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Procedia Engineering 212 (2018) 1075–1082

7th International Conference on Building Resilience; Using scientific knowledge to inform policy
and practice in disaster risk reduction, ICBR2017, 27 – 29 November 2017, Bangkok, Thailand

Failure of Reconciliation in Sri Lanka and risk of reproduction

of war?
N. C. R. Silva*
University of colombo, department of political science & public policy, faculty of arts, colombo 03, sri lanka, crishniruwandika@gmail.com

Abstract

Sri Lankan civil war was ended in 2009, keeping a great role to be played the actors in terms of peace building. Among them
reconciliation has become the foremost approach in peace building discourse. According to the current discourse, the civil war has
ended with a unilateral war victory the ethnic conflict is still going on with no war conditions and with absence of holistic approach
to solve it. Therefore, there will be a great contingency for the reproduction of civil war in future. Thus, it is very important to
identify the major issues which direct to the reproduction of war in future. Civil war is also a kind of disaster which can be
categorized as a manmade disaster. Hence, this paper seeks to explore the following research problem. Why that is the reconciliation
become a difficult and complex in Sri Lanka? This study employed a multiple methods to gather data including a survey and in-
depth interviews. The survey was conducted in the districts of Mannar, Vauvniya, Mullativu and Thrincomalee with a total sample
of 200. Similarly 30 in-depth interviews were carried out with policy makers, politicians, academics, journalists, activists of civil
society and researchers. When it comes to the initial findings, following reasons can be identifies as the potential facts for the
reproduction of civil war in future. 1) Lack of unanimity amongst the actors within the government regarding the post war
reconciliation, 2) Confrontational agenda between the government, civil society organizations and international community, 3)
Ambiguity maintained with regard to policies on reconciliation and peace building, 4) Contradiction among the key policy makers
in the reconciliation process and 6) Greater deal of the ignorance among the general public. Therefore, national security and
restoration of normalcy are being regarded as the salient issues in the post-war landscape in Sri Lanka. Hence, end of the civil war,
it has opened up a new opportunity and time to focus more on sustainable peace and space to deal with the ethnic problem in Sri

* Corresponding author. Tel.: + 094773529954

E-mail address: crishniruwandika@gmail.com

1877-7058 © 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Peer-review under responsibility of the scientific committee of the 7th International Conference on Building Resilience.

1877-7058 © 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Peer-review under responsibility of the scientific committee of the 7th International Conference on Building Resilience
10.1016/j.proeng.2018.01.139
2 N. C. R. Silva/ Procedia Engineering 00 (2017) 000–000
1076 N.C.R. Silva / Procedia Engineering 212 (2018) 1075–1082
2 N. C. R. Silva/ Procedia Engineering 00 (2017) 000–000
Lanka. In this no war condition, still Sri Lanka has filed to overcome the risk of war in future.
Lanka. In this no war condition, still Sri Lanka has filed to overcome the risk of war in future.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Peer-review
© under responsibility
2017 The Authors. Published byof the scientific committee of the 7th International Conference on Building Resilience.
Peer-review under responsibility of Elsevier Ltd. committee
the scientific of the 7th International Conference on Building Resilience.
Peer-review under responsibility of the scientific committee of the 7th International Conference on Building Resilience.
Keywords: Conflict, Reconciliation, Disaster
Keywords: Conflict, Reconciliation, Disaster

