Regional Security Dialogue InThe Middle East

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Regional Security Dialogue in the

Middle East
At this time of considerable political turmoil in the Middle East, there is a

pressing need to explore alternative frameworks for regional security. This
book discusses the Helsinki Process as one potentially relevant historical
model to learn from.
The Helsinki Process began in a divided Europe in the early 1970s and,
over 40 years, achieved major successes in promoting cooperation between
the Warsaw Pact and NATO member states on social, human rights, security,
and political issues. In this volume, established Middle East experts, former
diplomats, and emerging scholars assess the regional realities from a broad
range of perspectives and, with the current momentum for turbulence across
the Middle East, chart a path toward a comprehensive mechanism that could
promote long-term regional security.
Providing a gamut of views on regional threat perception and suggesting
ways forward for regional peace, this book is essential reading for students and
scholars with an interest in Politics, the Middle East, and Conflict Studies.
Chen Kane is Middle East Projects Manager and Senior Research Associate
at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Washington DC
office. Kane is the author of numerous publications on nuclear nonprolifera-
tion and global security, and the founder of the Middle East Next Generation
Network. She has held research positions at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard University, and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Egle Murauskaite is Research Associate at the James Martin Center for

Nonproliferation Studies, Washington DC office. She specializes in trends in
sensitive technology transfers and interdisciplinary research on other nuclear
proliferation challenges, with a focus on the Middle East and South Asia.
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UCLA Center for Middle East Development (CMED)

Edited by Steven Spiegel,
UCLA
Edited by Elizabeth Matthews,

California State University, San Marcos
The UCLA Center for Middle East Development (CMED) series on Middle
East security and cooperation is designed to present a variety of perspectives
on a specific topic, such as democracy in the Middle East, dynamics of
Israeli-Palestinian relations, Gulf security, and the gender factor in the
Middle East. The uniqueness of the series is that the authors write from the
viewpoint of a variety of countries so that, no matter what the issue, articles
appear from many different states, both within and beyond the region. No
existing series provides a comparable, multinational collection of authors in
each volume. Thus, the series presents a combination of writers from coun-
tries who, for political reasons, do not always publish in the same volume.
The series features a number of subthemes under a single heading, covering
security, social, political, and economic factors affecting the Middle East.
1. The Struggle over Democracy in the Middle East

Regional politics and external policies
Edited by Nathan J. Brown and Emad El-Din Shahin
2. Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Agents of change
Edited by Fatima Sadiqi and Moha Ennaji
3. The Israel-Palestine Conflict

Parallel discourses
Edited by Elizabeth Matthews
4. Gender and Violence in the Middle East

Edited by Moha Ennaji and Fatima Sadiqi
5. Non-State Actors in the Middle East

Factors for peace and democracy
Galia Golan and Walid Salem
6. Regional Security Dialogue in the Middle East

Changes, Challenges and Opportunities
Edited by Chen Kane and Egle Murauskaite
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Regional Security Dialogue

in the Middle East
Changes, challenges and opportunities
Edited by
Chen Kane and Egle Murauskaite
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First published 2014

by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2014 Chen Kane and Egle Murauskaite
The right of the editors to be identified as the authors of the editorial
material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted
in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Regional security dialogue in the Middle East : changes, challenges and
opportunities / edited by Chen Kane and Egle Murauskaite.
pages cm. – (UCLA Center for Middle East development series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Security, International–Middle East 2. Strategic culture–Middle East.
3. Arms control–Middle East. 4. Middle East–Foreign relations. 5. Helsinki
Process on Globalisation and Democracy. I. Kane, Chen, author, editor of
compilation. II. Murauskaite, Egle, author, editor of compilation.
JZ6009.M628R437 2014
355’.0310956–dc23
2013047158
ISBN: 978-1-138-01838-9 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-138-01849-5 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-77386-5 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman

by Cenveo Publisher Services
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Contents
List of contributors vii

List of abbreviations xv
Foreword xvi
JAAKKO LAAJAVA
Introduction 1
CHEN KANE AND EGLE MURAUSKAITE
PART I
The Helsinki Process 17
1 Cautious optimism: The Helsinki Process as a model for

negotiations in the Middle East 19
LYNN M. HANSEN
2 A zone in the Middle East: Confidence-building measures and the

European experience 38
ROLF EKÉUS
PART II
Perspectives from the region and outside 51
3 The Helsinki Process and the Middle East: The viability

of cooperative security frameworks for a region in flux 53
NABIL FAHMY AND KARIM HAGGAG
4 The Helsinki Process and its relevance in a changing Middle

East: An Israeli perspective 91
EHUD EIRAN
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vi Contents
5 Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East: A
political view from Riyadh 103
HRH PRINCE TURKI AL-FAISAL OF SAUDI ARABIA AND AWADH AL-BADI
6 Domestic politics in Iran and a future regional process 111

ARIANE M. TABATABAI
7 Lessons learned: The Turkish role in arms control and regional

security talks in the Middle East 129
NILSU GÖREN
PART III
The Middle East today: Changes, challenges, and opportunities 147
8 The Helsinki Process in the Middle East: Promoting security,

development, democracy, and peace 149
GERSHON BASKIN AND HANNA SINIORA
9 The future of arms control in the Middle East 170

BILAL SAAB
10 The Middle East and the Helsinki Process: Unfulfilled

aspiration … so far 184
MICHAEL YAFFE
11 Civil society dialogues and Middle East regional security:

The Asia-Pacific model 198
PETER JONES
PART IV
Possible futures 213
12 A Helsinki Process for the Middle East? New discourse,

new opportunities 215
PATRICIA LEWIS AND KARIM KAMEL
Conclusion: Charting a course inspired by the Helsinki experience 233

CHEN KANE
Index 244
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Contributors
Jaakko Laajava is the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Security

Policy in the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In 2011, he was desig-
nated the facilitator for the conference on the establishment of a Middle
East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruc-
tion, prior to which he served as Finland’s Ambassador to the UK (2005–
2010). From 1996 to 2001, Laajava served as Finland’s Ambassador to the
US in Washington, DC, where he had earlier been appointed as the
Deputy Chief of Mission (1986–1990). Following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Laajava was closely involved in shaping Finnish foreign policy, and
his contributions were instrumental in negotiating Finland’s accession to
the European Union. From 1985 to 1986, he was a Fellow at the Center
for International Affairs at Harvard University in Cambridge, MA. Laa-
java was also the Head of Arms Control Section at the Finnish Ministry
for Foreign Affairs from 1982 to 1985 and the Political Director from 1992
to 1996. In over four decades he spent with Finland’s Foreign Service,
Laajava has held posts in Paris, Madrid, Belgrade, and Warsaw, and has
served as Attaché with Finland’s Mission to the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Geneva. He holds an MA from the
University of Helsinki and a BA from Stockholm University.
Chen Kane is Middle East Projects Manager at the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Washington, DC office. She focuses on
projects related to the reduction of the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and the projected expansion of nuclear energy, with a parti-
cular focus on the Middle East. She also serves as an advisor to the
National Nuclear Security Administration. Kane is the founder of the
Middle East Next Generation of Arms Control Specialists Network and
co-editor of the website Arms Control and Regional Security for the
Middle East. Prior to joining the CNS, Kane served as a fellow in the
nonproliferation program at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) and worked for the Israel Atomic Energy Commission
(IAEC), eventually becoming Director of External Relations. Kane has
held research positions at the Belfer Center for Science and International
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viii Contributors
Affairs, Harvard University, and the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy. She was an advisor to both the Jebsen Center for Counter-
Terrorism Studies at Tufts University and the Crown Center for Middle
East Studies at Brandeis University, and was an adjunct professor with the
National Defense University. She has served as an officer in the Israeli
Defense Forces. Kane holds a PhD from Tufts University’s Fletcher School
of Law and Diplomacy, and an MA and BA from Tel Aviv University.
Egle Murauskaite is Research Associate at the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Washington, DC office. She specializes
in trends of nuclear and dual-use technology transfers, with a focus on
the Middle East and South Asia. Her work appeared in the Global Policy
Journal, Arms Control Today, the Chicago Tribune, as well as the website
Arms Control and Regional Security for the Middle East; she also pre-
sented her research at the 54th Annual Convention of the International
Studies Association (ISA), the 26th Annual Conference of the Interna-
tional Association for Conflict Management (IACM), the 8th Pan-
European Conference on International Relations, and the ISA ISSS-ISAC
Joint Annual Conference. Prior to joining the CNS, Murauskaite had
been working as a research assistant with Nabil Fahmy at the American
University in Cairo. In 2011, she taught a short course, “Introduction to
Politics and Negotiations,” at Vilnius Satrija Youth Center. She holds
an MA (summa cum laude) in International Security Studies from
Sciences Po Paris and a BA in Economics from the Stockholm School of
Economics in Riga.
Lynn M. Hansen’s positions were Vice-Chairman of the National Intelligence
Council, US Intelligence Community and Director of the Collection
Concepts Development Center, CIA. Hansen also served as Deputy Head of
the US Delegation to Stockholm Conference (with personal rank of
ambassador), Assistant Director of US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, Ambassador and Head of US Delegation to the Geneva Con-
ference on Disarmament, Ambassador and Head of US Delegation to the
Vienna Negotiations on Conventional Forces Europe, and Political Advisor
to the Commander of US and NATO Air Forces in Europe. Hansen had
spent 23 years in active service in the US Air Force (USAF) and retired in
1983 as a full colonel. He was the holder of the first endowed chair at the
USAF Academy in Colorado Springs, the John M Olin Distinguished
Professor of National Defense and Security Studies. Educated at Utah State
University, Hansen was a Fulbright Scholar to the Free University of Berlin.
The recipient of an MA and a PhD, he was fluent in German, Dutch,
Swedish, and Russian. Hansen passed away in October 2013.
Rolf Ekéus is former Chairman of the Board of the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). He is also a member of the board of
directors of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and the European
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Contributors ix
Leadership Network (ELN). From 2001 to 2007, he served as High
Commissioner on National Minorities for the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe. He has held a number of diplomatic posts,
including Swedish Ambassador to the United States from 1997 to 2000
and Head of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq
(UNSCOM). From 1991 to 1997, he served as Executive Chairman of
UNSCOM. In that post, he was responsible for work that sought to elim-
inate the Iraqi infrastructure for nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction. He served as Ambassador and Head of the Swedish delegation
to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as Permanent
Representative of Sweden to the Conference on Disarmament (1983–1989),
and as Chairman of the international negotiations on the Chemical
Weapons Convention. He is a member of the board of the International
Commission on Missing Persons. He also serves as Chairman of the
Swedish Pugwash Network. He was a member of the Advisory Board on
Disarmament Matters of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the
Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, and the
Tokyo Forum on Disarmament. His work in this field was recognized with
the Wateler Peace Prize from the Carnegie Foundation in 1997.
Nabil Fahmy was the founding Dean of the School of Public Affairs at the
American University in Cairo, and the Chair of the James Martin Center
for Nonproliferation Studies’ Middle East Project at the time of writing.
As of September 1, 2008, he has been Ambassador at Large at the
Egyptian Foreign Ministry after completing his post as Ambassador of
Egypt to the United States since October 1999. He also served as Egypt’s
Ambassador to Japan from September 1997 to September 1999 and before
that as the Political Advisor to the Foreign Minister from 1992 to 1997; he
has held numerous posts in the Egyptian government since 1974. Fahmy is
a career diplomat, who has played an active role in the numerous efforts to
bring peace to the Middle East, as well as in international and regional
disarmament affairs. He headed the Egyptian delegation to the Middle
East Peace Process Steering Committee in 1993 and the Egyptian delega-
tion to the Multilateral Working Group on Regional Security and Arms
Control emanating from the Madrid Peace Conference since December
1991. Over the years, Fahmy has been a member of the Egyptian Missions
to the United Nations (Disarmament and Political Affairs) in Geneva and
New York. He was elected Vice Chairman of the First Committee on
Disarmament and International Security Affairs of the 44th Session of the
UN General Assembly in 1986, and from 1999 until 2003, he was a
member of the UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board of Disarmament
Matters, where he served as its chairman in 2001. Fahmy has written
extensively on Middle East politics, peacemaking, regional security, and
disarmament. He holds a BSc in Physics and Mathematics, and an MA in
Management from the American University in Cairo.
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x Contributors
Karim Haggag is an Egyptian career diplomat. He has served in numerous
capacities as part of Egypt’s Foreign Service, focusing on Middle East
regional security, arms control and nonproliferation, and Arab-Israeli
diplomacy. At the time of writing he was a visiting faculty member at the
Near East and South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies at the
National Defense University in Washington, DC, where he focused on
the implications of the Arab Uprisings. He served as the Director of
the Egyptian Press and Information Office in Washington, DC from 2007
to 2011. From 2002 to 2007, he served in the Office of the Presidency in
Cairo and was responsible for US-Egyptian relations and economic policy
coordination. Prior to that, he was assigned to the political section
of Egypt’s embassy in Washington, DC, where he was responsible for
politico-military affairs, including the Arab-Israeli Peace Process.
Ehud Eiran is Assistant Professor at the Division of International Relations,
School of Political Science at the University of Haifa. Eiran holds degrees
in Law and Political Science from Tel-Aviv University, Cambridge, and
Brandeis University. He held research appointments at Harvard Law
School, Harvard Kennedy School, and Brandeis University, and was a
lecturer in the Department of Political Science at MIT. Prior to his aca-
demic career, Eiran held a number of positions in the Israeli civil service,
including Assistant to the Prime Minister’s Foreign Policy Advisor. Eiran
published numerous analytical pieces in popular and scholarly outlets,
including the online editions of the New York Times, Foreign Affairs, and
Newsweek, and was a guest on leading American shows such Charlie Rose
and NPR’s On Point. Eiran is interested in practical and theoretical
aspects of international conflict and conflict resolution, with a particular
interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
His Royal Highness Prince Turki Al-Faisal bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud was born
on February 15, 1945, in Makkah, Saudi Arabia. His Royal Highness
began his schooling at the Taif Model School and went on to complete his
high school diploma at the Lawrenceville School in New Jersey. His Royal
Highness then studied at Georgetown University. He was appointed as an
Advisor at the Royal Court in 1973.
In 1977, His Royal Highness was appointed Director-General (with the
rank of Minister) of the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), Saudi
Arabia’s main foreign intelligence service, and served as Head of the
GID until August 2001. In October 2002, he was appointed as the Saudi
Arabian Ambassador to the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland.
His Royal Highness served in that position until July 2005, when he
was appointed as Ambassador to the United States. He retired in February
2007.
A founder and trustee of the King Faisal Foundation, His Royal High-
ness is also the Chairman of the King Faisal Center for Research and
Islamic Studies. In addition, His Royal Highness is a trustee of the Oxford
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Contributors xi
Centre for Islamic Studies at Oxford University and the Center for Con-
temporary Arab Studies (CCAS) at Georgetown University. He received
an honorary PhD in Law in 2010 from the University of Ulster in Ireland
and an honorary PhD in International Politics in 2011 from the University
of Hankuk in South Korea. His Royal Highness is a visiting distinguished
professor at Georgetown University, and he is an active participant in
the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting, the Munich Security
Conference, and the Clinton Global Initiative’s Annual Meeting. He is also
a member of the International Advisory Board of the National Bank of
Kuwait.
Awadh Al-Badi is Senior Research Fellow at the King Faisal Center for
Research and Islamic Studies, Saudi Arabia.
Ariane M. Tabatabai is a PhD candidate in the Department of War Studies,
King’s College London, focusing on the strategic implications of the
legality of nuclear weapons under Islamic law. She is a 2013–2014 pre-
doctoral Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. She was a non-resident
Research Associate with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation
Studies. She is also part of the CNS Network of the Middle East Next
Generation of Arms Control Specialists. She holds an MA in International
Peace and Security (with distinction) from King’s College London and a
double BA in Political Science and Cinema and Cultural Studies (cum laude)
from the State University of New York at Stony Brook.
Nilsu Gören is a PhD candidate at the University of Maryland’s School of
Public Policy, specializing in International Security and Economic Policy,
and a graduate fellow at CISSM, focusing on nonproliferation issues. Prior
to coming to Maryland, she was an instructor at Koc University (Istanbul)
and a research assistant at the CNS, Washington, DC office, where she
worked on export control and illicit nuclear trafficking issues. She holds an
MA in Political Science and a BA in Economics from Sabanci University
(Istanbul).
Gershon Baskin, born and raised in the United States, is a veteran Israeli
peacemaker. He is the Israeli Co-Chair of the Israel/Palestine Center for
Research and Information (IPCRI), a joint Israeli-Palestinian public policy
research think tank working on issues in conflict between the two sides,
which he founded in 1988. Previously, he founded and directed the Insti-
tute for Education for Jewish-Arab Coexistence, which was affiliated with
the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Education. He
served for 20 years (reserves) in the IDF College for the Education of
Officers where he lectured on Israeli and Palestinian society and politics.
Baskin is an expert on almost all aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process. He also writes a regular column
in the Jerusalem Post called “Encountering Peace.”
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xii Contributors
Hanna Siniora is a Palestinian Christian who lives in East Jerusalem. He is
the publisher of The Jerusalem Times and the Palestinian Co-Chair of the
Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI). He is also a
member of the Palestine National Council and the Chairman of the Board
of the European-Palestinian Chamber of Commerce, as well as former
Chair of the American-Palestinian Chamber of Commerce. An early pro-
ponent of dialogue and negotiations with Israel, Siniora has a long history
of involvement in pro-peace activities. For his lifetime commitment to
working toward Palestinian-Israeli peace, he was awarded the Order of the
Knights of Malta. Born in Jerusalem in 1937, Siniora completed his BSc in
Pharmacy at a university in Benares, India in 1969, at which time he
returned to the West Bank. In February 1974, he was asked to manage the
Arabic language newspaper Al Fajr after its editor-in-chief, Yusuf Nasr,
was kidnapped. He established an English language version of Al Fajr in
1980 and served as its editor; he was later granted the position of editor-in-
chief of the Arabic language version of the newspaper in 1983.
Bilal Saab is Senior Fellow for Middle East Security at the Brent Scowcroft
Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council and former
Executive Director and Head of Research of the Institute for Near East
and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) North America in Washington,
DC. He is the founder and editor-in-chief of the website Arms Control and
Regional Security for the Middle East (www.middleeast-armscontrol.com)
and was a non-resident scholar with the James Martin Center for Non-
proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
Previously, Saab worked at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the
Brookings Institution as a research analyst. Prior to joining the Brookings
Institution, he was Chief Officer and Editor of the Middle East Desk at the
Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the
University of St Andrews in Scotland, where he was a British Council
scholar. Before that, he held several research positions at the Lebanese
Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) in Beirut and at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) and the Middle East Institute (MEI) in
Washington, DC. Saab is a prolific scholar who specializes in defense
and security affairs in the Middle East and a regular international media
commentator with numerous appearances on NPR, BBC, and France 24,
as well as in the New York Times and the Washington Post. He is fluent in
Arabic and French.
Michael Yaffe is Professor at the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for
Strategic Studies in Washington, DC. Prior to joining the NESA Center,
Yaffe was a career Foreign Affairs Officer in the US Department of State,
where he focused on Middle East security and weapons of mass destruc-
tion nonproliferation. From 1993 until 2001, he served on the US delega-
tion to the Middle East Peace Process, focusing on multilateral
negotiations in the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Working
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Contributors xiii
Group. Additionally, he organized and managed the US government’s
multi-million-dollar Middle East regional security Track 2 program fos-
tering regional security dialogue and promoting confidence-building mea-
sures. As an expert on nonproliferation and arms control, he also served as
Senior Advisor and Lead US Negotiator on Middle East issues to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Preparatory Committees and the 2000
Review Conference, as well as the Annual General Conferences of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In the immediate aftermath
of the attack on September 11, 2001, he served as a coordinator on the
counter-terrorism task force in support of “Operation Enduring Freedom.”
During 1992 and 1993, Yaffe supported “Operation Restore Hope” by
managing a program in Mogadishu that provided 100 civilian translators
to US forces in Somalia. He was a recipient of two Department of State
Superior Honor Awards, a Group Meritorious Honor Award, and a
Department of the Army Certificate of Appreciation. From 1989 to 1993,
Yaffe was a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University’s John M Olin
Institute for Strategic Studies, Associate Fellow at the Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, and
Peace Scholar at the United States Institute of Peace. His undergraduate
education was in Economics at the University of Massachusetts at
Amherst. He received an MA in International Relations from the London
School of Economics and a PhD from the University of Pennsylvania. He
has published articles on Middle East security, arms control, diplomatic
history, and strategic studies.
Peter Jones is Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Public and
International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. He holds a PhD in War
Studies from Kings’ College London and an MA in War Studies from the
Royal Military College of Canada. Before joining the University of
Ottawa, he served as a senior analyst for the Security and Intelligence
Secretariat of the Privy Council of Canada. Previously, he held various
positions related to international affairs and security at the Department of
Foreign Affairs, the Privy Council Office, and the Department of National
Defence. An expert on security in the Middle East and Track 2 diplomacy,
Jones led the Middle East Security and Arms Control Project at the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in Sweden in
the 1990s. He is presently leading several Track 2 initiatives in South Asia
and the Middle East, and is also widely published on Iran. He is also
Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution at
Stanford University and a member of the Council of the Pugwash Con-
ferences on Sciences and World Affairs.
Patricia Lewis is Research Director for International Security in Chatham
House in London. Previously, she served as Deputy Director and Scientist-
in-Residence at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in
Monterey, California. She holds a BSc in Physics from the University of
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xiv Contributors
Manchester and a PhD in Nuclear Structure Physics from the University
of Birmingham. Lewis was Director of VERTIC, the Verification Research
and Training Centre in London (1989–1997) and Director of UNIDIR, the
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva (1997–
2008). She was also a consultant for the UK Foreign and Commonwealth
Office and the UK Ministry of Defence on verification of the Conventional
Forces in Europe Treaty. She was a reviewer for the Canberra Commission
on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (1996), a member of the Tokyo
Forum for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament (1998–1999), a
commissioner (Ireland) on the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission,
commonly referred to as the Blix Commission (2004–2006), and a special
advisor to the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and
Disarmament chaired by Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi (2008–
2010). Most recently, Lewis served on the Advisory Panel on Future Prio-
rities for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
chaired by Rolf Ekéus (2010–2011). In her capacity as Director of
UNIDIR, she was a member of the United Nations Secretary-General’s
Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (1997–2008). She was the Eli-
zabeth Poppleton Fellow at the Australian National University in 1992 and
the UK Governmental Expert on the 1989–1990 United Nations Expert
Study on Verification in All its Aspects.
Karim Kamel is a program associate for the Conflict Prevention and Peace
Forum at the Social Science Research Council. Before joining the Council,
Karim worked as a consultant for the External Relations and International
Cooperation Section at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization (CTBTO), where he focused on policy research, with specific
emphasis on the Middle East. Karim’s main research focus is arms control
in the Middle East. He also served at the United Nations Office for
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) in Vienna, supporting the administrative
and substantive work of the UNODA, particularly in areas related to its
cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the
CTBTO, as well as the nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) and Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear (CBN) security culture.
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Abbreviations
ACRS Arms Control and Regional Security

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CBMs Confidence-building measures
CFE Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CSBMs Confidence- and security-building measures
CSCE Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
EU European Union
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NWFZ Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
WMDFZ Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-Free Zone
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Foreword
Jaakko Laajava
One can identify a multitude of reasons why the model and framework of
post-Cold War Europe in building security, cooperation, and trust – aka the
Helsinki Process – cannot be exported to the Middle East. To start with, there
is the general question of what can be learned from history, even within one
region. In addition to the temporal dimension – which this question raises –
there is a geopolitical dimension. The Middle East is not Europe, although
the two regions are closely interconnected.
Yet, it can be argued equally convincingly that many lessons and best prac-
tices of the Helsinki Process – where not only the main adversaries, the two
military blocs, but also the European neutral and non-aligned countries played
a role – are worth studying from the perspective of the Middle East. This book
edited by Chen Kane and Egle Murauskaite makes this observation justified
with the help of insightful views from both within and outside the region.
The usefulness of European lessons for the Middle East can be built upon
findings about the dynamics of the process during its initial stage just as much
as it can be built on the process’ end results. When the Helsinki Process was
launched, the overall strategic situation in Europe had many similarities to
the present-day state of affairs in the Middle East: there was a conflict (or
conflicts) along with the threat of the use of force; weapons of mass destruc-
tion were in the possession of many governments; there was an overall per-
ception of a zero-sum situation; and there was a lack of trust and stability.
When it came to interstate relations, nonrecognition played a role.
Where the strategic setting in Europe of the 1970s clearly differs from that
of the Middle East of today is in the presence of two military alliances led by
two dominant superpowers. The situation and threat perceptions emerging
from it were symmetrical, whereas the Middle East today is plagued by a
number of asymmetric conflicts. Power relations between states in the region
are much more complex, not to mention the presence and influence of
significant non-state actors. European countries on both sides of the Iron
Curtain, in the initial stages of the Helsinki Process – and many years there-
after – were internally quite stable compared to the internal volatility of many
countries in the Middle East today. All these features are given a thorough
analysis in this book.
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Foreword xvii
Some of the characteristics of the Helsinki Process are particularly note-
worthy. The internal dynamics, including the initiative itself, were driven from
within the region. The process was – and still is – an evolutionary one. These
two factors were intertwined in an interesting way. The Helsinki Process
basically started as a state-driven effort with a careful balance between state
sovereignty and self-determination on the one hand, and the rights and free-
doms of individual citizens on the other. At the outset, while providing for a
more rules-based security and stability, it seemed to cement the ideological
and politico-military divide in Europe. Yet, the most prominent achievements
of the Helsinki Process were the popular uprisings in Eastern Europe and the
regime changes there. Many Arab countries of the Middle East have wit-
nessed popular uprisings and democratization. It remains to be seen whether
these developments would give space for a regional security structure. What-
ever the direction of developments, almost all governments in the region will
face the challenge of managing internal transition and change while trying to
keep up with the pace of global developments, with their promises and
threats.
The discussion of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction
has once again highlighted the question about what should come first in the
Middle East: peace and security or disarmament. In the Helsinki Process,
political agreement on the basic principles of interstate behavior and com-
mitment to cooperation in the economic and human rights baskets preceded
step-by-step deals on military confidence-building measures. Disarmament
measures that were, in fact, negotiated and agreed by the two military alli-
ances only came later. Once again, in the Helsinki Process, we do not find a
single, globally applicable recipe, but rather ingredients such as peace, secur-
ity, disarmament, and confidence-building that are not isolated from one
another. How they are linked – and how they are to be linked – is a matter of
regional specificity.
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Introduction
Chen Kane and Egle Murauskaite
The past few years have brought considerable political turmoil to the Middle
East: transformation processes following the Arab Uprisings continue
throughout the region; Iran continues to pursue a nuclear program consistent
with weapons development; and at the same time, little if any progress has
been made in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process. Internationally, efforts continue
to convene a Middle East conference to establish a Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD)-Free Zone in the region, and President Obama, with
whom many have associated high hopes for promoting the Arab-Israeli Peace
Process, remains committed to this at least as a long term goal.
Against the backdrop of these regional strategic developments, there is a
pressing need for a new framework for regional security in the Middle East –
this book offers a fresh assessment of the alternatives at hand. This volume
examines the delicate balance that exists at the intersections of some of the
most critical issues for ensuring regional security in the Middle East: picking
up the momentum of change from the Arab Uprisings while allowing time for
the long-standing regional regimes to adjust; having a process in place and
avoiding entrenching the status quo within it; and taking a page from the best
practices seen elsewhere in history, rather than importing a rigid framework
wholesale from a different context.
This book examines the historic Helsinki Process, which unfolded in a divided
Europe in the early 1970s and which, over 40 years, has achieved major successes
in promoting cooperation between Warsaw Pact and NATO member states on
social, human rights, security, and political issues. The insights of transforming
a zero-sum game, in the context of the East-West Cold War divide, into a co-
operative security community are unveiled in light of their relevance to the
Middle East of today. At the same time, this book examines the unique circum-
stances of the Middle East and identifies the distinct characteristics required to
create a successful and sustainable regional cooperative framework.
European regional security: the road to Helsinki and beyond

It is important to note that the European experience, while impressive in
results, was not a result of a “grand design” – the transformation was a
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2 Chen Kane and Egle Murauskaite
response to acute needs and requirements based on creative solutions in a new
political and security environment. The process was slow and gradual. It was
also evolutionary and flexible – over time, multiple additions and extensions
to the process were developed, unforeseen from the start.
The Helsinki Process originated in the early 1950s, when the Soviet Union
first proposed the creation of an all-European security conference, with
renewed calls for such a conference in the mid-1960s. In May 1969, Finland
sent a memorandum to all European countries, the United States, and
Canada, offering Helsinki as a conference venue. Subsequently, it took over
three years for the representatives from 35 nations to gather, in November
1972, for preparatory talks on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE). The Conference itself was held in Helsinki in July 1973. The
process of organizing the Conference, however, moved for nearly three years
to Geneva – where various arrangements and the framework for the
Conference was worked out – before being concluded in July 1975.
In August 1975, the leaders of these 35 states gathered in Helsinki again and
signed the Final Act of the CSCE. Also known as the Helsinki Accords, the
Final Act was a politically binding agreement consisting of three main sections,
informally known as “baskets,” that were adopted on the basis of consensus.
This comprehensive Act contained a broad range of measures designed to
enhance security and cooperation, and build confidence among its signatories
in a geographical region extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
Basket I contained the “Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between
Participating States,” including a section on Confidence-Building Measures
(CBMs). It encompassed a series of measures underwriting aspects of inter-
national security and aimed at increasing military transparency in the region.
The Declaration legitimated the present borders of European states, outlawed the
use of force and intervention in internal affairs of states, and required the parties
to commit to respecting human rights. Basket II covered economic, scientific,
technological, and environmental cooperation. It sought to expand commercial
relations within the region, building on mutual interdependence to enhance
security arrangements. Basket II also addressed issues related to migrant labor,
vocational training, and the promotion of tourism, keeping the process going,
and generated goodwill by reaching mutually satisfactory outcomes on matters of
somewhat lesser strategic importance. Basket III was devoted to addressing
cooperation in human rights and in several other fields.
Based on the provisions of the Final Act, a follow-up conference was convened
in Madrid from 1980 to 1983. The Madrid talks gave the mandate for CSCE
nations to hold what came to be known as the Conference on Confidence-
and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE). During
the three years of CDE negotiations in Stockholm, CSCE states sought to arrive
at a more comprehensive politically binding agreement designed to increase
the transparency of military activities and to reduce the risk of war in Europe.
The resulting Stockholm Document, signed in September 1986, required states
to notify each other of planned military exercises that involved 13,000 troops
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Introduction 3
or more, and allowed on-site inspections of field activities involving more than
17,000 ground troops or 5,000 airborne troops.
The Stockholm Document set a precedent in arms control by including a
verification mechanism for military activities with compulsory on-site inspec-
tions. Arguably, the verification principle introduced hereby paved the way for
the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the
United States and the Soviet Union – the first time the two superpowers had
agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Significantly, the treaty eventually
encouraged a number of European states that were not parties to it to also
destroy their conventional missiles with the ranges banned by the INF Treaty.
Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs)
continued in a follow-up conference in Vienna from 1986 to 1989 in parallel
to negotiations on the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). The
CFE, signed in November 1990, marked a turning point in European security
architecture, based as it was on the mutual confidence of concerned parties.
By setting equal limitations on the conventional armaments that NATO and
Warsaw Pact member states could deploy in the region, the CFE eliminated
the possibility for either bloc to amass large conventional forces for a surprise
attack. In the same month, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (also
known as the Paris Charter) was adopted, building on the foundations of
the Helsinki Accords. The Conference for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) was thus gradually institutionalized in the early 1990s
and transformed into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE).
In 1994, during the Budapest Summit Meeting, members agreed on a Code
of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security, which recognized the
importance of democratic civilian control over armed, internal, paramilitary,
and intelligence forces, as well as the police; established new tasks for the
OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC); and drew up the principles
governing nonproliferation among OSCE participants, outlining the commit-
ment of participating states to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD).
Since 1975, the number of countries to sign on to the Helsinki Accords has
increased to 57, reflecting geopolitical changes, such as the breakup of the
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, but also indicating the grow-
ing appeal and sustainability of the regional security architecture built around
the Helsinki model.
Some have criticized the CSCE as being “ineffective” or “dead,” pointing
out its failure to resolve the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Nagorno-Karabakh
conflicts or Russia’s aggression in Georgia and Ukraine. The critics may be
right about the testing challenges the CSCE faces: the CSCE may not have
fully adapted to the post-Cold War reality, with ethnic conflicts as the main
source of instability; however, it has succeeded in its original mission –
transforming relations between the East and West during the Cold War from
a zero-sum game to cooperative security.
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From Helsinki to the Middle East: previous implementation attempts
There has been no shortage of ideas on ways for moving forward with the
Middle East Peace Process, and even the idea of learning from experiences of
other regions in fostering a cooperative security community in the region is
not new. Indeed, extending the concepts conceived during the Helsinki Pro-
cess into the Middle East has also been explored, in both theory and practice.
While this volume seeks to highlight newly relevant aspects of this historic
success and to caution against the pitfalls that lie ahead in the complex
Middle Eastern environment, it is imperative to fathom the reasons why pre-
vious attempts to institute regional cooperation on security issues and to
revitalize the Peace Process have fallen short.
Looking back at the previous attempts to implement the best practices of
the Helsinki Process, it is important to recognize that the Helsinki Final Act
itself effectively linked the security of Europe with security in the Mediterra-
nean. A special partnership within the OSCE was created between the Act’s
signatories and the following Mediterranean states: Algeria, Egypt, Israel,
Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco. Lebanon, Libya, and Syria have been invited
to participate, but have not become partners. Nevertheless, the scope of this
partnership has been very limited in both its geographical reach and the issues
that it covers.
The idea of establishing a Middle Eastern version of the OSCE regime can
be traced back to the immediate aftermath of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.
The first one to advocate this idea was Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli Prime
Minister at the time. Speaking before the 13th Socialist International Con-
gress in Geneva in 1976, Rabin proposed a “Geneva Conference on Security
and Cooperation in the Middle East,” which, in his view, would not only deal
with territorial aspects of the Middle East conflict, but would also strive for
“the creation of a new regional structure of stability, security and peace
founded upon Middle East realities.”
Max Kampelman, the American lead negotiator to the OSCE process,
called for a bold initiative to expand the OSCE to include the countries of the
Mediterranean to form a new grouping, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in the Mediterranean and Middle East.
The 1991 Madrid Peace Conference inaugurated two parallel negotiations
tracks – bilateral and multilateral, with the latter establishing five separate
working groups that loosely replicated the structure of “issue baskets”
employed in Helsinki. The Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS)
working group attempted to build on the notion of military security issues,
gradually strengthening agreed confidence-building measures, and slowly
expand the scope of cooperation. However, this effort has been suspended
since 1995 when the direct talks between Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) failed.
The Helsinki process created the context for the initiative put forward by
Israel and Jordan for the creation of a Conference on Security and Cooperation
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Introduction 5
in the Middle East (CSCME). Jordan’s Crown Prince El Hassan bin Talal
endorsed the idea of a regional framework based on the OSCE, and so have the
Israeli leaders Shimon Peres and Benjamin Netanyahu.1 In fact, the peace
agreement between Jordan and Israel incorporated the vision of a regional
security framework based on the European experience. The treaty formally
binds the parties to support the development of OSCE principles and structures
for application to the Middle East. Article 4 of the Israeli-Jordanian Treaty of
Peace states the following:
… the Parties recognize the achievements of the European Community

and European Union in the development of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and commit themselves to the crea-
tion, in the Middle East, of a CSCME (Conference on Security and
Cooperation in the Middle East). This commitment entails the adoption
of regional models of security successfully implemented in the post-World
War era (along the lines of the Helsinki Process) culminating in a regio-
nal zone of security and stability.
Similarly, Section 7 of Article 4 states that the parties:
Undertake to work as a matter of priority, and as soon as possible, in

the context of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and
Regional Security, and jointly, toward the following: the creation in the
Middle East of a region free from hostile alliances and coalitions; the
creation of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction, both
conventional and nonconventional, in the context of a comprehensive,
lasting and stable peace, characterized by the renunciation of the use of
force, reconciliation and goodwill.
Starting in 1995, the Barcelona Process grew out of the Euro-Mediterranean

Partnership (EMP) as a more inclusive multilateral forum (with the PLO,
Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey joining the dialogue). Building on the Helsinki
baskets model, tested in the Madrid Conference, the Barcelona Process
attempted to create a space for cooperation, along three consolidated tracks, on
political and security, economic, and social issues. Still, the structural premise
of both these initiatives largely remained that of a means for assuring European
security by fostering stability in and dialogue with its extended neighborhood.
The 1996 British initiative for an OSCE in the Middle East was an attempt
to infuse the processes, built around the Helsinki experience, with a more
exclusively regional focus. While a number of conferences and summits were
held in the region over the next few years, they failed to advance the archi-
tecture of an institutional security framework owing to the absence of a
shared vision among Middle Eastern states regarding the outcome of these
efforts as well as limited political commitments of external powers to the
cause.
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The 2004 US Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) was a post-9/11 attempt
to move the process of reform in the region ahead, sidestepping the Arab-Israeli
conflict. This was the latest attempt to borrow an aspect from the Helsinki
Process. This time, global powers, external to the region, attempted to overcome
the principal disagreement between the Israelis and Palestinians by getting the
regional parties to handle adjacent issues, hoping to generate enough goodwill
to eventually allow them to tackle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without having
to overcome the original entrenched animosity of the parties in dispute.
A watered-down version of this initiative, designated as the Broader Middle
East and North Africa Initiative (BMENAI), was adopted at the G-8 summit
at Sea Island, Georgia (United States) later that year. The BMENAI tied the
prospects for reform in the region to the progress on the Arab-Israeli conflict,
underscoring the internally construed nature of any future reform, and rejec-
ted political reform as a necessary condition for the diplomatic process.
However, with its military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and its
failure to advance the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, the United States had,
by then, lost its credibility and did not carry the same clout in the region
as it once did in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s (or as it did in the Cold War
European context of the 1970s). The Arab states rejected these efforts as
outsider attempts to impose external constructs and interests on them.
Academic thought on the applicability of the Helsinki Process

to the Middle East
Turning to earlier theoretical analyses on the applicability of lessons from the
Helsinki Process to the Middle East, the most comprehensive study remains
the 1997 joint volume by two regional experts, Shai Feldman and Abdullah
Toukan.2 The authors take a fresh look at the geographic scope of the Middle
East and proceed to examine the changes in the regional security dynamics
that are increasingly less conducive to the continuation of the Peace Process.
Bridging the gap not only between Arab and Israeli approaches, but also
between the approaches of different Arab states, the book emphasizes parallel
tracks for confidence-building measures and arms control as a way forward,
building on the Helsinki experience. However, written by an Israeli and a
Jordanian author, the book reflects the specific security concerns and interests
of these two nations. While other regional states may subscribe to their ideas,
the priorities of at least two major players, Egypt and Iran, are not reflected
in the book in a way that would enable them to join a region-wide process.
A more recent edited volume exploring the transferability of the European
CSCE model to the Greater Middle East has been compiled by Andreas
Marchetti in 2004.3 While the studies therein carefully consider the different
institutional aspects, they ultimately fall prey to framing the issue from a
European security perspective, reflected in the subsequent discussions of
diverging interests, availability of resources and the relative urgency of re-
solving different sets of issues as a starting point. Given that it was written in
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Introduction 7
the wake of the US invasion of Iraq, the book concentrates on the issue of
political reforms in the Middle East as imposed by outsiders – in contrast to
the domestically inspired process that we are currently witnessing in the Arab
world.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has recently
republished its 1998 report “Towards a Regional Security Regime for the
Middle East: Issues and Options” by Peter Jones. The 2011 edition offers a
substantive review of previous regional security architecture projects, in light
of the 2010 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference commitment
toward developing a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East. The report
emphasizes the importance of a continuous procedural engagement for fos-
tering an environment of mutual trust that is conducive to progress, but it
envisions arms control as the central focal point around which the process
ought to revolve. Indeed, Jones views the introduction of a verification regime
(perhaps reminiscent of the 1986 Stockholm Document) as an important
confidence-building measure, with the long-term view of eliminating ballistic
missiles from the region (again, implying the possibility of replicating the
region-wide effects of the subsequent 1987 INF Treaty). The author under-
scores the need to include all regional, geographically proximate, and politi-
cally relevant players in the process of institutionalizing a regional security
framework, but, recognizing that an all-inclusive start is unlikely, suggests
that a “coalition of the willing” should jump-start the initiative. Given its
publication date, the report engages with the new regional realities following
the Arab Uprisings only tangentially and, while recognizing contradictory
trends at work, offers little guidance as to their relative impact.
In addition to the above-mentioned academic studies, several hearings held
by the US Congress on adapting the Helsinki Process for the Middle East
offer a broad array of perspectives from professionals, think-tank and non-
governmental organization leaders, as well as regional experts and former
officials.4 The hearings were held as part of the work of the Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki Com-
mission, an independent US government agency created in 1976 to monitor
and encourage compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE
commitments.
Criticism of the Helsinki Process as a model

Most scholars and policy analysts explore the Helsinki Process in a positive
light, saying it is a valuable model and that certain aspects of it are worth
adapting. Meanwhile, criticisms from inside and outside the region for draw-
ing on the Helsinki Process in order to move ahead with the Middle East
security and cooperation framework have traditionally been expressed along
the following four principal lines.
First, the timing is not right for a regional security dialogue. Those who
hold this position argue that the preconditions that enabled the process in the
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European context (and other regional contexts) do not exist in the Middle
East, and that the region is plagued by obstacles (asymmetries; ongoing
armed conflicts; unwillingness of states to join such a process) that are not
conducive to starting a regional process.
Second, the lessons and experiences from the Helsinki Process are not
applicable to the Middle East, or they cannot be easily transferred from
Europe to the Middle East. Here, the critics point to the Cold War geopoli-
tical setup in Europe, with the US and the USSR maintaining a firm grip
over states in their respective spheres of influence, and ideological divisions
practically creating only two sides to the conflict. The MENA region con-
trasts with this image as a multipolar space in flux, with no state or person
able to authoritatively assert leadership across the region long enough to
bring the parties to the negotiating table.
Third, a process or framework in place is just a way of avoiding the difficult
issues at hand and cannot replace a solution. According to the critics who
voice this objection, past initiatives based on the Helsinki Process were based
on the notion that regional institutional structures, whether built around
security regimes or cooperative frameworks, can supersede, or at least ame-
liorate, the region’s many divisions. They also look at the Helsinki Process as
a relatively narrow enterprise, complementary with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) as central pillars of
European security instead.
Last, critics point out that in the Helsinki Process there were obvious win-
ners (the West) and losers (the Soviet Union). They insist that, looking at this
outcome, no country would want to join a process and risk finding itself on
the losing side.
Countries in the Middle East have also frequently expressed reluctance to
adopt the Helsinki Process as a model owing to the implicit stigma sur-
rounding Western imperialism. Intuitive distrust of the West has scarred the
region, starting with the historical baggage of Western discourse along the
lines of “mission civilisatrice” or the “white man’s burden,” deepening with
the perception that colonizing powers made the Arab world pay for the
Jewish sufferings in Europe, and increasing with the recent military interven-
tions that have resulted in regime change in the region. While external powers
are painfully aware of the consequences of the Middle East conflicts spilling
over, and have in the past stepped up to assist in defusing such crises, these
efforts have often been perceived as unwelcomed interference from parties
with hidden agendas – a perception that has permeated the peace (or other
regional) initiatives by the same external powers. Global players have so far
failed to engage the regional powers, and convey their concerns and aspira-
tions, in a manner that does not conjure up this pejorative imagery.
In many ways, the Middle East is indeed unique: there is no universally
accepted definition of what area and which states constitute the Middle East. It
lacks a regional institutional framework to unite all the states, as well as the very
tradition of regional or subregional cooperation: interaction between the states
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Introduction 9
is minimal, even in terms of trade as well as other financial interactions. Many
states still do not have definitively recognized borders, or are subject to ongoing
occupation. Importantly, this is the only region that faces the challenges asso-
ciated with the proliferation of all the different types of WMD, not as a distant
and threatening prospect, but as daily reality. Active ongoing armed conflicts
that plague the region place additional strains on adopting the Helsinki model,
which by design is a gradual approach to promoting incremental change.
Nevertheless, the region cannot continue along the path it has taken over
the past decades, as illustrated by the popular discontent that fuelled the Arab
Uprisings with growing demands for social, economic and governance
reforms. Three quarters of the global oil reserves located in the region could
be used to lift the great majority out of economic hardships, and the unpre-
cedented numbers of unemployed youth could be turned to national build-up
projects based on innovation. A more secure and stable environment, based
on close cooperation among the rising political leaders and dynamic civil
societies across the region, would be helpful in tapping this latent potential,
the benefits of which would extend to the broader neighborhood.
While it is clear that every region is unique, and attempts that set out to
duplicate history in a strict fashion are doomed to fail, there nevertheless are
a number of relevant lessons, both within and outside the Middle East that
can be drawn upon at this critical time. One such lesson is that the initiative
must come from within the region and that regional ownership of the process
is required for its sustainability. Another is that a process needs to be inclu-
sive, comprehensive, and flexible. At the same time, experiences from outside
the region can help inform – and assist in implementing – these choices.
Traditionally, major external powers have tended to periodically inject new
impetus into the Middle East Peace Process, nudging the regional players in
their sphere of influence closer together. Following the Arab Uprisings,
greater popular empowerment and evolving civil society organizations have
led several authors in this volume to explore the prospects for a more intern-
ally driven process. However, while regional ownership will ultimately make
or break the process in the long term, in the present political climate, local
leaders seem reluctant to take the risk of starting the initiative, even though
having such an initiative in progress shows increasing appeal.
Some of the experts in this book have called for another external jump-
start, looking at the United States and Russia as traditional conveners.
Admittedly, an initiative by these powers could reinvigorate the informal
talks, but with their regional influence in decline, it is also worth exploring
ways to involve more neutral brokers, as well as other international power-
houses, such as China, Japan, and South Korea, in carrying on the process.
With growing economic interests and presence in the Middle East, China and
South Korea are likely to respond positively to an invitation to step up to the
political dialogue that would have a stabilizing effect on their investments in
the region. Moreover, partnering with the United States and Russia on such a
project could potentially strengthen the bilateral relations between the global
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powers. China, Japan and South Korea are not associated with imperialist
ambitions in the Middle East (indeed, both regions share the past experience
of being colonized) and are viewed as anything but US proxies in the region,
which gives them the potential to come across as more genuine brokers.
Indeed, lessons on strengthening and stabilizing a region through closer intra-
regional relations and public-private partnerships may ring more true to the
Middle East leaders when they come from global powers that have recently
undergone, or are still in the process of undergoing, domestic transformation.
Historically, many countries in the Middle East have been unwilling to
engage in a Helsinki-like process, pointing to the eventual destabilizing
impact that commitments to human rights have had on the Soviet Union.
While this perception may have been relevant some three years ago, today
these processes are already unfolding across the region, with governments
looking to manage change and avoid becoming victim to it. In view of the
current domestic demands for reform across the Middle East, a regional
process could provide a platform for governments in the Middle East to
demonstrate serious commitment to meeting growing domestic demands for
governance, economic, and social reform. At the same time, such a process
would allow the region’s regimes to manage the period of change and transi-
tion presently underway and implement these reforms. Indeed, unrest and
revolutions across much of the Arab world were started by civil societies
pushing for the reform of existing regimes – not too different from the civil
society demands for the Soviet leadership in the 1970s.
The faith of the regional governments will be decided based on how well
they manage transition and change, as well as their perceived responsiveness
to the demands of their citizens. For regional leaders, both surviving and
newly-elected, engaging in the collective construction of a regional framework
could help facilitate responses to domestic demands, provide much needed
stability, and pave the way for economic development.
Structure and contributions of this book

This volume offers an analytical synthesis from a diverse group of experts,
ranging from officials directly involved in the Helsinki negotiations to parti-
cipants of previous Middle East arms control negotiations and international
scholars. Authors examine the ways of promoting a long-term regional pro-
cess for the Middle East based on their reflections on the East-West European
regional experience. Many of the experts have paired up with emerging young
professionals from the Middle East to co-author their chapters as a way of
fostering expertise in the new generation of scholars from the region.
This book is organized into four parts. Part I examines the original Helsinki
Process and is written by Lynn M. Hansen and Rolf Ekéus, who have both
negotiated the Helsinki Accords and have long been involved in the dialogue
concerning European security. Hansen starts Chapter 1 by tracing the interna-
tional power dynamics that have led to the decision to initiate the Helsinki
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Introduction 11
Process, pointing out the importance of the personal relationship between the
heads of the Russian and American delegations that developed over time.
He then analyzes the measures that worked in Europe and can be relevant to
the Middle East, as well as pitfalls to be avoided in the Middle Eastern context.
Ekéus takes on the central question of achievable temporal sequencing, in
terms of arms control, disarmament, and the regional security environment,
and analyzes the role of nonconventional weapons that Middle Eastern
states – unlike European states – possess. Emphasizing throughout Chapter 2
the importance of creating a regional institutional structure to support the
diplomatic process, he encourages greater reliance on the resources and com-
petencies of international organizations such as the International Atomic
Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,
and the UN Security Council for that purpose. Based on the Helsinki
experience, Ekéus commends the use of declaratory CBMs on a voluntary
unilateral basis as a starting point that would generate goodwill for moving
the process forward on a broader range of issues in the future.
Part II collects the reflections of Middle Eastern experts and their younger
colleagues on the European experience. It also analyzes earlier unsuccessful
attempts to create a collective security community and commence a regional
security dialogue in the Middle East, and it points out lessons to be learned
from these experiences. In Chapter 3, Nabil Fahmy and Karim Haggag present
the Egyptian perspective, pointing to the deficiency of the Helsinki Process when
one attempts to apply it to the Middle East – the lack of conflict resolution and
disarmament agendas to address the region’s conflicts and strategic imbalances.
In turn, they offer to address these deficiencies by taking holistic approach that
includes a security framework in the Gulf, which will also address Iranian
concerns, internationalizing the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, and an agree-
ment on a regional WMD-Free Zone as important stepping-stones on the way
to a comprehensive institutional framework for the region. Nevertheless, Fahmy
and Haggag noted the importance of the Helsinki process in providing the
normative foundation for transforming relations in Europe.
Ehud Eiran proceeds to expand on Israeli views, identifying Israel as deeply
skeptical of the ability of such a process to transform relations in the region
and lead to its genuine acceptance. While Israel is not openly reluctant to
participating in such a process, Eiran identifies throughout Chapter 4 seven
relevant core aspects of the Helsinki Process and analyzes how Israel might
respond to each of these aspects by investigating the degree of their alignment
with Israel’s traditional national security doctrine, as well as its current stra-
tegic preferences. His analysis identifies the security basket as a major incen-
tive, where Israel sees potential in jointly addressing the risks associated with
failing or otherwise unstable states in the region, as well as Iran’s nuclear
program. Curiously, the economic basket is singled out as the least con-
tentious starting point for future negotiations, while human rights issues are
depicted as sensitized, despite the positive changes brought about by the Arab
Uprisings, in light of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
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HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal and Awadh Al-Badi expand, from the posi-
tion of Saudi Arabia, on the urgency of collective international action to
create a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East. Chapter 5 traces this historic
pursuit through UN resolutions to the ACRS and the NPT Review Con-
ferences of 1995 and 2000, criticizing Israel for refusing to engage con-
structively in both of these processes. They identify both Israeli and Iranian
nuclear programs as problematic for achieving regional security and chart a
six-step plan to advance the efforts to convene the WMDFZ conference in
Helsinki and foster peace and security in the region. Advocating the right of
peaceful development of nuclear energy, and setting the effort of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states as an example, His Royal
Highness and Awadh Al-Badi implore the global powers to provide a nuclear
security umbrella as well as economic and technological incentives to states in
the Middle East as a way of imbuing the nonproliferation message with new
strength and commitment.
In Chapter 6, Ariane M. Tabatabai assesses the viability of the “issue
baskets” model from the Iranian perspective. Looking at the trends and
developments in Iranian domestic politics, she assesses how domestic poli-
tical constraints interact with the prospects of a regional security process.
Analyzing the shifting Iranian position vis-à-vis other actors in the Middle
East, Tabatabai explores the avenues for confidence building and collective
engagements that would strengthen the fabric of the region, transforming
antagonistic trends into constructive behavioral patterns based on aligned
interests.
In Chapter 7, Nilsu Gören looks at the evolving Turkish position in build-
ing regional structural frameworks, discussing how the changing character of
Turkish foreign policy influences its ability to play a constructive or even a
leading role. She analyzes the laudable and problematic aspects of the ARCS
process from the perspective of Turkey as a facilitator, arguing that Ankara
could draw on this past credential in a new round of regional security talks.
Scrutinizing Turkey’s relations with Iran, Israel, and Syria, Gören seeks to
gauge the depth and durability of diplomatic clout mustered by this emerging
regional power.
Part III examines four unique aspects related to the inherent challenges and
opportunities of promoting regional security dialogue in today’s Middle East.
In Chapter 8, Gershon Baskin and Hanna Siniora, Israeli and Palestinian
scholars, respectively, jointly scrutinize the relationship between the Peace Pro-
cess and the potential for a regional security dialogue in light of the new geo-
political realities emerging after the Arab Uprisings. They acknowledge the rise
of Islamist or other radical movements as growing trends in both Israeli and
Palestinian leaderships and societies, replacing the traditional secular voices.
Baskin and Siniora discuss the Arab Peace Initiative at length as a blueprint
with high potential for regional conflict resolution that has not been seriously
explored before due to an inclement political climate. However, the growing
tensions between Iran and Israel are seen as precluding the start of substantive
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Introduction 13
arms control or region-wide WMD-Free Zone negotiations in the near future.
Instead, Baskin and Siniora lay out suggestions for near-term CBMs between
the Israelis and Palestinians that could help unhinge the present Peace Process
deadlock: facilitating economic integration of the Gaza Strip by lifting the
economic blockade, exploring the natural gas in the adjacent territorial waters,
and engaging Turkey to revive the Gaza shipping industry.
Bilal Saab proceeds to offer in Chapter 9 a deeper look at the ramifications of
political reform in the Arab world for future arms control negotiations, focusing
on the human factors and domestic context for foreign policy decisions as pre-
viously neglected aspects of reform. Looking at domestic institutional land-
scapes of Middle Eastern states, Saab sees hardly any transfer of expertise from
the previous regimes, since activists currently holding offices in many countries
have previously been largely excluded from the decision-making process. On the
other hand, he identifies the current large, unqualified bureaucracies and weak
parliamentary institutions as significant challenges – their capacity for top-down
decision-making is diminishing, especially under new leadership and a growing
need for interagency cooperation. Saab underscores the role of civil society in
arriving at durable arms control commitments while cautioning that robust
civil-military relations and stable economies are necessary to enable such agree-
ments in the long term, even when momentous political will is present.
In Chapter 10, Michael Yaffe explores a subregional approach as more
conducive to fostering security and cooperation in the Middle East through
Track-2 negotiations. Taking the OSCE as a role model, Yaffe illustrates the
lack of key ingredients for a successful region-wide security regime in the
Middle East, arguing that the Arab-Israeli conflict remains the last focal
point of regional collectivity. Yaffe explores the dynamics between the coun-
tries in the Persian Gulf and those clustered around the Mediterranean basin
as a new basis for a future bifocal structure.
Peter Jones focuses in Chapter 11 on the role of the newly empowered civil
society in the future security dialogue in the Middle East. He posits that regional
governments are unlikely to involve the emerging societal groups in the process
to the extent that it was done in Helsinki, and suggests the government-civil
society relations in Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) coun-
tries as a more plausible model. Considering the central dilemma of nuclear
disarmament, Jones remains skeptical about such a possibility before substantive
change can be seen in the regional security environment, but he nevertheless
prescribes a process that could help reshape a regional security dialogue.
In Chapter 12, Patricia Lewis and Karim Kamel chart a future course: a
Regional Security Process (RSP) for the Middle East, inspired by the Helsinki
experience, and explore the implications for its potential success, taking the
recent trends of regional dynamics into account. They suggest a bold approach
of tackling the issue of WMD head-on, as it lies at the heart of the symbolic
mistrust and insecurity that currently overshadows the region. Lewis and Kamel
emphasize the importance of fostering regional relations built on confidence,
and the benefit of reaching agreements on less contentious issues first as a way
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of keeping the ball rolling and generating win-win solutions along the way.
They offer steps that would move the regional dynamic from the framework of
a zero-sum game toward win-win situations for all states in the Middle East. In
light of the structural changes in the civil societies of the region following the
Arab Uprisings, and the greater engagement of the younger generation in poli-
tical processes, Lewis and Kamel accentuate the power of terminology and
collective points of reference in shaping a more positive discourse.
In the Conclusion, Chen Kane acknowledges that while parties of concern
in the Middle East presently share an understanding of the problem at hand
as well as the collectively desirable end-goal, they hold competing visions
about the procedural means of achieving that goal. Indeed, the very agree-
ment to open negotiations has become a bargaining chip, with regional lea-
ders plagued by insecurity reluctant to make even this “concession.” The
Helsinki Process experience indicates that in order to see progress on the
Middle East regional architecture, the parties in the region must be able to
agree first that such a process will serve their national interests; second, they
will have to agree on the rules of engagement and the tools to be employed in
order to achieve this objective; and third, they must agree to create a com-
prehensive and flexible process that will enable a shift in relations among
states from a zero-sum game toward a transactional cooperative mindset. If a
process is to eventually succeed from the onset – and it should be expected to
be a long-term engagement – it should be conducive to addressing not only
security concerns associated with terrorism, so-called rogue or failed states, or
WMD, but also issues pertinent to the broader concept of security, such as
migration, refugees, internally displaced persons, water and energy security,
as well as economic underperformance.
The objective is not to load the plate with issues, but to expand the nego-
tiations’ pie away from security issues, which tend to be zero-sum by nature,
to other areas of immediate concern that require transnational cooperation to
be resolved. This book offers valuable insights into designing a process that
could pave the way for a new regional order by transforming the dynamic of
regional relations.
We wish to thank those that made this project possible – the Norwegian
Foreign Ministry and the Swedish Foreign Ministry.
Notes
1 See The Middle East: Would the Helsinki Process Apply? Hearing before the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 108th Congress, June 15,
2004. Available at: http://tinyurl.com/k8ay22y; Hassan Bin Talal, Crown Prince of
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, letter dated October 26, 1993, to Hon. Dennis
DeConcini, in Hearing, Peace in The Middle East, October 14, 1993. Available at:
http://tinyurl.com/kapjonj; Address by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the
Conference of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
Lisbon, December 3, 1996. Available at: http://tinyurl.com/llg4uvh. Please note
that throughout this book, all urls that are excessively long will be shortened using
the tool located at www.tinyurl.com.
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Introduction 15
2 Feldman and Toukan, Bridging the Gap.
3 Marchetti (ed), “The CSCE as a Model.”
4 See the United States Senate, Lessons of the Helsinki Process for the New World
Order. Hearing before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, 102nd Congress, March 14, 1991. Available at: http://catalog.
hathitrust.org/Record/007608472; Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: Hearing
before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 103rd Congress,
October 14, 1993. Available at: https://archive.org/details/implementationof1014u-
nit; The OSCE at Twenty: Its Relevance to Other Regions, November 13–14, 1995,
Volume 4; The Middle East: Would the Helsinki Process Apply? Hearing before the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 108th Congress, June 15,
2004. Available at: http://tinyurl.com/k8ay22y; and The Future of the OSCE Med-
iterranean Partners for Cooperation. Hearing Commission on Security and Coop-
eration in Europe: US Helsinki Commission, July 23, 2009. Available at: http://
tinyurl.com/ksgndbt.
Bibliography
Feldman, Shai and Abdullah Toukan. Bridging the Gap: A Future Security Archi-
tecture for the Middle East. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997.
Marchetti, Andreas (ed). “The CSCE as a Model to Transform Western Relations with
the Greater Middle East.” ZEI Discussion Paper C 137. Bonn: Center for European
Integration Studies, 2004. Available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/2027/1/dp_c137_marchetti.
pdf.
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Part I
The Helsinki Process
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1 Cautious optimism
The Helsinki Process as a model
for negotiations in the Middle East
Lynn M. Hansen
A bit of history
As I sat among the representatives of 35 states participating in the Stockholm
Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarma-
ment in Europe, I wondered to myself whether such a process could be useful
in resolving problems in the Middle East.1 I even mentioned to a high-
ranking official in the US government my view that the Helsinki Process – the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) – could be
adapted and utilized in the Middle East. The response was quite negative.
This was in the mid-1980s and bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union
on nuclear and other issues were beginning to look positive. The prevailing
political views in Washington seemed not to favor multilateral negotiations if
these issues could be addressed bilaterally. There was always the concern that
it was difficult to achieve agreements in the United Nations that served
American interests and the same would be true for other multilateral forums.
Moreover, some were concerned that the United States would often be pres-
sured by its allies to agree to something it really did not want put in an
agreement.
Negotiations within the Helsinki Process began in 1973 and ended in 1975
with the so-called Final Act that established the CSCE. It is noteworthy that
the United States was not in favor of this forum, but was more or less forced
to participate because it hoped to initiate negotiations with the Soviet Union
and the Warsaw Treaty Organization on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduc-
tions (MBFR) that eventually opened in Vienna in January 1973. The MBFR
negotiations were a response to Senator Mike Mansfield’s efforts to withdraw
US forces from Europe. It was, then, a tit-for-tat trade. Still, the CSCE had
few, if any, devotees in Washington. A memorandum from Henry Kissinger
to President Ford makes this clear: “We have never seen much to be gained
for ourselves in CSCE” – as the negotiating portion of the Helsinki Process
came to be known.2
While MBFR did not accomplish anything, the CSCE process resulted
in the signing of the Helsinki Final Act on August 1, 1975. No further
agreements of substance were reached until the conclusion of the Madrid
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20 Lynn M. Hansen
Follow-Up Meeting in September 1983, which provided a mandate for the
Stockholm Conference. Success in Stockholm led to fruitful negotiations on
conventional forces in Europe and agreement on the “Charter of Paris for a
New Europe” that was signed on November 21, 1990.
The collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as arms control successes (such as
the treaties on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE); Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF); and Strategic Arms Reduction (START)), brought
about changes in the role of the CSCE. Its name was changed to the Orga-
nization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on January 1, 1995,
with principal offices established in Budapest and Vienna.
The OSCE is the world’s largest regional organization in which security
issues play a dominant role. The organization’s concerns, however, are not
limited to security issues. It recognizes that security is tightly linked to the
economy, the environment, and humanitarian issues, including human rights.
The goal is comprehensive security for each of its members. Agreements
within the OSCE do not have the legal force of a treaty; rather, they are
political obligations (some say politically binding), expressing a common goal
of security and cooperation in Europe. This facilitates the political process
within OSCE states, allowing them to remain flexible in a common search for
cooperation while avoiding disputes and/or sanctions over implementation.
The OSCE has been involved in matters such as the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict in the Caucasus, the Transdniestrian conflict in Moldova, and the
August 2008 conflict in Georgia. It also has field operations in Albania and
Uzbekistan, as well as a mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Created in 2002
at the initiative of Kyrgyzstan, the OSCE Academy in Bishkek is a regional
center of postgraduate education and a forum for regional security dialogue
and research.
As already noted, Washington’s political elite were initially very skeptical
about the value of the Helsinki Process in the mid-1970s. Apart from a few
State Department professionals, Helsinki had few devotees in the Reagan
administration. Many senior officials believed it had been a grave mistake to
even sign the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, let alone abide by it.3
By the time of the first Follow-Up Meeting, held in Belgrade on October 4,
1977, it was quite clear that agreements reached in 1975 were not being
implemented or respected, particularly in the field of human rights. This
strengthened the views in the US government about the incompetence of the
Helsinki Process and multilateral negotiations more generally. There were
then (and there remain now) those on the political right in the United States
who rejected all multinational negotiations and even opposed the efforts of
the United Nations.4
Nonetheless, a serious effort to look at the process as a whole would have
to conclude that the Helsinki Process has been a resounding success in deal-
ing with the problems that plagued Europe during the Cold War and in the
subsequent period of instability in the former Yugoslavia and other places in
Europe. Moreover, it has advanced the cause of human rights in ways that are
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Cautious optimism 21
often not understood. Many were willing to dismiss the Helsinki Final Act as
worthless at the time of the first Follow-Up Meeting to the CSCE held in
the Yugoslav capital of Belgrade (October 4, 1977–March 8, 1978) because
the Soviet Union and its allies had not implemented the Helsinki Accords
in the field of human rights.
It must be remembered that the US Delegation in Belgrade, led by
Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, established the principle that the United
States would not negotiate further security measures without progress in the
field of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In September 1986, after
the 32 European states plus the United States, the Soviet Union, and Canada,
participating in the Helsinki Process reached agreement, those rights were
spelled out in the 1975 Final Act in the seventh of the ten principles that were
to guide relations among them: “Respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief.”
This position was reinforced at the second Follow-Up Meeting in Madrid
(September 1980–September 1983). In general, however, the Madrid Meeting
is remembered for the agreement on a mandate for the Stockholm Conference
on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.
Nonetheless, other meetings were also mandated to comprise the human
rights and human contacts dimensions of the Helsinki Process – including
such issues as immigration, family visits, family reunification, and contacts
between people – thus preserving the idea of a balanced process within
the CSCE. This principle also played a significant role in the Stockholm
negotiations.
The Stockholm Conference

