Inspectioneering - 2021-09-01

ASSET INTEGRITY INTELLIGENCE
Fe atured Article
Overcoming Pitfalls When Establishing an

Effective RBI Program
VOLUME 27, ISSUE 5

SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER 2021
DEEPER
INSIGHT
TO ELEVATE YOUR FIRED HEATER INTEGRITY
OPTIMIZATION STRATEGIES
Each fired heater presents its own unique challenges to accurately
identify and maximize its remaining life. Due to specific operator
and individual asset requirements, a generic management model is
not an effective long-term solution. Quest Integrity provides a diverse
set of integrity optimization solutions to fit your needs, elevating your
integrity management strategies and extending the life of your assets.
Visit QuestIntegrity.com to learn more.
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VOLUME 27, ISSUE 5
industry news and events, and other valuable
resources. SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER 2021
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13 Using RBI for Piping
I nteg ri ped i a A Recap of the Spring 2021 “Meeting of the Minds”
A community-sourced encyclopedia of Asset Roundtable Discussion
Integrity Management terms and definitions. Jeremiah Wooten, Inspectioneering
We need your help continuing to expand our
library of terms. 15 Applying the PERI Model to Fixed Equipment
Mechanical Integrity
inspectioneering.com/topics
John Reynolds, Intertek AIM and Inspectioneering SME
The In sp ec t i o n e e r
A free weekly e-newsletter containing 20 Overcoming Pitfalls When Establishing an
featured content, news recaps, industry Effective RBI Program
updates, and upcoming events. Greg Alvarado, Chief Editor
inspectioneering.com/newsletters 23 Detecting and Quantifying External Fretting-Wear Damage

Johnny Weaver, Quest Integrity
Neither this publication nor any part of it may
be reproduced, stored in any retrieval system, or
27 Condition Monitoring Optimization: Going Beyond Traditional
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
CML Optimization
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise,
Dr. Andrew Waters, Pinnacle
without the prior permission of Inspectioneering,
Ryan Myers, Pinnacle
LLC. Inspectioneering Journal (ISSN 1082-6955)
is published bi-monthly, by Inspectioneering, LLC,
31 Corrosion Management System Implementation Using
701 Sawdust Road, Suite #4, The Woodlands, TX
77380 USA. Inspectioneering Journal is a registered
Corrosion Control Documents and Cost of Corrosion KPI
trademark of Inspectioneering, LLC. Dr. Abdulaziz Moshaweh, Saudi Aramco
Postmaster: Send address changes to 35 A New Era: Digitalized Field Reporting Rules the Day
Inspectioneering, LLC, 701 Sawdust Road, Suite #4, Ryan Streeter, MISTRAS Group
The Woodlands, TX 77380 USA.
38 How Digital Twin Improves Maintenance, Reliability, and Asset

Design and layout by Heather Cobb. Printed by
Integrity Management for Storage Tanks and Terminals
Thomas Printworks, 707 West Road, Houston, TX
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Copyright © 2021 Inspectioneering, LLC.

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Columns
04 Event Planner 12 Corporate Members List
06 News Briefing 41 Fitness-For-Service Forum
08 Contributing Authors 45 Damage Control
11 Editor's Note 53 Let's Be Frank
SEPTEMBER
SEPTEMBER
| OCTOBER
| OCTOBER 2021Inspectioneering
2021 InspectioneeringJournal
Journal 3
EVENT PLANNER OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG
2021 2022
Nov e m ber 20 2 1 Understanding the CCD/IOW Implementation Process

November 4, 2021 | Webinar
In this 1-hour webinar, Inspectioneering teams up with Equity Engineering to discuss the CCD/IOW
implementation process and how they support a strong mechanical integrity program.
NIA's Insulation Energy Appraisal Program (IEAP)

November 9-10, 2021 | Virtual Training
Insulation Energy Appraisal Program (IEAP) is a 2-day course that teaches participants how to determine
the optimal insulation thickness and corresponding energy and dollar savings for a project.
API Fall Refining and Equipment Standards Meeting

November 15-18, 2021 | Orlando, Florida, United States
The 2021 Fall Refining and Equipment Standards Meeting will bring together Inspectioneers from
across the oil and natural gas industry to discuss the contents of numerous API Standards, including all
Inspection and Materials/Corrosion Standards.
ASNT 2021: The Annual Conference

November 15-18, 2021 | Phoenix, Arizona, United States
ASNT 2021 is the place to interact with more than 2,500 NDT industry professionals and hear industry
experts present high-quality, innovative content.
NIA's Thermal Insulation Inspector Certification Course

November 30-December 3, 2021 | Houston, Texas, United States
NIA’s Thermal Insulation Inspector Certification is a 2-part, 4-day course to educate insulation
inspectors on how to evaluate installation work and determine whether it is compliant with
mechanical insulation specifications.
Dec e m be r 20 2 1 Robotics for Inspection & Maintenance

December 8-9, 2021 | Virtual Event
This 2-day virtual event brings together a combination of asset owners, robotics & UAS inspection
service providers, robotic maintenance providers, and other key stakeholders.
14th Annual National Aboveground Storage Tank Conference & Trade Show
December 1-2, 2021 | The Woodlands, Texas, United States
This 2-day conference & trade show is a great place for storage tank professionals to connect and learn
about new tank services, products, and technologies.
13th Chem, Petrochem, and Refinery Shutdowns and Turnarounds Conference

December 1-2, 2021 | Austin, Texas, United States
Attending this marcus evans conference will provide TAR professionals with lessons learned from their
peers to maintain and improve production across plants and companies even in the face of adversity.
Februa ry 20 2 2 2022 IPEIA Conference and Exhibition

February 28-March 3, 2022 | Jasper, Alberta, Canada
The 25th Annual International Pressure Equipment Integrity Association (IPEIA) Conference, held
Feb. 28-March 3, 2022 in Jasper, AB will attract 500+ industry professionals from around the globe.
M ar ch 20 2 2 ICPIIT Conference 2022

March 16-18, 2022 | Sugar Land, Texas, United States
ICPIIT is ASNT’s foremost conference dedicated to the chemical and petroleum industry and provides a
forum for the exchange of theoretical, practical, and scientific information.
For a full listing of upcoming events covering asset integrity issues, please visit inspectioneering.com/events.
4 Inspectioneering Journal SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER 2021

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integrated inspection, engineering and 3D asset analysis solution. Significantly reduce the time and
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NEWS BRIEFING
I ndust ry U.S. Department of Transportation Awards Nearly $100 Million in Grants to Support Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Efforts
CSB Held a Public Board Meeting on September 24, 2021 and Released Two Final Investigation Reports
Federal Energy Regulators Issue Standards Following Texas Freeze
U.S. Offshore Oil Output Lags as Louisiana Refiners Restart After Ida
Global NDT Services Market Poised to Reach $12.6 Billion by 2026
CSB Releases Animation Detailing the Events Leading to the Fatal Hydrogen Sulfide Release at the Aghorn
Waterflood Station in Odessa, Texas
Oper at o r s Refiner Eneos to Buy Japan Renewable Energy for $1.8B
Shell's Norco Louisiana Complex to Begin Post-Ida Restart
bp Investing $269 Million to Improve Efficiency, Reduce Emissions, and Expand Renewable Diesel Production
at Cherry Point Refinery
Tank Oil Spill at Marathon's Galveston Bay Refinery
TotalEnergies Feyzin, France Refinery Hit by Fire
Libyan Unity Government and National Oil Corp Plan to Build New Refinery
ExxonMobil Offers New Proposal to Locked-Out Beaumont Refinery Workers
6 Injured in Explosion at Lake Charles Petrochemical Complex
Shell Eyes Mid-October for Norco Refinery Restart After Ida
Hilcorp Evaluating Phillips 66 Alliance, Louisiana Refinery
Marathon Petroleum Reports Power Loss at Los Angeles Refinery Due to Earthquake
SABIC, ExxonMobil Petrochemical JV Begins Commissioning Activities in Texas
Shell to Build One of Europe’s Biggest Biofuels Facilities
P66 Alliance Refinery Faces Multi-Month Shutdown
LyondellBasell Weighing Options for 268,000 bpd Houston Refinery, Including Potential Sale
Enbridge Advances U.S. Gulf Coast Strategy with $3 Billion Acquisition of Moda Midstream
Huntsman Increases Polyurethane Catalyst and Specialty Amine Capacity at Petfurdo, Hungary Plant
Bunge, Chevron Announce Proposed JV to Create Renewable Fuel Feedstocks
Phillips 66 Puts Alliance Refinery Up for Sale
Serv i ce C om pa n i e s weavix™ Disrupts Industrial Communication Market: Introduces Converged Communications for
Industrial Field Workers
Antea Launches New Asset Integrity Management Software Version for Single-Site Operators
Stress Engineering Services Extends Reach with New Offices on U.S. East and West Coast
HUVR Releases Ultrasonic Testing Inspection Workflow Module
Inspectioneering Prepares 5,000 Meals to Help Feed Local Community

Estimate Remaining
Life & Manage Risk
Pressure, temperature, stress, corrosion... so many potential

risks, what could go wrong?
Over time, these risks may result in significant operational or maintenance

costs in process units.
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HTHA | Damage Mechanism Review | Fitness-for-Service | Pressure Relief Devices | Equity Engineering Practices
ANSWERS FOR TODAY. INSIGHTS FOR TOMORROW.
Sales@E2G.com // 216.283.9519 // www.E2G.com

CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS
Greg Alvarado
Greg Alvarado is a Principal with Pinnacle and is also the Founder and Chief Editor of
Inspectioneering Journal. He possesses over 40 years of experience in the chemical,
petrochemical, and oil and gas industries. His roles have included positions as an owner
operator, consultant, Chief Chemist, and Corrosion/Materials/NDE applications engineer. He
has specialized in risk-based inspection consulting training and project management since
1996. He is a 30-year member of the API Sub-Committee on Inspection, and a long-time
working member of the API RP 580 and API RP 581 task groups on Risk Based Inspection.
Floyd Baker
Floyd Baker is the Vice President for Antea USA. With over 39 years of experience, Floyd
provides valuable insight and perspective on the digital assets and industrial internet of
things. He is an Asset Integrity and Digital Strategies advisor in global communities. Prior
to joining Antea, Floyd served at senior levels for end-users of asset integrity management
platforms. He has also served about half of his career at executive levels as a strategist/
technology driver at companies providing AIM/RBI/Technology services.
Ryan Meyers
Ryan Myers, Product Manager at Pinnacle, oversees all new product development activities.
He leads multi-disciplinary technical teams across engineering, data science, and software
development fields to drive the creation of new products and services focused on increasing
customer value through transforming their reliability, integrity, and maintenance programs.
Ryan specializes in mechanical integrity and reliability engineering, project management,
operational excellence, digital transformation, and product management. Ryan also has
extensive experience both developing and applying decision analytics and mathematical
models to improve business performance. Ryan obtained his Bachelor of Science in
Mechanical Engineering with a minor in business from The University of Texas and is
also a certified Lean Six Sigma Black Belt.
Dr. Abdulaziz Moshaweh

Dr. Moshaweh currently works for Saudi Aramco as a corrosion engineer. He holds a PhD
in Electrochemistry and Corrosion from the University of Cambridge, and an MSc with
Distinction in Corrosion Control Engineering from the University of Manchester. He is a
Chartered Engineer from the UK Engineering Council and a certified Senior Corrosion
Technologist with NACE International. Before joining Saudi Aramco, he has worked for, as an
employee or as a contractor, ExxonMobil, Maersk Oil, Lloyd's Register, and Intertek-CAPCIS.
John Reynolds
John Reynolds is a Principal Consultant with Intertek Asset Integrity Management, Inc. Prior
to this he was a Master Engineering Consultant with Shell Oil's Westhollow Technology Center
in Houston. John joined Shell in 1968. Over the last 45 years he has held various engineering
and management positions in the United States and the Netherlands, within the refining
and chemical manufacturing fields, where he has primarily focused on mechanical integrity
issues. John is currently the master editor for several API Standards on Inspection and
remains active in both the API Inspection Subcommittee and the ASME Post-Construction
Committee. John is the past Chairman of the API Inspection Subcommittee, the API Task
Group on Inspection Codes, the API Task Group on NDE Technology, the API Task Group on
API 580 RBI, and the API User Group on Risk-Based Inspection.

Ryan Streeter
Ryan joined the oil and gas industry in 2008 and now acts as the Divisional Vice President of
Digital Operations for MISTRAS Group, responsible for driving the development and adoption
of digital technology throughout the MISTRAS organization and for its customers. During his
past 12 years in the oil and gas industry, as well as his prior 8 years in healthcare, Ryan has
subscribed to a customer-centric mentality, bridging the gap between the business and IT,
seeking opportunities to streamline and digitalize manual/paper-based work processes, and
collaborating with customers to leverage existing IDMS and CMMS systems or develop new
systems where appropriate.
Dr. Andrew Waters

Dr. Andrew Waters is Chief Data Scientist at Pinnacle, focusing on developing data-driven
algorithms to enhance a variety of reliability and maintenance applications. Dr. Waters also
specializes in utilizing machine learning methods to improve and augment human decision
making. He has utilized these skills across a diverse set of industries including finance,
communication systems, engineering, signal processing, optimizing student learning
outcomes, and hiring and recruitment programs. Dr. Waters holds a doctorate in Electrical
and Computer Engineering from Rice University and is the author of over 20 publications
in the areas of signal processing, machine learning, and Bayesian statistical methods. His
research interests include sparse signal recovery, natural language processing, convex
optimization, and non-parametric statistics.
Johnny Weaver
Johnny Weaver started his career with Quest Integrity in 2008 after serving 8 years in the
United States Navy as an Electronics Technician. Starting as a Field Technician, utilizing
the Furness Tube Inspections Service (FTIS), Johnny was promoted to Project Manager in
2009. With a focus on customer service, he inspected hundreds of fired heaters ensuring
the asset’s mechanical integrity. During this time, he was also instrumental in training future
Project Managers. In 2019 he was promoted to Process Service Line Manager where he
currently helps the company to meet their annual business plan as a liaison between the
Sales, Engineering, Quality, and Training departments as well as client Operations.
Jeremiah Wooten
Jeremiah Wooten joined Inspectioneering in 2012 after several years practicing O&G law in
Dallas, TX. He currently serves as Managing Partner and General Counsel for the company,
where his primary roles involve business development, corporate relations, and managing the
organization's legal department. Mr. Wooten holds a Bachelor of Arts and received his Juris
Doctor from the University of Oklahoma.
SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER 2021 Inspectioneering Journal 9

Of f i ce
EDITOR'S NOTE
Please address all correspondence to:
701 Sawdust Road, Suite #4
The Woodlands, Texas 77380 USA
Jo urna l S ta f f
Chief Editor
Gregory Alvarado Why We Do What We Do
VP and Technical Director Understanding what motivates us is often a key to our success and a driver to
Nick Schmoyer encourage and invigorate us, making what we do more gratifying. Some of us are
inspectors, some are engineers, some are NDE/NDT technicians, and the list goes on.
VP and General Counsel
We don't do what we do because we have nothing better to do. We don’t inspect or
Jeremiah Wooten
analyze equipment and create equipment strategies out of boredom. We do it to make
VP, Sales & Marketing the facilities we work in or support safer and more reliable. Why?
Christopher Levy
Hopefully none of you have lost family or friends to a chemical release that resulted
Corporate Accounts Lead in their death or injury. When that happens, our jobs begin to take on a stronger
Josh Means importance and the motivation to do the job well will increase dramatically. Doing our
jobs well, with the proper leadership, helps us contribute significantly to the reliability
Ed i t o ri a l B o a r d and profitability of our companies. When we realize that lives and livelihoods are
Senior Editor affected by the quality of our work, the importance of that should motivate us to take
John Reynolds our jobs all the more seriously.
So, what can we do as integrity and reliability professionals to improve the quality
Technical Editors
of life and safety for our friends, relatives, co-workers, and employers? Practices like
Mark Geisenhoff, Flint Hills Resources
improving our critical thinking skills (some schools actually offer courses on this
John Harville, Phillips 66
topic), having a strong work ethic (courses on ethics have been re-introduced in our
Art Jensen, PBF Energy
schools of higher learning), being conscientious, paying attention to details, always
Lynne Kaley, Pinnacle
being willing to learn no matter our age, having an attitude of continuous improvement,
David Moore, Becht being diligent, taking ownership of safety and reliability, having humility or a willingness
John Nyholt, BP (retired) to admit when we do not know something, having a strong professional network to
Dave Osage, Equity Engineering Group call upon when needed, having information sources where we can get the needed
Chad Patschke, Ethos MI Solutions expertise, and having a sense of accountability are just a few things that will provide
Shane Roysum, Yara a strong foundation to build a successful and gratifying career and legacy.
Clay White, Becht
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Using RBI for Piping
A Recap of the Spring 2021 “Meeting of the Minds”
Roundtable Discussion
Jeremiah Wooten, VP and General Counsel at Inspectioneering
Introduction
Earlier this year, Inspectioneering and PinnacleART co-hosted
our 7th bi-annual ‘Meeting of the Minds’ (MOTM) with a select
group of mechanical integrity (MI) experts from across indus-
try. This meeting was once again conducted virtually, hopefully
for the last time. Nonetheless, our panel of SMEs were excited
to gather for another engaging discussion. As with previous
meetings, participants come from various sectors of the indus-
try, including refining, petrochemicals, offshore production, and
chemical processing.
Previous MOTM Recaps have summarized some of the key
takeaways from our discussions over topics like emerging tech- the benefits include identifying specific damage mechanisms for
nologies, corrosion under insulation (CUI) programs, integrity each piping circuit and being able to really scrutinize the loca-
operating windows (IOWs), corrosion control documents (CCDs), tions where they are looking for them. “We’ve had several finds
risk-based inspection (RBI), and most recently, the effects of that weren’t originally detected until we actually went out there
the Covid-19 pandemic on mechanical integrity programs. This to look for them properly,” he said. But of course, this can be done
meeting was focused on piping RBI and the challenges operators with an effective damage mechanisms review, RBI or not. RBI has
are facing properly implementing it. Industry surveys attribute the promise of prioritization based on probability of failure com-
some of the biggest and most prevalent MI failures to piping. bined with criticality or consequence considerations. The struc-
What can we do to improve this performance? This brief recap tured process also forces us to think more critically and consider
of our MOTM discussion on RBI for piping might provide some things we may have discounted in the past. RBI also forces us to
helpful insight. think about confidence in finding the mechanisms of interest by
using properly weighted strategies.
This meeting was focused on piping Another participant is in the process of overhauling all of their
sites’ MI programs, including proper RBI implementation of pip-
RBI and the challenges operators ing. He admitted that they were just starting their RBI journey for
are facing properly implementing it. piping and that they’ve traditionally been rule-based. Regardless,
they were seeing good initial results. “We’re not necessarily using
Industry surveys attribute some of the RBI to identify damage mechanisms, but rather, using it to do
biggest and most prevalent MI failures exhaustive damage mechanism reviews and optimize our MI
program by optimizing condition monitoring locations (CMLs) at
to piping. the same time.
A participant with experience in both upstream and downstream
Piping Inspection Methodology O&G said for upstream/offshore, they were primarily rule-based;
This meeting kicked off with a discussion over what inspection but for downstream, they were using RBI. They had found that for
methodology(ies) the participants were using for their piping. piping, a lot of the CMLs they’d been doing for a long time weren’t
While most everyone is still using traditional time-based and con- really providing the value that they once thought. However, the
dition-based inspection strategies to manage piping integrity to a inspection plans generated through RBI were paying dividends.
degree, the conversation quickly shifted to who has implemented He said “some people may think RBI would lead to less time in the
or is trying to implement RBI for piping at their facilities. field, but for us, it led to more time in the field; which isn’t neces-
sarily a bad thing.” For them, “RBI has resulted in some significant
One participant from a major refiner said they were using RBI
finds because we are now looking in the right way, at the right
on piping at 3-4 of their sites, yet his other sites had only partially
spot, with the right amount of coverage.”
implemented it. The goal was for all of them to be on an RBI pro-
gram eventually though. He acknowledged that piping RBI is a One of the participants not using RBI for piping said they did an
little tougher than pressure vessels, but they were seeing bene- extensive RBI implementation in the late 90s/early 2000’s and it
fits to it so they were committed to seeing it through. Some of included piping. However, they dropped RBI pretty early on for