1. Introduction
1. Introduction
Sri Lankan civil war was ended in 2009, keeping a great role to be played the actors in terms of peace building.
Among themcivil
Sri Lankan reconciliation
war was ended has in
become the foremost
2009, keeping a greatapproach inplayed
role to be peace the
building
actorsdiscourse.
in terms of According to the
peace building.
current discourse,
Among them the civil war
reconciliation has has endedthe
become with a unilateral
foremost war victory
approach in peacethe ethnic conflict
building is still
discourse. going ontowith
According the
no war conditions
current discourse, and with war
the civil absence of holistic
has ended withapproach to solve
a unilateral it. Therefore,
war victory thereconflict
the ethnic will beisa still
greatgoing
contingency
on with
for the reproduction
no war conditions andofwith
civilabsence
war in future. Thus,
of holistic it is very
approach important
to solve to identify
it. Therefore, thewill
there major
be aissues
greatwhich direct
contingency
to
forthe
thereproduction
reproductionofofwar
civilinwar
future. Civil war
in future. is also
Thus, it isavery
kindimportant
of disasterto
which can the
identify be categorized
major issuesaswhich
a manmade
direct
disaster.
to the reproduction of war in future. Civil war is also a kind of disaster which can be categorized as a manmade
disaster.
1.1 Research Problem
1.1 Research
Eight Problem
years after the end of the civil war, Sri Lanka is still struggling to establish a sustainable and viable peace
Eight years 2015).
(Uyangoda, after the end
The of theofcivil
absence warwar, Sri Lanka
and violence hasisconstructed
still struggling to establish
a favourable a sustainable
political and socialand viable peace
environment for
(Uyangoda,
the 2015).
settlement The
of the absence
ethnic of warThe
conflict. andstate
violence has constructed
of emergency is notainfavourable
operation;political andnosocial
there are environment
curfews, for
no military
the settlement
presence of the
in public ethnicand
spaces, conflict. The state
no daylight of emergency
abductions is not in operation;
and “involuntary there are
disappearances” no curfews,
which no amilitary
used to be part of
presence in public spaces, and no daylight abductions and “involuntary disappearances” which used to be a part of
everyday life in the past (Uyangoda, 2015). In the absence of curfews and sudden bomb explosions in public places,
everyday
Sri lifeeconomy
Lanka’s in the past
and(Uyangoda, 2015).
public culture In the absence
are awake of well.
at night as curfews
Theand sudden
massive bomb explosions
infrastructure in publicprojects,
development places,
Sri Lanka’s
which economy
the previous and publiclaunched
government culture are awake at nightwith
in collaboration as well. The massive
the Chinese infrastructure
state and development
capital, impression projects,
that post-war
which
Sri the previous
Lanka government
has entered launched
a new phase in collaboration
of rapid with the
economic take-off Chinese
under state and capital,
the conditions of socialimpression thatthe
peace. With post-war
end of
Sri Lanka
the has entered
war in 2009, a new phase
the government of rapid
of Sri Lankaeconomic take-off under
and the international the conditions
community of social
emphasized peace.
that With the should
reconciliation end of
the the
be war top
in 2009, the government
priority of Sri
of the country. InLanka and the
addition, the international community
large-scale violence emphasized
in the Northernthat
andreconciliation should
Eastern Provinces,
be the top one
considered priority of key
of the the country.
obstaclesInto addition, the large-scale
reconciliation, ended withviolence in So
the war. thewhy
Northern and Eastern fail
did reconciliation Provinces,
during
considered one
Rajapaksa’s of the
tenure? keyisobstacles
This to reconciliation,
the question at the thematicended
heartwith thestudy.
of this war. So why
This did reconciliation
research fail during
attempts to address the
Rajapaksa’s
following tenure?
issue: WhyThisdid isreconciliation
the question at the thematic
attempts fail inheart of this during
Sri Lanka study. This research
the period of attempts
2009-2015to despite
address the
the
following of
existence issue: Why did
conditions in reconciliation
its favour? attempts fail in Sri Lanka during the period of 2009-2015 despite the
existence of conditions in its favour?

1.2 Methodology
1.2 Methodology
Both primary and secondary data are used in this research. Primary data refers to information and evidence gathered
Both
by primary
research andprimary
from secondary data are
sources, used in
through this research.
surveys, Primary
interviews, data refers
discussions, andtoobservations
information in
andtheevidence gathered
field. Secondary
by research
data fromfrom
is obtained primary sources,sources
secondary through– surveys, interviews,
published materials,discussions, and observations
such as newspapers, reports,inand
theexisting
field. Secondary
research
data is obtained
studies. from
Qualitative secondary
data sources
is collected – published
through opinions,materials, suchideas,
perspectives, as newspapers, reports, andand
stories, recollections, existing research
case histories.
studies. Qualitative
Demographic data is collected
and economic through
information is opinions,
collected perspectives, ideas,
as quantitative data.stories, recollections,
Qualitative and case histories.
and quantitative data are
Demographic
gathered and
as both economic
primary information
and secondary is collected as quantitative data. Qualitative and quantitative data are
data.
gathered as both primary and secondary data.
 N.C.R. Silva / Procedia Engineering 212 (2018) 1075–1082 1077
N. C. R. Silva/ Procedia Engineering 00 (2017) 000–000 3