In September 1986, after the 35 European states participating in the Helsinki
Process reached agreement – along with the United States and Canada – on
the Stockholm Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
(CSBMs), there was much jubilation among the Conference delegates.
Champagne bottles were uncorked, and old quarrels were forgotten. After all,
this was the first time that East and West had been able to agree on an arms
control document of any significance to Europeans.
While others were celebrating, my negotiating partner, General Viktor
Tatarnikov of the Soviet General Staff, sought me out and said more or less
the following: “It is good that we have an agreement, but it is far more
important that we were able to agree.” For the first two years of the negotia-
tions, Tatarnikov had avoided me like the plague. At one point, he even sent a
Hungarian diplomat, whom I knew from the Madrid CSCE Follow-Up
Meeting, to tell me that if the United States wanted an agreement in Stock-
holm, the French would have to be NATO’s primary interlocutor. My reply
was brief and to the point: “then there will be no agreement.” I could not
agree more with Tatarnikov’s statement to me at the end of the Conference.
The fact that we were able to agree on a set of militarily significant CSBMs
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22 Lynn M. Hansen
was indeed a milestone in East-West relations of perhaps greater political
than military significance. Upon further reflection, I saw an even deeper
meaning to his statement. We had succeeded in replacing the Feindbild
(a German term for the image of an enemy), which each of us held of the
other, with respect and the knowledge that we could work together to produce
such agreements.
Ambassador Oleg Grinevsky, who was Head of the Soviet Delegation, has
told me many times that the Stockholm Accords were vital to the negotiation
of both the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) of 1987 and the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed on July 31, 1991. This was
precisely because the Feindbild had undergone substantial change. The on-site
inspection provisions contained in the Stockholm Accords had desensitized
the Soviet military to having foreign inspectors present at their facilities.
The Stockholm negotiations had an inauspicious beginning. Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrey Gromyko gave one of the nastiest, most controversial, and
provocative speeches on record – accusing the United States of developing
first-strike weapons to initiate a nuclear conflict in Europe. The deployment
by US of Pershing II missiles, as well as ground-launched cruise missiles
(GLCMs), to Europe at approximately the same time as the Stockholm
Conference got underway strengthened the conviction of some in the Kremlin
that the United States was planning to conduct a nuclear war. The word in
Soviet security circles was that the Pershing II missiles would be able to reach
Russian targets four to six minutes after their launch, hardly allowing enough
time for Soviet leaders to reach their defensive bunkers. Moreover, President
Ronald Reagan’s 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) seemed to under-
mine the doctrine of deterrence, since strategic defense lessened mutual vul-
nerability to nuclear strikes, which had been the foundation for an uneasy
peace for decades. It is small wonder, then, that Tatarnikov was initially
reluctant to enter into weighty discussions about confidence-building.
It has been noted that there was substantial paranoia on the part of senior
officials in the Kremlin.5 Certainly, Foreign Minister Gromyko’s opening
remarks at the beginning of the Stockholm Conference were reflective of that
paranoia. Previous regimes in the Kremlin – from Leonid Brezhnev, to Yuri
Andropov, to Konstantin Chernenko – had formed a Feindbild that precluded
a positive relationship between the two adversaries. The principal negotiating
goal for the Soviet Union therefore seemed to be an agreement on the non-
use of force. They also proposed an agreement on the no first-use of nuclear
weapons, which went nowhere because of the NATO doctrine of flexible
response. Handicapped by outmoded thinking and acute distrust, it is easy to
comprehend why Tatarnikov was so reluctant to enter into any bilateral talks
with the United States.
In fact, it was not until Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze
took over the reins of government in the Soviet Union in 1985 that Tatarni-
kov and I established a positive relationship. After that, he and I must have
spent over 100 hours together trying to discover solutions to problems that
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plagued the negotiations. Considering the application of the Helsinki Process
to the Middle East, one must understand that changes in leadership and
attitude will be necessary before any significant progress can be made. It
remains to be seen whether the “Arab Spring” uprisings will develop into a
more hospitable place for multilateral negotiations that hold promise for
finding solutions to the region’s problems.
Unprecedented commitments in the field of human rights became an inte-
gral part of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which was adopted by a
summit meeting of European governments as well as those of Canada and the
United States on November 21, 1990. All of this was accomplished within the
Helsinki Process. Moreover, it would be natural for one to consider such a
process as a means of dealing with issues that confound those who seek peace
in the Middle East.
The more one looks at the Middle East, the more sobering the difficulties
become. Nonetheless, at the end of the day, it may be possible to start a sort
of Helsinki Process there, on a modest basis. That attitude notwithstanding,
after following events in the Middle East, I became pessimistic about any
negotiation bearing fruit in that region. It seemed as though when former US
Secretary of State James A Baker III gave the chapter on the Middle East in
his memoirs the title “An encounter with the quagmire”, he provided an apt
description. In his opening paragraph, he writes the following: “I frankly saw
the Arab-Israeli dispute as a pitfall to be avoided rather than an opportunity
to be exploited.”6 Despite Baker’s best efforts to make peace, it was a quag-
mire for him.
As time progressed, I thought the 2003 Iraq War was a disincentive to any
peace negotiations in the region. Nonetheless, it seems that an agreement
between Israel and the Palestinians was within reach a couple of times, but
then slipped away because of unwillingness to compromise on some issue or
because one or the other’s constituency did not support an agreement. The
issue of Iran’s development of nuclear capability, and possibly a nuclear
weapon, further soured the possibility of holding a regional process designed
to resolve these issues and bring peace to the Middle East. Indeed, the pro-
spect of an attack on Iran’s nuclear development facilities kept resurfacing.
Such an attack would, in my view, wreck any chances for a comprehensive
negotiation on security issues for a substantial period of time.
Then, however, I remembered that the 1980–1983 Madrid CSCE Review
Meeting and the 1984 Stockholm Conference were held at a time in the Cold
War when we were closer than ever to nuclear war between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact. During a closed meeting with KGB officers in May 1981,
General-Secretary Brezhnev and KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov announced
that the United States was preparing a secret nuclear attack on the Soviet
Union. Brezhnev and Andropov were old-fashioned Communists who
believed Reagan’s rhetoric about the Soviet Union being reduced to the “ash
heap of history.”7 Consequently, Soviet intelligence services commenced the
largest peacetime intelligence operation in Soviet history. In Washington,
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24 Lynn M. Hansen
Soviet agents were even counting the number of lights on at night in the
Pentagon. To make matters worse, in November 1983, the United States and
NATO conducted the exercise Able Archer 83, which was a command post
exercise that simulated conflict escalation culminating in a nuclear release.
The realistic nature of this exercise, along with the deployment of Pershing
II missiles in Europe, caused Soviet forces to increase their alert status and
strengthened the view of some in the Kremlin that the West was indeed
preparing the first nuclear strike.8 For its part, the Soviet military was pre-
pared to launch first a nuclear strike, contrary to its stated policy. “Do not
forget that we will not wait until we are attacked,” Chief of the Soviet
General Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov explained, “we will open the offen-
sive ourselves;”9 then he pointed out places in Germany where nuclear
strikes were planned.
Never before had Europe teetered on the brink of nuclear war. Both sides
were well prepared, and one side believed that nuclear war was inevitable.
Nonetheless, and maybe because of this threat, the nations of Europe plus the
United States, Soviet Union, and Canada gathered in Stockholm and ham-
mered out an accord that changed the face of Europe. If such a process could
be organized and implemented during that period in Europe, one would think
it should be possible in the Middle East, especially if states in the region
could adopt Gorbachev’s vision of a common home.10
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the OSCE

For the most part, the original OSCE confidence-building measures contained
in the 1975 Final Act were an important, positive first step. However, these
few CBMs had a rocky start. The major measure called upon states to notify
each other about military maneuvers involving 25,000 troops or more 21 days
in advance and invite observers to these notified activities. In the negotiations
leading up to the adoption of those measures, the Soviet Union persistently
argued that adopted measures must be purely voluntary. The West, on the
other hand, felt they must be compulsory, even though they were not legally
binding.
The Soviet and Eastern Bloc’s adherence to these obligations was inade-
quate. When large maneuvers were held without prior notification, the result
was not confidence-building, but the sowing of further seeds of suspicion and
distrust. Two large maneuvers that were conducted by the Warsaw Pact,
apparently in connection with growing unrest in Poland in 1981, were
“Soyuz-81” and “Zapad-81.” CSCE member states were not notified of either
of these maneuvers, and, of course, no observers were invited. This, many
in the United States felt, was a breach of faith in the whole CBM process.
President Reagan called it a gross violation of the Helsinki pact.11
As the United States and its allies moved to negotiations on CSBMs at the
Stockholm Conference, three things were key to the Western approach. First,
all measures agreed upon would be politically binding; second, they would
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apply to the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals (with the
exception of Albania); and third, on-site inspections would have to be agreed
to as part of the agreement. The back and forth that occurred in the early
portion of the actual negotiations is examined by Grinevsky and Hansen, as
they relate the insiders’ views of what transpired.12
The Stockholm Agreement ushered in a new era of cooperation. At my
urging and with the cooperation of the US Joint Chiefs, an experienced offi-
cer, Colonel Donald Stovall, was chosen to lead the first US inspection of a
Soviet exercise that was to take place in the Byelorussian Military District.
Stovall had previously served as Chief of the US Military Liaison Mission to
the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in (East) Germany. Under
Stovall’s leadership, everything worked beautifully. Soviet authorities even
granted permission for a US aircraft to transport the inspection team to
Belarus, as it is now called. The Soviet military responded with a request for
an inspection of Turkish forces. That too went well, although some in the
Turkish military questioned the wisdom of agreeing to cooperate on such
measures.
Those initial experiences paved the way for the routine notification of military
exercises within the framework of the CSBMs agreed to in Stockholm. Based on
the Stockholm Agreement, on average, participating states collectively under-
take about 90 inspections and 45 observation visits each year.13
After the negotiation of the CFE was completed and its implementation
began, the Forum for Security Cooperation was established. It met weekly in
Vienna to discuss and make decisions concerning the military aspects of
security in the CSCE area and on CSBMs in particular.
As part of the idea of cooperative security in Europe, the CSCE Forum
agreed on a Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security that
was adopted in Budapest in December 1994. The CSCE Helsinki Summit
endorsed it in July 1992. The document expounds on the validity of a com-
prehensive concept of security; it also sets norms and principles that should
define the role of armed forces in democratic societies. The Code emphasized
the determination of participating states to act in solidarity should OSCE
norms and commitments be violated.
An integral part of the Helsinki Process’s CSBMs is the obligation by each
state to refrain from the use of force in their international relations. This
includes the commitment not to threaten with the use of force the integrity or
political independence of any state. This measure also reaffirms the obliga-
tions set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.
Without a doubt, the Middle East would greatly benefit if even a very
modest set of CSBMs could be agreed upon. The act of negotiating such
measures would help take the edge off one’s Feindbild, and the implementa-
tion of agreed upon measures would further assist in even more important
measures over time, similarly to the way it has happened within the Helsinki
Process now incorporated in the OSCE, which was established in 1994 as a
permanent organization to replace the CSCE.
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26 Lynn M. Hansen
Efforts to invigorate negotiations
There have been several attempts to create the provisions necessary for peace
in the Middle East. Perhaps the most important one was the Madrid Con-
ference, which was hosted by the Government of Spain and co-sponsored by
the United States and the Soviet Union, that opened on October 30, 1991 and
lasted for three days. Its purpose was to inaugurate two separate yet parallel
negotiating tracks – bilateral and multilateral. The Conference had no power
to impose solutions or veto agreements; it was designed to serve as an
opening forum for all the participants.
At the beginning of the 1991 Madrid Conference, US President George H
W Bush said that all had come to Madrid “on a mission of hope, to begin
work on a just, lasting, and comprehensive settlement to the conflict in the
Middle East.”14 He emphasized that the United States had come there “to
seek peace for a part of the world that in the long memory of man has known
far too much hatred, anguish, and war,” adding that he could not “think of
an endeavor more worthy, or more necessary.”15
The negotiations took two parallel paths: four separate sets of bilateral
negotiations (Israel-Jordan; Israel-Palestinians; Israel-Syria; Israel-Lebanon)
in addition to several multilateral working groups. The talks with the three
Arab states were aimed at achieving peace treaties, and the negotiations
between Israel and the Palestinians were based on a two-stage formula: five-
year interim self-government arrangements to be followed by negotiations on
the permanent status issues. These issues involved the question of Israeli set-
tlements on the West Bank, the founding of an independent Palestinian state,
and the borders of such a state.
Much like the negotiations in the Helsinki Process, the multilateral talks
were meant to build confidence among the participants and facilitate the
agreements that could help define the Middle East in the future. These mul-
tilateral talks, which opened in Moscow in January 1992, included five sepa-
rate working groups, attended by delegations from countries in the region, as
well as representatives of the international community. The negotiations
focused on key issues that concern the entire Middle East – water, the envir-
onment, arms control, refugees, and economic development.
Almost immediately after the Madrid Conference, bilateral negotiations
between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were con-
ducted in Oslo, Norway, and completed on August 20, 1993. This resulted in
the so-called Oslo Accords, officially titled the “Declaration of Principles
on Interim Self-Government Arrangements.” This was an attempt to resolve
the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It purported to be the first direct face-
to-face agreement between the Government of Israel and the PLO as the
representative of the Palestinian people. The first principle defined the aim of
the Middle East peace process to be the establishment of a Palestinian
Interim Self-Government Authority for the Palestinian people in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip for a transitional period not exceeding five years,
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leading to a permanent settlement. The Accords were then officially signed in
Washington on September 13, 1993, in the presence of PLO Chairman Yasser
Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and US President Bill Clinton.
The documents themselves were signed by Mahmoud Abbas for the
PLO, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres for Israel, Secretary of State Warren
Christopher for the United States, and Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev for
Russia. It seems clear that these accords did very little, if anything, to advance
peace in the region.
At the end of the Conference and the meetings in its aftermath, all that was
really left was hope – and that had dimmed dramatically. Two decades have
passed, bringing about substantial changes in the Middle East, many of which
have served to thwart the whole process. Some have argued that the symbolic
significance of the Madrid Conference outweighed its accomplishments.16
This is a dubious claim. One grows tired of conferences of this sort that are
long on political rhetoric and short on actual achievements.
Working with the Russians, who with the United States had become
co-sponsors of the Middle East Peace Process, President Clinton and his
Secretary of State, Madeleine K Albright, made a good faith effort at the turn
of the century to reinvigorate the process. From January 29 to February 2,
2000, Russia and the United States co-chaired a ministerial meeting of the
Multilateral Steering Group in Moscow. The purpose of the meeting was to
mark the formal revival and resumption of the work of the multilateral track
of the Middle East Peace Process.
This was the first ministerial meeting in eight years that dealt with the
multilateral portion of a moribund peace process. Secretary Albright outlined
three principal objectives:
First, to craft a strong joint statement in support of the Madrid Con-

ference, stressing the importance of forward movement on all tracks;
Second, to endorse dates and venues for working group plenary meetings on
water, the environment, refugees, and regional economic development; and
Third, to consider new directions for the multilateral track, in terms of
both content and structure, in order to ensure that it continues to meet the
needs of regional parties.17
That was the last attempt to renew the multilateral track until the NPT
Review Conference in 2010. The decision adopted during the 2010 NPT
Review Conference included a request for the UN Secretary-General, toge-
ther with the three NPT depositaries (Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States), to convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all states
of the region, on the establishment of a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East.
In October 2011, Finland was designated as the host country for the 2012
conference, and the Finnish Undersecretary of State, Ambassador Jaakko
Laajava, was named as its facilitator. So far, based on Laajava’s updates, this
conference seems unlikely to take place anytime soon.
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28 Lynn M. Hansen
Camp David and Annapolis
In July 2000, US President Bill Clinton hosted a Middle East Peace Summit at
Camp David. Present were Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian
Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat. The Summit failed in its attempt to negotiate a
“final status settlement” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Disagreement on four
principle issues – territory, Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, refugees and the right
of return, and settlements – made it impossible for the parties to conclude an
agreement..The failure of this summit meeting also ended, for all practical pur-
poses, bilateral talks between the Israelis and Palestinians for the next seven years.
Washington then convened a conference at the US Naval Academy in
Annapolis, Maryland in November 2007, to pursue the objectives outlined in
the Roadmap offered by US President George W. Bush. This was an attempt
to launch negotiations again that would ultimately result in agreement on a
two-state solution. Already in July 2007, Bush promised to support the
Palestinians in negotiations aimed at the establishment of a Palestinian State.
This was, in fact, the first speech by a US president that advocated a two-state
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.18 In 2011, President Barack
Obama declared that the prevailing borders before the 1967 Arab-Israeli
War – adjusted to account for Israeli settlements in the West Bank – should
be the basis of a deal. Obama’s formula of land swaps to compensate for
disputed territory created a new benchmark for a diplomatic solution.19
From December 2006 to mid-September 2008, Ehud Olmert and Mahmoud
Abbas, and their negotiating teams, met more than 36 times to work on a
declaration of principles that would address key issues in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and lead to its end. Both sides indicated they were close to an agree-
ment, but could not in the end resolve certain difficult issues.20 There was much
opposition to the entire process among the public in both societies. Many
Israelis opposed the negotiations in the first place and argued that Abbas was
politically weak and unable to implement the Road Map or any other mean-
ingful agreement. Hamas and Iran urged the Palestinians to boycott the meet-
ings, which Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called a political show for
the media in Israel’s interest. Little to no progress was recorded until September
2010, when Palestinian leader Abbas met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu in Washington. This initiated a series of direct talks between the
two leaders designed to implement the two-state solution. However, they broke
down in late September 2010, when an Israeli partial moratorium on settlement
construction in the West Bank expired and Netanyahu refused to extend the
freeze unless the Palestinian Authority recognized Israel as a Jewish state.
Abbas, speaking for the Palestinian leadership, refused to continue negotiating
unless Israel extended the moratorium.
The Middle East and aspects of the Helsinki Process

The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 contains three major sections, often referred
to as “baskets,” plus a document on CBMs and certain aspects of security
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and disarmament. The first section deals with “Questions relating to Security
in Europe”; the second with “Cooperation in the Field of Economics, of
Science and Technology, and of the Environment”; and the third with
“Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields.”
The fundamental challenge in the Middle East remains the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, the solution to which would require an end to the Israeli occupation of
the Palestinian West Bank and the establishment of a viable and contiguous
state for the Palestinians, as well as the recognition of the State of Israel by all
Arab states. In theory, the appropriate place to start would be the first basket,
dealing with questions of security. This might involve something analogous to
the Helsinki Final Act’s Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between
States. Note, however, the complexities of the issues addressed in the Helsinki
document, which range from the inviolability of frontiers and non-intervention
in internal affairs to the principle of sovereign equality and respect for human
rights; none of these would make for an easy topic in a multilateral Middle
Eastern forum similar to the Helsinki Process.
Instability in the Middle East

Continuing volatility in the region is presently the greatest challenge to the
revival of any dialogue on the Middle East security architecture, with key
regional players seemingly bogged down by domestic instability in the linger-
ing aftermath of the Arab Uprisings.
At the time of publication, the crisis in Syria has occupied the forefront of
international attention for over two years, with unrelenting battles between
the Assad regime and the rebel forces coming to include chemical weapons,
experienced foreign extremist fighters flowing into the country to join the
fight, and a fractured Syrian opposition unable to put forth a viable alter-
native political platform. Whilst the collapse of Assad’s family reign might
seem just a matter of time, under the present circumstances it would likely
only intensify the turmoil in Syria. Under the scenario of Assad stepping
down as part of a negotiated settlement, perhaps a friendly nudge from
Russia could assist in forming new Syrian attitudes, but should the rebels
seize control, Russia’s views will likely be irrelevant. The most powerful and
well-organized group will attempt to assume leadership in the early post-
conflict stage, and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood might still be the most
organized force within the Syrian National Council.
In Lebanon, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, which has tradi-
tionally been Syria’s closest ally, has become the effective head of state in
March 2013. Hezbollah’s organizational make-up has ensured its longevity,
despite regular predictions of its downfall, and it is quite likely to strive to
maintain close ties to Syria as the new government shapes up, with its anti-
Western views remaining a constant challenge in the political picture. In
addition, the influx of about 1,000,000 Syrian refugees into a country with a
population of only 4,500,000 people further complicates the situation in
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30 Lynn M. Hansen
Lebanon: aside from the humanitarian consequences of this migration, the
presence of these refugees may provide a new recruitment pool for Hezbollah.
In Egypt, following the removal of President Mubarak, Mohamed Morsi
became the first democratically elected head of state, but his was a term
marked, perhaps inevitably, by popular disillusionment over the lack of tangible
progress. Morsi’s subsequent removal by the Egyptian military will certainly
change the character of the nation, but we do not yet fully understand this new
path that Egypt might take. The new leadership might be tempted to play to
the more conservative elements in Egyptian society, irrespective of how many
or how few there may be. Nevertheless, once stabilized, Egypt could certainly
play a powerful role in a future CSCE-like forum, and if it was to take a more
moderate position with sufficient fervor to influence other countries, it would
contribute substantially to addressing regional security concerns. Overall, it
would be difficult to create circumstances that are favorable to resolving Middle
East issues in a manner that resembles the Helsinki Process until the discussion
of political and religious issues can be effectively separated.
Iraq continues to be plagued by instability, including rising tensions in the
Kurdish North, following the withdrawal of US and coalition forces, so it will
be some time before the country is able to play any meaningful role in a
regional security process.
In Israel, turmoil in the neighboring Arab states is observed with concern,
and the particularly forceful response by the Israeli Defense Force to the acts
of violence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has heightened Palestinian ani-
mosity, only fertilizing the soil for extremist recruiters.
Overall, the bulk of regional security issues cannot be effectively addressed
without a negotiated political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the
establishment of a Palestinian state with defined borders. This is not to sug-
gest that the Helsinki Process could not be a prototype for a peace process in
the Middle East. But such a forum would have to develop its own set of
topics for discussion and negotiation. One must admit that current events in
the Middle East make a conference or a regional process involving all the
states in the region a challenging prospect.
Participation
The Helsinki Process involved 32 European states plus the United States,
the Soviet Union, and Canada. In the application of such a process to the
Middle East, one immediately confronts the question of who would partici-
pate. Like all political transitions throughout history, the Arab Uprisings have
led to internal instability in many of the region’s political heavyweights.
It is questionable whether Iran, for example, would wish to be a partici-
pant – even though Iran is very much at the crux of many of the issues that
confront the Middle East. Its ties to Hezbollah and Hamas undoubtedly
make Iran a problematic participant. Nonetheless, it seems critical that Iran
participates because of its stature in the region and its efforts to presumably
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acquire nuclear weapons. Moreover, a forum like the Helsinki Process might
be an agreeable place to reinforce nonproliferation commitments, especially
following the recent election of a more moderate leader in President Hassan
Rouhani. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has cautioned that
“the region is like a gunpowder store and the future cannot be predicted.” It
remains to be seen whether his concern would lead him to opt for participa-
tion in a Helsinki-like forum.
It is difficult to conceive of a successful Helsinki-like process in the Middle
East without the participation of the United States. It has traditionally been
a key player in attempts to reach agreements in the Middle East and has
publically supported the concept of a two-state solution for the Israeli-
Palestinian dilemma. But one must not forget how sensitive an issue that is.
Antagonism toward the United States has almost become an Arab cultural
trait because of frequent US unconditional support of Israel, as well as US
military activity in the region. US participation in such a conference would
likely put it in a position to demonstrate open support for Israel, which
would impede its role as an unbiased mediator. Therefore, active Russian
participation is very important, should such a process materialize. They have
experience in dealing with the difficult issues that were addressed in the Hel-
sinki Process and have seen its benefits. Moreover, they would help counter-
act the perception that the Americans were steering the negotiations.
Nonetheless, a regional process should not be constructed in such a manner
as to cause participants to view this as an American-Russian process. Despite
Chinese involvement in the Road Map, their interests in the Middle East are
largely economic, and I fear they would just muddy the waters, so to speak.
Perhaps they could have observer status. I believe it would be well if a more
neutral country or an organization such as the European Union could be the
overall organizer of future negotiations. Such a conference must be recog-
nized as a Middle East conference, not an American one. It is worth noting
that Turkey already has experience in introducing arms control concepts into
the Middle East equation.
Non-state actors and state-sponsored terrorism

Hearkening back to the Helsinki Process, in the 1983 concluding document of
the Madrid CSCE Follow-Up Meeting, the participating states agreed to the
following:
They will take all appropriate measures in preventing their respective

territories from being used for the preparation, organization, or com-
mission of terrorist activities, including those directed against other
participating states and their citizens. This also includes measures to
prohibit on their territories illegal activities of persons, groups and
organizations that instigate, organize, or engage in the perpetration of
acts of terrorism.21
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32 Lynn M. Hansen
They also committed to refuse to aid terrorist activities directed at the violent
overthrow of the regime of another state. That meant specifically that they
would refrain from financing, encouraging, fomenting, or tolerating any such
activities. However, this commitment was agreed upon within the CSCE,
where terrorism was not, at the time, a significant issue.
There are, of course, enormous differences between security and coopera-
tion in Europe and in the Middle East. In thinking of the viability of a
CSCE-type process in the Middle East, one immediately encounters non-state
actors in general and Hamas and Hezbollah in particular, which both play a
prominent role in the region’s politics. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin stated in 1987,
and the Hamas Charter affirmed in 1988, that Hamas was founded to liberate
Palestine from Israeli occupation and to establish an Islamic state in the area
that is now Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Hamas is a terrorist
organization regardless of what good it may have accomplished among the
Palestinians by establishing hospitals, education systems, libraries, and other
services. The European Union, Israel, Japan, Canada, and the United States
have all identified Hamas as a terrorist entity; indeed, Hamas has claimed
responsibility for a number of suicide attacks targeting Israeli civilians.
For a long time, Mahmoud Abbas was the leader of and spokesman for the
Palestinians while a long internecine political struggle for authority and
influence took place between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. Then,
on February 6, 2012, the rival Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas,
announced that there should be an interim unity government, politically cou-
pling the Gaza Strip population with that of the West Bank. This has the
potential of giving Hamas more political power than ever before, even though
the Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas will head the govern-
ment. The idea of a unity government that includes the Hamas leadership
further complicates the possibility of Palestinians participating in a CSCE-like
process in a meaningful way. So far, Hamas has been rejecting US Secretary
of State Kerry’s announcement of a return to talks; it considers the Palesti-
nian Authority’s return to negotiations – while Israeli occupation is still
ongoing – to be at odds with the national Palestinian consensus.
Iran provides political support and supplies weapons to Hamas – an orga-
nization committed to the destruction of Israel through jihad. Iran has also
supplied another enemy of Israel, the militant organization Hezbollah, with
substantial amounts of financial, political, diplomatic, and organizational aid,
as well as training, weapons, and explosives, all the while urging Hezbollah to
take action against Israel. Despite all these negatives, one might argue that a
convergence of view among the Arab states present would influence the Ira-
nians. This would be an extremely optimistic argument bordering on naïveté.
Despite the lack of prestige among the Arab states, Iran is still a force to
be reckoned with in any peace process. Moreover, a multilateral forum might
be helpful in addressing regional concerns about Iran’s nuclear program.
Iran is a Shiite theocracy that has strong ties with the Shiite and allied
majorities in control of Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. It severed all diplomatic
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and commercial ties with Israel after the 1979 revolution, and its government
does not recognize Israel as a country, referring to its government as the
Zionist regime.
Despite his apparent willingness to participate in a Middle East peace
process, Benjamin Netanyahu remains rather belligerent. He is at present
unwilling to negotiate with Hamas because it is a terrorist organization that
persists in sending unguided rockets from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory
where Ashkelon and even Tel Aviv are at risk. Yet it should be noted that
rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip have virtually ceased following the
November 2012 conflict between Hamas and Israel, and the deployment of
the Iron Dome. Thus, the inclusion of Hamas in an interim unity government
heightens my pessimism about a viable CSCE-like peace process. This is not
to argue against Hamas participation, only to point out Netanyahu’s negative
attitude toward such participation. Still, Netanyahu has agreed to participate
in the Kerry Process, and his attitude could change as negotiations continue.
Applied to the Middle East, the 1983 CSCE Madrid commitments would
serve the Peace Process well, if they were adhered to. However, after partici-
pation in peace talks of various hues, the more radical elements among the
Palestinians may have reached the conclusion that one listens to the voice of
violence more than one listens to the voice of peace, the idea being that if one
participates in an armed struggle, one gets results, but that if one advocates
for peace, one gets nothing.22 Moderate elements among the Palestinians have
repeatedly been disappointed in the lack of results of the direct negotiations, a
situation which has led them to search for alternative solutions such as
Abbas’s attempt to gain UN recognition of Palestine as an independent state.
Prospects for future progress on regional issues

In September 1993, I was invited by Ambassador Süha Umar, then in charge
of arms control in the Turkish Foreign Ministry, to attend a meeting in
Antalya from October 4 to October 6 that same year. It was intended that
Ambassador Oleg Grinevsky and I give a joint presentation at an arms con-
trol workshop on how agreement was achieved at the Stockholm Conference.
While Ambassador Grinevsky was unable to be there because of a chaotic
political situation in Moscow, I was able to attend. I was not aware of the
nature of the workshop until I arrived. The workshop turned out to be part of
the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group, one of the
multilateral working groups established following the Madrid Conference.
Turkey was chosen to be the “mentor” on arms control and confidence-
building measures, and Umar had decided I should chair the meeting, in
which the different regional representatives faced each other to decide whe-
ther they were willing to embark on some sort of confidence-building mea-
sures. Despite my initial pique at Umar for not asking me ahead of time to
chair the meeting, I did so and enjoyed it immensely. Israel, Jordan, Egypt,
Oman, and Qatar, as well as the PLO, were represented; all displayed a
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34 Lynn M. Hansen
willingness to deal with the issues at hand. Umar was quite enthusiastic, as
the process seemed to have gotten much further than anyone had dared hope.
Nonetheless, I could not help but notice that the attending representatives of
Arab countries would not even take their coffee during breaks if there hap-
pened to be an Israeli at the coffee table. I speak thereof because it was not
unlike the relationship I had with General Tatarnikov at the beginning of the
Stockholm Conference that was influenced by Feindbild.
In late March 1994, I was again invited by the Turkish government to
attend the same working group on Arms Control and Regional Security in
the Middle East. Again, I was asked by the Turkish government to chair the
meeting on pre-notification and confidence- and security-building measures,
which I gladly did. By the end of the meeting, we had put together a couple
of papers that expressed more or less the direction that the Middle East par-
ticipants might take in creating CBMs. Diplomats from Oman, Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Tunisia, and the PLO were the chief
Arab representatives. It was interesting to observe that Arab unity was not
necessarily a given among those states and that several were more concerned
about other Arab states than about Israel.
Sometime later, the Washington-based Stimson Center contacted me and
asked me if I would write a paper on confidence- and security-building mea-
sures to deliver at a conference in Malta on June 24 and 25, 1994. The
meeting was to involve roughly the same people who had earlier attended the
meetings in Antalya. Inasmuch as I felt I had been effective in pushing
CSBMs in the Antalya meetings, I felt a moral obligation to make myself
available for consultations. The conference went well. My presentation
focused on how my own cynicism about CSBMs was gradually overcome
because Tatarnikov and I were able to work through concrete issues to even-
tually reach an agreement. This was only the third meeting in which I parti-
cipated where Arabs and Israelis were present. I could not help but notice
how much that Feindbild each had of the other had diminished in intensity.
By the end of this meeting, the Israelis and the representatives from the Arab
countries not only got their coffee at the same time, but they sat together and
chatted amicably.
Future outlook
There is little doubt that the Helsinki Process presents an excellent model for
dealing with the problems of the Middle East. The Madrid Conference might
be compared to the Helsinki meetings, but of the Middle Eastern states only
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria were present at the Conference
itself. The Palestinians were there as part of the Jordanian delegation. One
must be quite skeptical about getting all the pertinent states in the region to
agree on an agenda for discussions and negotiations. It is also quite clear that
not every state in the region would agree to discuss the issues (and possibly go
beyond them) that have been part of the Helsinki (OSCE) Process. One could
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get around that by agreeing that no subject is taboo, but that might be too
much to hope for.
Once again, Washington is trying to invigorate a peace process in the Middle
East, and hopefully the pertinent states in the region will eventually join the
effort. I tend to be skeptical of such processes when they open with much
ceremony and media coverage. Kerry’s approach entails concluding an agree-
ment on all issues within a nine-month period. Most will realize that such a
plan is an impossible dream, given the complexity of the issues that must be
dealt with. It was Kerry’s intention that he, and only he, would advise the
media and the public on events arising from the negotiations. Nonetheless,
some of the most important agreements were reached behind closed doors.
Kerry’s policy on silence and secrecy as expressed in the high-level small-group
talks that were held in Washington in July 2013 and that were subsequently
moved to the region – and without substantive leakages from the closed-door
discussions – seems to have been violated by recent media coverage.
The term “confidence-building” is, I believe, often construed to mean con-
fidence in one’s adversaries. That certainly is not the factual role of CBMs.
Rather, implementation of freely agreed upon measures builds a state’s con-
fidence in its own security and well-being. Faithfully implemented, such
measures can also modify the Feindbild spoken of earlier. More generally,
however, sitting down together for a prolonged period does significantly
alter the form and texture of one’s view of an adversary. It should be
remembered that the Stockholm Conference lasted from January 1984 until
mid-September 1986 – two-and-a-half years went by before any substantial
results were produced.
Rather than a full-fledged process with high-ranking participants, another
effort to define confidence-building measures for the region, or just between
individual states, could be undertaken. To be clear, what I am suggesting is
the revival of the multilateral arms control and the regional security element
of the moribund Peace Process. Because of its experience and interests within
the region, Turkey could be the right country to initiate and oversee this
process again, being one of the more stable powers in the region. The United
States and Russia could assist in whatever way Turkey might ask, but that
should be kept on an expert (not political) level. The European Union might
also find a role in the process exerting both political pressure and expertise
while promoting the principles contained in the Barcelona Process of 1995.23
Let there be no mistake, I believe a Middle East forum based on the
Helsinki Process would promise significant progress in resolving large and
smaller problems. However, it would have to be understood from the begin-
ning that it will take time – a lot of time. Such a forum would have to be kept
at the expert level, with occasional visits from senior political figures to spur
the process on. This effort might well go relatively unnoticed by international
media. That, it seems to me, is the best way to make anything concrete
happen in the Middle East Peace Process in the current environment and in
the foreseeable future.
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36 Lynn M. Hansen
Notes
1 The author no longer has an affiliation with the US government; the views
expressed here are distinctly his own.
2 Kissinger, Memo to the President.
3 See Grinevsky and Hansen, Making Peace, 43.
4 For instance, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired by the majority
Republicans, held a hearing on March 3, 2011 to discuss withholding part of US
annual contributions to the United Nations (see, for example, Simpson, “The
United States”). That same year, the Committee also considered bills H.R.1501
and S.923 to withhold US contributions to the United Nations until the United
Nations formally retracted the final report of the “United Nations Fact Finding
Mission on the Gaza Conflict.”
5 See Kalugin, The First Directorate, 302.
6 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 115.
7 President Ronald Reagan used this expression in a speech to the British House of
Commons on June 8, 1982.
8 See notes 52, 56, and 58 in Grinevsky and Hansen, Making Peace, 980.
9 Grinevsky and Hansen, Making Peace, 118–119.
10 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 427.
11 See Grinevsky and Hansen, Making Peace, 68–69.
12 Grinevsky and Hansen, Making Peace, 169–366.
13 Section 38 of the Stockholm Document indicates that each state may inspect another
state once a year; however, no more than three inspections may be conducted on a
single state’s territory. According to Section 63, the notification of major maneuvers
carries with it an obligation to invite two observers from each state.
14 Bush, “Remarks.”
15 Ibid.
16 See, for example, Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 513.
17 Albright, “Statement.” Curiously, she made no direct reference to the Arms Con-
trol and Regional Security Process.
18 Nathan-Kazis, “Pro-Israel Lawmakers.”
19 Obama, “Remarks by the President.”
20 Nathan-Kazis, “Pro-Israel Lawmakers.”
21 This quote comes from Paragraph 5 of the Concluding Document of the Madrid
Meeting (November 11, 1980 to September 9 1986) Statement of Principles.
22 International Peace Institute. “Ashrawi: ‘One Minute to Midnight’ in Middle East
Peace Process,” March 21, 2012. Available at: http://www.ipinst.org/events/speakers/
details/347-ashrawi-one-minute-to-midnight-in-middle-east-peace-process.html.
23 The Barcelona Process sought the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean partnership
that would expand economic relations while dealing with basic security issues.
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Baker, James A. The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992.
New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995.
Bush, George H. W. “Remarks at the Opening Session of the Middle East Peace
Conference in Madrid, Spain.” Speech. Madrid, October 30, 1991, George Bush
Presidential Library and Museum. Available at: http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/
research/public_papers.php?id=3566&year=1991&month=10.
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Gorbachev, Mikhail. Memoirs. New York: Doubleday, 1996.
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Kissinger, Henry. Memo to the President. January 17, 1975.
Nathan-Kazis, Josh. “Pro-Israel Lawmakers Promote One State.” Jewish Daily For-
ward, March 12, 2012. Available at: http://forward.com/articles/152888/pro-israel-
lawmakers-promote-one-state/?p=all.
Obama, Barack. “Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa.”
Speech. Washington, DC, May 19, 2011. State Department. Available at: http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-
north-africa.
Simpson, Dan. “The United States Needs the United Nations.” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette,
February 9, 2011. Available at: http://www.post-gazette.com/dan-simpson/2011/02/09/
The-United-States-needs-the-United-Nations/stories/201102090396.
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2 A zone in the Middle East

Confidence-building measures
and the European experience
Rolf Ekéus
In 1966, the Soviet Union proposed a Conference on European Security, with

the basic underlying motive of consolidating the political division of Europe
after the end of World War II (WWII). If successful, it would have provided
international recognition of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states (Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania), part of the Finnish Karelia, the former German terri-
tories of Pommeria and East Prussia, part of Poland (and the Polish annexa-
tion of parts of Germany), the division of Germany, including the recognition
of the Berlin Wall, and future Soviet political domination of large parts of
Central Europe.
This initiative started a process that slowly and gradually dismantled the
complex ideological and violence-based East-West tensions on the European
scene after WWII, which appeared doomed to remain without an end. That
atmosphere is not too dissimilar from what can be observed in the Middle
East today: the decades-long Arab-Israeli political and territorial conflict and
Arab-Iranian tensions, rooted in age-old religious differences, contradictions,
and colliding territorial interests. For the purpose of finding new approaches
toward preventing further violent conflicts in the Middle East, it is worth
taking a closer look at the political and military ways and means adapted to
the settlements of the Cold War confrontations in Europe.
Initially, the Soviet plan was that only European states should participate.
Divided Germany was to be represented by the two German states – the
Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. How-
ever, the original Soviet plan to separate the United States from its allies in
Europe did not work, so after a while the Soviet Union modified its position
to include both the United States and Canada in its conference proposal.
Unsurprisingly, the United States and its allies met the proposal with
demonstrable skepticism. The West responded with a proposal of its own for
Multilateral Balanced Force Reduction in Europe (MBFR), with the ambi-
tion of reducing the substantial numerical superiority of the Soviet Union and
its allies in terms of conventional forces. Although substantial changes of the
pre-WWII borders had been established in the 1970 Moscow Treaty between
West Germany and the Soviet Union, and in the Warsaw Treaty concluded
the same year between West Germany and Poland, this New European Order
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A zone in the Middle East 39
could not be recognized until all states in Europe, together with the United
States and Canada, would collectively agree to it.
After long hesitation, diplomatic preparations started in Helsinki in
November 1972, leading to a Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in July 1973, where
they agreed to launch a genuine negotiating process addressing three so-called
“baskets” of issues: political security, enhanced trade and technological
transfers, and human dimensions aspects like freedom of movement and
freedom of expression. This process took place in Geneva from the autumn of
1973 to the summer of 1975; during this period, important definitions were
agreed upon, and finally a concrete set of political steps with regard to all
three baskets was drafted in the form of a final document, which was adopted
by the heads of state and government in Helsinki on July 31, 1975 and
became known as the Helsinki Final Act.
During the period from 1973 to 1975, significant developments took place
in the political positions of the two sides of divided Europe. Western reluc-
tance toward and skepticism about the Conference initiative eased gradually.
For West Germany, it was especially important that the prospects for a future
German unification had brightened, when after months of intensive negotia-
tions, the participating states could agree that, in addition to the principle of
inviolability of frontiers, the borders could be changed by peaceful means and
by agreement in accordance with international law. It was also remarkable
that the Soviet Union, in order to obtain general acceptance and recognition
of its large territorial advances in Europe during WWII, went along with the
West’s language, which stressed the obligation to respect human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
In parallel with this process, the West was able to convince the Soviet
Union to accept the launching of MBFR talks in 1973 between the member
states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. From the Western perspective, the
talks were aimed at achieving an equitable balance of forces in Europe. The
Soviet Union certainly had no interest in moving quickly toward that end,
given its considerable numerical superiority in conventional forces, but
accepted to enter the talks to achieve the political goal of legitimizing its
great territorial gains, which were made from 1939 to 1945. With these initial
positions, it was not surprising that the MBFR talks got nowhere with regard
to force reductions. The talks ended in 1989, with progress made only on
settling certain definitional issues, and were replaced by the much more suc-
cessful negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).
In contrast to the MFBR, the CFE negotiations, which unfolded over
1989–1990 between the members of NATO and the states of the Warsaw
Pact, were more successful in producing a system of balance between the
forces in Europe for two main reasons. First, the basis for the CFE negotia-
tions was the progress achieved through the confidence-building measures
(CBMs) negotiations, launched with the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, the
Stockholm Conference in 1986, and the Vienna Document in 1990. Second,
the CFE Treaty provided for equal ceilings for major weapons and equipment
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40 Rolf Ekéus
systems for both groups of negotiating states – they were then translated into
national limits and opened for adoption as the breakup of the Warsaw Pact
became imminent.
The Helsinki Final Act, though signed by all the participants, was not a
treaty in the formal sense, but a “politically binding” document. It contained
a set of ten principles, such as sovereign equality and respect for the rights
inherent in sovereignty; refraining from the threat or use of force; inviolability
of frontiers; territorial integrity of states; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-
intervention in internal affairs; and respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, including the freedom of thought, freedom of conscience, and
freedom of religion or belief. The Final Act was linked to a number of addi-
tional documents on CBMs, such as “Cooperation in the Field of Economics,
of Science and Technology, and of the Environment” and “Cooperation in
Humanitarian and Other Fields,” outlining specific steps to be implemented
by the participating states.
A breakthrough for international security cooperation was the document in
the Final Act which provided a list of military CBMs, such as the obligation
to give prior notification of major military maneuvers and the obligation of
exchanging observers. These first, relatively modest, concrete steps, though
remarkable in the context of the Cold War, were to be followed by extensive
and refined improvements and extensions during the process of negotiations
in Stockholm (1984) and Vienna (1990).
The Helsinki Final Act also contained agreements and undertakings of
cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the
environment. Even more important, long-lasting, and influential were the
provisions for undertakings of cooperation and exchanges in the fields of
culture, education, and information. Moreover, contact between family
members and the reunification of families dispersed between Eastern and
Western states were made easier.
The Helsinki Final Act made human rights issues a legitimate subject for a
dialogue between East and West for the first time since the start of the Cold
War in 1946. It offered a permanent channel of communication through
follow-up conferences, a normative Code of Conduct, and a long-term pro-
gram of cooperation. From a democratic perspective, the fundamental idea
was that if borders were to be recognized, they should represent borders in a
contemporary sense – sufficiently porous to make it possible for people and
ideas to cross over, and not just modifications of Iron Curtain practices.
The follow-up to the Final Act

The first follow-up meeting took place in Belgrade from October 1977 to
March 1978. Very little was achieved in Belgrade in terms of substantive
agreements: at most, the participating states could agree to disagree. But
something else happened. The most significant change of political realities,
with relation to the follow-up, was the creation of spontaneously organized
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groups in the states of Central and Eastern Europe, which started taking on
the task of monitoring the implementation of the human dimension provi-
sions and obligations of the Final Act. Since the Final Act was politically –
but not legally – binding, Moscow, Warsaw, East Berlin, and Prague did not
expect to have to take the human rights and democracy provisions seriously,
which was the reason why they had signed the Final Act. But to everyone’s
surprise, many inhabitants in these states, particularly the intellectuals and the
critics of the regimes, behaved as if the rules were really binding. Most nota-
bly, in Central Europe individual writers and thinkers – like Václav Havel in
Czechoslovakia and Adam Michnik in Poland – created Charta 77, a group
which highlighted the lack of implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and
made the population aware of their democratic and human rights. This laid
the foundation for a civil and political revolution. The Soviet Union and its
allied states had reluctantly followed a provision in the Final Act to widely
distribute the text of the Final Act to all citizens, who thus became aware of
their rights under the Act. The accessibility and power of the rules in basket
three started to shake the Soviet-inspired system in Central and Eastern
Europe. Helsinki Committees were spontaneously organized in all countries;
particularly notable is the leadership and support of the Final Act principles
by a famous nuclear weapon scientist, Andrei Sakharov – it carried special
weight in setting up such committees in the Soviet Union. This development
impressed the United States and the Carter administration in particular,
which awakened to a new enthusiasm for international human rights and the
human dimension of the Final Act.
After the failed follow-up meeting between the participating states in
Belgrade, a second follow-up meeting started in Madrid in 1980 and con-
tinued for three years. During this period of serious Cold-War tension
between East and West, the pressure on the Warsaw Pact countries to respect
human rights continued and increased. Remarkable was the unrest in Poland
in the form of trade union strikes, especially in the shipbuilding industry,
supported by intellectuals. The shipyard workers organized themselves in
the Solidarity movement. The strikers and the supporting movement were
oppressed under martial law in December 1981, a situation which gave cause
for more protests. This created serious security concerns in Western Europe,
which led to a state of military alert in several countries west of Poland.
In contrast to the East-West détente during the 1970s, with mutual under-
standing between the major actors, the Carter administration, taking office
in 1977, engaged in a major buildup of its military capability with a focus on
the rapid deployment of its forces, especially after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979. The US allies in Europe promised to increase their
support for a joint buildup of NATO forces. It is not surprising that in this
political climate, the MBFR talks were stalling. However, in spite of this ser-
ious East-West tension, the ongoing Madrid Process gathered a momentum
of its own, as it could offer the participating states a functioning channel of
communication. Concrete settlements were not reached, but the discussions
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42 Rolf Ekéus
on peaceful settlement of disputes created the basis for later agreements. The
East-West differences did not prevent the states participating in the Madrid
Conference from reaching a principled decision to reduce regional military
tensions by improving and further developing the confidence-building mea-
sures agreed upon in the Final Act.
Human rights in Europe were no longer a prerogative of Charta 77 and the
emerging Helsinki Committees only, but gradually became a subject for
interstate dialogue. In this framework, many humanitarian cases, such as
family reunification, were resolved positively.
Military confidence-building measures

The eternal dilemma faced by everyone who deals with security policy and
disarmament affairs is whether security and political stability should come
first as a precondition for disarmament, or whether disarmament must come
first as a precondition for security. The same could be said about confidence-
building measures: should CBMs lay the groundwork for negotiating security
structures, or should established security structures be strengthened and sup-
ported by CBMs in the form of verification and compliance arrangements?
The most systematic and successful set of military confidence-building
measures was arguably established in the process of developing the structures
of the Conference (later Organization) on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE/OSCE). The notion of CBMs in international affairs has ori-
ginally been created in the context of the negotiations on and implementation
of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE. The first CBMs in Europe, as
created and implemented during the first years of the CSCE after 1975, ori-
ginally played a modest role in purely military terms, but their psychological
and political impact was considerable. All participating states, from East to
West, agreed to give prior notification of military exercises exceeding 25,000
troops in areas within 250 kilometers of a common frontier. Furthermore,
they agreed to exchange observers of military maneuvers on a bilateral and
voluntary basis, and likewise to give prior notification of other major military
exercises.
The system survived the “New Cold War” during the early 1980s. Specifi-
cally, the Stockholm Conference of 1984–1986 adopted a much broader scope
of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), which were no
longer voluntary but politically binding, providing for the prior notification
(42 days) of all military activities that involve more than 13,000 troops, and
the compulsory invitation of observers and exchange of calendars for planned
military activities. Thus, all states were obliged to accept inspections of all
declared military activities for purposes of verification.
A third generation of CSBMs was introduced through the Vienna Docu-
ment in 1990 and further developed in a series of Vienna Documents from
1992 until 1999. The Vienna Document of 1990 provided for compulsory
annual meetings of implementation assessment, which started in 1991, and
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evaluation visits to military units and air bases reported under the informa-
tion regime. In addition, the Vienna Document of 1990 introduced new
communication and consultation measures, like identifying contact points for
incidents of military nature and computerized communications networks.
Finally, the CSBMs provided for emergency meetings to be held at the Con-
flict Prevention Center in Vienna to clarify unusual military activities, either
bilaterally or with all participating states.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the
Vienna Documents of 1992, 1994, and 1999 added further measures, like
programs for military contacts and cooperation, joint military exercises, and
transparency with regard to defense planning, the provision of information
about defense policies, doctrines, force planning, and defense budgets. The
1999 Vienna Document lowered the threshold for compulsory reporting of
military activity from 13,000 to 9,000 troops.
An institutional support system was established in Vienna in 1992 through
the Forum for Security Cooperation with military experts, which com-
plemented the Permanent Council responsible for the political and diplomatic
leadership of the OSCE.
As mentioned above, the negotiations on balanced force reductions in
Europe had stalled during the 1980s, but with the changing political atmo-
sphere, it was finally possible in 1989 to start a fresh set of negotiations
between the member states of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact on the
reduction of conventional forces in Europe (CFE). An agreement was reached
in November 1990, encompassing large reductions of heavy military equip-
ment, like artillery, tanks, and armored vehicles. The CFE Treaty entered into
force in 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union (and of the Warsaw
Pact).
An idea going back to a 1955 initiative by US President Dwight Eisenhower
to establish a regime of unarmed observation flights was resurrected in 1990,
when the former Warsaw Pact states and NATO agreed to a Treaty on Open
Skies, signed in Helsinki in the context of the 1992 OSCE summit meeting. The
Treaty provided a regime for conducting observation flights over the territories
of the state parties, including reciprocal quotas for such flights, notification of
points of entry, and technical details of sensors to be used. The Treaty entered
into force in 2002 and is controlled by the Open Skies Consultative Commis-
sion, served by the OSCE Secretariat.
Obviously, it is nearly impossible to draw any parallels between the
European experience of the late 1980s and the present-day Middle East. Still,
there are lessons to be learned from Europe. The relations within the region
shifted from an atmosphere of relatively relaxed cooperation on many poli-
tical and economic issues during the time of the Helsinki Conference (1973–
1975) to a gradual hardening of East-West relations, reaching a peak in the
early 1980s during the “New Cold War.” This negative trend was broken
during the Stockholm Conference (1984–1986), when the participating states
could adopt a new set of confidence- and security-building measures. The
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44 Rolf Ekéus
addition of the word “security” implied that the new measures were both
concrete and substantive in a military context. The participating governments
saw these new CSBMs not only as tools to stabilize a shaky military situation,
but also as means to save the political security arrangements established
through the Helsinki Process.
The gradual deconstruction of the Soviet system, including the dissolution
of the Warsaw Pact, took place in an institutional context, with the Charter
of Paris for a New Europe adopted on a summit level in November 1990
acting as the centerpiece. The undertaking, in accordance with the Charter, of
all states to build, consolidate, and strengthen democracy as the only system
of government is fundamental in this context. The two documents, the CFE
Treaty and the first Vienna Document on CSBMs and their implementation,
changed radically the security and military environment in Europe. The
human dimension issues, strengthened by the subsequent creation of the
Office for Democratic Institutions, the High Commissioner on National
Minorities, and the Representative on Freedom of the Media, added a system
of implementation to the undertakings provided by the Charter. The radical
changes in Europe around the 1990s, which meant the end of the post-WWII
era, were thus embedded in a structured institutional framework, which
served to provide stability and a measure of trust between the major actors.
This did not prevent serious birth pains and armed conflicts in the Balkans,
the Caucasus, and Central Asia, where ethnic and religious identities violently
collided during the establishment of a number of new nation-states.
Security in the Middle East

The strategic environment in the Middle East, though in many respects dif-
ferent from that of Europe, nevertheless has a number of similarities with it,
especially as it existed during the period from the early 1950s until 1990, the
most prominent similarity being constant tensions between major political
actors. However, the European situation during the Cold War had the distinct
character of having two secular ideological systems facing each other, both
sides being armed with destructive capabilities unprecedented in human his-
tory. By contrast, the current Middle Eastern political situation is complex
and multifaceted in both an ethno-religious and a strategic sense.
The centuries-old rivalry between Arabs and Persians, or in religious terms,
between Sunni and Shia Muslims, is reflected in the tensions between Iran
and several of its Arab neighbors: Saudi Arabia, the majority of the Gulf
Cooperation Council members, and Egypt. The 1980–1988 war between Iraq,
an Arab state under the secular Saddam Hussein regime, and Iran, restruc-
tured following the 1979 Islamic (Shia) Revolution, had much of the char-
acter of an Arab-Persian ethnic conflict, where the Iraqi religious Shia
Muslim majority had clearly chosen its Arab identity over its religious affinity.
Most Arab states supported Iraq, financially and materially, similarly to the
US supporting its European allies, or the Soviet Union providing for its
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partners in the Warsaw Pact. Notably, only Israel was backing Iran with
military equipment and technology. Today, Iraq is subject to bitter sectarian
tensions, which have had a negative impact on its military capability, and is
no longer the influential strategic regional actor it once was. Iran, having
gained influence in Iraq, its former enemy, is now running the risk of losing
its most important Arab partner, namely, Syria.
Under the leadership of the al-Assad family regime, Syria has tried to
maintain a secular identity, which may be challenged by the country’s Sunni
majority, depending on the dynamics of the ongoing civil war. On the state
level, the League of Arab States, especially member states Saudi Arabia and
Qatar, have lent support to the opposition, politically and with military
equipment and munitions, while Russia continues to provide similar support
to the Syrian government. In terms of non-state actors, several Sunni funda-
mentalist groupings are expanding their support for the opposition, while
Iranian-backed Hezbollah militias operate from Lebanon in support of the
regime. The use of chemical weapons in this conflict has pushed Russia and
the United States to cooperate on the UN Security Council to bring such use
to a halt, including the engagement by the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), tasked to eliminate all chemical weapons and
related equipment and material in Syria. The Syrian regime’s cooperation
with the international inspection efforts has earned it some political breathing
space, while the opposition has lost some democratic legitimacy due to the
perceived infiltration of extremist groups into its ranks. As a consequence, the
political, though not necessarily the military, balance has shifted in favor of
the regime. At the same time, Syria’s supporter, Iran, has initiated a political
“charm offensive” of sorts toward the United States and the West, and even
toward Israel, though so far with limited success.
With the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, a new dimension of
great strategic significance was added to the region. Israel, a newcomer to the
contemporary Middle East, presented a challenge to the political order
shaped by the French and British colonial rulers, who left the region after the
end of World War II. Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian West Bank in 1967
led to an increase in tensions in the Middle East as a whole. The centuries-old
rivalry between Arabs and Persians, and Sunni and Shia was compounded by
the creation of Israel and its occupation of territories outside the UN-
mandated lands, considered by most in the region to be part of Arab territory.
Thus, the Arab-Israeli regional rivalry added a third dimension to the tradi-
tional ethno-religious confrontation in the Middle East.
Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons capability in the late 1960s radically
changed the regional security calculations. The vast numerical Arab troop
superiority in relation to Israel’s conventional forces, which had been more or
less balanced by Western (including American) military support, lost its sig-
nificance when it was gradually understood that Israel had the capacity to use
nuclear weapons against a numerically superior conventional force. However,
as late as the Yom Kippur War of 1973, it was not clear if Israel really had
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46 Rolf Ekéus
the capacity and/or the political will to employ nuclear weapons against the
clearly superior attacking Arab forces. In the end, strong American backing
of Israel, parallel to the reluctance of Moscow (under pressure from
Washington) to significantly support the Arab side, helped Israel turn this war
around without any nuclear weapons having to be used. Still, Egypt was
subsequently eager to acquire chemical weapons as a tool of deterrence
against Israel’s nuclear capability, and later also shared this capability with
Syria. As late as 1997, when the Chemical Weapons Convention entered into
force, it was clear that neither Egypt nor Syria had the intention to join the
Convention, preferring instead to preserve their deterrent. Originally, Syria’s
chemical weapons capability served a strategic role as a deterrent against
Israel, but in 2013 this arsenal was turned into a means for tactical warfare,
with severe humanitarian consequences. Similar to Egypt and Syria, Iraq saw
chemical weapons as a useful tool for threatening and deterring Israel, but
also turned to the use of gas warfare against Iran’s numerically superior but
poorly protected force during the 1980–1988 war, resulting in considerable
military gains – all this despite being party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925
prohibiting the use of chemical (and biological) weapons.
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in
1970, became the major political and legal obstacle to nuclear weapons
acquisition in the Middle East. From the beginning, Israel made it clear that
it had no intention of joining the Treaty. Notably, one party to the Treaty,
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, embarked on an ambitious secret nuclear weapons
program, which was not detected or eliminated until the late 1990s, in the
context of the cease-fire arrangements following the liberation in 1991 of
Iraqi-occupied Kuwait. The latest nuclear weapons enigma in the Middle
East is Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, which has been the subject of
increasing international concern for years, as negotiations between its gov-
ernment and those of major powers have so far failed to produce a satisfac-
tory outcome, despite mounting sanctions against it. Leading Arab states, like
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, are closely watching these international develop-
ments with regard to Iran’s nuclear program, implying that their commit-
ments to the non-acquisition of nuclear weapons could be in jeopardy if Iran
was to uncontrovertibly acquire nuclear weapons capability.
In terms of Iranian-Israeli dynamics, it is important to remember that their
strategic relationship, established during the regime of the Shah, was actually
maintained even after the 1979 Islamic Revolution had unfolded. Indeed,
during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), Israel was fundamentally the only
state supporting Iran with weapons and military equipment – in contrast to
all the Arab states, the United States and its Western European allies, as well
as the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries, which all supported Iraq
with weapons, funding, military technology, and aerial surveillance. Even well
after that war had ended, Israel (under Yitzhak Rabin) tried to keep this
strategic partnership alive, but the shifts of leadership in Tehran made this
policy difficult to maintain. Namely, while Iranian leadership may have seen
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the strategic benefit of having Israeli support to jointly balance against major
Sunni Arab states, the tactical cost-benefit assessment suggested, instead,
siding with the Arab popular majority in criticism of Israel’s policy toward
the Palestinians and the Occupied Territories. Iran’s policy of harsh anti-Israel
rhetoric and statements of Holocaust denial have created a deep concern in
Israel about a possibly existential threat from Iran. This has led Israel to
respond with a strongly critical policy against Iran and perhaps even to con-
sider preemptive strikes against Iran’s nuclear installations similar to its 2007
bombing of an undeclared nuclear reactor under construction in Syria.
Confidence-building measures in the Middle East

