
partly from the information given by the respondent widow,
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
17
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
stated that Dr. Leuterio complained of headaches presumably
due to high blood pressure.
ISSUE: Whether the widow of Dr. Leuterio is a real party in
interest in bringing an action against Grepalife
RULING: Yes, The rationale of a group insurance policy of
mortgagors, otherwise known as the "mortgage redemption
insurance," is a device for the protection of both the mortgagee
and the mortgagor. On the part of the mortgagee, it has to enter
into such form of contract so that in the event of the unexpected
demise of the mortgagor during the subsistence of the mortgage
contract, the proceeds from such insurance will be applied to the
payment of the mortgage debt, thereby relieving the heirs of the
mortgagor from paying the obligation. [Serrano vs. Court of
Appeals, 130 SCRA 327, 335 (1984).]
In a similar vein, ample protection is given to the mortgagor
under such a concept so that in the event of death; the mortgage
obligation will be extinguished by the application of the
insurance proceeds to the mortgage indebtedness.8 [Ibid.]
Consequently, where the mortgagor pays the insurance premium
under the group insurance policy, making the loss payable to the
mortgagee, the insurance is on the mortgagor's interest, and the
mortgagor continues to be a party to the contract. In this type of
policy insurance, the mortgagee is simply an appointee of the
insurance fund, such loss-payable clause does not make the
mortgagee a party to the contract.9 [43 Am Jur 2d, Insurance
Section 766; citing Hill vs. International Indem. Co. 116 Kan 109,
225 P 1056, 38 ALR 362.]
Section 8 of the Insurance Code provides:
"Unless the policy provides, where a mortgagor of
property effects insurance in his own name providing
that the loss shall be payable to the mortgagee, or
assigns a policy of insurance to a mortgagee, the
insurance is deemed to be upon the interest of the
mortgagor, who does not cease to be a party to the
original contract, and any act of his, prior to the loss,
which would otherwise avoid the insurance, will have
the same effect, although the property is in the hands
of the mortgagee, but any act which, under the
contract of insurance, is to be performed by the
mortgagor, may be performed by the mortgagee
therein named, with the same effect as if it had been
performed by the mortgagor."
The insured private respondent did not cede to the mortgagee
all his rights or interests in the insurance, the policy stating that:
"In the event of the debtor's death before his indebtedness with
the Creditor [DBP] shall have been fully paid, an amount to pay
the outstanding indebtedness shall first be paid to the creditor
and the balance of sum assured, if there is any, shall then be
paid to the beneficiary/ies designated by the debtor."10 [Rollo,
p. 12.] When DBP submitted the insurance claim against
petitioner, the latter denied payment thereof, interposing the
defense of concealment committed by the insured. Thereafter,
DBP collected the debt from the mortgagor and took the
necessary action of foreclosure on the residential lot of private
respondent.11 [Id. at 180.] In Gonzales La O vs. Yek Tong Lin Fire
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
& Marine Ins. Co.12 [55 Phil. 386 (1930), citing Corpus Juris,
volume 26 pages 483 et seq.] we held:
"Insured, being the person with whom the contract was
made, is primarily the proper person to bring suit
thereon. * * * Subject to some exceptions, insured may
thus sue, although the policy is taken wholly or in part
for the benefit of another person named or unnamed,
and although it is expressly made payable to another as
his interest may appear or otherwise. * * * Although a
policy issued to a mortgagor is taken out for the benefit
of the mortgagee and is made payable to him, yet the
mortgagor may sue thereon in his own name, especially
where the mortgagee's interest is less than the full
amount recoverable under the policy, * * *.'
And in volume 33, page 82, of the same work, we read the
following:
'Insured may be regarded as the real party in interest,
although he has assigned the policy for the purpose of
collection, or has assigned as collateral security any
judgment he may obtain."13 [Id. at 391, citing Corpus
Juris, volume 26 pages 483 at seq.] And since a policy of
insurance upon life or health may pass by transfer, will
or succession to any person, whether he has an
insurable interest or not, and such person may recover
it whatever the insured might have recovered,14
[Section 181, Philippine Insurance Code.]
the widow of the decedent Dr. Leuterio may file the
suit against the insurer, Grepalife.
ERNESTO ROBLES, petitioner, vs. HON. DELFIN FL. BATACAN,
HON. CONRADO M.
VASQUEZ, HON. JOSE B. JIMENEZ, ATANACIO GERONIMO and
BENEDICTO
GERONIMO, respondents.
1987-10-12 | G.R. No. L-46978
Digested by: James Cagas
FACTS: After his death, an ejectment suit was filed against his
two sons by the petitioner, who claimed they had no right to
remain in his land. Benedicto was declared to be in default The
other defendant, Atanacio Geronimo, averred that he was
entitled to succeed his father as the petitioner's agricultural
tenant in accordance with R.A. No. 1199 and Section 9 of R.A.
No. 3844.
The private respondent's position is that his father was an
agricultural tenant of the petitioner during the twenty years the
former worked in the latter's land. Hence, in accordance with the
aforementioned laws, he could remain in the petitioner's land
under the same terms and conditions of the original tenancy
share arrangement entered into between his father and the
petitioner. The petitioner, for his part, insists that Severino
Geronimo was never an agricultural tenant of his but worked
merely as a watcher in his land. He did receive the sum of
P100.00 every harvest but not as his share therein for that
amount was given to him as a reward for his past services. the
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
18
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
Court of Agrarian Relations ** rendered judgment recognizing
the defendant as the agricultural tenant of the plaintiff and
ordering the payment to him of the sum of P12,000.00 as his
tenancy share.
ISSUE: Whether Anatacio had the right to take over as an
agricultural tenant upon his father’s death
RULING:
Yes, On the nature of the work performed by Severino
Geronimo, it quoted with approval the conclusion of the trial
court that he "was the tenant on the subject parcel for quite a
time and was recognized by Ernesto Robles as such," discharging
such tasks as supervising the harvest, cutting down bushes,
clearing the land. picking up the fallen nuts, and paying the
laborers, like the coconut gatherers and huskers, from his 1/3
share.
This was based on the declarations of several witnesses, 8
including the petitioner himself, and the several documents
presented by Atanacio in which his father was described by the
petitioner as his "kasama" to whom was being given his
"bahagui" or share. As for the private respondent's right to
succeed his father, the respondent court was correct in affirming
the ruling of the trial court that, as the son of Severino
Geronimo, Atanacio had the right to take over as agricultural
tenant in the petitioner's land in accordance with R.A. No. 1199
and R.A. No. 3844.
Obviously, Atanacio was the only heir interested in succeeding
his father as his brother, Benedicto, had not seen fit to claim his
right and in fact defaulted in resisting the petitioner's claims in
the ejectment suit. Significantly, when in his prayer the
petitioner asks for authority to appoint the said Benedicto to
succeed his father, it is presumably as his watcher only and not
as agricultural tenant. The petitioner's consistent claim, it should
be noted, is that Severino Geronimo was not his tenant but only
his watcher.
RABADILLA VS CA
Digested by: Victor Alba
FACTS:
In her last will and testament Aleja Belleza (testratix) left her
property, a parcel of land to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla; same property
shall be inherited by the children and spouse of Rabadilla should
the latter die ahead of Belleza.
However, Bell eza imposed certain obligations in her codicil, that:
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall
give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall
have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as
specified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to
Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of
December of each year.
(b) If the property is later on sold, leased, mortgaged, the
buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation
to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100)
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza,
on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs
of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic,
until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer,
lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected
my command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize
this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs,
and shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic) and
the latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONE
HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall
die.
(c) I further command in this my addition (Codicil) that my
heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will
obey and follow that should they decide to sell, lease,
mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my
near descendants and my sister."
Pursuant to the codicil, the land was transferred to Jorge. When
he died in 1983, the property was inherited by his wife and
children, Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza
Villacarlos filed a complaint, against the above-mentioned heirs
of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject
Codicil.
The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the
conditions of the Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine
National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in
disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell,
lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and
sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their
obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar
(75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to
plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar
crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as
mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for
compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of
the Codicil which provided that in case of the sale,
lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee,
or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to
deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein
private respondent.
Plaintiff prayed for the reconveyance of the land, cancellation of
the TCT in the name of the land, cancellation of TCT in name of
Jorge and issuance of a new title in the names of the surviving
heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
RTC dismissed the complaint.
CA reversed the RTC decision.
Issue: WON obligations imposed on Jorge were transmitted to
his heirs upon his death. YES
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
19
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
Held:
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all
the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished
by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced
heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on
the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to
his compulsory heirs upon his death.
ALVAREZ vs IAC
Digested by: Victor Alba
FACTS:
The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as
Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B which were originally known as Lot 773.
It was registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes who
was survived by his children Rufino, Felipe, and Teodora.
Anecito left his children lots 773 and 823. Record, however
shows that Fortunato, Santiago, Monico Fuentebella and
Rosendo Alvarez were in possession of lot 773. Fortunato
Santiago was issued a TCT covering lots 773-A and 773-B. Said
lots were then sold to Monico Fuentebella. After the latter’s
death, the administratix sold the lots to Rosendo Alvarez.
In 1960, Teodora and the children of her brother Rufino (Estelita,
Iluminado and Jesus) filed a complaint against Santiago, Arsenia
Vda de Fuentebella (administratix), Alvarez and the Register of
Deed for the return of ownership and possession of lots 773 and
823. During the pendency of the case, Alvarez sold lots 773-A
and 773-B to Rodolfo Siason.
A decision was rendered by the court ordering Alvarez to
reconvey the lots to the plaintiff. Unfortunately, the decision
cannot be executed since Siason was in possession of the same.
Siason filed a manifestation stating that the decision cannot be
enforced against him as he was not a party thereto.
Consequently, the court nullified its previous order.
In 1968, the Yanses filed an action for the recovery of the lots
with damages, praying for the cancellation of the TCT’s issued to
Siason for being null and void. Named defendants were Siason,
the legitimate children of deceased Rosendo Alvarez and the
Register of Deeds.
In its decision the court dismissed the case with respect to
Siasion and the Register of Deeds. Rosendo Alvarez died but he
was adjudged to pay the monetary value of properties with
damages to Yaneses.
Issue: WON the liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the
sale of lots 773-A and 773-B could be legally passed or
transmitted by operation of law to the petitioners without
violation of law and due process. YES
Held:
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale
of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr.
Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo
Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine
obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of
the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate
children and heirs.