The research included 45 in-depth interviews with civilians from war-affected communities and interviews with focus
groups discussions of opinion leaders, including practitioners in the field, civil society activists, journalists, academics,
state-level policy makers, bureaucrats, politicians, researchers, and diplomats. The interviewees represent the different
fields of practice, gender, ethnicity, religion, education and locality (mainly the Northern, Eastern and Western
Provinces). Pre-designed and semi-structured in-depth interviews were used.
A survey was conducted to gather quantitative data in six districts, namely, Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee,
Batticaloa, and Mullaitivu, for a total sample of 150. This sample contained respondents who belonged to different
ethnic groups (mainly Sinhala, Tamil, and Muslim), both males and female, in the age categories of 20-30, 30-40, 40-
50 and 50+, with diversity in terms of religion and education, etc. Interviews were conducted through a structured
questionnaire and face-to-face interviews. The questionnaire was designed on themes, such as political view, political
culture, ethnic relations, infrastructure, economic development, and understanding of international community, Tamil
diaspora and political solution to the national question. This was not an exhaustive list; if there were any serious
inquiries related to above themes, it was also added to make a strong framework and understanding on the study. The
questionnaires were translated into both Sinhala and Tamil.

1.3 Facing Down International Pressure

After the civil war came to an end, many international and some local actors requested the Sri Lankan government to
conduct an impartial investigation concerning the growing allegations of war crimes. However, President Mahinda
Rajapaksa, as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and Gotabaya Rajapaksa, as the Secretary of the Ministry of
Defence, continuously refused to cooperate with international organizations, preventing an internal inquiry that met
international standards (Report of the Secretary General`s Panel of expert on accountability on Sri Lanka, 2011). The
UN unilaterally appointed two committees: a Panel of Experts to look into the military’s actions, and a Review Panel
to review the role played by UN officials on the ground and at higher levels, including the Secretary General, Ban Ki-
Moon, during the final stage of the civil war. The Panel of Experts found the Sri Lankan armed forces and the LTTE
in breach of International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL); the first committee
estimated 40,000 deaths, the second committee 70,000; the UN was found to have failed its responsibilities to the
civilian population during the conflict (Report of the Secretary General`s Panel of expert on accountability on Sri
Lanka, 2011).

1.4 Policy Debate on the Darusman Report and the Report of the Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission
In the face of heightened pressure by the international community, including the United Nations, for an impartial
investigation into alleged war crimes, the Rajapaksa eegime government found it difficult to continue their home-
grown policy. Thus, Rajapaksa regime the government appointed the Lessons Learned and Reconciliation
Commission (LLRC) in April 2010 to conduct a domestic investigation. This was also a political manoeuvre while
the risk of the UN committee being appointed loomed large (De Mel, 2013). Nevertheless, the LLRC was criticized
1078 N.C.R. Silva / Procedia Engineering 212 (2018) 1075–1082
4 N. C. R. Silva/ Procedia Engineering 00 (2017) 000–000

from the first as an exercise to conceal or whitewash any wrongdoing by of Rajapaksha Regime. The final report of
the LLRC released in November 2011 exonerated the armed forces from allegations of having violated International
Humanitarian Law and committed war crimes. The following statement of the LLRC report provides evidence

…evaluating the Sri Lanka experience in the context of allegations of violations of IHL, the
Commission is satisfied that the military strategy that was adopted to secure the LTTE held
areas was one that was carefully conceived, in which the protection of the civilian population
was given the highest priority. The Commission also notes in this regard that the movement of
the Security Forces in conducting their operations was deliberately slow during the final stages
of the conflict, thereby evidencing a carefully worked out strategy of avoiding civilian casualties
or minimizing them. (LLRC Report, 2011: 11-12)