The European experiences from 1973–1975 and 1984–1990 have demon-
strated that systematic efforts to build confidence between negotiating parties
can enable substantive and formal agreements. The success of the European
approaches was based upon a combination of military confidence-building
and political undertakings. The system of information and verifiable open-
ness, with regard to troop positioning, military training, and military equip-
ment, provided the confidence necessary to make political compromises and
commitments possible.
An effort to transfer these European experiences to the Middle East region
was made in 1990 with the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS)
working group initiative as part of the Madrid Conference. What prevented
the ACRS working group from finally succeeding was the traditional
dilemma facing arms control and disarmament negotiations, namely, that
such agreements are difficult or even impossible to reach before security is
ensured – and, as mentioned above, security cannot be ensured until first
agreements on arms control are reached. The centrality of these ideas in
Israeli political thinking is illustrated by its consistent stance, emphasizing the
requirement that Arab neighbors recognize the existence of the State of Israel
as a precondition for its participation in disarmament negotiations.
It was this fundamental contradiction that the negotiating parties to the
European Security Conference managed to overcome and master. Thus, par-
ticipating states succeeded in combining coordinated agreements, encompass-
ing the recognition of frontiers established by Eastern and Western armies
during World War II, with military confidence-building measures and reduc-
tions of conventional forces.
However, one significant difference between the European security context
during the 1970s and 1980s and the present security situation in the Middle
East is that nuclear weapons in Europe were essentially a matter of super-
power relations, being under a separate strategic and bilateral dimension and
a separate negotiating process, while in the Middle East the issue of weapons
of mass destruction (WMDs) is linked to a multilateral and multifaceted
security situation with elements of legal instruments in the fields of arms
control, nonproliferation, and disarmament as part of regional political
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48 Rolf Ekéus
considerations. Nevertheless, legal instruments are deeply embedded in the
security considerations in both regions. For example, in Europe, the CFE
Treaty prescriptions for numerical limitations and notification mechanisms
are still respected, although the Treaty itself is no longer legally in force, and
these mechanisms were further strengthened by the updated Vienna Docu-
ment on CSMBs. In the Middle East, all the Arab states continue to abide by
NPT principles and respect the norms embedded in it, with Israel repeatedly
reprimanded for not joining the Treaty and Iran subject to harsh sanctions
because of presumed violations of its safeguard obligations.
While conventional forces may be regarded as essential for security in the
Middle East, nuclear weapons arsenals, existing or potential, are first and
foremost instruments of political and strategic agendas. The case of Syria is
illustrative of how the norms against the use of chemical and/or biological
weapons – which are embedded in the Geneva protocol – have become so well
established that after the use of chemical weapons had been confirmed in
Syria, the country was effectively forced to join the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention (CWC) immediately and get rid of its arsenal. The question is if
Egypt, after the Syrian experience, could contemplate eventual use of its
chemical weapons arsenal, with the political stakes now even higher than they
were before.
As negotiators set out to determine the best approach to making use of and
integrating CSBMs into a framework for creating a WMD-Free Zone in the
Middle East, it is essential to start by building on a common base, starting
with an agreement on the desirability – without a binding commitment – of
establishing a zone free of WMDs and of ensuring that all pertinent parties
work toward that end by agreeing on the geographical extent of the zone as
well as its scope.
With such fundamental mutual understandings in place, talks on voluntary
CSBMs could start with the aim of reducing tensions and suspicions, and
building trust. Such steps could in the beginning be unilateral and declaratory
in nature, but also be made with expectations of reciprocity. Negotiations on
military CSBMs could follow thereafter in the pattern of a step-by-step pro-
cess aimed at reaching formal agreements among the participating states.
If such limited measures could be agreed upon and upheld, their scope
could be widened and some exploratory talks could be launched that would
also encompass conventional weapons reductions and aim at formal com-
mitments. The military CSBMs could be designed following the CSCE/OSCE
model for the exchanging and verification of military organization, man-
power, and major weapons and equipment systems, and be subject to trans-
national inspections and observation missions. Following European practice,
arrangements would not necessarily be formed as international treaties;
rather, they would constitute “politically binding” agreements.
The usefulness of CSBMs concerning WMD-related items cannot be con-
sidered directly on the basis of the European experience, as the nuclear
dimension was not part of the CSCE’s work. These capabilities were mainly
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dealt with in a bilateral context between two superpowers. Nevertheless,
agreements and deals that focus on CSBMs that pertain to nuclear and other
WMD issues can be an effective and constructive contribution by creating the
necessary political framework of trust in the Middle East region.
However, it is important to recall that a system like the CSCE-related
component known as the Opens Skies Treaty of 2002 could also be tried out
in a Middle Eastern context for the purposes of verifying WMD-related
activities. Another good example of an arrangement that can be reached after
a pressing and complex negotiation were the aerial surveillance system (U2)
operations over Iraq carried out by UNSCOM during the disarmament pro-
cess (1991 to 1998), which were highly successful in subsequently producing
both operational and interpretive work.
If the talks on substance could get underway under a reasonably well-
structured negotiation framework, it would not be long before the participating
states would have to start addressing the question of institutional support. Of
course, it is true that substance must have priority, but no serious results can be
achieved without supporting institutional structures, as has been proven by the
European experience. However, it must be emphasized that the resources and
competence of existing international organizations, such as the UN Security
Council, the IAEA, and the OPCW, have to be engaged to the fullest possible
and practical extent.
Whether a Helsinki-like conference on a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle
East could generate as much progress as the Helsinki Process of 1973 and
1975 remains to be seen, but it is essential that regional powers are ready to
attend. As we have learned, in 1973 there was no lack of suspicion and dis-
trust, but if the states now could first openly engage in a dialogue about
modalities for talks and negotiations and then be ready to meet, a new inter-
nal dynamic may be created. Against all odds, the European initiative of the
1970s succeeded at long last. The nations in the Middle East now need crea-
tivity and political courage to make use of the momentum which has been
created by the initiative on a WMD-Free Zone.
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Part II
Perspectives from the region
and outside
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3 The Helsinki Process and the

Middle East
The viability of cooperative security
frameworks for a region in flux
Nabil Fahmy and Karim Haggag
Introduction
The modern Middle East has witnessed several grand designs and ambitious
visions to reorder its politics, few of which can be said to have furthered the
interests and aspirations of its peoples. The dismemberment of the Ottoman
Empire, the infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Balfour Declaration, and the
British Mandate for Palestine that led to the United Nations Partition Resolu-
tion in 1947 are but a few of the milestones that speak to the region’s long and
troubled history. More recently, the Middle East has been subject to successive
attempts by foreign powers to impose various security frameworks in the hopes
of pacifying the region’s chronic instability. This has manifested itself in the
context of superpower alliance politics for the region, which dates back either
to the heyday of the Cold War era in the form of the Baghdad Pact and its
subsequent iteration, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), during the
1950s and 1960s; the Reagan administration’s attempt to devise a “strategic
consensus” during the 1980s; or the attempt by the second Bush administration
to group the region’s “moderate” Arab camp of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
Jordan in a loose coalition to counter the “radical” axis of Iran and Syria
together with Hezbollah and Hamas. More recently, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization’s (NATO) decisive military intervention in Libya, the division
amongst the permanent members of the Security Council over ongoing civil
war in Syria, and the Obama administration’s critical reaction to the popular
revolution that led to the overthrow of President Morsi in Egypt all run counter
to the initial Western approach of non-intervention in the Arab Uprisings. In
light of this experience, it is no surprise that the region has long been suspicious
of outside attempts to reshape its dynamics.
And yet, in spite of this history, the idea of establishing a regional frame-
work modeled on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE), and the Helsinki Process which emerged from it, has enjoyed enor-
mous longevity. Inspired by the legacy of the CSCE in overcoming the Cold
War division of Europe, the idea of instituting a similar regime for the Middle
East has acquired a certain aura as a possible vehicle for conflict resolution
and regional cooperation, and has been at the core of several ambitious
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54 Nabil Fahmy and Karim Haggag
proposals for Middle East regional cooperation ever since the adoption of the
Helsinki Final Act in 1975.
The CSCE experience has thus provided the impetus for the various attempts
to institute region-wide multidimensional cooperative frameworks along the
lines of the three substantive “baskets” embodied in the Helsinki Final Act:
political dialogue and cooperative security; functional cooperation in the areas
of science, technology, and commerce; and human contact, tourism, cultural
and educational exchanges, and human rights. This broad framework has pro-
vided the impetus for most of the major cooperative frameworks put forward
for the region: from the Barcelona Process for the Mediterranean launched in
1995, the multilateral track for regional cooperation that ran parallel to the
bilateral negotiations of the Middle East Peace Process launched at Madrid in
1991, and the Greater Middle East initiative in its various iterations put for-
ward by the G-8 at the behest of the Bush administration as a framework for
engaging the region in the post-9/11 era. Regional advocates of this notion,
mainly Jordan and Israel, have at various times proposed the creation of a
Conference on Security and Cooperation for the Middle East (CSCME).
All of these initiatives had as their underlying assumption the notion that
regional institutional frameworks, whether constructed around security
regimes or cooperative frameworks, can supersede, or at least ameliorate, the
region’s many divisions. In particular, the abiding faith in the centrality of
institutions as a mechanism for regional governance, a concept that for dec-
ades has anchored the security architecture of the Euro-Atlantic region, has
infused the quest to “export” this approach to other regions beyond Europe.
With the notable exception of the Arab League, created in 1945 as the first
regional organization of its kind, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
which has proven to be the more sustainable of the various subregional
organizations proposed for inter-Arab cooperation, the Middle East certainly
stands out among other geographic areas for its lack of regional institutional
frameworks. As Ian Lesser explains, the surfeit of institutions in the north
stands in stark contrast to the institutional “deficit” in the south “ … from
North Africa to Pakistan (or even from West Africa to Indonesia) [which] has
very little, if any, functioning institutions along these lines. If the demand
exists to put a cooperative architecture in place across the greater Middle
East, this architecture will have to be created out of whole cloth, or formed as
an extension of existing frameworks in the north.”1
That none of these initiatives has taken root in the Middle East points to
the fallacy of transposing the Helsinki model outside of its European context.
As pointed out by P. Terrence Hopmann:
… the OSCE is to some degree a product of its history, especially its

origin as an institution intended to overcome the divisions wrought by
the East-West conflict … For this reason, many of the lessons of the
OSCE are perhaps not relevant to other regions that were situated more
on the periphery of the East-West confrontation.2
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The Helsinki Process and the Middle East 55
The stark differences between the European and Middle Eastern regional
contexts in terms of their history, differing sociopolitical makeup, and strate-
gic and geopolitical balances provide one obvious explanation for the failure
to establish a Middle Eastern version of the CSCE/Helsinki framework. The
enduring nature of the region’s problems, in particular the Arab-Israeli con-
flict, as a barrier to regional institutionalism offers another. However, beyond
this regional disparity, the idea of superimposing the Helsinki model on the
Middle East relies on a misreading of the CSCE experience in the European
context itself. Proponents of a conference-like framework for the region base
their approach on a misreading of the CSCE’s centrality to Europe’s security
architecture during the Cold War, or that of its post-Cold War iteration, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
A close examination of the post-World War II European experience reveals
that the creation of a cooperative framework embodied in the CSCE/OSCE
was complementary to, but not a substitute for, conflict resolution and dis-
armament processes that often unfolded outside of that framework, and via
different security and political institutions, namely NATO and the European
Union (EU), that arguably constitute the true anchors of European security.
While the CSCE/OSCE framework certainly enabled the emergence of coop-
erative relations between regional actors, it did not constitute the central
pillar of European security.
This is not to argue that the creation of regional cooperative structures
does not offer security benefits, but rather that it does not in and of itself
suffice for the establishment of comprehensive processes that address regional
political conflicts. It is the absence of such processes, rather than the lack of
institutional structures, that accounts for the failure of CSCE-like regimes for
the Middle East. However, if the pursuit of such a regime has hitherto proven
elusive for the Middle East, the historic developments sweeping the region are
likely to place such a goal further out of reach. The domestic upheavals
brought about by the Arab Uprisings are merging in novel and unexpected
ways with the region’s ongoing conflicts, which are themselves undergoing
profound transformations, to fundamentally alter the region’s security land-
scape. Rather than seeking to establish new regional structures, the focus
should shift to putting in place robust conflict resolution and disarmament
mechanisms that can ameliorate what seems to be an inevitable trend toward
greater regional instability.
Such a holistic approach is in fact reflected in the experience of Helsinki,
which emerged in the context of the Cold War disarmament regime between
the superpowers and subsequently developed in parallel with a series of
interlocking arms control agreements that have anchored the security archi-
tecture of the Euro-Atlantic area. This is why assessing the applicability of the
CSCE/OSCE framework to other geographic areas depends very much on
correctly assessing the context in which it has evolved in the European setting
and the intricate linkages that it fostered between political dialogue, arms
control, and security cooperation. In the end, transferring this model to the
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Middle East must start from drawing the right lessons from Helsinki rather
than from a selective reading of its history.
Drawing the right lessons from Helsinki

The emergence of the Helsinki/CSCE framework took place in the context of
a turning point in the Cold War during the second half of the 1960s, when the
Soviet Union had attained strategic parity with the West by developing a
second-strike nuclear capability. Prior to that point, the West had rejected
Moscow’s long-standing call for a pan-European security framework out of
concern that this would legitimize a post-war settlement that resulted in the
division of Europe, thus enabling the consolidation of Soviet control over its
sphere of influence in the East. The achievement of strategic parity between
the superpowers prompted the Western alliance to shift its focus toward
ameliorating the nuclear arms race through engagement with Moscow on an
arms limitation agenda while at the same time coming to terms with the
territorial status quo in Europe, an approach which was subsequently for-
malized in the Nixon/Kissinger policy of Détente. It was this tacit acceptance
of the strategic and territorial status quo that paved the way for the successful
conclusion of the negotiations initiated in July 1973, which resulted in the
adoption of the Helsinki Final Act nearly two years later.
Herein lay the major structural differences between the European and
Middle Eastern regional contexts. First, the stability afforded by the two
rival politico-military blocs provided for an environment that enabled a far-
reaching negotiating agenda to at least be conceived. Second, the negotiation
and subsequent functioning of the Helsinki/CSCE regime was founded upon
a mutual acceptance of the regional status quo. The negotiating history of the
CSCE framework reveals that there was a degree of divergence on this key
issue between Washington and its European allies. Nixon and Kissinger
essentially approached the CSCE negotiations in the context of managing
the superpower rivalry with Moscow. In this regard, the negotiations were
seen as a bargaining chip within the overall policy of Détente. In return for
Washington’s acquiescence on the CSCE, which for Moscow meant legit-
imization of its holdings in Eastern and Central Europe, and a recognition of
the Soviet Union as a pillar of the international order, the United States
would demand Soviet cooperation on the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
(SALT), the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, and the
Quadripartite Rights and Responsibilities (QRR) in West Berlin, in addition
to a more accommodating Soviet posture on Vietnam and the Middle East.
Only when the Kremlin agreed to move positively on this agenda did the
Nixon administration decide to engage seriously on the CSCE negotiations.3
In this regard, the human rights agenda and the issue of establishing
human and cultural contacts with the East, advocated by the European allies
as a means to gradually loosen the restraints imposed by superpower rivalry
in Europe and eventually to catalyze a process of political liberalization in the
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Communist bloc, did not figure in Washington’s approach to the negotiations.
On the contrary, Nixon and Kissinger were keen to emphasize the concepts
of peaceful coexistence and mutual respect for the sovereignty and non-
interference in the internal affairs of states as the cardinal principles govern-
ing its relationship with Moscow.4
In the end, the Helsinki Final Act struck a delicate balance between the
competing agendas of accommodating the status quo of a divided Europe,
prioritized by Washington and Moscow, and instituting a process that would
gradually chip away at its foundations, as favored by the Western European
allies. Nonetheless, the point of departure for Helsinki was the acceptance of
the prevailing power structure of Cold War Europe, which was embedded in a
broader framework that sought the stabilization of the superpower arms race
through a robust process of arms control. On the basis of this accommoda-
tion, Helsinki enabled the acceptance of an agenda of soft security enshrined
in the Decalogue of the Helsinki Final Act and the functional baskets estab-
lishing a wide ranging cooperative agenda on non-security issues (trade,
human rights, cultural exchange, and education). This linkage between hard
and soft security was at the heart of the CSCE/Helsinki approach.
In the Middle East, there has been no such accommodation with the pre-
vailing status quo. Indeed, the central feature of the region’s security dynamic
is that the status quo is constantly being challenged by revisionist regional
and international powers, domestic threats against ruling regimes, and, most
of all, the perennial Arab-Israeli conflict that acts as a vortex for regional
instability. Of course, it is this state of chronic regional insecurity which a
CSCE-like regime is designed to address. However, the region’s ongoing con-
flicts and multiple axes of geopolitical competition do not lend themselves to
the construction of an overarching, region-wide security regime given the
difficulty of accommodating the stark divergence in the security interests and
threat perceptions of regional actors. Whereas the acceptance of the regional
status quo and the stabilization of the security environment in Europe enabled
the linkage between hard and soft security, and the forging of consensus
around a multidimensional agenda for cooperation embodied in Helsinki,
such a consensus in the fractured security environment of the Middle East is
monumentally difficult to achieve.
Therefore, what is needed is a much more differentiated and nuanced
approach to regional security founded upon a set of sustainable processes for
conflict resolution through disarmament and arms control. It is our view that
such an approach does not necessarily require the creation of a regional
security forum. The history of the Middle East shows that successful conflict
management and resolution processes are not dependent on region-wide
frameworks. Indeed, the history of the CSCE/OSCE itself bears this out.
From the start of the CSCE negotiations, it was clear that the Nixon
administration would insist on keeping the hard security issues involved in
negotiations with Moscow outside the Helsinki framework. Negotiations on
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and Mutual and Balanced Force
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Reduction (MBFR) would be conducted bilaterally between Washington and
Moscow, and not subject to the whims of the 35 state parties to the Con-
ference. This set the precedent that was continued throughout the Cold War,
with almost every major arms control and disarmament instrument nego-
tiated outside of the context of the CSCE, including SALT I and SALT II,
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and
the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). The most significant con-
tribution of the CSCE in the security realm was the establishment of a nego-
tiations process for the elaborate European Confidence- and Security-Building
Measure (CSBM) regime that was subsequently consolidated under the aus-
pices of the OSCE, especially with regard to the verification requirements of
the CFE Treaty.5 However, this CSBM structure was embedded in arrange-
ments that were negotiated and instituted outside the CSCE/OSCE frame-
work: in particular, the CFE Treaty and the follow-on 1999 Agreement
on Adaptation of the CFE, but also the 1992 Open Skies Treaty and the
stability- and transparency-enhancing mechanisms and structures instituted
by NATO to support its eastward expansion.6
This leads to the broader point of the place of the OSCE within the frame-
work of Europe’s overall security architecture. Contrary to the hopes following
the collapse of the Soviet Union that the CSCE could be transformed into a
truly collective security framework, the reality was quite different. In the post-
Cold War European security landscape, the OSCE did not constitute the cen-
tral pillar of European security. Rather, it was significantly eclipsed by NATO
and the EU, especially after the development of the European Common
Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) and subsequently the European Security
and Defense Policy (ESDP), which appropriated many of the functions within
the OSCE’s core mandate, as was clearly evident in Bosnia, Kosovo, and –
most recently – the 2008 conflict in Georgia.7
It is precisely because of this dependence on security structures external to
its framework that the OSCE now finds itself unable to deal with develop-
ments that threaten to undermine its viability, the most important being the
reemergence of the East-West divide between Russia and the NATO alliance.
Driven by Moscow’s antagonism toward NATO’s eastward expansion, the
United States’s deployment of missile defense systems in Eastern and Central
Europe, and NATO’s pressure on Moscow to withdraw from Georgia (a state
considered to be Russia’s “near abroad”), this growing estrangement over
Europe’s security agenda now threatens to seriously undermine the OSCE
itself. That these major developments have originated outside and largely
independent of the OSCE framework underscores its tangential relevance to
Europe’s security architecture. Prompted by the need to respond to this
changed strategic reality, Russia’s decision in December 2007 to suspend its
implementation of the CFE Treaty raises serious questions regarding the
future of what is arguably a central pillar of European security. While not in
danger of imminent collapse, the stalemate over the entry into force of the
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Adapted CFE Treaty, and the verification provisions attached to it, threatens
to severely undermine the security architecture built around the treaty regime.
Furthermore, Russia’s call for a new European Security Treaty clearly reflects
a recognition on the part of Moscow that redressing what it perceives as the
strategic imbalance resulting from Western security policies since the end of
the Cold War cannot be achieved within the OSCE framework. Given this
context, it is perhaps not surprising that much of the diplomacy aimed at
salvaging the CFE Treaty has been conducted outside of the OSCE between
NATO and Russia, or bilaterally between Washington and Moscow.8
The main conclusion we wish to draw from this brief overview is that the
CSCE/OSCE framework certainly facilitated the process of arms control and
conflict management in Europe, processes that were for the most part external
to this framework, but was in no way a substitute for them. Both in its genesis
and evolution, Helsinki was embedded in a broader strategic context
anchored in a series of interlocking arms control and disarmament processes
that were central to the security regime that emerged in the Euro-Atlantic
area.
The assumption, therefore, that adapting the institutional structure of
Helsinki to other regional contexts would enable such processes ignores the
critical point that the key ingredient is the process and not the structure.
Structures can complement and reinforce conflict resolution and disarmament
processes, but they cannot replace them, a conclusion borne out by numerous
examples from other regional settings. This is not to claim that the CSCE/
OSCE framework is or has been superfluous to European security. There can
be little doubt that Helsinki provided the normative foundation for the
development of a more benign regional context both during and after the
Cold War. However, to assume that Helsinki was integral to these processes
would be misleading.
Yet, it is precisely this flawed assumption that has guided the various
attempts to adapt a Helsinki-like regime for the Middle East. Far from
adopting the holistic approach embodied in the European experience, the
various regional schemes that have been proposed for a Helsinki-like frame-
work for the Middle East have tended to selectively draw on the CSCE model
while neglecting the complex linkages that were established between security
through strategic arms control, functional cooperation, and the human
security agenda enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act. Not surprisingly, the
long and ambitious search for a way to recreate Helsinki in the Middle East
has met with a poor record of success.
Transferring Helsinki to the Middle East: Deconstructing the history

of an idea
The origins of establishing a Middle Eastern version of a CSCE regime can
be traced back to the immediate aftermath of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.
The first to advocate for the idea was then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak
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Rabin, who, in perhaps the earliest articulation of this idea, cogently pre-
sented the strategic rationale for adapting the CSCE model to the Middle
East. Speaking before the 13th Socialist International Congress in Geneva in
1976, one year after the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act, Rabin spoke
forcefully about the applicability of the Helsinki model to the region. Specifi-
cally, he proposed a “Geneva Conference on Security and Cooperation in the
Middle East,” which, in his view, would not only deal with the territorial
aspects of the Middle East conflict, but would also strive for “the creation of
a new regional structure of stability, security, and peace, founded upon
Middle East realities.”9
Central to this idea was the prospect of replicating Helsinki’s basket struc-
ture to institute a framework of wide-ranging cooperation among the states of
the region. In Rabin’s words, “coexistence, security, trade, technology, coop-
eration, and human bridges … are the essence of the Helsinki baskets.”
The core objective of the proposal, however, was the imperative of stabilizing
the regional status quo in a manner similar to the de facto acceptance of the
postwar division of Europe consecrated at Helsinki. Although Rabin expli-
citly mentioned Israel’s readiness to negotiate the territorial boundaries
between Israel and its Arab neighbors – a position he was careful to note
departed from Helsinki, which had affirmed the postwar territorial status quo
in Europe – he stated that “the conference must not attempt the impossible,
through a futile illusion that history can be put back.”10 Rabin left the exact
meaning of this remark ambiguous: it is not clear whether he was referring to
reversing the reality of Israel’s existence, or to reversing Israel’s territorial
gains in the recent conflict. In any case, his argument rested on the assump-
tion that a regional version of Helsinki would transcend the core issues of the
conflict between Israel and the Arabs.
Rabin thus laid down the broad intellectual foundation that has informed
most subsequent proposals for instituting a CSCE-like regime for the Middle
East: a regional framework that would enable wide-ranging cooperation
based not on conflict resolution, but on the acceptance of the regional status
quo. While Israel would accept territorial adjustments that might cede some
of the Arab territories occupied in recent conflicts, it was incumbent upon the
Arab side to reconcile itself to Israel’s territorial conquests, or as Rabin put it,
“Middle East realities,” irrespective of progress toward resolving the Arab-
Israeli conflict.11 The institutionalization of functional cooperation between
states of the region would thus ameliorate, and eventually transcend, the
bitter conflicts that have long divided them, which in his view constituted the
essence of Helsinki.
Since then, the idea of extending the CSCE/Helsinki model beyond Europe,
and specifically to the Middle East, has enjoyed a long and oftentimes dis-
tinguished pedigree. Among the forceful advocates of this approach has been
Ambassador Max Kampelman, the US lead negotiator to the CSCE process
for over a decade, who called for a bold initiative to expand the OSCE to
include the countries of the Mediterranean to form a new grouping – the
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Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean and
Middle East.” He furthermore called on the second Bush administration to
incorporate such a regime as an integral component of the Middle East Peace
Process.12 This was echoed by calls for similar initiatives within the Parlia-
mentary realm, in particular the German Bundestag and the US Congress,
most notably by the successive chairmen of the US Helsinki Commission,
namely, Senator Benjamin Cardin and Representative Steny Hoyer, the
latter advocating “a Middle East security framework [that] could encourage
regional security through arms control, verification, confidence-building, and
respect for human rights.”13
More importantly, the idea of a Helsinki-like framework for the Middle
East was not confined to the realm of Parliamentary debates and intellectual
discourse. Rather, it has informed numerous ambitious proposals over the
course of the last two decades by international actors who have sought to
reshape the framework of their engagement with the Middle East and
by regional states seeking to reshape the region’s dynamics. These proposals
took as their point of departure the core assumption that the establishment of
frameworks for regional governance would eventually transform the region’s
conflicts by positively influencing their political context. Regional structures,
based on some form of permanent forum, would allow for the emergence of
patterns of cooperation between states separate from the framework of con-
flict that had long governed their interaction. However, while adhering to this
basic approach, the initiatives for establishing a regional version of the CSCE/
OSCE framework varied in their emphasis regarding the functional issues
that would drive regional interaction – in effect, selecting from the Helsinki
baskets – thus determining the nature and function of the forum to be cre-
ated. Accordingly, the attempt to transfer the CSCE model to the Middle
East has taken the form of three grand projects for establishing a regional
cooperative regime, all of which were inspired by the Helsinki legacy: the
Jordanian-Israeli proposal for a cooperative regional security framework
during the 1990s; the Broader Middle East Initiative proposed by the second
Bush administration to advance its freedom agenda for the Middle East in the
wake of 9/11; and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, ongoing since the
mid-1990s, which arguably embodies the most far-reaching attempt to repli-
cate the Helsinki framework. Together, these initiatives provide a rich and
illuminating history of the limitations, and indeed the pitfalls, of adapting
models of regional governance outside of their regional and strategic contexts.
Institutionalizing a security regime for the Middle East

The onset of the Madrid Conference and the initiation of the regional multi-
lateral track during the mid-1990s provided a particularly strong impetus for
reviving the idea of a CSCE-like regime for the Middle East. The establish-
ment of five separate working groups for water, refugees, economic coopera-
tion, the environment, and arms control and regional security – loosely
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replicating the basket structure of Helsinki – and the breakthrough of the
Oslo process between Israel and the Palestinians created the impression that
the region was moving closer than ever toward a cooperative regionalism
along the lines of the CSCE.
The 1994 peace agreement between Jordan and Israel created an opportune
context for the initiative put forward by the two countries for the creation of
a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME).
Jordan’s support of this initiative found its strongest proponent in Crown
Prince Hassan and was echoed by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who in
1996 endorsed the adoption of a regional framework based on the OSCE.14
That the multilateral working groups were to serve as a basis for the potential
establishment of a CSCME was explicitly acknowledged by Washington in
the context of the Jordanian-Israeli peace negotiations, and the concept itself
was eventually enshrined in the peace treaty between the two countries.15
Similarly, in 1996, British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind called for the
establishment of an Organization for Cooperation in the Middle East
(OCME) with an emphasis on an inclusive region-wide approach that would
eventually encompass Turkey, Iran, and Iraq.16 In particular, the work of the
Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group had introduced
a military security component to the emerging framework of regional coop-
eration that gave impetus to the notion of developing a region-wide security
architecture that was embodied in the CSCME proposal.
The concept of the CSCME, however, was never fully presented at the
official level by any of the governments that, at various times, had cham-
pioned this proposal, a task which fell to the expert academic community.
The most expansive articulation of this concept was jointly put forward by
Shai Feldman, one of Israel’s foremost security experts, and Abdullah
Toukan, the head of the Jordanian delegation to ACRS and a former science
advisor to the Jordanian monarchy.17
Feldman and Toukan’s proposal for a Middle East Cooperative Security
Framework (MECSF) established as its objective expanding and institutio-
nalizing the regional multilateral track. In particular, the confidence-building
measures (CBMs) agreed to in the context of ACRS would be transferred to
the MECSF, where they would be reinforced and expanded. However, the
concept of security would be broadened beyond the military dimension
embodied in the ACRS working group to include issues such as energy, eco-
nomic cooperation, and demography, thus entailing a multidimensional view
to regional security that would eventually transcend the Arab-Israeli context.
In the words of Feldman and Toukan: “As such [the MECSF] would address
issues that affect the region’s security but are independent of Arab-Israeli
peacemaking. In this sense, the MECSF would be a much more truly multi-
lateral process than the Madrid framework.”18
The basic premise was that such a framework would develop its own dis-
tinct regional identity, with membership confined to states of the region that
would define the relationship of the MECSF with extra-regional actors, in
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particular the United States. The identity of the forum would be founded on a
robust conflict prevention agenda – focusing on border disputes and political
confidence-building – thus moving the region “from confrontational security
policies into cooperative security frameworks.”19 Eventually, the MECSF
would mature into a full-fledged collective security framework that would
confront challenges to regional security emanating from states within or out-
side of the region.
Herein lays the essence of the proposal: the CBM process would be gradu-
ally strengthened so as to constitute the scaffolding upon which a collective
security mechanism would emerge. How the MECSF would achieve this
ambitious leap, beyond the fact there was prevailing optimism during the
1990s that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was on its way to a settlement, is not
explained. Ungrounded in any incremental process, the attempt to move into
“cooperative” measures in the security domain in particular – even before
states of the region recognize each other – was either naïve or overly ambi-
tious. Nonetheless, as Feldman and Toukan point out, the objective of a
collective security framework is clear:
States may choose to consider an attack on any member of the frame-

work as a challenge to all its members. Moreover, defensive measures
currently adopted by individual states could be placed at the disposal of
the collective security framework, which would reduce the likelihood that
they would be regarded as threatening. 20
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the CSCME proposal, as articu-

lated above, was essentially tailored to the specific security needs of its two
principal regional adherents: Israel and Jordan. Buffeted since its creation by
regional crises emanating from both the Arab-Israeli arena and the Gulf,
Jordan’s acute security dilemma has often driven it to seek security outside of
the Arab context, inadequate as it is in addressing the security challenge
posed by its more powerful regional neighbors and the periodic instability
generated by the perpetuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For Israel, a
regional security regime that would transcend the regional framework would
not only pave the way for normalizing its regional status, but would also
allow it to utilize its comparative military advantage in a manner that would
enable it to emerge as a key provider of security within the context of such a
regime.
Beyond this consideration, however, the fundamental flaw behind the
CSCME concept lies in its attempt to institutionalize a region-wide security
regime in the absence of any serious attempt to address the source of the
region’s insecurities. Leaving aside the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict,
such a proposal must contain a serious arms control component to rectify the
asymmetry in regional strategic capabilities, manifested essentially in Israel’s
nuclear monopoly and overwhelming conventional superiority made possible
partly through massive US financial and military assistance. Here, it is
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instructive to briefly recall the experience of the ACRS process, given that it
constituted the only serious attempt at regional security cooperation and that
it was the presumed foundation upon which a prospective region-wide secur-
ity regime in the form of a CSCME would be established.
The negotiating history of ACRS has been recounted at some length and
need not be repeated here.21 That the process ultimately foundered on the
disagreements between Israel and Egypt on how to engage on the nuclear
issue is well documented. However, it is important to recall that differences
over the nuclear issue were part of a more fundamental divergence between
two broadly opposing approaches to regional security. Israel’s concept was
based essentially on prioritizing the development of an extensive regional
confidence- and security-building measure (CSBM) process, arguing that
issues of hard security, including arms control, must be deferred until it was
fully accepted as part of the region and a settlement of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict was reached. In the interim, the focus on CSBMs would result in a gra-
dual building of trust and familiarity between regional states that would
eventually pave the way for novel forms of regional security cooperation. The
significant progress made on the CSBM agenda in the context of the “opera-
tional basket” of the ACRS working group was a reflection of this approach,
including draft agreements related to maritime search and rescue, pre-
notification of military exercises, and the establishment of a number of
regional security centers and a regional communications network.
Egypt, on the other hand, argued that a regional security process could not
be sustained on the basis of CSBMs alone. Without a robust arms control
and disarmament agenda, an exclusive focus on confidence-building would
only serve Israel’s objective for greater political integration while leaving
unaddressed Israel’s overwhelming military superiority, both conventional
and unconventional. In arguing for a greater focus on arms control and dis-
armament, however, Egypt did not preclude an incremental approach or
discount the utility of CSBMs, but emphasized the need to extend such
an approach beyond the purely technical and military focus of the ACRS
“operational basket” and to cover all classes of weapons systems, including
nuclear weapons. Such CSBMs could include declarations of intent reaffirm-
ing the commitment to the creation of a Middle Eastern Weapons of Mass
Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ), the universality of the NPT and other
global disarmament treaties, and the non-use of WMD in any form.
Israel’s refusal to engage in any process of this kind ultimately led to the
official suspension of the ACRS working group at the end of 1995. In the end,
it was not simply a deadlock over the nuclear issue that was behind the
demise of ACRS, but the absence of any serious arms control or disarmament
agenda for any class of weapons, conventional or non-conventional. While the
collapse of the bilateral negotiations would eventually lead to the termination
of the entire regional multilateral track, the ACRS experience highlights the
futility of seeking to construct a regional security regime without addressing
the region’s strategic military imbalance – a cardinal lesson from the CSCE
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experience in Europe, as we have seen. In addition, the perpetuation of the
Arab-Israeli conflict would continue to pose a formidable barrier to estab-
lishing the normative foundation for regional cooperation that was a central
pillar of the Helsinki Final Act. Here, it is worth recalling that when the
Helsinki model was briefly discussed in the early stages of ACRS, Israel
refused a Palestinian request that the right of self-determination of peoples be
part of the political basket, just as it was in Helsinki: there was a clause in the
Helsinki Final Act that guaranteed equal rights and the self-determination of
peoples. This underscored once again the fact that any regional cooperation
process modeled on Helsinki would need a threshold of reciprocal recognition
of rights to be reached beforehand.
In the end, merely relying on CSBMs alone would prove to be too weak a
foundation for constructing the edifice of a regional security regime of the
magnitude and ambition as that embodied in the Jordanian-Israeli proposal.
What was, and still is, needed is a comprehensive regional approach that
combines a more far-reaching disarmament and conflict resolution agenda.
While such an agenda could be facilitated by a greater Arab sensitivity to
Israeli concerns regarding a surprise attack, it would very much depend on a
fundamental transformation of Israel’s security mindset from one of “excep-
tionalism” that requires sustaining its qualitative and quantitative military
superiority, to one that is founded on a shared sense of regional security that
guarantees “equal security for all.”
Prying open closed regimes

The human rights dimension of the CSCE has constituted perhaps the most
inspiring chapter of the Helsinki story, and to a great extent explains the
enduring interest in its potential applicability. The role of Helsinki in galva-
nizing dissident movements in the Eastern bloc through the establishment of
transnational networks across the Iron Curtain has served as a powerful his-
torical legacy of the Cold War that some suggest as having been directly
responsible for the demise of Communism and the dissolution of the Soviet
Empire, although that thesis is a matter of considerable dispute among
historians of the Cold War.22
It was this legacy that the second Bush administration appropriated as
the broad construct for devising its democracy agenda for the Middle East in
the aftermath of 9/11 and the US invasion of Iraq. In particular, the neo-
conservatives within the administration sought to shape US policy toward
the region in a manner that drew heavily on Helsinki as a model, with the
objective of ushering in sweeping change to the regional political order.
The premise of this approach was the need to renegotiate the bargain
Washington had struck with authoritarian regimes that for decades sacrificed
democracy for the cause of stability: a bargain that was seen to have collapsed
on the morning of 9/11. The regional status quo that had long provided a
breeding ground for global terrorism now posed a direct threat to US security
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and therefore had to be transformed, allowing greater space for democratic
forces to emerge in what leading Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
called a “Helsinki Coup” for the region.23 Michael McFaul has advocated a
Helsinki-like process for the region that would initially prioritize security and
preserve the territorial integrity of states, emphasizing that “the great lesson
of Helsinki was that better security between states creates more permissive
conditions for internal democratic change.”24 Egyptian pro-democracy advo-
cate Saad Eddine Ibrahim called for a Middle East Helsinki, arguing that “it
was this Cold War agreement between the West and the Soviet bloc over
respect for human rights that ultimately brought down the Soviet system
without a shot, eroding its legitimacy from within.”25
This approach was ultimately translated into policy in the form of the var-
ious proposals put forward by the Bush administration that together came to
be known as the initiative for the “Broader Middle East and North Africa”
(BMENA). Launched at the G-8 Sea Island Summit in 2004, BMENA
encompassed a broad range of supporting programs that would engage
regional governments on issues of reform and reach out to civil society to
strengthen the capacity of advocacy groups and pro-democracy movements.
The Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD) would bring together repre-
sentatives of regional governments and civil society to discuss issues of
women’s rights, electoral reform, and strengthening of political parties. This
was complemented by the Forum for the Future that was designed to exclu-
sively engage with civil society organizations in the region in order to
strengthen NGO capacity in the areas of rule of law, competitive elections,
human rights, and independent media. A host of other initiatives in the areas
of microfinance, literacy and education, investment, and entrepreneurship
were all part of an elaborate institutional and program infrastructure intended
to advance the Bush administration’s freedom agenda in the Middle East.26
That the Middle East Peace Process would be marginalized in this agenda
was abundantly clear from the administration’s statements, portraying demo-
cratization of the region as key to reaching a settlement of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. The imperative of creating a more hospitable regional security
environment for democracy by seriously addressing the region’s unresolved
conflicts, the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular, as argued by McFaul, Larry
Diamond, and other advocates of the Broader Middle East Initiative, was
essentially ignored by the administration.27
Although members of the Bush administration credit this policy for the
gradual opening of political space within key countries of the region, thus
setting the conditions that ultimately paved the way for the Arab Uprisings,
the reality proved to be quite different. Whatever democratic openings were
achieved during this period were very much driven by the domestic reform
efforts of Arab governments that were for the most part suspicious of
engaging with the administration’s democracy agenda. Similarly, the admin-
istration’s democracy agenda gradually receded as it came into conflict with
the need to engage Arab governments on issues of regional security and
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counterterrorism, especially in the aftermath of Hamas’ victory in the Palesti-
nian elections, the escalating insurgency in Iraq, and the steady rise of Iran’s
challenge to the regional order, thus exposing the cynicism that lay behind US
policy. The administration’s neglect of the Peace Process only reinforced regio-
nal suspicions of its agenda, ultimately forcing a reversal of US policy with the
convening of the Annapolis Summit during the final year of the administra-
tion’s second term. Far from being transformative, US policy eventually had
to adjust to the very regional realities it sought to change. The mechanisms
adopted as part of the Broader Middle East Initiative were quietly abandoned
as the more traditional “realpolitik” approach in Washington’s policy toward
the Middle East reasserted itself during the latter years of the Bush adminis-
tration and was more fully embraced by the Obama administration.
Institutionalizing Mediterranean regionalism

Of all the regional cooperative frameworks envisioned for the Middle East, it
was the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), otherwise known as the
Barcelona Process, which came closest in its original design to replicating the
CSCE model. The various European endeavors to devise a framework for
trans-Mediterranean cooperation drew their inspiration directly from the
Helsinki Process in both its form and substance, with the objective of insti-
tuting a system of state interaction that would pull the region away from
what was perceived as a dynamic of political instability and socioeconomic
degeneration.28
The end of the Cold War transformed the broad strategic context of the
Mediterranean area from one that constituted NATO’s southern flank to a
distinct region, a transformation which presented Europe with a unique set of
security challenges that could not be addressed solely within the framework of
the NATO alliance. The emerging conditions of instability on Europe’s
southern periphery necessitated a more multidimensional approach based on
a broader conception of security to address a diffuse array of threats that were
in essence non-military and transnational in nature, ranging from terrorism to
ethnic and religious conflict to migratory pressures borne of socioeconomic
distress.
It was in response to this emerging security reality that a number of pro-
posals were put forward for institutionalizing a regional cooperative frame-
work for the Mediterranean. Of these, the joint Spanish-Italian proposal put
forward in 1990 for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Medi-
terranean (CSCM) was the most comprehensive. The proposed CSCM would
be founded on the three “baskets” of security, economic cooperation, and
human rights and cultural exchange, and would cover a geographic area
stretching from the Maghreb to Iran, including the United States (given its
leadership role in the NATO alliance), the Soviet Union, and the European
Community (EC). The CSCM initiative failed to garner a wide consensus
within the EC mainly due to the vast geographic area encompassed under the
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proposal, which would intrude on US security arrangements in the Gulf area
and complicate Europe’s eastern enlargement, which in Germany’s view
should be conducted independently from the EC’s engagement with other
regions. Nonetheless, the core approach of the CSCM proposal – which was
based on the need for a broad multidimensional engagement with the Medi-
terranean region and which recognized the complex linkages between eco-
nomic growth, security, and political stability – would ultimately form the
basis of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
The Barcelona Declaration, adopted by the 27 participating states at the
Barcelona Conference in November 1995, enunciated a broad agenda for the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which was to be structured around
the three “baskets” (more commonly referred to as “chapters” in the context
of Barcelona) of political and security cooperation aimed at establishing a
common area of peace and stability; economic cooperation centered on the
ambitious objective of establishing a Mediterranean Free Trade Area
(MEFTA) by 2010; and sociocultural exchange aimed at broadly promoting
mutual understanding between the peoples and countries across the region
as well as strengthening cooperation “to reduce migratory pressures, among
other things, through vocational training programs and programs of assis-
tance for job creation.” In a further adaptation of the Helsinki Final Act, the
appendix to the Declaration outlined a follow-up mechanism at the Minis-
terial and Senior Official levels to review the progress achieved in the various
sectors. In this, the EMP in effect superimposed the Helsinki framework onto
the Mediterranean. In addition to organizing cooperative endeavors around
three distinct but interrelated baskets, both Barcelona and Helsinki were
founded on ambitious but ultimately non-binding political declarations with
follow-up provisions based on a “conference-like” framework.
Yet, for all the resemblance in terms of form and substance between Barcelona
and Helsinki, the actual outcome of both regional processes could not be more
different. The grand ambitions launched at Barcelona to institute a region-wide
framework of multilateral cooperation gradually gave way to a patchwork of
bilateral and subregional arrangements with no common foundation other than
a somewhat ill-defined notion of Mediterranean regionalism.
This was perhaps most evident in the security realm. Soon after the adoption
of the Barcelona Declaration, it became apparent that the security component
of the EMP would constitute its weakest pillar. While much of the focus of the
EMP was on “soft security,” it should be recalled that the Barcelona Declara-
tion itself had outlined an expansive agenda focusing on traditional security
issues encompassing nonproliferation, disarmament, confidence-building, and
conflict prevention as critical foundations for the establishment of an “area of
peace and stability.”29 However, attempts to translate this broad mandate into
an OSCE-like framework for cooperative security were repeatedly frustrated.
The EMP has been unable to replicate anything like the type of institutiona-
lized European security regime it sought to emulate. More than a decade and a
half after its launch, the Barcelona Process could not produce even a minimal
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regional security agenda, let alone the type of multilateral cooperative security
regime that was initially envisaged.
The reasons behind this are many, and together they reveal the structural
deficiencies that have hampered the emergence of a distinct security agenda
for the EMP. The European focus on essentially non-military threats as the
fundamental driver behind the Euro-Mediterranean project did not lend itself
easily to a traditional cooperative security agenda based on CSBMs, arms
control, or disarmament. More fundamental, however, was the problematic
nature of the EU as a security actor, since it had entered into the EMP very
much in its traditional role as a political-civilian power lacking a substantive
security agenda. The evolution of the Common Security and Foreign Policy
(CSFP), and later the European Defense and Security Policy (EDSP), did not
fundamentally alter this situation.30
The most formidable obstacle to the evolution of a Mediterranean security
agenda, however, was the exclusion of the United States from the EMP (under
French insistence). Washington has always shown a somewhat ambivalent
attitude toward the Euro-Mediterranean project, opposing the CSCM proposal
from the outset, because of the potential security dimension that could evolve
in the shadow of Washington’s dominant security role. As the primary security
actor in the region, the United States managed a security system (not a regime)
oriented primarily toward the core Middle East, the Gulf region, and – after
9/11 – Central Asia, rather than the Mediterranean. Based on a network of
bilateral regional alliances, NATO’s role in the Mediterranean, management of
the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, and its formidable military presence in the
Mediterranean and the Gulf, this security system was never integrated into or
even really made to overlap with the Barcelona Process.31 As a result, the states
of the southern Mediterranean oriented their security policy to varying degrees
toward the US-sponsored security system rather than the EMP.
In the end, the absence of consensus on any region-wide security agenda
left the Mediterranean region with a patchwork of parallel security initiatives
embodied mainly in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue initiated in 1994, the
5+5 Initiative launched in December 2004 as an informal defense framework
for the western Mediterranean. Overall, the balance remains heavily tilted
toward bilateralism rather than cooperative security in a multilateral setting.32
Moreover, this trend toward bilateralism was reinforced by what Roberto
Aliboni described as the “renationalization” of European security policy.
Given the inability of the EU’s collective security mechanisms to address the
pressing security threats of immigration and terrorism, especially in the wake
of 9/11 and the subsequent wave of terrorist incidents targeting European
cities, member states increasingly relied on their own national security strate-
gies to counter these threats, which were often heavily linked to their bilateral
security ties with countries of the southern Mediterranean outside of the
EMP or even the EU framework.33
With the political/security basket of the EMP remaining essentially empty,
it was the second chapter of the Barcelona Declaration – economic and
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financial partnership – that would emerge as the central pillar of the Euro-
Mediterranean project. Here, the European objective was to project its liberal
economic model outward to the Mediterranean, tying countries of the region
to the European market, from which a type of pan-Mediterranean regionalism
would emerge that would eventually be anchored in the MEFTA. The principal
instrument by which this was supposed to be achieved was the partnership or
“association” agreements bilaterally negotiated between the EU and countries
of the southern Mediterranean, through which the latter would harmonize their
trade and industrial policy to enable them to integrate into the European
market. This in turn would spur the acceleration of free market economic
reform that would eventually liberalize the economic regulatory framework of
the southern tier as a stepping stone toward the creation of MEFTA.
Here too, however, the core of the approach was essentially bilateral, which
clearly went against the ethos of the EMP with its emphasis on a discourse of
regional multilateral cooperation. This partly explains the uneven process of
association between the southern tier states and the EU, with Morocco,
Tunisia, and Israel exhibiting a much greater readiness to accelerate and
deepen their economic ties with Europe than the rest of the region. Moreover,
the expectation that integration with the internal EU market would spur
greater south-south economic cooperation did not materialize.
In sum, rather than fostering a Mediterranean multilateral regionalism
between two distinct blocs, the EMP morphed into what Aliboni aptly termed
a “hub and spokes system of bilateralism.”34 The resulting disillusionment
that had set in since the start of the founding of the EMP was clearly on
display during the Barcelona Summit held in 2005 to commemorate the tenth
anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration when not a single Arab head of state
was in attendance – with the exception of Palestinian Authority President
Mahmoud Abbas – an event that informally marked the denouement of the
EMP. An attempt to revive the notion of Mediterranean regionalism came in
the form of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) championed by French
President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2008. The focus of the UfM was on practical
cooperation on tangible regional projects in the areas of energy, infrastructure,
the environment, and education, with less of an emphasis on the reform-
oriented approach embodied in the EMP and the European Neighborhood
Policy (ENP).35 However, the UfM came well into the twilight of the Arab
authoritarian order. In the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, the fate of the
UfM – and the entire Euro-Mediterranean project – is now uncertain.
The evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean project had thus strayed quite far
from the original intent of establishing a Helsinki-like cooperative regime for
the region. The legacy of this ambitious attempt provides the clearest example
of the limitations inherent in transferring Helsinki outside of its European
context. The EMP was very much a European policy instrument, the genesis
of which was driven by European concerns, a situation quite distinct from the
historical and strategic setting that produced the CSCE-Helsinki Process. In
this sense, the character of Barcelona was not marked by Euro-Mediterranean
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multilateralism, but essentially European unilateralism targeted toward a
fractured region marked by tremendous heterogeneity, a diffuse array of con-
flicts, and multiple power centers. Instead of fostering closer integration, the
legacy of EMP has been marked by a growing estrangement between both
shores of the Mediterranean, thus undermining the core assumption of a
common Euro-Mediterranean space on the basis of which the EMP was
established.
To conclude, the history of the various proposals for transferring the Helsinki
model to the Middle East all draw upon the CSCE experience selectively, whe-
ther emphasizing the dimension of hard security (the CSCME), political liberal-
ization and human rights (BMENA), or functional integration (EMP). All of
these initiatives took as their starting point the assumption that devising some
variant of the CSCE regime would spur a more positive pattern of regional
dynamics that would transcend the region’s endemic conflicts. Notwithstanding
the continuation of the various fora of the Euro-Mediterranean framework, none
of these initiatives have taken root.
This poor track record is due mainly to the fact that none of these initia-
tives have enabled the emergence of serious processes to deal with the region’s
conflicts and strategic imbalances. In essence, they relied on the mistaken
assumption that regional cooperative frameworks can be a substitute for
serious processes to address the region’s conflicts and strategic imbalances.
None of the regional frameworks outlined above have managed to address the
core issues that drive the security dynamic in the Middle East or to arrest the
deterioration in the regional security environment over the course of the last
two decades. Left to fester in the absence of a concerted conflict-resolution
agenda, these developments have produced a profound transformation of
the security landscape in the Middle East, one in which the prospects of a
Helsinki-like regime look extremely distant.
A transformed Middle East security landscape