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased
party is not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that
money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from
his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs
(Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made
from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or
distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact
diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been
entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's
contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the
successors.
The rule is a consequence of the progressive
"depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties that, as
observed by Victorio Polacco has characterized the history of
these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from
person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation
from patrimony to patrimony with the persons occupying only
a representative position, barring those rare cases where the
obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu
personae, in consideration of its performance by a specific
person and by no other.
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they
cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's
transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages.
That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is
of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary
equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's
hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets
are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of
the estate.
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only
to the extent of the value of their inheritance.
PAMPLONA, et al. vs MORETO
Digested by: Victor Alba
FACTS:
The married couple Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega
acquired adjacent Lots Nos. 1495, 4545 and 1496 of the Calamba
Friar Estate. The spouses have six children namely: Ursulo,
Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo and Leandro.
Monica died intestate. More than six (6) years after the death of
his wife Monica Maniega, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent
of the heirs of his said deceased wife Monica, and before any
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
20
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
could be effected, executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona the
deed of absolute sale covering Lot 1495 for P900.00. A new TCT
was issued in favour of Geminiano and Apolonia Pamplona. The
spouses constructed a house and a piggery house on the lot
occupied by them. However, the portion sold to the parties to be
the Lot No. 1495 is part of Lot No. 1496.
The heirs of Monica filed an action seeking for the declaration of
the nullity of the deed of sale as regards one-half of the property
on the ground that Flaviano had no right to sell the lot as the
same belongs to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and his
deceased wife. Since the latter already died during the sale, the
sale was executed without the consent of the plaintiffs who are
the heirs of Monica.
Issue: WON the plaintiffs (as Monica’s heirs) are obliged to
deliver the property to Pamplona. YES
Held:
The conjugal partnership of the spouses was dissolved at the
time of Monica’s death. There being no extrajudicial partition
nor did liquidation of the conjugal property, the estate become
the property of Flaviano, as the surviving husband and his
children with the deceased co-owners.
The three lots constitute one big land and are not separate
properties located in different places. Lot 1495 contains an area
of 781 sq. meters, Lot 1496 with an area of 1,021 sq meters and
Lot 4545 with an area of 544 sq meters with a total area of 2,346
sq meters. Hence , at the time of sale, the co-ownership
constituted or covered these three lots adjacent to each other.
Since Flaviano, was entitled one-half pro-indiviso of the entire
land area or by about 1,173 sq meters as his share, he had a
perfect legal and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq meters of his
share to Pamplona spouses. Indeed, there was still a remainder
of some 392 sq. meters belonging to him at the time of the sale.
Therefore, the sale was valid as to the whole portion occupied by
the Pamplonas for the very simple reason that Flaviano, the
vendor, had legal right to more than 781 sq meters of the
communal estate, a title which he could dispose or alienate in
favour of the vendees, petitioner Pamplona, et al.
SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA, Plaintiffs
Appellees,
v.
CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL. Defendants-Appellant.
By: Kindy Gwapa
FACTS:
In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived maritally
with Lorenzo M. Quitco, while the latter was still single, of which
relation, lasting until the year 1921, was born a daughter who is
the other plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma.
In 1921, it seems hat the relation between Socorro Ledesma and
Lorenzo M. Quitco came to an end, but the latter executed a
deed, acknowledging the plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma as his
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
natural daughter and on January 21, 1922, he issued in favor of
the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory note, of the
following tenor:
P2,000. For value received I promise to pay Miss Socorro
Ledesma the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000). Philippine
currency.
Subsequently, Lorenzo M. Quitco married the defendant
Conchita McLachlin, with whom he had four children, who are
the other defendants. On March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M. Quitco died
and, still later, that is, on December 15, 1932, his father Eusebio
Quitco also died, and as the latter left real and personal
properties upon his death, administration proceedings of said
properties were instituted in this court, the said case being
known as the "Intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco.
Upon the institution of the intestate of the deceased Eusebio
Quitco and the appointment of the committee on claims and
appraisal, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma, on August 26, 1935,
filed before said committee the aforequoted promissory note for
payment, and the commissioners on claims and appraisal,
alleging lack of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim, denied he
same.
RTC:
The court renders judgment in this case declaring Ana Quitco
Ledesma an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased
Lorenzo M. Quitco, for legal purposes, but absolving the
defendants as to the prayer in the first cause of action that the
said Ana Quitco Ledesma be declared entitled to share in the
properties left by the deceased Eusebio Quitco.
As to the second cause of action, the said defendants are
ordered to pay to the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma, jointly and
severally, only the sum of one thousand five hundred
pesos(P1,500), with legal interest thereon from the filing of this
complaint until fully paid.
Argument of Defendant
Trial court erred in holding that the property inherited by the
defendants from their deceased grandfather by the right of
representation is subject to the debts and obligations of their
deceased father who died without any property whatsoever
ISSUE:
Whether plaintiffs may recover from the defendants the debt
contracted by the Lorenzo Quitco? No.
RULING:
Anent to the liability of defendants
While it is true that under the provisions of articles 924 to 927 of
the Civil Code, a children presents his father or mother who died
before him in the properties of his grandfather or grandmother,
this right of representation does not make the said child
answerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased father
or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the
inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that is to
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
21
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
say, the heirs only answer with the properties received from
their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio
Quitco, in representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are
not bound to pay the indebtedness of their said father from
whom they did not inherit anything.
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so
hold:
(1) That the filing of a claim before the committee on claims
and appraisal, appointed in the intestate of the father, for a
monetary obligation contracted by a son who died before
him, does not suspend the prescriptive period of the judicial
action for the recovery of said indebtedness;
(2) that the claim for the payment of an indebtedness
contracted by a deceased person cannot be filed for its
collection before the committee on claims and appraisal,
appointed in the intestate of his father, and the properties
inherited from the latter by the children of said deceased do
not answer for the payment of the indebtedness contracted
during the lifetime of said person.
Anent to the issue on prescription
Whether or not the action to recover the sum of P1,500,
representing the last installment for the payment of the
promissory note has prescribed. Yes.
According to the promissory note, executed by the deceased
Lorenzo M. Quitco, on January 21, 1922, the last installment of
P1,500 should be paid two years from the date of the execution
of said promissory note, that is, on January 21, 1924. The
complaint in the present case was filed on June 26, 1934, that is,
more than ten years after he expiration of the said period.
The fact that the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma filed her claim, on
August 26, 1933, with the committee on claims and appraisal
appointed in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, does not suspend
the running of the prescriptive period of the judicial action for
the recovery of said debt, because the claim for the unpaid
balance of the amount of the promissory note should no have
been presented in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, the said
deceased not being the one who executed the same, but in the
intestate of Lorenzo M. Quitco, which should have been
instituted by the said Socorro Ledesma as provided in section
642 of the Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing a creditor to
institute said case through the appointment of an administrator
for the purpose of collecting his credit.
More than ten years having thus elapsed from the expiration of
the period for the payment of said debt of P1,500, the action for
its recovery has prescribed under section 43, No. 1, of the Code
of Civil Procedure.
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
Article 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent.
ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED),
vs.
LEONARDO R. VEGA,
By: Kindy Gwapa
Doctrine:
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not
inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the
decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot effect a
repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed
among the decedent’s heirs.
FACTS:
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the
owner of a 3,120-square meter parcel of land. Leon and Rafaela
died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana
Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are
now both deceased.
Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and
grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega.
Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children:
petitioners Natividad Ining-Ibea (Natividad), Dolores Ining-Rimon
(Dolores), Antipolo, and Pedro; Jose; and Amando. In short,
herein petitioners are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses
thereof (Gregoria’s heirs).
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property
belonged to him as Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed with
the Regional Trial Court a civil case for partition, recovery of
ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s
heirs.
In their Answer with counterclaim, Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo,
Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo claimed that Leonardo had no cause
of action against them; that they have become the sole owners
of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the
same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who
in turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware
of this fact.
RTC: The trial court found the April 4, 1943 and November 25,
1943 deeds of sale to be spurious. It concluded that Leon never
sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold
the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property
remained part of Leon’s estate at the time of his death in 1962.
However, the trial court held that for his long inaction of filing a
complaint for partition, Leonardo was guilty of laches as well.
Consequently, the property should go to Gregoria’s heirs
exclusively.
CA: Reversed the decision of the RTC. The Action of Leonardo is
not yet barred by prescription. Petitioners act of partitioning the
property among them to the exclusion of Leonardo cannot affect
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
22
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
the latter; nor may it be considered a repudiation of the co-
ownership as it has not been shown that the partition was made
known to Leonardo.
ISSUE: Whether Leonardo may seek the partition of the
property. YES.
RULING:
Anent To The Sale Of The Property
The trial court, examining the two deeds of sale executed in
favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., found them to be spurious. It
then concluded that no such sale from Leon to Lucimo Sr. ever
took place. Despite this finding, petitioners did not appeal.
Consequently, any doubts regarding this matter should be
considered settled. Thus, petitioners’ insistence on Lucimo Sr.’s
1943 purchase of the property to reinforce their claim over the
property must be ignored. Since no transfer from Leon to
Lucimo Sr. took place, the subject property clearly remained
part of Leon’s estate upon his passing in 1962.
Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and
Gregoria.
Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana
and Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal shares. In
turn, Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs – the parties herein –
became entitled to the property upon the sisters’ passing.
Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession
are transmitted from the moment of death.
Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject
property.
Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and
Romana, petitioners and respondents became co-owners
thereof. As co-owners, they may use the property owned in
common, provided they do so in accordance with the purpose
for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the
interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners
from using it according to their rights.
Anent To Lucimo Sr. Alleged Acts Of Repudiation
Lucimo Sr. is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-
in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora. Under the
Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for
succession, exclude relations by affinity pursuant to Article 150
of the Civil Code.
In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the
property; Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a
repudiation of the co-ownership, which he was never part of. For
this reason, prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo,
and his right to seek a partition of the property has not been
lost.
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO,
vs.
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
COURT OF APPEALS,
By: Kindy Gwapa
FACTS:
On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a
will in Angeles City leaving:
1. several personal and real properties.
2. a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada and
with whom he had
3. seven children who are the herein respondents.
4. paramour (PETITIONER) TEODORA RIOFERO and
their children.
On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes
Orfinada discovered that:
1. on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio
and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate of a Deceased Person with
Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the
decedent.
2. petitioners were able to obtain a loan of P700,000.00
from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing
a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties subject of
the extra-judicial settlement.