all of their piping across their plants because they didn’t believe One participant said they’ve “historically said let’s set up a special
that RBI could correctly model piping like they really needed it to. emphasis program, whether it’s dead legs, or touch points, etc.,
They had it modeled as one component per circuit, and found it but at the end of the day, you want a holistic program that catches
wasn’t really representative of what was going on in the circuit. all of those and considers the consequences that go with it.” He
Now, they invest a lot of time and money on piping inspection said putting that holistic approach together has been their biggest
and following up with RT and other techniques. They have also challenge. Piping integrity is definitely one of the most compli-
developed a statistical model to analyze data outside of traditional cated challenges the industry faces, especially in the more com-
thickness monitoring and use it to optimize their system. plex operating systems.
Another participant manages six sites with very different back- Value of Consequence Evaluation
grounds. Piping strategies at each site are somewhat different,
One person commented that he believed those that are really
but he hopes over time they will converge to something similar.
using RBI effectively on piping have a significant advantage
But in terms of RBI, pretty much all of their sites use some vari-
(“real value”) because of the evaluation of consequence, which
ation of RBI for damage mechanism reviews (DMRs), identify-
doesn’t come very well with time-based inspection and condi-
ing morphology, expected damage rates, etc. Then they compare
tion-based inspection. He claimed that sites that have effectively
that to historical circuit data. But he said most of their inspection
implemented RBI can substantially lengthen the majority of
scheduling is done per API 570 in 5/10 year default intervals.
their piping intervals, leaving them able to focus much more on
Challenges to Making RBI for Piping Work the remainder.
Everyone appeared to be in agreement that implementing an RBI Another participant agreed on the importance of evaluating
program for piping is more challenging than it is for pressure potential consequences of failure (CoF), sharing that he addressed
vessels. But what makes it so challenging? Here are some of the this very issue earlier that week with his team. “I encouraged
biggest challenges the participants are facing when it comes to more of my people to pay closer attention to the CoF side, because
successfully implementing RBI for piping. that’s where they can really gain some dividends and give some
of the low consequence stuff time off for good behavior,” he said.
One person, who acknowledged they were still in the implemen-
tation phase, said the challenge is really two-fold: A participant with a slightly different opinion stated that “a big
problem with CoF for piping is that piping systems can physically
1. Many of their plants just don’t have their piping properly
be very long, and while one section may be near a river, the rest
organized, meaning it hasn’t been properly systemized and
may be in a tank farm. So now it would need to be broken up into
circuitized yet.
different circuits.” They have tried to simplify the consequence
2. The other big challenge is more culture and training—there’s side just based on a default hole size, so now they just look at
still a lot of misperception that RBI is just a tool to extend internal pressure and the fluid properties to determine the CoF.
intervals. When RBI comes back with a bunch of inspections Regardless, he admitted it can become extremely challenging and
on the back end, people tend to start questioning its validity, that simplification can over-emphasize consequence for most
and quite frankly get defensive about the perceived lack of cases. “Trying to come up with accurate CoF for piping is compli-
faith in prior inspections. cated and extremely difficult,” he said.
One of the participants said the biggest limitation for them was Closing
that when they implemented RBI for piping, they treated it like a
In closing, most failures in the O&G and chemical processing
pressure vessel and had every circuit represented by one compo-
industries can be attributed to piping. It’s a complex asset that
nent (e.g., one corrosion rate, one thickness, etc.). After doing so,
requires a robust inspection and reliability strategy to manage
they found that model to be too simple for a complex piping sys-
properly. Effectively implementing RBI for piping continues to be
tem. However, he did admit that nowadays might be different with
a challenge for operating facilities around the world, but if done
all the data and computer processing we have available. Another
properly, it can pay dividends in the form of more effective and
participant was in full agreement, stating that “traditionally, a lot
efficient inspections, and more reliable operations.
of these RBI programs were standalone, so you had to feed them a
corrosion rate and other information from your IDMS. Whereas Inspectioneering and Pinnacle would like to thank all of the participants
now, they’re all embedded and we’ve got all of this information for joining in this discussion of these critical issues. We sincerely appreci-
at our disposal. There is now a lot more opportunity to get clever ate you dedicating your time to share your thoughts and experiences with
about how the logic works in these programs and actually make our community. n
some logic-based decisions, versus nominating some component
that might not actually represent the circuit.” For more information on this subject or the author, please email
us at inquiries@inspectioneering.com.
Another big issue brought up is that with piping, you have a lot of
internal and external damage mechanisms to consider. You can
apply a consequence to it, but making sure you catch all those
mechanisms and get them scheduled appropriately is challenging.

Applying the PERI Model to Fixed Equipment
Mechanical Integrity
John Reynolds, Principal Consultant at Intertek AIM and Inspectioneering SME
Introduction
This article is all about approaching Nirvana in Fixed Equipment
Mechanical Integrity (FEMI). What is Nirvana in FEMI? In my mind
it’s the idyllic place we would all like to be when it comes to inspec-
tion planning. It’s the time and place where inspection and repair
planning are as good as they can be and no more improvements
to the work processes are needed. The PERI model can help us get
there by achieving excellence in inspection planning.
Is your PERI work process as good as it can be? This article is
all about how to make continuous improvements in your FEMI
work process using the Plan-Execute-Review-Improve (PERI)
work process[1]. The PERI work process shown in Figure 1 is a
repetitive model for creating excellence in all our FEMI activities.
The PERI work process is similar to Deming’s PDCA work pro-
cess, which stands for Plan-Do-Check-Act, but the PERI model is
simpler and more oriented toward FEMI activities[2]. The PDCA
cycle, on the other hand, is much more encompassing and can
be confusing when applied to the FEMI work process because
of its wide range of applicability in total quality management of Figure 1. PERI Model.
business processes.
As Vince Lombardi (the first football Superbowl winning coach)
once said: “Perfection is not attainable, but if we chase perfection
we can catch excellence.” So if you would like to achieve excel- • We then realize we have no need to Improve (the “I” in PERI)
lence in your FEMI work process, read on. the plan or execution because we found nothing in our review
of our work process that could be improved.
What does “perfection” look like in the FEMI business? Here’s an
example using an inspection of a column/tower during a turn- If we did the four PERI steps as well as they could be performed,
around. In this example, perfection in our FEMI work process we have achieved perfection in our Inspection Planning work pro-
might mean that: cess for that column/tower. But as you know, it’s a rare case that
our planning and execution of the inspection plan are perfect. We
• We do a very thorough job at Planning (the “P” in PERI) the
could benefit by applying the PERI model if we did not achieve
inspection of a column during a turnaround at the lowest
excellence in our inspection plan and execution and issues were
reasonable time and cost using excellent records and the
found that were not adequately planned (i.e., surprises, discover-
guidance of a corrosion specialist to produce a detailed plan.
ies, differences from plan, etc.), or that the plan could be/should be
• We then implement that plan during the turnaround and carry improved. The next time we make an inspection of that same col-
out the detailed inspection. We Execute (the “E” in PERI) the umn, we could plan and execute it better than before—get “closer
plan exactly as documented and find out that the plan was to excellence by chasing perfection.” If we do it better next time by
perfect (i.e., everything we found in the thorough inspection implementing the PERI model we will achieve things like:
was exactly what was expected by the inspection planners). No
• Reducing the time and cost of planning and/or executing
adjustments to the plan were needed during the turnaround.
the inspection.
It was conducted within the time predicted and produced only
the repair recommendations expected and planned for. • Avoiding unexpected loss of containment or unscheduled
repairs, as well as unscheduled plant outages for making
• We then Review (the “R” in PERI) the execution of the plan to
unplanned repairs.
see if we can find ways to improve the column inspection that
was planned and implemented; but we find out that there were • Knowing exactly when the equipment will need to be replaced
no improvements needed because the planning and execution or repaired which allows for scheduled planning rather than
of the inspection were both perfect. emergency repairs/replacements.

• Achieving no unexpected turnaround delays, extension, or cost non-corrosive lube oil storage cylinder, but little else. On the
overruns due to inadequate inspection planning. other hand, that’s an example of the sort of vessel that risk-based
inspection (RBI) would find either little or no risk and would have
• Improving our FEMI record-keeping.
no inspection plan, or perhaps call for inspection once every 30
Wow! Who wouldn’t want that? But that’s just one example of years or so unless something changes.
applying the PERI work process to all sorts of our 101 essential
Additionally, the PERI model applies to any type of inspec-
FEMI activities[7]. There are dozens more examples besides the
tion planning whether we use time-based inspection (TBI)
planning of an internal inspection of a column/tower where
(e.g., every turnaround), condition-based inspection (CBI) (e.g.,
the PERI work process can help us improve our FEMI activities,
half-life scheduling), or RBI for inspection planning purposes
such as:
per API 580[3].
• other types of inspections (e.g., external, nondestructive exam-
ination (NDE), corrosion under insulation (CUI), etc.) Applying the PERI Model: Execution
As already mentioned, the second step in PERI is “E” which
• conducting repairs to any kind of equipment or piping
stands for the Execution process. Here again, this part of the PERI
• conducting any type of special emphasis inspection projects work process is what we have been doing in our plants for many
decades. The execution work process consists of following the
• preparing and updating a corrosion control document (CCD)
detailed plan while making the inspection. Clearly a very import-
• establishing and updating integrity operating windows (IOW) ant aspect of the execution process is that the field inspector
must be adequately trained, experienced, and certified to do what
• conducting QA/QC activities during maintenance or projects
is expected in following the plan and making adjustments as
• conducting FEMI audits necessary when the plan does not cover everything found during
the inspection.
• establishing and analyzing FEMI key performance
indicators (KPI) An important part of the execution process that is too often not
done well is the effort to note all damage issues that we find during
• conducting FEMI training programs
the inspection that were not included in the plan. As we all know,
• conducting leak and failure investigations the plan is rarely perfect, and we have to make adjustments as
we conduct the inspection. Those adjustments and surprise/new
Now let’s go through the four steps in the PERI model by con-
findings that were not included in the plan will be very import-
tinuing to use the example of an inspection of that same column/
ant to successfully conducting the Review and Improvement part
tower to explain the PERI work process in a bit more detail.
of the PERI work process. Hence, those involved in making the
Applying the PERI Model: Planning physical inspection need to understand their important role in
noting all issues they find, including what is not well covered in
As already mentioned, the first step in PERI is “P” which stands
the inspection plan.
for the Planning process. I can’t really add much more to that
work process than is already covered by Section 5 in both API
510 and 570. If we follow our codes for planning inspections,
Applying the PERI Model: Review
we should be able to do a very good job. In my numerous plant Now we come to the heart of the PERI work process, the part that
assessments/audits, the sites that do the best job at planning turn- can help us approach Nirvana in inspection planning. As previ-
around inspections not only provide all the necessary historic ously mentioned, the “R” in PERI stands for the Review process.
records and drawings to the inspector who will do the physical The Review and Improvement parts of the PERI model are key
inspection, but also provide a detailed checklist of what to look to making continuous improvements in inspection Planning and
for in each specific piece of equipment as well as a list of all the Execution parts of PERI. The Review step is the point in the PERI
specific spots that should be inspected with what NDE methods. work process where we assess the adequacy of inspection plan,
Those spots obviously include all areas where there have been find out how well the plan was executed, and then decide where
previous findings or damage mechanisms noted as well as previ- our opportunities are to improve (i.e., to make the inspection
ous repairs made, plus all the areas where the corrosion specialist plans better, more efficient, and more effective). In the military,
is concerned there may be credible damage mechanisms pres- this step is often called the “hot wash” process; in some compa-
ent. This latter part involving a review by a corrosion specialist nies it’s called the “look back” step. If we find a leak or failure
during the planning process is unfortunately not often included (during or before the inspection), it may involve a more thorough
in the planning process when it is needed, especially on higher investigation in accordance with the recommended practices
risk inspections. contained in API RP 585 to determine the root and contributing
causes of the failure[4].
The time for what I call open-clean-inspect (OCI) planning is
long gone, but I still see some sites telling maintenance or turn- If we found some surprises (aka discoveries) or can point to any
around planning to do this and there’s not much other than that other issues that were not predicted or adequately planned, those
in the non-specific plan. That might still apply to items like a need to be documented in as much detail as possible for analysis

during the Improvement part of the PERI work process. Such planning did not adequately cover all applicable and credible
issues (surprises, discoveries, inefficiencies, poor practices, inad- damage mechanisms in as much detail as needed for efficient
equate procedures, etc.) might include things like: and effective inspection planning, then improvements in the
CCD should be implemented[5].
• corrosion rate changes of components that are different from
those noted in previous records or forecasted to be current • If damage mechanisms other than general, relatively uniform
corrosion are expected, then more involvement of a corrosion
• new or different damage mechanisms noted during the
specialist may be needed to review the inspection plans.
inspection (e.g., cracking, pitting mechanical damage, erosion,
or any of the other 70 or so damage mechanisms covered in • If localized corrosion, cracking mechanisms, or metallurgical
API RP 571) deterioration are likely to occur, then involvement of an NDE
specialist may be needed to help select the most appropriate
• expansion or contraction of damage in areas that were found
combination of NDE techniques to detect, characterize, and
during previous inspections that were not forecasted in the
size the damage.
inspection plan
• If operating changes are likely to have caused a new damage
• deterioration of previous repairs that was not anticipated in
mechanism to come into play or existing damage mechanisms
the inspection plan
started to occur at an accelerated rate, IOWs may need to be
• configuration changes to piping circuits noticed during the reviewed to see if new ones need to be established or existing
inspection that were not part of the permanent records (i.e., ones need to be modified.
those found during inspection of the circuit that may not
• If RBI was used to plan the inspection, the RBI process should
have been properly authorized and recorded and therefore
be reviewed to determine if improvements need to be made to
were not included on P&IDs or piping isometric drawings)
better assess the probability portions of the risk assessment.
• inadequate planning for maintenance support to open
• If inadequate FEMI records did not allow adequate planning
and clean the equipment for inspection (e.g., extra cleaning
for the inspection, then record-keeping practices and proce-
was required after entry was attempted or NDE could not
dures probably need to be improved (e.g., the inspection discov-
be accomplished)
ers some repairs or modifications that were made previously,
• inadequate support from operations and/or process safety to but not well documented, in the FEMI records).
prep the equipment for entry or external inspection practices
• If documented inspection and FEMI procedures and practices
• inadequate coordination with NDE contractors to be fully used for the inspection work process were inadequate for the
prepared to efficiently and effectively conduct specified NDE type of inspections being performed, then improvement and
techniques in the time allotted training in those procedures/practices will be needed.
• inadequate support from process engineering to conduct their • If inadequate coordination with other stakeholders (e.g., opera-
required operability reviews of trays, distributors, and other tions, process engineering, maintenance, turnaround planning,
internal hardware that may not affect FEMI NDE contractors, etc.) led to inefficiencies or inadequate
practices, then review and improvement of the necessary
• documented inspection procedures and FEMI practices that
coordination are in order.
were inadequate to fully cover the types of issues found during
the inspection Applying the PERI Model with External
There are dozens of other reasons that you can probably think of Stakeholders
for why the planning and execution of inspections was not as effi- Although we Inspectioneers can handle most of the effort to
cient and effective as it could have been. apply the PERI model in order to approach FEMI Nirvana, it can also
be important to get some external stakeholders involved for their
Applying the PERI Model: Improvement suggestions and input on how we can improve our work process
And finally, we come to the biggest benefit of the PERI process. As with the PERI model.
previously mentioned, the “I” in PERI stands for the Improvement
External input can come from a variety of sources: turnaround
work process. This is where we analyze all the issues noted during
planners could certainly have input when it comes to plan-
the previously covered Review process and decide what specific
ning turnaround inspections; maintenance personnel need to
improvements we are going to make when we plan and conduct
be involved so that they fully understand the specific support
the next inspection so that it can be conducted more efficiently
needed to prepare for and facilitate the inspection; maintenance
and effectively. Continuing with the list of examples of inef-
staff could also have input when it comes to the interface between
ficiencies and ineffectiveness from the review process above,
inspection QA/QC and making the necessary repairs that have
we might make the following improvements to our inspection
been recommended; project staff could have input when it comes
planning process:
to planning and implementing QA/QC inspections for new and
• If the process unit CCD (per API RP 970) used for inspection replacement equipment scheduled during the turnaround;