1.5 Diplomatic Conflict between the International Community and the Rajapaksa Regime
Thus, steadily ignoring international pressure calling for an independent investigation into possible war crimes meant
that the Rajapaksa regime quickly found itself in a diplomatic conflict with the international community, primarily
the UN. The UNHRC appointment of the Darusman Commission in 2010 was the leading factor in heightening
tensions between the UN and the Sri Lankan state. This appointment was antagonistic towards and rejected the home-
grown approach of the Rajapaksa regime. The Darusman Commission backed the UNHRC to pass a resolution against
Sri Lanka regarding the war crimes allegations. This diplomatic conflict brought the confrontational debate between
the Rajapaksa regime and the UNO centric-international community to a climax. Thereafter, President Rajapaksa and
his regime continued its policy of challenging the West and the UN, rather than finding a holistic approach to post-
war reconciliation. Simultaneously, in response to the Sri Lankan challenge, the UN and western powers kept a hawk
eye on the state’s post-war reconciliation mechanism.

1.6 Confrontational Agendas

During the war, the quest for peace was a normative goal for Sri Lanka. Yet after the war, finding peace in the new
no-war status quo remains a challenge. There are a number of reasons behind this failure to arrive at genuine
reconciliation, including the confrontational agendas of the key stakeholders. This study finds three such incompatible
agendas. The first one is by hard-line nationalists on both sides of the divide, among the Sinhalese and Tamil
communities. The second is the agenda of Muslim political actors, and the third one is the agenda of the international
actors and the civil society organizations.

1.7 Lack of Unanimity within the Rajapaksa Rgime.

There was a major lack of unanimity within the Rajapaksa administration concerning post-war reconciliation. It
appears that politicians, policy makers, and many key representatives had divergent views about how reconciliation
could be achieved in Sri Lanka. For instance, key figures of the Rajapaksa regime, including Gotabaya Rajapaksa
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(Secretary of the Defence), Lalith Weerathunge (Secretary to the President) and Dr. Dayan Jayathilake (former Sri
Lankan Ambassador to France) had three different approaches with regard to engaging the international community.

1.8 Sinhala Buddhist Hegemony and a Single Identity Approach

Sri Lanka’s mainstream political ideology centres Buddhism and the Sinhala nation. Therefore, the majority of Sinhala
Buddhist people believe that the Sri Lanka is their homeland. Promoting this ideology, a prominent analyst emphasizes
“the need to guard Sinhalese people and Buddhism against alien forces” (Ojuela et al., 2016). However, Buddhist
philosophy comes under the concept of Do No Harm. Contemporary Sinhala Buddhist nationalist groups in Sri Lanka,
such as Sinha Le (Lion’s Blood) and Bodu Bala Sena (BBS, Buddhist Power Force), continue to exert political
influence in Sri Lanka. This is a dangerous fact in the current political arena, as the presence of such groups make it
more difficult to achieve reconciliation with Tamil minority groups. After the unilateral victory in 2009, Sinhala
Buddhist nationalism became a more powerful political force in Sri Lanka. They defined this victory as a personal
victory of the Sinhala Buddhist nation. While celebrating the overwhelming war victory, the Rajapaksa regime was
also responsible for propagating Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. This is a kind of political trap employed by the political
parties in heterogenic and multicultural societies like Sri Lanka.

1.9 Domination of the Reconciliation Process by the Ministry of Defence

Ministry of Defence domination was also a major obstacle in the post-war reconciliation process of the Rajapaksa
government. The post-war period led to significant overall shifts in the modus operandi of the Armed Forces.
Intelligence units were strengthened and expanded all over the former war affected areas, and more use was made of
the engineering battalions of the army forces for reconstruction and national development purposes. At the same time,
the Ministry of Defence under the leadership of Gotabaya Rajapaksa developed new policies and procedures for
military forces and their functions related to internal security (Herath, 2012). Gotabaya Rajapaksa was in charge of
not only the former war affected areas but also slated to control a proposed new Colombo Metropolitan Corporation
to oversee five municipal councils. The new corporation would have a “wide scope of powers and functions to govern
and develop” and was expected to continue contentious urban development initiatives Gotabaya was already pursuing
(Stokke, 2011). His dominant Sinhalese military was continually extending its role into civilian affairs, such as
requiring university entrants to attend mandatory “leadership training” at army camps.