On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso Clyde P.
Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before
the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, praying that letters of
administration encompassing the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada,
Jr. be issued to him.
On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for
the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate
of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage
and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles with Nos.
63983, 63985 and 63984 and Other Related Documents with
Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of Mangaldan, Inc.
and the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 42, Dagupan City.
ARGUMENT OF PETITIONER
On February 5, 1996, petitioners filed their Answer that
respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the
Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the
administration proceedings.
RTC:
The lower court denied the motion in its order on the
ground that respondents, as heirs, are the real parties-in-interest
especially in the absence of an administrator who is yet to be
appointed in S.P. Case No. 5118.
CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of
the estate pending the appointment of an administrator. YES
RULING:
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
23
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs
without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the
estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of:
Article 777 of the New Civil Code that (t)he rights to
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent.
The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that
the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of
the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to
another or others by his will or by operation of law.
Even if administration proceedings have already been
commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator
has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite
the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party
representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3 and Section 2, Rule 87
of the Rules of Court.
In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young, this Court
recognized the legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights
and properties of the decedent under administration pending
the appointment of an administrator. Thus:
The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or
administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the
deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the
deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an
administrator has already been appointed. But no rule
categorically addresses the situation in which special
proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been
instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed.
RATIONALE
The heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an
administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator
appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights
and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do
nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are
violated or dissipated.
Exceptions To The Rule That Heirs Have No Legal Standing To
Sue For The Recovery Of Property Of The Estate During The
Pendency Of Administration Proceedings
(1) If there is an appointed administrator but the executor
or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and
(2) if there is an appointed administrator but the
administrator is alleged to have participated in the act
complained of and he is made a party defendant.
(3) when there is no appointed administrator such as in this
case
Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief
to recover property of the estate is as compelling when there is
no appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is an
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to bring suit
or is one of the guilty parties himself.
Heirs of Tomas Calpatura, Sr. v. Prado
[G.R No. 129008, January 20, 2004]
Digested by: Keziah M. Sioson
FACTS:
Spouses Patricio Prado Sr. and Narciso Prado owned a residential
land consisting of 552.20 sq.m. situated in Quezon City.
Subsequently, Patricio died. Narcisa subsequently married
Bonifacio Calpatura. In order to support her minor children with
her first husband, Narcisa sold to her brother-in-law, Tomas
Calpatura Sr., the northern portion of the said property by
executing an Agreement of Purchase and Sale and later on a
Deed of Absolute Sale for the sum of P10,500.
In 1991, respondents (Prado et al) filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of sale and delivery of possession of the
northern half portion of the subject property against petitioners
(Heirs of Tomas Calpatura) before the RTC of Quezon City. They
contended that Narcisa, as natural guardian of her children, had
no authority to sell the northern half portion of the property
which she and her children co-owned.
In their answer, petitioners countered that Narcisa owned 9/14
of the property, consisting of ½ as her share in the conjugal
partnership with her first husband and 1/7 as her share in the
estate of her deceased husband, hence a valid sale.
RTC- Sale was valid.
CA- Respondents were co-owners of the subject property, thus
the sale was valid only insofar as Narcisa’s 1/7 undivided share
thereon was concerned.
Issue: WON the sale of Narcisa’s share is valid
Ruling: Yes.
The property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio Prado,
Sr., one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved
to the surviving spouse, Narcisa, as her share in the conjugal
partnership. Particio’s rights to the other half, in turn, were
transmitted upon his death to his heirs, which includes his widow
Narcisa, who is entitled to the same share as that of each of the
legitimate children. Thus, as a result of the death of Patricio, a
regime of co-ownership arose between Narcisa and the other
heirs in relation to the property. The remaining one-half was
transmitted to his heirs by intestate succession.
By the law on intestate succession, his six children and Narcisa
Prado inherited the same at one-seventh (1/7) each pro indiviso.
Inasmuch as Narcisa inherited one-seventh (1/7) of her
husband's conjugal share in the said property and is the owner of
one-half (1/2) thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total of
9/14 of the subject property. Hence, Narcisa could validly convey
her total undivided share in the entire property to Tomas.
Narcisa and her children are deemed co-owners of the subject
property.
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
24
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
Finally, no particular portion of the property could be identified
as yet and delineated as the object of the sale considering that
the property had not yet been partitioned in accordance with
the Rules of Court. While Narcisa could validly sell one half of the
subject property, her share being 9/14 of the same, she could
not have particularly conveyed the northern portion thereof
before the partition, the terms of which was still to be
determined by the parties before the trial court.
Felipe v. Heirs of Aldon
[G.R No. L-60174, February 16, 1983]
Digested by: Keziah M. Sioson
Facts:
Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara in 1936. The spouses
bought several pieces of land sometime between 1948 and 1950.
In 1951, Gimena Almosara sold the lots to the spouses Eduardo
Felipe and Hermogena V. Felipe. The sale was made without the
consent of her husband, Maximo.
On April 26, 1976, the heirs of Maximo Aldon, namely his widow
Gimena and their children Sofia and Salvador Aldon, filed a
complaint against the Felipes to recover said properties alleging
that they were the owners of the lots, and that they had orally
mortgaged the same to the Felipes and an offer to redeem the
mortgage had been refused.
Contention of the Felipes:
First, that when the right was transmitted, prescription already
started counting.
Second, that the children of Aldon has no legal standing given
that they do not have the right over the properties so they
cannot sue for a complaint to recover ownership.
RTC- in favor of the Felipes
CA- reversed the RTC; the Heirs of Aldon are entitled to recover
the ownership of the lots in question. Although the sale made in
1951 is not a forgery, the fact that the sale of Gimena is invalid
having been executed without the needed consent of her
husband, the lots being conjugal (the lots having been purchased
during the existence of the marriage, the same are presumed
conjugal).
Issue/s:
(1) What is the nature of the contract? (Just in case it will
be asked)
Ruling: Voidable. The husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership. (Art. 165, Civil Code.) Subject to certain
exceptions, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent.
(Art. 166, Idem.) And the wife cannot bind the conjugal
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
partnership without the husband's consent, except in cases
provided by law. (Art. 172, Idem.)
In the instant case, Gimena, the wife, sold lands belonging to the
conjugal partnership without the consent of the husband and
the sale is not covered by the phrase "except in cases provided
by law."
The Court of Appeals described the sale as "invalid" - a term
which is imprecise when used in relation to contracts because
the Civil Code uses specific names in designating defective
contracts, namely: rescissible, voidable, unenforceable, and void
or inexistent.
According to Art. 1390 of the Civil Code, among the voidable
contracts are "[T]hose where one of the parties is incapable of
giving consent to the contract." (Par. 1.) In the instant case-
Gimena had no capacity to give consent to the contract of sale.
The capacity to give consent belonged not even to the husband
alone but to both spouses.
The view that the contract made by Gimena is a voidable
contract is supported by the legal provision that contracts
entered by the husband without the consent of the wife when
such consent is required, are annullable at her instance during
the marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned. (Art. 173, Civil Code.)
Gimena's contract is not rescissible for in such contract all the
essential elements are untainted but Gimena's consent was
tainted. Neither can the contract be classified as unenforceable
because it does not fit any of those described in Art. 1403 of the
Civil Code. And finally, the contract cannot be void or inexistent
because it is not one of those mentioned in Art. 1409 of the Civil
Code. By process of elimination, it must perforce be a voidable
contract.
(2) Who can ask for the annulment of the voidable sale?
Ruling: During the marriage, only the husband can ask for
annulment. However, after his death, the children may do so
within the period prescribed by law.
As to the wife:
The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment by
her husband only during the marriage because he was the
victim who had an interest in the contract. Gimena, who was the
party responsible for the defect, could not ask for its annulment.
Their children could not likewise seek the annulment of the
contract while the marriage subsisted because they merely had
an inchoate right to the lands sold.
The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership by the death of Maximo Aldon did not
improve the situation of Gimena. What she could not do during
the marriage, she could not do thereafter.
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
25
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
As to the heirs:
The case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is different. After the
death of Maximo they acquired the right to question the
defective contract insofar as it deprived them of their
hereditary rights in their father's share in the lands. The father's
share is one-half (1/2) of the lands and their share is two-thirds
(2/3) thereof, one-third (1/3) pertaining to the widow.
As to Prescription of the right of the heirs to institute the
action:
Prescription will not operate in this case because the death of
Maximo Aldon is the reckoning period for the count of the time
of prescription.
The children's cause of action accrued from the death of their
father in 1959 and they had thirty (30) years to institute it (Art.
1141, Civil Code.) They filed action in 1976 which is well within
the period.
As to the legal standing of the heirs to sue for recovery of
ownership:
They have legal standing since they have the right over the
properties upon the death of the decedent.
Eastern Shipping Lines v. Lucero
G.R. No. L-60101 August 31, 1983
Digested by: Keziah M. Sioson
Facts:
On October 31, 1979, Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed by
petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., as master/captain to its
vessel M/V Eastern Minicon plying the Hongkong Manila route,
with the salary of P5,560.00 exclusive of ship board allowances
and other benefits. Under the contract, his employment was
good for one (1) round trip only, i.e., the contract would
automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of
Manila, unless renewed. It was further agreed that part of the
captain's salary, while abroad, should be paid to Mrs. Josephine
Lucero, his wife, in Manila.
On February 16, 1980, while the vessel was enroute from
Hongkong to Manila where it was expected to arrive on February
18, 1980, Capt. Lucero sent three (3) messages to the Company's
Manila office. The last message reads:
FEBRUARY 16/80 2150 HRS
PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD
NEED IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE POSTION 19-35 N 116-40 E
SEAWATER ENTERING INSIDE HATCH VESSEL INCLINING 15 TO 20
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
DEGREES PORT IF POSSIBLE SEND IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE
VESSEL IN DANGER PREPARING TO ABANDONE ANYTIME
MASTER
After the search and rescue done by Eastern yielded negative
results. Subsequently, the Lloyds of London, insurer of the M/V
Eastern Minicon through its surveyors, confirmed the loss of the
vessel. Thereafter, the Company paid the corresponding death
benefits to the heirs of the crew members, except respondent
Josephine Lucero, who refused to accept the same.
Contention of Lucero:
On July 16, 1980, Mrs. Lucero filed a complaint with the National
Seamen Board, for payment of her accrued monthly allotment of
P3,183.00, which the Company had stopped since March 1980
and for continued payment of said allotments until the M/V
Minicon shall have returned to the port of Manila. She
contended that the contract of employment entered into by her
husband with the Company was on a voyage-to-voyage basis,
and that the same was to terminate only upon the vessel's
arrival in Manila.