operations, process engineering, and process safety need to fully
The PERI model can help us make significant improvements in
understand their roles and timing of their input so as not to
our inspection planning work process by focusing more atten-
impact the efficiency of the inspection process.
tion on the last two steps in the model: review and improvement.
Summary and Conclusions These last two steps are key to approaching FEMI Nirvana and
thereby achieving excellence in your FEMI work processes.
This article has demonstrated the application of the PERI model
to improve the inspection planning process for an internal inspec- PS. One side benefit of using the PERI model to approach Nirvana
tion of a column/tower. But it can/should be applied to most FEMI in FEMI is that your boss should notice your contribution to FEMI
activities that we are involved in, for example: and cost control and be extremely pleased with you. That can and
should pay great dividends. n
• deciding how to make necessary repairs and conducting
the appropriate QA/QC for those repairs For more information on this subject or the author, please email
• planning and conducting most special emphasis us at inquiries@inspectioneering.com.
inspection projects REFERENCES
• planning and conducting heat exchanger bundle inspections 1. Reynolds, John, July/August 2012, “The Role of Continuous Improvement
in Achieving Excellence in Pressure Equipment Integrity and Reliability,”
at the bundle pad
Inspectioneering Journal.
• planning and conducting CUI inspection projects 2. Gabor, A., 1990, The Man Who Discovered Quality, Penguin Books.
• investigating FEMI incidents and near-misses[4] 3. API, February 2016, Risk-Based Inspection, 3rd edition, API RP 580, American
Petroleum Industry, Washington DC.
• planning and conducting shop inspections and field QA/QC for 4. API, April 2021, Pressure Equipment Integrity Incident Investigations, 2nd
projects occurring in existing plants[6] edition, API RP 585, American Petroleum Industry, Washington DC.
5. API, December 2017, Corrosion Control Documents, API RP 970, American
• following up on and tracking completion of inspection repair
Petroleum Industry, Washington DC.
recommendations in the maintenance back log
6. API, July 2019, Source Inspection and Quality Surveillance of Fixed Equipment,
• improving welding QA/QC and/or installation of coating 1st edition, API RP 588, American Petroleum Industry, Washington DC.
systems to reduce reliability and integrity problems 7. Reynolds, John, 2015, 101 Essential Elements of a Pressure Equipment Integrity
Program, 2nd edition, Inspectioneering.
• most any other FEMI work process you are involved in that
needs improvement.
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Overcoming Pitfalls When Establishing an
Effective RBI Program
Greg Alvarado, Chief Editor
As a young boy, I remember an admonition from my parents: off-gas from the vapor space was displaced through blowdown
“Greg, learn from your mistakes so you don’t repeat them. Better lines made of austenitic stainless steel (SS). These SS lines, being
yet, learn from the mistakes of others when you can.” In this short made of austenite, were extremely susceptible to chloride SCC,
article I will share, from personal observations in the field, many especially as this facility was on the coast of a relatively small
factors and elements in establishing and running a successful island in the middle of a sea.
RBI program that come from experience. I hope to leave you with
The plant had implemented an RBI program a few years earlier.
some food for thought that can help you get additional value from
These lines eventually failed catastrophically due to chloride SCC
the RBI process and help you avoid costly pitfalls.
while pressurized and while the RBI program was up and run-
How often do we hear of hazardous releases and catastrophes in ning. Why and how?
our industry that indicate we are not learning from the past? I
For the RBI study/analysis, the operator had correctly entered the
remember a keynote presentation from John Reynolds at a recent
operating conditions for modeling the potential consequences
API Inspection Summit where he opined that, after almost 50
of failure for this piping. Why do I say correctly? Because this is
years of experience and countless MI program gap assessments
the most likely time of failure, i.e., when they are under operating
and audits, many of the incidents we experience in industry are
pressure; not when they are sitting there in their ambient condi-
from repetitive mistakes; we often do not learn from the past and
tion when not actively blowing down LNG off gas. It is during
make the same mistakes[1]. Unfortunately, it almost seems part of
operating time that they are under the greatest pressure and filled
the human condition, doesn’t it?
with a highly flammable gas. BUT, the temperature of the piping
So, we turn to new work practices, structure, procedures, pro- at this time is well below the temperature range where one would
grams, and technology in attempts to overcome improper, inef- expect susceptibility to chloride SCC due to the expanding gas. As
fective, bad and/or unprofitable habits, thoughts, and actions. I recall, the temperatures were below – 175°F, so they were correct
Carolyn Merritt, a past chairperson of the United States Chemical to use these conditions for COF modeling.
Safety Board, shared a phrase from a Booz, Allen Hamilton report
For much of the time this piping is not “working” or in-service.
on a couple of industry incidents related to observations about
It is sitting at ambient temperatures and pressures exposed to
a corporate attitude, behavior, or tendency: "a normalization of
chloride containing external atmosphere, which is perfect for ini-
deviance where risk levels gradually crept up due to evolving
tiating chloride SCC, and would later be exacerbated by thermal
operating conditions."
stresses due to temperature swings. Unfortunately, when per-
In this same report, attitudes and motivation played a large role forming their damage mechanisms review (DMR), they did not
in these failures. Just because it is a false alarm today doesn’t apply the susceptibility to SCC under ambient conditions. They
mean it won’t be a real alarm tomorrow. This is one of the reasons applied the temperature to blowdown conditions, or less than
that, when I am teaching my API RP 581 training course, I often -175°F. In this state no one expected susceptibility to SCC.
caution students not to make decisions they are not qualified to
When conducting an RBI study and DMR, one should consider all
make and not to place false trust in automated systems. Don’t put
conditions that the equipment is subject to, for both internal and
off important things thinking someone else will fix them later. If
external damage mechanisms. In this case the DMR should have
it isn’t working correctly, fix it! Don’t ignore it! The next person
also considered ambient conditions and entered a susceptibility
won’t be able to discern false alarms from real alarms.
to chloride SCC. API RP 580 says we must consider steady state,
What follows are a couple of examples I will offer RBI practi- cyclic conditions and the impacts of downtime, shutting down
tioners that will hopefully spur you on toward excellence in RBI and recommissioning, essentially all conditions the equipment
modeling. Remember that motive and attitude are huge in any- will “see,” and model the risks appropriately. In this case the oper-
thing in life. Are you doing it for the right reasons? Or are you ator did not follow these rules and suffered the consequences.
taking shortcuts that could lead to an unwanted outcome?
Example #2: The impact of bad data and an
Example #1: When modeling COF using opportunity to use RBI as part of the QA/QC
in-service conditions and POF using idle Process
conditions was the right thing to do There was a large tower that fell over due to an improper mate-
I recall performing a gap assessment of an RBI program at a large rial of construction being inserted at the bottom outlet nozzle
liquified natural gas (LNG) plant. The operator filled ocean-going during original installation. The tower was lined with SS as well
tankers used to transport LNG to overseas power plants, etc. The as the bottom outlet nozzle. Fifteen years or so before the failure

occurred, changes were made during installation to the original The operator decided to perform the DMR assuming worse case,
design in the field that were not documented. In fact, the folder i.e., carbon steel construction in this case. They applied corrosion
with the design information being used by inspection showed the rates as though made of carbon steel. Once the RBI analysis was
original design with no modifications. performed on the circuits and components, it was easy to identify
that the drivers of unacceptable risk were the corrosion rates due
The bottom outlet nozzle was cut off just above the flange, and
to high temperature sulfidation. Since all risks were not the same,
a carbon steel section of pipe was welded to the SS lined nozzle.
it was easy to differentiate priorities.
Since the equipment operated at elevated temperatures, every-
thing in the system was insulated. There was little chance that Final Thoughts
even a peek under the skirt of the tower would reveal the devia-
The situation should be thought through to the most proba-
tion from design. It was all covered up.
ble end state. Be realistic with yourself. Understand your own
The related piping was supposed to be made of a material with motives. Are they good? Motives drive us and should direct us.
good resistance to the primary damage mechanism of this tower Are we doing our best? One final admonition: don’t do RBI to save
and system. The resistant material was not plain carbon steel! money; do RBI to be better at recognizing risk drivers, at mea-
For many years the operator took thickness readings on the suring risk, and at managing risks (the savings will come, if and
equipment, including accessible piping, that were made of cor- when justified)! Identify those “snakes in the grass” that can jump
rosion-resistant materials thinking this was the worst case, but up and bite you. The venom can be fatal. Use RBI to find those
having no idea that the short piece of plain carbon steel had been areas of vulnerability that can hurt people and your business. Use
inserted just below the bottom outlet nozzle. It should also be it to spot trends, both good and bad, which some call benchmark-
noted that, during the time leading up to the bottom outlet noz- ing. Then manage them appropriately! n
zle failure, other pieces of piping in the system for some reason
had been inadvertently replaced with carbon steel instead of the For more information on this subject or the author, please email
corrosion-resistant material. Some of these sections had failed, us at inquiries@inspectioneering.com.
but not catastrophically. Keep in mind that the whole system REFERENCES
was insulated. 1. Mountains We Have Climbed – Mountains We Still Need to Climb (https://
inspectioneering.com/videos/2020-04-27/8878/mountains-we-have-climbed-
As you might imagine, the day came that the carbon steel section
mountains-we-still-need-to-climb)
inside the skirt failed. This caused a fire that softened the skirt
and so on.
There are a few lessons to be learned here, but I want to offer
something for RBI practitioners to think about: how could RBI
have been used (almost like prioritizing a retro-PMI or other type
of retro program) to find these types of “snakes lurking in the
grass?” In this particular case, what if the operator had paid atten-
tion to previous issues that hinted there could be some instances
where piping was replaced with carbon steel instead of the more
corrosion-resistant steel? I would like to propose a possible way
to avoid such issues when they must be attacked after the fact. Of
course, a better solution would have been using proper materials
and documentation, but that did not happen. This is not always
the case, and it is one reason why so many organizations have
implemented a retro-PMI program. So how can we use RBI to
address such real concerns?
One could perform damage mechanisms reviews for such initia-
tives, assuming worse case scenarios. For example, lets imagine
the operator in this example had performed a DMR assuming
plain carbon steel construction as the worst case scenario. If the
system had been properly corrosion circuitized, including the
tower, each component could have been risk analyzed. This would
have provided justification for proper assessment and prioritiza-
tion of all components.
This reminds me of another similar case where RBI was imple-
mented on a crude unit in a refinery many years ago. They did a
very poor job of documenting materials of construction. It was
obvious a retro-PMI program was needed. But where to start?

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Detecting and Quantifying External Fretting-
Wear Damage
Johnny Weaver, Process Service Line Manager at Quest Integrity
Introduction
Fretting is a damage mechanism mentioned in API RP 571. It hap-
pens relatively frequently in fired heater coils where an external
component in physical contact with the tubes, such as a support or
hanger, vibrates during operation. This and other common dam-
age mechanisms are shown in Figure 1. The presence of unsta-
ble fluid flow, such as fluid hammer or dual phase flow in any
piping system potentially causes a flow-induced vibration (FIV).
The magnitude of vibration often fluctuates with feed flow rates
to the tube coils. This flow-induced vibration causes the com-
ponent to rub against the external pipe surface, cutting a sharp
Figure 1. Common Heater Coil Damage Mechanisms.
trench, and causing localized stress concentration and external
wall loss over time that might significantly reduce the tube life
and increase the probability of premature failure. Without the
use of proper inspection technology, detecting and quantifying
these anomalies can be somewhat like finding a needle in a hay-
stack. This is often because a hanger or other support component
can hide the damage during visual inspections. The only way this
damage would be visually detected or quantified is if an inspector
lifted every single pin and moved every corresponding hanger to
gain access to the contact area.
Visually inspecting each point of tube-support contact would
result in a time-intensive project that would seem to be unend-
ing in a facility’s comprehensive maintenance plan. However,
because mechanical fretting wear is not linear and can accelerate
over time due to changing environmental conditions, this dam-
age mechanism is extremely important to detect and quantify
before an unexpected failure occurs.
Identifying Small Damage Mechanisms

Smart (or intelligent) pigging technology uses immersion-based
ultrasonic testing (UT) to reliably and repeatedly measure a pipe’s
wall thickness and radius to detect damage mechanisms seen in Figure 2. Four-Inch Tool Technology Comparison Table.
fired heater and boiler coils. It allows the inspection to be carried
out in both the convection section and radiant sections without mechanisms, such as external fretting. It is important to confirm
the need to access the furnace box. During a typical operation, the the desired level of resolution when selecting the inspection tool.
intelligent pig is transported through the interior of the serpen-
tine piping coil via a column of water which provides propulsion Comprehensive Analysis
and coupling for the ultrasonic transducers. Unlike typical NDT A holistic approach to inspection is essential to an effective under-
inspection methods, advanced UT-based pigging technology can standing of fretting degradation.
provide a comprehensive assessment of both the internal and
API 530, Calculation of Heater-tube Thickness in Petroleum Refineries,
external condition of a coil.
is a design standard, written, and published by the American
Such inspection tools may utilize a high number of ultrasonic Petroleum Institute (API). Amongst other things, it is used to
transducers with small transducer sizes to provide the best establish recommendations and requirements for the procedures
ultrasonic surface coverage and resolution for the detection used for calculating the required wall thickness of new tubes and
of localized metal loss. A high-resolution inspection tool with associated component fittings for petroleum-refinery heaters and
100% circumferential and axial coverage (Figure 2) provides the determining design criteria for the same. While the calculations
best detection capabilities to quantify smaller, localized damage are not intended to be used for the design or inspection of external

piping, nor does it specify recommendations or requirements for Additionally, many intelligent pigging tools can detect deforma-
tube retirement thickness, access to these original calculations tions (e.g., creep, bulging, ovality, denting) that may exist in a coil,
are helpful in establishing a baseline knowledge source. using the associated inner radius readings.
Practices related to detecting and reporting external fretting can
be implemented as part of a facility’s integrity management pro-
Case Study 1: Failed Fired Heater Inspection
gram and processes. This can be carried out working in conjunc- Rectified
tion with smart pigging technology and data analysis expertise. Problem
A refinery in the United Kingdom needed three fired heaters
Initially identifying the locations of the tube sheets or supports
inspected, one of which was a re-inspection of a heater that pre-
(convection section) and pipe hangers (radiant section) through
viously caught fire shortly after it was inspected using smart pig-
manufacturing drawings help pinpoint potential areas of con-
ging technology. Further investigation into the fire revealed a loss
cern. Any past issues with the heater, especially resonant vibra-
of containment at an area of external tube fretting that was not
tion based, should also be noted. The standardization process
reported at the time of the inspection.
should also include regularly logging external wall loss, pitting,
or other damage in addition to internal and external fouling to aid Execution
in identifying degradation patterns. Another smart pigging company was hired to perform a re-in-
spection on the heater that caught fire along with an inspection
Only qualified field crews that have an in-depth understanding
of the other two heaters. To kick off the pre-job planning phase,
of advanced UT-based pigging technology should collect and ana-
the pigging inspection team reviewed the manufacturer’s draw-
lyze the data. The data produced may include both visual (quali-
ings of the asset and performed a pre-job questionnaire to assess
tative) and quantitative results for rapid onsite review. Inspection
all technical details. A considerable amount of due diligence
results can be produced in tabular and both 2D and 3D graphical
was conducted on the front end of the project, providing the
formats. It is extremely helpful when return bends are identified
inspection team with as much initial information as possible. An
and the coil is broken down into segments allowing flaw loca-
operations review form was also produced to serve as a living doc-
tions to be accurately identified.
ument to record all findings during the current inspection and to
Data analysis software used by some smart pigging companies be utilized to record important details after each inspection over
enables inspectors to view and assess the condition of coils using the asset’s lifetime.
views similar to the 2D coil layout graphic in Figure 3. The coil is
After the pre-job planning, the field data collection phase of the
presented in a rolled-out and flattened format which provides a
project took place. A high-resolution ultrasonic inspection tool
360° view of the pipe’s circumference. This ensures that no flaws
was utilized to inspect the fired heaters. Since the location of
are left undetected. In the Figure 3 plot, it is quite easy to identify
the tube hangers was established during the planning phase,
an entire portion of the furnace coil which is experiencing wall
extra attention was given during data collection on these areas.
thickness loss.
Multiple high density ultrasonic data sets were acquired for each
A 2D coil layout view also allows data analysts to zoom in on of the coils (passes) including the hanger locations.
specific flaws to identify and quantify small damage mecha-
Given the typical size and morphology of fretting, only a small
nisms, including external fretting-wear damage, that can be reli-
number of individual valid ultrasonic readings are typically
ably detected utilizing high resolution intelligent pigging tools
obtainable. Therefore, having a technology that provides the
and software.
highest surface resolution and best coverage, and knowing
Figure 3. 2D Coil Layout. Figure 4. External Fretting Detection Test Area.

Figure 5. Radiant Pipe 25 External Figure 6. Radiant Pipe 24 External Figure 7. Radiant Pipe 21 External
Fretting Fretting Fretting with Possible
Lower Readings
Figure 8. Radiant Pipe 2 External Figure 9. Radiant Pipe 1 External

Fretting Fretting
Figure 10. Report Results.

Figure 12. Radiant pipe 21 external fretting.
Case Study 2: Missing Manufacturer Asset

Drawing Issue Overcome
Problem
A routine multi-heater inspection at a refinery in the Netherlands
was underway. However, the owner/operator was lacking proper
manufacturer’s drawings on one of the heaters. The tube support
and pipe hanger locations were unknown, adding a level of com-
plexity to identifying potential fretting problem areas.
Figure 11. External fretting detected in Execution
radiant pipe 21.
During the inspection, an acute area of localized external wall loss
was identified and quantified.
where the pipe hangers are located are essential to the detection,
Outcome
qualification, and quantification of fretting.
The large quantity of ultrasonic transducers providing circumfer-
Once the data collection phase was completed, the data was ential coverage along with the proper tool speed for axial coverage
analyzed, and a preliminary field report was produced. identified a flaw measuring 0.800 in. (20.32 mm) long by 0.300 in.
(7.62 mm) wide (Figures 11, 12). Initially the flaw was classified as
Outcome
localized external metal loss (EML), but following visual inspec-
The inspection results revealed over forty areas of external fret-
tion confirmation, it was reclassified as fretting (FRT) in the
ting where the wall thicknesses were quantified and reported. A
final report.
portion of those results are shown in Figure 10. Two areas with
weld overlays from previous fretting repairs were also detected Utilizing an inspection tool with lower resolution (Figure 2) may
and reported. not have detected the flaw (Figures 11, 12). Choosing an experi-
enced company with qualified NDE technicians armed with the
In addition, numerous other areas were detected where exter-
knowledge, skill set, and high-density smart pigging tools can
nal fretting was quantified with possible lower wall thickness
make a significant difference in producing accurate and quantifi-
readings. It was recommended to perform a visual inspection at
able inspection results.
those hanger locations. In some cases, valid ultrasonic readings
were not obtainable due to the sharp geometry of the external Conclusion
fretting (results in off-angle reflections), but all flawed areas
As shown with the two case studies, having a holistic approach
were identified.
along with the right technology and experience is essential to
These findings were in stark contrast to the previous inspection identifying smaller damage mechanisms like fretting. If an
findings, which did not detect and quantify any external fretting inspection system cannot provide complete and comprehensive
or even identify fretting-like indications at the hanger locations. inspection data, assets are left at risk. Having an understanding
As a test of field personnel and the high-density UT tool detec- of a technology’s capabilities and limitations is crucial for ensur-
tion capabilities, the inspection team at the refinery epoxied over ing asset integrity. The best means to enable the safe and reliable
the leaked section of the tube and left it inside the heater. The operation of assets is to verify that the technology and experience
area, which can be seen in Figure 4, was properly detected and exist to accurately detect, identify, and quantify flaws and dam-
reported during the inspection. age prior to them finding you. n
Figures 5-9 are additional examples of external fretting detected For more information on this subject or the author, please email
during the inspection. us at inquiries@inspectioneering.com.