The extraordinary developments in the Middle East over the last two years
seem to have invalidated much of the rationale behind the idea of transposing
the CSCE experience to the region. The Uprisings have dramatically over-
turned the domestic status quo in key Arab states, opening up a vast new
political space largely independent of international intervention. Driven by
powerful internal dynamics, the Uprisings in many ways undermined the logic
inherent in the Broader Middle East Initiative based on the assumption that
external engagement, or “intervention,” was necessary to liberalize author-
itarian regimes. Libya might be the exception to this rule, but even there it is
important to note that NATO’s military intervention did not translate into a
greater international role in the post-Qadhafi transition. Furthermore, the
“Deauville Partnership” initiative launched at the G-8 summit in May 2011
shows that the thrust of the international response to the Uprisings thus far
has taken the form of channeling already committed donor assistance to
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support the process of post-revolutionary transition, an approach that is far
more modest than the collective multidimensional cooperation envisioned in
the BMENA or various Euro-Mediterranean frameworks.36 And despite
nearly a decade and a half of “partnership” with the countries of the southern
Mediterranean, Europe has yet to devise a strategic response to the Arab
Uprisings, as the EU appears to be in a process of reevaluating its entire
approach to the region while facing internal struggles on the future of the
Union.37
The Arab Uprisings have ushered in a long period of introspection and
domestic political upheaval. With the fall of autocratic regimes, new forms of
political identities will emerge, some based on religious and ethnic frame-
works, others on a redefined sense of national identity. This will render the
short-term prospect of region-wide cooperative frameworks even more
remote, given that the very notion of “regional identity” is now very much in
flux. The Arab Uprisings will therefore greatly complicate an already frac-
tured regional security landscape, a reality that calls into question the notion
that such volatile security dynamics can be managed in the context of a
region-wide framework.
At first glance, it would appear that the ramifications of the Arab Uprisings
for regional security have been minimal, the potential spillover affects of the
situation in Syria notwithstanding. The Uprisings have yet to produce any
fundamental reorientation in the foreign policy of key Arab states, as was
feared of Egypt following the overthrow of Mubarak and the subsequent
ouster of Morsi. Nor did they result in any dramatic shifts in the regional
balance of power.
Yet, the real significance of the Arab Uprisings for regional security is that
they unfold in the context of the escalation of the region’s conflicts. The pro-
found political and social transformations currently underway on the domes-
tic level are likely to intersect with the region’s conflict environment, raising
the potential for instability in the short term.
On the domestic level, the Uprisings have introduced a new populist
dimension to the foreign and security policy of Arab states. Critical to
understanding this trend is the recognition that the conventional wisdom in
the certain quarters in the West, which saw the Uprisings as completely
divorced from foreign policy, is shortsighted. The objective of the Uprisings
was the overthrow of the authoritarian legacy of the past, and was thus
focused on domestic concerns; yet foreign policy was very much a part of this
legacy. While the cries of freedom, dignity, and social justice formed the
dominant narrative in Egypt’s Tahrir Square, these same themes will guide
the making of Egyptian foreign policy, especially with regard to the Palesti-
nian issue. In the context of a more democratic political order, foreign policy
will increasingly be based on a reevaluation of national interests, and it will
be subject to the test of popular legitimacy.
This will likely be a gradual, evolutionary process, one that will very much
depend on the consolidation of democratic politics that will engender a
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broad-based public debate on foreign policy issues among the political forces
emerging from the revolution. However, this process will not be insulated
from, and could even be derailed by, the crisis-prone regional context of the
Middle East.
Already we are seeing the Uprisings intersect with regional conflicts. In
fact, the Arab Uprisings have opened up new arenas for regional, geopolitical
competition. This was clearly the case with Bahrain, where a political upris-
ing took place in the context of an escalating rivalry between Saudi Arabia
and Iran. The mostly Shia-led uprising against the Sunni al-Khalifa royal
family was viewed by Saudi Arabia as an extension of Iran’s challenge to
Saudi interests in the Persian Gulf. This would have placed Iran’s influence
directly at Saudi Arabia’s doorstep, prompting greater unrest among the Shia
population in Saudi Arabia’s eastern provinces, which is the Kingdom’s lar-
gest oil-producing region, and would have created a very dangerous precedent
with the fall of an Arab monarchy. Riyadh’s decision to intervene militarily in
the middle of March 2011, under the cover of the GCC’s Peninsular Shield
force dramatically altered the course of the uprising. Saudi Arabia thus drew
a line against the spread of the Arab protest movement in the Gulf, driven in
large part by considerations related to its geopolitical competition with Iran.
Similarly in Syria, the uprising against the Assad regime has in many
respects become regionalized, with Iran providing political and material sup-
port to the regime, prompting a number of Gulf countries and the Sunni
tribes of Iraq to arm the Syrian opposition. Iran clearly sees the Syrian
uprising in strategic terms: the fall of the regime in Damascus would deprive
it of a major regional ally and conduit to Lebanon, through which it extends
military and financial support to Hezbollah and subsequently onto the
Palestinian-Israeli arena. With the descent into a full-scale civil war, Syria has
now been transformed into an arena for a regional proxy conflict along sec-
tarian and ethnic lines, among many other faction lines. The implications of
this for the regional balance of power can be quite profound. For instance,
the civil war in Iraq removed a major threat to the Gulf, but at the same time
it produced a regional security vacuum and eliminated Iraq as a counter-
weight to Iran. A similar situation in Syria, a key frontline against Israel, can
turn it into an arena of regional competition by proxy.
As the Arab Uprisings become regionalized, they have the potential to
acquire an increasingly sectarian character. Sectarian and ethnic divisions
have always been a staple of Middle East politics, one that has long been
exploited in the context of the region’s conflicts. However, such divisions are
now assuming a strategic dimension, in terms of defining the regional balance
of power, whereby regional security is increasingly framed in terms of the
ascendance of one sectarian or ethnic group over another, a trend that was in
many ways exacerbated by the invasion of Iraq and its subsequent civil war.
In short, the intersection between the Arab Uprisings and the region’s
conflicts will likely constitute a major source of regional instability for the
foreseeable future, and it will create an acutely challenging environment for
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the consolidation of democratic politics in the post-revolutionary transition
phase. As in the Gulf, this will also likely hold true for the other major axis of
conflict in the region: the Arab-Israeli conflict. Most significant in this regard
is the fact that the historic developments of the Arab Uprisings coincide with
a profound transformation in the nature of the conflict itself brought about by
the accelerated erosion of the two-state solution as the basis for resolving the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The intense international preoccupation with the Iranian nuclear issue, the
continued stalemate in the Peace Process, and the onset of the Arab Uprisings
have obscured this gradual shift in the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict – from
a territorial dispute between two nationalist movements that could potentially
be settled on the basis of national claims, to an ethnic-communal struggle
between two rival ethnic groups without a basis for a settlement. The steady
dismemberment of the West Bank, resulting from the relentless expansion of
Israel’s settlement project, has eroded the territorial basis for a solution. This in
turn has been paralleled by the erosion of the political basis for a settlement
brought about by the shift to the right in Israeli politics; the continuing split in
the Palestinian national movement between Fatah and Hamas despite recent
attempts at reconciliation; the demise of the founding generation of leaders on
both the Israeli and Palestinian sides which was able to make historic compro-
mises for peace; and the challenges to the legitimacy of the Palestinian Author-
ity as a result of the repeated failures of successive rounds of negotiations.
As prospects for a two-state solution further deteriorate, a new paradigm of
conflict is emerging, one in which the conflict is gradually reverting to its
existential phase, although it appears that it is Palestinian rather than Israeli
statehood that is threatened. Instead of an Israeli-Palestinian conflict that can
be solved on the basis of two states, we are witnessing the unfolding of an
Arab-Jewish conflict within a single geopolitical unit that defies a negotiated
settlement, a situation which in essence brings the conflict back to its origins
during the British Mandate of Palestine.38 The increasing anxiety in Israel
about its Jewish identity; the potential demise of the Palestinian Authority
and with it the prospects of Palestinian statehood; and the rise in communal
violence in the Territories between Palestinians and an increasingly militant
Jewish settler movement all point to this changing reality.
To the Arab states in the region, this has serious security and political
ramifications. On the security level, the situation in Gaza presents an
immediate and ongoing security challenge to Egypt. The security problems in
Gaza are now spilling over into the Sinai in a way that presents enormous
complications for Egypt’s relationship with Israel. A latent possibility for such
a scenario also exists in the West Bank, should Israel decide on another round
of disengagement, or if we see the demise of the Palestinian Authority, which
could present a major security concern for Jordan. The crisis resulting from
the breakdown of the two-state solution is thus spilling over into the neigh-
boring states, an outcome that has been openly advocated by numerous Israeli
officials who have argued for a “regional” solution to the conflict (i.e. outside
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of the Israeli-Palestinian territorial context), with Egypt and Jordan assuming
responsibility for Gaza and the West Bank, respectively.39
Secondly, on the political level, the demise of the two-state solution will
shift the burden of the conflict to the Arab states. A rupture in the form of a
renewed outbreak of widespread violence in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tories, or alternatively a campaign of nonviolent resistance against the occu-
pation, is likely to result in the collapse of the Palestinian Authority,
triggering a leadership struggle within the Palestinian national movement.
Even if there is no formal abrogation of the Oslo Accords that provided for
mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO (as representative of the
Palestinian people), such an eventuality would signify the reversion of the
conflict to its pre-Oslo phase. The delegitimization of the negotiating process
as a means to end the occupation and the transformation of the conflict into
one of ethnic struggle between Arab and Jew will transfer the responsibility of
managing the conflict to the Arab states. As a result, Egypt and Jordan will
come under tremendous popular domestic pressure to adopt a more assertive
Arab response to the collapse of the Peace Process irrespective of the fact that
neither country harbors any desire for a conflict with Israel. In short, the
transformations in the Arab-Israeli arena greatly increase the potential for
regional crisis by default, or by miscalculation by Arabs or Israelis, at pre-
cisely the time when domestic developments in Egypt and Jordan are pushing
toward greater political openness.
Finally, this transformation of the region’s security landscape unfolds in the
shadow of the ongoing crisis over Iran’s nuclear program, one that poses a
severe challenge for regional security. It poses an acute dilemma in the
absence of any viable regional disarmament process since the collapse of
ACRS in 1995 and subsequently creeping proliferation in the region that has
proceeded very much unchecked. Over the last three decades, the Middle East
has witnessed not only record levels of military expenditure, in comparison to
other regions, but also the proliferation of every major category of WMD and
their delivery systems.40 Had the Middle East benefited from a robust dis-
armament process based on a comprehensive response to the region’s pro-
liferation challenges, Iran’s nuclear program would likely not have matured to
the point where it poses such a serious risk to regional stability.
Instead, the absence of such a process has not only exacerbated this pro-
liferation problem, but it has also hampered the search for a solution. The
decades-long effort of the international community to convince Tehran to
curtail its enrichment program, led initially by the EU-3 (France, Britain, and
Germany) and later joined by the other permanent members of the UN
Security Council – the United States, Russia, and China – has had a poor
track record. Divorced from a broader regional context, an Iranian nuclear
deal might be seen as capitulation to or of the United States and the West,
whereas a broader regional framework could provide Tehran with political
cover for such concessions, tying them to steps by other regional actors,
including Israel, on the regional nonproliferation agenda.
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While much of the concern surrounding Iran’s nuclear program has focused
on the adverse consequences of the “cascade scenario,” whereby other regio-
nal powers would strive to attain a military nuclear capability in response to
an Iranian nuclear breakout, this tended to discount other equally serious
consequences of a possible crisis surrounding Iran’s nuclear program – speci-
fically, the serious erosion of the global nonproliferation regime. Combined
with the adverse security implications of a possible military strike against
Iran, or Tehran’s success in reaching a nuclear breakout capability, this could
produce a highly destabilizing regional security situation. The potential pro-
liferation effects of an Iranian nuclear breakout would not be immediate, and
the future will likely play out over the medium to long term the future pro-
liferation scenario in the Middle East is more likely to come out not as a
“cascade of proliferation,” but instead as a series of regional defections, par-
tial or complete, from the nonproliferation regime in response to its gradual
erosion.
This uncertainty would inevitably begin to factor into the security calculus
of regional actors, prompting others to follow suit in order to hedge against a
deteriorating regional security environment. The most likely consequence
would be the intensification of a regional arms race. The Iranian nuclear issue
cuts to the heart of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. The right to
the peaceful use of nuclear energy enshrined in the NPT; the ability of an
NPT member state to achieve nuclear breakout capability while not being in
material breach of its treaty obligations; and the possible invocation of Article
X of the Treaty, which grants members the sovereign right to withdraw in
light of “extraordinary events” that threaten their security – clearly a possi-
bility in light of the potential US and/or Israeli military option against Iran –
are all wrapped up in the Iranian nuclear crisis.
An Iranian decision to withdraw from the NPT in response to a military
attack, or the threat of imminent attack, would constitute an extreme example
of such a defection. Alternately, short of invoking Article X of the NPT, Iran
can resort to partial steps such as formally suspending its obligations under
the IAEA safeguard agreement, withdrawing from the Additional Protocol
which Iran signed in 2003 but never brought into force, or declaring an end to
its cooperation with the IAEA altogether. In such a context, the suspension of
the verification regime for Iran’s nuclear facilities would only fuel the uncer-
tainty regarding its intentions to reconstitute its nuclear program after a strike
or rapidly embark on a crash weaponization program if it reaches breakout
capability.
This could prompt other regional states to hedge their bets against the
growing regional uncertainty by curtailing their obligations within the NPT,
or more broadly within the global nonproliferation regime that is increasingly
perceived as inherently unjust.
As pointed out above, such defections would not take place in a vacuum,
but in the context of a highly unstable regional situation precipitated by the
Iranian nuclear crisis. A more serious turn could be Israel’s decision to
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relinquish its posture of nuclear ambiguity in favor of a declared nuclear
deterrent in response to Iran – a development that would probably constitute
the strongest driver for a “proliferation cascade” in the Middle East.41 The
domestic political repercussions triggered by these developments in regional
states would be difficult to gauge. However, given the effects of the Arab
Uprisings, the prospect of widespread popular protests in the event of a mili-
tary strike against Iran – similar to the mass demonstrations in 2003 in
response to the US invasion of Iraq – would inevitably push governments to
adopt a much more critical position toward the crisis or to risk potential
domestic instability.
The fact that the Iranian nuclear issue has generally been addressed in
isolation from a broad regional nonproliferation framework, therefore,
leaves a limited range of policy options, all of which would be highly
destabilizing. The use of force would only temporarily delay Iran’s nuclear
program; likely trigger Iran’s defection from the NPT, further eroding the
normative and legal framework against proliferation; and set in motion a
highly negative security dynamic that would alter the security calculus of
regional actors toward greater militarization and, ultimately, proliferation.
While a framework agreement between Iran and the P5+1 may stave off these
negative consequences, the prospects for an agreement that brings about the
fundamental resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue, outside the context of a
broader regional framework, appears to be remote. The likelihood that a par-
tial interim agreement can be sustained over the medium to long term is
therefore similarly questionable.
Taken together, the transformation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the looming
crisis with Iran, and the security implications of the Arab Uprisings are ush-
ering in a profound transformation of the regional security landscape in the
Middle East. These changes are unfolding in the context of escalating conflict
and unabated militarization, driven by the creeping proliferation of non-
conventional weapons. In the absence of a resumption of a sustained process
for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and a disarmament agenda to
stem the tide of regional proliferation, the Arab Uprisings will at some point
intersect with these broader regional trends, producing a situation that is
prone to tremendous instability. Now more than ever, the region is in dire
need of a robust arms control and disarmament and conflict resolution
agenda that can reverse the adverse trends feeding the current dynamic of
instability.
Conclusion: The imperative of a conflict resolution and disarmament

agenda for the Middle East
The prospect of a region-wide cooperative framework, always a difficult pro-
position for the Middle East, seems more elusive than ever. The region’s
conflicts are simply too deep, its rivalries too intense, and its divisions too
long-standing for such a framework to be viable. The period of reevaluation
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of national and regional identities, following the Arab Uprisings, only com-
pounds the difficulty.
However, this is not to completely dismiss the idea of cooperative frame-
works in the Middle East, especially on the subregional level, but only to
argue that they must be structured around comprehensive and substantive
processes for addressing the region’s political conflicts. Specifically, we advo-
cate a regional security approach for the Middle East anchored in the twin
agenda of regional disarmament that would lay the foundation for the estab-
lishment of a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone for the region and revive the pro-
spects for Arab-Israeli peace through internationalizing the parameters of an
Israeli-Palestinian settlement. This by no means constitutes a comprehensive
or exhaustive security agenda for the region. Nor is it a panacea to stabilize
the region’s volatile security environment. It would, however, defuse the two
most explosive issues that pose the gravest challenge to regional stability; halt
the erosion of the two-state solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and at
the same time provide a more enabling regional environment for the success-
ful consolidation of democratic politics in the wake of the Arab Uprisings.
Formulating a process for addressing the nuclear weapons issues in the
Middle East must start with the appreciation that the use of force against Iran
would have destabilizing repercussions, and that Israel’s quest for absolute
security through military superiority, including its nuclear monopoly, cannot
stand indefinitely. While the military option would no doubt be costly to
Tehran, the aftermath would also come at great cost in terms of regional and
global stability. At best, a military strike would only temporarily set back
Iran’s capability; prompt it to drive its nuclear program underground outside
of IAEA safeguards; and greatly compromise – if not abort entirely – future
diplomatic efforts at resolving the crisis. Accordingly, the only viable solution
to this standoff is through a negotiated compromise. The Iranian regime
should be provided with a credible avenue of retreat from the brink, but in a
fashion that involves all relevant regional and international parties, in order
to create a sustainable security framework that acknowledges Iran’s legitimate
security interests, but not its regional ambitions. The goal should ultimately
be to bring Iran into the regional fold and the international order without
anointing Iran as the first among equals in the Middle East – as feared by
other regional powers. The shift from confrontation to regional and interna-
tional engagement would require a mutual deescalation of rhetoric so as to
provide the political space for a negotiated compromise. This is not to suggest
abandoning the hard bargaining involved in a serious negotiations process,
one that would curtail and eventually dismantle those elements of Iran’s
nuclear program not dedicated to peaceful civilian use in return for relief from
international sanctions. However, the current political deadlock and climate
of mutual suspicion effectively undermine the prospects for a negotiated
agreement.
This should be undertaken in parallel with a serious drive to convene a
conference to initiate a process toward the creation of a Middle East Nuclear
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Weapons-Free Zone (MENWFZ). As has been emphasized throughout this
chapter, the effectiveness of any regional security framework requires that it
be coupled with a serious disarmament process to address the region’s strate-
gic asymmetries. A regional process, coupled with international guarantees,
leading to the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone would enable a
long-term resolution of the nuclear issue instead of simply staving off the
problem temporarily. Conditional to their launch, such talks would require a
moratorium on the Iranian nuclear program, which could be achieved
through the promise of Israeli concessions concerning a cessation of the pro-
duction of weapons-grade nuclear material, or the gradual incorporation of
Israel’s nuclear program into the IAEA verification regime.
We do not underestimate the difficulty involved in this process. However,
developing the concept and the legal framework to underpin the creation of a
MENWFZ is not the main obstacle. Indeed, this has been the subject of an
extensive literature that has addressed the modalities, sequencing, and ver-
ification mechanism for such a zone.42 Elsewhere, Nabil Fahmy and Patricia
Lewis have outlined the possible elements of a MENWFZ Treaty.43 The pri-
mary obstacle, rather, lies in Israel’s reluctance to relinquish its military
superiority – both conventional and nonconventional – in a region it still
perceives as fundamentally hostile to its security. Although officially sub-
scribing to the goal of creating a MENWFZ as a long-term objective, Israel
has refused to engage in any serious regional arms control or disarmament
process, driven by a fear that this would erode its deterrent capacity against
regional threats to its security. Moreover, this reluctance is not confined to the
nuclear realm; Israel is the only country that is not a full state party to any of
the major treaty regimes that make up the global nonproliferation system.44
As outlined above, Egypt’s incremental approach in the context of the ACRS
talks, based on an acknowledgment of the complexity and sensitivity involved
in addressing the nuclear issue in the Middle East, did not persuade Israel to
change its position.
However, in the interest of the halting of Iran’s assumed quest to attain the
capacity to develop a military nuclear capability, it might be possible to con-
vince Israel of the advantages of disclosure within the context of a regional
disarmament road map that would culminate in the creation of a MENWFZ.
Israel’s qualitative and quantitative military superiority over its neighbors
already affords it a wide margin of security, and the consequences of war with
a nuclear Iran would be devastating for Israel no matter the size of its nuclear
arsenal. Achieving a nuclear weapons-free Middle East would therefore ulti-
mately benefit Israel’s interests. Iran has already stated its nominal support
for the creation of a MENWFZ, even if only to embarrass the West over
Israel’s certain refusal. If Israel were to indicate its readiness to engage in a
serious regional disarmament process, Iran would find it difficult not to reci-
procate. Indeed, negotiation would become strategically attractive for the
Iranian regime. The economic bite of sanctions could be ameliorated through
accepting dialogue with the West, while success in extracting a compromise
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from Israel could be portrayed as a victory for Iran. This would afford Iran’s
leadership the domestic political capital, as well as the ideological justifica-
tion, to safely back down and engage in comprehensive talks. To be sure,
this scenario is an ideal one, but it is not impossible if Western, especially
American, policymakers are willing to press Israel toward it.
If the challenges involved in instituting a regional disarmament process in
the Middle East are formidable, they appear equally daunting when con-
sidering a viable approach to reviving the stalled Arab-Israeli Peace Process.
Reviving the prospects for a negotiated settlement may require a fundamental
rethinking of the very tenets of the Peace Process after such a prolonged
period of stalemate, which is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, in
sketching the contours of a new approach, a few ideas can be offered as the
basis for further elaboration. Since the start of the Oslo Process, it has
become obvious that the Israelis and Palestinians are incapable of reaching an
agreement without the active involvement of outside third parties, a role
principally filled by the United States. However, the last decade has revealed
that Washington’s role is subject to significant limitations. That the US role
still remains indispensable to a negotiated resolution of the conflict – in the
form of financial assistance, security guarantees, and diplomatic support –
should not be confused with the ability of the US alone to broker a final
status agreement, which is now in doubt. Even for the Obama administration,
which has perhaps been the most vocal in articulating a strategic rationale for
ending the conflict based on American national security interests, the domes-
tic political limitations, financial constraints, and diplomatic capacity of
the United States in brokering such an agreement have become increasingly
evident.
In light of this, it is perhaps time to consider internationalizing the broad
parameters of a settlement to the conflict. Much of the groundwork for a final
status agreement has already been laid through the Clinton parameters, the
Taba negotiations, and the results of the Annapolis Process and the sub-
sequent Abbas-Olmert negotiations. The problem has been the failure of both
sides to summon the political will necessary to pay the price for reaching such
a settlement and the inability of the United States to bridge the gaps between
them to shepherd the process to a successful conclusion. Internationalizing
the parameters of a settlement would alter the context in which future nego-
tiations would take place. A UN Security Council Resolution that would
enshrine the basis of a settlement could be one pillar of this approach. This
should be complemented by a standing “Madrid – 2” peace conference that
would convene periodically to oversee the negotiations on the basis of such a
Resolution, as opposed to the original 1991 conference – “Madrid – 1” – that
convened only once to launch the various bilateral and regional negotiating
tracks.
Israel’s inevitable rejection of such an approach is based on the argument
against an “imposed” solution, and that any settlement must be reached as a
result of direct negotiations between the parties. To be clear, there can be no
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imposed solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and in the end, no sub-
stitute for direct negotiations between the parties. However, by internationaliz-
ing the parameters of a solution, this approach may succeed where the United
States has failed by altering the incentive structure for the parties to reach an
historic agreement. Anchoring the Peace Process in a robust international con-
sensus on the outlines of a settlement and the tradeoffs involved in a final
status agreement would greatly increase the costs to the parties of saying “no”
to a fair deal, given that this would entail going against not just the United
States, as both the Palestinians and Israelis have repeatedly done, but the con-
sensus of the international community. In addition, the incentives for reaching
a fair agreement can potentially overcome the reluctance of the parties to pay
the political costs entailed in the necessary compromises that inevitably would
have to be made. Israel would be hard pressed to reject an agreement that
involved international recognition of its capital in West Jerusalem, the final
borders and security arrangements with the nascent Palestinian state, the
underwriting of whatever arrangement is reached on the refugee issue, and even
the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state provided this does not compromise
the rights of Palestinian refugees or Israel’s Arab minority. Similarly, the
Palestinians could be enticed to make the difficult concessions on a final status
agreement if backed by solid international support for a Palestinian capital in
East Jerusalem, a Palestinian state on the basis of the 1967 borders, and a
broad assistance package for reconstruction and the resettlement of Palestinian
refugees. As was mentioned above, this approach would not preclude a strong
US role, but such an arrangement would not leave it solely up to Washington
to force the necessary concessions from the parties.
A new approach based on internationalizing the Peace Process will only
gain more urgency as the regional context becomes more complex. The cur-
rent political climate of transitions in the Arab world may call into question
the viability of the Arab Peace Initiative. Indeed, in a more democratic poli-
tical setting, Arab attitudes toward Israel may harden, given the latter’s con-
tinued settlement expansion and the erosion of the two-state solution that
places the creation of a Palestinian state further out of reach, thus making the
regional context all the more challenging for sustaining the Peace Process.
Needless to say, the prospect of renewed violence in the Occupied Territories
would only reinforce this trend. However, should a concerted international
effort enable serious movement toward a negotiated solution, this might
provide the impetus to recommit to the Arab Peace Initiative. A renewed
momentum in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations under international auspices
would provide the political space to renew the Arab strategic commitment to
peace backed by democratically elected governments. The strategic opportu-
nity presented by the Arab Uprisings is that they lend legitimacy to any
regional arrangements or agreements, including ones that would help resolve
the Arab-Israeli conflict. If Israel makes serious efforts to end its occupation
of Palestinian lands in the context of a final settlement of the Palestinian issue
and a comprehensive peace based on full withdrawal from Arab occupied
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territory, the result could be a win-win situation. The Palestinians would
exercise their national identity in their contiguous state and Israel would
achieve a full-fledged peace not with authoritarian regimes but with the Arab
peoples.
If there is one certainty amidst the state of flux in today’s Middle East, it is
that the continued stalemate in the Peace Process makes the status quo in the
Arab-Israeli arena unsustainable. Coupled with the continued trend toward
WMD proliferation and the crisis surrounding the Iranian nuclear issue, the
resulting dynamics will drive the Middle East toward a state of acute regional
insecurity. Only a concerted conflict resolution and disarmament agenda can
halt and possibly reverse these negative trends. It is the urgent pursuit of such
an agenda, rather than the elusive search for grand designs of regional archi-
tecture, that should constitute the focus of regional security efforts in a
rapidly changing Middle East.
Notes
1 Lesser, “Institutional Issues,” 162.
2 Hopmann, “Organization for Security and Cooperation,” 609.
3 For an assessment of the negotiating history of the CSCE, see Romano, “Détente,
Entente, or Linkage?” and Hanhimäki, “They Can Write it in Swahili.”
4 For a detailed presentation of the West European position, see Davy, “Helsinki
Myths.”
5 For background and the negotiation history of CSBMs in Europe, see Goodby and
Barry, “The Stockholm Conference” and Snyder, “The Foundation for Vienna.”
The development and adaptation of the CSBM structure during the post-Cold War
phase is treated in Lachowski, Confidence- and Security-Building Measures.
6 These include the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Partnership
for Peace (PfP), and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), all of which
were designed to enhance politico-military transparency for the process of accept-
ing new members and for reassurance to former Warsaw Pact members.
7 For the interplay and relationships between the various European security institu-
tions, see Møller, “European Security”; Caruso, “Interplay Between the Council of
Europe”; Hopmann, “The OSCE: Fighting for Renewed Relevance”; Mlyn, “The
OSCE, the United States and European Security,” 426–447; and Stewart,
“Restoring EU-OSCE Cooperation.”
8 For a detailed assessment of these developments, see François, “The United States,
Russia, Europe, and Security”; McCausland, “The Future of the CFE Treaty”;
Witkowsky, Garnett, and McCausland, “Salvaging the Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe”; Zellner, “Conventional Arms Control in Europe”; Lachowski,
“The CFE Treaty One Year After its Suspension”; and Ghebali, “Growing Pains at
the OSCE.” For an assessment of Russia’s proposal regarding the European
Security Treaty, see Dunay and Herd, “Redesigning Europe?” and Zagorski, “The
Russian Proposal for a Treaty on European Security.”
9 Rabin, “Statement to the 13th Socialist International Congress.”
10 Ibid.
11 It is useful to recall that securing recognition of Middle East “realities” has been a
consistent objective of Israeli diplomacy in order to legitimize territorial gains
acquired through the use of force or the creation of facts on the ground primarily
through settlement expansion. In 2004, Israel asked for and obtained such
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recognition in the form of the letter of assurance from President Bush to Prime
Minister Sharon.
12 Örhün, “Considerations” and Kampelman, “Peace Premised on the Four ‘Oughts’.”
13 For an overview of such initiatives, see Waslekar et al. “Inclusive Semi-Permanent
Conference” and International Peace Institue, “The OSCE-Mediterranean Part-
nership.” See also Hoyer, “A New Framework.”
14 Netanyahu, “Address.”
15 Joint Communique by US President William Clinton, Jordanian Crown Prince
Hassan Bin Talal, and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. Article 4 of the
Israeli-Jordanian Treaty of Peace states that “ … the Parties recognize the
achievements of the European Community and European Union in the develop-
ment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and
commit themselves to the creation, in the Middle East, of a CSCME (Conference
on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East). This commitment entails the
adoption of regional models of security successfully implemented in the post-World
War era (along the lines of the Helsinki Process), culminating in a regional zone of
security and stability.”
16 Bellamy, “Rifkind Seeks Security Pact.”
17 Feldman and Toukan, Bridging the Gap. A more recent articulation of the Israeli
approach in this regard can be found in Teitelbaum, “An Alternative Diplomatic
Process.”
18 Ibid., 89–90.
19 Ibid., 91.
20 Ibid., 93.
21 For an Egyptian perspective, see Fahmy, “Reflections on the Arms Control and
Regional Security Process”; “Prospects for Arms Control”; and “Special Comment.”
The most extensive articulation of the Israeli perspective can be found in Landau,
Egypt and Israel in ACRS. For an authoritative US perspective, see Yaffe, “Pro-
moting Arms Control” and “An Overview.” In addition, numerous academic treat-
ments have been produced. See Jones, “Arms Control”; Jentleson, “The Middle East
Arms Control and Regional Security Talks”; and Peters, “Building Bridges.”
22 For a lucid articulation of the impact of Helsinki’s human rights agenda in ending
the Cold War, see Thomas, The Helsinki Effect.
23 Johannsen, “The ‘Helsinki Coup’.”
24 McFaul, “A Helsinki Process.”
25 Gardels, “A Helsinki Accord for the Arab World.”
26 A description of the BMENA initiatives can be found at http://bmena.state.gov/.
27 Asmus, Diamond, Leonard, and McFaul, “A Transatlantic Strategy.” Elsewhere,
McFaul, together with Fukuyama, make the argument for addressing the Palesti-
nian issue albeit from the standpoint of enhancing US public diplomacy. See
Fukuyama and McFaul, “Should Democracy Be Promoted or Demoted?”
28 It is worth recalling that the Helsinki Final Act devoted a special section to
“Questions Relating to Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean,” in which
the signatories declared their intention to “promote the development of good-
neighborly relations with the non-participating after Mediterranean states in con-
formity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,”
based on an expansive agenda of increasing mutual confidence, security, and
stability, and economic cooperation in the Mediterranean region.
29 The relevant passage of the Declaration in this regard states that the parties shall
“consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and bio-
logical weapons; refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate
defense requirements, at the same time reaffirming their resolve to achieve the same
degree of security and mutual confidence with the lowest possible levels of troops
and weaponry and adherence to CCW; promote conditions likely to develop good
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security, prosperity, and regional and subregional cooperation; consider any con-
fidence- and security-building measures that could be taken between the parties with
a view to the creation of an ‘area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean’
including the long-term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that
end.”
30 Bailes and Messervy-Whiting, “Death of an Institution”; Wessel, “The EU as a
Black Widow”; and Smith, “The End of Civilian Power EU.”
31 It was in deference to the primacy of the United States’ security role that the
Barcelona Declaration included a clause which stated: “this Euro-Mediterranean
initiative is not intended to replace the other activities and initiatives undertaken in
the interest of peace, stability, and development of the region, but … it will con-
tribute to their success”, in particular “ … the realization of a just, comprehensive,
and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East.”
32 See Me, “Cooperation in Western Mediterranean”; Panebianco, “Dealing with
Maritime Security”; Cameron (ed), “Euro-Mediterranean Security”; and Lesser,
Green, Larrabee, and Zanini, The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative.
33 Aliboni, “Southern Europe and the Mediterranean.” See also Bicchi and Martin,
“Talking Tough or Talking Together?”
34 Aliboni and Saaf, “Human Security.”
35 Hunt, “The UfM and Development Prospects in the Mediterranean”; Holden,
“A New Beginning?”; and Cardwell, “EuroMed, European Neighborhood Policy
and the Union for the Mediterranean.”
36 For an assessment of the G-8 initiative, see Dadush and Dunne, “American and
European Responses.”
37 For a critical treatment of the European legacy of engagement with the Arab
revolutions, see Hollis, “No Friend of Democratization”; Colombo and Tocci,
“The EU Response to the Arab Uprisings”; and Driss, “The EU Response to the
Arab Uprisings.” For the reassessment of EU policy toward the region in light of
the Arab revolutions, see Echagüe, Michou, and Mikail, “Europe and the Arab
Uprisings”; and Perthes, “Europe and the Arab Spring.”
38 While numerous works have highlighted the demise of the two-state solution,
Menachem Klein has been the one who has analyzed in some depth the transfor-
mation of the conflict. See Klein, The Shift.
39 As an example, see the writings of former and current Israeli National Security
Advisors Giora Eiland and Yaakov Amidror: Amidror and Diker, “Strategic
Implications,” as well as Eiland, “Regional Alternatives”; “Rethinking the Two-
State Solution”; and “The Jordan Option.”
40 The Middle East is one of the few regions that have continued to witness a steady
increase in overall military expenditures. See SIPRI, Background Paper on SIPRI
Military Expenditure Data. For an inventory of nonconventional military arsenals
in the region compiled from open sources, see the database as of 2006 by the
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, which is available at: http://cns.miis.edu/
wmdme/index.htm.
41 Avner Cohen has addressed the issue of Israel’s potential response to a nuclear Iran
in his book, The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb (214–241).
42 UNIDIR, Building a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone; UNDDA, Effective
and Verifiable Measures; Lewis and Potter, “The Long Journey”; and Baumgart
and Muller, “A Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone.”
43 Fahmy and Lewis, “Possible Elements of a NWFZ Treaty.”
44 To date, Israel is a signatory to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), but has not ratified either. It
has not signed the NPT or the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC).
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4 The Helsinki Process and its relevance

in a changing Middle East
An Israeli perspective
Ehud Eiran
Introduction
This chapter assesses possible Israeli responses to a proposed Helsinki-like
process in the Middle East. It begins by framing relevant core aspects of
the Helsinki Process and then analyzes how Israel might respond to each of
these aspects by investigating the degree of their alignment with Israel’s
traditional national security doctrine, as well as with its current strategic pre-
ferences. The chapter further discusses Israel’s long engagement as a Medi-
terranean partner of the Helsinki Process and the lessons it drew from
participation in the 1992–1995 multinational regional talks, including an
Arms Control and Regional Stability (ACRS) working group, and their
applicability to a future regional process.
The chapter concludes that while Israel, and the Zionist movement before
it, aspired to reside in a stable region in which parties adhere to international
norms that regulate conflict, Israel’s experiences made it highly skeptical
about the feasibility of such a vision. Therefore, although Israel has long been
interested and involved in the Helsinki Process (through the Mediterranean
partners program), it remains skeptical about the transformative possibilities
offered by such a process in the Middle Eastern context. Still, a Helsinki-like
process is aligned with Israel’s other traditional policy goals. There is a greater
likelihood for Israeli participation if certain features of this process are revised
to accommodate Israeli concerns; even so, Israel can be expected to exercise
caution regarding the terms of reference to any security issues, both in a
broader security basket and in a specific working group. Nevertheless, Israel
will be more inclined to participate in a security group that also addresses the
new security challenges posed by Iran and the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, violent non-state actors, and the possibility of failed states and
unstable regimes in the region. Finally, with no Helsinki-like process presently
on the regional agenda, and, given Israel’s general reluctance to reflect on
regional grand visions, this chapter is based on extrapolation from Israel’s
traditional approach to national and regional security, with an attempt to
integrate information from more contemporary trends as well. Among some
of its limitations, therefore, is a limited ability to predict Israeli behavior once
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92 Ehud Eiran
regional actors initiate or participate in peace talks with Israel, the 1977
Egyptian Peace Initiative and the 1991 Madrid Process being two such
examples.
A vision for a regional security community (and beyond?)

Helsinki’s set of ideas and initiatives concerning human rights, security, and
economic cooperation in its nascent institutional framework were, in effect,
intended to create a regional security community. This encompassed both a
community in the traditional sense, which resolves its conflicts in a peaceful
manner,1 and a greater vision that fosters the creation of a “European House”
based on shared values and possibly a shared identity. These communal
aspects became more pronounced at the end of the Cold War. For example,
the joint German-Soviet declaration from June 13, 1989 stated that the 1975
Helsinki Final Act and the follow-up meetings in Madrid and Vienna charted
a course toward “the development of a Europe marked by peace and coop-
eration – a peaceful European order or a common European home.”2
Similarly, political Zionism’s initial aspiration was to be truly accepted into
the region. The movement’s founding fathers further hoped that their future
state would reside in a stable region, and some even thought that their project
might help the area prosper. These ideals were reflected, among other places, in
the never-to-be-ratified 1919 Faisal-Weizmann Agreement that set the relation-
ship between the future Jewish political entity in Palestine and its future
Arab neighbor state.3 Article 1 stated that “the Arab State and Palestine [The
future Jewish region] in all their relations and undertakings shall be controlled
by the most cordial goodwill and understanding.” However, Arab opposition to
the Zionist project, as well as the patterns of Israel’s evolution, have led most
Israeli elites to become deeply skeptical about the possibility of their true
acceptance in the region. The two prominent figures that competed for leader-
ship of the Zionist movement from the 1920s to the late 1930s – David Ben-
Gurion and Zeev Jabotinsky – adopted an analysis that viewed, reluctantly, the
Zionist project as one that would face regional enmity.4 The armed conflicts
between Israel and the Arab world led Israel to develop a security doctrine that
is premised, in the words of its founding father, Ben-Gurion, on the belief that
the “essence of our security problem is our existence … the political goal
[of Israel’s Arab foes] is to eradicate the Yeshuv [the Jewish political entity]
from the face of the earth.” In a speech in the Israeli Parliament in June 1950,
Ben-Gurion said that “we are different from the environment around us – a
cultural difference, a social difference, and an economic difference, and this
difference will only get greater.”5 The Labor Party’s last Prime Minister, Ehud
Barak, held essentially the same perspective when he famously described Israel
in the late 1990s as a “Villa in the Jungle.”6
Israel’s current leadership is unlikely to take a different approach. Indeed,
its distrust of the intentions of other international actors extends not only to
Israel’s immediate surroundings, but also to its allies. Israel is unlikely to
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The Helsinki Process and its relevance in a changing Middle East 93
initiate a Helsinki-like process in the region. Its past record shows that all of
its previous significant engagements with neighboring countries toward a
political settlement – such as the 1979 Peace Accord with Egypt and the 1991
Madrid Process – were reactive. Recent cases where Israel took the initiative –
the Oslo Process of the 1990s7 and the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza – are
presently seen in Israel as utter failures. Moreover, Israel’s only grand regional
design, Shimon Peres’ New Middle East vision of the 1990s, was met with
regional resistance. Being generally skeptical about the possibility that such a
process would ever produce lasting regional security changes, Israel is unlikely
to be its initiator. However, Israel would most likely sign on to a new regional
Helsinki-like process if it is asked to join one.
All-inclusive, balanced, flexible, and gradual participation

Participation in the original Helsinki Process can be associated with four
aspects that are relevant for the consideration of an Israeli response to a
similar regional process in the Middle East.
Inclusive regional membership

Participation, and later membership, in the Helsinki Process was all-inclusive
on the regional level, and all European states (barring two, Albania and
Andorra),8 as well as the United States and Canada also took part in the Pro-
cess. This was a rather substantial achievement, as the Process took off in the
midst of the ideological, political, military, and economic hostility of the Cold
War in Europe. While Israelis traditionally believe that regional peace is unat-
tainable and that their nation is under a constant threat of annihilation, Israeli
political elites have supported region-wide processes as part of their quest for
regional acceptance. Indeed, even Israel’s hard-liner Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu stated the following during his first term in office in 1996:
Bilateral treaties can only produce partial security. For a solid, compre-
hensive security to prevail in the Middle East, our quest for peace must
cover the entire region from Morocco to the Gulf. And this larger peace is
the goal of the present Government of Israel, even if we reach it in steps.9
Membership in regional organizations serves Israel’s aspiration to be accepted

in the region both on a symbolic level as well as on a practical level. The
latter would entail enjoying the benefits of having open lines of communica-
tion and the possibility of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Both aisles
of the Israeli political spectrum share this desire. In 1994, Foreign Minister
Peres expressed his hope that Israel would become a member of the Arab
League.10 Two years later, it was Prime Minister Netanyahu who stated that
“the … lesson of Helsinki [for the Middle East] is that contact between
former adversaries must remain constant.”11
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94 Ehud Eiran
Internal balance
The second significant aspect of the Helsinki Process was that member states
were initially unofficially organized into a Western bloc and an Eastern bloc,
roughly equal in number and power. A European model, in which two blocs
within the process were generally equal in power, would most likely appeal to
Israel. Historically, Jerusalem has been concerned that, within large regional
and international forums, it would be cornered and automatically out-
numbered by an Arab majority. For example, from the 1970s to the 1990s,
Israel’s preference was to avoid regional peace negotiations in which it had to
face all Arab countries in one forum. Jerusalem feared that this would lead to
a “race to extremes” by the various Arab parties and would also place it
under pressure from the majority of the participants. Unlike the Helsinki
Process, where East and West were informally equal in number and where
they balanced each other’s capabilities, in a Middle East regional context,
Israel will most likely see itself as standing alone in the midst of a large Arab
bloc. In turn, this might lead Israel to either try to negotiate terms of refer-
ence to such a process in a way that none of its vital interests could be in
jeopardy under a majority rule (for example, by reaching an agreement that
all Arab League nations would collectively hold one vote in certain matters)
or try to secure the membership of other actors outside the region that would
balance with Israel against the Arab majority.
Non-regional offshore balancing

The balance between East and West within the Helsinki Process was a result
of the inclusion of two states that were not part of the region geographically,
but that were part of its security architecture: the United States and Canada.
Perceiving itself as a future minority in a regional setting, Israel would most
likely embrace this precedent and welcome non-regional members that are
strong enough to balance, at least in part, its position, such as the United
States. Although Washington is not as powerful as it was in the region in the
1990s, Israel is still expected to view the United States as potentially being
able to balance its position. At the same time, the weakening of the United
States’ image and influence in the region may make it harder to bring Israel
to the table because Washington would have less “balancing weight” to offer.
Israel might also support a wider definition of the region so as to include
Eastern Mediterranean actors such as Cyprus and maybe even Turkey in the
process.
Flexible
The third significant aspect was that membership in the Helsinki Process was
flexible. The two European nations that remained on the sidelines, Albania
and Andorra, eventually joined the framework. Moreover, new states that
were created as a result of the dissolution of two member states – the USSR
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and Yugoslavia – were admitted, although some of them were not geo-
graphically in Europe. The precedent set in the Helsinki Process, whereby
members could join or be added as the process moved along, would most likely
appeal to Israel, as Gershon Baskin and Hanna Siniora further discuss in
Chapter 8. This would allow Israel to see the utility of such a process even if,
initially, an important actor, such as Iran, would not take part in the process, as
was the case with Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, and Libya in the 1990s.12
Transactional logic
The underlying logic of the Helsinki Process was transactional. The Soviet
Union sought recognition of its territorial gains in Europe in World War II
and to advance trade relations with the West in order to improve quality of
life within the USSR as a way of addressing mounting internal pressures. The
West was interested in advancing the human rights agenda. Both parties had
a mutual interest to stabilize relations, diminish tensions, and avoid open
hostilities. A similar transactional logic will most likely be acceptable to
Israel, since its peace agreements with neighboring countries have tradition-
ally been driven by this principle.13 Nevertheless, a key issue to be resolved in
such a “peace transaction” will be its sequence relative to bilateral negotia-
tions: the assumption in Israel is that other parties in the region would not be
prepared to accept a security framework without bilateral talks. But if a
structure could be worked out with multilateral talks preceding bilateral dis-
cussions, Israel would likely be much more eager to participate: such sequen-
cing would allow some of the gains associated with a multilateral deal to be
secured before engaging in the possibly more politically costly bilateral nego-
tiations. Even in terms of internal Israeli capacity, a multilateral process
separate from a bilateral one may be preferable because the Israeli experience
from the 1990s was that some key players were overloaded by the political,
security, and bureaucratic requirements of the bilateral peace negotiation.14
Gradualism
The fourth aspect embedded in the Helsinki Process was gradualism. The
Process was spread over many years (launched in 1972, and still evolving) and
was advanced carefully, as each phase was meticulously planned over time.
For example, the parties were engaged in a three-year process of meetings
before the Final Act was approved in 1975. The logic of gradualism is well
aligned with Israeli perceptions of its interaction with the region. Indeed,
Israel’s long-term strategy of being accepted into the region was based on a
logic of gradualism, by which cumulative Israeli deterrence would first
diminish the incentive for its neighbors to attack it, and then lead them to
interest-based peace agreements, hopefully resulting in eventual full accep-
tance.15 Israel’s preference for gradualism is also reflected in Israel’s peace
accords with its neighbors, which are colored, however, by Israel’s traditional
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96 Ehud Eiran
distrust. All the peace agreements that involved Israel forgoing strategic ter-
ritorial assets were spread over time in their implementation in order to test
the other party’s ability to perform as well as their commitment to peace. The
1978 Israeli-Egyptian framework for a peace agreement included an Israeli
withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula over three years (1979–1982) and an
additional phase that was to be concluded in follow-up talks, but which never
was. The architecture of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process in the 1990s was
similarly dissected into two parts: an interim agreement (1994–1999) and a
framework for a permanent one that has not been concluded to date.
Although the Oslo Process, or rather, its failure, could have led Israel to try
and conclude all items at once, many voices in the leading Likud Party
advocate, in effect, for yet another gradual framework in the form of a new
interim agreement. For example, the former Likud Cabinet Secretary Zvi
Hauser explained in an August 2013 interview that “if we are to achieve a
solution in our bad neighborhood, it must be a phased solution, in a frame-
work of trial and error. The extreme changes in reality [around Israel] entail
long-term interim, reversible, solutions.”16
Security basket
The Helsinki Process security basket, as it was set in the 1975 Final Act,
included a declaration of security principles, as well as a note about the actual
steps that led to the launch of some confidence-building measures between the
Cold War foes. With its acute sense of an existential threat,17 the security
aspects of a possible Helsinki-like process will be at the center of Israeli
attention when Jerusalem considers its options. Israel will refuse to engage, if
elements of the process are perceived as compromising its fundamental
security interests, but it will look more favorably at a process that promises to
advance, at the very least, its secondary security interests (e.g. preventing
illegal migration through the Sinai Peninsula or resolving its dispute with
Lebanon with regard to their maritime boundary in the Mediterranean). Yet,
in all security-related issues, Israel is likely to be skeptical about the prospects
of a regional security architecture in which norms, rather than power, play an
important role in providing security. Horowitz18 and Maoz, among others,
have suggested that a basic tenet of Israel’s security policy is that “Israel
cannot rely on the outside world to ensure its survival and defense.”19 After
all, as Horowitz observed in 1982, “the dominant approach of national
security in Israel tends to view diplomacy as the slave of strategy. And not the
other way around.”20 It is not surprising, therefore, that “the Israeli govern-
ment has always treated with a high degree of skepticism ideas about regional
security.”21 In particular, Israel would be cautious in committing to any pro-
cess that could limit its options to provide for its own security. Although the
purpose of any regional security agreement, at least in theory, is to reduce
collective uncertainty and subsequently the need for exclusive self-reliance,
Israel’s belief in self-reliance is deeply entrenched in its security doctrine and
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experiences. Although a regional arrangement was never seriously explored in
the Middle East, Israel’s suspicion of external guarantees to its security stem
from observing repeated failures of the UN to secure the Jewish state in
1948–1949, 1967, and since 1978 (on the Lebanese front). Israel holds a
similar, though milder, approach even toward the United States – in part due
to Washington’s failure to open the Straits of Tiran in 1967, despite a 1956
commitment to do so should it be required, and in part due to its lack of
response to the August 1970 deployment of Egyptian SAMs near the Suez
Canal in breach of the cease-fire that ended the War of Attrition.
Some strategists hold that Israel’s long-entrenched approach of self-
reliance may be changing. As early as the 1990s, Inbar observed: “We can
detect signs of shying away from self-reliance and of adopting collaborative
security measures.”22 However, these tendencies have reversed after the
Second Intifada and more recently with the failure of the international
community to stop Iran’s nuclear program. If such a trend becomes more
pronounced, Israel could choose to participate in a security basket if that is
perceived as advancing its security interests. The “Helsinki Decalogue,” the
ten principles that were set by the “Declaration on Principles Guiding
Relations between Participating States” in the 1975 Final Act, largely con-
forms with the set of norms that Israel hopes should govern its future
security environment (but that it does not deem possible). In particular,
Israel may find the prohibition of the use of force appealing, as in its mind,
the Jewish state is under the constant threat of attack by its neighbors.
Indeed, Israel’s Prime Minister stated the following in 1996: “The first
lesson the Middle East can learn from the Helsinki Process is that diplo-
macy must be based on agreed fundamental norms. The most important of
these is the absolute commitment of all parties to refrain from the threat or
use of force in the resolution of political differences.”23 This principle may
also appeal to Israel today in the Palestinian context. Even more than in
1996, Israel’s current leadership is cautious in its talks with the moderate
PLO, in part due to the shadow of continuing violence by Hamas looming
over the negotiation table. Indeed, in his 1996 speech, Prime Minister
Netanyahu stated that “a peace process cannot be successful if violence,
incitement to violence, and provocations leading to violence hover over the
negotiating table.”24
Two other aspects of the “Decalogue” might be relevant to an Israeli deci-
sion whether to participate in a Helsinki-like process. First, the 1975 docu-
ment used the term “frontiers” rather than “borders.” Given the disputes
surrounding Israel’s borders to the east and north, Jerusalem might prefer the
open-ended term “frontier” over the term “border.” Second, the “Decalogue”
commits its signatories to adhere to international law. Here, with recent
Israeli concerns over the use of international law tools against its interests
(such as the Goldstone Report and fears of Palestinian legal action against
Israel in the International Criminal Court), Jerusalem might prefer more
moderate language to be used instead.
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98 Ehud Eiran
Finally, as Levite and Landau observed at the height of the Peace Process
in the 1990s, effective confidence-building measures, such as those advanced
in the security basket of the Helsinki Process, might help the government to
“solidify the Israeli public’s confidence in and active support for its govern-
ment choices in favor of peace.”25 The latter benefit, however, will be available
only if the Israeli elite supports the process (and is not forced to join) and if
there is progress in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Regional realities, such
as instability in Syria and Egypt, and current hard-line preferences of the
Israeli public and leadership indicate that at least for now, a Helsinki-like
process can only produce limited internal political benefits. Moreover, Israeli
public opinion’s move to the right26 may pose a challenge to Israeli partici-
pation in a Helsinki-like process if it is perceived as compromising Israeli
security interests. It will take a significant leadership effort, especially
from the right-wing government that is now (2014) in power, to frame such a
process as advancing Israeli interests.
With the lack of any “security basket”-type process in the Middle East
since the 1990s, Israel’s specific response will likely be similar in its policy to
its response toward the ACRS process adopted in the 1990s, which reflected a
realist approach. Specifically, Israel held then that confidence-building mea-
sures and arms control are directly tied to, and conditioned upon, progress in
the Peace Process. Israel also held that any limitation on its military assets (in
the broader arms control process or in any specific CBMs) should be endured
only if accompanied by a significant decrease in the conventional and non-
conventional threats it faced. In addition, Israel saw the need for all limita-
tions to include effective measures for verification and to offer a tangible
remedy to possible military advantages that any party could achieve by
unilaterally withdrawing from the regional agreements.27 Israel’s concern
over the Iranian nuclear program over the last decade has further reinforced
Jerusalem’s belief in the necessity of these measures.
In any future discussion on a security basket, Israel can be expected to raise
the new types of threats that have evolved since the approach described above
was developed in the 1990s. The echoes of Helsinki in ACRS in the 1990s
included a focus on instability between bordering states that could mobilize
conventional forces against each other. However, since then, Israel’s main
concern shifted toward a nonconventional weapon potentially under devel-
opment in Iran, a country 1,500 kilometers away. In any future scenario with
Iran – an armed confrontation, a Western-brokered agreement, or acceptance
of Iranian nuclear weapons – Israel’s security interests would benefit from a
regional security discussion such as the one that emerged out of the Helsinki
Process.
Israel has also been concerned about the threat posed by non-state actors,
most notably Hezbollah, Hamas, and elements of the Global Jihad move-
ment. Indeed, all its armed confrontations over the past decade were with
non-state actors. More recently, there has been growing concern in Israel
about the ongoing civil war in Syria, what may follow it, and the fate of
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Syria’s chemical weapons, as well as the instability in Egypt and Libya fol-
lowing the Arab Uprisings. A particular set of concerns relates to Egypt’s
inability to act effectively in Sinai: Israel has already suffered from numerous
attacks from Sinai into its territory28 and experienced cuts in the gas supply
originating from Sinai.29 These types of new threats do create new incentives
for regional security cooperation, even though they might not fit into the
traditional Helsinki-like model.
Economic basket
Like the Zionist vision of full Israeli integration into the region, economic
cooperation between Israel and other regional actors has long been desired,
but generally unattainable. Indeed, over the years, Zionist, and later Israeli,
leaders highlighted the possible contribution that a more economically
advanced pre-state Jewish political entity (the Yeshuv), and later Israel, could
bring to the region. Strategically, Israel was also hoping that the value it
brings to the region would ameliorate the hostility toward it. The two
most recent iterations of this long-held vision – Shimon Peres’ New Middle
East vision (1990s) and Benjamin Netanyahu’s economic peace with the
Palestinians (2000s) – have not produced the desired outcome. The former left
an institutional legacy, the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) between Israel
and Jordan, and Israel and Egypt, which include some limited cooperation.
However, unlike the Soviet Union’s precarious situation at the time of the
Helsinki Process, Israel’s economy is doing well and can generally continue on
the same trajectory despite the currently low level of economic cooperation
with the Arab world. Still, if a future Helsinki-like process offers the prospect
of economic cooperation, Jerusalem can be expected to embrace it based on
its political value. Being the most advanced economy in the region, Israel’s
business sector will also likely support regional engagement, as it did in the
1990s, due to the expected economic benefits.
Human rights basket

Elements in Israel’s political elite had long advocated a regional human rights
effort. Former Likud Minister, and now Chair of the Executive of the Jewish
Agency for Israel, Natan Sharansky, for example, stated the following in 2003:
Just as Helsinki helped liberate hundreds of millions of people and defeat

an evil empire that threatened the democratic world, the same approach
today can transform the Middle East from a region awash in terror and
tyranny into a place that provides freedom and opportunity to its own
people, as well as peace and security for the rest of the world.30
Yet, the majority of Israel’s current political elite is less supportive of uni-
versal application of human rights norms. Jerusalem is concerned that though
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100 Ehud Eiran
these norms mean well, they could in fact be used as a political tool against,
among others, Israel as part of a broader “lawfare” effort to delegitimize the
Jewish state.31 Israelis, for example, were quick to point out the fact that Syria
and Libya were important members of the UN’s human rights council.
Therefore, unless preceded by a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
more than ever before, official Israel – as opposed to its thriving civil society
organizations – might be suspicious of a human rights basket.
Conclusion
Israel has expressed interest in the Helsinki Process in Europe since its
early days. Indeed, its comments and contributions to the Process are
recognized in the 1975 Final Act. Israel has been a Mediterranean Partner
for Cooperation of the CSCE, and later the OSCE, for many years, and its
representatives to numerous meetings have highlighted Israel’s support for
it. Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Netanyahu (in his first term in
the 1990s), have declared their support for a similar process in the region.
In the 1990s, Israel participated in the multilateral regional talks that were
part of the Madrid Process. This Helsinki-inspired process did not culmi-
nate in a vision document, such as the Helsinki Final Act, but did include
five – rather than three – baskets. A Helsinki-like process could advance
Israeli strategic interests. First, it would be a step toward its integration
into the region – a traditional Zionist goal. Second, if done properly, such
a process could help Israel reduce the uncertainty and diminish the poli-
tical and economic costs associated with its current exclusive self-reliance.
Third, such a process could help Israel deal with immediate challenges
that warrant a regional solution, such as the flow of illegal immigrants
from Africa through Sudan and Egypt. Yet, Israel is unlikely to initiate
such a process in the region. A dramatic regional event such as a conflict
(or a deal) with Iran would enhance the chances of Israeli participation.
Recent history shows that monumental events, such as the 1973 Yom
Kippur War, the 1991 (First) Gulf War, and the 1987–1991 (First) Pales-
tinian Intifada, can reshape the beliefs of Israel’s leaders and even some
aspects of its security doctrine. If Israel joins a Helsinki-like process, it is
likely to be highly sensitive to the terms of reference of the security basket.
However, with the recent regional turmoil, Israel has more incentives to
participate in a region-wide discussion in which its current security con-
cerns, such as the effects of failed states and unstable regimes in the
region, may be at least partially alleviated through a regional approach.
Similarly, Israel will be careful regarding a human rights basket, as it now
perceives some aspects of the emerging international human rights norms
as constraining its ability to protect its security act in the Palestinian
arena. This leaves the economic basket as the least complicated one from
an Israeli perspective and, consequently, the one that should be launched
first, if sequencing is an option.
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Notes
1 “Security community” is a term coined by Political Scientist Karl Deutch in the late
1950s. In its initial formulation, it referred to a regional group of states that no
longer used violence to resolve their conflicts. See Griffiths, Fifty Key Thinkers, 179.
2 Genscher, “Foreword.”
3 The text of the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement, signed on January 3, 1919, can be
found at http://tinyurl.com/yl42q6s.
4 Jabotinsky, “On the Iron Wall”; Tevet, “Ben Gurion and the Arab Question.”
5 Ben-Gurion, Military and Security, 244.
6 Quoted in Margalit, I Saw Them, 308.
7 Even there, it was a Norwegian think tank, the Fafo Research Foundation, that
began the process, joined first by an Israeli think tank, the Economic Cooperation
Foundation (ECF), and only later by the Israeli government.
8 Both Albania and Andorra did not attend the initial phase of the Helsinki Process
on account of their isolationist foreign policies, but their absence from the Process
was of relatively little significance. Both joined the OSCE in the 1990s.
10 Alexander and Bogdanor, The Jewish Divide over Israel, 36.
12 Syria and Lebanon preferred not to participate then, and Iran, Iraq, and Libya
were not invited.
13 The Arab position, on the other hand, preferred to view peace accords as adher-
ence to international norms, especially when referring to agreements that included
an Israeli withdrawal from areas Israel gained during wars.
14 Levite and Landau, “Confidence- and Security-Building Measures,” 161.
15 Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 9.
16 Shavit, “What Israel is Doing Wrong.”
17 Horowitz, “Change and Continuity,” 4.
18 Horowitz, The Israeli Approach to National Security, 6–8.
19 Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 9.
20 Cohen, Eisenstadt, and Bacevich, “Knives, Tanks, and Missiles,” 20.
21 Steinberg, “Regional Security Frameworks,” 190.
22 Inbar, “Israeli National Security,” 81.
24 Ibid.
25 Levite and Landau, “Confidence- and Security-Building Measures,” 158.
26 With one exception in 2006, the right-wing Likud Party (or a Likud candidate) won every
election since 2001. Kadima, the 2006 exception, was itself a break-away party from the
Likud, and its candidate, Ehud Olmert, was a Likud leader until late 2005. The composi-
tion of the 15th to the 19th Knesset (i.e. the 29th to the 33rd Government of Israel) can be
seen at http://www.knesset.gov.il/govt/heb/GovtByNumber.asp?govt=0.
27 Steinberg, “Regional Security Frameworks,” 193.
28 On August 18, 2011, for example, a group that crossed over from Egypt attacked
two busses in Israel, killing eight Israelis and wounding a few dozen. See Kershner
and Kirkpatrick, “Attacks Near Israeli Resort.”
29 Stuart, “Egyptian Gas Pipeline to Israel.”
30 Sharansky, “Testimony,” 14.
31 Sabel, “Manipulating International Law.”
Bibliography
Alexander, Edward and Paul Bogdanor (eds). The Jewish Divide over Israel: Accusers
and Defenders. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006.
WWW.EBOOK777.COM
102 Ehud Eiran
Ben-Gurion, David. Military and Security. (Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Ma’archot, 1955.
Cohen, Eliot, Michael Eisenstadt, and Andrew Bacevich. Knives, Tanks, and Missiles:
Israel’s Security Revolution. Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, 1998.
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich. “Foreword.” In Perspectives for a “European House” within
the Framework of the CSCE-Process. Berlin: Aspen Institute, 1989: 2–3.
Griffiths, Martin. Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations. London: Routledge,
1999.
Horowitz, Dan. The Israeli Approach to National Security: Constant and Variable in
Israeli Strategic Thought. Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1973.
——. “Change and Continuity in Israel’s Security Perception.” Policy Paper 4. Jerusalem:
Leonard Davis Institute of International Relations, 1982.
Inbar, Efraim. “Israeli National Security, 1973–1996.” The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 558, (1998).
Jabotinsky, Zeev. On the Iron Wall. (Hebrew). Betar, 2013 [1923]. Available at: http://
betar.org.il/d4/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=15&Itemid=38.
Kershner, Isabel and David D. Kirkpatrick. “Attacks Near Israeli Resort Heighten
Tensions With Egypt and Gaza.” New York Times, August 18, 2011. Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/19/world/middleeast/19israel.html.
Levite, Ariel. Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine. Boulder: Westview
Press, 1990.
Levite, Ariel and Emily B. Landau. “Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in
the Middle East.” In Regional Security in the Middle East: Past, Present, and
Future, edited by Zeev Maoz. London: Frank Cass, 1997: 143–171.
Maoz, Zeev. Defending the Holy Land: Critical Analysis of Israel’s Security and For-
eign Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009.
Margalit, Dan. I Saw Them. Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan, 1997.
Netanyahu, Benjamin. “Address to the Conference of the Organization on Security
and Cooperation in Europe.” Speech. Lisbon, December 3, 1996. Available at:
http://tinyurl.com/llg4uvh.
Sabel, Robbie. “Manipulating International Law as Part of ‘Anti-Israel’ Lawfare.” The
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs 13.6 (2013).
Sharansky, Natan. “Testimony in Front of the Commission on the Security and
Cooperation in Europe.” 108th Congress. Speech. Washington, D.C.: US Congress,
June 15, 2003.
Shavit, Ari. “Zvi Hauser Tells Haaretz What Israel is Doing Wrong.” Haaretz, August
16, 2013. Available at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/.premium-1.541889.
Steinberg, Gerald. “Regional Security Frameworks in the Middle East: A Realist
Approach.” In Israel’s Security Web: Core Issues of Israel’s National Security in Its
Sixth Decade, edited by Hagai Golan. (Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense
Press, 2001: 178–201.
Stuart, Hunter. “Egyptian Gas Pipeline to Israel and Jordan Bombed by Militants in
Sinai.” Huffington Post, July 7, 2013. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/07/07/egyptian-gas-pipeline-_n_3557896.html.
Tevet, Shabtai. “Ben-Gurion and the Arab Question.” Kathedra 43 (1987): 52–68.
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5 Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free

Zone in the Middle East
A political view from Riyadh
HRH Prince Turki Al-Faisal of Saudi
Arabia and Awadh Al-Badi
Introduction
Nuclear weapons are the only weapons ever invented that have the capacity to
wholly destroy life on this planet, and the arsenals we now possess are able to do
so many times over. The problem with nuclear weapons is at least equal to that of
climate change in terms of gravity – and much more immediate in its potential
impact. So long as any state has nuclear weapons, others will want them. So long
as such weapons remain, it defies credibility that they will not one day be used –
by accident, miscalculation, or design. And any such use would be catastrophic.
This statement in the report of the International Commission on Nuclear