Contention of Eastern:
The Company maintained that Mrs. Lucero was no longer
entitled to such allotments because: [a] the Lloyds of London had
already confirmed the total loss of the vessel and had in fact
settled the company's insurance claim and [b] the Company,
with the approval of the Board, had likewise paid the
corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the other seamen.
The Company further invoked the provisions of Article 643 of the
Code of Commerce: If the vessel and her cargo should be totally
lost, by reason of capture or wreck, all rights shall be
extinguished, both as regards the crew to demand any wages
whatsoever, and as regards the ship agent to recover the
advances made.
National Seamen Board- It ruled in favor of Mrs. Josephine
Lucero and against petitioner Company. The Board held that the
presumption of death could not be applied because the four-
year period provided for by Article 391(l) of the Civil Code had
not yet expired.
NLRC- Affirmed the decision of the Board. It held that a person to
be presumed dead should first "not been heard of for four years
since the loss of the vessel" before he can be presumed dead for
all purposes. Applied to Capt. LUCERO, it is evidently premature
to presume him dead as four years has not yet expired.
Indeed, by the terms of the appointment of Capt. LUCERO, his
engagement terminates upon the return of the vessel at the Port
of Manila. He is considered to be still working entitling his
spouse to allotment until the vessel returns or until it is officially
declared totally lost, or until the presumption of his death
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
26
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
becomes effective in which case the burden of proving that he is
alive is shifted to his wife for purposes of continuing her
allotment.
Issue: WON the rule on presumptive death applies
Ruling: No. There is thus enough evidence to show the
circumstances attending the loss and disappearance of the M/V
Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing facts, quite logically.
are sufficient to lead Us to a moral certainty that the vessel had
sunk and that the persons aboard had perished with it. upon this
premise, the rule on presumption of death under Article 391 (1)
of the Civil Code must yield to the rule of preponderance of
evidence. As this Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro "Where there
are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion
can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of
preponderance of evidence controls."
We cannot permit Article 391 to override, or be substituted for,
the facts established in this case which logically indicate to a
moral certainty that Capt. Lucero died shortly after he had sent
his last radio message at 9:50 p.m. on February 16, 1980.
The decision of the NLRC is hereby set aside, and the complaint
of respondent Josephine Lucero dismissed. However, Mrs.
Lucero is entitled to death benefits.
G.R. No. 126334 November 23, 2001
EMILIO EMNACE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF VICENTE TABANAO, SHERWIN
TABANAO, VICENTE WILLIAM TABANAO, JANETTE TABANAO
DEPOSOY, VICENTA MAY TABANAO VARELA, ROSELA TABANAO
and VINCENT TABANAO, respondents.
Digested by: Franklin Flores
FACTS:
Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto
Divinagracia were partners in a business concern known as Ma.
Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of 1986, they
decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement
of partition and distribution of the partnership properties among
them, consequent to Jacinto Divinagracia's withdrawal from the
partnership. Among the assets to be distributed were five (5)
fishing boats, six (6) vehicles, two (2) parcels of land.
Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after
Vicente Tabanao's untimely demise in 1994, petitioner failed to
submit to Tabanao's heirs any statement of assets and liabilities
of the partnership, and to render an accounting of the
partnership's finances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to
turn over to Tabanao's heirs the deceased's 1/3 share in the total
assets of the partnership, amounting to P30,000,000.00, or the
sum of P10,000,000.00, despite formal demand for payment
thereof.
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
Consequently, Tabanao' s heirs, respondents herein, filed against
petitioner an action for accounting, payment of shares, division
of assets and damages.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction over the nature
of the action or suit, and lack of capacity of the estate of
Tabanao to sue.
RTC: The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. It held that
the heirs of Tabanao had aright to sue in their own names, in
view of the provision of Article 777 of the Civil Code, which
states that the rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent.
CA: It upheld RTC’s decision, finding that no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction was
committed by the trial court in issuing the questioned orders
denying petitioner's motions to dismiss.
ISSUE: W/N THE HEIRS OF VICENTE TABANAO HAVE THE
CAPACITY TO SUE THE PETITIONER.
YES, THE HEIRS OF VICENTE TABANAO HAVE THE CAPACITY TO
SUE THE PETITIONER.
Petitioner’s assertion:
Petitioner asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao
has no legal capacity to sue since she was never appointed as
administratrix or executrix of his estate. Petitioner's objection in
this regard is misplaced.
RULING:
The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as
executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can file the
action. She and her children are complainants in their own right
as successors of Vicente Tabanao.
From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao' s death,
his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were
transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had
against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to
respondents by operation of law, more particularly by
succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which
the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value
of the inheritance of a person are transmitted. Moreover,
respondents became owners of their respective hereditary
shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died.
A prior settlement of the estate, or even the
appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as executrix or administratrix,
is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to
sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent
upon his death, they can commence any action originally
pertaining to the decedent.
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
27
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
From the moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to
demand fulfillment of petitioner's obligations as outlined in
their dissolution agreement were transmitted to respondents.
They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the court's
intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.
G.R. No. L-50261 May 31, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF GUARDIANSHIP OF THE MINORS CECILIA,
REBECCA, FLORIDA, RAPHAEL, RODOLFO, LUISITO, TEODORO,
all surnamed LAVIDES, ALBERTO C. LAVIDES
vs.
CITY COURT OF LUCENA, Branch I
Note:
I tried to tailor the facts, issue and ruling in relation to
Article 777, but wala talagang discussion regarding sa provision.
Parang gi-mention lang sya bigla ng Court. The case was not also
discussed in the TSNs. Better check na lang the full text so you
can see for yourself. Sorrryyy. 
FULL TEXT:
DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the two (2) orders of
respondent City Court of Lucena, Branch I, one dated December
5, 1978 dismissing petitioner's petition for guardianship for lack
of jurisdiction and the other, dated December 27, 1978 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order of December
5, 1978.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
Upon the death of his wife, petitioner Alberto Lavides instituted
on April 5, 1971 before respondent City Court a guardianship
proceeding (Special Proceeding No. 0609) with respect to the
person and property of their seven (7) minor children named
Cecilia, Rebecca, Florida, Raphael, Rodolfo, Luisito and Teodoro,
all surnamed Lavides. Said petition alleged that the estate left by
the deceased wife of herein petitioner, mother of the above-
named minors, has a total value of thirty-five thousand pesos
(P35,000.00) or an amount of P5,000.00 pertaining to each
minor. Although there had been no previous settlement of the
estate of the deceased, petitioner was appointed and qualified
as judicial guardian on May 10, 1971.
On June 23, 1971, respondent City Court, then presided by
Honorable Judge Filemon Juntereal, upon motion, authorized
petitioner to settle the estate extrajudicially and to sell a portion
thereof consisting of shares of stocks. Pursuant to said authority,
petitioner extrajudicially settled the estate, and on August 28,
1971, sold the said shares of stocks for the sum of P64,512.00
On November 22, 1978, petitioner filed a motion for
confirmation and approval of a Deed of Exchange Agreement
dated November 18, 1978. While this latter motion was still
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
pending consideration, the respondent court, now presided by
Honorable Judge Jose J. Parentela, Jr., reviewed the records of
the case and finding that the undivided estate left by the
deceased was worth at least P35,000.00, dismissed the case in
an Order dated December 5, 1978, for lack of jurisdiction,
revoked the appointment of petitioner as guardian and annulled
all proceedings taken prior to the issuance of the said order of
December 5, 1978.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said order which
was denied by respondent city court in its order dated December
27, 1978. Hence, this instant petition, petitioner raising the
following issues, namely:
a. Whether or not respondent city court's
jurisdiction over a petition for general
guardianship is based on the total value of the
estate or on the value of the individual share
of the minors in the estate of their deceased
mother; and
b. Whether or not the promulgation of the
Revised Rules of Court which was made
effective on January 1, 1964 overruled the
doctrine laid down by this Honorable Tribunal
in the case of "Delgado vs. Gamboa," G. R. No.
L-14326, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 505.
It appears that respondent city court dismissed the petition for
guardianship on ground of lack of jurisdiction 1) because a
perusal of the records of the case shows that the undivided
estate left by the deceased is worth P35,000.00 which is clearly
outside its jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 92 of the
Revised Rules of Court, and 2) because of this Court's ruling in
the case of Delgado vs. Gamboa, supra, to the effect that the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Courts with
the Court of First Instance over the guardianship of the person
and properties of the minors and incompetents cannot be
exercised when the estate has a value in excess of the
jurisdictional amount for the former courts.
Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that in the case of
petition for guardianship of more than one minor, the individual
share of each minor which is then the estate of said minors
determines the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court; that inasmuch as there are
seven (7) minor children sought to be placed under guardianship
and that the total value of the estate is P35,000.00, then by
simple mathematical computation, the value of the property of
each minor is P5,000.00, already a determined estate, which is
well within the jurisdiction of the respondent city court; that the
case of Delgado vs. Gamboa, promulgated in 1962, invoked by
respondent city court in dismissing his petition has been
overruled and abandoned by the promulgation of the Revised
Rules of Court, which took effect in 1964.
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
28
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
Section 1, Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court granting
concurrent jurisdiction to the municipal and city courts with the
Court of First Instance in the appointment of guardians,
provides:
Section 1. Where to institute proceedings.—
Guardianship of the person or estate of a
minor or incompetent may be instituted in the
Court of First Instance of the province, or in
the justice of the peace court of the
municipality, or in the municipal court of the
chartered city where the minor or
incompetent person resides, and if he resides
in a foreign country, in the Court of First
Instance of the province wherein his property
or part thereof is situated; provided, however,
that where the value of the property of such
minor or incompetent exceeds the jurisdiction
of the justice of the peace or municipal court,
the proceedings shall be instituted in the
Court of First Instance.
In the City of Manila the proceedings shall be
instituted in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court.
The above section, in clear terms, grants concurrent jurisdiction
between municipal and city court and Courts of First Instance in
the appointment of guardians either with respect to the person
or property of the minor or incompetent, except that where the
value of the property of such minor or incompetent exceeds the
jurisdiction of the municipal or city courts, the guardianship
proceedings shall be instituted in the Court of First Instance. It is
clear, therefore, that the value of the property of the minor or
incompetent sought to be placed in guardianship determines
which court has jurisdiction. And that property referred to is the
individual estate of the minor so much so that when there are
more than one minor or in competent sought to be placed under
guardianship, what determines which court has jurisdiction is the
value of the individual property of each minor or incompetent.