Condition Monitoring Optimization: Going
Beyond Traditional CML Optimization
Dr. Andrew Waters, Chief Data Scientist at Pinnacle
Ryan Myers, Product Manager at Pinnacle
Introduction 2. Provide a description of potential methodologies for perform-

The goal of inspection is to accurately assess the condition of ing condition monitoring optimization
an asset and to reduce the current and future uncertainty of the
3. Demonstrate the validity of the approach using a real-world
damage state that can occur from corrosion. An accurate condi-
case study
tion assessment provides the information required to calculate an
asset’s probability of failure and define future inspection require- In our second article, we will explore additional complex scenar-
ments. Current inspection programs rely heavily on inspection ios including limited inspection history, inadequate CML place-
data from condition monitoring locations (CMLs); however, ment, and poorly chosen inspection techniques.
many facilities struggle to properly place the correct number of
CMLs and struggle to optimize CML inspection activities based Probabilistic Models for CML Remaining
on their assets’ damage rate and risk. Useful Life
To perform reliable condition monitoring optimization, we must
Traditional CML optimization programs are often used to deter-
first have a model that describes the likelihood that a given CML
mine the minimum number of CMLs needed to accurately moni-
will fail with respect to time. While a variety of models can be
tor active damage mechanisms and identify susceptibilities prior
used to achieve this goal, we will highlight one probabilistic
to an asset failure. These optimization programs are typically con-
model that combines historical inspection data along with sub-
cerned with eliminating CMLs by intelligently defining inspec-
ject matter expertise—the Lifetime Variability Curve (LVC).
tion scope, techniques, and intervals that prevent unexpected
The LVC determines the probability of failure for a given failure
failures. The desired result is the identification of inspection
mode, and unlike other common industry approaches, it takes
program deficiencies and specific changes required to effectively
into account the degradation rate and the uncertainty in the data
assess risk with confidence.
which can affect future expectations. The LVC inputs include
This article describes condition monitoring optimization as a historical inspection data, how the asset’s data is changing over
data-driven methodology by which inspection scope, techniques, time, the uncertainty associated with each thickness reading,
and intervals are intelligently determined and dynamically prior knowledge from subject matter expert (SME)-based or mod-
updated to maximize reliability and return on investment (ROI) eled degradation rates, and how operating conditions may vary
as new information becomes available. Using this methodology, over time.
data collected through inspection is used to improve confidence
When applied to thickness data, the LVC produces a probabilis-
in the asset damage state and to determine situations in which
tic estimate of the thickness of a CML at any point in time. The
additional data is required, inspection adds little or no value, or
model also projects a range of potential failure dates for the given
corrective maintenance is the appropriate action.
CML, which enables us to achieve a probability distribution for
Condition Monitoring Optimization the remaining useful life of the asset under consideration for the
given CML.
Condition monitoring optimization goes beyond traditional CML
optimization, which is often limited in the breadth of analysis, or While a full technical description of the LVC model is beyond the
can overemphasize a subset of the overall objective. For example, scope of this article, the model adjusts its prediction based on
facilities may focus solely on the elimination of CMLs, simply new data and prioritizes trends in later data over trends in ear-
select effective inspection techniques, or just quantify the dam- lier historical data. Additionally, when the model does not have
age state of the asset within a specified level of uncertainty. Not a large amount of inspection data, it will naturally rely more on
only is CML optimization inconsistently defined and applied SME input. As more data is acquired, the model will put greater
throughout the industry, but most efforts also do not consider the emphasis on the inspection data, especially in cases where the
ramifications of major changes in the context of neither entire inspection data clearly presents trends that are at odds with the
mechanical integrity (MI) and risk-based inspection (RBI) pro- preconceived expectations of the SME.
grams nor their impact on overall facility reliability performance.
Figure 1 is an example of an LVC. The first plot on the left dis-
This article is the first of a two-part series on condition monitor- plays a single data point. In this case, the model relies heavily on
ing optimization. In this article, we will: the SME’s prior expectations, and estimates that the CML will fail
sometime between 2023 and 2042. In the second plot, additional
1. Review probabilistic models for determining the end of useful
inspection data has been collected and reveals a consistent trend;
life for individuals CMLs
however, this trend is at odds with the SME’s more pessimistic

Figure 1. Probabilistic model for predicting failure at the CML level. Left: A single data point. Middle: The model
updates its predictions after receiving two additional data points. Right: The model again updates with
five data points showing an acceleration in degradation.
expectation of degradation. The result is a wider range of uncer- asset and, therefore, are the only ones in need of immediate mon-
tainty regarding the ultimate failure date of the CML. In the right itoring. These CMLs contribute most heavily to the overall dam-
plot, two additional data points have been collected and show an age state of the asset and, therefore, the risk. Additionally, this
acceleration in the overall rate of degradation. The model now approach can be utilized in the scenario where inspection costs
predicts a much tighter interval for the failure date of the CML, may vary across CMLs (e.g., where scaffolding must be erected
ultimately matching closely with the SME’s original projections. in order to access certain portions of the CML population). This
method identifies the driving CMLs while optimizing the overall
From Probabilistic Models to Optimized inspection cost.
Inspection Plans
The LVC model provides the probability distribution that each
Given historical inspection data, the LVC model estimates a
CML will fail on or before some point in time. From the set of LVC
probability distribution of likely failure dates for every CML in
models, we calculate the probability that each CML will fail before
the population. As discussed earlier, we will proceed under the
all other CMLs in the population. Typically, a small number of
assumption that CML placement and the accompanying inspec-
CMLs have a reasonable probability of failing first, meaning that
tion technologies are sufficient in effectively detecting and quan-
other CMLs can be deprioritized in the current inspection. By
tifying the damage occurring on a given asset. We make this
assuming a confidence that defines the required level of certainty,
assumption simply to allow for an introduction to the general
the set of identified CMLs contains the first-to-fail CML on the
methodology and will relax this assumption in our second article.
asset. The required confidence level is determined in a variety of
Our objective is to identify the set of CMLs that require moni- ways, including examination of consequence of failure and the
toring at the present time. Note that this objective differs from definition of an acceptable risk threshold. If we incorporate addi-
traditional CML optimization, which is typically concerned with tional information regarding the cost to inspect each CML, this
eliminating CMLs entirely from the population. Rather than elim- formulation will find the set of CMLs that meet the required con-
inating CMLs, our objective is to prioritize CMLs for inspection fidence level at the optimized possible cost.
based on the value that each CML provides for characterizing the
Consider a real-world example involving a piping circuit consist-
damage state of the asset under consideration. Note that the set
ing of 235 CMLs. Roughly 90% of the CMLs have an estimated
of CMLs selected for monitoring can change over time as new
average cost of $100 to inspect. Other CMLs in the population
inspection data is collected.
require the construction of scaffolding to access and, in this case,
Next, we’ll describe two methods for prioritizing CMLs for have an estimated average cost of $1,000 to inspect. We first run
inspection. Each method is based on a different optimization the LVC model on each CML. Below, we show the overall deg-
strategy. The first method aims to identify the set of CMLs that radation of the individual CMLs as a density plot along with an
are most likely to drive the failure of an asset. The second method example LVC of a high risk and low risk CML. Note that the vast
is related but aims to select CMLs with risks that exceed some majority of CMLs show very low degradation rates with some
specified threshold on or before a selected future date. Naturally, outliers showing very high degradation rates. These higher deg-
other methods beyond those presented here could be utilized radation CMLs are critical to monitor since they are more likely
depending on specific objectives and reliability strategies. to drive failure.
Method 1: Effectively Quantify Damage State at Lowest We then perform our optimization analysis over a range of confi-
Possible Cost dence levels. We present these results below in terms of the over-
In this method, we are interested only in identifying the CMLs all cost of the inspection as well as the number of CMLs inspected
that are most likely to be the first to fail on a given asset. The ratio- for each confidence level. For the case of 0.95 confidence, the
nale for this mindset is that this subset of CMLs is the only group inspection cost is $3,900 for 21 CMLs compared to a cost of $41,500
strongly contributing to the overall probability of failure of the for inspection of all 235 CMLs.

of $100,000. This necessitates a probability of failure threshold of
0.05 for each CML in the population. Under these constraints, we
find that 44 CMLs of the total 235 are required for inspection, at a
total cost of $7,100.
Conclusion
We presented a new vision for condition monitoring optimiza-
tion based on selecting a set of CMLs for inspection formulated
by specific criteria and explained two methods for performing
this optimization. First, we proposed selecting a set of CMLs that
have a high probability of driving failure on an asset. This method
enables the quantification of the damage state of an asset, result-
ing in effective risk management at an optimized cost. Second, we
proposed selecting all CMLs that violate a risk-based threshold.
We demonstrated both approaches with real industry data and
showed that we can optimize the cost of an inspection with the
egradation rates for each CML for the circuit under consideration. defined impact on overall risk.
Figure 2. D
Most CMLs are decaying very slowly over time with a few outliers
with higher degradation rates. The case presented results of an inspection cost reduction.
Naturally, the outcome of the analysis will vary on a case-by-case
basis. In some cases, coverage may need to be increased or more
advanced, and more costly inspection techniques need to be uti-
lized to effectively manage risk.
We assumed throughout this article that the current CMLs avail-
able for optimization provided adequate coverage for the assets
under consideration to effectively illustrate the concept. While
this assumption was true for the case that we examined, it will
not be an accurate assumption in other situations where either
CML placement, coverage, or inspection technologies are not well
calibrated for the types of damage that may be encountered. This
type of scenario will be the focus of the next article in this series.
The methodology presented in this article illustrates how data
analytics can help facilities improve their inspection programs,
and ultimately, empower facilities to make better reliabil-
Figure 3. Quantifying damage state at the lowest possible cost. With 95%
ity decisions that will help them effectively manage risk and
confidence, we have selected the CMLs that will be first-to-fail in
the population. This requires sampling only 21 of 235 CMLs, while overall costs. n
reducing the inspection cost by 90%.
For more information on this subject or the author, please email
Method 2: CMLs Exceeding Risk Threshold by Target

Date
As an alternative to identifying the set of driving CMLs, we can
also use the LVC to calculate the probability of failure for each
CML on or before some target date, such as the date of a future
turnaround when a facility can easily engage in inspection and
maintenance activities. Combined with consequence of failure
data for each CML, we can further formulate this problem as
identifying any CML whose risk exceeds some desired threshold
on or before the target date.
Using the real-world data introduced earlier, we now solve the
condition monitoring optimization problem using the risk-based
approach. We consider a target date of June 2027, which equates to
two turnarounds out for the unit. The consequence of failure for
the piping circuit is estimated at $2,000,000 with a risk threshold

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Corrosion Management System
Implementation Using Corrosion Control
Documents and Cost of Corrosion KPI
Dr. Abdulaziz Moshaweh, Corrosion Engineer at Saudi Aramco
Introduction
In this article, a new approach to implement an innovative cor-
rosion management system at a facility will be discussed. The
approach uses commonly developed documents in most facilities
as part of their corrosion control practice. The main advantage of
this approach is that it requires focused, important information
to establish an effective corrosion management system from the
start. However, this approach should not be considered a replace-
ment to a full-fledged corrosion management system, but rather
a more effective way of starting to implement one.
Asset Management
The concept of asset management is not new. It emerged into
public use around 40 years ago[1]. ISO 55000 defines asset man-
agement as “the coordinated activity of an organization to real-
ize value from assets"[2]. Realization of value entails looking into
costs associated with these assets. ISO 55001 sets seven different
requirements for an asset management system[3]:
1. Understanding the context of the organization
2. Leadership: management commitment, policy, and roles
and responsibilities Figure 1. Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA), or Deming Cycle.[4]
3. Planning: actions and objectives

4. Support: resources, competencies, awareness, communication,
and information 2001/044, “Review of corrosion management for offshore oil and
gas processing,” by the UK Health and Safety Executive[5]. This doc-
5. Operation: planning and control, management of change,
ument was later updated and published by the Energy Institute
and outsourcing
in 2006. The second edition was published in March 2019. The
6. Performance Evaluation: monitoring, auditing, and review latest edition adopts the ISO 55001 Plan-Do-Check-Act approach
to the management systems. However, the real “boost” to corro-
7. Improvement: corrections, prevention, and continual
sion management systems came from the NACE IMPACT study
improvement
in 2016 that clearly states “to achieve the full extent of potential
The standard adopts the Deming approach–Plan-Do-Check-Act savings, it is the conclusion of this study that implementing a
(PDCA) for building a management system as shown in Figure 1[4]. Corrosion Management System (CMS) and its integration into an
However, any approach can be used as mentioned in the standard organization’s overall management system is mandatory”[6]. The
introduction: “The order in which the requirements are presented study defines CMS as “a set of policies, processes, and procedures
in this International Standard does not reflect their importance for planning, executing, and continually improving the ability of
or imply the order in which they are to be implemented"[3]. Thus, an organization to manage the threat of corrosion for existing and
any approach that will help in building a robust management sys- future assets.” The document outlines the relationship between
tem is acceptable. It should be noted that complying to ISO 55001 the corrosion management system and the overall organization
is the bare minimum and does not address all aspects that have management system. It also describes the corrosion management
major impact on asset management objectives[1,2]. system elements of:
Corrosion Management System a) Policy, Strategy, and Objectives

One of the first documents that addressed the corrosion man- b) Enablers, Controls, and Measures
agement system (CMS) was the Offshore Technology Report

The first part can be considered management-specific, while the Composite Cost of Corrosion KPI (3Cs)
second is made up of corrosion-specific elements. This was fur- A previous publication proposed a composite, weighted average
ther detailed and explained in NACE SP21430-2019 which aligns KPI to study the performance of both existing and newly deployed
the corrosion management system elements with the ISO 55001 corrosion control activities and programs for an operating facil-
asset management system[7]. The requirements are as follows: ity[9]. Several facilities started using the KPI after customizing its
metrics to meet their needs. To achieve this, the corrosion costing
a) Policy and Strategy
methodologies given in the IMPACT study were further divided
b) Planning into preventive, corrective, reactive and proactive cost elements[9].
It should be noted that such division will not affect the total cost
c) Organization of the CMS
and any corrosion control activity will be captured only once in
d) Operational Support the cost of corrosion model. The most recent form of the KPI for
one of the facilities, which is being considered in this study, is as
e) Management of Change
follows:
f) Performance Evaluation
3Cs Indicator = A * Indirect Cost Metric + B * Number
g) Continuous Improvement of Pinhole Leaks Metric + C * Corrective to Preventive
Cost (CPI) Metric + D * Proactivity Metric + E *
However, building such a CMS is laborious and time consum-
Innovative Solutions Metric where A, B, C, D, and E are
ing that not every facility can afford to allocate towards manag-
the weighted-average percentages.
ing corrosion issues. Such management systems also tend to be
expensive because CMSs are usually developed by third party • I ndirect Cost Metric: a metric to measure the reduction or
contractors. Given these two major constraints, time and cost, a increase in indirect cost incurred on a yearly basis. Target is a
simpler approach is needed to start building a CMS. Since one of reduction in cost on a yearly basis.
the requirements for the CMS Performance Evaluation element
• Number of Pinhole Leaks Metric: a metric to measure the
is to report the performance of the CMS financially, cost studies
reduction or increase in pinhole leaks recorded on a yearly
can be used to “jump start” the CMS development. In this arti-
basis. Target is a reduction in the number of pinhole leaks on a
cle, we will describe a new approach to building a CMS based on
yearly basis.
financial tools and corrosion model/KPI costs, in addition to the
main deliverable of any corrosion management program: corro- • CPI Metric: a metric to measure the ratio between corrective
sion control documents (CCDs)[8,9]. costs to preventive costs—“ideal” target is corrective costs /
protective costs < 1
Developing Corrosion Control Documents
• Proactivity Metric: a metric used to calculate the cost of
The first step is to develop robust and comprehensive CCDs, as
facility-wide programs that are used to inspect, detect, mon-
they are an essential part of any mechanical integrity program. A
itor and/or control corrosion in the facility before any failure
CCD is the first document that an engineer should look at when
occurs compared to the total cost of corrosion (Preventive Cost
planning any activity on an asset. Well-developed CCDs are his-
+ Corrective Cost). If failure occurs before starting the program,
torical records that summarize all information related to the asset
then it is not considered as proactive, but a reactive program.
and they define the dominant damage mechanisms. This is par-
ticularly important for an aging facility where most of the docu- • Innovative Solutions Metric: a metric to measure how
ment might be missing and/or not digitized. innovative the facility is in tackling corrosion challenges.
This might be in inspection, detection, monitoring and/or
After developing the CCDs, the documents should then be
controlling corrosion.
reviewed by all stakeholders and issued as corporate reports. The
focus now shifts to developing a cost of corrosion model. Using Cost of Corrosion Model and KPI for
Corrosion Management—An Example
Cost of Corrosion Model
What follows is an example for a facility that used cost of cor-
The International Measures of Prevention, Application, and
rosion as a basis for their corrosion management strategy (the
Economics of Corrosion Technologies (IMPACT) study estimated
corrosion-specific elements). The facility under consideration
the global cost of corrosion as $2.5 trillion and 3.4% of global GDP[6].
is an aging oil and gas facility with massive production capac-
It was reported that cost savings of 15%-35% could be realized by
ity. The corrosion control practice has always been a reactive
using available corrosion control practices and sound corrosion
one with no clear corrosion management plan or strategy. The
management systems. Nevertheless, this subject lacks a key per-
main practice was to replace the deteriorated assets with iden-
formance indicator (KPI) to measure the overall performance of
tical ones without real root-cause analysis or further corrosion
an operating facility in managing corrosion. Most facilities use
protection introduced.
the corrective to preventive cost as an indicator. This severely
underrates any maintenance or replacement undertaking by the The project started by collecting all the data to build a cost of
facility to proactively control a foreseeable corrosion threat[8,9]. corrosion tree (Figure 2) for the last three years and plotted

protection being experienced in the field. This may reflect
inaccurate measurements and readings being recorded or an
ineffective cathodic protection program.
d) Expenditures related to dead-leg surveys and corrosion under
insulation programs do not reflect the damage caused for an
aging facility in a humid area. Dead-leg survey being catego-
rized as a reactive cost.
e) Wet H2S cracking is a major cost element. This may reflect
wrong material selection or change in process that led to
initiating this program. The huge spending on detecting and
managing such a damage mechanism before a failure has
occurred (proactive cost) indicates that the facility was very
vulnerable to this type of damage. The subject matter experts
(SMEs) were diligent to start the program before failure.
Planning Corrosion Control Activities Based

Figure 2. Cost categorization and tree for an aging oil and gas facility.
on Cost of Corrosion Models and KPIs
After getting a general idea about the different cost elements and
the dominant damage mechanisms in the facility, measuring the
performance and planning to close any gaps identified should be
the two next steps.
In this example, measuring the performance was quite easy using
the composite KPI described above and discussed further else-
where[9]. The KPI was customized and enhanced to capture the
facility’s objectives. Based on the results of the first two years, the
facility managed to plan corrosion control activities for the forth-
coming years.
In 2020, the facility decided to start a plant-wide corrosion under
insulation program to close one of the gaps. Another gap identi-
fied was cathodic protection, which will be addressed in the com-
ing two years. Active change of materials of construction for one
of the most vulnerable assets that suffers from premature failures
is ongoing. Similarly, the automation of corrosion monitoring and
Figure 3. Cost elements for an aging oil and gas facility. Only two years are chemical treatment is planned. The facility also started deploying
shown for clarity. The third year shows similar trends. the latest technologies in corrosion control as part of a corporate
program to automate most of such activities.
For corrosion under insulation, the facility decided to take the
(Figure 3) to visualize the different costs as shown:
painstaking option of full insulation removal. This might seem
From a quick look at the cost tree and graph, an experienced cor- to be an overreaction, but given that there is no fully functional
rosion and materials engineer can figure out certain problems CUI program (the types of insulation and the age of insulation are
with the corrosion management at the facility. A few such obser- not known, no coating underneath, etc.) in place, this becomes a
vations are as follows: sensible, albeit expensive, decision. A new procedure to document
and coordinate this activity is being written.
a) There is no cost element associated with material selection
and upgrade; thus, it seems that the major practice is to The facility suffers from oiled sand beds for all tanks. Thus,
replace the failed asset with similar material without proper cathodic protection rarely does its intended job. The facility
failure analysis and identification of the root causes. decided to redesign all their external and internal cathodic protec-
tion systems by replacing sand, changing anodes and wiring, and
b) Corrosion monitoring costs are understated, especially with
possibly using vapor phase corrosion inhibitors to comply with
the huge cost associated with chemical treatment. A proper
the latest company standards.
chemical treatment program includes proper corrosion moni-
toring. This is not the case here. Finally, a new procedure was written to manage dead-leg cor-
rosion. The procedure identified physical and operational dead-
c) Cathodic protection expenditures have been declining irre-
legs throughout the facility. This was followed by removal of
spective of the repetitive failures associated with cathodic