1.10General Public’s Lack of Awareness about Reconciliation

Since 2009, the concept of reconciliation became mainstream in Sri Lankan political discourse after the defeat of
LTTE terrorism. Nevertheless, it seemed that most ordinary people were unaware of the concept, which was
considered only a political slogan. Sometimes wrong connotations of reconciliation created great scepticism among
the public. For instance, one Sinhala respondent described reconciliation as nothing but an agenda by the international
community to divide the country. In addition, a Tamil respondent explained reconciliation as a set of bogus promises
1080 N.C.R. Silva / Procedia Engineering 212 (2018) 1075–1082
6 N. C. R. Silva/ Procedia Engineering 00 (2017) 000–000

in post-war Sri Lankan society. Against this backdrop, this study revealed that a majority of ordinary Sinhala and
Tamil people are unaware of the concept of reconciliation. This allowed a few political elites in the Rajapaksa regime
to direct the reconciliation process as they wish.

1.11 Crisis of Democracy: Securing the Rajapaksa Dynasty

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka is neither democratic nor socialist. Since the war victory in 2009, it
was fast becoming a ruthless fascist dictatorship, leading to a crisis in democracy. In addition, there is a crisis of
capitalism in Sri Lanka (Senewirathne, 2015). By 2005, Sri Lanka had drifted towards a politico-military fascist state
run by President Rajapaksa, his brothers, and the military. By 2010, it had actually become a Rajapaksa autocracy.
Nepotism was a significant feature of the Rajapaksa Regime government on its way towards autocracy. The
International Crisis Group describes how the state accomplished soft authoritarianism by fabricating and manipulating
public opinion through the war victory. The president’s brothers, Gotabaya and Basil, and son, Namal, were active
partners in and direct beneficiaries of the government’s post-war agenda. Moreover, there were plans to expand their
domains. In addition to the PTF, Basil Rajapaksa took control over the new, unelected, local governance layer (Jana
Sabhas or People’s Councils) (International Crisis Group, 2012). Likewise, Gotabaya had control of the development
process of the country under his Ministry of Defence and Urban Development. Namal Rajapaksa was the next heir
apparent of the Rajapaksa dynasty.

1.12 Conclusion
The Sri Lankan experience shows that post-war transition is more complex and difficult following a unilateral war
victory, in comparison with a conflict that ends in a negotiated peace settlement. The military victory of the Rajapaksa
regime, a triumphalist mind-sets, and the total decimation of the LTTE created a new status quo which may be
characterized as an absolute disequilibrium between the government that executed the war and the Tamil minority
whose bargaining power was silent during the war. In parallel, the Rajapaksa regime’s continued militaristic rhetoric
after the war actively contributed to the disequilibrium of interests between the Sinhalese and Tamils. Key
administration figures, particularly former Secretary of Defence Gotabhaya Rajapaksa (perhaps due to his military
background), brought an antagonistic approach to the post-war political arena, thus influencing the reconciliation
agenda. Moreover, the widespread victory celebration by the general public in the south after the war was manipulated
by the Rajapaksa regime as a political strategy to secure its power in Sinhala-dominated areas. Also, in representing
the Sinhala Buddhist hegemony, the Rajapaksa regime was unable to address Sinhala and Tamil interests in a just
manner. Thus, the post-civil war peace in Sri Lanka continues to be an asymmetric peace between the victor and the
vanquished.
The conclusion of the war does not necessarily mean that the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka has ended. Rather, the
conflict has been redefined and reproduced with new actors, new approaches, and new global locations. Simply put,
following the end of the civil war, the ethnic conflict assumed a new approach: the Rajapaksa regime, the West-led
global powers, and civil society organizations were the three main stakeholders in this new phase of the Sri Lankan
 N.C.R. Silva / Procedia Engineering 212 (2018) 1075–1082 1081
N. C. R. Silva/ Procedia Engineering 00 (2017) 000–000 7