In the case at bar, it appears that respondent city court
dismissed the petition for guardianship on ground of lack of
jurisdiction because a perusal of the record of the case shows
that the undivided estate left by the deceased mother is worth
P35,000.00 which amount is clearly outside its jurisdiction. This
reasoning must be rejected for it overlooks the fact that the
petition for guardianship filed by herein petitioner before the
respondent city court clearly alleged that the individual estate or
share of each of the seven minor children sought to be placed
under guardianship is P5,000.00, which amount is well within the
jurisdiction of the respondent city court (Section 88, Judiciary Act
of 1948, as amended by R.A. No. 3828). That the respondent city
court has jurisdiction over the case cannot be denied, for the
rule is well-settled that jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and/or
petition. 1 That each of the seven (7) minor children became
owner of a one- seventh (1/7) share or an amount of P5,000
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
from the estate left by the deceased mother valued at
P35,000.00 upon the death of the latter cannot also be denied
for Article 777 of the New Civil Code expressly provides that "the
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent," and from then on, the heir becomes the
absolute owner of the decedent's property, subject of the rights
and obligations of the decedent and he cannot be deprived of
such right except by methods provided for by law. 2
Respondent city court, however, would also base its dismissal of
the case in the light of this Court's ruling in the case of Delgado
vs. Gamboa, supra, to the effect that the concurrence of
jurisdiction between Courts of First Instance and inferior courts
over guardianship of the minors or incompetents cannot be
exercised when the estate has a value in excess of the
jurisdictional amount for the latter courts. The respondent Court,
however, overlooked one vital fact. A more careful examination
of the facts of said case, decided in 1962, reveals that it involved
guardianship proceeding over the person and property of three
(3) minor children of decedent and an undivided estate valued at
P7,000.00. That would make a share of P2,333.33 for each minor
child, which amount is also in excess of the jurisdictional amount
for inferior courts. 3 In the case at bar, there are seven (7) minor
children to share in an undivided estate valued at P35,000.00 or
a share of P5,000.00 for each minor, which amount is well
within the jurisdiction of the respondent city court, 4 which,
therefore, cannot validly invoke the case of Delgado vs. Gamboa
to support its dismissal of the petition for guardianship. For what
is decisive is not the total value of the estate of the decedent,
but the value of the individual share of each of the minor heirs
for whom a guardian is sought to be appointed individually not
collectively.
But petitioner would contend, as raised in the second issue of
this petition, that the doctrine laid down by this Court in the
aforecited case of Delgado vs. Gamboa, has been overruled by
the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court, particularly
Section 1 of Rule 92, He argued that the case of Delgado vs.
Gamboa, promulgated on February 28, 1962, was decided when
Section 1, Rule 93 of the former Rules of Court was still effective,
which rule commands that guardianship shall be originally
cognizable by the Court of First Instance; that when the Revised
Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964, the institution of
guardianship proceedings is now governed by Section 1 of Rule
92 which states that guardianship proceedings may be instituted
in the Courts of First Instance or in the municipal courts.
A perusal of the case of Delgado vs. Gamboa, decided when
Section 1 of former Rule 93, as amended by R.A. No. 643, was
still effective, shows that it merely restated and confirmed the
doctrine laid down in the case of Morales vs. Marquez, G. R. No.
L-7463, May 27, 1955, which in effect, expounded the grant of
concurrent jurisdiction between inferior courts and Court of First
Instance, as provided for by R.A. No. 643. And a comparison of
the provisions of Section 1 of former Rule 93, as amended, and
Section 1 of the present Rule 92 shows that the latter rule
restates the former rule. Under the former rule, municipal or city
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
29
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
Instance in cases where the value of the property of such minor
or incompetent falls within the jurisdiction of the former courts.
Likewise, under the present rule, concurrent jurisdiction was also
granted except that "where the value of the property of such
minor or incompetent exceeds the jurisdiction of the inferior
courts, the proceedings shall, be instituted in the Court of First
Instance." The criterion, therefore, in determining in which court
the guardianship proceeding shall be instituted under the
provision of both the former Rule 93 and the present Rule 92
remains the same. Hence, it cannot be accurately stated that the
Delgado ruling has been abandoned. In any case, the Delgado
doctrine, as already demonstrated, does not militate against
petitioner's contention that the City has jurisdiction over the
instant guardianship case.
Lastly, there is still one aspect of this case which must not be
overlooked. It is not disputed that the respondent City Court has
entertained and granted petitioner's petition for guardianship in
its Order as early as May 10, 1971 and has exercised its
jurisdiction by granting authority to petitioner to settle the
estate extrajudicially and to sell a portion thereof consisting of
shares of stock; that after the lapse of seven (7) years or on
November 22, 1978, respondent City Court dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction, revoked the appointment of petitioner as
guardian and annulled all proceedings taken. Would it serve the
interest of justice to dismiss the case at this stage and let a new
petition for guardianship be filed in another court? To draw a
tenuous jurisdictional line is to undermine stability in litigations.
The time to be lost, effort wasted, anxiety augmented, additional
expenses incurred—these are considerations which weigh
heavily if this situation is allowed to happen. As aptly stated by
the petitioner.—"To let the respondent court reverse its stand
now will pave a pattern of judicial instability which, to reason
and logic, is definitely not healthy administration of justice and
not inducive of court's veneration." 5
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Order of respondent City Court
of December 5, 1978 dismissing the petition and the Order of
December 27, 1978 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof are hereby set aside and the case is
remanded to it for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and
PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who represents the minors
vs.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA
BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of
JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court
of First Instance of Abra
Digested by: Franklin Flores
FACTS:
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio
Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla,
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to
quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the
complaint, but before the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the
counsel for the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint in order
to include certain allegations therein. The motion to amend the
complaint was granted and on July 17, 1975, plaintiffs filed their
amended complaint.
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is
dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion
to dismiss was heard on August 14, 1975. In said hearing,
counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata
Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor children and
her husband, the petitioners herein; but the court after the
hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a
dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal
personality to sue.
Counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation
praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be
allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but the CFI
denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
W/N ROSALIO BONILLA AND SALVACION BONILLA BE ALLOWED
TO SUBSTITUTE THEIR DECEASED MOTHER FORTUNATA
BARCENA.
YES, ROSALIO BONILLA AND SALVACION BONILLA SHOULD BE
ALLOWED TO SUBSTITUTE THEIR DECEASED MOTHER
FORTUNATA BARCENA.
RULING:
While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in
court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case
up to its completion. The records of this case show that the
death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the
complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when
the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena
was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction
over her person.
*** If thereafter she died, the Rules of Court prescribes the
procedure whereby a party who died during the pendency of the
proceeding can be substituted. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies ... it
shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of
such death ... and to give the name and residence of his
executor, administrator, guardian or other legal
representatives." This duty was complied with by the counsel for
the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the
respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975
and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case. ***
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
30
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the
substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead
person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error.
Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent,
the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject
to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot
be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods
provided for by law.
The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs
acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be
pure or contingent.
The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in
them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the
testate or intestate proceedings.
When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to
the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not
extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon
her death.
Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in
litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is,
therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their
substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.
G.R. No. L-17757 May 30, 1962
MAMERTA DE LA MERCED, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EZEQUIEL M. SANTOS, and AMPARO
MACAPAGAL, respondents.
Digest by: Jessalyn Puerin
FACTS:
On 23 March 1987, Evarista Dela Merced died intestate. She was
survived by three sets of heirs: (1) Francisco Dela Merced, her
legitimate brother; (2) Teresita Rupisan, her niece who is the
only daughter of Rosa Dela Merced, a sister who died in 1943;
and the legitimate children of Eugenia Dela Merced, another
sister who died in 1965.
Almost a year later or on 19 March 1988, Francisco, Evarista’s
brother, died. He was survived by his wife, three legitimate
children and an illegitimate child, private respondent Joselito.
The three sets of heirs of the decedent Evarista executed an
extrajudicial settlement adjudicating the properties of Evarista to
them, each set with a share of one-third pro-indiviso.
Joselito P. Dela Merced, illegitimate son of the late Francisco de
la Merced, filed a petition for Annulment of the Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Evarista alleging that
he was fraudulently omitted from the said settlement made by
petitioners, who were fully aware of his relation to the late
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
Francisco. He thus prayed to be included as one of the
beneficiaries, to share in the one-third pro-indiviso share in the
estate of the deceased Evarista, corresponding to the heirs of
Francisco.
Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged the Joselito, being an
illegitimate child, is barred from inheriting from Evarista because
of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down an impassable
barrier between legitimate and illegitimate families.
RTC: The trial court dismissed the petition.
CA: The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court
of origin and ordered the petitioners to execute amendatory
agreement which shall form part of the original settlement, so as
to include private respondent Joselito as a co-heir to the estate
of Francisco, which estate includes one-third (1/3) pro indiviso of
the latter's inheritance from the deceased Evarista.
ISSUE: WON Joselito as an illegitimate child is barred from
inheriting from Evarista’s estate.
RULING:
No. Article 992 of the New Civil Code is not applicable because
involved here is not a situation where an illegitimate child would
inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of his father, which is
prohibited by the aforesaid provision of law. Rather, it is a
scenario where an illegitimate child inherits from his father, the
latter's share in or portion of, what the latter already inherited
from the deceased sister, Evarista.
As opined by the Court of Appeals, the law in point in the
present case is Article 777 of the New Civil Code which provides
that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent.
Since Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco, the latter
inherited a portion of the estate of the former as one of her
heirs. Subsequently, when Francisco died, his heirs, namely: his
spouse, legitimate children, and the private respondent, Joselito,
an illegitimate child, inherited his (Francisco's) share in the
estate of Evarista. It bears stressing that Joselito does not claim
to be an heir of Evarista by right of representation but
participates in his own right, as an heir of the late Francisco, in
the latter's share (or portion thereof) in the estate of Evarista.