Nonproliferation and Disarmament1 delegitimizes nuclear weapons and
mounts a case for their abolition. It fits well with the advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice, which found in 1996 that “the threat or use of
nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of
humanitarian law.”2 There is no other threat to international peace and
security that is more pressing than the proliferation of nuclear weapons and
their possible use: this threat, if not matched by the concerted determination
of the international community to eliminate it, will put international peace
and security far out of reach. Ridding the world of nuclear weapons, and
creating international consensus for the immediate need to progress toward
this noble goal, must be at the top of the agenda of all states in the world for
the sake of humanity. However, it is fair to say that while the world is
increasingly conscious of this goal, it unfortunately remains elusive, and
efforts to realize such a goal remain inadequate.
An old Arab proverb (‫ ) َﻣﺎ ﻻ ُﻳ ْﺪ َﺭ ُﻙ ُﻛﻠّ ُﻪ ﻻ ُﻳ ْﺘ َﺮ ُﻙ ُﺟﻠّ ُﻪ‬says that not being able to
achieve an objective as a whole should not discourage one from accomplish-
ing as large a part of it as possible, akin to the English expression that perfect
should not be the enemy of good. It seems that the international community
could take a leaf out of this book when tackling the issue of nuclear non-
proliferation. Establishing regional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs)
seemed like a logical and essential step toward ridding the world of this exis-
tential threat.
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104 HRH Prince Turki Al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia and Awadh Al-Badi
UN General Assembly Resolution 3263, which called for the creation of
such a zone in the Middle East as “one of the measures which can contribute
most effectively to halting the proliferation of those instruments of mass
destruction and to promoting progress toward nuclear disarmament, with the
goal of total destruction of all nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.”3
No region in the world is in greater need of becoming such a zone than the
conflict-ridden Middle East, particularly in these times of its drastic transfor-
mation, with Israel being a de facto nuclear weapon state and Iran seemingly
progressing toward becoming one. This chapter aims to address the issue of
establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the
Middle East in light of the current political changes in the region and to dis-
cuss the approach to realizing this objective.
Too much ado about nothing: The diplomacy of NWFZs

and WMDFZs in the Middle East
The proposal of Egypt and Iran to create a NWFZ in the Middle East and its
approval on December 9, 1974 by UN General Assembly Resolution 3263
commenced a protracted diplomatic process that, so far, has been fruitless,
failing to realize these objectives of nonproliferation and disarmament, or
even bring that state of affairs any closer. This resolution, which endorses the
idea of the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East, states the following:
… in order to advance the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the

region of the Middle East, it is indispensable that all parties concerned in
the area proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on
a reciprocal basis, from producing, testing, obtaining, acquiring, or in any
other way possessing nuclear weapons; calls upon the parties concerned
in the area to accede to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) expresses the hope that all states, in particular the
nuclear-weapon states (NWS), will lend their full cooperation for the
effective realization of the aims of the present resolution.4
UN General Assembly Resolution 3474, adopted in 1975, added provisions

recommending that regional parties should also refrain from seeking nuclear
explosive devices and not permit the stationing of nuclear weapons in their
respective territories pending the establishment of such a zone, encouraging
them to refrain from any action that could jeopardize the objective of estab-
lishing a NWFZ in the long term.5
These two resolutions could have been the foundation for a successful dip-
lomatic process, given the level of support they had received from nuclear-
weapon states and the welcoming attitude of all countries in the region
(except Israel, which abstained from voting on them). Furthermore, what
could have made it easier at the time was that all states in the region did not
possess the nuclear know-how and did not have the means or the will to
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Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East 105
develop nuclear programs. However, Israel’s policy of nuclear opacity, and its
insistence that the Arab-Israeli conflict must be fully settled before a regional
arms control agreement can be reached, has been a roadblock to progress on
this issue from the start. Indeed, one of the prevailing views in Saudi Arabia
is that Israel’s accepting and implementing UN Security Council Resolution
242 could have led to a peace agreement earlier and helped in creating a
NWFZ in the Middle East at its initiation.
The General Assembly of the United Nations has continued to adopt these
resolutions annually, with some modifications that respond to political and
security developments that arise in the region. Indeed, significant changes in
this conflict-torn region, brought about by the eight-year war between Iraq
and Iran (1980–1988); the use of chemical weapons in this war; the suspicions
surrounding the Iraqi nuclear program; and the concerns about biological and
chemical weapons programs in the region have ultimately led the former
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to call for the establishment of a Weapon
of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East in April 1990.
The Gulf War of the 1990s affirmed the need to create a WMDFZ in the
region, with a notable shift in the objective from a NWFZ to a WMDFZ, as
reflected in United Nations Resolutions at both the General Assembly
(Resolution 4630) and Security Council (Resolution 687) level. Addressing
the issue is still a permanent item on the agenda of the annual sessions of UN
General Assembly.
In terms of efforts on the regional level, a multilateral Arms Control and
Regional Security (ACRS) working group was formed following the Madrid
Peace Conference of 1991. It included fourteen Middle East countries and
worked for almost five years, negotiating initial agreements on actual coop-
eration measures for multilateral security and drafting up a series of con-
fidence-building measures (CBMs). However, these CBMs were never
implemented, and lacking trust, the process collapsed upon attempts to link
the progress on any of the ACRS issues to the bilateral peace negotiation
tracks, with contentions over the Israeli refusal to sign on to the NPT ulti-
mately leading to the collapse of the Madrid Peace Process. With the break-
down of the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian peace process, all other multilateral
working groups on water, refugees, environment, and economic development,
which were modeled after the Helsinki Process, have also stopped.
Nevertheless, the experience of this working group on negotiating the issues
of arms control and regional security can offer valuable lessons for future
efforts. Namely, the great interconnectivity of a multitude of security issues in
the Middle East means that without tackling the very roots of insecurity and
instability, no confidence can be built and no progress can be made. Again, it
is at this foundational level that Israel’s position has become an impediment
to progress, effectively asking every other country in the region to abide by
international treaties, rules, and regimes while refusing to do so itself. From
the Saudi Arabian perspective, Israel joining the NPT is imperative for any
future confidence-building measures to work. While the Helsinki Process
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would always be seen as an important experience and an inspiring intellectual
enterprise, the goal of such a process in the Middle East would be to bring the
Arab countries and Israel together – an objective that cannot be achieved
without a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
After the failure of ACRS, regional arms control and disarmament efforts
continued through the NPT review conferences. The 1995 NPT Review and
Extension Conference adopted a resolution recognizing the special status of
the Middle East as a region and calling for the establishment of a regional
WMDFZ; the accession to the NPT by states in the region that have not yet
done so; and the placement of all nuclear facilities in the region under the full
scope of IAEA safeguards. The 2000 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed the
1995 resolution, and in the 2010 Review Conference, a WMDFZ in the
Middle East became the dominant issue of the discussions. As a practical step
toward realizing this objective, a decision was made to convene a conference
in 2012 for the states of the region in order address the question of a regional
zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction,
with the support of the sponsors of the 1995 resolution (the United States,
Russia, and the United Kingdom). In October 2011, the Finnish Under-
secretary of State, Ambassador Jaakko Laajava, was appointed to be the
facilitator for this conference, which was to be hosted by Finland. Prepara-
tions for this conference went ahead, but the United States had put a sig-
nificant dampener on these efforts, insisting that without consensus on how to
proceed on several key issues at hand, holding the conference would be a
waste of time. This and other factors have ultimately led to the conference
being postponed, with this failure becoming the latest show of the limits of
traditional diplomacy. Nevertheless, the international community must con-
tinue to look for ways of dealing with the pressing threat of nuclear weapons.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and nuclear power

It is the right of all nations to have nuclear programs for peaceful uses, and
Israel and Iran would be welcome to exercise this right if their programs were
transparent and under the supervision of the IAEA – as it is the case with
other countries of the region. All of the GCC countries are members of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and have agreed to set up peaceful, civilian-
run programs of developing nuclear energy and to share their know-how in
this realm. Saudi Arabia has signed memorandae of understanding with several
countries and has publicly announced its intentions to designate 20 billion
dollars worth of contracts for reactors over the next 20 years. The Kingdom
will concentrate on building human capacity along with the construction pro-
gram, viewing nuclear energy as an alternative source for its domestic elec-
tricity and desalination plants. Nuclear energy development will allow Saudi
Arabia to minimize its consumption of fossil fuels, enabling it to export
more oil and gas instead of burning them in situ. The UAE has already signed
contracts with South Korea to build nuclear reactors, with contracts worth
20 billion dollars over the next 10 years, but other GCC countries have not yet
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announced specific programs. All of these dealings are transparent and abide
by all international treaties, rules, and safeguards.
Time to act: Considering alternatives

As the dynamic political landscape in the Middle East continues to shift, it is
important to recognize that people in the region, not dissimilar to people in
the rest of the world, are looking for peace and security. Being under constant
threat has led them to view their future prospects as bleak and has tended to
radicalize them. The failure of regional leaders and the international com-
munity during the last four decades to address the region’s pressing issues and
their ignoring the aspirations of their people to live normal lives with dignity
and respect have produced an angry and frustrated generation, resulting in
the continuous turmoil that we are witnessing in the Arab world today. The
causes behind the changes taking place in the region are multiple, and if they
are not addressed in a peaceful and secure regional environment, the future
prospects of peace – for the region and the world – will become increasingly
bleak. Therefore, the timeframe for international diplomacy to search for an
elusive overarching objective has lapsed, and now the focus should be on the
rudimentary threats to peace and security in the region.
The Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and the other countries of the Gulf
Cooperation Council, have publicly embraced the efforts to establish a
WMDFZ in the Middle East, making it their official nuclear nonproliferation
and disarmament policy. However, Israel has not made any public commitment
in support of the Zone, despite its alleged endorsement of the idea. Similarly,
Iran, while paying lip service to the WMDFZ concept, seems more committed
to pursuing uranium enrichment and other suspicious activities. The doubts
these activities have raised about Iran’s commitment to the Zone’s objective
may compel other countries in the region to pursue policies that could poten-
tially lead to dramatic consequences. Indeed, the best way toward peace in the
region seems to be for all nations – but most importantly Iran and Israel – to
support the establishment of a WMDFZ. Ironically, the Iranian government
was one of the initiators and staunch supporters of this concept, having spon-
sored the resolution that called for the establishment of the Zone jointly with
Egypt in 1974. Indeed, from the early 1970s throughout the 1980s, Iran fre-
quently joined the efforts of other nations, working through the United Nations
system to gain support for what was called a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.
And yet, despite all these efforts, the Middle East today is anything but free
of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Instead, it is the world’s most militarized
region, largely due to the many recent and ongoing conflicts therein. While
soldiers, tanks, and planes have been growing in number in the area, the Iraq-
Iran War of the 1980s and the Gulf War of the 1990s have increased the
danger of the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the region as
well as of the threats associated with the spread of ballistic missiles capable of
carrying them. States seek WMDs for various reasons, including deterrence;
arms races with neighbors; the ability to attack or project the ability to attack;
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and ability to spare the high costs of conventional weapons. The first nation
in the region to acquire nuclear capability was Israel, and the region has
continued on a dangerous downward spiral, culminating today in suspicions
about Iran developing a nuclear arsenal of its own.
Saudi Arabia firmly believes that it is in every nation’s interest, including
Israel’s and Iran’s, not to possess nuclear weapons. Through various initia-
tives, the Kingdom has tried to convey to Iran that, whilst it is their, and any
other nation’s, right to develop a civilian nuclear program, as Saudi Arabia
has done, trying to extend such a program into the nuclear weapons realm is
a dead-end and that wiser choices would result in greater utility for all. The
Kingdom remains convinced that a regional Weapons of Mass Destruction-
Free Zone is the best way to get Iran and Israel to give up nuclear weapons.
Barring the current Iranian support for a WMDFZ, the IAEA reports of
growing Iranian nuclear capabilities are disturbing. But dealing with this issue
by military strikes would be entirely counterproductive and would be seen by
the people of the region as proof of the double standards of American and
European policies toward the region. Indeed, it is important to remember the
nonmilitary policy alternatives, yet unexplored, that could produce the
desired result without the unwanted consequences.
The same thing can be said about Israel’s nuclear arsenal, which it refuses
to acknowledge: it continues to stand in the way of a regional peace agree-
ment that could otherwise assuage its threat perceptions and be in its national
security interests. In addition, Israel’s unwillingness to cease its unlawful
colonization and its continual refusal to grant the Palestinians their own
homeland are at the core of continuing Arab-Israeli animosity. There have
been ample proposals for peace, many of them completely rational and fair,
with the Arab Peace Initiative – originally outlined by Jordan’s King Abdul-
lah in 2002 – being seemingly the only viable one today. It calls for an Israeli
withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a viable and con-
tiguous Palestine, with its capital in East Jerusalem, proposing to settle the
issue of refugees through mutual agreement. If Israel could be encouraged to
take these necessary steps toward peace and justice, a subsequent peace
agreement could lay the groundwork for a regional security framework,
taking away the need for Israel’s arsenal of WMDs.
Alas, the limited success of the international community in stemming
nuclear proliferation so far has actually given an incentive for countries in the
region to try and acquire these weapons. When Pakistan and India exploded
their bombs, both of them were admonished and punished with sanctions;
however, before long both countries were not only relieved of these sanctions,
but also presented with lucrative nuclear deals that enhanced their capabilities
rather than curtail them. India has garnered American, French, and Russian
support in building nuclear reactors and acquiring the relevant technical
know-how, and Pakistan continues to receive support from China. An addi-
tional case in North Korea shows a country that was sanctioned before it
exploded its nuclear devices and that subsequently engaged in six-party
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negotiations, meeting with relative success in getting the United States to lift
sanctions and deliver it various forms of aid.
Israel continues to receive Western technical support, and its technology
companies are fully integrated with US and European commercial and
defense contractors, granting Israel substantial access to the latest technolo-
gies. For instance, Germany has sold Israel submarines capable of carrying
nuclear-armed missiles, and American technologies have become so pervasive
throughout the Israeli missile development sector that it has become difficult
to tell them apart. Furthermore, when it comes to Israel’s illegal acquisitions of
American and European nuclear know-how, the US firm MILCO International
Inc.’s shipping 800 krytron nuclear triggers to the Israeli Ministry of Defense in
the 1980s, despite repeatedly being refused an export license, is only the tip of
the iceberg. When it comes to biological weapons and chemical weapons, the
story is even more alarming, as Israel’s nefariousness is completely under the
radar. In this context, it is hardly surprising to see Iran undertaking suspicious
and disturbing steps to realize its own nuclear ambitions.
Conclusion
The Middle East is beset by a number of great challenges, but in the end,
these challenges can be met by the very principles that recognize the reality of
Israel’s nuclear weapons and allow the IAEA to investigate the true nature of
Iran’s nuclear program. In order to advance the efforts to convene a con-
ference in Helsinki and foster peace and security in the region, the interna-
tional community, represented by the UN Security Council, should issue a
Declaration of Intent that would:
1. Establish a WMDFZ in the Middle East;

2. State that all activities by member states deemed to be contributing to
nuclear weapons development should cease immediately and be put under
IAEA inspections;
3. Extend a nuclear security umbrella by the permanent members of the
Security Council for states that join the WMDFZ;
4. Reward these states with economic and technical support to develop
peaceful uses of nuclear power;
5. Obtain a pledge from the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council that countries which refuse to join the WMDFZ and which are
seen to be developing weapons of mass destruction will face not only eco-
nomic and political sanctions, but military action as well;
6. Establish a regional security forum, open to all states of the region, with
the authority to convene discussions on a broad range of regional security
issues, including the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolu-
tions 242 and 338, consideration of the Arab Peace Initiative, as well as
arms control and disarmament extending to both conventional and non-
conventional arsenals.
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Such a declaration would not immediately establish the WMDFZ: a period of
five to ten years should be agreed to by all members for the Zone to come
into force, so that they could resolve their disagreements that could otherwise
impede the functioning of the Zone. This Declaration of Intent would hope-
fully be sufficient to incentivize Israel to accept the hand of peace, which has
been extended to it since 2002 through the Arab Peace Initiative. Iran would
hopefully be equally incentivized to come clean on its secretive and suspicious
nuclear program. On the other hand, failure to create a WMDFZ in the
Middle East might drive more countries in the area to engage in activities
that would ultimately contribute to nuclear proliferation.
The developments in the Syrian conflict, which have involved the use of
chemical weapons, have underscored the importance of moving as rapidly as
possible to rid the region of weapons of mass destruction. They have also
shown that when the international community can muster the will and
resolve, significant progress can be achieved on this matter. The Syrian gov-
ernment, under the threat of the use of force, has submitted without any pre-
conditions to international demands to destroy its arsenal of chemical
weapons, indicating the viability of a proposed plan to create a Middle East
Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone.
Notes
1 In 2008, I was privileged to be a member of the International Commission on
Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament; it was established by Australia and
Japan to stimulate debate and build momentum for nuclear nonproliferation and
disarmament in the lead-up to the NPT Review Conference for International Peace
and Security that was held in 2010 in New York. My distinguished colleagues and I
worked for over one year tackling all aspects of this issue and consulted experts
from all over the world. We worked with representatives of governments, the global
nuclear power industry, nongovernmental organizations devoted to the cause of
disarmament, and those responsible for advancing and monitoring nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament. We concluded our mission by launching our report
in Tokyo in December 2009 entitled “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical
Agenda for Global Policymakers.” The report’s twenty-point action statement, “A
New International Consensus on Action for Disarmament,” was circulated to the
NPT Review Conference as a working paper from the Commission. The report is
available at http://tinyurl.com/n8grla3.
2 “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Advisory Opinion. Interna-
tional Court of Justice Reports, 1996. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/95/7495.pdf.
3 Resolution 3263 of the UN General Assembly of December 9, 1974. Available at:
http://tinyurl.com/mjjxltu.
4 Ibid.
5 See Resolution 3474 of the UN General Assembly of 1975. Available at: http://
tinyurl.com/kngbrkn.
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6 Domestic politics in Iran and a future

regional process
Ariane M. Tabatabai
Establishing dialogue among key regional actors in the Middle East is an

intricate affair due to the complex realities of domestic politics and regional
dynamics that each state is facing. Iran certainly contributes to this com-
plexity due to its culture and history, as well as the challenges associated with
its current domestic politics and the relations it has with its neighbors. This
chapter will examine the challenges and opportunities that arise from Iran’s
internal dichotomy and attempt to outline Iran’s part in a future regional
security process by looking at some of the key aspects of the Helsinki Process,
were it to be adapted for the Middle East.
The first section discusses Iran’s internal dichotomy, which stems from two
ideological trends: the idea of Persian exceptionalism and nationalism on the one
hand, and the idea of Iran as part of the Muslim community on the other. The
second section focuses on the greatest challenge as seen from an Iranian perspec-
tive: shaping a security process around two regional powers, Iran and Israel, with
the former not recognizing Israel as a legitimate and sovereign state and the latter
considering Iran as the greatest threat to its existence since its creation. The third
section looks at the challenges and opportunities that the “security basket” model
of the Helsinki Accords could present in the Middle East. Chiefly, this section
examines the Iranian nuclear program and Israel’s presumed nuclear arsenal, as
well as Tehran’s relations with other key regional players. Specifically, it looks at the
possibility of expanding the negotiation framework through economic cooperation
incentives as a way of facilitating compromise on security issues while providing
“give and take” options on more sensitive issues, such as security and human rights.
The fourth section is an attempt to assess the role of key non-regional players and
the possibility of incorporating an economic basket into a regional process, espe-
cially in light of the sanctions regime that Iran is currently under. The fifth section
surveys the challenges and benefits of a Helsinki-like process in the region for the
promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Iran.
Iran’s internal dichotomy

Iran prides itself with being the successor of the Persian Empire, distinguish-
ing itself by its dominant Persian culture and language, as well as the sect of
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112 Ariane M. Tabatabai
Islam it has adopted as the official state religion, Shiism. At the same time,
the Islamic Revolution of 1979 marked the beginning of a process of Islami-
zation as a reaction to several decades of Iranization, de-Islamization, and
modernization under the Pahlavi dynasty.
Reza Shah, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, and his son and successor,
Mohammad Reza Shah, both wanted to secularize Iran and go back to the
essence of Iranian national identity while modernizing the country’s institu-
tions. On the other hand, the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, wanted to distance himself from Iranian nationalism
and its Pagan and Zoroastrian heritage while Islamizing the country’s laws
and institutions and “demodernizing” it. Under the rule of Khomeini and his
successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Islamic nature of the regime has
taken precedence over its nationalistic, Iranian nature, which has led to com-
plex domestic and regional dynamics. Domestically, this has created tensions
between those who wish to maintain Persian exceptionalism and value
Iranian identity, and those who wish to blend in with the rest of the ummah,
or Muslim community.
While the Islamic Republic has tried to distinguish itself from the Shah’s
rule, it has continuously attempted to maintain Iran’s regional leadership
and exercise influence, in both its immediate neighborhood and beyond.
Attempts to extend regional leadership and exercise influence have been part
of efforts to export the ideals of the Revolution, as well as visibly demon-
strate to publics at home and abroad that Iran is not as isolated as the West
claims. This is best illustrated by the country’s support of the Syrian ruler
Bashar al-Assad in spite of allegations of chemical weapons use against
civilians; its attempts to exert political, military, and economic influence
in Iraq; and its funding of violent groups abroad, such as Hamas and
Hezbollah. The regional players Tehran has associated itself with, as well as
the idea of Islam as a key defining component in Iranian national identity
(and subsequently, of the country’s foreign policy) are drastically different
from the Shah’s vision of his country and its relationship with the region
and the world.
To a great extent, the Iranian narrative regarding its controversial nuclear
program is also shaped around this intricate relationship between Persian
“exceptionalism” and belonging to the Islamic community. Much of the dis-
course surrounding the country’s nuclear program has been emphasizing the
fact that any progress made by Iran is the fruit of the Iranian nation’s labor
and an element of national pride. Manifestation of these sentiments lies in the
institution of April 9 as National Nuclear Technology Day in 2006 and the
incorporation of the atomic symbol on the 50,000 Rial bill a year later
alongside a quote attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, which reads as fol-
lows: “If the science exists in this constellation, men from Persia will reach
it.” Iran’s technological achievements have also been presented as a source of
pride, and a symbol of defiance of the West, for the Muslim community as a
whole. What is more, Tehran offered to collaborate with the rest of the
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Domestic politics in Iran and a future regional process 113
ummah and share its nuclear achievements with its Muslim brothers across
the globe. In the words of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei:
Whatever power the Islamic Republic obtains, whether it is scientific,

technological, or social, this power belongs to the world of Islam [ … ]
Nuclear energy, which for the Iranian nation is a national achievement
and a source of pride, is also a source of pride for the world of Islam.
This strength is their [the rest of the Muslim community’s] strength.1
State sovereignty: The challenge of Israeli-Iranian relations

The Helsinki Process succeeded in bringing together two blocs with opposing
values, differing views on governance, and divergent stances on most subjects
around a key area of agreement as the basis for collective engagement in a
regional security process. This idea is encompassed in Article 1(a)(I) of the
Final Act of the Helsinki Accords (1975):
The participating states will respect each other’s sovereign equality

and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed
by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every state to jur-
idical equality, to territorial integrity, and to freedom and political
independence.2
Since the 1979 Revolution, Iran has consistently viewed Israel as its greatest
foe and rival in the region, and much of the “enemy” narrative developed by
the country’s leadership revolves around the Jewish state. While the narrative
of confronting an external enemy has been of great importance in how the
Islamic Republic defines itself,3 overcoming the contentious issue of recog-
nizing Israel’s right to exist4 is the key prerequisite for initiating a Helsinki-
like process in the Middle East.
Hence, the regime sees its existence as inherently linked to the existence of
an “enemy,” and Israel has fulfilled that role for the past thirty-five years.
This animosity toward Israel dates back to the pre-Islamic Revolution era as
one of the key areas of divergence between the founder of the Islamic
Republic and the Shah, who had cordial relations with the Jewish state. The
Shah never officially recognized the State of Israel, and Iran voted against of
such recognition at the United Nations General Assembly. Yet, relations
between the two countries were amicable, and they cooperated in many areas,
including defense and security. Tehran’s rhetorical animosity toward the
United States is also closely related to Washington’s support for Israel. Hence,
undertaking an overt process of “normalization” with its archenemy, Israel,
would go against Tehran’s every word and deed since the conception of the
Islamic Republic. Additionally, the Islamic Republic has been using the
enemy narrative as a way to avoid addressing domestic issues: the regime has
regularly cracked down on the opposition – using the pretext that an
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alternative view, opposing that of the regime, will empower the enemy – while
attempting to rally the Iranian people around the flag.
Nevertheless, in the face of escalating tensions as a result of the Iranian
nuclear program, Iran, like Israel, may find comfort in the implementation of a
provision similar to Article 1(a)(II) of the Helsinki Accords, which provides
that “the participating states will refrain from any acts constituting a threat of
force or direct or indirect use of force against another participating state.”5 This
would require Iran to change its political discourse, a part of which has been
shaped around denying the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Jewish
state. The regime could, however, reverse this position and still save face by
officially stating that it is up to Palestinians to make the decision that best suits
them, including the decision to accept a two-state solution. Moreover, con-
fidence-building measures (CBMs) would have to be put in place in order for
the two parties to be able to trust each other’s commitment to such an agree-
ment. Given that CBMs would play a key role in any future regional process,
and that the security basket of a Helsinki-like process traditionally incorporates
such measures, such a process would bring benefits to both parties.
But standing in the way of such benefits are various domestic factors, which
can complicate any future regional process. In his “nuclear memoirs,” Iran’s
president and former chief negotiator with the EU 3 (Germany, France, and
Great Britain), Hassan Rouhani, has highlighted four key problems with
decision-making in Iran, some of which had become entrenched as vital parts
of the Islamic Republic’s modus operandi. These challenges could impact an
Iranian decision to join a regional process. First, there is a general misconcep-
tion in the West that the highest priority, shared by all states, is the promotion
of their national interests. Hence, Iranian foreign relations and nuclear policy-
making are often viewed through the lens of national interests. However, the
Islamic Republic’s highest priority is not the preservation of the country or the
advancement of national interests, but rather the survival of the Islamic regime.
This idea was formulated by the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah
Khomeini, as maslahat-e nezam.6 According to this view, when the interests of
the regime are not in line with the interests of the nation, the former takes
precedence over the latter.7 This view is explicated by Rouhani as follows:
… in other countries, goals and values help national interests, and, in

case of contradiction, national interests are prioritized, but in an Islamic
regime, sometimes the interests linked to the belief system take pre-
cedence over national interests. However, in circumstances where [this]
would pose a threat to the very existence of the regime, we are no longer
willing to continue it. This discussion is the most important one, and as
the late Imam [Khomeini] and the Supreme Leader [Khamenei] have
stated, the preservation of the regime is the ultimate duty.8
Hence, preserving the interests of the regime outweighs all other endeavors in
the Islamic Republic, followed by the preservation and promotion of the
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ideology of the Islamic Revolution. According to this position, national
interests, which for most nations are the highest priority, come third. These
words summarize the core of the Islamic Republic’s approach to foreign
policy, nuclear policy, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. For instance, while sup-
porting Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Hezbollah, and Hamas may not be in
Iran’s national interests, the regime has found the cultivation of these relations
to be in its best interest, and so Iran continues to pursue this strategy. The
regime will only agree to recognize the State of Israel if its very existence is
called into question otherwise.
Second, the regime does not always differentiate between rhetoric and
policy. In some ways, it can be helpful for external observers to appreciate
that Iran’s articulated stance is for domestic consumption, and it does not
necessarily correspond to the actual policy that the regime intends to carry
out. To borrow Rouhani’s words, “the problem is that we use slogans exces-
sively” and this “means that collective thinking gets to the point of no
return.”9 Unsurprisingly, political rhetoric and propaganda play a greater role
in Iranian domestic politics than they do in the domestic politics of demo-
cratic societies. This stems from the very nature of authoritarian regimes,
where policy is simplified and communicated through slogans. Furthermore,
the Islamic Revolution, which, like most revolutions, was promoted with
catchy slogans, continues to employ them in an attempt to fill the policy void
and garner popular support for its position. This is especially true in the case
of Iran’s anti-Zionist rhetoric,10 which makes it extremely difficult for the
regime to reverse its position on the Jewish state.
Third, the fear of internal and external conspiracies to overthrow the Isla-
mic state would likely be exacerbated by a regional process. According to
Rouhani:
One of the other problems with the opinion of the public, as well as that
of Iranian officials, is the fretful discussions of the future of the regime.
Some of the officials appear permanently worried about strong enemies
that are busy conspiring and plotting against the Islamic regime, and they
constantly fear for its future.11
Rouhani, as a self-proclaimed defender of the Revolution and the Islamic

Republic, does not question the regime’s foundations here, as he believes these
are soluble challenges caused by “the social atmosphere created by particular
groups.”12 Viewed from outside the Islamic Republic’s framework, these
observations take on another dimension: as discussed above, they are applic-
able to the system as a whole and go hand in hand with the enemy narrative.
Fourth, change of policy is perceived as admitting a mistake in a regime
that does not acknowledge errors or leave space for them. According to
Rouhani, “sometimes prestige becomes a decisive factor in decision-making
in Iran. We think that admitting to any mistake means accepting defeat.”13
Hence, reversing a three-decade-long approach to foreign policy seems
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unlikely, especially when it comes to a vital pillar of the Islamic Republic’s
ideology, one so clearly defined by the revered founder of the Islamic regime.
One possible scenario under which the leadership could conceivably take such
a step is if the reversal of this decision became inherently linked to its survival
and if there was a way for the regime to save face and explain this departure
from one of its founding ideologies to the domestic public. Alternatively, if
such a change brings enough benefits to the regime without posing an exis-
tential threat to it, the Supreme Leader could make this decision. Further-
more, it is important to note that as long as the status quo persists and the
Islamic Republic’s power structure remains the same, only the Supreme
Leader will be in a position to make such a decision.
Issues related to security are particularly challenging when it comes to the
dynamic between Iran and Israel, which can be best described as indirect and
distrustful: the contentious nature of Iran’s nuclear program, its views of
Israel’s nuclear status, and the alleged covert operations undertaken by the
two countries against each other, ranging from cyberattacks to assassinations
and terrorism, hardly inspire confidence. Indeed, while Israel holds Iran
accountable for empowering and financing terrorist organizations that pose a
threat to its national security, Iran argues that Israel has been behind a series
of cyberattacks against it in recent years, in addition to assassinating Iranian
nuclear scientists.
Nevertheless, the trust deficit between Iran and other regional players,
including Israel, is no greater than that between Washington and Moscow at
the peak of the Cold War, which means that this ought not to preclude
the two countries from engaging in a process of détente, similar to the
one undertaken during the Helsinki Process. However, the United States and
the Soviet Union managed to maintain an open channel of communication
throughout the Cold War, and an important first step that could serve as a
confidence- and security-building measure (CSBM) would be for Tehran and
Jerusalem to at least begin communicating. While direct communication or
negotiations between the two countries may currently not be feasible, unoffi-
cial initiatives – including track 1.5 diplomacy, which involves officials, aca-
demics, and civil society representatives and which takes place in a regional
group setting – could facilitate such dialogue.
Current regional dynamics: Prospects for security and cooperation

Iran has been using the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to project power
regionally and internationally; Iran used it as leverage against the traditional
powers, using belligerent political rhetoric based on the “divide and conquer”
strategy. In the Middle East, this policy is promoted by attempting to appeal
to the Muslim world and antagonizing the United States and Israel. This
attempt to drive a wedge between the “West” and the “rest,” the so-called
first world and third world, the “arrogant imperialists” and the “oppressed,”
makes confidence-building very difficult. This challenge would be particularly
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acute in a regional process that would aim to bring together Israel – and
possibly the United States as an external supporting actor – on the one hand,
and the Muslim states, which Iran has tried to appeal to, on the other. The
ultimate challenge, however, lies with Iran’s nuclear program and Tehran’s
inability (thus far) to convince its neighbors and other regional players, espe-
cially Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC), and Egypt, of the peaceful nature of this program.14
Nevertheless, Iran’s increasingly pressing need for security also represents a
great incentive for the regime to embark on a regional process, as it could
potentially lead to mutual security arrangements. This pressing need for
security stems from domestic and foreign factors. On the one hand, the
regime is increasingly unpopular and viewed as illegitimate at home due to
the gross violations of human rights (which became more apparent after the
2009 contested presidential elections) and the impact of sanctions. Some of
this lost legitimacy seems to have been restored following Rouhani’s election;
nevertheless, if the socioeconomic climate does not improve soon, this legiti-
macy will be lost again. On the other hand, internationally, Tehran is further
isolated from the international community and threatened by a potential
Israeli attack against its nuclear facilities.
Within the realm of security, a Helsinki-like process could play a role and
incorporate solutions to the nuclear issues (nonproliferation, so far, in the
case of Iran, and disarmament for Israel). Both parties suffer from a great
lack of trust in this area, with neither willing to make any concessions with
regard to their nuclear programs. Israel views the Iranian program as a mili-
tary one, aimed at providing the Islamic Republic with nuclear weapons
which would in turn threaten the existence of the Jewish state. Tehran, equally
wary of Jerusalem’s intentions, has reiterated a number of times that it is
Israel’s nuclear arsenal that constitutes a threat to regional security.15 The
opacity surrounding Israel’s nuclear program and its consistent refusal to join
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) have been widely criticized by key
regional players, maintaining that Israel’s nuclear posture constitutes a major
obstacle to a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the
Middle East,16 as well as a threat to regional stability and security.17
Similarly, some regional states would like to see Tehran end its nuclear pro-
gram. Hence, while Iran sees the creation of a WMDFZ in the region as
dependent on Israeli nuclear disarmament, Jerusalem sees the materialization of
the Zone as conditional on peace agreements and reconciliation in the region,
including, especially, agreements and reconciliation with Tehran. Given the
importance of the nuclear program for the Islamic regime, it could consider
engaging with Israel if it saw its nuclear program as being contingent upon it.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi-Iranian relations present another set of complex problems marked by a
long history of rivalry that dates back to the Arab conquest of Persia and the
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advent of Islam in the Persian Empire. The Saudi Kingdom has always been
wary of Iran’s regional ambitions and its military capability, but cooperated
with the Shah to maintain regional security from the time of Israel’s estab-
lishment until the Islamic Revolution in 1979. This relationship, fluctuating
between rivalry and cooperation, was taken to a new level after the Islamic
Revolution with the emergence of harsh Iranian criticism of Wahhabism, the
dominant sect of Islam in the KSA. The masked Saudi support for Baghdad
during the Iran-Iraq War has also cast a shadow on this difficult relationship.18
The controversy surrounding Iran’s nuclear program has further increased ten-
sions between the two states: the KSA has expressed concerns over its Persian
rival’s nuclear ambitions, at times threatening to “go nuclear”19 should Iran
choose to do so, while attempting to benefit from the sanctions regime (an
opportunity for the Kingdom to fill the gap in the oil market) and encouraging
the United States to consider military action.20 Yet, Riyadh has publicly
declared that it would not allow its airspace to be used in an attack by Israel
and/or the United States against Iran’s nuclear sites and military bases.21 Fur-
thermore, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry has spread to the rest of the Middle East,
especially to regional zones of conflict such as Iraq and Syria, where Sunni and
Shia factions are supported by Riyadh and Tehran, respectively, to promote
their own interests.
Still, looking back at the period of reformist Mohammad Khatami’s pre-
sidency in Iran, one can find positive indications for potential cooperation
between Iran and Saudi Arabia, under the right circumstances and in areas of
overlapping interest. During that period, the two states went as far as to sign
a security agreement in 2001. The agreement provided the framework for
cooperation between Tehran and Riyadh in security areas such as anti-
terrorism and the countering of drug trafficking and money laundering.
Moreover, the two countries held a united front during the first Persian Gulf
War as a common enemy, Baathist Iraq, undertook to annex Kuwait. Hence,
while relations between Tehran and Riyadh have always been marked by
rivalry and suspicion, the two states have also found the means to cooperate.
A Helsinki-like regional process could provide the framework for reviving
such cooperation by placing renewed emphasis on common interests and by
helping the parties develop mutual trust.
Egypt
As with virtually every aspect of Iran’s foreign policy, the country’s relations
with Egypt were affected by the 1979 Revolution. This was not only because
Anwar El Sadat, then President of the Arab Republic, signed a peace treaty
with Israel and did not see eye to eye with the fundamentalists in Tehran on
religious and political issues, but also because he had provided the dying Shah
with a safe haven when all his other friends and allies refused to do so due to
pressure from the revolutionaries. Tehran severed its ties with Cairo after
Sadat’s death, and the first sign that the two countries could resume their
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relations came only in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings in Egypt and the
establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood as the governing party. This devel-
opment was welcomed by Tehran as one that was inspired by the 1979 Isla-
mic Revolution. Former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s visit to
Tehran in August 201222 and the subsequent trip to Cairo by at the time
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in February 201323 were signs that
bilateral relations between the two countries may be improving. However,
given Morsi’s failure to reconsider Egypt’s relations with Israel, as well as the
events following the downfall of the Muslim Brotherhood, the future of
Egyptian-Iranian relations remains uncertain.
At the time, Iranian leaders depicted this new start in broadly positive
terms as increasing political distance between Cairo and Washington.24 Yet,
some in Egypt were warning against Iranian “interference” in the affairs of
Arab states of the Persian Gulf (hinting at Tehran’s role in Bahrain),25 while
others were denouncing Iranian “occupation” of Khuzestan.26 It is important
to note that Egypt also sees itself as a leader of not only the Muslim world,
but of the NAM as well. A stronger Iran, especially after serving as the NAM
chair for the period of 2012 to 2015, means that it is less isolated from its
Arab neighbors, which is not exactly what Egypt desires. These events and
statements hint at the reluctance of a portion of the Egyptian leadership to
normalize relations with Iran and its fear of Iranian influence in the region
(including concerns over Tehran’s nuclear program).27 Regardless of the hur-
dles along the road, the recent developments in Egypt could pave the way for
closer collaboration between the two countries. A memorandum of under-
standing (MoU) calling for cooperation in the field of tourism was signed by
the two countries in 2013 in the hopes of promoting cooperation in “eco-
nomic, trade, and scientific areas” as well as “peace, security, and brother-
hood.”28 The MoU and the new-found willingness to cooperate by the two
countries can be helpful in fostering a regional context more conducive to
collective security. Indeed, cordial bilateral relations can help increase this
possibility and serve as a prelude to a multilateral process. Nevertheless, while
Egypt could help bring Iran to the table in a regional process, a less desirable
outcome could lie in Egypt joining the Iranian position on Israel. Yet, much
to Tehran’s dismay, such a change in the Egyptian position on Israel has not
occurred, despite changes in the country’s leadership.
Syria
Historically, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Bashar al-Assad’s Syria have
enjoyed particularly close relations, and this bond is the only one that Damas-
cus has managed to maintain uncompromised, even in the advent of the Syrian
civil war. Both countries constitute each other’s greatest ally in the region, and
Tehran has gone so far as to warn external powers against attacking Syria,
saying that it would constitute an attack against Iran.29 This rhetorical move
was reinforced by the Defense Cooperation Pact signed between the two
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countries in 2008 and reiterated a number of times since the internal conflict’s
escalations and the growing threat of a Western intervention.
Some in Iran have gone as far as to describe the defense of Syria as more
important than Iran’s own territorial integrity.30 This statement, along with
the regime’s financial, military, and political support of Assad, has been
widely criticized by the Iranian opposition.31 However, while supporting
Assad may be against Iran’s national interest, and against the will of many in
Iran, it is in the regime’s interest, as Assad constitutes a strategic ally to the
Islamic Republic, allowing Iran to maintain direct access to Hezbollah, and
even Israel, should the need arise. It is further important to note that in the
case of the collapse of the Assad regime, the likelihood of it being replaced by
an Alawite government is very slim. This Shiite sect is a minority in the
country, and its crackdown on the non-Alawite majority under Assad has
created a wound that will likely take years to heal. This has an important
implication for the inherently universalist Shiite ideology of the Islamic
Revolution, as Tehran sees it as vital to help preserve a Shiite government.
Furthermore, Tehran’s historically close relations with Assad are likely to
backfire if the latter’s regime collapses, leading to poor relations between Iran
and the next Syrian government. This is especially true, since allegations of
Iranian involvement in Syria’s chemical weapon stockpiles have surfaced.32
Nevertheless, relationship between the Islamic regime and Assad’s govern-
ment could be conducive to regional dialogue in the meanwhile, especially
since the Arab League has alienated Syria following the events of the past
couple of years. Indeed, Iran could be used as a channel to Damascus to
solve the current Syrian crisis. Yet, the current trend seems to suggest other-
wise, as the Syrian crisis seems to have further alienated Iran from other
states in the region, as well as the West. This alienation could be further
reinforced if Assad’s regime is toppled.
Turkey
Turkey and Iran have enjoyed cordial relations, albeit with a hint of historic
rivalry. A meaningful dialogue between them, as two out of the three non-
Arab states in the Middle East, could help shape a regional process of col-
lective security. The two countries have cooperated on a number of issues,
including regional security, as illustrated by their joint counterterrorism
efforts to address the threat posed by Kurdistan’s Workers’ Party (PKK).
Additionally, Turkey has played a role in the negotiations on the nuclear issue
with Iran, acting as a facilitator and host country at times.
Ankara has powerful incentives to try and shield Iran from increasingly
stringent sanctions not only as a major trade partner, but also as its largest
source of oil imports (51% in 2011, to be cut down to 22% in 2013)33 and the
second largest source of gas imports.34 Yet, the two neighbors’ relations have
deteriorated recently, with Turkey growing increasingly suspicious that Iran
may be pursuing military nuclear capability; the countries’ divergent positions
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on the Syrian crisis; and Iran’s opposition to the presence of the NATO mis-
sile defense system in Turkey.35 Nevertheless, these events do not seem to
disturb the general pattern of economic and commercial interaction, and
security cooperation between the two countries. Hence, the historic record of
cooperation between the two countries, especially on issues related to regional
stability and security, as well as their continuous economic and commercial
interdependencies, provide grounds for optimism to be utilized in the context
of a regional process.
Key non-regional players and the economic basket

A key incentive for Iran to take part in the process of collectively constructing
a regional security framework, and a great challenge for the inception of such
a process, concerns the economic factor. For example, due to the sanctions
regime implemented by the international community led by the United States,
Tehran is finding itself in increasing economic isolation. The current trends
have led some experts to suggest that Iran may soon be traveling the same
path as its Western neighbor, Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, exchanging oil for
food. Tehran has unsuccessfully attempted a number of times to coerce the
P5+1 into lifting unconditionally the backbreaking sanctions. Hence, a pro-
cess that would encourage commercial collaboration in the region would cer-
tainly benefit Iran, especially if such regional cooperation could help ease the
sanctions. The impact of sanctions on the Iranian economy became the main
campaigning platform for many candidates in the 2013 presidential elections,
taking precedence over a number of other pressing issues, including human
rights. In fact, one of the main reasons leading to Rouhani’s election could be
found in his moderation and consequent ability to better engage with the
international community, particularly regarding the nuclear program, with the
popular hope that he would be able to negotiate an easing of sanctions. In
this sense, the involvement of key non-regional players could be beneficial
to Iran in the current situation, even though it could pose some challenges
as well.
A regional process would most certainly involve key international actors
in some capacity, including the United States, Russia, and perhaps the
European Union (EU). Iran, however, would be less inclined to partake in
such a process if external players, especially the Western powers with the
United States as their flagship, play a key role in the process. Tehran has
made it clear time and time again that it does not support Western invol-
vement in the region and believes the Middle East’s problems should be
solved by regional players. However, Washington’s and Brussels’ imple-
menting of the sanctions regime against Iran could push Tehran to the
table if it perceives their involvement as an opportunity for change. Iran’s
involvement in the process could be leveraged as a CSBM in itself, allow-
ing the parties to move toward easing the sanctions regime. If non-regional
powers were to be engaged in such a process, the inclusion of non-Western
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powers such as Russia and/or China could encourage Tehran to partake in
it. Indeed, Iran would see the participation of the powers that have tradi-
tionally been more supportive of the regime’s actions and ambitions as a
force against the Western powers’ attempts to “undermine” the Islamic
Republic.
It is important to note that even outside the framework of the sanctions
regime, a tool facilitating and promoting regional economic cooperation can
only be beneficial to Iran as a key exporter of oil and gas in the region, and as
a potential exporter of nuclear power and clean energy, in addition to other
resources. Such cooperation could range from agriculture to tourism and
medicine. Indeed, Iran enjoys climate diversity, which allows it to cultivate a
range of products that can be exported to its regional neighborhood and
beyond. The country also boasts a number of natural, religious, cultural, and
historical sites of interest to tourists. Medically, “Iran offers a wide range of
state-of-the-art treatment, through an extensive network of highly-equipped
hospitals, around 850 hospitals, and rehabilitation centers at reasonable
costs.”36 Additionally, “Iran also enjoys a unique range of competent medical
staff,” and “the Iranian health care system is constantly supported by exten-
sive medical research.”37 Iran is already the destination of a number of med-
ical tourists, many of whom make the trip from neighboring countries for
quality treatment at a competitive price. All these resources could generate
substantial revenues if Tehran could engage in regional collaboration, which
would facilitate tourism and trade.
However, several challenges persist, even in the economic basket. First, the
extent of possible economic cooperation under the current strict international
sanctions would have to be addressed. This does not necessarily mean that a
nuclear deal must resolve all pending issues, but rather that the rigidity of the
current regime must be managed. Second, the Helsinki Accords provided that
the participating states reaffirmed:
[T]heir will to intensify such cooperation between one another, irrespec-

tive of their systems, recognizing that such cooperation, with due regard
for the different levels of economic development, can be developed on the
basis of equality and mutual satisfaction of the partners and of recipro-
city, permitting, as a whole, an equitable distribution of advantages and
obligations of comparable scale, with respect for bilateral and multilateral
agreements.38
Such a requirement comes as a challenge, as Iran and Israel have had no

commercial or economic exchanges in decades. Nevertheless, such coopera-
tion, while encouraged, is not a requirement for a regional process of collec-
tive security to materialize and could be facilitated through the process itself.
The effectiveness of such a process in the economic sphere would greatly
improve if the United States and the European Union, chiefly the EU 3,
could be convinced to accommodate Iran’s wish to ease sanctions.
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Human rights basket
The third basket in the Helsinki Final Act addresses issues related to human
rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as CBMs. However, it is important to
note that the Final Act “did not envisage the promotion of human rights as a
key goal” and was politically, rather than legally, binding.39 This was possibly
the compromise language between the West and East, and the reason why the
process was relatively successful. Furthermore, this flexibility has allowed for
the Helsinki Process to be used as a model for potentially similar processes in
the context of other adversarial relations, such as in the case of the Middle East.
If human rights issues were presented as a key component of a regional
security process, many Middle Eastern governments, including the government
of Iran, would be suspicious and reluctant to embark on it. Indeed, to say that
Tehran’s human rights record is unsatisfactory would be an understatement.40
The country has consistently fallen short of acting in accordance with interna-
tional human rights law and guaranteeing its citizens their fundamental free-
doms. Nevertheless, the issue of human rights did not stop the Soviet bloc from
engaging in the Helsinki Process, even though the intent to comply with those
human rights provisions was never there. And yet it was not a lost cause:
The Helsinki Accords created a chink in the armor of “state socialism,” a

small opportunity to hold their leaders to account. To those trapped in
the gloom of oppression from Moscow, the crucial incorporation of
human rights principles into the documents helped lay the foundation of
1989’s bursting illumination.41
Hence, the human rights basket represents a great opportunity without

necessarily representing an obstacle. In other words, the basket can provide a
win-win situation for both the regime and its opposition as long as the regime
believes it can continue to control any future domestic reform process. As was
the case with the Helsinki Process, the human rights component can be flex-
ible enough to encourage Tehran to engage on a regional level, while the very
incorporation of such a component, even on a very basic level, can provide
the Iranian opposition with a new outlet to promote the respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the country. At the very least, the process
could be used as a platform by the Iranian opposition to press the regime to
accommodate its reformation demands. The regime would also benefit from a
human rights basket, as it could help the leadership manage change, if it so
desires, and be seen as responsive to domestic and international demands to
improve its human rights record.
Conclusion
Launching a regional process, based on or similar to the Helsinki model, can
represent both a challenge and an opportunity for Iran, and Iranian
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participation is also likely to bring considerable benefits while entailing poli-
tical costs. Perhaps the greatest challenge is posed by Iran’s relationship, or
lack thereof, with Israel. This chapter has argued that while the Soviet Union
and the United States did not see eye to eye on many issues, they could at
least agree on the fact that they were both sovereign entities, with an
unquestionable and unalienable right to nationhood, and perceived the pro-
cess of engagement as serving their national interests – which is not the case
with Israel and Iran. While a formal recognition of the State of Israel is not a
necessary step in cooperation, as illustrated by the cordial relations between
the two states under the Shah, the basic acknowledgment of Israel’s right to
exist, even implicitly, as a sovereign entity is a prerequisite to the advance-
ment of a regional process based on mutual trust. Likewise, while the rhetoric
of both countries regarding each other has been belligerent, with Benjamin
Netanyahu pushing for a military solution to the Iranian nuclear program
and the Iranian leadership calling the Jewish state a “cancerous tumor,” the
Helsinki Process makes one hopeful.42 Such a process could further serve a
dual purpose: serving either as a stepping-stone to nuclear arms control
negotiations in the region or as an additional CSBM that facilitates such talks
and that is conducted in parallel to them. Indeed, as highlighted by Lynn M.
Hansen in Chapter 1 of this volume, some of the rhetorical exchanges
between Soviet and US officials were just as heated.
Other items contained in the Accords are secondary to the great obstacle
of the recognition of Israel as a legitimate and sovereign state. Indeed, while
the security basket represents a great challenge, it is not impossible to over-
come. After all, while most of the region backed their fellow Arab state,
Iraq, during the Iran-Iraq War, and while the United States saw the war as
an opportunity to weaken Iran (which it saw as a threat), Israel stepped in
and provided Iran with weapons. Back then, the Islamic Republic repre-
sented less of a threat to the Jewish state than the ambitious Baathist Iraq.
Neither country acknowledged this defense cooperation, but it illustrates the
willingness of the two countries to find ways to cooperate if their interests
push them to do so. Yet, the dynamics of the region have changed since the
1980s, and so have the two countries’ respective domestic political climates.
Relations between the two countries during the Iran-Iraq War were not
overcast by the shadow of three decades of animosity or a contentious
nuclear program, labeled by Israel as the greatest threat to its existence since
its establishment.43
Hence, several issues arise from both the Iranian and Israeli sides with
direct implications on the ability to initiate and sustain a regional process:
would Iran be willing to compromise its (over) thirty-year policy regarding
Israel by agreeing to a rapprochement with its greatest foe in the region?
Would Israel agree to sit at a table with the officials who consider its very
existence a “cancerous tumor?” Would Israel be willing to make concessions
regarding Iran’s nuclear program and would Tehran recognize Israel as a
legitimate state and as a state with a right to territorial integrity? The answers
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seem to range from unlikely to impossible under current circumstances.
Nevertheless, small steps in this direction, including CSBMs, can be taken by
Iran, Israel, and other regional actors. The example of the first steps taken by
Tehran and Cairo toward the normalization of their relations after 33 years
could also be applied to Iran’s relations with other regional actors. Indeed,
starting to build trust and improving bilateral relations by taking neutral
steps, such as facilitating and promoting tourism, can lead to greater accom-
plishments in both bilateral and multilateral relations.
Notes
1 Khamenei, “Statement in Meeting with the People of Qom.”
2 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Final Act, Helsinki,
1976.
3 The role of the enemy narrative in authoritarian regimes can best be explained in
the words of German political philosopher Carl Schmitt: “As long as a people
exists in the political sphere, this people must, even if only in the most extreme
case – and whether this point has been reached had to be decided by it – determine
by itself the distinction of friend and enemy. Therein resides the essence of its
political existence. When it no longer possesses the capacity or the will to make this
distinction, it ceases to exist politically.” See also Khomeini, “The Imam’s Strategy
regarding Israel.”
4 Farda News, “The Importance of the Disappearance of Israel.”
1976.
6 Khomeini, Sahife-ye Noor.
7 The Supreme Leader, whose role was defined in its present form in the revision of
the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran as the solutes legibus, is the guar-
antor of the preservation of the Islamic state. He preserves the Islamic state by
defining the interests of the regime and prioritizing them above all else, including
the faith itself, if needed.
8 Rouhani, National Security, 77.
9 Ibid., 66.
10 An aerial shot of the crowd chanting “death to Israel” is virtually a necessary
component of the coverage of major events in Iranian political and religious life, as
is criticism of Zionism and Israel by any public figure giving a speech, especially
the Supreme Leader.
11 Rouhani, National Security.
12 Ibid., 55.
13 Ibid., 65.
14 Borger, “Medvedev: Sanctions against Iran’s Nuclear Programme.”
15 Jerusalem Post, “UN Report Hints at Slowdown.”
16 Dahl, “Iran, Arabs Criticize Delay of Middle East Nuclear Talks.”
17 Issacharoff, “Arab League.”
18 Hiro, The Longest War, 76.
19 Goldberg, “Saudi Arabia.”
20 Al-Arabiya, “Iran Lashes Out.”
21 Haaretz,”Saudi Arabia.”
22 New York Times, “Egypt’s President.”
23 Fahim, “Ahmadinejad Visits Egypt.”
24 PressTV, “Iran, Egypt, Turkey.”
25 Al-Arabiya, “Al-Azhar Tells Ahmadinejad.”
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26 A conference was convened in Cairo during Iranian Foreign Minister Salehi’s visit,
which called for Arab assistance to the “Arab brothers in Ahvaz,” whose “iden-
tity” is being “changed” and oil resources “used” by “occupying” Iran. See Meir
Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, “Spotlight on Iran.”
27 Pincus, “UN’s Ban.”
28 PressTV, “Ahmadinejad Stresses Expansion.”
29 McDonnell, “Iran Issues Threatening Warning.”
30 The statement that defending Syria’s territorial integrity would take precedence
over the defense of the Iranian province of Khuzestan was made by Mehdi Taeb of
Ammar (an organization that is supposed to combat “soft warfare,” or internal
opposition to the regime). The statement was retracted following the substantial
criticism this declaration received.
31 Kaleme, “Martyr Bakeri’s Wife.”
32 Sanger, Lehren, and Gladstone, “With the World Watching.”
33 Ersoy, “Turkey Will Cut Imports of Iranian Crude.”
34 Babali, “The Role of Energy.”
35 PressTV, “NATO Missiles Create Insecurity.”
36 Jabbari, Delgoshaei, Mardani, and Tabibi, “Medical Tourism in Iran.”
37 Ibid.
August 1, 1975.
39 Sowula, “The Helsinki Process.”
40 Deutsche Welle, “Ahmad Shahid.”
41 Sowula, “The Helsinki Process.”
42 Farda News, “The Importance of the Disappearance of Israel.”
43 Follath, “Potential for Apocalypse.”
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amassed-nerve-gas.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0.
Schmitt, Carl. The Concept of the Political. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.
Sowula, Timothy. “The Helsinki Process and the Death of Communism.” Open-
Democracy, July 31, 2005. Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-
protest/helsinki_2716.jsp.
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7 Lessons learned
The Turkish role in arms control and
regional security talks in the Middle East1
Nilsu Gören
The need for a comprehensive security framework for the Middle East to deal
with the risks and uncertainty therein has brought about the idea that an
institutional body, i.e. a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the
Middle East (CSCME), could be built upon the foundations of the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This chapter assesses
the outcomes of the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working
group that was created following the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. It
identifies the major risks and opportunities associated with ACRS while
focusing on the role of Turkey as a facilitator and crucial player in the
broader Middle East. It is relevant to state that Turkish foreign and security
policy toward the Middle East has evolved from isolationism throughout the
Cold War into regional engagement in the Post-Cold War era and regional
activism under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). This
chapter argues that, in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, Ankara’s relations
with regional governments have drastically changed, and that the regional atti-
tudes toward the AKP have changed as well – as can be judged by recent
developments in Turkey’s relations with Egypt and Syria – all of which ulti-
mately hinders Turkey’s role as a regional facilitator. Nevertheless, Turkey’s
identity as a Muslim-majority country with regional clout, a relatively demo-
cratic and secular political system, a modern and sizable military, experience
with international regimes, and institutional capacity will continue to positively
influence the course and aftermath of the popular uprisings in the region.
Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group

The 1991 Madrid Peace Talks have their roots in the broader Helsinki Process
of debate and dialogue. The final stage of the CSCE was the signing of the
Helsinki Final Act in the Finnish capital in August 1975 – a set of key com-
mitments on political, military, economic, environmental, and human rights
issues.2 It established ten fundamental principles (the “Decalogue”) governing
the behavior of states toward their citizens, as well as toward each other.3
These principles showed that external security and internal security are
meaningfully related. They defined global governance as a multi-actor,
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130 Nilsu Gören
multilevel interaction between local, national, regional, and global political
players, emphasizing that these actors should exist side by side and not in
hierarchical order.4 Two of these principles, required by the Warsaw Pact
countries, were the inviolability of national borders, i.e. that force would not
be used across borders, contingent on the responsibility for upholding the
principles of the Decalogue internally, and non-intervention, i.e. no armed
intervention seeking the violent overthrow of governments. The Helsinki
Process brought together government representatives, international organiza-
tions, civil society groups, private sector entities, religious institutions, as well
as representatives of the academic and media communities to enhance coop-
eration in confidence-building, idea-shaping or innovation, and implementa-
tion or adding scale by introducing non-state actors to leverage all public and
private resources to decrease the time between decision and action.5 Overall,
the Helsinki Final Act formulated the need for confidence- and security-
building measures (CSBMs), recognizing the integral relationship between the
political and military aspects of security.6
Building conceptually on the Helsinki model, the 1991 Madrid Peace
Conference focused on enhancing relations between Arab states and Israel,
and moving forward with multilateral working groups on the environment,
water, refugees, arms control, and economic development. Russia and the
United States led the arms control talks that included 16 parties. Syria and
Lebanon did not attend due to their bilateral conflicts with Israel, while Iran,
Iraq, and Libya were not invited, as they were not party to the Peace Pro-
cess.7 Since the geographic scope of ACRS was depicted as the region from
the “Atlantic Ocean to Central Asia,”8 Turkey criticized the US and Israeli
decision to exclude Iran and Iraq.
The ACRS working group, along with four other multilateral working
groups (regional economic development, refugee status, environmental issues,
and water security), was created to complement the bilateral negotiations
between Israel and the Arab states. One of the more important strategic
objectives behind ACRS was the establishment of a Weapons of Mass
Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East.
In May 1994, as bilateral talks progressed, the ACRS working group meet-
ings were moved to the region, with the first plenary session held in Doha,
Qatar.9 Parties to the talks convened in annual plenary sessions and expert
groups for a total of 42 meetings over four years. ACRS discussions were divi-
ded into two “baskets”: operational and conceptual. The operational basket
covered specific confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), while the
conceptual basket dealt with longer-term questions, including threat percep-
tions and visions for a future regional security order free of WMD. Whilst the
ACRS talks generated several important agreements, in principle, and drafted
progressive confidence-building measures, issues related to nuclear weapons
were primarily discussed among Egyptian and Israeli delegations.
However, due to complications in the Peace Process and sharp disagree-
ments between Israel and Egypt over the nuclear issue, the discussions were
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Lessons learned 131
put on hold and the agreed measures were not implemented. The ACRS
talks ultimately collapsed in November 1995.10 Furthermore, following the
collapse of the Madrid-Oslo Process, the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian track was
discontinued and the Middle East Peace Process, with regard to both bilateral
and multilateral negotiations, was halted.11
The ACRS process: successes and challenges

Former US Secretary of State James Baker III put forward the agenda of
ACRS as a modest set of confidence- and security-building measures
(CSBMs) that were also aimed at enhancing transparency. The existing lit-
erature on the ACRS process suggests that the CSBMs, established during the
negotiations in Madrid, supported in the conceptual and operational bas-
kets.12 Major positive outcomes include the drafting of the following impor-
tant charters:
The Declaration of Principles and Statements of Intent on Arms Control

and Regional Security;
The establishment of a regional security center in Jordan and two affiliated
institutions in Qatar and Tunisia;
A communications network by end-user stations in capitals to convey
information regarding the ACRS process (based on the one developed in the
CSCE to deal with emergency situations by urgent communication); and
Procedures for the pre-notification of certain military activities, the exchange
of military information, and a number of maritime CSBMs such as draft
agreements on search and rescue and the prevention of incidents at sea.13
The CSBMs involving the pre-notification of military activities, the exchange

of military information, communications, and maritime confidence-building,
most of which were under Turkish mediation, were successfully finalized.
However, none of these measures were implemented by regional states when
the formal talks ended in 1995.14
ACRS entailed the creation of a new series of CSBMs between Israel and
its neighbors, an idea that drew its inspiration from the Helsinki Process in
Europe in the 1970s. Emily Landau describes ACRS as an innovative frame-
work for dialogue in seminar format.15 It was the first truly regional multi-
lateral cooperative framework that brought Israel and the Arab states
together, and despite being a nonbinding process, it shaped state attitudes
toward arms control diplomacy; created arms control bureaucracies; and built
expertise on these issues. Moreover, even though some of the CSBMs were
only adopted by a limited number of countries, ACRS forged shared under-
standings on arms control.
Although the formal ACRS talks collapsed, there has been growing interest
from regional parties in meeting and discussing regional security affairs, an
effort that has culminated in ACRS Track 2 diplomacy. Following the
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132 Nilsu Gören
suspension of ACRS, governments from outside the region as well as non-
governmental organizations, including universities across Europe and the
United States, sponsored and organized hundreds of workshops, courses,
seminars, and events on Middle Eastern WMD and nonproliferation issues.16
One of the ground rules common in most of these meetings was strict con-
fidentiality: discussions were held off-the-record, and participants were asked
not to report on the proceedings or even confirm the existence of these
meetings. This practice was adopted to allow regional participants to attend
and discuss the issues freely.
The main challenge in the ACRS process was its dependence on the success
of the Peace Process as a whole, consequently tying the progress and success
of multilateral talks to that of bilateral talks. Thus, the Arab-Israeli conflict,
and not threat perceptions among regional actors, shaped the outcome of the
ACRS talks.17 Other challenges included the lack of understanding of, and
expertise in, the arms control concepts among many of the participants; the
fact that the seminar format of the working group centered on communica-
tion and persuasion rather than decision-making, and the absence of some
relevant players from the process.
Another challenge in the ACRS process was that the more convergence
among parties there was on the CSBMs, the less incentive Israel had to deal
with Egypt’s concerns regarding its opaque nuclear program. It became clear
that Israel saw discussions on its nuclear weapons as a non-negotiable issue,
wishing to maintain its strategic advantage.18
Süha Umar, the Turkish ambassador to Jordan between 1995 and 1998
who attended ACRS talks, attributes the halt of the ACRS process, as well as
the broader Middle East Peace Process, not to a “lack of confidence,” but to
an outright “crisis of confidence” between the Arab states and Israel, and also
amongst the Arab states.19 He defines the crisis of confidence as the principal
stance adopted by most countries to not come to any agreements that would
assuage the primary concerns of others until agreements were reached on
their own priorities. He argues that the Turkish position to promote the
principle “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” was necessary to
alleviate the concerns of the participants about concessions.
Turkey’s objectives and role during ACRS