Figure 4. Simplified approach to CMS using CCDs and cost of corrosion KPI. CCDs are used to capture the his-
torical performance of the asset and list the dominant damage mechanisms, while cost of the corro-
sion tree or model is used to show the current activities and identify any gaps. Cost of corrosion KPI
is used to measure the current performance and to plan and prioritize any future corrosion activities.
This approach will end up with full CMS after developing the management aspects of the CMS.
all physical dead-legs and enforcing a flushing program for the REFERENCES
operational ones. The facility deployed an innovative approach 1. "Asset Management - an anatomy," The IAM, 2015.
called “risk-based flushing,” where the frequency of flushing is 2. "ISO 55000:2014 Asset management — Overview, principles and terminology,"
changed based on the criticality of the service and the recorded ISO, 2014.
corrosion rates[10]. 3. "ISO 55001 Asset management — Management systems — Requirements," ISO,
2014.
Finally, by utilizing the above approach, corrosion and materials
SMEs can start their CMS and get the benefits out of it almost 4. "Guidance for corrosion management in oil and gas production and processing,"
Energy Institute, 2019.
immediately, especially the corrosion-specific elements of the
CMS. However, having a complete CMS as described by NACE 5. "OTR 2001/044: Review of corrosion management for offshore oil and gas
processing," Health and Safety Executive, 2001.
SP21430-2019 and the Energy Institute guidance is paramount;
this approach is not trying to address all aspects of CMS, espe- 6. G. Koch, J. Varney, N. Thompson, O. Moghissi, M. Gould and J. Payer, "NACE
IMPACT - International Measures of Prevention, Application, and Economics of
cially the management-related aspects, such as management Corrosion Technologies Study," NACE International, 2016.
policy and strategy[4,7]. Below is a graphical representation of the
7. "NACE SP21430-2019," NACE International, 2019.
proposed approach:
8. A. Moshaweh, "2018 Cost of Corrosion at Abqaiq Plants," Saudi Aramco, 2019.
Conclusion 9. A. Moshaweh, M. Shahrani and L. Teh, "Cost of Corrosion: Key Performance
Indicator," Materials Performance, vol. 59, no. 4, pp. 50-53, 2020.
In this article, a new approach to “jump start” corrosion manage-
ment at a given facility is discussed. This new approach relies 10. M. F. Al-Shahrani, S. A. Al-Dossary, L. S. Teh and F. M. Al-Mutahhar, "Proactive
Corrosion Management for Dead-Legs," in CORROSION 2019, Nashville, 2019.
on defining the dominant damage mechanisms by developing
robust corrosion control documents. This is followed by calculat-
ing the cost of corrosion to check if the corrosion control activi-
ties in place address the identified damage mechanisms and the
experienced failures or not. Finally, measuring the performance
of these corrosion control activities and planning new activi-
ties can be done by utilizing a well-designed and tailored KPI (a
financial KPI was recommended in the article). The advantage
of this approach is that it requires the least, but most important,
information to start an effective corrosion management system.
However, this approach should not be considered as an alterna-
tive to a full-fledged corrosion management system as per NACE
or Energy Institute documents, but rather a way to start imple-
mentation while realizing and measuring benefits quickly. n


A New Era: Digitalized Field Reporting Rules
the Day
Ryan Streeter, Divisional Vice President of Digital Operations at MISTRAS Group
Introduction
Conducting effective and accurate inspections of plant assets
is a crucial task for inspectors and inspection management, but
issues with traditional inspection execution and reporting pro-
cesses can add to the challenges these personnel face. Relying
on paper-based scheduling and inspection reporting can result
in inefficient nondestructive testing (NDT) inspection work pro-
cesses, miscommunication with related trade support (such as
scaffolding, insulation, and surface preparation), project delays,
and inconsistent quality of mechanical integrity (MI) data.
Solutions now exist to shift MI programs away from traditional
inspection and reporting methods to digital, paper-free tech-
niques. Solutions like field service management (FSM) platforms Figure 1. Digitalized FSM platforms allow data to be reported faster and
give inspection professionals the opportunity to transform their more accurately compared to traditional, paper-based reporting.
inspection processes and enhance the quality and effectiveness of
plant operations. Through a digital reporting platform, inspectors in the field
capture all relevant NDT data through cloud-connected mobile
In 2021, as industries and companies across the world are search-
devices, rather than paper-based reports, as is commonly found
ing for opportunities to digitally transform their operations
in the downstream refining industry. Inspectors have access to
to increase their efficiency and productivity, facilities can uti-
all relevant data on their mobile devices (e.g., isometric drawings,
lize a forward-thinking, modern solution to unlock their plant’s
weld maps, piping & instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs), U1s, pipe
highest potential.
schedules, inspection histories, etc.), providing them essential
Common Traditional Inspection Process contextual information on the assets they’re inspecting.
Pain Points All data, photos, and document annotations that are collected in
Traditional, paper-based inspection programs have a slew of pain the field are dynamically sent to the plant’s inspection database
points that make the entire process a challenge. Planning and management system (IDMS) removing the need and hassles
scheduling work while balancing compliance due dates with associated with manual data entry. This greatly increases trans-
the location of assets in relation to each other can be difficult parency of important data points for inspection managers, and
and often overlooked. Dispatching work to inspectors already enables them to review inspection results in real-time, rather
in the field can be challenging and inefficient as work requests than days or potentially weeks later, even if they are off-site.
and supporting documentation must either be hand-delivered
to the field or the inspector must return to the office to retrieve Benefits of Digitalized Field Reporting:
work packages. Consistency, Visibility, Timeliness
Mobile, cloud-based FSM-reporting platforms enhance inspec-
Following field execution, data, reports, and isometric drawing
tion processes and offer benefits beyond streamlined field execu-
redlines can take significant time to be delivered and reviewed,
tion. Digitalized operations enhance a team’s overall performance,
and field data verification efforts can further delay project deliv-
from daily tasks to plant-wide oversight, positively impacting not
erables. Inspection results are typically hand-written on paper in
just inspectors and inspection managers, but also maintenance
the field with varying form templates and terminology, which
and reliability personnel, engineers, and plant management.
introduces inconsistencies and inaccuracies that may lead to
data and report quality issues. There is also a resounding lack of Having access to a real-time key performance indicator (KPI)
visibility while working remotely, which can make it difficult for dashboard is a key benefit of receiving data immediately as
inspection managers to gain the insights needed to drive import- inspections occur in the field. Because this KPI dashboard is
ant business decisions. accessible from the web, management personnel can access data
in real-time no matter their physical location.
How Digitalized Field Reporting Works
Having immediate access to relevant documentation, draw-
Digital reporting streamlines the process of coordinating field
ings, and diagrams is a huge benefit of a digitalized system.
execution processes, as well as collecting and inputting inspec-
With traditional reporting, documentation can be scattered and
tion data into the system of record.

safety by ensuring inspectors do not begin work until all nec-
essary certifications, permits, and approvals are submitted and
checked. In an industry where safety is of the utmost importance,
this aspect of digitalized FSM is essential for accountability.
The ability to operate remotely is a huge factor, not only for
COVID-19 working restrictions, but also for any other times that
operators or management may find themselves away from the
plant. Having the ability to maintain oversight and track the prog-
ress of on-site teams from anywhere offers an advantage as man-
agement personnel continue to work remotely more frequently.
Optimized Inspection Scheduling to Drive

Efficiencies
As a supplemental solution available through some digital report-
ing platforms, scheduling programs also have the ability to
Figure 2. Through digital FSM platforms, inspectors can have access to streamline inspection processes.
all relevant data on their mobile devices.
Semi-automated scheduling tools aim to reduce inefficiencies
that currently exist when scheduling inspections according to
IDMS due dates alone. Designed to be used by in-house sched-
uling personnel, such solutions help identify opportunities for
schedulers to bundle inspection tasks, which might otherwise be
overlooked through manual processes.
Through automation, quantitative data (including inspection
due dates, in-plant zones, and the proximity of assets to one
another) is utilized to identify the most efficient framework to
schedule inspections.
Being proactive and smart about when and how inspections are
conducted ultimately helps plants stay on top of compliance con-
Figure 3. Digitalized platforms streamline pre- and post-inspection
cerns. Deadline alerts and asset prioritization aim to also consider
work processes.
asset strategies, giving more consideration to assets that may be
spread across different locations. Digital platforms centralize in more need of immediate inspection.
and organize all files, decreasing stress and time spent searching
By optimizing the scheduling of inspections and related trade
for documents.
support, field execution can be performed more efficiently,
Digital reporting reduces or eliminates paper from inspection and the cost of the overall inspection program should decrease.
processes in plants. This greatly increases the quality of reports, Defects might also be identified earlier, which can reduce the cost
eliminates the need for handwriting in the field, and prevents of maintenance and repairs.
the loss of reports by making them accessible via a web portal. By
eliminating the physical, paper element of reporting, data is free The Future of Data Reporting
to appear on the web portal instantly, rather than days or weeks Utilizing a digital field service management platform for inspec-
later when an inspector finds time to input the data manually. tion and related trade support is the answer to many of the dif-
Because information is more readily available to the owner-op- ficulties experienced in mechanical integrity programs today.
erator, any necessary field validation work can be dispatched for With project performance tracking, quality review, automation,
execution more quickly, reducing the overall report cycle time. reduced delays, and other benefits, such software platforms
can greatly contribute to bringing plant operations into today’s
Digital operations also streamline the pre- and post-inspection
digital world.
work processes of third-party blasters, insulators, painters, and
scaffolders with digital planning, automatic handoffs, and task As the world and process industries continue to change and
status tracking. Digitalizing trade support coordination helps evolve, it is clear that updating processes to be more inclusive
to avoid a domino effect of project delays and miscommunica- of our technological world and interconnected systems is some-
tions. The centralized web portal offers full insight into trade thing that won’t be changing anytime soon. With digitalized
support activities, inspection accessibility requirements, and reporting, inspection work processes can become increasingly
project statuses. effective with time, enabling a plant to be a true industry leader. n
When performing inspection work, safety is the most important For more information on this subject or the author, please email
aspect to consider. Digitalized FSM reporting enhances plant us at inquiries@inspectioneering.com.

BECOME AN IPEIA MEMBER FOR 2022
IPEIA will celebrate its

25th Anniversary and host
our 2022 Conference and
Exhibition in Jasper, Alberta
from February 28 – March 3, 2022
at the Fairmont Jasper Park Lodge
The 25th IPEIA Conference & Exhibition

and 2022 Membership registration is now live.
Register now and take advantage of an Early Bird
reduced rate for IPEIA Members ($200 savings)!
• Special guest speakers—including industry leaders.

• Technical webinars—topics Include: Inspection Technologies
& Methodologies, NDT/NDE, Risk Based Inspection,
Corrosion & Materials, Codes & Standards and much more.
• Invites to be a part of Integrity Challenges Forum Sessions.
• Opportunities to engage with regulators.
• Receive certificates of attendance to apply for
PDUs/certification renewals.
• Access to past technical presentations.
• Student involvement through IPEIA’s Codes
Courses and Student Poster Sessions.
• One stop shop for industry vendors, suppliers and owners.
• Discounted rate for IPEIA’s Annual Conference (when offered)
with exclusive early bird access to registration.
Conference and Exhibition Highlights
• Three (3) FULL days of conference technical program,
keynotes, and special sessions!
• Networking Events including an “Ice Breaker” and IPEIA’S 25th
Anniversary Celebration!
• 70 Exhibitors!
Register now at www.ipeia.com SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER 2021 Inspectioneering Journal 37

How Digital Twin Improves Maintenance,
Reliability, and Asset Integrity Management
for Storage Tanks and Terminals
Floyd Baker, VP at Antea North America
Introduction it can cause a reduction of production capacity or worse, a loss

Digital Twin, which can be defined as a digital representation or of containment of the entire tank. Such capacity losses and shut-
virtual model of a physical object, is not a new technology; as a downs can cost days or even months of lost opportunity from a
concept, it has been around for years. Yet, in the usage of asset single tank with a price tag of hundreds of thousands of dollars.
integrity management (AIM) for oil and gas or petrochemical stor- If you consider a facility with multiple tanks experiencing similar
age tanks and terminals, digital twin technology is evolving rap- issues and production losses, you can understand how quickly the
idly. It is a critical piece in the increasingly common movement economic impact can compound. Thus, the ability to immediately
toward digital transformation as many plants and facilities turn access accurate and current information isn’t just convenient, it’s
to laser mapping or 3D modeling to digitize their assets. What are significant from a cost reduction standpoint as well.
these companies discovering? The positive impact of digital twins
There is also the logistics factor of turnaround planning, which
on inspection planning, maintenance costs, turnaround, revenue
requires a lot of patience and due diligence. In many cases, the
generation, and safety are substantial and rapid in their return.
kind of information you need to plan activities on any given asset
This article will examine why to leverage this technology and
can require hours–sometimes even days–to compile. By contrast,
how to do so in a fiscally viable manner.
the immediate accessibility of data provided by a digital twin can
Applications for Mechanical Integrity of reduce that access time to minutes or even seconds. It equates
Storage Tanks and Terminals to transparent visibility, which can save hours of searching and
researching files and shared drives, and this again equates to cost
Digital twin as applied to AIM for storage tanks and terminals
savings. The outage can be planned more intelligently thanks to
helps eliminate information silos and consolidate all asset data
more accurate information, and the time it takes to complete the
into a single version of the truth. All data from disparate sources –
outage work can be drastically reduced.
including 2D, 3D modeling, point cloud data, smart P&IDs, PFDs,
laser scanning, plot plans, and/or Google Maps – is consolidated The Power of Visualization
and bidirectionally linked into one virtual replica of the entire
One of the biggest impediments to effective mechanical integrity
plant or facility, including all assets within it and all components
management is the time it takes to gather, catalog, and assess
for each asset.
large volumes of data. When data exists in silos, it is scattered
What does that mean, really? Imagine logging into your AIM soft- across an array of offices or file types, or is collected from a myr-
ware. On your screen is a visual representation of the plant that iad of disparate sources, which makes it difficult to interpret the
you can tap with one click to access the physical asset of interest. big picture for informed decision making. It can also add hours to
From there, you can: simple tasks. Worse, it increases the risk of acting on outdated or
incorrect information – wasting additional resources if, say, the
• View tank inspection, testing, and maintenance data.
wrong replacement parts are ordered, or the wrong repair type
• Plan tank maintenance and repairs. is scheduled.
• Schedule maintenance activities. The digital twin empowers you with the ability to gain insights
from integrated platforms, process, and equipment data. It
• Manage regulatory requirements and audits.
improves the ability to understand the live condition of your
• Plan and schedule instrumentation work and calibrations. assets by establishing a visual context with risk-level color cod-
ing and one-click access to the most recent information. Because
• Manage safety systems and fire suppression equipment.
inspection data can be uploaded into the database from anywhere
• Visualize volumetric data through digital twin (fill height, flow (even a mobile tablet directly from the field) and immediately rep-
rates, temperature, etc.) via integrity operating windows (IOW) licated in the digital twin, the database can be kept evergreen as a
and remote sensors. single version of the truth.
• Visualize and stage work activities from anywhere. Digital twin can also be kept evergreen with data from other
legacy sources (and vice versa). Seamless integration with ERP,
Why is this valuable? A single tank or terminal will frequently
CMMS, SAP, and legacy systems means an effective intersection
face critical issues which need to be resolved or repaired. If critical
between information technology and operational technology. An
information on the asset’s condition is not immediately accessible,
AIM software that is Internet-of-Things-enabled further enhances

this capability by linking remote sensors, data historian, and DCS • Risk based inspection (RBI): Manage all mechanical integrity
connectivity for real-time insights. data while measuring risk. Build risk models that consume
real-time asset data to help produce intelligent inspection
In terms of operational efficiency and time savings, the sum of all
schedules and allocate resources accordingly. This will improve
these parts is the ability to reduce hours to locate pertinent infor-
tank performance and mitigate catastrophic events from taking
mation down to literal seconds. Such rapid insight into actionable
place throughout the lifecycle.
intelligence means smarter inspection planning and scheduling
for maintenance, repairs, and compliance-driven turnaround • Digital twin with 3D overlay: Ideally, the ability to extract data
activities, which translates to fewer unnecessary and expensive from all disparate sources (PFDs, laser scanning, 3D model-
shutdowns. ing, 2D, smart P&IDs, point cloud, plot plans, maps, etc.) and
automatically bidirectionally link and populate the data into
Digital Twins and Covid Restrictions, Safety, a virtual replica of the plant, all assets, and all components
and Environmental Impact within it.
The use of digital twins facilitates effective workarounds due to
• Integrity operating windows (IOW): Monitor operating
Covid restrictions. Social distancing and remote work can be eas-
conditions from any number of remote locations in near real-
ily facilitated when the asset in question can be viewed visually
time with early alert notification when an asset approaches or
by multiple people from multiple different locations. Inspectors,
exceeds dangerous operating limits and take immediate collab-
operators, and project managers alike can simultaneously man-
orative and corrective action to mitigate downtime risk.
age a given tank or terminal using the same data in real-time.
• Mobile technology: Input, access, and analyze asset data via
The details of the terminal’s infrastructure can be accessed and
mobile device or tablet, which boosts collaboration and com-
analyzed digitally without having to physically survey the asset,
munication among operations, maintenance, and engineering.
and the rapid insight into the tank or terminal’s live condition and
Leverage mobility with digital twin to guide field workers
potential conflicts means more cost-effective solution planning
through the remote sites, thus reducing mean time to inspect,
with fewer errors.
maintain, or repair assets.
These benefits also apply to data collection, as operators and
• Geospatially registered data: Leverage specific coordinates
inspectors can perform their inspections and observations via
in a geo-referenced space to know where an asset is for quick
mobile tablet, syncing their findings and reports into the dig-
logistics and data retrieval, making you one click away from
ital twin database via Wi-Fi. Materials can be geographically
data related to a given point of interest. In this case, you not
staged for repairs and replacements visually through the digi-
only know what an asset is, but also where it is in space, and
tal twin. Safety pre-walk downs can be performed. Contractors
visualize its surroundings as a deeply immersed decision-mak-
can leverage the technology and Google maps to perform
ing tool to glean clearer insights.
logistics planning.
The natural byproduct of this is also a substantial increase in Conclusion
safety for personnel as fewer people are required to be present The ultimate impact of a digital twin for storage tanks and ter-
in hazardous situations or around hazardous materials. All infor- minals is not only to improve maintenance with prolonged asset
mation can be accessed and accurately analyzed remotely. There lifecycle but also to improve safety along with social and envi-
is also a natural positive impact on the company’s environmental ronmental responsibility; equating to substantially reduced costs
footprint the more digital its processes and operations become. with measurable ROI. It helps drive intelligent operations and
sets the stage for future intelligence, helping you stay current
Cost-effective Strategies to Leverage in an ever-evolving market with increasing demands for digital
Digital Twin technology adoption.
It’s important to note that the process of digitization isn’t as tech-
As society continues to evolve into a more digital landscape, so
nically elusive as it seems. Modern AIM software exists today
should the oil and gas & petrochemical industries; and with them,
with established algorithms that can extract the data, and then
the mechanical integrity management of storage tanks and ter-
populate it into the virtual replica automatically, in quick and
minals. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, digital twin
affordable succession. The path to digital twin is nowhere near as
is not new. While there are constantly new ways its application
daunting as it sounds – it can be as simple as selecting the right
can be leveraged, as a technology it is already an old concept, mak-
software and implementing a few simple practices.
ing it even more important to implement if your plants and facil-
First, the AIM software itself should provide ities have yet to enter the digital age. n
the following: For more information on this subject or the author, please email
• Inspection data management system (IDMS): Migrate all us at inquiries@inspectioneering.com.
legacy data to a digital and reliable IDMS database, and put in
place standard processes to collect, populate, and analyze new
asset data digitally within the web-based IDMS platform.