Petitioners argue that if Joselito desires to assert successional
rights to the intestate estate of his father, the proper forum
should be in the settlement of his own father's intestate estate,
as this Court held in the case of Gutierrez vs. Macandog (150
SCRA 422 [1987])
Petitioners' reliance on the case of Gutierrez vs. Macandog
(supra) is misplaced. The said case involved a claim for support
filed by one Elpedia Gutierrez against the estate of the decedent,
Agustin Gutierrez, Sr., when she was not even an heir to the
estate in question, at the time, and the decedent had no
obligation whatsoever to give her support. Thus, this Court ruled
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
31
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
that Elpedia should have asked for support pendente lite before
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in which court her
husband (one of the legal heirs of the decedent) had instituted a
case for legal separation against her on the ground of an attempt
against his life. When Mauricio (her husband) died, she should
have commenced an action for the settlement of the estate of
her husband, in which case she could receive whatever
allowance the intestate court would grant her.
The present case, however, relates to the rightful and
undisputed right of an heir to the share of his late father in the
estate of the decedent Evarista, ownership of which had been
transmitted to his father upon the death of Evarista. There is no
legal obstacle for private respondent Joselito, admittedly the son
of the late Francisco, to inherit in his own right as an heir to his
father's estate, which estate includes a one-third (1/3) undivided
share in the estate of Evarista.
G.R. No. L-28394 November 26, 1970
PEDRO GAYON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SILVESTRE GAYON and
GENOVEVA DE GAYON, defendants-appellees.
Digest by: Jessalyn Puerin
FACTS:
In 1967, Pedro Gayon is the brother of Silvestre Gayon whose
wife is Genoveva Gayon. Pedro filed a case against against
Silvetre and Genoveva , alleging substantially that, on October 1,
1952, said spouses sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00,
a parcel of unregistered, including the improvements thereon,
subject to redemption within five (5) years or not later than
October 1, 1957; that said right of redemption had not been
exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or any of their
heirs or successors, despite the expiration of the period therefor;
that said Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso had, by
virtue of a deed of sale, sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff
Pedro Gayon for the sum of P614.00; that plaintiff had, since
1961, introduced thereon improvements worth P1,000; that he
had, moreover, fully paid the taxes on said property up to 1967;
and that Articles 1606 and 1616 of our Civil Code require a
judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in and to a land
acquired through a conditional sale, and, accordingly, praying
that an order be issued in plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of
ownership in and to the aforementioned.
Genoveva alleged that her husband, Silvestre, died long before
the institution of this case.
RTC: The Court of First Instance of Iloilo dismissing his complaint
ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs. Gayon has nothing to do with the
land subject of plaintiff's complaint since Silvestre Gayon is now
dead who is is the absolute owner of the land in question?
RULING: NO
To begin with, it is not true that Mrs. Gayon "has nothing to do
with the land subject of plaintiff's complaint." As the widow of
Silvestre Gayon, she is one of his compulsory heirs and has,
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
accordingly, an interest in the property in question. Moreover,
her own motion to dismiss indicated merely "a necessity of
amending the complaint," to the end that the other successors in
interest of Silvestre Gayon, instead of the latter, be made parties
in this case. In her opposition to the aforesaid motion for
reconsideration of the plaintiff, Mrs. Gayon alleged, inter alia,
that the "heirs cannot represent the dead defendant, unless
there is a declaration of heirship." Inasmuch, however, as
succession takes place, by operation of law, "from the moment
of the death of the decedent" and "(t)he inheritance includes all
the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death," it follows that if his heirs were
included as defendants in this case, they would be sued, not as
"representatives" of the decedent, but as owners of an aliquot
interest in the property in question, even if the precise extent of
their interest may still be undetermined and they have derived it
from the decent. Hence, they may be sued without a previous
declaration of heirship, provided there is no pending special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and
the case remanded to the lower court for the inclusion, as
defendant or defendants therein, of the administrator or
executor of the estate of Silvestre Gayon, if any, in lieu of the
decedent, or, in the absence of such administrator or executor,
of the heirs of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, and for further
proceedings, not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of
this instance against defendant-appellee, Genoveva de Gayon. It
is so ordered.
BORROMEO-HERRERA VS BORROMEO (152 SCRA 172)
G.R. No. L-41171 July 23, 1987
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO
BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II,
respondents.
Digest by: Jessalyn Puerin
FACTS:
Vito Borromeo, a widower, died on March 13, 1952, at the age of
88 years, without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in
the province of Cebu. All his brothers and sisters predeceased
him.
April 19, 1952, JOSE JUNQUERA filed a petition for the probate of
a one page document as the last will and testament, devising all
his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia (all surnamed
Borromeo), in equal and undivided shares and designating
Junquera as executor.
Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. On May 28,
1960, the probate court held that the document presented as
the will of the deceased was a forgery. The decision was
affirmed upon appeal.
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
32
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate
proceedings. Several parties came before the court filing claims
or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of
Vito Borromeo.
RTC: The trial court issued an order declaring the following, to
the exclusion of all others, as the INTESTATE HEIRS OF THE
DECEASED VITO BORROMEO: Jose Cuenco Borromeo, Judge
Crispin Borromeo, Vitaliana Borromeo, Patrocinio Borromeo
Herrera, Salud Borromeom Asuncion Borromeo, Marcial
Borromeom Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and, The heirs of
Canuto Borromeo.
The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of
Vito Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and
distributed in equal and equitable shares among the 9 declared
intestate heirs.
On August 25, 1972, respondent FORTUNATO BORROMEO filed a
motion to be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased,
alleging that he is an illegitimate son and that he was omitted in
the declaration of heirs.
As an acknowledged illegitimate child, he stated that he was
entitled to a legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the
legitime of an acknowledged natural child.
However, finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was
already barred by the order of the court dated April 10, 1969,
the court dismissed the motion.
Fortunato filed a motion for reconsideration. In the
memorandum he submitted, Fortunato changed the basis for his
claim to a portion of the estate. He asserted and incorporated a
WAIVER OF HEREDITARY RIGHTS (7/31/1967). In the waiver, five
of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the
disputed estate.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: The trial court, acting as a probate
court, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim;
Fortunato is estopped from asserting the waiver agreement; that
the waiver agreement is void as it was executed before the
declaration of heirs; that the same is void having been executed
before the distribution of the estate and before the acceptance
of the inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and inexistent for
lack of subject matter.
- The "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" has been cancelled
and revoked on June 29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato
Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is without force and effect
because there can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights
before there has been a valid acceptance of the inheritance the
heirs intend to transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil
Code, to make acceptance or repudiation of inheritance valid,
the person must be certain of the death of the one from whom
he is to inherit and of his right to the inheritance. Since the
petitioner and her co-heirs were not certain of their right to the
inheritance until they were declared heirs, their rights were,
therefore, uncertain.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Under Article 1043 of the Civil
Code there is no need for a person to be first declared as heir
before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
required is that he must first be certain of the death of the
person from whom he is to inherit and that he must be certain of
his right to the inheritance. He points out that at the time of the
signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories
to the waiver document were certain that Vito Borromeo was
already dead as well as of their rights to the inheritance as
shown in the waiver document itself.
On December 24, 1974, the trial court concluding that the five
declared heirs who signed the waiver agreement assigning their
hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same
rights, declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito
Borromeo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Waiver of Hereditary Rights executed
IN 1967 is valid as to entitle Fortunato to the estate of Vito?
RULING:
YES. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights
is that "the properties included in an existing inheritance cannot
be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the
heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality of the
former. Nor do such properties have the character of future
property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession from
the moment of the death of the deceased, by principle
established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil
Code, according to which the heirs succeed the deceased by the
mere fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from the
moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into
possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in any
event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with
article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although
conditioned upon the adjudication of the corresponding
hereditary portion." (Osorio v. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship
Co., 41 Phil., 531). The heirs, therefore, could waive their
hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the
estate was issued only in 1969.
In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary
Rights" cannot be considered to be effective. For a waiver to
exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right;
(2) the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention
to relinquish such right. (People v. Salvador, (CA) 53 O.G. No. 22,
p. 8116, 8120). The intention to waive a right or advantage must
be shown clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of
intention rests in what a party does, his act should be so
manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent to,
voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that no
other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible (67 C.J.,
311). (Fernandez v. Sebido, et al., 70 Phil., 151, 159).
The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the
waiver document did not have the clear and convincing intention
to relinquish their rights, Thus: (1) On October 27, 1967.
Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading entitled
"Compliance" wherein they submitted a proposal for the
amicable settlement of the case. In that Compliance, they
proposed to concede to all the eight (8) intestate heirs of Vito
Borromeo all properties, personal and real, including all cash and
sums of money in the hands of the Special Administrator, as of
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
33
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
October 31, 1967, not contested or claimed by them in any
action then pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In
turn, the heirs would waive and concede to them all the 14
contested lots. In this document, the respondent recognizes and
concedes that the petitioner, like the other signatories to the
waiver document, is an heir of the deceased Vito Borromeo,
entitled to share in the estate. This shows that the "Waiver of
Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be what the respondent
now purports it to be. Had the intent been otherwise, there
would not be any reason for Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia
Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer to settle the case
amicably, and offer to concede to them parts of the estate of the
deceased; (2) On April 21 and 30, 1969, the majority of the
declared heirs executed an Agreement on how the estate they
inherited shall be distributed. This Agreement of Partition was
approved by the trial court on August 15, 1969; (3) On June 29,
1968, the petitioner, among others, signed a document entitled
Deed of Assignment" purporting to transfer and assign in favor
of the respondent and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all her
(Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and participation as an
intestate heir in the estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo. The
stated consideration for said assignment was P100,000.00; (4)
On the same date, June 29, 1968, the respondent Tomas, and
Amelia Borromeo (assignees in the aforementioned deed of
assignment) in turn executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor
of the heirs-assignors named in the same deed of assignment.
The stated consideration was P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of
Deed of Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance was signed by
Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968,
while Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on March 24,
1969.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial
court had jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver
agreement. It must be noted that in Special Proceedings No. 916-
R the lower court disallowed the probate of the will and declared
it as fake. Upon appeal, this Court affirmed the decision of the
lower court on March 30, 1967, in G.R. No. L-18498.
Subsequently, several parties came before the lower court filing
claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate
estate of Vito Borromeo. We see no impediment to the trial
court in exercising jurisdiction and trying the said claims or
petitions. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the trial court extends to
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized
powers in handling the settlement of the estate.
PALICTE vs. RAMOLETE
September 21, 1987
Digested by: Vicco Piodos
FACTS: Palicte is among the declared heirs on Spl. Proc. No.
2706-R. However, the lower court ruled that she does not qualify
as a successor-in-interest who may redeem the real properties
sold at public auction on July 5, 1979 for the satisfaction of the
judgment in the amount of P725, 279.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not Palicte is a successor-in-interest who may
be able to redeem the said properties sold at pubic auction?