In the past, Turkey has made it clear that as a NATO member it would
always support cooperative security frameworks in the Middle East, but that
it would not be a party to any binding security structure, as it was able to
fulfill its security needs through the NATO alliance and it considered the
Middle East to be the source of its security concerns. The official Turkish
stance to exclude itself from the Middle East map paved the way to a clear
statement that Turkey would not be a party to any CSBMs in the region.20
The proposal for a WMDFZ, while not a core principle of ACRS, was
pushed by Egypt in response to the Israeli nuclear program. While the
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Lessons learned 133
geographical delineation of the Zone is yet to be agreed upon, the working
assumption is that it will include the 22 Arab League members, in addition to
Israel and Iran, and that there should be protocol agreements with neighbor-
ing states such as Turkey.21 Indeed, as a NATO member, Turkey has a sepa-
rate set of security principles and calculations.
During the ACRS process, Track 1.5 meetings helped buttress the inter-
mittent official talks, giving the officials participating in the formal process an
opportunity to present their individual opinions as a way of continuing the
dialogue between Arab countries and Israel. In exchange for facilitating the
talks on military information exchanges and pre-notification of certain mili-
tary activities, the United States granted Turkey special status as a mentor to
the ACRS talks.22 Under the operational basket, Turkey hosted two meetings,
in 1993 and 1994 in Antalya, which paved the way to the Track 1.5 dialogue.
During the two meetings, participants agreed to CSBMs in communications
networks; military information exchanges such as pre-notification of certain
military exercises, the exchange of unclassified military publications, and joint
military training; and maritime security measures.23 Moreover, the 1994
Antalya meeting generated a proposal to hold a joint rescue-at-sea exercise,
with the participation of Israel, a number of Arab states, and the US Sixth
Fleet; the proposal also called for the establishment of a regional commu-
nication center in Cairo.24 This proposal was implemented by Turkey, the
United States, Israel, and Jordan in Search and Rescue (SAR) exercise known
as “Reliant Mermaid” in 1998.25 Egypt and Iran harshly criticized Jordan for
participating in the military maneuver.
Turkey shepherded the preparation and adoption of almost every document
on CSBMs and conflict prevention. Furthermore, the Turkish delegation
shared with Jordan and Israel its experiences from a post-Helsinki agreement
with Bulgaria on additional CSBMs, and these CSBM principles were utilized
until the 1998 shift in Israel’s position on the Peace Process.26 They also
served as a model for collaboration between Jordan and Israel in the afore-
mentioned Reliant Mermaid exercise.
For Turkey, another important objective for participating in the talks and
leading the CSBM process was to enhance bilateral ties, and especially mili-
tary cooperation, with Israel. Turkey was willing to contribute to the Middle
East Peace Process in order to consolidate its position in the region and
strengthen its ties with the United States and the European Community. The
year 1992 marked the beginning of an era of change in Turkish-Israeli rela-
tions and led to the Turkey-Israel-Jordan strategic partnership that shaped
Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East until 2002. As part of this
partnership, a military cooperation agreement signed by Turkey and Israel in
1996 granted the fleets of these countries the right to visit and use each other’s
ports and air bases, and to exchange military personnel and aircraft.27
Turkey had similar bilateral agreements with Arab countries, e.g. the
agreement Turkey signed with Jordan between 1996 and 1998 on military
personnel exchange and joint exercises.28 Nevertheless, the Arab states were
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134 Nilsu Gören
suspicious of Turkish-Israeli cooperation, supposing that military relations
between the two countries would create a hostile strategic axis in the region
that would in turn undermine their own security.29 The Turkish-Israeli mili-
tary cooperation agreement was not a defense pact, and one of the underlying
Turkish objectives was to promote its security interests in the Middle East.30
Turkey expected its agreement with Israel to relax the tensions in the region
and build trust by integrating Israel into the process and eliminating Israel’s
“fortress mentality” of isolation from Arab countries.31 However, between
1996 and 1999, as the Peace Process and ACRS talks halted, Turkish-Israeli
cooperation became a source of animosity in the Arab world, with Egypt and
Iran as its most vocal opponents.
Ambassador Umar argues that although Turkey initially had a crucial role
in ACRS by hosting the Antalya meetings, it lost this lead in the Track 2
process to the United States and Greece after 1995. He states that it was a big
loss for Turkey in terms of not being able to promote its national interests
through the Track 2 activities. Moreover, he argues that the Track 2 process
has become broader and less focused on ACRS with the introduction of
working groups on political issues such as democracy and Islam after the 9/11
attacks.32
Applicability of the European experience to the Middle East

The idea that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East
(CSCME) could be modeled on the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE) presumes that a Western European model could be adap-
ted to a different regional context where similar strategic asymmetries prevail.
Yet, the European experience of the 1990s cannot apply to the Middle East
without a revised framework, as the region is dominated by unresolved bilat-
eral conflicts and an unbalanced distribution of military assets.
Post-Cold War security threats no longer require massive military con-
frontation; instead, they require pragmatic cooperative strategies that can be
utilized against security contingencies. These cooperative strategies require
international regulation of the size, technical composition, and operational
practices of global military forces by mutual consent for mutual benefit.33
The new security environment requires more constructive and sophisticated
forms of influence, as there is more concentration on the preparation of mili-
tary forces than on the final decision to deploy them. The main purpose of
cooperative security is to prevent successful aggression and war through
comprehensive, transparent, and consensual measures. Under a fully devel-
oped cooperative security arrangement, mutual reassurance would be attained
by the reduction of threat perceptions and consensual and comprehensive
collaboration on all military capabilities and establishments. Since projection
of military power cannot be the sole instrument of policy, mutual restraint
measures such as verified reassurances, transparency in force deployment and
operations, national intelligence sharing, and establishing international means
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Lessons learned 135
of monitoring are necessary.34 The ultimate goal is to show that states taking
part in a cooperative security arrangement will be threatened less and will
gain access to valuable security information, advanced technology, and col-
lective security guarantees, and that effective penalties will be instituted for
violators of such an arrangement.
Some scholars and policymakers argue that the Middle East needs its own
Helsinki Process as a step to defuse tensions between states and to promote
security, development, and democracy by establishing a permanent multi-
lateral security organization.35 Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan states
that today’s emphasis on military action in response to global terrorism
makes the need for a CSCME with a stability charter ever more urgent.36 His
formulation includes a regional strategy based on energy and water policy,
arms control, and debt reduction.37 Former US Ambassador to Russia
Michael McFaul argues that the regional security organization should include
the Arab countries, Israel, Iran, and Turkey.38 Similar to the European model,
basic security guarantees that respect the territorial integrity of states should
be at the core of the regional security organization. A permanent structure
would help establish institutional expertise while generating a multilateral
setting that might be preferable to bilateral interactions between states with
tensions between them. Specifically, a multilateral institutional setup would
help circumvent the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.39
Analysts who have participated in the Track 2 initiatives in the Middle East
suggest that, if a CSCME ever comes into being, it would go beyond the geo-
graphical delineation of a WMDFZ to include Turkey as well due to its tech-
nical capabilities and human resources.40 Senior Turkish security experts
argue that international arms control and nonproliferation regimes, such as
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), brought the awareness of, and the
need for, capacity in arms control and nonproliferation measures in Turkey. As
Turkey became party to more such arrangements, the government went
through a learning process to train the personnel and follow the pertinent
guidelines.41 Hence, Turkey can contribute its expertise in setting up domestic
institutional frameworks required for the regional security architecture. Given
this capacity, it would now be helpful to examine Turkey’s perceptions of the
regional process and its overall foreign policy toward the Middle East.
Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East

This section aims to provide an overview of the changes in the logic of Turkish
security policymaking toward the Middle East in three phases which corre-
spond to three periods: the Cold War; the end of the Cold War; and the last
decade under AKP rule, transitioning from isolationism to regional activism.
Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu states that “Turkey has proven to be a
staunch member of the [NATO] Alliance, and a net contributor to both regio-
nal and global peace and security,” arguing that Turkey is “not a security
consumer, but a security promoter.”42 Yet, in the last couple of years, Turkey
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136 Nilsu Gören
has reemphasized its ties to NATO as a response to the Arab Uprisings and
realized the limits of its power in the Middle East. Indeed, Turkey’s relations
with many regional governments have deteriorated, as can be seen in the
dynamics of the Syrian civil war and Turkish support for military action
against the use of chemical weapons, as well as the breakdown of relations
between Turkey and the Egyptian interim government in the aftermath of the
military coup that removed the Muslim Brotherhood under Morsi from power.
Initial phase: From joining NATO to the end of the Cold War (1952–1990)
In the aftermath of World War II, confronted with the Soviet attempt to
control the Turkish Straits and eastern provinces in Anatolia, Turkish security
policy was centered on the main objective of deterring the Soviet Union and
containing its expansion, a policy that was aligned with that of the United
States.43 This alignment of US and Turkish security interests was institutio-
nalized by the Turkish accession to NATO, together with Greece, in 1952.
Turkish security policymaking was almost entirely based on Turkey’s com-
mitment to the Western idea of democracy and to seeking immunity from the
escalation of local conflicts in its neighborhood by the Soviet Union through
this NATO alliance. Turkish concerns about the Soviet threat became more
urgent again in the 1970s. The Soviet Union increased its military power and
influence in the extended Middle East, as exemplified by the Soviet interven-
tion in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War; the development of a Soviet-Syrian alliance
along Turkey’s southern border; the Soviet Union’s role in the Islamic Revo-
lution in Iran; and finally the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. As a
response, Turkey gradually increased military cooperation with NATO.
Throughout this period, the modern Republic of Turkey showed no interest in
being involved with the conflicts in the Middle East as it sought to disconnect itself
from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire in the region. Being already able to
fulfill its security needs with the help of its Western allies, Turkey had little moti-
vation to try and reconcile its threat perceptions with the concerns of the Arab
states, who sought close relations with the Soviet Union against Israel. Turkey’s
only reason for regional engagement was economic, namely, oil imports. The
strategic aspects of oil were equally important in the military sector. During the
1980s, the number of Turkish contractors in the region steadily increased, provid-
ing some infrastructure for regional economic cooperation and increasing Turkish
interests in the region.44 But overall, in order to pursue a subtle foreign policy in the
region, Turkey made it clear that it would not make any formal strategic commit-
ments outside the NATO framework.
Second phase: From the Post-Cold War era to the election of the AKP
(1990–2002)
Throughout the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, Turkish foreign
policy prioritized its orientation toward Europe and NATO. Regional
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Lessons learned 137
cooperation was mostly framed in political economy terms, focusing on
resources such as water, energy, and investments rather than on security. Lack of
stable institutions and regional organizations, and the contingency of broader
regional cooperation on the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict ultimately
meant that any discussions on a Middle East regional security framework were
destined to fail.
With the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s strategic objectives shifted from
containing Soviet expansion toward more US-Turkish security cooperation in
the extended region, but there was no clear alignment of US and Turkish
security objectives. Turkey’s relations with the Middle East were also proble-
matic, as the Soviet threat had been replaced by Syria, Iraq, and Iran, who
ideologically belonged to different camps.45 The 1991 Gulf War gave Turkey a
chance to reiterate its strategic importance by supporting the US-led campaign
against Iraq. However, this support backfired, as developments in the war-torn
neighborhood led to the rise of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
The Kurdish nationalist movement posed the most pressing challenge to
Turkey’s national security throughout the 1990s, and tensions with Iran and
Syria over the Kurdish issue further exacerbated the country’s security pro-
blems. Hence, Turkey perceived the Middle East as the main source of its
security concerns – one of the reasons why Turkey sought to reinforce its
military ties with Israel. But this threat perception was not the sole factor
behind Turkish-Israeli cooperation. In fact, the Turkish military’s desire to
gain access to Israel’s advanced defense technologies was another factor
behind the rapprochement of the 1990s.46
The fragmentation of the Iraqi state in the aftermath of the Gulf Wars, and
the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, led to the growth of Kurd-
ish nationalism and a de facto autonomous Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.
The guerrilla war along the southeastern border of Turkey has gone through
several stages, from cross-border attacks to truce signings, since the 1980s.
The imprisonment of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in 1999 paved the
way for the relocation of PKK leadership to the Qandil Mountains in
Northern Iraq under the leadership of Murat Karayilan. Following the US
invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United States has been reluctant to provide
military assistance to Turkey to fight Kurdish separatism, as the US forces
have been utilizing the Iraqi Kurds in the Iraqi coalition to prevent civil war.
Currently, there is an intense debate in Turkey on the possibility of opening a
dialogue with the Iraqi Kurdish leadership, using the imprisoned Abdullah
Öcalan as a facilitator. As military means have not succeeded in eliminating
the PKK threat, a political dialogue, against the backdrop of Öcalan’s call for
a truce, might be the solution. Given the United States’ interest in maintain-
ing a unified Iraq, this issue can only be resolved by involving the United
States and other regional partners. The significant alteration of balance
between the Turkish civilian and military establishments in the aftermath of
the prosecutions of military generals due to coup d’état plots is likely to
impact the course of the security strategy Turkey pursues on the Kurdish
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138 Nilsu Gören
issue – from military strategy to political dialogue. According to Henri
Barkey, the economic relations between Ankara and the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq, based as they are on oil and gas, will
have an important role in the Kurdish Peace Process, and the KRG will con-
tinue to influence the PKK, while Ankara’s relations with Baghdad will
deteriorate with the resolution of the Kurdish problem.47
Third phase: The AKP and “zero problems with neighbors”

(2002–present day)
Arguably, over the last decade there has been a shift in the Turkish mindset,
which has been emphasizing religious identity and conservatism under the
AKP government. Turkish foreign policy has been formulated as the
improvement of its regional relations and had been coined as “zero problems
with neighbors.” This shift has been defined as “turning its back on the West”
by some and “broadening its reach” by others.48 The latter is evidenced by
Turkey’s active attempts to redefine its ties with the West in the aftermath of
the Arab Uprisings. Yet, the divergence between US and Turkish security
interests has been reflected in the expansion of Turkish attention to areas
formerly neglected and in the quest for “diplomatic flexibility,”49 i.e. enhan-
cing Turkish clout in its neighborhood. Hence, Turkish security policymaking
no longer reflects isolationism from the Middle East, but rather promotes
engagement outside the traditional NATO alliance as a means to enhance
Turkish strategic interests. The “zero problems” policy encourages Turkey to
act as a mediator in regional conflicts, as well as promote economic inter-
dependence within the region.50 The AKP government defines this policy as
an extension of “strategic depth,” a concept developed by the Turkish Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu as multifaceted foreign policy and proactive peace
diplomacy in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Black Sea, the
Eastern Mediterranean, North Africa, and Western and Central Asia.51 This
new role Turkey is trying to play has been reflected in its efforts to mediate in
the Arab-Israeli conflict; contribute to solving the Iranian nuclear impasse;
attend the Arab League conferences; contribute to the UN and NATO forces
in Lebanon and Afghanistan; and assume leadership in the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation.52
In terms of the diverging US and Turkish security interests, the US had
concerns about the shift of Turkey’s regional priorities from Europe to the
Middle East, especially in the aftermath of the Gaza flotilla incident and
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s “one minute” intervention in Davos.53 Yet,
in terms of regional politics, in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings and the
rising role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, traditional relations between
the AKP government and the former Arab one-man or one-party govern-
ments are nonexistent, as in the cases of Syria and Egypt. Additionally,
Turkey’s relations with Iran have been under pressure due to Iran’s nuclear
stance, which, from the Turkish perspective, has the potential to lead to a
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Lessons learned 139
strategic rivalry for regional supremacy. The AKP’s “zero problems with
neighbors” policy has been rephrased by critics as Turkey’s “zero neighbors
without problems” policy.54 In terms of Turkey’s balancing NATO commit-
ments and regional identities, Barkey argues that between 2002 and 2007, the
AKP played a conciliatory role by meeting all sides to the Arab-Israeli con-
flict and hosting the Israeli-Syrian talks.55 Between 2007 and 2011, Turkey
attempted to be a more forceful player in the region by balancing Israel. Since
2011, Turkey has reprioritized its Western ties and focused on its domestic
struggle with democratization: the demonstrations in the summer of 2013
indicate that freedom of speech remains an unresolved issue.
With respect to the Iranian nuclear puzzle, Turkey supports Iran’s right to
peaceful nuclear energy. Energy dependency on oil and natural gas pushes
Turkey to pursue a constructive engagement policy with Iran. Yet, the pro-
spect of Iran eventually acquiring nuclear weapons capability is trouble-
some for Turkish security interests. Turkey is concerned about a
fundamental shift in the balance of power to Iran’s advantage, and fears
additional regional nuclear proliferation and/or an international military
response to a nuclear-armed Iran.56 Together with Brazil, Turkey has tried
to achieve greater consensus on containing Iranian nuclear ambitions
through a nuclear fuel swap and other cooperative measures, and not eco-
nomic sanctions, but it has failed to stop the UN Security Council vote in
2010. The Iranian aspiration to increase its influence in the Middle East has
paved the way for its geopolitical competition with Turkey, and Turkey’s
approach toward the Iranian nuclear threat has started to change. While the
Syrian conflict has diverted attention from Turkish concerns over a pre-
emptive military strike against Iran by Israel or the United States, the
public debate and the government’s declaratory policy toward Iran has
prioritized cooperative responses over coercive ones, including economic
sanctions and military responses. Barkey argues that Turkey and Iran care-
fully manage their rivalry in amity by maintaining their economic coop-
eration, i.e. trade partnership.57 Turkey vetoes all forms of NATO
cooperation with Israel and remains opposed to sanctions on Iran.
Recent political turmoil in Syria and the Turkish posture condemning the
human rights violations and loss of human lives, as well as Turkish support
for military strikes against the Assad regime have brought Iran and Turkey at
odds over Syria. But trade relations still remain significant, forcing Turkey to
try and reconcile an array of increasingly diverging interests as the UN
Security Council resolutions and the United States continue to tighten eco-
nomic sanctions on Iran. Turkey and Iran also share Kurdish minorities. In
the aftermath of the June 2013 presidential elections in Iran and Hassan
Rouhani’s election, Iranian Ambassador to Turkey Alireza Bikdeli believes
that Rouhani will seek constructive interaction with Turkey on the basis of
mutual benefit and common interest, and that a Turkish-Iranian friendship
can solve the Syria problem because Iran can act as a mediator with groups
like Hezbollah and the PKK, with which it has good relations.58
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140 Nilsu Gören
Recommendations for future arms control and regional security talks
in the Middle East
The successful aspects of the ACRS talks suggest that the next round of
security talks in the Middle East should have a nonbinding dialogue compo-
nent in order to enhance communication and alleviate concerns among the
parties. Yet, the regional security arrangement should be led by an institutional
framework that will be legally binding in order to have the decision-making
component that ACRS lacked. These talks should address regional threat
perceptions and formulate cooperative security principles before applying
cooperative threat reduction measures such as CSBMs. Without these core
principles, short-term implementation of cooperation measures on nonstrategic
matters cannot lead to a sustainable regional security architecture.
Based on the ACRS experience, future talks should aim to separate poli-
tical aspects from the technical dimensions of security cooperation, as seen in
the separation of conceptual and operational baskets. Since all agreed docu-
ments in ACRS were set aside until the final agreement could be reached, a
new formal arms control and regional security process would benefit from
revisiting what has already been agreed upon in terms of CSBMs by the same
principle. While this separation is challenging, it can be achieved, for the
arms control component of the regional security dialogue, by separating
nuclear talks from other, less politicized elements of the WMDFZ, such as
radiological and biological weapons. Last but not least, while separating the
political talks from the technical talks, a lexicon should be provided to all
parties in regional languages that explains the political and technical concepts
of arms control and regional security in order to address the lack of con-
sensus on these matters and the lack of understanding of pertinent political
and technical terms. With the older generation of former arms control nego-
tiators and technical experts gradually retiring, there is an urgently felt need
to impress that knowledge upon the next generation of professionals that
would take over such a process in the future.
Conclusion
Although Turkey had a facilitator role in ACRS due to its experience with the
OSCE and its relatively neutral stance vis-à-vis regional parties, the political
developments over the last decade have woven Turkish interests into ongoing
regional conflicts much more heavily. The AKP’s foreign policy has sent
mixed signals to the region through its unsustainable implementation of the
“zero problems” policy. Erdogan’s stance against Israel, the Syrian conflict,
and the power struggles in Iraq have eroded Ankara’s role as a credible
mediator.
A regional cooperative security framework would serve Turkish interests, as
the current security challenges in the Middle East, especially the civil war in
Syria, pose immediate threats to the country. Such a framework needs to
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Lessons learned 141
consider the context of the region’s political situation and be informed by the
European experience without rigidly following that model. In crafting its role
as a conflict mediator in the Middle East, Turkey should leverage its pool of
technological, scientific, and human resources – which compare favorably
with those of other regional actors – rather than build its credentials based on
popularity, which is volatile and unsustainable.
A Middle Eastern cooperative security framework can help countries
reduce uncertainty and risk. For any future structure, it is clear that cost-
benefit calculations need to take economic development and anti-poverty
measures, political reform, and civil conflict mitigation into consideration.
Hence, detaching the arms control talks and focusing on technical aspects of
arms control cooperation, rather than on political conflicts, can increase the
likelihood that such an initiative will succeed.
Notes
1 The author is indebted to Ambassador Süha Umar (Rtd), Ambassador Khaled G.
AbdelHamid, and Dr. Sitki Egeli for their valuable comments and contributions.
2 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Signing of the Helsinki
Final Act.”
3 Ibid.
4 Antola, “Final Report of the Helsinki Process.”
5 Ibid.
6 Landau, Arms Control in the Middle East.
7 Yaffe, “Promoting Arms Control and Regional Security.”
8 Author’s correspondence with Ambassador Süha Umar (Rtd).
9 Before that, an inter-sessional verification seminar (July 1993) and a conceptual
basket workshop (January 1994) were held in Cairo, Egypt, and an operational
basket workshop was organized in Antalya, Turkey (March 1994).
10 Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, “Arms
Control and Regional Security.”
12 Heller, “Prospects.”
13 CSCE Helsinki Document, “The Challenges of Change.”
14 Jones, “Negotiating Regional Security.”
15 Landau, “Egypt and Israel in ACRS.”
16 Yaffe, “Promoting Arms Control.”
17 Instead, this gap was filled by a number of civil society initiatives, such as the
“Search for Common Ground,” that produced a collection of papers on threat
perceptions in connection with ACRS talks. See Kane, “The Role of Civil Society.”
18 Landau, “Egypt and Israel in ACRS.”
20 Ibid.
21 Kane, “The Role of Civil Society.”
22 Canada was a mentor on maritime measures; the Netherlands on communications,
the United States and Russia were co-mentors on long-term objectives and
declaratory measures, and on verification.
23 Foundation for Middle East Peace, “The Arms Control and Regional Security
Working Group.”
24 Feldman, Nuclear Weapons.
25 Global Security, “Reliant Mermaid.”
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142 Nilsu Gören
26 During ACRS, the Turkish delegates shared their experience in creating CSBM
agreements with delegates of participant countries. For instance, Turkey and Bulgaria
signed the Sofia Document in December 1991, “pledging not to hold military exer-
cises within 15 kilometers of their mutual border, as well as to establish military
cooperation … Two months later, a friendship, good neighborliness, and security
agreement was signed between the two states.” See Uzgel, “The Balkans,” 57.
27 Bac, “Turkey and Israel.”
29 Agha, Feldman, Khalidi, and Schiff, Track II Diplomacy, 115–132.
30 Umar, who was also the Turkish Ambassador to Jordan between 1995 and 1998,
argues that Turkey partnered with Jordan also in order to influence US policies
toward the Middle East, and especially Iraq, and in order to minimize the security
costs to Turkey.
32 Ibid.
33 Nolan, ed, Global Engagement, “Foreword.”
34 Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, “A New Concept.”
36 Prince El Hassan bin Talal, “A Force for Good.”
37 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Lehman, Jones, et al. “Workshop on Arms Control.”
41 “Turkey is a party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biologi-
cal Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Wassenaar
Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee,
the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism, the Ottawa Convention, the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons and its three Protocols.”
See http://www.turkey4unsc.org/index.php.
42 Davutoğlu, “Transformation of NATO.”
43 Karaosmanoğlu, “Turkey’s Security.”
44 Ibid.
45 Tür, “Turkey’s Changing Relations.”
46 Author’s correspondence with Dr Sitki Egeli.
47 Barkey, “The Turkey-Iran-Iraq Nexus.”
48 Alessandri, “Commentary on Ulgen’s Article.”
49 Larrabee, “Turkey as a US Security Partner.”
50 Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Synopsis.”
51 Ahmetoğlu, “Strategic Depth.”
52 Taspinar, “Turkey’s Middle East Policies.”
53 On May 31, 2010, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted six vessels on the high
seas, including the lead vessel Mavi Marmara, known as the “Free Gaza Flotilla”
organized by the Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), claiming to be
bringing humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip. An armed conflict between Israeli
commandos and civilian protestors took place, leading to the death of nine flotilla
passengers and the injuring of seven Israeli soldiers. Although Israeli Prime Min-
ister Netanyahu apologized to Turkey upon President Obama’s visit to Israel in
March 2013, Turkish-Israeli relations have not been normalized yet. On a separate
note, at the 2009 World Economic Forum in Davos, Prime Minister Erdogan
walked off the stage after the moderator cut off his remarks in response to Pre-
sident Peres’ defense of the Israeli offensive against Gaza, and he furiously
requested one minute to finish his speech.
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Lessons learned 143
54 Cohen, “Between Martyrdom and Diplomacy.”
55 Barkey, “Evolution.”
56 Murdock, “Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications.”
57 Barkey, “Turkish-Iranian Competition.”
58 Good Morning Turkey, “Iranian Envoy Opposes Turkmen Gas Delivery.”
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Part III
The Middle East today
Changes, challenges, and opportunities
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8 The Helsinki Process in the

Middle East
Promoting security, development,
democracy, and peace
Gershon Baskin and Hanna Siniora
The Arab Uprisings has had an adverse effect on the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict, possibly putting it on the back burner for the next decade. In Israel, the
Likud government has not seriously engaged with resolving this conflict, and
the public has little appetite to push for change; meanwhile, Palestine’s Mah-
moud Abbas has made this issue his top priority, antagonizing Hamas in the
process. Drawing on aspects of the Helsinki Process, this chapter discusses the
prospects for a regional security framework that could help untie this
Gordian knot, against the backdrop of the major changes unfolding in the
Middle East. With the danger that, if left unattended, the present tensions
could spill into a third Intifada or a broader Arab-Israeli conflict, the authors
offer their views on alternative options for the way forward in light of
renewed diplomatic efforts.
The Arab Uprisings: Change in regime and traditional alliances

Political revolt in the Middle East has spread through almost every part of
the region, changing the political map beyond recognition. Who could have
imagined that the decades-long dictatorial regimes which have ruled Tunisia
for 24 years and Egypt for 30 years could fall as a result of public revolts? In
Libya, Muammar Gaddafi was also overthrown – after 42 years in power and
with the assistance of NATO forces. Who could have foreseen democratic
elections taking place in these countries? The power bases of politics in the
Arab world have now moved outside of the presidential palaces and the intel-
ligence headquarters into the squares and streets of the major cities. The voice
of the people is now a considerable force that all leaders in the region must take
into account.
Many pundits and analysts have argued for years that the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict has been the root cause of problems in the Middle East
and of the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. The Palestinian view has certainly been
that the festering of the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict brings long-
term damage to the Arab region, with satellite television coverage bringing
the continued conflict directly into the homes of hundreds of millions of
Arabs and Muslims. The Palestinian people’s suffering is experienced daily
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150 Gershon Baskin and Hanna Siniora
under Israel’s occupation of their land. Although there are periods when the
brutality of the Syrian regime against its own people or the turmoil in Egypt
take center stage, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains front page news and
the primary focus of media reports. The centrality of this conflict in the region
is manifested not so much by the outpouring of public support for the Palesti-
nian people, but rather by the frequent animosity and hatred felt toward Israel.
Meanwhile, Israeli analysts would offer a completely different explanation of
the current situation: they see the Arab world as filled with its own internal
problems and conflicts that mainly stem from a lack of democracy; the
existence of backward economic systems effectively on life support from oil
revenues; and the presence of radical Islam.
More than two years after the Arab Uprisings began, the Middle East
remains an area of great uncertainty, with basic political stability in question
and the ability of governments to stay in power questioned in almost every
country, from Morocco in the west to Iraq and Iran in the east – with the
exception of Israel. During the summer of 2011, a widespread social protest
movement developed also in Israel, bringing hundreds of thousands of Israelis
into the streets. The movement’s demonstrations were not aimed at over-
throwing the government; rather, they were part of a primarily middle-class
revolt that was sparked by the rising cost of living and the neoliberal economic
policies of the Israeli government, which has been privatizing public services for
years. Notably, the leaders of the protesting factions went to great lengths to
keep the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the occupation issue off the agenda.
Whilst most issues on the agenda of the summer 2011 protests were not
resolved, the masses did not take to the streets again in the following summers –
either disappointed with the results of their 2011 protests or distracted by the
unfolding events in the region and heated debates on the Iranian nuclear threat.
Anxiety over the Uprisings – which have uprooted secular dictatorial regimes
in the region, only to replace them, potentially or already, with military and
Islamic political movements – was felt particularly acutely in Israel. The
models of existing Islamic regimes, such as the one in Iran, and Islamic mili-
tant movements, like Hezbollah and Hamas, fuel fears in Israel that a regional
peace process could hardly yield anything positive. An illustrative example of
the rhetoric espoused by some of the Islamist leaders is the sentiment recently
expressed by the Deputy Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, leading
Hamas official Sheik Ahmad Bahr: “Oh, Allah, destroy the Jews and their
supporters … and the Americans and their supporters … Oh, Allah, count
them one by one, and kill them all, without leaving a single one.”1
The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its Palestinian
Authority (PA) also have great concerns regarding the rise of political Islam
in the region, since the secular Palestinian national movement has been the
principal representative of Arab political views. In addition, ousted Egyptian
leader Hosni Mubarak and former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben
Ali were both great allies of the Palestinian people and their leadership, with
Ben Ali providing the PLO with a home base in exile from 1982 to 1994. In
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The Helsinki Process in the Middle East 151
contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership was more closely aligned with
the Palestinian Hamas movement, the archrivals of the PLO. The rise of
political Islam in the region has not made the process of internal Palestinian
reconciliation any easier, and Egypt’s efforts to bring the parties closer toge-
ther have petered out with Morsi’s removal from power.
The Arab Uprisings can be characterized as the redrawing of the Arab
political map: previously dominated by autocratic regimes, it has turned to
“greener shades” with the rise of political Islam throughout the region, but
that still poses great challenges to liberal secular democrats, who were at the
core of the revolts together with Islamic groups. When the time came for
elections in Tunisia and Egypt, liberal democrats failed to secure electoral
victories, despite the fact that sizeable portions of the local populations were
supportive of their views.2 Whilst a number of secular, liberal, Western-oriented
political parties and candidates have sprung up, their lack of organization, the
absence of coalition-building skills, and the wealth of the Islamist parties have
left these democratic forces on the sideline. The West, which has promoted
democratic developments in the region for decades (while supporting con-
servative dictatorships at the same time), must now contend with the reality of
a military regime in Egypt and democratically elected governments led by
political Islamist parties in other countries.
From the Arab vantage point, the West has committed two grave mistakes
when it was promoting reform within the region: first, after the Islamic par-
ties won the elections in the mid-1990s in Algeria, the French and the West
lent overwhelming support to the National Liberation Front3 to prevent the
Islamic parties from assuming power, which ultimately led to civil war.
Second, a similar mistake was committed by Israel, the United States, and the
European Union (EU) in preventing Hamas from taking effective power after
they won the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. The International Quartet
(US, EU, UN, and Russia) demanded that Hamas recognize Israel, adhere to
previously signed agreements with Israel, and renounce violence as conditions
for Hamas to take part in peace negotiations and aid renewal. Hamas refused
to accept those demands, and then the Quartet refused to engage with the
Hamas-led government. As a result of this step (and other steps taken on
both sides of the divide), friction grew between Fatah and Hamas, leading to
a governance split between the West Bank (Fatah) and Gaza (Hamas) and
leaving the Palestinians deeply divided. This split, while not tantamount to a
civil war, has served as one of the factors jeopardizing the move toward
Palestinian liberation and independence. If Israel were to negotiate with the
West Bank leadership under the PLO, it is not clear what the fate of Gaza
would be. The rapprochement between Hamas and Morsi’s Egypt had raised
the subject of Gaza becoming a separate entity in the 2012 round of talks.
And although such an idea quickly lost support after Morsi’s ouster, with
both Palestinian factions in search of powerful backers, we might be moving
toward a new reality in which the two-state solution refers to two Palestinian
states – one in the West Bank and one in Gaza.
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Following the democratic elections in Egypt that brought the leader of the
Muslim Brotherhood to power, and his subsequent ouster by the military, it
appears that the West has been handling the new situation with extra caution,
encouraging leadership pragmatism and moderation. Nevertheless, the new
governing factions in the Middle East have been eager to show themselves as
responsible members of the international community: for instance, amidst
growing fears that Egypt would renege on its peace treaty with Israel, then-
President Mohamed Morsi exchanged letters with Israeli Prime Minister
Shimon Peres; security and military officials from both sides met face-to-face in
September 2012 and reached agreements that would see Egypt introduce addi-
tional troops into the Sinai to fight Jihadi terrorist groups there. It is possible to
envision that Egypt could follow the Turkish model of political Islam, main-
taining a secular democracy inspired by Islamic law and advocating con-
servative social agendas, but not infringing on basic human rights, especially
the rights of minorities – in contrast to the model of post-revolutionary Iran.
Indeed, similar to the Turkish government’s removal of the military as the pri-
mary guarantor of the constitution, one of Morsi’s first acts was to fire the
heads of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and limit its
powers. However, his subsequent removal highlighted Egypt’s deep internal
divisions about the way forward: on the one hand, many condemned the mili-
tary deposing a democratically elected leader after his first year in office, but on
the other, many were awed by Morsi’s heavy-handed policies.
From the Israeli vantage point, the Arab Spring is often perceived as the
“Islamic Winter”: continuing instability and Islamic-party-led governments
are perceived in Israel as a mounting threat. Indeed, some of the political
platforms of the newly empowered contain anti-Israeli sentiments: for
instance, the Tunisian government has reinstated laws prohibiting any contact
with Israelis or any cooperation with them. Such positions are often not
connected at all to Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories; rather,
they run against Israel’s very existence. Ironically, expressed political positions
that do not envisage Israel as a part of the region strengthen the antagonistic
elements in Israel that do not see themselves as part of the region either. For
most Israelis, the Middle East is becoming a more frightening and less wel-
coming neighborhood than ever before. An Israeli glancing out around the
“neighborhood” sees the Islamic regime of Hamas in the south launching
rockets and mortars at its civilian population with increasing intensity and
lethality, and the Islamic regime of Hezbollah in the north – the closest ally of
the Iranian regime and effectively in control of the Lebanese government –
pointing thousands of rockets at its territory. The turmoil in Syria is likely to
bring an end to the Assad regime, which has maintained Israel’s quietest
border since May 1974, when US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger nego-
tiated the agreement for the separation of forces.4 The Syrian opposition has
failed to present an organized political front so far, and groups antagonistic to
Israel, ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood to Al-Qaeda affiliates and other
radical Islamist elements, have established a significant presence amongst the
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rebel fighting forces. In this continuing state of civil war, the uncertainty
regarding the security and management of Syria’s substantial arsenal of che-
mical weapons and rockets has been at the forefront of Israel’s concerns.5 In
addition, Israel is watching with great concern as Iran advances a nuclear pro-
gram with the potential for weaponization and continues to develop missiles
capable of hitting any point in Israel.6
The Palestinian leadership is also not on the best terms with the Islamic
political parties in the region. Iran’s relationship with the Palestinian leader-
ship has been tense ever since the PLO signed the Oslo Agreement in 1993.
Relations worsened when Iran increased its financial and military support of
the PLO’s adversaries, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Iran’s allies, Hezbollah and
the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, have had antagonistic relations with
the Palestinian leadership as well. The Palestinian street, generally more reli-
gious and conservative than its leadership, cheered the revolutions in Tunisia,
Egypt, and Libya and was glad when the dictators there fell. The victories of
the Arab street in throwing out dictators served as an inspiration for Palesti-
nians, not vis-à-vis their own leadership, but rather with respect to the Israeli
occupation: they hoped for the Arab Uprisings to spill into the streets of
Palestine. In March 2011, there was a small attempt on the part of the
Palestinians at organizing under the title “the March 15 movement.” Young
Palestinians have called for demonstrations across Palestine, which would be
mostly aimed at forcing Hamas and the PLO to reunite and take on the
occupation together; however, the movement has made no significant pro-
gress. Nevertheless, some believe that President Abbas and Hamas leader
Khaled Mashal did internalize the call of the streets, which in February 2012
and again in April 2014 led them to agree on reconciliation deals and to form
a unity government. However, strong internal resistance in both Fatah and
Hamas has so far prevented the implementation of the deal.
The Arab Peace Initiative

In addition to changes brought about by the Arab Uprisings, two other sig-
nificant developments have taken place. First, Palestine has been admitted as
a non-member state to the UN under General Assembly Resolution 67/19 on
November 29, 2012. Some Palestinians have taken this to mean the recogni-
tion of Palestine within the borders as they existed on June 4, 1967, implying
that the former Occupied Territories are now recognized as the State of
Palestine and are not disputed territories. The second major development has
been the relaunching of direct peace talks in the region following the tireless
efforts of US Secretary of State John Kerry. Since the PLO has accepted the
principle of minor land swaps to incorporate the majority of Israeli settlers in
the West Bank into the borders of Israel, it is imperative to recognize the
possibility of resettlement programs for both sides in the now disputed terri-
tories of 1947–1967. Both parties have violated the principle of an interna-
tional regime for Jerusalem, and the only way to resolve the contentions
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might be to have two sovereign entities over Jerusalem: Israel over the
Western part and Palestine over the Eastern part. The Old City of Jerusalem
could also be put under an international regime to safeguard and manage the
Holy Places; alternatively, God’s sovereignty could be declared over the Old
City and the religious leaders – bishops, rabbis, and imams – could be
appointed to manage its affairs. The possibility of adopting the concept of
divine sovereignty over the Holy Places in Jerusalem, especially over the
Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif seems to have significant support amongst
religious leaders and clergy, even within the Hamas movement.
Against the backdrop of security concerns discussed above, and the efforts
to reinvigorate direct bilateral peace talks between Israel and Palestine, it is
worth revisiting the Arab Peace Initiative (API) as a promising model for a
comprehensive regional peace agreement. The API was launched at the Beirut
Summit of the League of Arab States in March 2002 and was the first com-
prehensive Arab attempt to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. The initiative offers
full peace and normal relations between Israel and all the Arab states in
return for Israel’s withdrawal from territories occupied after June 4, 1967, as
well as an agreed solution to the refugee problem and the establishment of a
Palestinian state. Unfortunately, it coincided with the peak of the second
Palestinian Intifada and did not receive due consideration that such a pro-
gressive proposal deserved at that time. Over the past decade, at every inter-
national meeting with Israeli and Arab participants, the subject of the API
has inevitably been raised, with most Arabs quite frustrated that their initia-
tive went without a positive Israeli response. On the day that it was presented,
though, 30 Israelis were killed and 140 injured (20 seriously injured) in a sui-
cide bombing at the Park Hotel in the coastal city of Netanya, in the midst of
the Passover holiday seder, with Hamas claiming responsibility for the attack.
This was the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back, leading to the
Israeli offensive operation Defensive Shield for the full reoccupation of
the West Bank and the placing of Palestinian President Yasser Arafat under
siege in the muqata’ in Ramallah. With suicide bombings as a daily occur-
rence, many in Israel, under the leadership of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon,
were hardly in the mood to consider the API.
In April 2011, a group of prominent Israeli academics, civil activists, and
former security chiefs published the Israeli Peace Initiative (IPI) as a direct
response to the API,7 but this initiative has failed so far to engage the Israeli
leadership and public in serious discussion. One of the main reasons for
Israel’s reluctance to engage on the API is that the API mentions UN Reso-
lution 194, which is the foundation of the Arab claims for the right of return
for the 1948 war refugees to their homes in Israel. Additional Israeli objec-
tions include the direct reference to the June 4, 1967 borders as permanent
ones between Israel and a future Palestinian state. Israel claims that, in
border negotiations with the Palestinians, the principle of territorial exchan-
ges has already been accepted and that the 1967 borders ignore the new rea-
lities on the ground and the very tenuous nature of those borders for Israel.
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The most objectionable and perhaps the most misunderstood aspect of the
API for Israelis is the sense that this is a “take it or leave it document.” If this
is the case, then the majority of Israelis would “leave it.”
The Israeli understanding is that the API is not a peace plan. It has no opera-
tive aspects to it, no mechanism for implementation, and no clear plan for how it
should even begin. The only operative part of the initiative runs as follows:
The council … requests the chairman of the summit to form a special

committee composed of some of its concerned member states and the
Secretary General of the League of Arab States to pursue the necessary
contacts to gain support for this initiative at all levels, particularly from
the United Nations, the Security Council, the United States of America,
the Russian Federation, the Muslim states and the European Union.
Israel is conspicuously left off this list. Israeli analysts, who view the API as a
positive document, believe that the Arab League needs to address the Israeli
concerns, not ignore them, as has been the case since the API was first pre-
sented in 2002. They hold that the Arab League should find a way to state
that the API is a framework, a basis, or a platform for renewing the Peace
Process, rather than a document that must be accepted in full or rejected in
full. King Abdullah II of Jordan had proposed an “Arab peace deposit”
(mirroring the so-called “Rabin Deposit” on the Golan Heights)8 that would
in fact provide some clarifications or additional incentives to Israel to accept
the API. President Obama, during his first year in office, tried to convince the
Saudis to offer some confidence-building measures to Israel, including the
right of Israeli civilian aircraft to fly over Saudi Arabia on their eastern
routes, but the Saudis rejected this request.
Inside the Arab world, the API enjoys broad support: it was accepted
unanimously by all of the member states of the Arab League and unan-
imously ratified again at the League of Arab States meetings in Khartoum in
May 2006, in Riyadh in March 2007, and, most recently, in Baghdad in
March 2012. Notably, half of the leaders of the Arab states did not attend the
2012 summit, but at least 10 Arab leaders did. Gone were the authoritarian
leaders of Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen. Syria, suspended from the group ever
since it began waging a bloody campaign against anti-government forces and
protesters, was represented by an empty chair. Colonel Qaddafi was dead,
shot by rebels in October 2011 in the very city where the Arab League staged
its 2010 meeting. Despite the turmoil and the uncertainty (and despite not
engaging in any real discussion), the Arab countries decided to keep their
peace initiative on the table, while Israel continued to ignore it and to relate
to it as a nonstarter. The PLO’s Negotiation Affairs Department has posted
on their website a document of frequently asked questions and answers about
the API, indicating clear support for the initiative,9 and the Al Jazeera pub-
lished as part of “Palestine Papers” an email from the Negotiations Support
Unit discussing a planned PLO media campaign in support of the API.10
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Among the primary benefits of the API, according to this campaign, is its
offer to end Israel’s diplomatic and economic isolation through the normal-
ization of relations with the Arab states, as well as its envisaging a compre-
hensive regional security framework that promises to address the root causes
of the conflict.11
The Arab world has tried to impress upon Israelis what is new and revolu-
tionary in the Initiative, but Israelis have failed to understand or accept this. This
initiative, calling for “achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee
problem to be agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolu-
tion 194,” is the first time that an Arab document uses the word “agreed” in this
context – meaning this issue would be negotiated between the parties. In its
operative paragraph on refugees, the Resolution states the following:
The refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their
neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date
and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing
not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under princi-
ples of international law or in equity, should be made good by the gov-
ernments or authorities responsible.
The resolution does not state that all refugees must be allowed to return, and
it opens the door for those who do not wish to return to receive financial
compensation instead. An agreement between Israel and the PLO that would
award Palestinian refugees compensation instead of return would certainly
fulfill the requirements of the API and should not hinder Israeli agreement to
the Initiative.
Some of the API’s key drafters, such as Amr Moussa, the previous Secre-
tary General of the League of Arab States, and Marwan Muasher, the former
Jordanian Foreign Minister and Ambassador of Jordan to the State of Israel,
have framed it as a means of providing Israel with irresistible incentives to
make peace with the Palestinians. The simple way of putting it was to offer
Israel a deal that, for the price of peace with the Palestinians, would let it gain
peace with 22 Arab states and many more Muslim countries. They believed
that eliminating the threats to Israeli security that may potentially emanate
from Arab states would encourage Israel to take bolder steps toward peace.
Unfortunately, successive Israeli governments have failed to see the enormous
potential value of the offer and have not even responded formally to the API.
For Palestinians, the right of return is one of the three issues central to
resolving the conflict. The other two issues are a Palestinian state within the
June 4, 1967 borders, with minor adjustments through bilateral land swaps,
and Israeli recognition of East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian
state. In Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the PLO recognized West Jerusalem
as the capital of Israel and, in turn, a corresponding Israeli recognition of
East Jerusalem as the capital of the future State of Palestine is expected. The
Oslo Process assumes the understanding that the future of East and West
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Jerusalem will be decided through negotiations. In order to benefit from the
API, Israel must allow for the creation of an independent sovereign Palesti-
nian state, within borders that will be mutually acceptable to Israel and the
PLO, with East Jerusalem as its capital. Many people in the Israeli security
community understand these terms to be within Israeli national security
interests, although it is not clear whether the current Israeli government still
adheres to this general philosophy. Indeed, the API offer may not stay open
indefinitely: in August 2012, the Mufti of Al-Azhar University in Cairo,
Dr Ahmed al-Tayyeb, urged the leaders of the 57 Muslim states to withdraw
the Arab Peace Initiative in response to Israeli aggression against Jerusalem
and the Al-Aqsa Mosque, pointing out that only 20% of historic Palestine is
still available for a Palestinian state.12
Even after concluding a final peace accord with the Palestinians, Israel
would still need to negotiate with Lebanon and Syria a solution to the Shebaa
Farms issue and the withdrawal from the Golan Heights as part of peace
agreements with these countries. No longer having to fear a potential war on
its northern border is also clearly in Israel’s national security interest. With
Syria in crisis and Bashar al-Assad as an unacceptable leader in the eyes of
the Arab majority, the possibility of negotiating the future of the Golan
Heights is currently off the table, at least until a new government is formed in
Damascus.
The most significant element of the Initiative from an Israeli perspective is
its call for the recognition of the State of Israel, full peace, and normalized
relations between all the member states of the Arab League and Israel, with
the latter reference being of particular significance. The notion of normalizing
relations with Israel has been a steadfast taboo in Arab political culture since
1948, so the Arab League’s call for normalized relations is no less than a
political revolution. This is almost too good to be true, and had it been pre-
sented before the second Intifada, it might have been received much more
positively in Israel.13
Domestic and regional factors

At the time of the writing of this chapter, the peace camp among Israeli Jews
was not particularly strong. An August 2013 poll showed that while 63.8% of
Jewish respondents favored peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority
(compared to 67.9% support among the general public), 67.1% did not
believe it could lead to peace in the coming years (the level of skepticism
among the general public was somewhat similar at 64%).14
Many in Israel seem particularly skeptical of the “land for peace” schemes;
there is a broad perception that, after withdrawing from areas in the West
Bank and creating the Palestinian Authority under Arafat, Israel was
attacked with the weapons it had provided to the Palestinian Authority in the
first place. With respect to Gaza, Israel has completely withdrawn from the
territory – in terms of the presence of settlements and military outposts – only
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to be shelled with Qassam and Grad rockets. Whether this skepticism reflects
reality and why things have unfolded the way they have seems less relevant
than the pervasiveness of this view among Israelis – and in this context, the
API is not particularly attractive.
Israelis seem to primarily want security and quiet. They only want to be
part of the Middle East neighborhood if the threat of terrorism is addressed.
Most Israelis are very skeptical that real peace is a possibility, and it is
because of this skepticism that they no longer believe that the best way to
achieve security is by giving back territory. During the days when the Oslo
Agreement was popular and there was hope that peace could actually emerge,
it was possible to talk about “peace and security.” Today, the philosophy of
the Netanyahu government, and the political culture and mood that brought
it to power, is that first there must be security and only then can there be
peace. This is not merely a game of semantics. This is a widely held view, and
it is essential to understand it in order to be able to understand the Israel of
2014. Israel is willing to grant peace and quiet in exchange for peace and
quiet. Israelis are not interested in wars with their neighbors, but they have
now become quite sensitive to their neighbors’ verbal threats. The rhetoric
against Israel from Iran, Turkey, Tunisia, and lately also from Egypt, is not
taken lightly in Jerusalem. It is understood to be in the interest of both sides
to keep the 35-year-old Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, but the instability in
Egypt and deteriorating security in Sinai have led the Israeli army to start
implementing plans for the reestablishment of a robust southern command,
which could conceivably be called to duty.
The enormous weapons smuggling trade, coming primarily out of Libya, has
created a lawless reality in the Sinai Peninsula.15 In August 2012, a terrorist
attack killed 16 Egyptian officers, and in August 2013, elements of the global
Jihadi movement launched two rockets from Sinai into the Israeli resort town
of Eilat. Since the Egyptian Uprising, experts in Israel have been warning
about the development of cells affiliated with the global Jihadi movement in
Sinai, observing that they have started to set up bases of operation there. Over
the past two years, the new government in Egypt has engaged in a wide mili-
tary operation against Jihadi and al Qaeda cells, as well as Bedouin criminal
elements in the area. Israel believes that Hamas and other groups in control of
Gaza are intentionally using Sinai as a base from which to attack Israel in
order to provoke an Israeli attack in Sinai, which could snowball into a larger
conflict and result in the annulment of the Israeli-Egyptian treaty.
The Israeli government and the general public are not enticed anymore by
promises of normalization, acceptance, and free movement in the region. This
is the “heart” of the API, and it has not produced the desired results in the past
number of years. The Israeli government and general public insist on seeing
actions: they want to see real evidence of a willingness to make peace with
Israel that goes above and beyond words, including evidence of a genuine
acceptance of Israel in the region: this evidence would include the recognition
not only of Israel’s existence, but of its very right to exist as the nation-state of
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the Jewish People. This seems quite unlikely to happen. The demand to recog-
nize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish People first appeared in the
demands made by Israel’s former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni in the negotia-
tions for the final statement of the Annapolis Peace Summit in November
2007. This demand was fully adopted by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and
verbalized in his famous Bar Ilan University speech in June 2009, where he
recognized the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since then,
Israel has emphasized that this is not a precondition for negotiations, but rather
the desired outcome of such negotiations. This is a hurdle which today is per-
ceived as being too high for the Palestinians to cross for two main reasons:
recognizing Israel’s Jewish character, they believe, jeopardizes the rights of
Israel’s more than one million Palestinian citizens and would remove the issue
of the future status and rights of Palestinian refugees from the negotiating
agenda. Israeli officials have stated that Palestinian recognition of the Jewish
character of Israel would go far in terms of advancing Israeli willingness to
make more significant compromises. Unfortunately, there is no way to test this
without actually playing the card, a move which does not seem likely.
The steady stream of violent attacks by the extremist factions amongst
Israeli settlers in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, leading to regular
Palestinian retaliations, is indicative of the fact that security forces are gra-
dually losing control over these areas, risking a serious upsurge in violence.
As a much needed first step, Israeli and Palestinian security forces should
open a channel of cooperation to address these daily skirmishes. Subse-
quently, the geographic scope of the area under full Israeli military control
(so-called “Area C”) could be reduced, opening up more economic develop-
ment opportunities in the West Bank and allowing the Palestinian Authority
to work on economic improvements.
It seems that while the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may not have been at the
core of regional developments since 2011, it remains at the core of any
possible future regional process. The rise of political Islam in the region may
pose additional challenges in this realm, although the subject of the recogni-
tion of Israel has not been a major electoral campaign issue in any of the
countries in the region so far. If it were possible to resolve all of the issues
mentioned above, it would provide the means for achieving peace between
Israel and all of the Arab world in addition to the overwhelming majority of
the Muslim world. If this were to occur, the geographic area at peace with
Israel would extend from Marrakesh all the way to Bangladesh. As Iran is
not a member of the League of Arab States, it would be the only country
outside of this region of peace.16
The Iranian threat – The Israeli threat: Regional threat perceptions

The main regional concern from Israel’s perspective is the Iranian nuclear
program. Israel perceives nuclear weapons in the hands of the regime in Iran
as a direct existential threat that could lead to a new Middle East war. Israel
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is also concerned that Iran’s development of nuclear weapons capability could
spark an arms race that would include Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, as
well as other states from the region. Additional concerns include nuclear fuel
(enriched uranium of any grade) getting into the hands of non-state actors,
rogue organizations, or Jihadi terrorists. Israel believes that most of the Gulf
countries would not be displeased if an Israeli attack disabled the Iranian
nuclear program.
When analyzing Iran’s behavior as a signatory to the convention, the entire
validity of the NPT regime comes into question. Iranian non-compliance with
IAEA demands for full access to all nuclear-related facilities, acknowledged
and suspected, leaves few tools to ensure effective monitoring. During the
IAEA inspections in May 2012, traces of uranium enriched to above 20%
were detected, thereby disclosing yet another breach of Iran’s own com-
mitments and policies.17 Iran has also developed additional sites, formerly
undisclosed, where enrichment activities are taking place.
However, there seem to be few who believe that an Israeli attack against
Iran would be contained to a war solely between Israel and Iran. The stability
of the entire Gulf would be at risk – and with it the continued flow of oil to
the rest of the world. Meanwhile, from the Palestinian perspective, the Iranian
nuclear threat is somewhat secondary, since Israel is presently the only state in
the region with a nuclear arsenal. Palestinians are concerned about Israel’s
aging nuclear reactor in Dimona, in their own backyard. They are also well
aware that in the First Gulf War Saddam Hussein’s Scud rockets targeted the
reactor, as did Hezbollah rockets in the Second Lebanon War, and many
Palestinians fear the consequences of nuclear fallout in the case of a direct hit
on the Israeli nuclear reactor.18
The perception of Iran as a threat has been adopted by the Western powers,
and economic sanctions were mounting. The lack of full cooperation on the
part of Russia and China in joining the harsher sanctions limits their impact.
The European Union, Canada, and the United States have stepped up the
sanctions, concerned about a possible unilateral Israeli military strike against
Iran, and Canada has cut off diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic.
Nevertheless, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s speech at the UN in October 2013,
criticizing the Iranian nuclear program, seemed, instead, to spark more talks
about finding a way to end Israel’s policy of opacity regarding its presumed
nuclear weapons program. Indeed, numerous articles in the Israeli press
have since suggested that Israel’s aggressive global advocacy against Iran’s
nuclear program could end up bringing forth similar demands for Israel to
disclose its own program, place it under international inspection, disarm, and
join the NPT.
Egypt has historically been the main advocate of forcing Israel to fully
disarm its nuclear capacity even under Mubarak. During the 1992–1995
Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) in the Middle East talks, held
as part of the multilateral working groups created by the Madrid Process,
Egypt led the demands for Israel to open its nuclear facilities to international
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inspections. Despite the tumultuous domestic political situation following the
Arab Uprisings, Egypt has been no less demanding on this issue. In addition,
following the United States-Russia agreement on a program for removing
chemical weapons from Syria and the UN Security Council giving Chapter 7
authorization for the use of force, discussions in the region and around the
world have intensified over the possibility of renewed talks on a Weapons of
Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East. The Palestinian
position on the Iranian nuclear program has also been to negotiate for a
WMDFZ encompassing the entire Middle East, requiring Israel to open its
nuclear installations for IAEA inspections and join the Zone.
It is impossible to discuss the Helsinki Process, regional arms control,
and regional peace initiatives without considering the possibility of an
Israeli-Iranian war. There is a declining confidence in Israel that the inter-
national community will prevent Iran from reaching the status of a nuclear-
armed state, despite the hard-line position consistently voiced by the US
President. The international (P5+1) talks continue, and following the elec-
tion of Hassan Rouhani, the odds for constructive international dialogue
have increased. During his tenure, Benjamin Netanyahu has alluded to the
historic task that he confronts in preventing Iran from developing a nuclear
bomb. The Israeli public is basically evenly split on the issue of an Israeli
preemptive strike, although a large majority would prefer for the United
States and other members of the international community to lead an attack
against Iran; however, as with any military escapade, while it is possible to
know how it may begin, it is impossible to know how it would end. Indeed,
while Iran has the ability to sustain a long-term military conflict, and it has
done as much with the war against Iraq carried out from 1980 to 1988,
Israel probably does not have the ability to wage a multi-year war. This
gives one reason to believe that if Israel decided to launch a preemptive
strike, it would likely be one of devastating proportions (albeit short of a
nuclear attack) not limited in scope to Iranian nuclear installations, as such
strikes would only cripple the enrichment program for a limited amount of
time. Instead, Israeli military calculus would likely instigate a punitive
attack with a view toward deterring possible Iranian nuclear weapons pur-
suit by inflicting costs unacceptable to the Iranian government and people.
This is, by the way, the same strategy that was used in the Second Lebanon
War in 2006 and in the 2008 operation Cast Lead in Gaza. The Israelis call
it “the landlord has gone crazy” strategy, referring to the idea that Israel’s
enemies should be afraid of Israel’s willingness to use a disproportionate
amount of force in order to create effective deterrence to avoid future
rounds of violence. In hindsight, it appears that this strategy has in fact
worked.
The other aspect of a potential Iranian-Israeli crisis that needs to be con-
sidered is the possibility of Israel having to enter the NPT regime and be
asked to dismantle its nuclear capacity. In the 2010 Review Conference of the
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Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Action
Plan called for convening:
a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on

the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all
other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely
arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and
engagement of the nuclear-weapon States.19
The United Nations did appoint Finland to host the organization of the con-
ference, and many consultations have already taken place between Finnish
representatives and regional parties. However, so far the regional parties have
not been able to reach an agreement on the mandate, agenda, modalities, and
purpose of the proposed meeting. In November 2012, the three NPT deposi-
taries announced the postponement of the Middle East conference, which was
tentatively scheduled for December 2012, with no concrete date for convening
the meeting. Israel perceives itself as the only UN member state whose existence
is currently under threat from another member state, Iran, and the two are
unlikely to agree to sit at the table as equals under these circumstances. Israel
has not ruled out the possibility of eventually attending such a conference, but it
has indicated its dissatisfaction with the conference being framed within the
context of the NPT, particularly because the NPT has failed to stem the weap-
ons programs of North Korea and possibly Iran. Additionally, Israel is likely to
insist that the conference be more attuned to regional realities and address the
new threats that emerged in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings. Meanwhile,
Iran views the conference as being solely directed against its right to develop
nuclear energy, pointing to the international community’s failure to get Israel to
enter the NPT regime. Iran did agree to participate in the conference, but only
after it was clear that it would not be taking place any time soon. Nevertheless,
the newly elected President Hassan Rouhani has been actively looking to the
international community again, launching a “charm offensive” in a historic
appearance at the UN in September 2013 and in subsequent interviews with the
US media, as well as Iranian willingness under the Joint Plan of Action signed
in November 2013 to dilute half of its 20% enriched uranium, and to convert the
other half to 20 % enriched uranium during a six month period.
Any way it is examined, either from the point of view of Iranian non-
compliance or from the point of view of Israeli refusal to even enter regional
discussion on its nuclear capacity, it seems impossible to imagine progress on
a regional or even international level at this time on regional arms control.
Perhaps the only possibility for moving forward in this area would be a deci-
sion to create several subregional WMDFZs. The Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) could decide to become a WMDFZ. In fact, in December 2005, the
Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council called for a subregional
accord on such a zone comprising the six Gulf states, Iran, Iraq, and Yemen.
While the League of Arab States did not formally endorse the GCC initiative,
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GCC states continue to support preparations for a constructive conference on
a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East. The states of
the Maghreb could do the same. There are also precedents for states joining
existing NWFZs in their region years later: South Africa joined the African
Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone after dismantling its 6 nuclear devices, and
Brazil and Argentina joined the Latin American Zone after civilian govern-
ments got into power and nuclear weapons programs were cancelled.
Deadlock, stalemates, CBMs and CSBMs