Fitness-for-Service Forum
with Greg Garic, PE
Managing Principal at Stress Engineering Services, Inc.
Fire Damage Assessment: Tips and Guidance on FFS in the

Aftermath of a Process Plant Fire (Part 2)
Editor’s Note: This is Part 2 of a two-part column on Fire Damage Assessments. It focuses
on the important topic of establishing “Heat Exposure Zones” and how to conduct Level
1, 2, and 3 assessments after a fire.
Introduction
In the last edition of the Fitness-for-Service Forum, published in
the July/August 2021 issue of Inspectioneering Journal, I began
the discussion of Fire Damage Assessments (FDA). In Part 1,
I provided a big picture overview of the process of assessing
equipment in a post-fire “return- to- service” effort, discussed
the involvement of regulators, and highlighted the importance
of properly identifying damage mechanisms. In this follow up
article, I’m going to talk about the important topic of establishing
Heat Exposure Zones and discuss Level 1, 2, and 3 fitness-for-ser-
vice assessments.
Heat Exposure Zones

Heat exposure zones and the corresponding heat zone maps are
enormously important tools in fire damage assessments. They
are the key to all the work that follows.
Figure 1. Heat zone drawings.
What is a Heat Zone Map?
A heat zone map is a drawing of the plant, with a color-coded over-
in less damaged areas, the signs can be more subtle.
lay indicating the maximum temperature experienced in differ-
ent areas. Various temperature ranges are associated with Heat The heat zones themselves are divided into six broad temperature
Exposure Zones, as defined in API 579, Part 11. ranges, as given in API 579, Table 11.1, and summarized in Table 1.
Figure 1 shows an example of a simple heat zone map. Process
Table 1. Heat exposure zones.
equipment is included in the drawing with colored areas corre-
sponding to Zones 1 through 6. Heat
Temperature
Exposure Description
Range
The plan view covers the entire area of the fire, but since tempera- Zone
ture can vary with elevation, several elevation views at different I Ambient
Ambient temperature
cross-sections may also be necessary. during fire. No damage.
Smoke and water exposure.
How is a Heat Zone Map Created? II Ambient to 150°F
No damage.
Creating a decent heat zone map takes both experience and skill. It III >150°F to 400°F Light heat exposure.
requires very detailed detective work worthy of Sherlock Holmes.
IV >400°F to 800°F Moderate heat exposure.
The map team must: V >800°F to 1350°F Heavy heat exposure.
VI >1350°F Severe heat exposure
a) Have knowledge of what types of damage are associated with
what temperatures, and
In Zone 4 and lower (800°F and below), there is probably no dam-
b) Have the skill and detail orientation to pick out specific evi-
age to any steel components due to the temperature exposure.
dence of damage.
Thus, Zone 4 is an important cut-off, as it indicates the areas
In the most heavily damaged zones, this is not so difficult since in which more careful examination of steel components will
there may be many signs of very high temperature exposure. But be required.

API 579, Part 11 provides many excellent resources for identifying Identify All Damage Mechanisms
the signs and symptoms of exposure to different temperatures. Thus, the first step in the Level 1 assessment is to identify relevant
There are numerous tables that present a wide range of informa- damage mechanisms. Some are obvious (e.g., heat exposure, dents,
tion useful in estimating the temperature range in an area. For deformation), and some are less obvious (e.g., brittle fracture).
example, Tables 11.2 through 11.5 provide many examples of ther-
Sometimes the potential damage mechanism is typical of the
mal effects on materials, such as:
equipment (e.g., cracking at tray support rings in columns) or the
• Zone 3: 150°F to 400°F location (e.g., liquid metal embrittlement underneath galvanized
- Lead/tin solder – melts at 360°F+ beams), and other times by the type of metal (loss of temper in
heat-treated steels). In any event, the FDA team must have (or
• Zone 4: >400°F to 800°F
bring in) the expertise required to properly identify the relevant
- Wood – burns or chars at 450+°F
damage mechanisms.
- Copper tubing – soften and sag at 540+°F
Inspection
• Zone 5: >800°F to 1350°F
Assessing heat damage in a Level 1 assessment is primarily related
- Glass – starts to distort and melt at 950°F
to the heat zone assigned to each piece of equipment. However, it
- Aluminum – starts to melt at 1215°F
is necessary to perform at least a basic visual inspection on each
• Zone 6: >1350°F piece of equipment. There are many local phenomena that are not
- Steel – Spheroidizes at 1400+°F well-represented by looking at just the heat zone map. The visual
- Copper – Melts at 2000+°F inspection is intended to identify any special circumstances such
as local fires, broken nozzles, or blast/impact damage.
In practice, the heat zone mapping team walks through an area
In addition to identifying non-heat damage, the visual inspection
of damage and visually identifies damage that provides clues
could change the heat zone assignment for a vessel, but it is more
to the maximum temperature experienced in an area. If a piece
likely to increase the heat zone assignment than lower it.
of charred wood is observed, then the temperature in that area
reached at least 450°F (Zone 4). If aluminum insulation sheath- Assessment
ing is found melted in the same area, then the temperature in Level 1 assessments are based simply on the heat zone rating
that area reached at least 1215°F (Zone 5). The clues are assembled for the vessel. If a carbon steel vessel is in heat Zone IV or lower
to establish a conservative approximation of which areas were (<800°F), with no other mechanical damage, it passes the Level 1
exposed to which heat zones, and this is mapped onto a site plan assessment. It’s as simple as that.
as illustrated in Figure 1.
Other metals have different Level 1 acceptance limits (see Table
Of course, heat exposure is not the only possible damage. During 2), but carbon and austenitic stainless steels are so common that
this walk-around inspection, the map team may observe other the Zone IV 800°F limit is very significant.
types of damage that must be addressed (e.g., dents or a vessel
knocked off supports). Table 2. Heat Zones that satisfy Level 1 criteria.
Highest Heat
Level 1 Assessments Exposure Zone
Material
Which PASSES for
The Level 1 assessment is a screening criterion based on the heat Material
exposure zone. There are no calculations involved in the Level 1
• Many Steels - Carbon, Low Alloy,
assessment and the results are conservative. Although the API Austenitic Stainless
IV
(>400°F to 800°F)
579, Part 11 assessment is focused on heat damage, it can also • Alloy 20, 800/800H,825, 600, 625, C-276
bring in a wide range of issues. There is a good list in paragraph • Alloy 400
III
11.3.3.4 of the 2016 edition and it includes some not-so-obvious • Precipitation Hardened Alloys 17-4PH,
(>150°F to 400°F)
mechanisms, such as liquid metal embrittlement (e.g., melted 17-7PH
zinc dripping onto austenitic stainless steel), excessive oxidation • Duplex S/S (2205 & 2507)
II
(which can lead to wall thinning), and many more. • Copper
(Ambient to 150°F)
• Aluminum
The result of a Level 1 assessment is either a “PASS” (no further
action required) or a “FAIL” (requires elevation to a Level 2 with If a piece of equipment is either in a heat exposure zone higher
additional inspection and assessment). than acceptable, or there is other observed or suspected damage,
then it fails Level 1 and is elevated to a Level 2 assessment.
In practice, the FDA team must deal with the full ramifications
of the fire damage. This includes awareness of other non-heat Level 2 Assessments
related issues. Level 1 language briefly addresses this issue by
Inspection
saying that components are acceptable if they are in an accept-
The first step in most Level 2 assessments is to determine what
able heat exposure zone and “…there is no mechanical damage or
inspection and testing is required to address the suspected dam-
dimensional deviation.”
age mechanisms.

Heat damage may require dimensional checks (for deformations), Ancillary Equipment Damage
hardness checks (for strength), nondestructive testing (NDT)
Concrete: Although not addressed in Part 11, concrete founda-
evaluation for cracking, and/or microstructural evaluation in
tions are a very important consideration of any FDA. Concrete
some cases.
can become significantly degraded by exposure to heat over sev-
Where other damage mechanisms are of concern, additional, eral hours. It can lose its strength and crumble easily. I’ve seen at
more specific NDT may be required. least one occasion where a large tower was engulfed in flames for
hours, but passed the Level 2 assessment; however, the founda-
Assessment
tion had to be torn out and replaced.
When damage is discovered during inspection, it should be
handled using the appropriate corresponding section of API Concrete evaluation typically requires a specialist, sometimes
579. Examples of this are general or local thinning (Part 4 or 5), with specialized equipment. Be sure to include someone qualified
shell distortions or out-of-round (Part 8), and crack-like flaws to inspect and evaluate the concrete on the FDA team.
(Part 9), etc.
Structures: Structural issues following a fire are common and
If the only relevant damage mechanism is heat exposure in can be very expensive to resolve. Commonly, structures are
carbon and low alloy steels, hardness measurements (which screened based on the heat zone. Visible deformation is definitely
correlate with ultimate tensile strength) are typically used to a sign of problems and is sometimes used as a secondary screen-
identify any softening or hardening as compared to the new ing method, but a lack of visible distortion could still involve a
material specification. loss of the zinc coating and potential damage to the underlying
steel. In most cases, due to a lack of API 579 guidance, a structural
If all the damage mechanisms evaluated under Level 2 pass the
steel expert should be brought in to evaluate the structural steel.
assessment, then the equipment evaluation is complete, and it
may return to service. If any damage mechanism fails the assess- Mechanical Equipment: The many and varied types of mechan-
ment, it must be dealt with in the usual manner—elevated to a ical equipment—such as pumps, valves, generators, motors—all
Level 3 assessment, repaired, or replaced. include numerous internal components made of various materi-
als. Components made of steel may be hardened by heat treating
Level 3 Assessment and susceptible to not-so-obvious damage.
Equipment that fails a Level 2 assessment may be evaluated
Generally, mechanical equipment in heat Zones I or II will have
by Level 3 methods. Level 3 methods are typically very detailed
no damage. In Zone III (>150°F to 400°F) the potential emerges for
assessments that require specialists and advanced methods (e.g.,
damage to soft goods, wire insulation, seals, and other non-me-
finite element analysis (FEA) or computational fluid dynamics
tallic components. Functional testing may be performed by plant
(CFD)). A common example of a Level 3 fire damage assessment
personnel; but for critical equipment, evaluation by the original
would be a finite element analysis constructed from laser scans of
equipment manufacturer (OEM) is probably necessary.
a column or vessel deformed as a result of being engulfed in fire.
At Zone V and higher (800°F and up), damage to the casing,
Equipment that fails a Level 3 assessment must be repaired,
shafts, and other steel components is possible. At this point the
replaced, or derated.
likelihood of damage to non-metallic internals is almost certain.
“Finders Keepers” Replacement or evaluation by the OEM is necessary.
The problem of pre-existing conditions is one that nearly always One particular issue of concern relates to pressure safety valves
comes up in FDAs. The FDA team (and other plant personnel) (PSVs). The springs in PSVs are typically strengthened by heat
are looking for fire-related damage, but because of the extensive treating and can lose their temper and go out of calibration in
visual and other inspections being performed, they are likely to Zone IV and higher. PSVs should be sent to the OEM or rebuilt by
stumble across damage that may not be the result of the fire. a certified shop.
Depending on the person or plant, this is sometimes lamented Soft Goods: In Zone III and higher, soft goods have likely been
as a negative consequence of the FDA (“we’ve got enough to do damaged. Wholesale replacement of soft goods in Zones III and
dealing with the fire damage—we’ll never finish if we have to deal IV is not uncommon. Above that, further damage to the compo-
with every ding we run across in the whole plant”) or hailed as a nent must be evaluated.
positive (“we might have never found this otherwise, until it was
Electrical and instrumentation systems include many compo-
too late”). In any event, the path forward is not complicated. If you
nents that are affected at relatively low temperatures, such as
find it, you own it.
solder and wire insulation. Troubleshooting and evaluating elec-
Many pre-existing conditions come to light in a post-fire inspec- trical systems is also very time consuming. For these reasons, elec-
tion. These typically include physical damage such as dents and trical and instrumentation systems are often subject to wholesale
deformations, corrosion damage such as metal loss and pitting, replacement in Zones III and up.
and various forms of cracking. When such damage is found, it is
typically just rolled into the list of damage to be evaluated, along The Role of Documentation
with everything else. Documentation of the inspection, calculations, and results of an

FDA is a critically important part of the process. The documenta-
tion not only provides important information to engineers and
inspectors in the future, but it is also often required by insurance
companies and/or regulators to validate insurance claims or jus-
tify the safety of returning to service.
Documentation of a large FDA is anything but trivial. Records of
inspections, Level 1, 2, and 3 assessments, repairs, hardness tests,
PMI, and other activities must be organized into the FDA records
and eventually make their way into the equipment files.
The specific procedures for documenting FDA inspections, evalu-
ation, and reporting are well-beyond the scope of this discussion,
but suffice it to say, the documentation effort itself requires sub-
stantial thought and organization.
Conclusion
Returning equipment to service after a plant fire can be a daunt-
ing task. The quantity of equipment that was involved and the
number of potential damage mechanisms combine to make the
task seem overwhelming. Applying an organized assessment
methodology that allows segmentation of the damaged area into
different heat zones of varying severity and working through a
procedure for identifying and evaluating damage mechanisms is
an effective way to conduct a fire damage assessment. It’s still a
big task, but perhaps not quite so overwhelming.
If there are any topics you’d like to see in the FFS Forum, or if
you have comments in this article, leave a note in the “Comments”
section below or send me an email at FFS@inspectioneering.com.
Thanks…GG
P.S. Special thanks to Nicole Stein Bassi with W.R. Grace for suggesting
this topic and reviewing an early draft. Also, to my colleagues Dr. George
Szasz and Glenn Aucoin at Stress Engineering Services. George and Glenn
are both experienced fire damage team leaders and have provided valu-
able input and comments to this article. n

About the Author: Greg Garic, PE, has over 35 years of experience
in FFS and mechanical integrity assessment of pressure systems. He
began his career at NASA’s Stennis Space Center, where his tenure
spanned 15 years. After rising to the position of Senior Engineer, he
joined Stress Engineering Services and has been there for over 20
years. As a Managing Principal with Stress, Greg focuses most of
his work on stress analysis, fracture mechanics, pressure systems
engineering, and FFS across the process industries. He also teaches
FFS training courses, is qualified as a stress analysis expert in federal
court, and leads Stress’ New Orleans office. Suffice it to say, he’s been
around the block more than a few times and knows FFS.
Please send your inputs to the author at ffs@inspectioneering.com.

Damage Control
with Phillip E. Prueter, PE
Principal Engineer II and Team Leader - Materials & Corrosion at The Equity Engineering Group, Inc.
Wet H2 S Damage Detection

Editor’s Note: This regular column offers practical insights into various damage mech- most notably in the oil and gas industry, although H2S can also
anisms affecting equipment in the O&G, petrochemical, chemical, power generation, be present in process environments in the mining, food process-
and related industries. Readers are encouraged to send us suggestions for future top- ing, pulp and paper, wastewater treatment, and power generation
ics, comments on the current article, and raise issues of concern. All submissions will industries. H2S is more soluble in crude oil than in water, and H2S
be reviewed and used to pick topics and guide the direction of this column. We will
concentrations of 100-200 ppm are relatively common in typical
treat all submissions as strictly confidential. Only Inspectioneering and the author
will know the names and identities of those that submit. Please send your inputs to the
crudes[2]. Furthermore, any equipment subject to wet H2S process
author at damagecontrol@inspectioneering.com. conditions can be susceptible to damage under certain scenarios.
It is believed that some of the first industry experiences with dif-
Introduction ferent forms of wet H2S damage occurred in the 1950s in both the
U.S. and Canadian oil fields[1]. In some of these early documented
Aqueous phase process environments containing sulfur and
cases, sour environment corrosion occurred within approxi-
specifically, hydrogen sulfide (H2S), are generally referred to as
mately one month of equipment installation. These unfavorable
sour environments or sour service[1]. H2S is a flammable, color-
operating experiences led to the use of corrosion inhibitors to
less gas that poses a process safety risk to plant personnel due to
extend equipment service life. Even today, wet H2S damage con-
its toxicity. Furthermore, H2S (and sulfur) can occur naturally or
tinues to afflict pressure vessels, tanks, piping, and other equip-
can be generated from common oil and gas production/refining
ment in the oil and gas and related industries. Understanding
methods. H2S contributes to corrosion mechanisms such as high
the different types of wet H2S damage, identifying which process
temperature sulfidation (H2/H2S corrosion) and acidic sour water
units and equipment are most prone to such damage, and estab-
corrosion; however, the cracking mechanisms associated with
lishing appropriate inspection plans for in-service equipment can
hydrogen charging in wet H2S environments are the focus of this
mitigate costly unplanned outages and equipment failures.
Damage Control series. Wet H2S damage can detrimentally affect
the load-carrying capacity of pressure retaining equipment and
can manifest itself in numerous forms of material degradation, Understanding the different types of
including the following:
wet H2S damage, identifying which
• Hydrogen blistering
process units and equipment are most
• Hydrogen induced cracking (HIC)
prone to such damage, and establishing
• Stress-oriented hydrogen induced cracking (SOHIC)
appropriate inspection plans for
• Sulfide stress cracking (SSC)
in-service equipment can mitigate
Wet H2S damage is complex and often misunderstood because the
overall propensity for these damage mechanisms is governed by costly unplanned outages and
different controlling metallurgical and environmental variables. equipment failures.
Furthermore, each form of wet H2S damage exhibits distinctive
morphologies, introduces varying levels of risk, and ultimately Wet H 2 S Chemical Reactions And Damage
can promote different failure modes. Damage propagation rates Mechanics
can also be difficult to predict and can be accelerated by minor
The primary reactions that lead to the presence of H2S in oil and
changes in process environments. This article will summarize the
gas reservoirs are bacterial sulfate reduction (BSR) and thermo-
fundamentals of these wet H2S-related damage mechanisms, dis-
chemical sulfate reduction (TSR)[3]. At high pressures, sulfanes
cuss operating conditions and other factors influencing damage
are formed in the gas phase by the dissolution of elemental sul-
progression, and present the typical damage characteristics and
fur. When pressure is decreased (e.g., during oil/gas extraction
morphologies of each mechanism. Additionally, this article will
and production), these gaseous sulfanes dissociate to form ele-
offer some practical inspection guidance and will discuss com-
mental sulfur, and in the presence of water, form H2S. Sulfur can
mon locations predisposed to wet H2S damage on typical pressure
also be formed due to an oxidation reaction of H2S by air or by
equipment. A case study of a notable industry failure caused by
other oxides (e.g., iron oxide). This reaction can be detrimental to
different forms of wet H2S damage will also be reviewed.
steels because sulfur can contribute to corrosion, and it produces
In general, wet H2S damage affects carbon and low-alloy steels water, which increases the corrosivity of H2S[1]. Additionally, the