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
RULING: YES. The term successor-in-interest includes one who
succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law.
In this case, Palicte is the daughter of the late Don Filemon
Sotto whose estate was levied upon on execution to satisfy the
money judgment. As a legitimate heir, she qualifies as a
successor-in-interest. Thus the law provides,
Art. 777 of the New Civil Code, “The rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.”
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Lagniton, the Court has
ruled that: “the right of a son, with respect to the property of a
father or mother, is also an inchoate or contingent interest,
because, upon the death of the father or the mother or both, he
will have a right to inherit said conjugal property.
Thus, if any holder of an inchoate interest is a successor-in-
interest with right to redeem a property sold on execution, then
such son is such a successor-in-interest, as he has an inchoate
right to the property of his father.”
LOCSIN VS. CA,
G.R. NO. 89783. FEBRUARY 19, 1992.]
Digested by: Vicco Piodos
FACTS:
 The late Getulio Locsin had three children named
Mariano, Julian and Magdalena, all surnamed Locsin. He
owned extensive residential and agricultural properties in
the provinces of Albay and Sorsogon.
 After his death, his estate was divided among his three (3)
children. Those that Mariano inherited from his father,
Getulio Locsin, were surveyed cadastrally and registered
in the name of "Mariano Locsin married to Catalina
Jaucian."
 Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament
instituting his wife, Catalina, as the sole and universal heir
of all his properties. Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on
September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness.
 Don Mariano relied on Doña Catalina to carry out the
terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years after his
death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and
fully cognizant that she was also advancing in years, Doña
Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation or
assignment, Don Mariano's, as well as her own,
properties to their respective nephews and nieces.
 Four years before her death, she had made a will on
October 22, 1973 affirming and ratifying the transfers she
had made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's,
and her own, relatives.
 In 1989, or six (6) years after Doña Catalina's demise,
some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had already
received their legacies and hereditary shares from her
estate, filed action to recover the properties which she
had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging
that the conveyances were in officious, without
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
34
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
consideration, and intended solely to circumvent the laws
on succession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the nephews and nieces may validly question the
transfers, donations, and assignments which Doña Catalina made
during her lifetime.
RULING: No.
The properties which Doña catalina disposed 10 years prior to
her death did not form part of her hereditary estate. According
to Art. 777 of the New Civil Code, “The rights to the succession
are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent.”. Property which Doña Catalina had transferred or
conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed
part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs
may lay claim.
Moreover, had she died intestate, only the property that
remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her
legal heirs; and even if those transfers were, one and all, treated
as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to
impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's
gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither
they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs. All that the
respondents had was an expectancy that in no wise restricted
her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to
the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which
 Condition for transmission of successional rights (p. 12,
paras)
 Proper word is made effective, paras p. 12
 Cause of Succession: will of decedent; Condition of
Succession: death of decedent
LLENARES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ZABELLA
GR. NO. 98709, MAY 13, 1993
Digested by: Vicco Piodos
FACTS:
Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares were co-owners of a parcel
of land. Anastacio later sold his share of the lot to Aristo Zabella,
who was survived by Apolinar. Sometime after the sale, the
cadastral court awarded the parcel of land to Juan and Anastacio
in equal shares, and an OCT was issued in their favor.
Anastacio died in 1931, leaving Magdalena as his sole heir.
She adjudicated to herself the ½ share of the property that
belonged to Anastacio. However, because of the sale that
Anastacio made to Aristo, Apolinar filed an adverse claim on the
property. Magdalena claims she is entitled to the property and
alleged that she had been in possession of it since she 1931, and
that her cousin had administered the land since she was only 4
years old at the time, and that she began and has been
administering the property since 1959. She also further proved
that she had been paying taxes.
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
Apolinar claims that he and his siblings were in possession of the
land since 1930 that he had been paying irrigation charges since
1960. The trial court found for Magdalena, as the property was
registered and titled in the name of Anasticio since 1937; the
cadastral proceedings led to Anastacio being the registered
owner, and was binding and conclusive against the whole world.
The trial court also noted that the sale was conducted before the
finality of the cadastral case, and it had, therefore, lost its
efficacy. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Apolinar had
promptly filed his adverse claim, and found that Magdalena
wasn’t in possession since the tax payments were not in her
name until 1977.
ISSUE: Which between the parties is entitled to the ownership of
the property? – the Court rules for Magdalena
RULING:
The Supreme Court finds the ruling of the Trial Court to be in
consonance with the law. That the petitioner did not declare the
property in her name or paid taxes on the same is not fatal to
her case; until 1976, the property was registered under the
names of Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares, as evidenced by
the OCT.
The OCT itself does not contain an adverse claim by Apolinar and
his family, and no evidence shows that he made any action to
enforce his claim on the property based on the deed of sale.
On the other hand, as Magdalena is Anastacio’s sole heir, the
continued existence of the OCT in the name of Juan and
Anastacio fully protected her rights; her failure to declare the
½ portion of the land for tax purposes does not prejudice her
because the payments of the real estate taxes by others for and
in behalf of the registered owners counts as payment by the
registered owners.
Furthermore, the claim of Apolinar cannot be considered a claim
as contemplated by Section 110 of the Land Registration Act, as
it was based on a transaction that occurred long before the
rendition of judgment in the cadastral proceedings. It must be
noted that cadastral proceedings are judicial and in rem, so they
bind the whole world.
Finally, there is no law which requires Magdalena to execute an
affidavit of adjudication and cause the cancellation of the OCT
and the issuance of a new one her name in order to transfer the
ownership of the property to her or to protect her rights and
interests therein. As soon as Anastacio died, the transfer in her
favor took place. Art. 777 of the New Civil Code, “The rights to
the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
of the decedent.”
GEVERO VS IAC
(G.R. No. 77029 August 30, 1990)
Digest by: Nikki Tan
PARTIES:
1. Teodorica Babangha: decedent
2. Luis Lancero: seller to DELCOR
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
35
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
3. Del Monte Development Corporation/DELCOR: buyer 4.
Ricardo Gevero: seller to Luis
5. Geveros: heirs of Teodorica/petitioners
FACTS:
The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476. Said lot was
acquired by purchase from the late Luis Lancero on September
1964 as per Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of plaintiff
DELCOR. Luis Lancero, in turn acquired the same parcel from
Ricardo Gevero on February 1952 per deed of sale executed by
Ricardo Gevero which was duly annotated at the back of Original
Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering the mother lot identified as
Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha — 1/2 share
and her children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and
Ursula, all surnamed surnamed Gevero, 1/2 undivided share of
the whole area.
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was
survived by her six children aforementioned. The heirs of
Teodorica Babangha on October 17,1966 executed an Extra-
Judicial Settlement and Partition of the estate of Teodorica
Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them was lot 2476. By
virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and partition executed by
the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha, Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I,
inclusive, under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved
by the Land Registration Commission, Lot 2476-D, among others,
was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at the
time of extra-judicial settlement and partition in 1966.
Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action with the CFI
(now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet title and/or annul the
partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the
same prejudices the land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476.
Plaintiff proved that before purchasing Lot 2476-A it first
investigated and checked the title of Luis Lancero and found the
same to be intact in the office of the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan de Oro City. The same with the subdivision plan (Exh.
"B"), the corresponding technical description (Exh. "P") and the
Deed of Sale executed by Ricardo Gevero — all of which were
found to be unquestionable. By reason of all these, plaintiff
claims to have bought the land in good faith and for value,
occupying the land since the sale and taking over from Lancero's
possession until May 1969, when the defendants Abadas forcibly
entered the property
Petitioner’s Allegations
Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely invalid citing
alleged flaws thereto, such as that: 1) the signature of Ricardo
was forged without his knowledge of such fact; 2) Lancero had
recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed of sale when he
signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid the
Litigation"; 3) Ricardo's children remained in the property
notwithstanding the sale to Lancero.
RTC: Judgment is hereby rendered declaring the plaintiff
corporation as the true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot
No. 2476 of the Cagayan.
ISSUE:
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
(1) Whether the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero to Luis
Lancero is valid. YES
(2) Whether or not the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica
Babangha in one of the litigated lots, lot no. 2476 under OCT No.
7610 is included in the deed of sale. YES
(3) Whether the private respondents' action is barred by laches.
NO
RULING:
(1) As to petitioners' claim that the signature of Ricardo in the
1952 deed of sale in favor of Lancero was forged without
Ricardo's knowledge of such fact.
It will be observed that the deed of sale in question was
executed with all the legal formalities of a public document. The
1952 deed was duly acknowledged by both parties before the
notary public, yet petitioners did not bother to rebut the legal
presumption of the regularity of the notarized document. In fact
it has long been settled that a public document executed and
attested through the intervention of the notary public is
evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein
expressed. It has the presumption of regularity and to contradict
all these, evidence must be clear, convincing and more than
merely preponderant Forgery cannot be presumed, it must be
proven.
Likewise, petitioners allegation of absence of consideration of
the deed was not substantiated.
Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code, consideration is presumed
unless the contrary is proven. As to petitioners' contention that
Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed when
he signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid
Litigation", it is a basic rule of evidence that the right of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another. This particular rule is embodied in the maxim "res inter
alios acta alteri nocere non debet." Under Section 31, Rule 130,
Rules of Court "where one derives title to property from
another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while
holding the title, in relation to the property is evidence against
the former." It is however stressed that the admission of the
former owner of a property must have been made while he was
the owner thereof in order that such admission may be binding
upon the present owner. Hence, Lanceros' declaration or acts of
executing the 1968 document have no binding effect on DELCOR,
the ownership of the land having passed to DELCOR in 1964.
(2) The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or
vested immediately from the moment of the death of the
"causante" or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a successor
(with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary
share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of
such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation
of the estate.
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
36
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the
rights to the succession were transmitted from the moment of
her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in
1966, the date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received
his share in the lot as inheritance from his mother Teodorica.
Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 that share which
he inherited from Teodorica was also included unless expressly
excluded in the deed of sale.
Petitioners contend that Ricardo's share from Teodorica was
excluded in the sale considering that a paragraph of the
aforementioned deed refers merely to the shares of Ricardo and
Eustaquio. It is well settled that laws and contracts shall be so
construed as to harmonize and give effect to the different
provisions thereof to ascertain the meaning of the provisions of
a contract, its entirety must be taken into account. The
interpretation insisted upon by the petitioners, by citing only one
paragraph of the deed of sale, would not only create
contradictions but also, render meaningless and set at naught
the entire provisions thereof.