conflict, with a range of global and domestic actors aligning themselves with either party. Rajapakse’s regime faced
serious diplomatic conflicts with the United Nations and the Western European bloc. The Sri Lankan government’s
home-grown post-war strategy was characterized by centralization, militarization, and economic development,
whereas the UNO and the West-led international community advocated a liberal democratic peace building approach
focused on sustainable peace and democratization. The inherent contradictions within these diverse approaches to
post-war reconciliation created a cold battleground in post-war Sri Lanka, with the genuine need for reconciliation
remaining unaddressed.
This conflict between the UNO and the Western European bloc, on the one hand, and the Rajapaksa regime, on the
other, distorted the post-war peace building and reconciliation agenda. Furthermore, it repolarized the political forces
shaping the ethnic conflict, delayed humanitarian and peace building priorities, and even restricted the space for
political and policy alternatives to emerge. In fact, the fundamental antagonistic attitudes between these key
stakeholders (the state, the Tamil and Sinhala polities, the UN and Western powers, civil society organizations)
became a habitual practice during the Rajapaksa regime making reconciliation more complicated and difficult.

Furthermore, the contradictions among the approaches to peace building and reconciliation among the key
stakeholders (as discussed above) provided political rewards for ambitious local political elites, who took advantage
of the situation to realize short-term political objectives. For instance, President Rajapaksa manipulated the conflict
between competitive approaches to reconciliation to maintain his heroic status among the Sinhala Buddhist majority
by interpreting international pressure on post-war reconciliation as a conspiracy against Sri Lanka’s unitary status.
Later, this became a chronic misperception among the Sinhala Buddhist polity. Consequently, the Rajapaksa
administration followed a pragmatic strategy of marking time rather than directly addressing the issue of national
reconciliation.

Furthermore, a lack of policy unanimity among prominent members of Rajapaksa’s government further complicated
post-war reconciliation. While Gotabaya Rajapaksa (Secretary of Defence) advocated a Sri Lankan solution, Lalith
Weerathunge (Secretary to President Rajapaksa) adopted a more pragmatic approach which was adjustable according
to the context. Dayan Jayatilleke (then Sri Lankan Ambassador to France) had a quite critical outlook, based on a
classical balance of power approach. These individual approaches created ambiguity about how to move forward on
post-war reconciliation in Sri Lanka. Thus, the confrontational approaches between both domestic political elites and
global political actors need to be treated as conflicts that call for a mediated and negotiated settlement. Indeed, Sri
Lanka’s negative peace building experience during the past six years points to the inadequacy of thinking about an
ultimate solution for the ethnic conflict.
The shortcomings in the LLRC report, seen as the Rajapaksa regime’s handbook on reconciliation, contributed to the
stalling tactics and confusion about how to move forward on post-war peace building. There are several instances of
a mismatch between the LLRC recommendations and suggested activities in the action plan. These issues continued
1082 N.C.R. Silva / Procedia Engineering 212 (2018) 1075–1082
8 N. C. R. Silva/ Procedia Engineering 00 (2017) 000–000

to persist even in the progress report on the implementation of the LLRC action plan. However, the implementation
of the LLRC recommendations is crucial against the backdrop of the resolutions on Sri Lanka in the UNHRC. The
state must underscore the critical importance of civil society and international attention to issues of human rights
protection and accountability in Sri Lanka. Hence, it is essential that a mechanism to face augmented and persistent
challenges, democratic governance, durable peace, reconciliation, and unity be introduced.

Moreover, the state’s lack of genuine interest to involve and accept civil society support was also a barrier to
reconciliation. The state should have carried out civil society and public consultations on matters relating to legislation
and public policy. Instead the Rajapaksa regime neglected and ignored the expertise of organizations that could have
supported post-war peace building activities with financial and human resource assistance. Furthermore, civil society
organizations had a very limited space to function during this period for two main reasons. First, the PTF and the
Ministry of Defence dominated the post-war reconciliation agenda. Second, there was no intellectual discourse on
reconciliation. While there were diverse individual and group opinions about a political settlement to the ethnic
conflict during the Rajapaksa regime, they failed to become mainstream until 2015. In this context, civil society
organizations were side-lined from post-war reconciliation.

The way in which the civil war ended, as well as the conflict between the Rajapaksa regime and major global and civil
society actors, suggests that peace building and reconciliation required a regime change. Indeed international agencies
and civil society organizations expected a common political representation to address the polarization between the
Sinhala and Tamil communities during the past six years. After the partial regime change in January, 2015, there has
been new hope that a political solution to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka may be found.

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