Figure 1. Schematic of Wet H2S (Sulfide Corrosion) Chemical Reaction Process in an Idealized Steel Plate.
solubility of sulfur in water generally increases with tempera-

ture: for example, approximately 10 ppm-20 ppm at 77°F (25°C)
and approximately 50 ppm at 122°F (50°C)[1]. Furthermore, the dis-
solution of sulfur in water produces H2S and sulfuric acid. This
reaction tends to occur relatively slowly at ambient temperatures,
but nevertheless can generate sufficient H2S to cause damage.
The inception of the different forms of wet H2S damage described
herein is based on the fundamental sulfide surface corrosion reac-
tion where, in an aqueous environment, H2S and iron (e.g., carbon
or low-alloy steels) react to form iron sulfide and hydrogen atoms.
These hydrogen atoms diffuse into the steel (hydrogen charging)
and collect at any internal material imperfections or discontinu-
Figure 2. E
xamples of Hydrogen Blistering in Pressure Equipment
ities[4]. These hydrogen atoms then coalesce to form hydrogen
Plate Samples.
molecules that, due to their size, are unable to diffuse out of the
embedded local cavity or discontinuity in the steel. Subsequently,
blisters can induce visible surface bulging on the inside surface,
as the volume of trapped hydrogen molecules increases, pressure
outside surface, or within the wall thickness of pressure equip-
builds to a point where local permanent deformation occurs; that
ment. Blistering is frequently believed to occur near a mid-wall
is, local stresses near these steel imperfections exceed the yield
plane of weakness, where inclusions may appear and segregate
strength of the material (e.g., the ligament might bulge towards
during the plate solidification process[5]. Additionally, sometimes
the ID or OD surface) to create a void, blister, or crack-like flaw[5,6].
crack-like flaws can extend from the periphery of a blister, poten-
Figure 1 shows a schematic of this overall sulfide corrosion pro-
tially propagating in the through-wall direction, especially near
cess on an idealized steel plate.
welds. This implies that hydrogen blistering can be a precursor
Further discussion on how this damage progression process leads for HIC or SOHIC. Another important consideration is that no
to different types of wet H2S damage is provided below. Given externally applied stress is necessary to facilitate hydrogen blis-
these damage progression mechanics, older or “dirty” steels are ter formation[7]. It is also noted that blisters occur from hydrogen
particularly prone to wet H2S damage because they generally have generated by the sulfide corrosion process (see Figure 1), not
more volumetric inclusions, laminations, and original fabrication strictly from hydrogen gas in the process stream[4]. Additionally,
imperfections in both base metal and weld deposit regions. Also, these wet H2S-driven blisters differ from voids, blisters, or crack-
steel plate is usually more likely to have inclusions than other ing associated with high temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA)[8].
product forms; therefore, the shell of pressure vessels, tanks, or Figure 2 shows examples of hydrogen blistering observed in
sections of larger diameter longitudinal seam-welded piping common pressure equipment. In Figure 2, examples of both cross
components are ordinarily more susceptible to wet H2S damage sections of internal blister voids/cavities and inside surface bulg-
than conventional seamless piping, tubing, or forgings. ing due to local material yielding are shown in pressure boundary
plate samples.
Hydrogen Blistering
Hydrogen blistering is generally characterized by internal blisters Hydrogen Induced Cracking (HIC)
(i.e., planar cavities that result in physical bulges) in steel that are HIC is a form of internal hydrogen damage caused by the initi-
caused by the accumulation of molecular hydrogen (per the dam- ation and propagation of small crack-like flaws, often resem-
age progression described above). These blisters tend to occur at bling small internal voids or blisters, that are generally laminar
locations of large non-metallic inclusions, laminations, or other (in-plane) and oriented parallel to the inside and outside surfaces
metallurgical discontinuities in steel components[7]. Hydrogen of steel. Over time, these cracks tend to coalesce or link-up due

Figure 3. Examples of HIC Damage Morphology (Characteristic Stepwise Cracking)[4]. Figure 4. Example of Typical SOHIC Damage Morphology
Near a Full-Penetration Weld.
to internal pressure build-up and possibly local stress fields in SOHIC damage (perpendicular crack-like flaw) near a full-pen-
damaged regions. Furthermore, this behavior often results in etration (double-sided or double-v) butt-weld. This damage has
damage progression in the through-thickness direction, and due essentially propagated through the entire thickness of the plate.
to its characteristic damage morphology, is referred to as “step-
wise” cracking (i.e., linked-up cracks in different planes resemble Sulfide Stress Cracking (SSC)
steps extending through the wall of pressure equipment). One SSC is defined as cracking produced by a form of hydrogen embrit-
potential explanation for this phenomenon is that internal pla- tlement cracking under the combined effect of tensile stress
nar cracking creates local plastic zones that interact due to shear (applied or residual) and sulfide surface corrosion driven by the
loading, thus forming larger cracks oriented at 45° through-wall[5]. presence of H2S (see Figure 1). SSC usually initiates on the sur-
Susceptibility to HIC can be influenced by steel composition, face of either high-strength steels or high-hardness regions such
deoxidation practices, and processing history since these vari- as weld deposits and HAZs[7]. Regions with elevated hardness can
ables tend to correlate to non-metallic inclusions and the hydro- often be found in weld cover passes and attachment welds that are
gen permeation properties of the material[9]. Examples of stepwise not tempered by subsequent weld passes. To this end, welds that
cracking (HIC damage) are shown in Figure 3. have not received post-weld heat treatment (PWHT) are mark-
edly prone to this type of cracking due to elevated tensile resid-
Stress Oriented Hydrogen Induced Cracking (SOHIC)
ual stresses and lack of tempering/softening of the weld deposit
SOHIC is a form of HIC that can potentially be more detrimen-
and HAZ[4]. Additionally, SSC usually does not occur in seamless
tal to the structural integrity of equipment than conventional
piping that has been welded from one side because it does not
stepwise cracking. The hydrogen charging process for SOHIC is
contain a hard weldment on the ID surface that is exposed to H2S
the same as HIC and hydrogen blistering; however, SOHIC dam-
(the initial weld pass benefits from the tempering effect of sub-
age morphology usually appears as an array of cracks stacked
sequent passes as the weld is applied from the OD). Cracking is
on top of one another. This can result in a through-wall crack
usually intergranular in high-strength steels (yield strength > 100
(sometimes zigzag) that is perpendicular to the surface of the
ksi) or in areas of excessive hardness, whereas it tends to be more
component. Unlike HIC or hydrogen blistering, SOHIC damage
transgranular in lower strength steels. In general, high-strength
progression is generally driven by relatively high tensile levels
steels are more susceptible to SSC than typical lower-strength
of both applied and residual stresses (e.g., weld residual stress)[4].
steels (e.g., typical pressure vessel carbon steels). It is believed that
Furthermore, damage usually occurs in base metal directly adja-
grain boundary impurities in high-strength steels can promote
cent to weld deposit heat affected zones (HAZs) where damage
SSC. The presence of phosphorous and sulfur may also lead to
often initiates from HIC, SSC, or other fabrication-related cracks,
SSC[10]. Characteristically, SSC is also often oriented perpendicular
defects, lack of fusion, etc. SOHIC damage can also initiate from
to the applied stress[9].
stress concentrations such as the tip of an existing crack (e.g.,
from surface-breaking SSC in high-hardness HAZs) or defects, or Pressure vessel steels with inherently favorable resistance to SSC
from the interaction of closely-spaced hydrogen blisters on dif- can become susceptible through improper welding. Repair welds
ferent planes[6,7]. While SOHIC is typically less common than HIC on carbon steel, excessive ferrite in Duplex 2205 welds, or dissim-
or hydrogen blistering, given the perpendicular (through-thick- ilar metal welds (e.g., between ferritic and austenitic materials)
ness) propagation direction of SOHIC, it is more likely to cause in sour service reflect situations where welding procedures can
through-wall leaks or catastrophic loss of containment than HIC make ordinarily resistant materials susceptible to SSC failure by
or hydrogen blistering, in general. Figure 4 shows an example of inducing local regions with high hardness. Additionally, some

Figure 5. Examples of SSC Near Weld Deposits/HAZs (upper images adapted from[7]).
martensitic stainless steels (e.g., 17-4 PH and 410 stainless steels) extensive damage to other refinery equipment. Following the
and B7 bolts are intrinsically hard and thus, have a relatively high fire, the upper portion of this vertical pressure vessel was found
susceptibility to SSC. Pressure safety valve (PSV) springs, valve approximately 0.6 miles (1 km) away from the base of the vessel
trim, and compressor shafts often exhibit high hardness and can that was still intact[14]. This vessel was approximately 61.5 ft. (18.8
be prone to SSC in wet H2S environments. Also, hard regions in pri- m) tall, with a diameter of 8.5 ft. (2.6 m), and a shell thickness of
marily soft (acceptable) weld deposits can occur with submerged 1-inch (25 mm). The pressure boundary was made of carbon steel
arc welding when an active flux is used along with high-voltage plates (SA-516 Gr. 70). Furthermore, the vessel was fabricated in
heat input[11,12]. 1968 and placed into service in 1970, with planned outages every
two years to facilitate inspection. In 1974, extensive hydrogen
Under certain operating conditions, SSC can rapidly lead to exten-
blistering and cracking necessitated the replacement of the sec-
sive cracking and ultimately, failure. In general, the time to failure
ond shell course, although the first (adjacent) shell course also
decreases as material strength, total tensile stress, and environ-
exhibited wet H2S damage at that time. Two years later (1976),
mental charging potential increase; however, even short sour
a Monel (nickel-copper alloy 400) liner was installed in the
water excursions (e.g., during equipment shutdown) can rapidly
bottom of the vessel covering most of the first shell course to
propagate SSC damage[13]. Figure 5 shows two examples of SSC
attempt to mitigate the progressing damage[14]. H2S would also
near weld deposits; the upper images show crack propagation
regularly gravitate towards the lower portion of the vessel given
through the HAZ and into the base metal, and the lower images
process conditions.
show the crack remaining in the HAZ. Commonly, SSC cracks ini-
tiate at or near the surface as straight (non-branched) flaws and The subsequent failure investigation revealed that the vessel frac-
extend through-thickness over time. As these flaws propagate tured along a path adjacent to the 1974 weld repair/shell replace-
further through-thickness or enter the base metal, SOHIC often ment (circumferential field weld). It is believed that pre-existing
becomes the dominant damage mechanism. Lastly, modern (post- defects/cracks initiated and propagated in areas of high hardness
1980) steels are typically more immune to SSC than vintage steels, that formed during the welding process of the second replace-
but again, poor-quality welding (leading to high hardness) can ment shell course. No tempering or PWHT was performed fol-
invalidate this assumption[12]. lowing this repair procedure. Eventually, as hydrogen-induced
cracking progressed over time, a through-wall crack of approxi-
Union Oil Amine Absorber Vessel Failure mately 31-inches (800mm) occurred, which led to loss of contain-
(1984) ment (leakage). Consequently, this sizable crack triggered the
While there have been numerous documented equipment fail- ensuing catastrophic rupture about 15 minutes after a leak was
ures, leaks, and lost production due to wet H2S damage, one nota- identified by plant personnel[14]. Figure 6 shows a sketch of the
ble industry failure attributed to numerous forms of H2S-related failure location in the vessel along with cracking observed in
damage (SSC, HIC, and likely SOHIC) was the Union Oil Chicago several samples from the bottom shell courses. Examples of step-
Refinery explosion and fire on July 23, 1984 in Romeoville, wise cracking (HIC) were found in shell course 1, and character-
IL[5,9,14]. An amine absorber vessel (used to strip H2S from the istic surface-connected straight-sided crack like flaws in the weld
propane and butane process stream) ruptured and initiated an HAZ near the fusion line (SSC) that begin to zigzag through the
uncontrolled combustion event that resulted in 17 fatalities and thickness of the base metal (SOHIC) were identified at the failed

Figure 6. Sketch of Failure and Cracking Damage Morphology From 1984 Union Oil Metallurgical Amine
Absorber Investigation (adapted from[14]).
fracture surface and at other nearby welds. • The more inclusions and laminations in steel (e.g., “dirty
steels”), the more damage initiation sites there are for hydrogen
Ultimately, it is believed that SOHIC propagating through-wall
blisters, HIC, etc.
near the circumferential repair weld, exacerbated by existing
hydrogen damage, including surface-breaking SSC (which likely • Modern (post-1980) steels are generally less prone to damage
served as a crack initiator) led to this catastrophic and deadly fail- than vintage steels[12].
ure. The high hardness near this repair weld and high weld resid-
• Improved steel cleanliness will directionally offer improve-
ual stress (due to the omission of stress relief) likely accelerated
ment; however, SOHIC can still occur even with little-to-no
damage. Post-mortem fracture toughness testing indicated that
anomalies (cracking or blisters) visible on the surface[4].
hydrogen embrittlement also significantly reduced the fracture
resistance of the steel. Additionally, the Monel lining installed Weld Quality (Hardness)/PWHT
directly below the fracture location potentially contributed to • Welds/HAZs with high hardness primarily promote SSC.
the failure. Monel is not generally suitable for monoethanolamin Hardness values above 237 Brinell Hardness Number (BHN) are
(MEA) service and is essentially anodic to steel, which likely pro- considered to enable SSC[13].
moted hydrogen charging in this case. This case study highlights
• Hydrogen blistering, HIC, and SOHIC are not generally consid-
the dire consequences of a series of unfavorable fabrication, weld-
ered to be influenced by weld hardness; however, SSC can serve
ing, and repair practices coupled with an aggressive wet H2S pro-
as an initiation point for other forms of damage (e.g., SOHIC
cess environment.
propagation).
Critical Factors Influencing Damage • A lack of PWHT, resulting in elevated weld residual stresses
Progression and potentially high hardness, can increase the likelihood of
Many variables dictate the probability of experiencing in-service SSC and SOHIC, but it will not generally affect the propensity
wet H2S damage. Furthermore, there are many different nuances for hydrogen blistering or HIC.
associated with process conditions/contaminants, welding/steel
Operating Temperature
making practices, applied/residual stress fields, etc., that promote
• Hydrogen blistering, HIC, and SOHIC have been identified on
different forms of wet H2S cracking or blistering. The following
equipment that typically operates between ambient tempera-
summaries describe the main factors that influence equipment’s
tures and 300°F (150°C)[4,12].
overall susceptibility to wet H2S damage and the rate at which
damage progresses. • Hydrogen charging tends to increase with increasing tempera-
ture (assuming the aqueous phase is not eliminated); however,
Steelmaking Practices/Microstructure
wet H2S damage may occur at lower temperatures such as a

Table 1. Summary of Common Refinery Units Affected by Wet H2S Cracking[8].
low-temperature excursion for equipment that usually operates H2S Concentration

at elevated temperatures[13]. • Hydrogen permeation (charging) generally increases with
higher H2S partial pressures.
• SSC generally occurs at temperatures below around 180°F
(82°C) . Specifically, SSC is believed to be most aggressive
[4]
• A practical threshold of 50 wppm H2S in the water phase is
around 70°F (20°C) with a decreasing risk at either higher or often used in the refining industry to set a limit where wet H2S
lower temperatures[12]. damage becomes problematic; however, this limit should not
be universally applied as documented cases of damage have
Process Stream pH
occurred at lower H2S levels.
• Hydrogen permeation properties (i.e., diffusion rates) are
typically minimal at around pH 7 and increase at higher • The presence of even 1 wppm of H2S is understood to be suffi-
and lower pH .[4]
cient to facilitate hydrogen charging of steel[4].
• Chemistry conditions that are known to promote all forms It is important to consider that wet H2S damage is not usually a
of wet H2S damage include the following[4,12,13]: steady-state process. In fact, damage often happens in short peri-
ods of time or bursts of activity. Operating excursions or process
- > 50 wppm dissolved H2S in the free water
changes (e.g., pH fluctuations) can lead to this type of behavior.
- Free water with pH < 4 and some dissolved H2S present For example, the addition of cyanides to wet H2S environments
can dissolve the iron sulfide scale on the surface. This in turn
- Free water with pH > 7.6, 20 wppm dissolved hydrogen
accelerates corrosion and hydrogen atom permeation/diffusion,
cyanide (HCN) in the water, and some dissolved H2S
thus promoting more severe wet H2S damage. To this end, past
present
inspection data, assumed damage rates, or engineering (fit-
- > 0.0003 MPa (0.05 psia) partial pressure of H2S in the gas ness-for-service) assessments can be invalidated if equipment has
phase (associated with the aqueous phase of the process) been subjected to even minor process changes and possible rapid
damage propagation.
• Increased levels of ammonia may subsequently increase the
pH to a level where cracking may occur. Commonly Affected Equipment
• Increasing ammonium bisulfide above 2% (e.g., in hydropro- Wet H2S damage can occur in any equipment that meets the above
cessing units) can increase susceptibility to hydrogen blister- operating, process, and fabrication criteria; however, specific to
ing, HIC, and SOHIC[4]. the refining industry, several process units are distinctly prone
to damage. One of the most informative summaries of suscepti-
• Salts or other contaminants in the water phase that
ble refinery units is from the 1990 industry survey coordinated
decrease pH or increase the corrosion rate can accelerate
by NACE Working Group T-8-16a[8], where inspection results for
wet H2S damage[13].
almost 5,000 pressure vessels in different units were compiled.
• Rich amine (alkaline) environments can promote wet Overall, this survey reported a wet H2S-related cracking incidence
H2S damage[13]. of 26%. A summary of the cracking rate (percentage) in affected
refining units/sections is provided in Table 1. Note that these