Israel and Palestine have renewed direct negotiations in mid-2013 under the
leadership of US Secretary of State John Kerry. At the time of writing, 9
months have been allocated for those negotiations, with Kerry insisting that it
is possible to reach a permanent peace agreement between Israel and Pales-
tine within that time frame. However, the talks did not produce such an
agreement, and alternatives must be developed to mitigate the chances of the
resumption of violence between the two parties.
The Helsinki model could certainly be useful in the case of another round of
failures in the Peace Process by inviting, as a start, some of the parties of the
region to discuss utilizing the API as a regional tool for conflict resolution, and
by creating a mechanism that dispels the Israeli impression that the API is a
“take it or leave it” proposal. The challenge before the international commu-
nity – which is interested in advancing Middle East peace, arms control, and
democracy in the Middle East as well as providing human security to the peo-
ples of the region – is to create a mechanism that could bring the parties back
to the table. The Madrid Peace Conference of 1991 gathered almost all parties
and launched bilateral talks between Israel and all of its neighbors in addition
to a multilateral track dealing with regional economic development, arms con-
trol, refugees, water, and the environment. The international community, led by
the Quartet composed of the United States, the EU, the UN, and Russia –
particularly after a successful round of United States-Russia diplomacy on the
issue of chemical weapons in Syria – needs to accept the challenge of creating a
new Madrid Process that would serve as the basis for resolving bilateral and
multilateral issues. With a looming Iranian crisis and ongoing civil war in
Syria, the issue of regional arms control warrants special and urgent attention.
For instance, during the Cold War, unofficial talks among officials and
academics took place across the Western-Soviet divide. Similarly, the inter-
national community could initially convene a series of Track 2 meetings in
which not all the Arab parties have to be present if they choose not to parti-
cipate. Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, perhaps some of the Gulf
states, and Iran could be invited along with the Quartet representatives to
facilitate the process. It should start as an academic exercise that relays to the
Israeli and Palestinian leadership any progress in the deliberations. At a later
stage, additional willing officials from an expanded list of nations, such as
Turkey, could be invited to attend in order to contribute to the discussion on
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moving the process forward. While there is a rich history and culture of suc-
cessful Track 2 initiatives in the region led by local organizations and insti-
tutions, as well as regional and international bodies, the main challenge has
always been transferring the knowledge and the positive atmosphere of Track
2 into an effective and successful Track 1 initiative. In order for this to
happen, as it did in the original Oslo talks of 1993, some of the leading aca-
demic Track 2 participants would have to develop the means to bear serious
influence over politicians and decision-makers – which is no easy task.
In almost all talks about arms control, the first steps proposed are usually
confidence-building measures (CBMs). CBMs play an important role in gra-
dually enhancing previously strained relations, or relations between states in
conflict where trust has been undermined or nonexistent. Confidence- and
security-building measures (CSBMs) are more military-oriented and allow
adversary states to reassure each other that their intentions are not aggressive.
At this point, in the summer of 2014, it is hard to imagine effective CBMs or
CSBMs – yet they are precisely what is necessary. Perhaps this is where civil
society can best play a constructive role.
In March 2012, when the rhetoric between Israeli and Iranian leadership
heated up, peace activists in Israel reached out to Iranian citizens by “bom-
barding” them with a single message: “We love you.”20 Videos were posted
showing Israelis of all ages and classes sending messages of love and peace to
Iranians, and in a single day, one of the videos was viewed almost 40,000
times. Some Iranian citizens answered the call and made their own responses
videos to Israelis.21 Another instance of civil society participation is the work
of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, which launched the “Academic
Peace Orchestra Middle East” as a classic Track 2 initiative: the “Orchestra”
consists of some 70 experts – mainly from the Middle East, including the
Gulf. The Orchestra meets regularly in working groups (“Chamber Orchestra
Units”) on specific topics in the context of a nine-part conference cycle taking
place over 2011–2014.22 The main goal of this initiative is to shape the
Middle East Conference on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of
mass destruction and their delivery vehicles (DVs), agreed upon by the NPT
Review Conference in May 2010. The experts develop ideas, concepts, and
background information in a series of some 40 policy briefs, which are the
results of intense discussions within the Chamber Orchestra Units. The pro-
ducts of the project are released under the series title “Policy Brief for the
Middle East Conference on a WMD/DVs Free Zone” and sent to high-
ranking decision-makers in the Middle East, diplomats, and the media.
Initiatives toward positive change
Gaza at the crossroads of opportunity

After the fall of the Morsi government in Egypt and the Egyptian decision to
seal off Gaza from Sinai, the Hamas government is facing severe shortages of
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cash and electric power. This has led to an increased sense of strength within
the Fatah movement and the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah. Since the
falling out between these parties in June 2007, the PA in Ramallah has con-
tinued to pay some 80,000 salaries in Gaza and has also been responsible for
water and electricity supply, as well as health care. The PA also serves as a
liaison between Hamas and the Israeli military regarding the control of entry
and exit from Gaza via Israel. The Palestinian talks on reconciliation have
been deadlocked so far: President Abbas remains determined in his demands
that Hamas’ military forces be subordinate to the Ramallah-based PA, and
Hamas, whilst continuing to speak the language of reconciliation, shows little
genuine willingness to move forward in any way that would diminish its hold
over Gaza. For the time being, the existence of a separate Hamas-led
authority in Gaza is likely to be a long-lasting reality, but the worsening
economic situation in Gaza; the loss of revenues from the tunnels; Hamas’
inability to pay its bills; and the loss of regional allies are likely to lead to
increased public unrest.
With the closing of the tunnels from Gaza to Sinai, there has been a gen-
eral liberalization of goods entering Gaza from Israel over the past months,
but the export of goods from Gaza to the world or to the West Bank for trade
has been extremely limited. The border between Gaza and Sinai is regulated
more strictly and sealed tighter than it has ever been since the signing of the
Israel-Egypt peace treaty in 1979. The tension between the Egyptian govern-
ment after Morsi and Hamas is at its highest point, and there seems to be
little appetite in Egypt for a more liberal stance vis-à-vis Gaza.
Gaza floating sea port

If the status quo of an independent Gaza sealed off from the world and
excluded from the Palestinian Authority remains, the welfare of some 1.6
million people in Gaza will become a growing international concern. During
the optimistic days of the late 1990s and in the planning days of the Israeli
disengagement from Gaza, talks focused on the possibilities for developing a
Gaza deep-sea port linking Gaza to the world. An idea for a relatively cheap
and rapid solution for shipping to and from Gaza was developed in the form
of a “floating port.” This is probably still the best solution for Gaza’s eco-
nomic development in the immediate future. The main problem would stem,
of course, from security issues and the question of guaranteeing that military
equipment or sensitive dual-use materials are not entering Gaza. In this pro-
posal, the shipping industry for Gaza imports and exports could be turned
over to Turkish shipping companies. Turkey excels in this field and as a
NATO member could also help provide the security arrangements for ensur-
ing that the goods carried into Gaza are not in violation of export control
lists. The Turkish shipping industry could also be involved in supporting the
construction of the floating port (the Netherlands was also interested in this
project).
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As part of the plans for this project, a “dry port” would be constructed
on land adjacent to the ramp for the floating port. The dry port would be
divided into two main sections for imports and exports. The import side would
be subdivided into two sections: one for security checks of all goods loaded off
the containers coming off the ships and the second for goods bonded for the
purposes of customs handling. The security section would be under the respon-
sibility of an international/NATO body (based on criteria agreed with Israel).
The bonded goods section would be under the authority of the Palestinians.
Another positive by-product of entrusting Turkey with responsibility for the
Gaza shipping industry is the use of this initiative as the means for mending
Turkish-Israeli relations. Shipping to Gaza was one of the primary issues of
contention between the two states, and Turkish engagement in shipping to
and from Gaza could be a good way to rebuild those damaged relations.
Conclusion
This is one of the most difficult and frustrating periods in terms of the devel-
opment of regional peace and security initiatives in the Middle East. Israel’s
public standing in the region is at an all-time low. The rising calls to boycott
Israel have made formal or informal regional dialogues such as those taking
place in regional conferences, seminars, and cooperation programs almost
impossible. Several existing initiatives that focus on regional cooperation and
dialogue have, over the past year, been forced to either cancel events or to
uninvite Israeli participants. One of the convening institutions has said (in pri-
vate discussions with the authors) that the only meetings in the region where
they are able to include Israeli participants are small, closed-room meetings
with absolutely no public profile. This is also becoming the trend for meetings
between Israelis and Palestinians. The Palestinian “anti-normalization” cam-
paign against joint activities has taken on a popular dynamic, assigning illegi-
timate status to organizations that initiate such meetings and activities.
International funding for peace-related activities in the region is also at an all-
time low. It is at times of great difficulty, like those we are now experiencing,
that responsible members of the international community with the ability to
visualize a different future must forge forward with new initiatives, even if they
initially have to be discreet and secret, in order to help change the environment
and create new opportunities for contact between enemies.
It is also quite clear that a breakthrough must be found to the Israeli-Pales-
tinian conflict. Conflicts do not get resolved by not talking, and a way must be
found to advance negotiations between the parties. If contact and negotiations
in public are impossible, then back channels should be created. If such secret
channels are not open, then proxy talks between Jerusalem and Ramallah must
be launched through an acceptable mediator, who perceives themselves as
having the authority and the capacity to put bridging proposals on the table.
Obviously, such a mediator must be effective and must have the clout to engage
in the process. The most likely mediator, therefore, remains the United States.
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Even without a mediator, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should concern the
Israeli and Palestinian peoples first and foremost. They both seem to require
assistance to be able to move forward. Regional and international actors can
play a positive role, but they must adopt positions that recognize the legitimacy
of the claims of both parties and not embrace one narrative at the expense of
the other.
This is a period of relative calm, in security terms, between Israel and
Palestine. It should not be necessary to wait for the next round of violence
before the international community reenlists to help resolve this conflict.
Notes
1 Tepper, “Hamas Leader.”
2 See, for example, Pew Research Center, “The World’s Muslims.”
3 The National Liberation Front (NLF) is a socialist political party in Algeria. It
was set up on November 1, 1954, as a merger of other smaller groups, to obtain
independence for Algeria from France.
4 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Separation of Forces Agreement.”
5 Ghitis, “Syria’s Chemical Weapons.”
6 Elleman, “Ballistic Missile.”
7 See The Israeli Peace Initiative (IPI), “Proposal.”
8 Rabin’s “Golan Heights Deposit,” or the “Pocket,” referred to a commitment
Yitzhak Rabin made to former US President Bill Clinton in the 1990s for a full
Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights to the June 4, 1967 line in exchange for
full normalization. See Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace, 3–13.
9 PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, “The Arab Peace Initiative.”
10 Consider the following excerpt from the e-mail: “The Office of the President is
preparing a full media campaign on the API. They started with issuing the API
brochure in the Israeli newspapers, but they also want to extend the plan to include
International and Palestinian audiences as well. The idea is to have a set of inter-
views dedicated toward explaining what the API is all about, and issue paid ads in
the newspapers. Soon you will see the API brochure in the Guardian, Independent,
and French newspapers as well (and soon US newspapers). The President is fully
convinced that it is now the right time to push for this issue, especially with Peres’
recent comments and the article that appeared in the Sunday Times about Obama’s
intention to endorse the API.” See Al Jazeera Transparency Unit, “NSU E-mail.”
11 See PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, “The Arab Peace Initiative.”
12 Middle East Monitor, “Arab Peace Initiative.”
13 The second Intifada (2000–2005) brought with it a wave of suicide bombings in
Israel, resulting in the killing of hundreds of Israelis and the final demise of the
Israeli peace camp.
14 See Yaar and Hermann, “The Peace Index.” See especially the results for August
2013. Tel Aviv University has been conducting such monthly opinion polls since
1994.
15 See Yaari, “Sinai.”
16 All 57 states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (formerly, the Organiza-
tion of the Islamic Conference), including Iran, have expressed their support for
the Arab Peace Initiative. The members of the Organization reaffirmed their sup-
port at almost all of their sessions (including, for example, the 33rd Session of
the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers [“Session of Harmony of Rights,
Freedoms, and Justice”], which took place June 19–21, 2006 in Baku, Azerbaijan).
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17 See Associated Press, “Traces of Uranium.”
18 See Ramberg, “Should Israel Close Dimona?”
19 The text for the Action Plan can be found at: http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/.
20 See Saeed, “A Message to Iran” and NPR, “‘We Love You Iran.’”
21 See Yaron, “Israeli Facebook Initiative.”
22 See PRIF, “Academic Peace Orchestra Middle East.”
Bibliography
Al Jazeera Transparency Unit. “NSU E-mail: Office of President Morning Meeting
Summary.” Available at: http://transparency.aljazeera.net/en/projects/thepalestinepa-
pers/20121820513678990.html.
Associated Press. “Traces of Uranium Enriched to Higher than Previous Levels Found
at Iran Site.” Haaretz, May 25, 2012. Available at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/
middle-east/traces-of-uranium-enriched-to-higher-than-previous-levels-found-at-iran-
site-1.432644.
Booth, William and Abigail Hauslohner. “Egypt Shutting Economic Lifeline for Gaza
Strip in Move to Isolate Hamas.” Washington Post, September 8, 2013. Available at:
http://tinyurl.com/l45jy6k.
Dehghan, Saeed. “A Message to Iran from Israel: I Love you.” The Guardian, March
26, 2012. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2012/mar/26/
message-israel-iran-love-you.
Elleman, Michael. “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program.” The Iran Primer. Washington,
D.C.: United States Institute for Peace. Available at: http://iranprimer.usip.org/
resource/irans-ballistic-missile-program.
Ghitis, Frida. “Syria’s Chemical Weapons Threat Demands a Response.” CNN, August
16, 2012. Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/25/opinion/ghitis-syria/index.html.
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Israel-Syria Separation of Forces Agreement.”
Jerusalem: Government of Israel, May 31, 1974. Available at: http://tinyurl.com/
nyhzwsl.htm.
Middle East Monitor. “Mufti of Al-Azhar Demands Withdrawal of the Arab Peace
Initiative.” Middle East Monitor, August 15, 2012. Available at: http://tinyurl.com/
k429ymz.
NPR. “‘We Love You Iran’ Becomes Anti-War Campaign.” Interview. All Things
Considered. NPR, March 29, 2012. Available at: http://www.npr.org/2012/03/29/
149635825/we-love-you-iran-becomes-unlikely-anti-war-campaign.
Pew Research Center. “The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics, and Society.”
Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2013. Available at: http://www.pewforum.
org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-exec/.
PLO Negotiations Affairs Department. “The Arab Peace Initiative: Frequently Asked
Questions.” Available at: http://www.nad-plo.org/etemplate.php?id=157.
PRIF. “Academic Peace Orchestra Middle East.” Frankfurt: The Peace Research
Institute Frankfurt. Available at: http://www.hsfk.de/Academic-Peace-Orchestra-
Middle-East.800.0.html?&L=1.
Rabinovich, Itamar. The Brink of Peace: The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1998.
Ramberg, Bennett. “Should Israel Close Dimona? The Radiological Consequences of
a Military Strike on Israel’s Plutonium-Production Reactor.” Arms Control Today
38 (2008). Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_05/Dimona.
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Tepper, Greg. “Hamas Leader Prays for Annihilation of Jews, Americans.” Times of
Israel, August 20, 2012. Available at: http://www.timesofisrael.com/palestinian-
leader-prays-for-annihilation-of-americans-jews/.
The Israeli Peace Initiative (IPI). “Proposal.” April 6, 2011. Available at: http://israeli-
peaceinitiative.com/israeli-peace-initiative-english/the-israeli-peace-initiative-english/.
Yaar, Ephraim and Tamar Hermann. “The Peace Index.” Tel Aviv: The Israel
Democracy Institute, 1994-Present. Available at: http://www.peaceindex.org/index-
MainEng.aspx.
Yaari, Ehud. “Sinai – A New Front.” Policy Notes 9. Washington, D.C.: Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, 2012. Available at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.
org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PoilicyNote09.pdf.
Yaron, Oded. “Iranians Respond to Israeli Facebook Initiative: Israel, We Love You
Too.” Haaretz, March 19, 2012. Available at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/
iranians-respond-to-israeli-facebook-initiative-israel-we-love-you-too-1.419505.
WWW.EBOOK777.COM
9 The future of arms control in the

Middle East
Bilal Saab
Political space is opening up in the Arab world. While it is particularly diffi-

cult to speak with any degree of confidence on the ultimate trajectory of the
Arab Uprisings (with all their local variants), the process of democratization
that is sweeping through the region is likely to have a significant impact on
how Arab societies and their soon-to-be representative governments make
and conduct foreign and defense policy in the future.
One key area of concern is the subject of regional arms control and dis-
armament. Standing in the way of arms control and regional security in the
Middle East are old conditions – territorial disputes, arms races, security
dilemmas, historical rivalries, ideological radicalism, deep-seated fears of the
other, and sectarian, religious, and ethnic animosities – that are well known
and have been analyzed in some detail elsewhere.1
Because of the depth and scope of the political and security problems
facing the Middle East, it is tempting to give up hope on the region and
accept that no arms control initiative could ever be seriously entertained and
practiced in that part of the world. Even those very few idealists who have
retained their optimism rarely miss an opportunity to add one important
caveat: it will take a very long time before arms control is dealt with in a
serious fashion in the Middle East, a region that is deeply troubled, hopelessly
divided, and heavily militarized.
Nobody doubts that it will take years, if not generations, for arms control to
take root in the Middle East. With the Israeli-Palestinian conflict showing no
sign of resolution anytime soon; increasing regional uncertainties caused by the
political transitions; a raging civil conflict in Syria that not only threatens the
stability of neighboring countries, but also risks redrawing the regional security
map; and talk of possible military action by Israel or the United States against
Iran to thwart its nuclear program, the prospect of countries in that part of
the world cooperating with each other seems unthinkable at present. Thus, the
unprecedented move of placing real, verifiable, and mutual limitations on these
countries’ sovereignty, state secrets, and defense armaments for the collective
goal of reducing regional insecurity seems even more far-fetched.
Nobody doubts that the Middle East will experience growing pains should
it restart arms control and regional security talks, a diplomatic process that
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The future of arms control in the Middle East 171
has been interrupted since the 1995 collapse of the Arms Control and
Regional Security (ACRS) multilateral negotiations.2 Postponed indefinitely
due to Israeli concerns about its timing and agenda, the December 2012
Conference on a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East
is an example of one missed opportunity to restart the process.3 Any casual
reading of the arms control experience between the Soviet Union (later
Russia) and the United States, as well as that among European nations after
the end of the Cold War, will amply show that arms control – already a
counterintuitive concept and exercise even to the most liberal and open-
minded – is a tough and complex business. Over the years, the ills of the
Middle East and their effects on arms control have been properly diagnosed.
However, more precise analysis of the likely causes of these issues and how
they specifically impact regional security and arms control is still needed.
It is evident that the region suffers from profound security problems and
acute democratic deficits that will discourage even the most passionate regio-
nal security and arms control advocates. But these are outcomes, not causes,
of these conditions. A far more useful analytical approach to studying regio-
nal security and arms control would pay much closer attention to individual
actors and the domestic contexts of their foreign and defense policies. Such an
approach for the Middle East is long overdue.
Prior to the Arab Uprisings, the lack of scrutiny on the domestic contexts
of Arab foreign and defense policies was justified by pointing to the fact that
such policies were the exclusive domain of a select few (i.e. monarchs, auto-
crats, generals, and warlords) and their close advisors. Under these political
circumstances, inputs and pressures from actors outside that small decision-
making circle on the foreign policy process were arguably minimal. With the
exception of political psychologists, very few foreign policy analysts specia-
lizing in the Middle East saw much analytical value in studying the domestic
context of Arab foreign policies.4 As a result, the “Arab foreign policy black
box” was largely kept closed. Now, the current dramatic changes spreading
throughout the Middle East will force analysts to finally open it up.
While there are cultural, societal, political, and historical similarities
among the countries of the Middle East, and while democratic transitions
tend to unleash all too familiar forces in politics and society, it would be
wrong to treat foreign policy and decision-making processes in the region as
homogeneous. Indeed, because each country undergoing transition or tumult
is unique and at a different stage in its history with regard to political
maturity, social cohesion, and economic development, the effects of change
throughout the region and their implications for arms control will not be
uniform. A case in point is the divergent paths that Egypt and Syria have
taken since 2011. Even though the process of change was violent and chaotic
in its first few months in Egypt, Cairo managed to break away from the
authoritarian regime of Mubarak – although political stability is still very
much at risk. Syria, on the other hand, had a much more unfortunate trajec-
tory, and because of President Bashar al-Assad’s refusal to address the
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172 Bilal Saab
legitimate demands of the populace, the initially peaceful uprising gradually
morphed into a civil war that is threatening to rip the country apart and
destabilize neighboring countries. Libya is somewhere in between, escaping
the civil conflict and disintegration that Syria is experiencing, but at the same
time undergoing acute political instability and militia rule because of the
massive void left by the previous regime of Muammar Qaddafi. Tunisia’s
transition was the most peaceful because of the relatively quick collapse of
the previous government of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and the vital
pacifying role played by its civil society. However, this hardly suggests that
the process of democratic change will be smooth or problem-free, given the
growing role of Salafi politics and the resurfacing of Islamist militancy in the
country and in northern Africa more broadly.
Yet, despite all these variances and their implications for the future of arms
control and regional security, countries in the region will experience similar
challenges as they go through the difficult and much-interrupted process of
state- and (in some cases) nation-building. All countries in the Middle East
will face common problems and difficulties as they try to elect wise and
accountable leaders; build institutional capacity; promote bureaucratic effec-
tiveness and efficiency; and pursue economic development. Progress on these
areas will affect, in dissimilar ways depending on the local context, the ability
of Middle Eastern countries to successfully engage any potential arms control
agenda or, more specifically, to successfully engage the concept and goal of a
Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East.
New leaders
US-Soviet arms control achievements cannot be fully understood without
accounting for the roles and worldviews of national executives on both sides
and the political circumstances in which they were operating. For example,
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s plan to revamp the assumptions of Soviet
foreign policy was arguably central to understanding the Soviet Union’s will-
ingness to cooperate on the first installment of the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START I). While US President George H W Bush initially distrusted
Gorbachev’s new thinking (he ordered a review of the US-Soviet policy of his
predecessor, Ronald Reagan), his approach to negotiations changed in the fall
of 1989 as the US-Soviet relationship progressed and events in Eastern
Europe unfolded, positively impacting Bush’s worldview and his beliefs about
his rival. Bush also had considerable political autonomy due to high domestic
approval ratings, giving him flexibility in foreign policy. In sum, both
Gorbachev and Bush were in strong positions domestically at the time and
both were willing to start a new chapter in US-Soviet relations.
The political tsunami that swept through the Arab world in 2011 allowed
Islamists to enter the political process in full force. While the world is still
learning about the backgrounds and identities of the new leaders in Tunis,
Tripoli, and Cairo, one thing is certain: whoever will lead these countries in
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the near future, and perhaps for years to come, will not be another Zine El
Abidine Ben Ali, Muammar Qaddafi, or Hosni Mubarak. Of course, there is
always a chance that the new leaders in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and possibly
other countries will adopt similar foreign policies to those of their pre-
decessors. But there is no question that new political groups have, and will,
come to power under different political circumstances, facing greater societal
demands and political pressures, and with new, and perhaps radically differ-
ent, belief systems and ideas that will surely impact foreign policy decision-
making. Again, it is unclear whether the new leaders of the Arab world will
be able to bring their new foreign policy proposals and national strategies in-
to line with their perceptions of the region and the world. Much will depend
on the very nature of the democratic transition and whether it will truly bring
about concepts and practices such as the rule of law, an independent judi-
ciary, checks and balances, and other democratic features that ensure open-
ness, transparency, and accountability.
One widely held assumption in Washington and other Western capitals is
that Islamists, perhaps due to religious and ideological convictions, will not
maintain or make peace with Israel, let alone enter into cooperative arrange-
ments with the Jewish state regarding regional security and arms control.
Many assume that Islamists might be more eager than their predecessors to
utilize WMD programs and strategic weapons systems. Islamists may also
have different threat perceptions, as well as understandings of and apprecia-
tions for sovereignty, cooperation, and international relations.
While these assumptions are all possibly true, none of them are inevitable.
Despite important and lingering questions about some Islamists’ philosophi-
cal views regarding the secular nation-state; their past engagement in physical
violence; and their somewhat inexperienced political background more gen-
erally, it is unwise and unfair to judge these new actors – as heterogeneous as
they are – before or immediately after they assume office. These new leaders
are foreign policy novices and lack the necessary experience in foreign affairs,
as they have never been put in positions of national leadership – mostly
because they have been deliberately and often physically excluded from such
positions. In addition, arms control, an extremely complicated enterprise to
begin with, was not something that old leaders mastered or even fully appre-
ciated. Therefore, any arms control “knowledge” or “legacy” that could be
transferred from the old regimes to the new leaders may be minimal. This is
compounded by the death of the ACRS process in 1995. Even as it was
taking place, it did not attract much state media or domestic political atten-
tion (largely because it was a sensitive subject that Arab governments pre-
ferred to keep secret). Institutional memory of arms control in the Middle
East is severely deficient and, in some cases, nonexistent – Iraq, Iran, and
Libya were not invited to ACRS, while Syria and Lebanon chose not to par-
ticipate – which makes the new leaders’ learning curve even steeper.
Any potential rigidity and lack of cooperation on the part of the Arab
world’s new leaders with regard to foreign policy (particularly with regard to
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174 Bilal Saab
arms control) is likely to be checked by domestic political contexts and poten-
tial political costs at home. Specifically, if political parties inside and outside
governments (sometimes within the same governing coalition) and new voting
publics desire and call for regional security cooperation, the new leaders may
have little choice but to comply. Yet, the stronger these leaders become politi-
cally and the more their support bases grow, the better they will be able to
insulate themselves from such domestic pressures and enjoy greater autonomy
in foreign and defense policy. Furthermore, new Arab leaders will have an
interest in presenting themselves as nationalist statesmen who are capable of
defying the United States when necessary and aggressively pursuing their
countries’ national interests, even if it leads to friction or conflict with Israel.
However, should some of these leaders take substantive action based on these
leanings, they would be limited by the fact that their governments depend on
US financial and military aid.
Omnipotent military
New Arab elites have emerged and assumed positions of national leadership.
So will others in the next few months and years. Yet, what remains to be seen
is whether the last vestiges of the ancien régime – the military and the intelli-
gence services – will agree to this new paradigm or be forced to step aside and
allow for a real transformation of political affairs. One cannot speak of a new
social contract in the Arab world if the militaries retain their supra-constitu-
tional powers and firm grips on national politics. Egypt is one example where
the fight between the Islamists and the liberals on the one hand (i.e. those who
led the popular uprising) and the country’s military leadership on the other will
determine the course of democracy in the country. One expects similar political
battles and rocky transitional scenarios to take place in Syria should the regime
of President al-Assad collapse and the armed rebels take over until a new
government is formed.
History shows that authoritarian, military-dominated regimes jealously
claim to guard their countries’ sovereignty, but do whatever it takes to protect
their narrow interests and insulate themselves from the political and economic
pressures of the world. These types of political systems are generally insular,
defiant, and wary of globalization and international cooperation, especially
regarding arms control.5 As a rule of thumb, when civil-military relations in a
country are unhealthy and imbalanced, arms control policy generally suffers.
While it is true that militaries in democracies also resist limiting armaments
and cutting defense budgets (one need only look at the United States’
experience in arms control before, during, and after the Cold War), final
decisions are ultimately made by the civilian leadership. Resistance to arms
control in authoritarian contexts where the militaries and their political cro-
nies control national politics and decide on foreign policy is generally more
significant. Militaries in the Arab world have assumed major roles in defining
the objectives and orientations of their countries’ foreign policies, alliances,
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and national security cultures. Some national security cultures are more
receptive to arms control than others. In the Arab world, it will depend in
large part on the extent to which the new military leaders and their political
allies embrace such ideas and practices.
In sum, healthy civil-military relations and a properly defined role for the
military and security services are necessary conditions for the creation of an
arms control and regional security agenda in the new foreign and defense
ministries in the Arab world. While the new Arab militaries’ and security
services’ tolerance and appreciation of arms control policy will be crucial to
the future of the enterprise in the Middle East, their understanding of its
complexities will require expert knowledge and technical skills that have been
in short supply in all the countries of the Arab world. However, regular
interaction with Western armed forces and military-to-military engagement at
both the officer and commander levels has improved the organizational,
operational, and knowledge-based assets of Arab militaries over the years,
thus reducing the gap in Arab defense know-how (even though this gap
remains large).
Furthermore, the development over the past few years of local defense
industries in the Gulf region that are better integrated into the international
defense market and that enter into joint ventures with Western defense firms
could be a promising source of expertise for the Arab defense sector. The
United Arab Emirates (UAE), which is significantly ahead of all other Arab
countries in its development of local defense manufacturing capability and
know-how, is a case in point. Launched in 2007, Tawazun, the UAE’s local
defense investment company, has received much praise from major global
defense companies for its manufacturing and design of defense hardware and
software. Perhaps more important than its competition with larger and more
established defense giants around the world is Tawazun’s goal of providing
UAE nationals with the proper education and training in high-tech defense
affairs.6 In short, arms control requires its adherents to possess not only
expert knowledge of defense affairs including strategy, doctrine, and tactics,
but also a high level of technical expertise in land, sea, air, and space defense
systems to manage that extremely difficult balance between reassuring allies
and adversaries by cooperating and sharing sensitive information while also
maintaining national security. Strategic dialogue on lower and higher levels,
joint exercises and simulations, joint training and cultural exchanges, as well
as partnerships and joint ventures with Western militaries and defense firms
can be excellent sources of defense knowledge in general, and arms control
expertise in particular, for the Arab world’s new militaries.
Large and dysfunctional bureaucracy

Even as a new political era in the Arab world begins, state and bureaucratic
capacity will remain an issue for years to come. In the interim, Arab countries
that may be enthusiastic about arms control and regional security proposals
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176 Bilal Saab
will likely struggle to turn ideas into reality. The old regimes were not only
toppled for their exclusion of large segments of society from the political pro-
cess, but also for their creation and maintenance of large, corrupt, and ineffi-
cient bureaucracies that were necessary to sustain their patronage policies.
These institutions, especially foreign and defense ministries, were filled with
people who were loyal to the regimes, but who possessed few or no specialized
skills. Thus, it is no surprise that corruption is rampant in Arab public admin-
istrations, a condition that is likely to endure for a long time and impact efforts
to staff bureaucracies with diplomats, scientists, and specialists with the neces-
sary skills and knowledge to fully engage any arms control agenda.7
Arms control requires a certain level of bureaucratic and managerial capa-
city that Arab governments do not currently have. Ironically, when fewer
individuals are in charge of foreign policy, it is arguably easier to evade or
bypass the kind of bureaucratic inertia, politics, and infighting that generally
impair arms control negotiations.8 (Just look at how Henry Kissinger cen-
tralized and micromanaged decision-making on arms control with the Soviets
in the Nixon White House during the period of the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT)). For example, Qaddafi did not have to consult his fictitious
foreign ministry (or anybody else for that matter) to make the crucial decision
in 2003 to abandon his country’s pursuit of chemical weapons and a nuclear
program. Also, while Mubarak consulted with his foreign minister, Amr
Moussa, and some of his top military officials regarding his decision to have
Egypt participate in ACRS, he did not need to have his decision vetted by
other elements of the Egyptian government or by the parliament and the
public. Of course, these actions and political conditions are not recommended
and should not be recreated. Instead, these examples illustrate the point that
with more political players likely to enter into governmental service and more
actors engaged in foreign-policy-making, the tasks of interagency coordina-
tion and cooperation will naturally become more challenging. This culture of
bureaucratic politics, coordination, cooperation, and compromise, at least as
practiced in the West, is lacking, and in some quarters non-existent, in the
Arab world and will take time to develop after more representative govern-
ments are put in place.
However, this is not a call for bureaucratic growth. On the contrary, Arab
countries, due to their populist policies, have historically had very large public
sectors that have absorbed scarce resources that could have been directed
toward more productive activities. Rather, it is a call for efficiency and effec-
tiveness. Bureaucracies in the Arab world require major reform because their
role will be counted on to serve the needs of ever-expanding and more poli-
tically involved societies. Arms control will face fewer domestic obstacles if
the new leaders of the Arab world refrain from using their countries’ bureau-
cracies as control devices and spaces for extending patronage. The effort of
stopping bureaucratic expansion and engaging in administrative reform will
not be politically easy and will take time. With very few exceptions, all Arab
countries face the same problem of downsizing and cutting off huge numbers
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of publicly employed personnel. However, it is a job that has to be done and
that can be facilitated through the better integration of the private sector into
economic life.
Intelligence services are another aspect of dysfunctional Arab bureaucracies
that are in need of major reform. Their primary objectives have always been
to crush political opposition and spy on society at large in order to prevent
domestic threats to their sponsoring regimes. Needless to say, the services of
Arab intelligence agencies have not been put to good use. So long as Arab
governments continue to staff their intelligence services with loyalists rather
than professionals and instruct them to serve as protectors of the regime,
massive technical and human resources will be diverted away from other
necessary national tasks, including the making of foreign and defense policy.
Intelligence services play the crucial role of monitoring and verifying com-
pliance with arms control agreements, and without their unique input, cheat-
ing by the other side becomes easier and detecting it becomes more difficult.
Verification is a sine qua non for arms control, and its absence can certainly
be a huge obstacle to an agreement. During the Cold War, arms control
agreements acknowledged “national technical means” for monitoring their
terms.9 Stability was arguably enhanced by the confidence each side had in its
and the other’s intelligence capabilities to detect violations. Without real
intelligence reform in the Arab world and a revolutionary shift in these ser-
vices’ missions and standard operating procedures, arms control is likely to
face some serious technical problems.
Weak parliaments
Parliaments in the Middle East are not as powerful as Western legislatures
and do not play as important a role in foreign policy – even though Western
legislatures can sometimes play a constraining role as well. Instead, Middle
Eastern parliaments are symbolic, powerless, and often rubber-stamping
institutions that do not have much of an impact on important national deci-
sions, including decisions on matters of national security and foreign policy.
There are variations, of course. For example, the political costs of completely
ignoring the wishes and preferences of the parliaments in Amman, Kuwait
City, and even in Tehran are higher than those in Riyadh or Damascus. But if
push comes to shove, King Abdullah II of Jordan, Sheik Sabah al-Ahmad Al
Sabah of Kuwait, and Ayatollah Khamenei of Iran can make critical national
decisions without the tacit consultation and approval of their parliaments.
The fact that parliaments in the Arab world play few or no constraining roles
in foreign policy may sound like good news to the future of arms control in the
Middle East. That is hardly the case, however. If arms control policies are to be
effective, and if arms control agreements are to be durable, they have to enjoy
not only authority but also legitimacy in the eyes of the public, which usually
derives from the parliament. Obviously, Arab parliaments should be empow-
ered to fulfill the goals of legislation, oversight, accountability, regulation, and
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178 Bilal Saab
constant renewal of political life. But it is also worth emphasizing that strong
parliaments can play an extremely constructive role in foreign policy in general
and arms control in particular. From ratification of arms control treaties to
financing foreign policy proposals and approving defense budgets, or from
overseeing and scrutinizing weapons systems to checking the executive branch
and its powerful intelligence services, parliaments in the Arab world can and
should have a much bigger say in foreign affairs.
In sum, stronger parliaments guarantee a better democratic future and
more effective foreign policies for the countries of the Arab world. While most
of today’s discussions regarding the Arab Uprisings focus on the likely iden-
tities and policies of the new executive leaders, we should keep a close eye on
the extent to which these transitions will empower legislative bodies.
Resurgent civil society and public opinion

The recent resurgence of civil society and the empowerment of the public in the
Arab world are positive developments that will help ease and accelerate the
transition to democracy. It has always been commonly agreed that democracies
tend to be more prosperous and adept at running their domestic politics.10 It is
also widely assumed that democracies are better than autocracies at making
foreign policy, negotiating, and even fighting and winning wars.11
Part of the reasoning behind democracies’ foreign policy superiority in
relation to autocracies is that open societies, generally speaking, tend to form
governments that are more competent and better at integrating and incor-
porating the input of as many skilled and specialized voices as possible from
outside their own walls. Closed societies tend to form less effective govern-
ments because they have a much smaller pool from which to choose, often
paying attention to factors like loyalty and ideology at the expense of skill
and capability.
The importance of civil society involvement in the arms control process
cannot be overstated. The instrumental role that US civil society and industry
has played in supplying the US government with knowledge about and tech-
nical resources for arms control, including nuclear power, chemistry, biology,
weapons systems, radars, sensors, overhead reconnaissance satellites, etc., has
helped the United States successfully negotiate and sign a number of arms
control treaties, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Che-
mical Weapons Convention. Even the most competent governments need the
expertise and specialized skills of practitioners, scientists, and companies from
the private and nonprofit sectors. In arms control, public-private collabora-
tions and partnerships are essential, given the field’s complexity and multi-
disciplinary nature.
The Arab world’s governments do not have a stellar record of engaging
their civil societies and seeking from them the necessary knowledge and skill
sets to enhance their public and foreign policies. Of course, some governments
are better than others. For example, Jordan has a growing science and
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technology community that is often relied upon to assist the government in a
wide range of public policy matters. On the other hand, while Lebanon has
historically had an independent and vibrant civil society oriented mostly
toward law, commerce, services, and business, its input and expertise have
rarely been sought by the government. Obviously, the more open the political
system is, the more opportunities and avenues civil society will have to lend its
members’ expertise to governmental policy-making. Unsurprisingly, the idea
of empowering civil society or including it in governmental decision-making
has been anathema to Arab autocrats who viewed it as a political threat. With
new political opportunities now forming in the Arab world and civil society
being allowed to operate with more freedom after years of suppression, real
investments in education, science, and technology – necessary for creating and
nurturing an arms control culture – are now possible.
While public opinion in the Arab world did not often generate significant
political costs to old autocrats as they engaged in foreign policy (one notable
exception, however, was the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat
for his unpopular peace treaty with Israel), this is more likely to change in the
aftermath of the Arab Uprisings. Through popular will and mandate, Islamists
and liberals (fewer in number, of course) are coming to power in Tunisia,
Libya, Egypt, and possibly elsewhere, and should the leaders of these new
groups not fulfill their promises, public opinion will not be kind to them and
may force political adjustments or resignations.
Bad economics
Arms control has been considered desirable because it could release economic
resources. As early arms control strategist Hedley Bull once wrote, “arma-
ments, or [arms] races, are economically ruinous or profligate, and … arms
control [could] make possible the diversion of resources now squandered in
armaments into other and worthier channels.”12 But it is worth remembering
(and die-hard disarmament proponents tend to forget or ignore this) that
arms control is not an end in itself; it is a means to the ultimate goal of
reducing the chances of war or limiting its costs should it happen (in the US-
Soviet context, it was about improving strategic stability, a condition in which
nuclear first-strike incentives were removed). This suggests that arms control,
as its early advocates envisioned, does not automatically equate with dis-
armament, cuts in defense spending, or limitations in armaments.
Depending on the strategic environment and the threat spectrum, regional
security is sometimes enhanced by the development of new technology and
the acquisition of new kinds of weapons or telecommunications systems,
which often inevitably lead to more defense spending. Therefore, under bad
national economic conditions, arms control could suffer. Indeed, arms control
could place heavy burdens on the national economy, and if the government is
unable to spend more on defense, arms control will likely take a backseat to
other perceived national interests. Many critics of arms control, in the United
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180 Bilal Saab
States and elsewhere, have argued that arms control is prohibitively costly
and, hence, not worth pursuing.13
The Arab world’s economies are notorious for their underperformance, lack
of productivity and diversification, and deficient integration into the global
economy (Arab Gulf economies are exceptions, given their petroleum and
natural gas resources). While Arab societies rose up against their tyrannical
rulers to demand liberty and freedom, their motivations were also inspired by
their economic needs. The Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set
himself ablaze – unknowingly sparking a wave of revolutions across the Arab
world – not so much because he wanted to be free, but because police officers
abused him and wrecked his fruit cart, shattering his dignity and destroying
his produce and, therefore, his livelihood.
The Arab world needs new leaders who can form competent governments
and respond to the wishes of their constituents. At the same time, it also
needs functioning national economies that can produce, trade, employ people,
and cut mushrooming public deficits. It is probably futile to discuss how Arab
governments can devise and fund flexible arms control policies so long as the
average citizen in the street is hungry, uneducated, unemployed, and sees little
hope for improvement. If things improve, prospects may brighten.
Conclusion
The democratic transitions in the Middle East have presented a host of chal-
lenges and opportunities for the future of regional security and arms control.
If the history of modern Europe is any lesson, the transition from dictatorship
to democracy in the Arab world will take a long time, and in some quarters
where institutional deficits are severe, it will perhaps take even longer. But its
effects on national security thinking and decision-making will surely be felt.
Despite the rise of Islamists to political power in some quarters of the Arab
world, change in the region should be welcome because the status quo ante
was anything but progressive or sustainable. How the new leaders will
approach regional security issues and how receptive they will be to new
thinking and practices in foreign and defense policy are big questions.
With regard to proliferation challenges in the Middle East, much interna-
tional attention and diplomacy has converged around the idea of a WMDFZ.
Most of the debate has centered on the dilemma of sequencing: which should
come first: peace or disarmament and arms control? While there is undeniable
positive linkage between the resolution of political conflicts and progress on
regional arms control, the debate has paid much less attention to the ability
of regional countries, should comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace be one day
achieved, to implement any potential arms control agreement, especially one
so large and ambitious as a WMDFZ.
Several Track 2 efforts and initiatives have been launched by foreign gov-
ernments and international organizations over the years to engage Middle
Eastern parties in a much more fruitful discussion on what it truly takes, from
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a technical, scientific, and organizational standpoint, to create and verify a
zone free of WMDs in the Middle East. But as a participant myself in several
of these exercises around the world, it is sad to report that despite its noble
cause and its bringing up of some useful points, the discussion has been
directionless and without real impact on public policy or international non-
proliferation diplomacy. Even if a real transformation in political and eco-
nomic affairs takes place in the Middle East, the next challenge for Arab
societies will be to start building durable and effective institutional and tech-
nical capacity to be in a position to effectively engage with any regional
security and arms control agenda. That in itself is a process likely to take an
even longer time. Indeed, the Middle East could open up politically, but
remain mired in bureaucratic underdevelopment and an economic slump.
Notes
This is an edited version of the eponymous piece that was published in The Middle
East Journal (67. 3 (2013): 426–436).
1 Elleman, “Banning Long-Range Missiles; Inbar and Sandler, Middle Eastern
Security; Steinberg, “Middle East Arms Control”; Feldman, Nuclear Weapons;
and Jentleson and Kaye, “Explaining Regional Security Cooperation.”
2 ACRS is a working group on arms control and regional security that was created
in 1991 following the multilateral peace discussions launched by the US-led
Madrid Peace Conference. Made up of 13 Arab states, Israel, a Palestinian dele-
gation, and several other entities, ACRS complemented the bilateral tracks
between Israel and the Palestinians on the one hand and Israel and Syria on the
other, focusing on confidence-building and security-related issues. See Nuclear
Threat Initiative, “Arms Control and Regional Security.”
3 For more information on the 2012 conference, see James Martin Center for Non-
proliferation Studies, “The 2012 Conference.”
4 Korany and Dessouki, The Foreign Policies of Arab States; Mohamedou, “Foreign
Policy in the Arab World”; Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, Middle East States.
5 For more on this argument, see Solingen, “Mapping Internationalization.”
6 Doran, “Tawazun.”
7 Jabbra, “Bureaucracy and Development.”
8 Spanier and Uslaner call this phenomenon “the democratic dilemma.” For more
on this argument, see Spanier and Uslaner, American Foreign Policy, especially
161–163.
9 The term “national technical means” covers a variety of monitoring technologies
used by national governments to verify the other side’s compliance with an arms
control treaty. It was first used during the SALT I talks, and it appeared in sub-
sequent strategic arms control agreements between the United States and the
Soviet Union (later Russia).
10 Schumpeter, Capitalism; Barro, “Democracy and Growth”; Przeworski and
Limongi, “Political Regimes.”
11 Russett, Controlling the Sword; Smith, “Fighting Battles”; Stam, Win, Lose, or
Draw; and Reiter and Stam, Democracies at War.
12 Bull, “The Objectives of Arms Control,” 93.
13 Two of the staunchest US critics of arms control during the Cold War were Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle and Secretary of Defense Caspar Wein-
berger (both worked in the Reagan administration). For more on their views on
arms control, see Shimko, Images and Arms Control.
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182 Bilal Saab
Bibliography
Barro, Robert J. “Democracy and Growth.” Journal of Economic Growth 1.1 (1996):
1–27.
Bull, Hedley. “The Objectives of Arms Control.” In Disarmament and Economic
Development, edited by Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz. New York:
Transaction Publishers, 1966: 93–119.
Doran, James. “Tawazun Trains Emiratis to Work in High-Tech Defense Industry.”
The National, February 19, 2013. Available at: http://tinyurl.com/mn32ot5.
Elleman, Michael. “Banning Long-Range Missiles in the Middle East: A First Step
for Regional Arms Control.” Arms Control Today 42 (2012). Available at: http://
tinyurl.com/nxu62uh.
Feldman, Shai. Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East. Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1997.
Hinnebusch, Raymond and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds). The Foreign Policies of
Middle East States. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.
Inbar, Efraim and Shmuel Sandler (eds). Middle Eastern Security: Prospects for an
Arms Control Regime. London: Frank Cass, 1995.
Jabbra, Joseph G. “Bureaucracy and Development in the Arab World.” In Bureau-
cracy and Development in the Arab World, edited by Joseph G. Jabbra. Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1989: 1–11.
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. “The 2012 Conference on the
Establishment of a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East and the Role of the Facil-
itator.” Monterrey: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2011. Available at:
http://cns.miis.edu/stories/pdfs/111014_me_wmdfz_conf_factsheet.pdf.
Jentleson, Bruce W. and Dalia Dassa Kaye. “Security Status: Explaining Regional
Security Cooperation and Its Limits in the Middle East.” Security Studies 8.1
(1998): 208–238.
Korany, Bahgat and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (eds). The Foreign Policies of Arab States:
The Challenge of Globalization. Cairo: AUC Press, 2008.
Mohamedou, Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould. “Foreign Policy in the Arab World: The
Promise of a State-Centered Approach.” In The Foreign Policies of the Global
South: Rethinking Conceptual Frameworks, edited by Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-
Wagner. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003: 65–78.
Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East
(ACRS).” Available at: http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/arms-control-and-
regional-security-middle-east-acrs/.
Przeworski, Alan and Fernando Limongi. “Political Regimes and Economic Growth.”
Journal of Economic Perspectives 7.3 (1993): 51–69.
Reiter, Dan and Allan C. Stam. Democracies at War. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2002.
Russett, Bruce M. Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National
Security. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990.
Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper &
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Shimko, Keith L. Images and Arms Control: Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the
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Stam, Allan C. Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War. Ann
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36.1 (1994): 126–141.
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10 The Middle East and the Helsinki

Process
Unfulfilled aspiration … so far
Michael Yaffe
Comprehending the direction and meaning of current monumental changes in

the Middle East is challenging analysts inside and outside the region. While
much attention is naturally focusing on the transitioning Arab regimes and
corresponding shifts in domestic politics within each state, there is a growing
interest in trying to understand the impact of these changes on regional
dynamics. Three principal viewpoints are being staked out. On one side are
those who see danger in emerging political alignments that could exacerbate
cultural and political antagonisms in an already fragile region; they are skep-
tical of the wherewithal of regional organizations to positively shape these
alignments. On another side are those who see growing opportunity for coop-
erative security hungry for economic collaboration and a stable Middle East
without hegemonic rivalry, costly arms races, or major conflicts. On the third
side of the triangle are those whose first priority is a comprehensive Arab-
Israeli peace and who believe that the best way to advance bilateral peace talks,
particularly between Israelis and Palestinians, is by ensconcing them in some
form of multilateral negotiations framework.
A few simple facts should be borne in mind at the outset when discussing
the prospect for regionalism and establishing a cooperative security frame-
work in the Middle East. There is no universally accepted definition of what
area and states constitute the Middle East. If one adopts the popular defini-
tion for the area – that is, from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf including
North Africa, the Levantine coast, and Arabia – then this geographic part of
the world is notable for being the least integrated and least cooperative one.
None of its regional institutions enjoys the membership of all the region’s
states, and those few transnational institutions that do exist are severely lim-
ited in terms of both membership and the scope of multilateral cooperation.
It has a very low rate of trade, financial, and monetary transactions between
individual states in the region, as most transactions occur with outsiders. It is
home to the longest modern armed conflict in which most parties remain in a
formal state of war and in which perpetual conventional arms races threaten
to transition into the nuclear realm. It is one of the few places on earth where
so many nations are still without final recognized borders. Stability so far
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The Middle East and the Helsinki Process 185
remains elusive in the Middle East, and regional cooperation is little more
than an unrealized foreign concept.
Yet, the Middle East is distinguishable as a unique regional security com-
plex, which Barry Buzan defines as “a group of states whose primary security
concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot
realistically be considered apart from one another.”1 Still, the existence of a
security complex with proximate states does not connote that there is recog-
nition of belonging to a particular region or that a cooperative regime among
those states is just around the corner. One analyst has succinctly described the
Middle East as “a region without regionalism.”2
Despite these shortcomings, advocates of a cooperative security regime
continue to believe regional institutionalization will be an important ingre-
dient for minimizing the security dilemmas facing the Middle East in the long
term. Together with a stable balance of power, they want to construct inclu-
sive frameworks infused with consultative mechanisms and collaborative pro-
grams that promote predictable, positive, transparent relations among the
states in the region. It’s an idea with a pedigree that can be traced back to the
European Enlightenment and 18th-century Kantian philosophy.
Essentially, it is European wine repackaged in new bottles imported into
the Middle East. For the moment, any new bottle will only be added to a
robust collection in a cellar full of unopened bottles dating back to 1979. The
content of each bottle is derived from a single seed of hope that eventually the
Middle East will yield the same kind of bountiful vintage of regionalism
harvested in Europe through the institution of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and its earlier incarnation as the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Enough cannot be
said about the influence of the OSCE beyond Europe. Its founding principles,
norms, and commitments have profoundly inspired most of the regional fra-
meworks that have been tabled in the Middle East and elsewhere during the
last 40 years. Constant dabbling with proposals for a common regional
system as part of an agreement to end the Arab-Israeli conflict holds out hope
that it is only a matter of time before an OSCE-like arrangement will finally
bear fruit.
Cooperative security aspirations from 1948 to today

The earliest modern aspirations for establishing a cohesive Middle East living
in peace centered on the unrealized dream of an integrated Arab region
united by Arab nationalism and the goal of destroying Israel. After Israel and
Egypt signed a peace treaty in 1979, however, the CSCE became an appealing
regional model for a multicultural and heterogeneous Middle East order in
which Arabs and Israelis, Sunnis and Shiites, as well as authoritarian, mon-
archical, and democratic states coexist peacefully. It was premised on the
realization of two ambitions. First, all the other Arab states and the Palesti-
nians would quickly conclude separate peace agreements with Israel. Second,
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186 Michael Yaffe
bilateral agreements would not be enough to bring about comprehensive
security, and some form of regional structure would be necessary for addres-
sing the multiple security dilemmas and armament imbalances throughout the
entire Middle East while generating economic and cultural cooperation that
would foster greater confidence and trust among the state parties.
In 1979, there was cause to believe this new regional order was near. After
all, without Egypt’s involvement in the Arab coalition against Israel, the
conflict could not be resolved through military force. It seemed like just a
matter of time before other Arab states would come to the same conclusion
and then find a way to negotiate, probably with US assistance, the end of
their long-standing conflict with Israel. Instead, the Middle East went into an
internal Cold War in which Egypt was excommunicated from the Arab fold;
revolutionary Iran threatened the stability of the Arab regimes; Iraq and Iran
were engaged in one of the deadliest wars in the region’s history; Israel
became entangled in a war with Lebanon; and the Palestinians revolted
against Israeli occupation before changing the PLO charter to recognize
Israel.
After a decade of turbulence, emerging events brought new hope to coop-
erative regional security architects. The end of the Cold War and the suc-
cessful coalition that removed Iraq from Kuwait pointed to a new regional
balance of power in which the United States was the primary external power
shaping the region. Springboarding off of this new platform, the United
States, in partnership with the Russian Federation and other extra-regional
powers, launched the Madrid Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) in 1991.
The focus of the Madrid Process was bilateral negotiations between Israel and
its immediate neighbors over ending the conflict. It also brought in nine other
Arab states (while Iran, Iraq, and Libya were excluded) to address long-term
issues of region-wide importance through five working groups, which focused
on refugees, economic development, the environment, water, and arms con-
trol and regional security, respectively. All 5 multilateral tracks eventually
stalled when the bilateral talks between Israel and the Palestinians, and Israel
and Syria broke down in 2000.
The first multilateral group to break down was the one dealing with regional
security, the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group.
ACRS met in four plenary sessions and 31 expert-level meetings between
January 1992 and September 1995. During that time, the group negotiated
many of the same issues that Europe addressed in the CSCE/OSCE process two
decades earlier. Indeed, input from OSCE representatives was invaluable to the
ACRS process. ACRS began by reviewing a long list of OSCE confidence- and
security-building measures and selecting a few on which to focus initially:
communications, maritime cooperation, military information exchange, and a
conflict prevention center. Human rights and other human dimensions of the
security equation were not accorded prominence at the outset as the process
began with small, less controversial steps. It was noted in several declaratory
confidence-building measures, however, that respecting human rights would be
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critical to enhancing security and peace. Much attention was given to the idea
of broadening the “culture of peace” in the region needed for undergirding a
comprehensive peace settlement.
The working group produced a nearly complete declaratory statement on
norms, principles, intentions, and steps to enhance regional security. After long
hours of meetings, agreements were reached on several key topics – a major
achievement, given that many of the parties were, and continue to be, in a
formal state of war with each other and that most do not recognize the State of
Israel. It concluded negotiations on a draft mandate to establish a regional
security center in Amman, Jordan, with associated centers in Tunisia and
Qatar. This mandate provided both an institutional base for region-wide dia-
logues on security and cooperation and established the norms, principles, and
framework guiding the work of the center. It was a uniquely Middle Eastern
mandate, borrowing and rejecting ideas from other regional organizations.
Before the regional security center mandate could be considered for adop-
tion, ACRS ended abruptly in the autumn of 1995. Failure to make progress
in the two principal pan-regional issues, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, converged to freeze activ-
ities within ACRS and (later) the other multilateral working groups as well.
After meeting intensively for four years, ACRS parties could not find an
acceptable way to address the issue of nuclear proliferation and lost momen-
tum for continuing. At the core of this dispute was the inability of the parties
to develop a cohesive vision for what the region should look like in the long
run and a work plan for realizing that vision. But ultimately, ACRS ended
because of the way the Madrid Process was originally configured. Bilateral
peace and end-of-conflict negotiations between Israel and its neighbors set the
pace for the amount of progress achievable on all region-wide initiatives.
Following the demise of ACRS, the European Union (EU) launched the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and has been tinkering with that basic
design ever since. First, there was the Barcelona Process, which brought
together 15 EU members with the 14 Mediterranean littoral states in a frame-
work to manage bilateral and regional relations. The process largely petered
out due to a perception that it institutionalized an asymmetrical relationship
in which the Europeans dictated the terms to the states of North Africa and
the Levant. Also, its forums tended to become venues for rehashing unresolved
Arab-Israeli grievances and invoking promises that better times were ahead for
the Barcelona Process and the region only after the end of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Barcelona could not insulate itself from the principal ongoing conflict
in the region.
New life was breathed into the Partnership through the European Neigh-
borhood Policy and revived again in July 2007 under the banner of the Union
of the Mediterranean, a 57-country forum with leadership responsibilities
shared jointly between European Union and Southern Mediterranean states.
Like the OSCE, the Barcelona Process regularly brought together foreign
ministers and has organized its agenda into three groupings: political and
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188 Michael Yaffe
security; economic and financial; and social, cultural, and human partner-
ships. Though the Process has produced various visionary declarations and
respectable codes of conduct applicable to the entire region, most cooperative
accomplishments are derived, first, in bilateral partnerships set up to address
the specific needs of individual countries and, second, in loans from the Eur-
opean Investment Bank.
This experience suggests that the one-size-fits-all approach will not work in
a region with so many disparities between governance polities – authoritar-
ians, monarchies, and democracies – and economic wealth. More importantly,
the driving force behind the Union idea was French President Nicholas
Sarkozy and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Together they served as the
Union’s first co-presidents, and with their departures from power, enthusiasm
for the Union has waned. Another problem with the Union was that Turkey,
a key state in the region, saw it as a French-created wedge to keep Turkey out
of the European Union.
Other European-driven cooperative partnerships with the Middle East
states have come from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
the OSCE. NATO reached out to Middle East states through its Mediterra-
nean Dialogue Program and Istanbul Cooperative Initiative. Both center on
bilateral relationships between individual Middle East states and NATO, as
opposed to an inclusive multilateral forum, and, as such, their activities are
very limited. Mediterranean Dialogue parties are invited to participate in
courses at the NATO Defense College. Only Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the
United Arab Emirates have elected to participate in the Istanbul Cooperative
Initiative, mostly through training and education programs related to coun-
terterrorism, disaster preparedness, and border security. Like the Barcelona
Process, not all Middle East states participate in these NATO engagements,
and a few are not invited at all. As such, they cannot be considered integrated
regional engagements.
Every now and then, members of the OSCE discuss the idea of expanding
the organization to encompass the wider Middle East from the Atlantic to the
Persian Gulf and from the Sahara to the Arctic, but no action has been taken.
Taking exception to this idea, British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind
proposed in 1996 that the region needs a stand-alone institution called the
“Organization for Cooperation in the Middle East,” an idea that went
nowhere. Rather than focusing on its own expansion, the OSCE focuses
instead on nurturing a special relationship with six Middle East states, known
as “Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation,” as proposed in the 1975 Hel-
sinki Final Act. The Partnership emphasizes the close links between security
in Europe and security in the Mediterranean region. Through dialogue and
joint projects, the OSCE focuses on confidence-building measures, protecting
human rights and fundamental freedoms; linkages between the environment
and security; media and new technologies; migration; and integrated policies
with the six partners. The interaction is regarded as productive, although it is
seen as being a far cry from a cooperative regional regime of equals.
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In 2004, at the instigation of the United States, the G-8 founded the “Part-
nership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader
Middle East and North Africa.” This partnership centered on large annual
conferences called “Forums for the Future,” with a singular focus on enhancing
trade and investment in the Middle East. It met a few times, but enthusiasm for
it faded after new conflicts in the region emerged and Israeli-Palestinian talks
stalled again.
The idea of establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone
(WMDFZ) in the Middle East, as first called for by Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak in 1992 and built on the 1974 Iran-Egypt proposal for creating a
Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ), is another manifestation of the dream
for an integrated Middle East. Attempts to isolate and separate talks on the
Zone from other fundamental issues shaping the regional security landscape
have met resistance. There is low expectation that the delayed Conference on
Establishing a WMDFZ – if it will be finally held in Helsinki – will steer the
region on a concerted course of regionalism and active cooperation, as it
lacks the mandate to do so. Though all regional parties support the estab-
lishment of a WMDFZ and see its urgency more than ever in light of the
prospective entrance of Iran into the nuclear-weapon state club and the
removal of chemical weapons from Syria, they are unable to divorce the pro-
liferation issue from other security issues. Just as ACRS fell apart over con-
flicting views on how to approach the nonproliferation issue – “peace first
then disarmament” or “disarmament first then peace” – any conference
devoted narrowly to establishing a WMDFZ in isolation from the other
regional security issues will face the same conundrum.
So far, no state within the Middle East has emerged with enough clout to
advance the establishment of a new regional order or forum. Though Israel
and Jordan called for the creation of a “Conference on Security and Coop-
eration in the Middle East,” and codified their support for such an organiza-
tion in Article IV of their 1994 peace treaty, neither party has found a way to
reify this proposition. Instead, both parties have tacitly put the idea on hold
pending a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.
The Arab Peace Initiative (API) of 2002, reissued in 2007 and reaffirmed
subsequently, is the best recent example of a new sense of urgency for a
regional approach to solving local conflicts. Initiated by Saudi Arabia, the
API was unanimously endorsed and proposed by the Arab League as a path
forward to finally end the Arab-Israeli conflict through negotiations. In
exchange for settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Israel-Syria/
Lebanon conflict based on the existing boundaries on the 1967 borders, the
Arab states would formally end their conflict and establish normalized rela-
tions with Israel. The API went further by promising to include Israel in some
type of regional security mechanism.
Adoption of the API was a watershed event in the history of the Middle
East. Arab parties not only signaled that they wanted and were ready to
end the conflict, but they also accepted that the Middle East would be a
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190 Michael Yaffe
heterogeneous region, not an Arab Middle East, with recognized sovereignty
for all. The API replaced the previous Arab League position of “no peace
with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel.” Some
have argued that the API was not a serious offer, but rather a take it or leave
it “diktat” to Israel, which could be ignored. Others have seen it as an open-
ing gamut in a bargaining process and a valuable opportunity to advance
peace. Certainly, the broader implications for such a far-reaching proposal in
terms of regionalism should not be dismissed. The API is a standing offer as
a regional approach for ending the conflict, and, perhaps, could someday be
combined with a formal “Israeli Peace Initiative” to form a Regional Peace
Initiative.
Is the Middle East ready for a cooperative regional regime?