(3) DELCOR had therefore acted in good faith in purchasing the
land in question. Consequently, DELCOR's action is not barred
by laches.
Under the established principles of land registration law, the
person dealing with registered land may generally rely on the
correctness of its certificate of title and the law will in no way
oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the
condition of the property. This notwithstanding, DELCOR did
more than that. It did not only rely on the certificate of title. The
Court of Appeals found that it had first investigated and checked
the title in the name of Luis Lancero. It likewise inquired into the
Subdivision Plan, the corresponding technical description and
the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero in favor of Luis
Lancero and found everything in order. It even went to the
premises and found Luis Lancero to be in possession of the land
to the exclusion of any other person.
SUAREZ VS CA
(G.R. No. 94918. September 2, 1992.)
Digest by: Nikki Tan
PARTIES:
1. Marcelo Suarez decedent
2. Teofista Suarez wife of decedent
3. Danilo I. Suarez, Eufrocina Suarez-Andres, Marcelo I. Suarez,
Jr., Evelyn Suarez-De Leon And Reginio I. Suarez : heirs of
Marcelo
4.Valente Raymundo, Violeta Raymundo, Ma. Concepcion Vito
And Virginia Banta- highest bidders in auction sale
FACTS: Herein petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father
died in 1955 and since then his estate consisting of several
valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila has lot been
liquidated or partitioned.
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
Case Digests
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession III- Manresa
2019
College of Law

In 1977, petitioners’ widowed mother and Rizal Realty
Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for rescission of
contract and for damages, and were ordered by Branch 1 of the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Branch 151, RTC of
Pasig) to pay, jointly and severally, herein respondents the
aggregate principal amount of about P70,000 as damages.
The judgment against petitioner’s mother and Rizal Realty
Corporation having become final and executory, five (5) valuable
parcel of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, (worth to be millions then)
were levied and sold on execution on June 24, 1983 in favor of
the private respondents as the highest bidder for the amount of
P94,170.000. Private respondents were then issued a certificate
of sale which was subsequently registered or August 1, 1983.
On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption
period, petitioners filed a reinvindicatory action against private
respondents and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, thereafter
docketed as Civil Case No. 51203, for the annulment of the
auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of the levied
pieces of property.
Petitioner’s Allegations
Therein, they alleged, among others, that being strangers to the
case decided against their mother, they cannot be held liable
therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are
co-owners, can neither be levied nor sold on execution.
On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued to private
respondents a final deed of sale over the properties.
Case No. 51203."
ISSUE: Whether or not the Raymundos can validly acquire all the
five (5) parcels of land co-owned by the Suarez and registered in
the name of petitioner’s deceased father. Marcelo Suarez, whose
estate has not been partitioned or liquidated, after the said
properties were levied and publicly sold en masse to private
respondents to satisfy the personal judgment debt of Teofista
Suarez, the surviving spouse of Marcelo Suarez, mother of herein
petitioners.
NO.
RULING: It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on
the validity of the execution and the manner of publicly selling
en masse the subject properties for auction. To start with, only
one-half of the 5 parcels of land should have been the subject
of the auction sale.
The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law
applicable at the time of the institution of the case.
"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent."
Article 888 further provides:
"The legitime of the legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary
estate of the father and of the mother.

On October 22, 1984, Teofista Suarez joined by herein The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half,
petitioners filed with Branch 151 a Motion for Reconsideration of subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the
the Order dated October 10, 1984, claiming that the parcels of surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."
land are co-owned by them and further informing the Court the
filing and pendency of an action to annul the auction sale (Civil Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides:
Case No. 51203), which motion however, was denied.
"If there are two or more legitimate children or
On February 25, 1985, a writ of preliminary injunction was descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a
issued enjoining private respondents from transferring to third portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate
parties the levied parcels of land based on the finding that the children or descendants."
auctioned lands are co-owned by petitioners.

RTC: On October 10, 1984, RTC Branch 151 issued in Civil Case Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is
Nos. 21736-21739 an Order directing Teofista Suarez and all equal to the legitime of each child.
persons claiming right under her to vacate the lots subject of the The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and
judicial sale; to desist from removing or alienating improvements auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of their
thereon; and to surrender to private respondents the owner’s mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not
duplicate copy of the torrens title and other pertinent because of their mother but through their own right as children
documents. of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in
any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to
CA: The appellate court rendered its decision on July 27, 1990, protect their own interest.
10 the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and

the questioned orders dated February 25, 1985, May 19, 1989
and February 26, 1990 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 are hereby
annulled, further respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil

-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
37
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession
College of Law
LORENZO VS POSADAS
(G.R. No. 94918. September 2, 1992.)
Digest by: Nikki Tan
PARTIES:
1. Thomas Stanley: decedent
2. Moore: former trustee
3. Pablo Lorenzo: trustee for the estate of Thomas Stanley
4. Matthew Hanley: beneficiary
FACTS: On May 27, 1922, one Thomas Hanley died in
Zamboanga, Zamboanga, leaving a will (Exhibit 5) and
considerable amount of real and personal properties.
On June 14, 1922, proceedings for the probate of his will and the
settlement and distribution of his estate were begun in the Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga. The will was admitted to
probate.
Said will provides, among other things, as follows:
4. I direct that any money left by me be given to my nephew
Matthew Hanley.
5. I direct that all real estate owned by me at the time of my
death be not sold or otherwise disposed of for a period of ten
(10) years after my death, and that the same be handled and
managed by the executors, and proceeds thereof to be given
to my nephew, Matthew Hanley, at Castlemore,
Ballaghaderine, County of Rosecommon, Ireland, and that he
be directed that the same be used only for the education of
my brother's children and their descendants.
6. I direct that ten (10) years after my death my property be
given to the above-mentioned Matthew Hanley to be
disposed of in the way he thinks most advantageous.
8. I state at this time I have one brother living, named Malachi
Hanley, and that my nephew, Matthew Hanley, is a son of my
said brother, Malachi Hanley.
Appoint a trustee
The CFI considered it proper for the best interests of their estate
to appoint a trustee to administer the real properties which,
under the will, were to pass to Matthew Hanley ten years after
the two executors named in the will, was, on March 8, 1924,
appointed trustee. Moore took his oath of office and gave bond
on March 10, 1924. He acted as trustee until February 29, 1932,
when he resigned and the plaintiff herein was appointed in his
stead.
During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the defendant
Collector of Internal Revenue, alleging that the estate left by the
deceased at the time of his death consisted of realty valued at
P27,920 and personality valued at P1,465, and allowing a
deduction of P480.81, assessed against the estate an inheritance
tax in the amount of P1,434.24 which, together with the
penalties for delinquency in payment the defendant filed a
-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
38
Case Digests
III- Manresa
2019
motion in the testamentary proceedings pending before the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga (Special proceedings No.
302) praying that the trustee, plaintiff herein, be ordered to pay
to the Government the said sum of P2,052.74. The motion was
granted.
On September 15, 1932, the plaintiff paid said amount under
protest, notifying the defendant at the same time that unless the
amount was promptly refunded suit would be brought for its
recovery.
ISSUES:
(1) When does the inheritance tax accrue and when must it be
satisfied?
(2) Should the inheritance tax be computed on the basis of the
value of the estate at the time of the testator's death, or on its
value ten years later?
RULING:
(1) The accrual of the inheritance tax is distinct from the
obligation to pay the same.
Section 1536 as amended, of the Administrative Code, imposes
the tax upon "every transmission by virtue of inheritance, devise,
bequest, gift mortis causa, or advance in anticipation of
inheritance, devise, or bequest."
The tax therefore is upon transmission or the transfer or
devolution of property of a decedent, made effective by his
death. It is in reality an excise or privilege tax imposed on the
right to succeed to, receive, or take property by or under a will
or the intestacy law, or deed, grant, or gift to become operative
at or after death.
According to Article 657 of the Civil Code, "the rights to the
succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his
death." "In other words", said Arellano, C. J., ". . . the heirs
succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased
ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of
the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had
executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his
death."
Plaintiff, however, asserts that while Article 657 of the Civil Code
is applicable to testate as well as intestate succession, it
operates only in so far as forced heirs are concerned.
But the language of Article 657 of the Civil Code is broad and
makes no distinction between different classes of heirs. That
article does not speak of forced heirs; it does not even use the
word "heir". It speaks of the rights of succession and the
transmission thereof from the moment of death.
The provision of section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure
regarding the authentication and probate of a will as a
necessary condition to effect transmission of property does not
affect the general rule laid down in article 657 of the Civil Code.
The authentication of a will implies its due execution but once
probated and allowed the transmission is effective as of the
 ATTY. LEILANIE YANGYANG-
Case Digests
ESPEJO
Ateneo de Davao University Wills and Succession III- Manresa
2019
College of Law

death of the testator in accordance with article 657 of the Civil

Code. Whatever may be the time when actual transmission of
the inheritance takes place, succession takes place in any event
at the moment of the decedent's death. The time when the
heirs legally succeed to the inheritance may differ from the time
when the heirs actually receive such inheritance.

(2) The plaintiff contends that the estate of Thomas Hanley, in so

far as the real properties are concerned, did not and could not
legally pass to the instituted heir, Matthew Hanley, until after
the expiration of ten years from the death of the testator on
May 27, 1922 and, that the inheritance tax should be based on
the value of the estate in 1932, or ten years after the testator's
death.

The plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that in 1932

the real properties in question had a reasonable value of only
P5,787. This amount added to the value of the personal property
left by the deceased, which the plaintiff admits is P1,465, would
generate an inheritance tax which, excluding deductions,
interest and surcharge, would amount only to about P169.52.

If death is the generating source from which the power of the

estate to impose inheritance taxes takes its being and if, upon
the death of the decedent, succession takes place and the right
of the estate to tax vests instantly, the tax should be measured
by the value of the estate as it stood at the time of the
decedent's death, regardless of any subsequent contingency
value of any subsequent increase or decrease in value. "The right
of the state to an inheritance tax accrues at the moment of
death, and hence is ordinarily measured as to any beneficiary by
the value at that time of such property as passes to him.
Subsequent appreciation or depreciation is immaterial."

-Palma-Gil – Du – Latorza – Claros – Cagas – Alba – Pamaos – Sioson – Flores – Puerin – Piodos – Tan -
39