Figure 7. Example of a TFM Scan Showing Embedded Hydrogen Blisters with ID-Connected HIC.
cracking percentages should not be interpreted as being absolute Visual Inspection (VT)
given possible inconsistencies in inspection coverage/method • Visual inspection represents the first line of defense to identify
across different owner-users, varying fabrication/weld qualities, hydrogen blistering (e.g., internal bulges). Again, blistering is
different crude feed compositions, and the potential for other often a precursor for or an accessory to HIC.
damage mechanisms to be misidentified as wet H2S damage (e.g.,
• Visual inspection of any internal coatings or cladding issues is
potential carbonate cracking in FCCU fractionation/overhead
an effective way to target any potential problem areas.
systems). Additionally, the sample size varies for different units
as shown in Table 1. Wet Fluorescent Magnetic Particle Testing (WFMT)
• This is a common surface inspection method that is sensi-
There are specific locations within each of these process units
tive enough to reliably detect surface breaking cracks. This is
that are especially prone to wet H2S damage. A few examples of
usually the preferred method for discovering surface damage,
this include reactor effluent air cooler (REAC) systems (duplex
especially near welds (e.g., SSC).
stainless steel welds with high ferrite content are distinctly prone
to SSC) and high/low pressure separators in hydroprocessing • WFMT usually requires extensive surface preparation (e.g.,
units, amine treating unit absorbers/contactors (especially near grit blasting, water blasting, and cleaning) which can adversely
sour gas inlet nozzles), regenerators, overhead condensers, and affect future hydrogen permeation rates and damage because
knock-out drums, sulfur recovery unit (SRU) acid gas knock-out of the removal of the iron sulfide scale/film[15]. Roughly 6-inches
drums, and sour water stripper (SWS) unit overhead equipment (150 mm) on either side of a weld often requires blasting/clean-
(e.g., condensers and reflux drums). Additionally, in fluid catalytic ing for successful WFMT[8].
cracking units (FCCUs), light ends recovery/fractionation (over-
• To avoid sudden and rapid hydrogen charging following inspec-
head) equipment and especially locations downstream of wet gas
tion, it may be appropriate to apply a suitable coating to any
compressors, intercoolers/aftercoolers, knock-out drums, sponge
areas that were grit blasted or cleaned.
absorbers, and deethanizers are historically problem areas for wet
H2S damage. Ultrasonic Testing (UT)
• UT includes shear wave (SWUT), phased array (PAUT), total
General Inspection Considerations focusing method (TFM), full matrix capture (FMC), time of
In many cases, it may be appropriate to institute special emphasis flight diffraction (TOFD), etc. These methods are ideal for cate-
mechanical integrity (SEMI) programs for “high risk” equipment gorizing embedded or volumetric damage (e.g., blistering, HIC,
in wet H2S service. Consultation with materials and corrosion or SOHIC). An example of a TFM scan highlighting embedded
experts is recommended to develop suitable inspection scopes hydrogen blistering with ID-connected HIC is shown in
for different equipment items, to help review areas of past dam- Figure 7.
age, and to guide inspection methods, coverage, and frequency,
• These methods may be recommended pre-turnaround as a
etc. Since weld seams and nozzle attachment welds are notably
screening tool to determine the most practical inspection scope
prone to SSC and SOHIC, they are often targets of any inspection.
and to identify potential wet H2S damage to further address or
A summary of some of the commonly used nondestructive exam-
repair during a planned outage.
ination (NDE) methods for detecting and characterizing wet H2S
damage is offered below[8]. • One advantage is that UT methods can sometimes be used

without the need for excessive removal of protective iron sul- REFERENCES
fide surface scales. 1. Papavinasam, S., 2014, “Corrosion Control in the Oil and Gas Industry,” Gulf
Professional Publishing, Waltham, MA.
• These UT methods are most frequently employed for sizing
2. Heidersbach, R., 2018, “Metallurgy and Corrosion Control in Oil and Gas
(e.g., depth, width, length, orientation, etc.) of hydrogen blisters
Production,” 2nd Edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ.
and crack-like flaws (HIC or SOHIC) for FFS assessments.
3. Balliache, N.M., January 28-29, 2020, “Understanding the Origin of H2S in
• For regions of extensive damage, automated UT (AUT) tech- Carbonate Oil and Gas Reservoirs: A Review,” AAPG Middle East Region
Geoscience Technology Workshop: 3rd Edition Carbonate Reservoirs of the
niques may be appropriate.
Middle East, Abu Dhabi, UAE.
• In general, UT methods require a skilled inspector to accurately 4. Dobis, J.D., Cantwell, J.E., and Prager, M., 2019, “WRC Bulletin 489 (2nd Edition):
identify/characterize wet H2S damage and to differentiate Damage Mechanisms Affecting Fixed Equipment in the Refining Industry,” The
blisters from HIC/SOHIC or other forms of volumetric damage. Welding Research Council, Shaker Heights, OH.
5. Staats, J.C., Buchheim, G.M., and Osage, D.A., 2010, “WRC Bulletin 531:
Other inspection techniques such as acoustic emission testing Development of Fitness-For-Service Rules for the Assessment of Hydrogen
(AET), alternating current field measurement (ACFM), and eddy Blisters, HIC, and SOHIC,” The Welding Research Council, Shaker Heights, OH.
current testing (ECT) represent alternative methods that can be 6. API/ASME, 2016, “API 579-1/ASME FFS-1, Fitness-For-Service,” 3rd Edition,
used for wet H2S damage detection situations; however, for the The American Petroleum Institute and The American Society of Mechanical
sake of brevity, they are not discussed herein[8]. Regardless of the Engineers, Washington DC/New York.
NDE method used, it is essential that the limitations and margin 7. Cayard, M.S., Kane, R.D., Kaley, L., and Prager, M., 1994, “WRC Bulletin 396:
of error be well-understood, and that qualified and experienced Research Report on Characterization and Monitoring of Cracking in Wet H2S
Service,” The Welding Research Council, Shaker Heights, OH.
inspectors are involved. Again, given the possibly unpredictable
8. NACE, 2020, “SP0296-2020: Detection, Repair, and Mitigation of Cracking in
or sudden damage progression associated with wet H2S dam-
Refinery Equipment in Wet H2S Environments,” NACE International, Houston,
age mechanisms, it is important to ensure that high-risk equip- TX.
ment, and especially regions of previously identified damage,
9. Kane, R.D., Wilhelm, S.M., and Oldfield, J.W., March 28-30, 1989, “Review
are routinely monitored. Additionally, these different NDE meth- of Hydrogen Induced Cracking of Steels in Wet H2S Refinery Service,”
ods play an integral role in establishing a successful wet H2S Proceedings of the International Conference on the Interaction of Steels with
inspection/SEMI program. Once damage is identified, proper Hydrogen in Petroleum Industry Pressure Vessel Service, Paris, France.
engineering evaluation, repair, or equipment replacement is 10. NACE, 2013, “8X294: Review of Published Literature on Wet H2S Cracking of
required. The next installment of Damage Control will focus on Steels Through 1989,” NACE International, Houston, TX.
recommended fitness-for-service (FFS) methods for assessing 11. Kotecki, D.J. and Howden, D.G., 1973, “WRC Bulletin 184: Submerged-Arc-Weld
the different forms of wet H2S damage. Furthermore, leveraging Hardness and Cracking in Wet Sulfide Service,” The Welding Research Council,
Shaker Heights, OH.
technically-based FFS methods to qualify damaged equipment
in wet H2S service can extend the useful operating life of critical 12. API, 2020, “API RP 571, Damage Mechanisms Affecting Fixed Equipment in the
Refining Industry,” 3rd Edition, American Petroleum Institute, Washington,
in-service components. n D.C.
For more information on this subject or the author, please email 13. NACE, 2015, “ANSI/NACE MR0103/ISO 17945:2015: Petroleum, Petrochemical
and Natural Gas Industries – Metallic Materials Resistant to Sulfide Stress
Cracking in Corrosive Petroleum refining Environments,” NACE International,
Houston, TX.
14. McHenry, H.I, Shives, T.R., Read, D.T., McColskey, J.D., Brady, C.H. and
About the Author: Phillip E. Prueter, P.E. is a Principal Engineer II Purtscher, P.T., March 1986, “Examination of a Pressure Vessel that Ruptured
and Team Leader - Materials & Corrosion at The Equity Engineering at the Chicago Refinery of the Union Oil Company on July 23, 1984,” NBSIR
Group, Inc. in Shaker Heights, Ohio, where his responsibilities 86-3049. Institute for Material Science and Engineering – National Bureau of
Standards, Boulder, CO.
include providing technical consulting expertise to the refining,
petrochemical, specialty chemical, and power generation indus- 15. Kane, R.D. and Cayard, M.S., May/June 1995, “Wet H2S Cracking in Steel
Vessels – Part 1: An Evaluation of WFMPT Techniques,” Inspectioneering
tries and managing Nuclear Consulting Services. He specializes Journal.
in fitness-for-service, design by analysis, explicit dynamics, tran-
sient thermal-mechanical fatigue analysis, elevated temperature
creep, seismic and natural frequency analysis, fracture mechanics,
root-cause failure analysis, damage mechanism reviews, and high
temperature hydrogen attack. He holds a BS and MS in mechani-
cal engineering and is a Registered Professional Engineer in nine
states. Additionally, he is a member of the ASME Working Groups
on Design by Analysis and Elevated Temperature Design, serves as
an organizer for the ASME Pressure Vessels and Piping Conference,
is an instructor for the ASME Master Classes on Design by
Analysis and Fatigue, and has authored or co-authored more than
40 technical publications.

Let's Be Frank
with Inspector Frank
Who are the Stakeholders?

Editor’s Note: Writing under the pseudonym Inspector Frank, the author of this that the real question is Who are the stakeholders involved
column offers a first-hand, candid view of what he has witnessed throughout his and what are their interests and motivations?
career. His purpose in sharing these experiences and opinions is to encourage
If you are currently employed as a contractor, employee, or man-
readers to think deeper about what they do, why they do it, and the possible impact
ager within an owner-user organization this is a very important
of their decisions.
concept to consider.
Inspectioneering is committed to protecting the anonymity of pseudonymous
Right now, in my career, I do a wide variety of work. I still do
authors. We do, however, hold these contributors to the same editorial standards
direct inspection work (yeah—I still put on coveralls and crawl
as those writing under their own name. In this, we know the author’s identity and
through equipment), but these days I also do a lot more program
maintain communications regarding the author’s published works. If you have any
development and management. At either end of that spectrum,
questions, feedback, or concerns stemming from this article, please send an email
understanding who the stakeholders and target audience are
to befrank@inspectioneering.com and we will forward your correspondence to the
helps me to write reports or present information more effectively.
appropriate party.
Understanding who the stakeholders

Introduction and target audience are helps me to
When I went back to school to start my third attempt at a career,
I needed to write lab reports, technical papers, presentations, etc. write reports or present information
I remember having it drilled into me to “know your audience.” more effectively.
Who are you writing for? Is it other technical people, is it upper
management who may not be technically savvy, or is it for some- It also helps me understand why sometimes things appear to
one else entirely? happen that have no basis in the reality that is the integrity
world. To a wider extent, it helps me understand some of what is
That’s probably the first time I started thinking about the bigger
happening in the greater world as well.
picture in the world. In the frame of understanding my current
setting better. But let’s go back to the audience for a second. If I have done an
inspection and am very familiar with the company I am working
Don’t get me wrong; I had written before, including papers, school
for, it is very easy to present that information. I know the people
reports, military reports, and even for pleasure occasionally, but
involved, I know their level of understanding of technical terms,
I had never really sat down to think about my audience to that
inspection techniques, damage mechanisms, and so forth. That
level of detail. Do I change my use of technical language? Do I
knowledge allows me to put together my findings and any sup-
skip technical language and try to make it as understandable as
porting NDE/materials testing in such a way that I know it will
possible? Is the person reading this going to be positively attuned
be received well and, because of that, they will ask me back to do
to my work or do I need to write to win their trust?
more work.
When I started working for an engineering consulting firm, this
But what if I don’t know the company well? Now, I am trying to
became critical. Was I writing a report summarizing the effects of
write for an audience and stakeholders that are unknown to me.
the heat treatment for a company that was looking for technical
This is where I really enjoy the challenge and would like to think
advice or direction, or was I writing a summary of a failure anal-
I am reasonably good at it. What I do (and I am not alone in this,
ysis that was going to have to be understandable to a court full
nor was it originally my idea) is write a non-technical summary
of non-technical people? How about the information I was pre-
up front in such a way that anyone from the company’s secretary
senting? Did I need to make graphs, charts, or other visualizations
to a corrosion engineer can get the gist of what may be wrong and
of data to support my conclusions to technical or non-technical
what likely needs to be done about it. I then follow that with the
people? What is it my audience would really want out of this?
body of the report that includes all the technical nitty gritty that
As I moved more into the petrochemical inspection world, these is concluded with a very technical discussion. In this manner, I
same questions would still come up. Who is the audience for what know my report will be useful to the client no matter who ends
I am doing? In another way of looking at it, I also started realizing up reading it. It’s not rocket science.

So, covering the stakeholders in an inspection report is not too Guard the gates. At the end of the day, the world we live in will
hard; again, just think of the audience. But what if you are an always require a massive amount of energy to run. We who have
integrity employee in a multinational petrochemical company ended up in the integrity field are trying to keep those systems
wondering why the company seems to be doing some really running safely so the world can carry on in whatever way it
dumb sh*t? sees fit. n
To help understand the greater ‘political’ situation, apply the same For more information on this subject or the author, please email
thought process. Who are the stakeholders and audience, and us at inquiries@inspectioneering.com.
what do they hope to get out of the situation?
As I look at the greater petrochemical industry around me in the
world today, some odd things pop up. Demand is down slightly
for private transportation consumer fuel (because of the pan-
demic), while transportation of goods fuel needs has gone up
(again, because of the pandemic). The agriculture industry is still
screaming for petrochemical-supplied fertilizers and pesticides/
herbicides. The demand for plastics and battery components has
risen like crazy, yet the media presents the petrochemical energy
sector in a bad light and says we are at the end. Maybe? But I don’t
think so. The alternatives can’t provide the energy or the supplies
that the world needs and wants right now. Regardless, why are
stocks and investments in petrochemical companies not doing
so well?
Supply and demand would dictate otherwise in a truly free mar-
ket system, but still we see a lagging industry. Hiring freezes are
happening in many areas of the world. Norway, for example, has
had a hiring moratorium for most positions in their state oil com-
pany (Equinor ASA) even though it has stayed financially strong.
Projects are on hold or shut down even though there are strong
demands for the goods those processes produce. Decisions get
made all over the world that don’t seem to make sense.
Again, look at the stakeholders involved. The simplest answer to
explain why stupid decisions seem to get made usually revolves
around money—either making a lot of it or stopping a loss of it.
Why does a company seem to want to stop doing what would
help make it money? You can take a look at the stock prices and
where investors are funneling their funds for the answer. Most
boards of directors are given the responsibility of growing stock
value and unfortunately that doesn’t always mean building a
strong business.
Governments make decisions (in the capitalist world) with goals
to keep economies strong and investments high while hoping
to be re-elected. This unfortunately does not mean keeping the
voters happy in a lot of places, but rather, keeping the lobbying
groups and businesses that support election costs happy.
This means a lot of what we are currently seeing is driven by
greed and fear. Fear of what we might lose, and greed over what
we could gain.
I don’t want to preach, and I don’t want to put ideas in your head.
I am not that smart. What I would like the integrity world to do is
think about the stakeholders involved—whether they are writing
the best report possible for the people who need to read and act on
it, or if they are contemplating why the company they work for
seems to be behaving contrary to common sense.

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ASSET INTEGRITY INTELLIGENCE

Overcoming Pitfalls When Establishing an

VOLUME 27, ISSUE 5

Visit QuestIntegrity.com to learn more.

inspectioneering.com/newsletters 23 Detecting and Quantifying External Fretting-Wear Damage

38 How Digital Twin Improves Maintenance, Reliability, and Asset

Copyright © 2021 Inspectioneering, LLC.

Nov e m ber 20 2 1 Understanding the CCD/IOW Implementation Process

NIA's Insulation Energy Appraisal Program (IEAP)

API Fall Refining and Equipment Standards Meeting

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NIA's Thermal Insulation Inspector Certification Course

Dec e m be r 20 2 1 Robotics for Inspection & Maintenance

13th Chem, Petrochem, and Refinery Shutdowns and Turnarounds Conference

Februa ry 20 2 2 2022 IPEIA Conference and Exhibition

M ar ch 20 2 2 ICPIIT Conference 2022

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Providing a smarter path to optimal performance assurance.

Federal Energy Regulators Issue Standards Following Texas Freeze

Global NDT Services Market Poised to Reach $12.6 Billion by 2026

Oper at o r s Refiner Eneos to Buy Japan Renewable Energy for $1.8B

Shell's Norco Louisiana Complex to Begin Post-Ida Restart

Tank Oil Spill at Marathon's Galveston Bay Refinery

TotalEnergies Feyzin, France Refinery Hit by Fire

ExxonMobil Offers New Proposal to Locked-Out Beaumont Refinery Workers

6 Injured in Explosion at Lake Charles Petrochemical Complex

Shell Eyes Mid-October for Norco Refinery Restart After Ida

Hilcorp Evaluating Phillips 66 Alliance, Louisiana Refinery

SABIC, ExxonMobil Petrochemical JV Begins Commissioning Activities in Texas

Shell to Build One of Europe’s Biggest Biofuels Facilities

P66 Alliance Refinery Faces Multi-Month Shutdown

Bunge, Chevron Announce Proposed JV to Create Renewable Fuel Feedstocks

Phillips 66 Puts Alliance Refinery Up for Sale

HUVR Releases Ultrasonic Testing Inspection Workflow Module

Inspectioneering Prepares 5,000 Meals to Help Feed Local Community

6 Inspectioneering Journal SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER 2021

Pressure, temperature, stress, corrosion... so many potential

Over time, these risks may result in significant operational or maintenance

By proactively managing the lifecycle of pressure vessels, storage tanks, and

Improve safety Indentify areas of

Avoid costly Develop maintenance and

ANSWERS FOR TODAY. INSIGHTS FOR TOMORROW.

Sales@E2G.com // 216.283.9519 // www.E2G.com

Dr. Abdulaziz Moshaweh

8 Inspectioneering Journal SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER 2021

Dr. Andrew Waters

SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER 2021 Inspectioneering Journal 9

Phone: +1 (281) 397-7075

SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER 2021 Inspectioneering Journal 11

Submit all articles to Borealis Group Larsen & Toubro Sasol

publish@inspectioneering.com BP LyondellBasell SATORP (Saudi Aramco Total Refining

accuracy or application of methodologies, Chevron Methanex Corporation Syngenta

case histories, or unauthorized release of CHS Inc. Motiva ThaiOil Group

12 Inspectioneering Journal SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER 2021

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14 Inspectioneering Journal SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER 2021

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20 Inspectioneering Journal SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER 2021

38 How Digital Twin Improves Maintenance, Reliability, and Asset

Figure 8. Radiant Pipe 2 External Figure 9. Radiant Pipe 1 External

Figure 10. Report Results.

Introduction 2. Provide a description of potential methodologies for perform-