Does this 40-year history of trying to instill a sense of regionalism in the
Middle East indicate that it is only a matter of time before some form of
cooperative architecture will take hold, or is such an international order
nothing more than a pipe dream? Is the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict the
primary force holding back the forces that would bring forward such archi-
tecture? Does the wave of new democratic governments together with political
reform movements throughout the region augur well for a new look at form-
ing inclusive regional institutions? Is the region a step closer to forming a
cooperative security regime akin to the OSCE?
Identifying the conditions that made the OSCE possible holds clues as to
what ingredients are still missing in the Middle East for establishing a similar
regime. A few items may be applicable exclusively to the context of Europe
during the Cold War in 1975 and, as such, are idiosyncratic to the OSCE.
Others have universal applicability. A distillation of the fundamental ingre-
dients includes the following:
1 Strong pivotal states committed to regional cooperation rather than conflict;

2 Military stalemate and relative parity, with the accepted norm that the use
of force and arms racing will not change the political status quo;
3 Common geographical identity, history, and affinity;
4 Lack of an active conflict in the region;
5 Recognized territorial sovereignty by all state parties;
6 Integrated regional institutions; and
7 External powers’ acceptance of region-wide institutions.
The CSCE was a product of the Cold War in Europe in the 1970s. By 1972,
the superpowers had informally acknowledged strategic parity and embarked
on rounds of arms control as a means of stabilizing their relationship through
negotiations. As Western Europe pondered its future under superpower parity,
it settled on a concept called “Common Security” for the whole of Europe.3
Common Security became formally enshrined in the agenda at the 1975
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Conference on Security and Economic Cooperation in Europe. It formally
recognized that the situation in Europe could not be changed through mili-
tary force and that the only way forward was to build relations between
Eastern and Western Europe based on mutual respect for sovereignty and
territory. Essentially, it was a “live and let live” system, in which the parties
would agree to an agenda for cooperation while maintaining their ideological
competition and division inside Europe. The CSCE was a tangible pro-
nouncement that Europe saw itself as a single region and that its future would
be regulated through cooperative interactions, not just military division.
Several elements undergirded this newfound cooperative regionalism in
Europe. First, through years of interactions preceding World War II, CSCE
member states had developed a sense of what geographically constituted
Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, and that this was part of their iden-
tity. The people of Europe acknowledged themselves as Europeans, in con-
junction with diverse cultural affinities including religion, nationalism,
political ideology, governmental systems, and history. There was a uniform
sense that they would share a long future together due to their geographic
proximity and historical affinities. Second, the United States and the Soviet
Union were included in the Conference as pivotal players that at best blessed
the idea of a cooperative regional organization and at least did not obstruct it.
Third, reconciliation between West Germany and France was critical: antag-
onism between these two powerful states would have made it impossible to
advance cooperation throughout the rest of Europe. Fourth, after nearly
30 years of antagonism, especially over Berlin, the prospect of hard conflict in
Europe had receded with détente and the acceptance of spheres of influence in
the East-West rivalry. Fifth, a stable balance of power as defined by rival mili-
tary alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, gave the CSCE space to develop a
cooperative agenda. Additionally, Europe was laced with regional institutions
that bounded most European states together in exclusive arrangements, be it in
the European Commission, the Western European Union, NATO, or the
Warsaw Pact. An ethos of cooperation was present on the continent.
The vanishing Middle East and the founding of the OSCG

and OSCEM
As noted at the outset of this chapter, the Middle East lacks most of the key
ingredients for a cooperative system. There is not a single pivotal state or
alignment of pivotal states capable of leading all the others when facing multi-
ple conflicts in the region. By contrast, individual pivotal states have, inten-
tionally and inadvertently, disrupted cooperative initiatives and undermined
efforts to resolve latent and ongoing conflicts. Today, the key regional parties
must include Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia; in addition, a cooperative
system could hardly be envisioned without the United States and key states like
Turkey, France, and Germany – the latter two through the European Union
framework. Even an alignment of pivotal states may not be enough to put the
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192 Michael Yaffe
region on a different course without a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.
Though Egypt and France dabbled with the Union of the Mediterranean as an
inclusive regime, they were unable to infuse this regime with enough power to
be a shaping instrument in the region. Missing from the combination of key
pivotal states was the pulling power of Turkey and Israel, and the European
Union (particularly Germany) was also hesitant about it.
A fundamental problem with the whole idea of a Middle East cooperative
regime is the lack of cohesive identity and affinity for the concept of a Middle
East. There are many reasons for this state of affairs. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, the region has been shaped as much by outsiders as by those living
there. Indeed, the very appellation “the Middle East” was concocted by an
outsider, an American in 1902.4 Constant foreign intervention and tinkering
are the burdens denizens have borne for living at the crossroads of the world.
Complicating matters even more, these outsiders either fomented conflicts
between local residents for their own interests or were manipulated by resi-
dents in their local rivalries.
Adding to this identity crisis is the lack of homogeneity in the region. While
the overwhelming majority of the people are Arab Muslims, the Middle East is
also home to several great religions with sundry derivative sects and multiple
ethnicities. Until recently, there was only one full-blown democracy in the
region, Israel, along with bounded democracies in Lebanon and Iran. Now, we
see democracies, or liberal orders, emerging in Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and
possibly Egypt, all of which are expected to undergo years of adjustment, set-
backs, and progress. About half of the states are republics, while the others are
monarchies. Most of the states interact in subregional groupings rather than in
a pan-regional organization. The Arab League has been anything but a pow-
erful promoter of cooperation between states in the region.
Most of the states interact with each other in two exclusive geographic set-
tings, in the Persian Gulf and in the Mediterranean basin, and each setting has
its own rhythm, pace, norms, and threats. The Gulf is dominated by the rivalry
between the pivotal states of Saudi Arabia and Iran. With the exception of the
bilateral conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean, between Israel and Syria,
Lebanon, and the Palestinians, the rest of the Mediterranean is relatively
secure: no state craves or disputes the sovereignty of the other, and all have
normal relations (though there is tension between Morocco and Algeria).
Oddly enough, the most powerful force driving a sense of regionalism in
the modern Middle East has been the Arab-Israeli conflict. Establishing a
state for the Palestinian people has been the singular cause for Arab cohesion,
both at the state level and in civil society. Likewise, support for Syria had
rested largely on getting the Golan Heights back from Israel, while Lebanon
received Arab empathy during bouts of Israeli intervention and occupation.
Regional states have shown a propensity to entertain the idea of cooperative
regional activities only within the context of peace talks. Arab governments
agreed to join the Madrid Peace Process in the hopes that this would lead to
the end of the conflict and then agreed to participate in various economic and
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security projects with Israel. When it appeared that a peace treaty with the
Palestinians might become a reality during the period from 1993 to 1996,
Israel established economic trade offices in Morocco, Tunisia, and Qatar.
When those talks did not bear fruit and Israel reaffirmed its occupation in the
West Bank and sent troops into Gaza, Arab governments abandoned the
multilateral negotiations and closed the economic trade offices. Likewise,
Arab states jointly decided to table the Arab Peace Initiative when it looked
like the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations were stalled in 2002 and subsequently
reaffirmed the API when doing so was believed to help set an atmosphere
conducive for resumed negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
Every attempt to advance some form of cooperative regional regime has
been stymied by the lack of a comprehensive peace. It’s an impressive list of
failures – the Madrid Middle East Peace Process, ACRS, the Barcelona Pro-
cess, the Union for the Mediterranean, the Arab Peace Initiative, and the
Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the
Broader Middle East and North Africa, the Arab Peace Initiative (reaffirmed),
and the (yet to occur) WMDFZ conference. The 65-year-old conflict has been
the single most important feature shaping Middle East identity, but at the same
time, it has been the reason for putting the brakes on all attempts to integrate
the region and foster collaborative activities. The conflict has isolated Israel
from interacting more with the Arab world and been a cause of tensions with
other regional pivotal states, namely Turkey and Egypt, with which it has
formal relations. Meanwhile, Iran has used the conflict to create wedges
between the Arab states and advance its hegemony in the region.
By logical extension, once the Arab-Israeli conflict ends, the region will
erase this long-standing dividing line against which it measures regional
identity. Each nation will have equal sovereignty and normalized relations
with the other regional parties. Rather than being known as the home of the
Arab-Israeli conflict, the region would become home to an amalgamation of
different cultures living peacefully side-by-side, at least in theory. Barriers and
stigmatism against increased interactions, especially in the economic realm,
will be removed. It may take years before long-standing animosities are
erased, but the process of reconciliation could move forward. Focus would
likely shift to other regional conflicts, particularly between Iran and the Arab
Gulf states, especially if Iran loses influence in the Levant. The key pivotal
states would be more inclined to exert power in their immediate neighbor-
hoods. This means Turkey, Israel, Egypt, and the European Union would
lead the way in the Mediterranean area. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and powerful
states from the International Community would continue to be the primary
shapers in the Gulf.
If these predictions are correct, then the region traditionally known as the
Middle East is likely to divide further between the Persian Gulf and the
Mediterranean, so that these areas become two distinct regions with their own
unique regional complexes, sets of interactions, norms, and principles. The
Middle East, as we have come to know it, will fade away.
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194 Michael Yaffe
One can extrapolate further on this provocative premonition with regard
to the implications for regional security. With peace, Iran’s reach beyond
the Gulf into the Mediterranean Arab world vis-à-vis Syria, Hamas, and
Hezbollah would be greatly diminished, causing Tehran to refocus its energies
on the Gulf, particularly on neighboring Iraq. The Gulf will become the locus
of the main regional conflict, but because of its centrality to the world’s
energy system, the conflict will be internationalized. In addition to the regio-
nal pivotal states, the other great powers – the United States, China, the
European Union, India, Russia, and Japan – will all have critical stakes in
supporting stability in the Gulf. Adding to the complexities will be Iran’s
nuclear program and Iranian adjustment to a new set of leaders replacing the
original revolutionary generation.
The security order in the Gulf will gyrate around containing Iranian hege-
monic ambitions; achieving an acceptable way of coexistence between Saudi
Arabia and Iran; and transforming Iran into a status quo power. If trilateral
relations improve between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, then the
establishment of a consultative forum in which all Persian Gulf parties parti-
cipate might have a chance to succeed. Once the parties recognize that mili-
tary conflict and competition will not be to anyone’s advantage, Gulf parties
might take a page out of the European experience and adopt a common
security framework or opt for a “live-and-let-live” relationship.
With peace, relations in the Mediterranean will undergo an abrupt
change. There will be greater interaction among the littoral states, realizing
the ambitions set forth in numerous European Union-sponsored initiatives
and plans. This time, however, the pivotal states of Turkey, Egypt, and
Israel will help lead the way together with the European Union. The
volume of transactions between individual Mediterranean states and Eur-
opean states is already on a steady rise. These interactions range from trade,
joint research, and scientific cooperation and investment to stemming illicit
trafficking, organized crime, and the drug trade. One can expect to see more
job opportunities open up in Europe for the Mediterranean states abundant
with underemployed youth, as the pool of Northern and Central European
workers shrinks over the next 50 years. This workforce flow would be
greatly facilitated by the establishment of a free-trade zone between the EU
and some Middle Eastern states after a peace agreement is signed. Though
many EU states have been slow to integrate recent Arab and Muslim
immigrants, since 9/11 there has been a growing recognition that they must
do so for their own security and survival. These immigrants will become
more vital to the European economies as the global economy recovers from
the traumatic economic recession of the early 21st century. European states
will be looking for new export markets, particularly on their doorstep, from
where these immigrants came. At the same time, there will be a need for
greater cooperation between the European states and the Mediterranean
states to contain illicit activities that often accompany increased legitimate
interaction.
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Turbulence should be expected as the European-Mediterranean relationship
accelerates. The partnership will have enough differences between individual
states to remain primarily a transactional engagement rather than a con-
vergence of civilizations. Though differences will remain between the various
societies in the region, the replacement of autocratic regimes with democ-
racies in North Africa and the Levant will make cooperation easier. This is
not to suggest that there is smooth sailing ahead. The newly democratic states
will be adjusting, often fittingly, to a more open form of governance and to
being accountable to their publics. These democracies will have distinct iden-
tities based on the dominant culture, ethnicity, and religion within each state.
Their idiosyncrasies will make them different from the European democracies.
As such, cooperative relations between Southern Mediterranean states and
European states may hinge more on intersecting national interests than on
governance affinity.
Whereas the Gulf, with its strategic paralysis, may be driven toward
obtaining a common security regime, based on a “live-and-let-live” relation-
ship, the Mediterranean will be more of a cooperative security regime. Until
there is some kind of reconciliation between Iran and the rest of the Gulf
powers, that region may look like Europe did during 1972–1975, prior to the
founding of the CSCE during the Cold War. In due course, as the situation
stabilizes, the Gulf powers may want to set up a Conference on Security and
Cooperation in the Gulf (CSCG).
By contrast, lacking hard conflict, the Mediterranean basin would be prone
toward a cooperative security regime for dealing with softer security threats,
such as illicit trafficking, terrorism, and crime, while promoting fundamental
human rights. These issues are not limited to the Mediterranean basin; they
also apply to the whole of Europe. As such, it may be more instrumental to
open up the OSCE, which already involves all of the parties, to offer full
membership for all states in the Mediterranean basin, than to form a new
regime just for the littoral states. It would become the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Mediterranean (OSCEM). As a
singular success story already involving all the parties prior to the end of
Arab-Israeli conflict, the OSCE is in a good position to foster cooperative
energies between European and Mediterranean states post-conflict. Expand-
ing the OSCE into the OSCEM would be well in line with the natural growth
of an organization originally formed to support stability at the denouement of
a major conflict and whose membership expanded when that conflict ended.
Such an organization would easily coexist with other regional arrangements,
such as NATO and the Arab League, which will continue to serve the special
needs and interests of their respective members.
What’s next?
Much of the vision of the future of the Middle East presented in this chapter
is predicated on an analysis that the region fundamentally lacks regionalism.
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196 Michael Yaffe
The single driving force for demarcating the region as a geographic grouping
has been the Arab-Israeli conflict. Without a sense of regionalism, the Middle
East will not have the wherewithal to sustain itself as a composite region from
the Atlantic to the Gulf after a comprehensive peace between Israelis and
Arabs is achieved. Until that event occurs, attempts at promoting regional
cooperation are likely to fail.
So what should be done to advance such cooperative security regimes for
when conditions are more auspicious to founding such regimes? As with all
things involved in international relations, context trumps all. Can the
Middle East truly wait for some grand design to emerge in order to deal
with its multiple security dilemmas, or must it wait for a comprehensive
peace or a catastrophic event like another war to trigger a movement for
creating a regional order based on a mixture of satiated balances of power
and mutually acceptable institutional regimes? These are questions that
should not be left up to governments alone to grapple with, but must involve
everyone in the dialogue, especially as the Arab Uprisings has seen the
awakening of greater civil society involvement in governance. They should
be at the heart of sustained Track 2 dialogues preceding and during formal
negotiations. In this sense, the Helsinki Process holds an important lesson
about the value of civil society engagement. Many of the ideas that influ-
enced and informed the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
in 1975 were hatched in think tanks and academic conferences. They helped
shape the principles adopted in formal agreements prior to European parties
formally sitting down together to hammer out the framework that would
define their future interactions.
Some fascinating studies have emerged from Track 2 diplomacy. Such
diplomacy includes the proceedings of workshops focusing on lessons learned
and potentially applied to the Middle East from security and cooperation
regimes in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. It includes reports from
working groups on promoting democracy, investment, economic develop-
ment, Gulf security, and Mediterranean security. It includes output from
semiannual workshops bringing together senior military leaders. It produced
a joint study by Israeli and Jordanian experts on how to “bridge the gap” for
constructing a Middle East cooperative security framework. A working group
developed a model “charter” of general principles based on the UN charter
(peaceful coexistence, respect for sovereignty, nonintervention, respect for
human rights, etc.) as a template to be adapted by regional governments to fit
their needs, not as something to be swallowed whole.
Track 2 can play an important role by sponsoring discourse on what
the Middle East might look like after a peace agreement is reached. More
importantly, it could focus on what the regional parties want the region to be.
Will they want to develop a sense of regionalism from the Atlantic to
the Persian Gulf, or do they see their future in bifurcated groupings, one in
the Mediterranean and Europe, and the other in the Gulf ? While such visions
will not necessarily impact the bilateral negotiations ending the Arab-Israeli
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conflict, they could shape the agenda of renewed multilateral negotiations
among all the parties involved in the conflict.
Change is coming to the Middle East no matter what cooperative or
reform initiatives are pursued. The impetus for this change is derived from
multiple and competing sources, including demographic surges, political suc-
cession, conflicts between modernizers and reformers and traditionalists and
obstructionists, technological change, water shortages, drug abuse, economic
stagnation, economic growth, satellite television, the internet, the educated
and the uneducated. But change, especially rapid change and the process of
establishing democracy, can by its very nature lead to violence and upheavals,
displacement, and greater tyranny. States in the region and outsiders should
work together in appropriate forums to create a calm and stable security
environment in the Middle East so that reforms can grab hold and not be
swept away by political uncertainties.
It is always difficult to make coherent and accurate predictions about
international relations. One should approach it with a strong sense of humility
and apprehension. It is especially daunting to make predictions about the
Middle East. This chapter has sought to comprehend emerging trends in the
Middle East security complex and extrapolate where those trends are leading.
Saying that the Middle East is vanishing and being replaced by new regional
regimes in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf is not a wish or an
attempt by another outsider to create a grand design for the region. The
future of the region is in the hands of those who live there. As the saying goes,
“the best way to predict the future is to create it.”
Notes
1 Buzan, People, States, and Fear, 3.
2 Aarts, “The Middle East,” 911.
3 See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Policies for Common
Security.
4 See Koppes, “Captain Mahan.”
Bibliography
Aarts, Paul. “The Middle East: A Region without Regionalism or the End of Excep-
tionalism?” Third World Quarterly 20.5 (1999): 911–925.
Buzan, Barry. People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International
Relations. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983.
Koppes, Clayton R. “Captain Mahan, General Gordon, and the Origin of the Term
‘Middle East’.” Middle East Studies 12.1 (1976): 95–98.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Policies for Common Security.
London: Taylor & Francis, 1985.
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11 Civil society dialogues and Middle

East regional security
The Asia-Pacific model
Peter Jones
Introduction
The Arab Uprisings have brought to the fore the importance of civil society
as a force for change in the Middle East. Exactly how the dust will settle is
not yet clear. However, it seems clear beyond doubt that it will be increasingly
difficult for entrenched elites alone to decide the region’s future. Of course, it
would be naïve to expect that those elites will completely surrender their pri-
vileged position – the experience of Egypt’s generals and their seizure of
power from the elected president is a case in point. Moreover, just because a
certain amount of “power” has been handed to the “people” does not mean
that peace will follow – the people can be swayed towards directions other
than peace. Nevertheless, the landscape has changed.
This chapter will assess the possibility of a civil society-led dialogue on
Middle East security, drawing on the experience of such dialogues in the
Asia-Pacific region. It contends that the model for a civil society dialogue on
security matters that has developed in the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) region has some useful lessons for the Middle East,
although it is not a perfect fit. Indeed, after many years of examining regional
security systems in the Middle East and elsewhere,1 I am convinced that each
region must find its own way based on its unique history and needs. However,
examining other regional models is useful in providing ideas and stimulating
discussions, which can lead to new ways of looking at things. At the very
least, some specific points from the ASEAN experience regarding the type of
process and the kinds of people that can have an impact on official policy in
the region might prove to be instructive.
ASEAN civil society dialogues on regional security

ASEAN civil society regional dialogue began during the Cold War, when a
small number of leaders of regional think tanks became concerned that
ASEAN governments lacked the policy ideas required to chart a course that
would allow their countries to avoid the fate of being minor players in their
own region. They therefore set out to develop a network between a select
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Civil society dialogues and Middle East regional security 199
group of local institutes for strategic and international studies – hence the
formal name ASEAN ISIS – that would allow the region to develop its own
processes and standard practices that would govern the relations within the
region and to which the outside powers would adhere.2
In the beginning, the ASEAN ISIS was not closely linked to governments;
it was up to each local institute to transmit the results of the collective
research to its host government through its own mechanisms and contacts.
Some of these institutes were sponsored by their governments and presumably
would have done that, though others were not officially sponsored, and the
extent of their ability to pass ideas to their local authorities is not clear. By
1992, ASEAN ISIS had developed a formal relationship with the ASEAN
Secretariat and other well-established channels whereby its ideas and studies
could be transmitted to officials in the region. The institutes also began a
process of formal meetings with senior officials charged with preparing the
annual ASEAN Summit.
A network of related civil society dialogue processes has evolved alongside
ASEAN ISIS to broaden and deepen its reach and work. For example, the
Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) was cre-
ated in 1992 to provide a mechanism for ASEAN ISIS to meet regularly with
a network of institutes from outside the ASEAN region, with participating
institutes from Northeast Asia, North America, Australia, China, Russia, and
Europe.3
Over time, a set of norms has evolved in these and many other related civil
society dialogues that have sprung up around ASEAN ISIS. Foremost
amongst these has been to avoid discussion of specific conflicts in favor of
dialogue over regional norms of behavior and over mechanisms for fostering
regional cooperation. Those conflicts that do exist in the region (such as the
disputes over sovereignty in the South China Sea and the China-Taiwan issue)
are tiptoed around by the tacit consent of all concerned.4
The ASEAN civil society dialogue experience thus paints a picture of an
ongoing dialogue process meant to facilitate quiet understandings between
officials (in their private capacities) and quasi-officials from government-
approved think tanks. In a way, some of this work is closer to what has been
called “Track 1.5” than Track 2 in that it represents a non-official interaction,
but one which is closely aligned with official priorities and which has an
institutional link to Track 1.5 However, even though it has close links to the
official realm, ASEAN Track 2 is not a place to work out the specifics of
future “agreements” between countries. Rather, the primary purpose of this
dialogue is to allow a space whereby academics and government officials can
explore conceptual issues and gradually raise them to the fore in a way that
avoids unpleasant surprises for all concerned.
Thus, in Job’s view, the process has been primarily “ideational.”6 By this,
he means that the ASEAN civil society dialogue on regional issues is a pro-
cess through which selected elites from the region, and invited extra-regional
participants, examine new ideas alongside traditionally prevailing concepts
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200 Peter Jones
and develop agreed understandings of them. These ideas are then passed for-
ward to the official process for consideration and possible adoption. It is in
this context that analysts such as Acharya have viewed the ASEAN-ISIS
experience as a process of “constructing” a new approach to the collective
understanding of what “security” means in the region.7
However, Job and others point out that there are clear limits to what the
ASEAN ISIS process can do. When it comes to issues that challenge the pri-
macy of states with respect to territory and the resolution of disputes over
contested sovereignty, it has to tread very carefully. But when it creates a
platform for the consideration of new ideas, it tends to do better – provided it
takes this softly and never forgets that regional states have “the first right of
refusal” over any idea.8
Those involved in this kind of work need to be very special types. The key
to successful development and transmission of new ways of thinking
and behaving is select individuals, whom Job and other constructivists call
“norm entrepreneurs.” Interestingly, in reviewing the history of ASEAN civil
society dialogues, Job finds that most of these people have not been from the
ASEAN countries. Rather, they have been from Canada, Australia, Japan and
others. This paints a picture of outsiders being invited to push the boundaries
of accepted thought and regional civil society leaders then working to develop
the acceptance of those ideas that they feel have some utility at any given
moment.9
There are, of course, criticisms, much of which have to do with the per-
ception that ASEAN ISIS is too close to the governments of the region and
that it is unwilling to “rock the boat” with uncomfortable new ideas. In this
context, analysts such as Seng See Tan have rather caustically asked whether
ASEAN ISIS is a civil society organization or a group of frustrated civil ser-
vants.10 Similarly, Kraft has raised what he calls the “Autonomy Dilemma,”
whereby the closer this dialogue is to officialdom, the greater its ability to get
its ideas heard by government, but the lesser its ability or willingness to
challenge entrenched thinking, and vice versa.11 Others, such as Paul Evans,
recognize that the close relationships between ASEAN ISIS and officialdom
make it a unique form of civil society dialogue, but argue that regional poli-
tical and cultural norms make this situation likely, if not inevitable. The key
to civil society being effective in these circumstances is not to bemoan this
state of affairs, but to skillfully exploit the opportunities it provides while
avoiding the entrapments of becoming entirely captive to official control,
something Evans believes ASEAN ISIS has done a better job of than its
critics would give it credit for.12
But Capie tells us that we should not just assume that the proposals from
ASEAN ideational civil society dialogues have always somehow found their
way into official action.13 He shows that such dialogues have high-water
points of influence when the world is changing rapidly and officials are
searching for new ideas and constructs, but that they are not so successful in
times of relative stability – if success is defined as promoting specific
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proposals for change that make it into official channels. Above all, Capie tells
us that the following factors must be present for civil society dialogues to
succeed in bringing about change:
Structural opportunity (a moment when the regional system is looking for

new ideas and policy proposals);
Sound ideas (ideas which are viewed by regional governments as both
realistic and also capable of addressing the needs of a moment when there
is great flux); and
Influential proponents (people who are regarded by regional governments
as trustworthy and whose ideas will be listened to by elites).
It would seem that these things do not happen in concert all that frequently.
Does this invalidate an ongoing civil society dialogue process in the region?
Proponents would say no; they would say that developing and maintaining a
dialogue creates a structure which is capable of generating ideas and propo-
sals, and also fosters a trusted core of proponents for those ideas who can be
effective in those moments when Capie’s conditions come together.
Moreover, even as we confront the fact that ASEAN Track 2 is rarely as
influential as one might think, despite its privileged position close to power,
some believe that this very position is a problem. There are thus growing
references in the region to an emerging “Track 3,” which refers to civil society
groups that seek to challenge their governments and other entrenched inter-
ests. Because ASEAN ISIS is so closely aligned with the governments of the
region, it leaves itself open to criticism from these people, much like that
voiced by Tan and Kraft, that it is too close to governments and unable to
think “outside the box.” At the conclusion of their articles reviewing the his-
tory of ASEAN civil society dialogue, scholars like Job, Ball, and others call
for ASEAN ISIS to try to open up to Track 3 and work with it – to recognize
that these people have important points to make and that they can prevent
the existing dialogues from becoming sterile.
All of this leads us to the question of how to measure the success of
ASEAN civil society dialogues. Ball and his colleagues note that “most of
the benefits of Track 2 security dialogue are intangible and, therefore, not
readily quantifiable.”14 Job reminds us that it is difficult to find direct ways
of measuring the flow and development of ideas; such things are usually
indirect. Moreover, the concept of “measuring” anything, including success,
usually implies a control mechanism or a benchmark – it is not clear how
these should or could be constructed in case of civil society dialogue, not
knowing what would have happened had such a dialogue process not been
in place.
For those who are engaged in this kind of work, and who believe in it,
there is thus an element of faith, a belief that the creation of a regional com-
munity of experts, who have collectively mastered the complex questions of
regional security and cooperation and developed concepts and proposals, is a
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202 Peter Jones
positive outcome.15 Measuring the specific manner in which these ideas may
have penetrated official policy is always a complex and inexact business.
In the case of ASEAN ISIS civil society dialogue, the key, many believe,
has been its work to develop an idea of the region based on a notion of a
gradual shift to regional politics based on a paradigm of cooperative and
shared security. That this idea has not always found its way onto the official
agenda of regional states is hardly surprising. Like everywhere else, the
region’s states operate in a world where the Realist security paradigm cannot
be ignored. But many of those who follow the region closely do believe that
the civil society dialogue has played a significant role in shifting the region’s
discourse, over time, to the point that cooperative security views are accepted
as a key part of the region’s approach to security.
Civil society dialogue and Middle East regional security

The literature on what a Middle East regional civil society dialogue aimed at
developing and promoting new approaches to regional security, including
arms control, might look like is sparse.16 With few exceptions,17 it has not
compared the Asia-Pacific case to the Middle East, and for good reason: the
security problems confronted by states in each region are quite different, and
the structure of regional diplomacy in the Middle East is significantly differ-
ent from that in the ASEAN region. In the Middle East, there is no region-
wide, inclusive official dialogue on security matters to match ASEAN and its
related forums. Thus, since ASEAN ISIS and its associated dialogues exist to
support the official process and draw at least some of their legitimacy from
this role (even though the benefit of civil society’s connections to the official
process is contested in the eyes of some), a civil society dialogue in the Middle
East modeled on the ASEAN ISIS approach would immediately run into the
problem of having no official process to feed its ideas into.
The only such official dialogue on regional security and arms control to
ever exist in the Middle East was the Arms Control and Regional Security
(ACRS) working group of the Middle East Peace Process. Six ACRS plenary
sessions were held between May 1992 and December 1994.18 Between these
plenaries, a number of inter-sessional activities took place, both in the region
and outside it. ACRS inter-sessional activities were largely organized into two
“baskets”: operational and conceptual. By and large, the operational basket
concentrated on the negotiation of specific confidence- and security-building
measures (CSBMs). These were often based on measures that had been
adopted in other regional contexts, although considerable effort was expended
on adapting them to the realities of the Middle East. The conceptual basket
dealt with longer-term questions, including threat perceptions, visions of a
future regional security order, and ways to deal with the region’s weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) problem.
There are many reasons why this structure was created, not the least of
which were logistical. But it was also true that this structure tended to
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separate the nuclear weapons issue from measures being developed for
immediate implementation. Though ACRS never officially stated that the
nuclear question was a long-term one, in effect this structure meant it was to
be addressed at some point in the future, when the broader regional security
dynamic will have changed considerably. This was the view held by Israel.
Egypt took the opposite view, supported in varying degrees by the other Arab
delegations. Namely, Cairo argued that the nuclear issue must be addressed
early on. This difference of views eventually became the key element leading
to the demise of ACRS. In addition to this pressure, ACRS suffered from the
general slowdown of the multilateral process: as the bilaterals grounded to a
halt, none of the multilaterals were able to proceed ahead of them, and they
subsequently suffered as well. Beyond these issues, however, there were some
key problems with ACRS itself.
The first key problem lay in ACRS membership. As ACRS was a part of
the Peace Process, Iran, Iraq, and Libya were not invited by the ACRS gavel
holders to participate. It may also have been the case that the United States
was not prepared to ask these countries to join due to its own differences with
them, and it is unlikely they would have agreed to participate had they been
invited, as they did not support the Peace Process. Meanwhile, neither Syria
nor Lebanon would agree to participate in the multilateral groups until their
bilateral negotiations with Israel had been completed. These “no shows” had
a critical impact on the ability of the process to seriously address regional
security issues, particularly those relating to WMD.
The second problem was that ACRS was created as a forum to discuss
regional issues as a subset of the Peace Process, which had a distinct Israeli-
Arab focus. Many Arab delegates (e.g. from the Persian Gulf) would privately
note that they were not especially concerned over Israel, in a military sense at
least, and could have adopted CSBMs with that country if the political
situation had permitted. For these countries, the key security concerns were
their immediate subregional neighbors, but there were no such discussions
within ACRS.19 Moreover, with Iran not having participated, it is difficult to
envisage serious discussions about the Persian Gulf issues. Thus, although
there are arms control and security issues that span the entire Middle East,
there are also issues that are primarily subregional, and this needs to be
recognized. In Track 2 work subsequent to ACRS, the possibilities of sub-
regional arms control and disarmament arrangements have been explored,
most notably in a project on the possibility of creating a WMDFZ in the
Persian Gulf, which was run by the Gulf Research Center.20
Thirdly, ACRS suffered from a structural problem: the question of internal
tensions over three fundamental axes, which were distinct but interrelated. The
first one, pervading the entire Peace Process, was the tension between the
bilateral and the multilateral tracks of the negotiations. A fear was constantly
expressed by many Arab delegations that going too far in the multilaterals
would reward Israel with normalized relations before it had made peace with
the Palestinians. Thus, the adoption of many ACRS texts and accomplishments
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204 Peter Jones
was deferred for reasons that had little, if anything, to do with the subjects
under discussion in ACRS itself. Secondly, tensions between the conceptual and
operational baskets meant that technical experts in the working groups often
could not proceed with the practical measures they agreed upon until their
diplomatic representatives could sign on to nominal official declarations. The
third, and in many ways the most serious, set of tensions emerged over the
nuclear issue, with key regional players unwilling to go ahead with the discus-
sion of CBMs until tangible progress was made on the track of the approaching
1995 NPT Review Conference.
This observation leads to the final problem with ACRS, namely, that it did
not develop a concept of an indigenous Middle East cooperation and security
system. There was some discussion of this issue at the very beginning of the
ACRS process, but it was largely a series of lectures on the experience of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), rather than a
dialogue on how a truly Middle Eastern system might be created. In the Asia-
Pacific context, it was from discussions at the ASEAN civil society level that
such a vision emerged for that region.
Beyond these problems, which were specific to ACRS, the Middle East
suffers from a deep suspicion on the part of some that any dialogue including
Israel, whether official or not, would be an act of “normalizing” relations
with her in the absence of a resolution of the Palestinian issue. By contrast, in
the ASEAN region, a deliberate decision was taken early on in the process of
developing both ASEAN and the region’s civil society dialogue that differ-
ences over political and even territorial matters would not be allowed to stop
the dialogue at either the official or civil society level. This idea is not yet
universally accepted in the Middle East.
Although there is no official dialogue in the Middle East on security, the
conference mandated by the 2010 NPT Review Conference to consider the
creation of a “Middle East free of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their
Delivery Vehicles” may provide an opportunity for a new beginning. This
conference, which has been postponed for political reasons, presents the first
opportunity in almost 20 years for an official regional dialogue over security
issues. If this process can stimulate the beginning, even in nascent form, of a
standing regional dialogue on security matters, this may provide a niche for a
civil society dialogue to play a useful supporting role.21
The states and civil society organizations of the region, and the international
community, should reflect on the ASEAN experience as part of their con-
siderations of how civil society can support a regional arms control and secur-
ity process in the Middle East. Above all, the ASEAN experience demonstrates
that the creation of a new regional security dynamic is a lengthy, and by no
means linear, process. Indeed, in reflecting back on regional processes that have
greatly changed the perceptions and dynamics of various regions of the world,
such as the ASEAN one, it was long-term regular interaction and dialogue that
were at least as important as any of the specific agreements that were achieved.
Thus, any future effort should begin with a sustained dialogue over what
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regional countries want to get out of the process – in effect, an exploration of
the principles for a future regional security system.
Following on from this, the Middle East needs to have a dialogue on the
subject of regional security for its own sake, not as an offshoot of the Peace
Process. There is a relationship between the willingness of Middle Eastern
states to consider new approaches to regional cooperation and security, and
the success of the Peace Process. But that should not form the foundation of
any new arms control and regional security process. There are many security
issues between, and within, states in the Middle East that involve the Arab-
Israeli dispute only peripherally, if at all. An avoidance of too great a rela-
tionship between a new regional cooperation and security dialogue and the
Peace Process could permit these wider questions to begin to be addressed.
This point is particularly important, as there are many issues that need to
be discussed which are only peripherally related to “security” as it is tradi-
tionally defined. Instead, it may be necessary for regional states to have a
quiet dialogue over how they will manage change in their countries in a way
that would help avoid confrontation. These discussions could include subjects
such as the security consequences of environmental change, or even social
issues which have a security bearing on the region. In the wake of the Arab
Uprisings, we are seeing how serious this can be. It is only out of an in-depth
discussion of the “first principles” for a new regional cooperation and security
dialogue that the structure of such a process will emerge.
Indeed, given the rapidly evolving realities of the region, it seems likely that
any civil society dialogue over different regional security futures will feature
an increasingly active component of what is called Track 3 in the ASEAN
context. Some regional countries may not like this, but it is already happening
as different civil society bodies are being created across the region to explore
security and arms control concepts.22 This represents a nascent, and long
overdue, set of grassroots initiatives which are looking to plant seeds of
change and work from the bottom up. One such example is the “Next Gen-
eration Network” sponsored by the James Martin Center for Nonprolifera-
tion Studies, which has gathered a group of younger scholars and researchers
from across the region to explore these issues and implement concrete small-
scale projects that are not hinged exclusively on official diplomatic progress.23
Some might ask: what is the relationship of such a process to the prospects
for having an official discussion about arms control in the Middle East?
Simply put, it is the creation of a new approach to regional dialogue and
cooperation on security issues, broadly defined, that will set the stage for
successful arms control. Research and writing on this idea has explored the
concept of some sort of Middle East cooperation and security structure.
Much of this research has drawn on the experiences of Asia, Europe, and
elsewhere, though it has made it clear that the Middle East is unique and will
have to develop its own system.24 Whatever structure of dialogue eventually
emerges, this will be a long-term, multigenerational process. Placing great
expectations on a process at its outset will only frustrate it.
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206 Peter Jones
This is particularly true of the WMD issue and, more specifically, its
nuclear dimension. It is tempting to believe that the complete renunciation of
all nuclear capabilities by some regional countries will take place near the
beginning of a new regional arms control and security discussion. But it is
highly unlikely. Indeed, the renunciation of such capabilities is itself more
a process that unfolds over a period of time than something that happens at a
specific moment in time.
Research into cases of nuclear renunciation or reversal suggests that this
process is a complex one, with several factors at play.25 Thus, even if a state
commits to rid itself of its WMD capability, it is likely that it will “hedge”
until it is certain that the regional security situation has evolved to the point
where a rapid worsening of the situation is no longer possible.26 A new
regional security and arms control dialogue will have to consider how this
dynamic might play out for several countries in the Middle East. Given the
very difficult history of the Middle East and its many interlocking rivalries, it
is likely that a Middle Eastern WMDFZ will have to be able to deal with
hedging by several potential members for a time. Thus, at least in its nuclear
dimension, the new regional security dialogue will, at least initially, seek to:
Introduce some rules on hedging behavior;

Offer rewards for those who go beyond hedging and completely renounce
the WMD option, including security guarantees; and
Promote the eventual renunciation of hedging itself – though that will take
some years and only be achieved in the context of a fundamental set of
changes in the regional security paradigm.27
If this is an accurate reflection of the likely reality of a long process leading to

eventual disarmament, a robust civil society engagement across the region on
these issues is going to be necessary. Ultimately, governments will have to
decide on these matters, but they will probably need help to develop the
intellectual tools to make progress possible and to run the kind of public
dialogue that will be necessary to secure public support for these shifts. As in
the Asia-Pacific region, civil society engagement with these issues in the
Middle East therefore has an ideational role to play in developing the con-
cepts and building the public support for the compromises that will be
necessary. Flowing from the analysis of the Asia-Pacific experience, a number
of questions arise for the consideration of such a dialogue in the Middle East.
First, there will be a need to better understand the kinds of dialogues that
will go on and what their relationship might be to Track 1 and to each other.
The Asia-Pacific experience has shown that an unofficial dialogue with close
links to Track 1 can play a useful and important role, but that it also has its
limitations which need to be understood. If it gets too close to Track 1, par-
ticipants in such a dialogue can become risk averse in terms of the subjects
they are willing to tackle and the toes the group is willing to step on; such a
dialogue can thereby risk becoming intellectually stultifying and sterile in
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terms of its willingness to develop and tackle new policy ideas. It can also
alienate the more grassroots-oriented civil society groups. In the ASEAN
case, they have spun off to form what is referred to in the region as “Track 3”
dialogues, which are not cooperating with ASEAN-ISIS and are even work-
ing at cross purposes in some cases. Some thought thus needs to be given to
how the various dialogues that are already going on in the Middle East, and
which may begin there, relate to Track 1 and to each other. One does not seek
an all-encompassing single dialogue: a diversity of discussions encourages
fertile thinking. But chaos and competition are not desirable either. At the
very least, some degree of interaction between the various projects, and
between these projects and Track 1, is desirable. Perhaps the Facilitator, who
has been appointed to shepherd the WMDFZ conference process, could start
by taking on this role of gentle coordination between the different tracks and
projects – a role that could potentially be institutionalized later as the process
unfolds, provided the parties see that as desirable.
Second, Capie has noted that ASEAN-ISIS has only rarely managed to
have a direct and specific impact on the official, policy-making Track 1,
despite having a very close relationship with it. Instead, as Job tells us, its
impact has been more in the realm of ideas and concepts – an “ideational”
process leading to the gradual adoption of new ideas of what security means
in the region. The ASEAN civil society dialogues did have a direct, specific,
and rapid impact on Track 1 under a very rare set of circumstances: instances
in which respected proponents and well-thought-out ideas were present when
officials were looking for ideas. This does not happen often and cannot be
planned for. All of this means that the civil society initiatives in the Middle
East should keep the goals for their dialogues on regional security appro-
priately modest in terms of how and when they expect to influence the official
process. Above all, the temptation to imagine that such dialogues will quickly
lead to profound policy shifts should be managed. It would be nice if that
were to happen, of course, but experience indicates that such a result should
not be planned for.
Finally, as noted above, the key to the extent of policy influence that civil
society dialogues have had in the ASEAN region has been the emergence of
what Job and others have called “norm entrepreneurs.” These are respected
individuals who are able to transcend the Track 1/Track 2 divide. They have
the rare capacity to interact with both camps in ways that make them equally
respected and effective within each of them: they can interact with civil
society actors and academics on the appropriate conceptual level, but they
can also persuasively render these ideas into language and concepts which are
relevant and useful to officials. Having worked in both realms, this is not as
easy as it sounds. Who will be the “norm entrepreneurs” for these ideas in the
Middle East? As Job has noted, in the Asia-Pacific region this function is
largely performed by outsiders – is that also the fate of the Middle East? One
would hope not; one would hope that, in time, people from within the region
will emerge to play this role. The identification and nurturing of such key
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208 Peter Jones
people should be a fundamental objective of regional civil society dialogues
on security and arms control.
Conclusion
These last points bring us back to the ASEAN experience of civil society
dialogue as a long-term exercise in changing regional security perceptions and
paradigms. Frustrating though this may be to those in the Middle East who
want action now, particularly on the WMD issue, it seems highly unlikely that
states in the Middle East that have explored the option of WMD will agree to
forego them until the prevailing regional circumstances which had led them to
do so have changed. There does not seem to be much chance of such a
situation arising in the near term.
This does not mean that a process of discussion and even negotiation
should not begin until there has been such a sea change in views. Quite the
opposite: the key lesson from the ASEAN civil society experience is that the
very process of ongoing discussion has the potential to ultimately bring about
this sea change. However, it takes time to develop new ways of seeing things,
and – if Capie’s analysis of how the ASEAN civil society dialogues have
really affected regional governments is true – it also takes the emergence of
credible regional people and ideas and the intervention of events which
cannot be planned to shock the system into doing things in different ways.
As we look to the regional WMDFZ process, which was scheduled to begin
in Helsinki in late 2012, it is perhaps best to view it not as a single conference
event, but as an opportunity to begin a long process that will include both
Track 1 and Track 2 dimensions. Presently, the Middle East is a profoundly
“realist” region in its dominant perspectives on security relations. National
security is conceived of by most in the region in terms of survival, power, and
also “zero-sum” views. Under these circumstances, it seems unlikely that sig-
nificant changes will take place in the views of key states on their WMD
policies.
Thus, it would be a shame if the Helsinki Conference on a Middle East
WMDFZ, whenever it happens, simply degenerated into a repetition of the
arguments which brought ACRS to a halt, as the discussion over when to
hold it seems to have done, at least to date. A far more productive approach,
in my view, would be to take this as an opportunity to begin the long-term
process of changing regional mindsets, which is required for ultimate success.
A key part of this would be the pursuit of public support for an official pro-
cess. This could be developed through the creation of an inclusive, structured,
civil society dialogue involving those from across the region who are willing
to participate in a discussion of what a Middle East Free of WMD would
look like, and how to get there.
The “Arab Uprisings” has thrown all of the balls up in the air with respect
to the different visions which have existed to this point in terms of regional
security and stability. Presently, there is no agreed grand vision or strategy of
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regional stability to work toward, and it is not likely that governments across
the region, many of which are preoccupied with their survival or locked into
the sterile repetition of well-known positions, will supply it. Civil society must
step forward to help develop and provide the macro-level vision that is
required if the Middle East is to realize its goal of creating a WMDFZ.
Notes
1 See, for example, Jones, Regional Security Regime and “Middle East Security.”
2 For a history of the development of ASEAN ISIS, see Hernandez, “Track Two and
Regional Policy.” There is extensive literature on Asian civil society dialogues
regarding regional relations and security issues. Many of the key papers are rep-
rinted in Ball and Guan, Assessing Track Two Diplomacy.
3 See the official website of CSCAP: http://www.cscap.org/.
4 There has been a Track 2 dialogue over the South China Sea issue running inde-
pendently of ASEAN ISIS, though many of its participants have been ASEAN
ISIS stalwarts. See Djalal and Townsend-Gault, “Managing Potential Conflicts.”
5 For more on the idea of “Track 1.5,” particularly as practiced in the sense of
conflict resolution, see Nan, Druckman, and El Horr, “Unofficial International
Conflict Resolution.”
6 Job, “Track 2 Diplomacy.”
7 See Acharya, Constructing a Regional Security Community and Whose Ideas
Matter?
8 See Job, op. cit. See also Ball, Milner, and Taylor, “Track 2 Security Dialogue in
the Asia-Pacific.”
9 Job, op. cit. and Ball, Milner, and Taylor, op. cit.
10 Tan, “Non-Official Diplomacy.”
11 Kraft, “The Autonomy Dilemma.”
12 See Evans, “Do Individuals Matter?”
13 Capie, “When Does Track Two Matter?”
14 Ball, Milner, and Taylor, op. cit., 182.
15 Such communities of experts are known as “epistemic communities,” and there is a
body of literature on their effect on international politics. See, for example, Haas,
“Epistemic Communities.” One attempt to sum up and assess the effectiveness of
civil society processes in advocating change in international politics is the review
article by Richard Price (“Transnational Civil Society”).
16 The leading papers and books include (in alphabetical order by author): Agha,
Feldman, Khalidi, and Schiff, Track II Diplomacy; Alrababa’h and Egel, “Civil
Society Engagement”; Jones, “Filling a Critical Gap” and “Track II Diplomacy”;
Kane, “The Role of Civil Society”; Kaye, Talking to the Enemy; Kubbig, Weidlich,
and Mulas, “How to Make a Middle East Conference”; and Saab, “The Future of
Arms Control.”
17 See Jones, “A Gulf WMD Free Zone,” op. cit. and Kaye, op.cit.
18 For more on ACRS, see Fahmy, “Special Comment”; Jentleson, The Middle East
Arms Control and Security Talks; Jones, “Arms Control” and “Negotiating
Regional Security”; and Landau, Arms Control in the Middle East.
19 As I recall, some of the ACRS participants had informally discussed the idea of
creating a subregional process within ACRS, but it was never seriously acted upon
before the group stalled.
20 For more on this, see Jones, “Gulf Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone.”
21 Indeed, the paper by Kubbig, Weidlich, and Mulas, op. cit., specifically addresses
how Track 2 could support this process.
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210 Peter Jones
22 See the post by Alrababa’h and Egel, op. cit., and the paper by Kane, op. cit., for
discussion of these groups and their activities.
23 See James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Next Generation Initiative.”
24 The principal texts are Jones, Regional Security Regime; Feldman and Toukan,
Bridging the Gap; and the collection of essays in the 2003 special issue of the
Journal of Strategic Studies (26.3) entitled “Building Regional Security in the
Middle East: International, Regional, and Domestic Influences.”
25 The key texts are Paul, Power versus Prudence; Reiss, Bridled Ambitions; Solingen,
“Political Economy”; and Potter, The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation.
26 Levite, “Never Say Never Again.”
27 This is further discussed in Jones, “A Gulf WMD Free Zone.”
Bibliography
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ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order. London: Routledge, 2001.
——. Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2009.
Agha, Hussein, Shai Feldman, Ahmad Khalidi, and Zeev Schiff. Track II Diplomacy:
Lessons from the Middle East. Boston: MIT Press, 2003.
Alrababa’h, Ala A. and Naomi Egel. “Civil Society Engagement in Middle East Arms
Control.” Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East, October 9, 2012.
Available at: http://www.middleeast-armscontrol.com/2012/10/09/civil-society-
engagement-in-middle-east-arms-control/.
Ball, Desmond and Kwa Chong Guan. Assessing Track Two Diplomacy in the Asia-
Pacific Region: A CSCAP Reader. Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of Interna-
tional Studies, 2010.
Ball, Desmond, Anthony Milner, and Brendan Taylor. “Track 2 Security Dialogue in
the Asia-Pacific: Reflections and Future Directions.” Asian Security 2.3 (2006):
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Capie, David. “When Does Track Two Matter? Structure, Agency, and Asian
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party Mediation in a Complex World, edited by Chester A. Crocker, Osler Hamp-
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Fahmy, Nabil. “Special Comment.” Disarmament Forum 2 (2001): 3–5.
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Hernandez, Carolina G. “Track Two and Regional Policy: The ASEAN ISIS in Asian
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Carolina Hernandez. Jakarta: ASEAN ISIS and Kanisius Printing, 2006: 17–29.
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James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. “CNS Middle East Next Genera-
tion Initiative.” Washington, D.C.: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation
Studies. Available at: http://cns.miis.edu/programs/middle_east/120305_mideast_
nextgen_initiative.htm.
Jentleson, Bruce. “The Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security Talks: Pro-
gress, Problems, and Prospects.” La Jolla: Institute on Global Conflict and Coop-
eration, Policy Paper 26, 1996.
Job, Brian L. “Track 2 Diplomacy: Ideational Contribution to the Evolving Asia
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Jones, Peter. Towards a Regional Security Regime for the Middle East: Issues and Options
Stockholm: SIPRI, 1998 (Republished with an extensive new afterword in 2011).
——. “Negotiating Regional Security in the Middle East: The ACRS Experience and
Beyond.” Journal of Strategic Studies 26.3 (2003): 137–154.
——. “Arms Control in the Middle East: Is It Time to Renew ACRS?” Disarmament
Forum 2 (2005): 56–62.
——. “A Gulf WMD Free Zone within a Broader Gulf and Middle East Security
Architecture.” Policy Analysis Papers. Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2005.
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Security and Terrorism Research Bulletin 1 (2005): 15–17. Available at: http://tinyurl.
com/m9jx8e4.
——. “The Gulf Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone: Some Ideas for the Next
Steps.” Security and Terrorism Research Bulletin 3 (2006): 21–22. Available at:
http://tinyurl.com/m9jx8e4.
——. “Filling a Critical Gap or Just Wasting Time? Track Two Diplomacy and
Middle East Regional Security.” Disarmament Forum 2 (2008): 3–12.
——. “Structuring Middle East Security.” Survival 51.6 (2009): 105–122.
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East.” Disarmament Forum 2 (2011): 51–62.
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and South Asia. Santa Monica: RAND, 2007.
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Southeast Asia.” Security Dialogue 31.3 (2000): 343–356.
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East Conference Happen: A Conceptual Framework for a Track II Expert Group’s
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The Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. Available at: http://academicpeaceorches-
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Conflict Resolution: Is There a Track One and a Half ? Are There Best Practices?”
Conflict Resolution Quarterly 27.1 (2009): 65–82.
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212 Peter Jones
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Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.” Occasional Paper 22. Washington, D.C.: Henry L.
Stimson Center, 1995.
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Service’?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 27.3 (2005): 370–387.
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Part IV
Possible futures
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12 A Helsinki Process for the

Middle East?
New discourse, new opportunities
Patricia Lewis and Karim Kamel
Introduction
The planning for the Conference on the Establishment of a Weapons of Mass
Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East has been met with many
obstacles and general skepticism, and not without reason, given the security
situation in the Middle East; the threat and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) in the region; the nonparticipation in and noncompliance with the
major WMD treaties; and the track record of the Middle East arms control
negotiations. However, the “sophisticated cynics,” who populate the world of
nonproliferation and arms control, might do well to remember how “well” they
predicted Syrian accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the ongo-
ing dismantlement of its chemical weapons, the interim agreement with Iran on
its nuclear program, or the ongoing direct consultations between states from the
region on convening the WMDFZ Conference. They might also remember how
few of them predicted the end of the Cold War and the success of the Helsinki
Process, and the security treaties it produced. Seemingly intractable security pro-
blems do not last forever: the world has witnessed the end of apartheid in South
Africa and the end of the all-out conflict in Northern Ireland, to mention but a
few, so giving up on the prospect of Middle East security is not an option.
Regardless of the eventual outcome of a conference on a Middle East WMDFZ,
this initiative has already made more gains than most experts had expected.
Perhaps it is not surprising that another attempt to address Middle East security
is being pursued; the people of the Middle East desperately need a positive vision
of the future that offers peace, security, and economic development, and their
political leaders know it. The prospect of perpetual war in the Middle East is
stimulating a new generation of leaders to look for ways that can help create
more stable and sustainable regional partnerships.
Appointing a Finnish facilitator and proposing Finland as the host country
for a conference on a Middle East WMDFZ instantly brings to mind the suc-
cessful Helsinki Process that began in a divided Europe in the early 1970s,
which transformed the region. The Helsinki Process achieved major successes
over nearly two decades in promoting cooperation between Warsaw Pact and
NATO countries on social, human rights, security, and political issues – all
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216 Patricia Lewis and Karim Kamel
elements that may provide inspiration for solving the current situation in the
Middle East. At the time, many experts disparaged the notion and were highly
skeptical of any positive outcomes. Fortunately for Europe, leaders with vision
on both sides of the Iron Curtain were able to work together toward a more
creative framework for European security and establish the Helsinki Process in
1972, as well as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE)1 and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The Act consisted of three “baskets”
that covered a broad range of issues aimed at enhancing security and coopera-
tion in the Euro-Atlantic region (from “Vancouver to Vladivostok”). Basket I
addressed questions relating to security in Europe. It included the Declaration
on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States; confidence-
building measures; and other aspects of security and disarmament aimed at
increasing military transparency. Basket II covered economic, scientific, tech-
nological, and environmental cooperation; migrant labor; vocational training;
and the promotion of tourism. Basket III dealt with cooperation in humani-
tarian and other fields: free movement of people; human contacts, including
family reunification and visits; freedom of information, including working con-
ditions for journalists; and cultural and educational exchanges. The ten princi-
ples guiding relations between the participating states, known as the “Helsinki
Decalogue,” would not be an easy fit for the states of the Middle East today.
Nor were they for many of the governments in the CSCE in the 1970s.2
A proposal to adapt the thinking behind the Helsinki Process for the Middle
East is not original. The 1991 Madrid Peace Process adopted a similar structure
that incorporated a broad approach to regional security by establishing a set of
multilateral working groups on water, refugees, the environment, economic
development, and arms control and regional security. The Madrid Peace Process
established two parallel tracks – bilateral and multilateral – to address the
interconnectedness of a set of intractable problems whilst serving as a conduit
for building confidence and positive relations among countries in the Middle
East. The negotiations, which opened formally in Moscow in January 1992, led
to the Oslo Peace Accords in 1993 and the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty in 1994.
The Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) talks were established by the
Madrid Process as one of the multilateral working groups and made significant
headway until they collapsed in 1995, in large part over the issue of when and
how to negotiate a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. So,
in exploring the lessons of the Helsinki Process for the Middle East, we are on
well-trodden ground, in a game of Snakes and Ladders,3 back to a familiar place
from which we roll the dice and start climbing up again. A new generation of
leaders and experts will have to take the vision of a peaceful Middle East for-
ward, and they may do a better job than their predecessors.
There is a direct connection between the Helsinki Process and the Middle
East. The Helsinki Final Act recognized that security in Europe is closely
linked with security in the Mediterranean and therefore created a special
partnership between the signatory states and the countries in the Mediterra-
nean. Currently, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco are
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A Helsinki Process for the Middle East? 217
active Mediterranean partners within the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and have made a commitment to work
toward the principles of the Organization. These states have recognized the
benefits of participating in a regional stabilizing process. Although the initia-
tive itself must come from within the region, outsiders could support the
process by hosting meetings and sharing experiences and lessons learned.
The Helsinki Process integrated social, economic, and political reforms as
underpinning long-term regional security. A regional mechanism in the Middle
East that includes domestic political reforms and developments would be able
to build on the opportunities arising from the Arab Uprisings. Indeed, such a
process could allow governments in the region to manage the period of change
and transition now underway, reducing instability. Countries in the Middle East
that are attempting to establish more democratic domestic processes could lean
on a regional security and stability framework to develop security, freedom,
and prosperity at home and in the neighborhood. Well before the Arab Upris-
ings of 2011, civil society organizations in the region were already making
Helsinki-style connections. Political dialogues and public participatory pro-
cesses, such as those developed under Helsinki Basket III, are directly relevant
to current developments in the Middle East.
In examining the Helsinki Process, it is important to stress that a Euro-
Atlantic process that took root in the 1970s is not directly applicable to today’s
Middle East. Instead, the approach should be thought of as a form of polli-
nation. People involved in developing proposals for security and stability in the
Middle East can examine ideas, principles, and experiences from the Helsinki
Process in order to determine which may resonate with today’s security envir-
onment and needs. There are new communication tools and new opportunities
available to negotiators. There are new ideas from the next generation of
Middle East experts4 – the success stories from the Helsinki Process should
serve as a means to stimulate the formation of new context-specific solutions
for the Middle East rather than as examples to be copied wholesale.
This chapter attempts to shed light on the failed approach to security in the
region and propose ways forward. It examines the strategies and tactics that
states in the Middle East have been implementing to enforce security and
argues that the core philosophy of the Arab Uprisings represents a challenge
to the old ways of oppression. In embracing the attempts to determine a new
set of security choices, this chapter explores ways in which sustainable security
architecture in the context of regional arms control could be inspired by the
Helsinki Process, and proposes ideas for practical consideration.
Moving from coercion to cooperation

Extensive use of coercive measures has long been the main instrument of
governance in the Middle East. As Laleh Khalili and Jillian Schwedler con-
clude in their work on coercion in the region, “the emergence of the modern
nation-state has also produced a concentration in coercive power …
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numerous mukhabarat states that extensively police and incarcerate citizens,
engaging in widespread torture and implementing spectacular punishments.”5
Coercion, which is one of a range of tools for governance, has long been used
in the Middle East to its fullest extent, eventually becoming its primary tool.
For instance, prior to 2011, Cairo had the highest number of police per
capita, compared with all the other capitals in the world.6
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the brutal use of force, and terror-
ism all reflect an overarching philosophy, one that claims that an extensive use
of force is the ultimate security tool. Arab countries that are currently going
through a transition period are starting to break this framework of coercion
and oppression, no longer equating force with security, but they still have a
long way to go. What is needed is a transformative paradigm shift, not a
timid incremental approach. As we have seen from other regions, when
moving from coercive power to cooperation, the change comes suddenly and
quickly. Relationships reform and transform themselves almost overnight.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact; the end of World War
II and the establishment of the United Nations; the peaceful transition in
South Africa to a representative democracy; and of course the Uprisings in
Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen, all serve as examples of how fast change
can take place.
Oppression, coercion, and WMD in the Middle East

Throughout history, the region we now call the Middle East has been turbu-
lent. Since the Assyrian Empire that began over 3,000 years ago, the combi-
nation of violent conflict and long periods of civilized intellectual and
physical development has shaped the region. Since the discovery of oil in the
Middle East at the beginning of the 20th century, the region has taken on an
additional strategic importance on a global scale. Recently, the recipe for
stability in the region has primarily been laid out as a doctrine of strategic
balance and deterrence, reducing the focus to cooperative interdependence.
This hard-line approach to security has led to several problems, including the
development of chemical and biological weapons in several countries; a
nuclear capability and opacity in Israel; attempts to create military nuclear
programs in violation of NPT obligations; and the sponsoring of terrorism.
Middle Eastern states have come to perceive these avenues as more politically
beneficial strategies than pursuing a sustainable regional security framework.
We postulate that the hard-line security approach fostered a culture of
oppression that trickled down to the street level. It was no coincidence that
the Uprising in Tunisia began with a confrontation between a street vendor
and the police, or that in Egypt the 2011 Uprising started on January 25,
which is the “Day of the Police.” Among the Egyptian police force, the spread
of corruption and the use of coercion had reached intolerable levels. Their
systematic use of coercion was so deeply ingrained that is was exercised in
almost every walk of life. As coercion and violence became an organizing
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principle and solidified to become the guarding philosophical dogma for
maintaining security in most Middle Eastern countries, the debate over
nuclear weapons, and their symbolism as the weapon of ultimate violence, has
a relevance to ordinary people that is not so easily understood in other
countries and regions. Being on the receiving end of coercive power is a dif-
ferent experience than feeling protected by it. In addition, countries that
abuse their citizens – showing scant regard for human rights – may be per-
ceived as more likely to use WMD, both against their own citizens and across
their borders (consider the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against the Kurds
and against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, and their use in Syria
in 2013). Thus, the dogma of security through ultimate coercion will remain
entrenched in the minds of governments in the Middle East unless the region
can transform the old security paradigm, including internal security practices.
For these reasons – and it is as true now as ever – it has long been under-
stood that introducing nuclear weapons into this inherently volatile region
would be adding fuel to the fire. Indeed, the Israeli position on nuclear
weapons has been long-stated as not being the “first to introduce” nuclear
weapons into the Middle East – although the phrase is subject to nuanced
interpretations.7 Most states in the region view the world’s tacit acceptance of
Israel’s nuclear capability as a double standard supported by the West. Israel’s
nuclear arsenal is overlooked, and Israel remains outside the NPT, while
others in the region are parties to the NPT – and therefore have given up any
legal path to developing nuclear weapons. Other regional players, such as Iraq
in the 1980s, chose to ignore their NPT commitments and develop nuclear
weapons programs in pursuit of national interests. Iran has been sanctioned
because it is pursuing a nuclear enrichment program that many believe might
have, or lead to, a military dimension, and, as an NPT member, it had chosen
to forgo such an option under international law. By contrast, Israel is effec-
tively free to develop a military nuclear program by virtue of the fact that it
has remained outside this global treaty, along with only two other countries.
Most people in the region are unconvinced by such legal arguments, however,
and view the NPT as an established norm to which all should adhere; they see
this situation, in which Israel’s nuclear capability is not addressed at the
international level, as unjust.
Coercion, security, and WMD: Ingrained perceptions

Since its founding in 1948, Israel has consistently felt insecure in its neigh-
borhood and has been engaged in seven full-scale wars. It is generally believed
that Israel developed nuclear weapons capability in the 1960s, but no Israeli
government has admitted to possessing a nuclear weapon. The harsh punish-
ment meted out to Mordechai Vanunu, as a result of his revelations regarding
the Israeli nuclear weapons program in 1986, which included his secret trial,
conviction, and eleven years of solitary confinement out of an eighteen-year
prison term,8 underscores the centrality of nuclear opacity9 to Israel’s military
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doctrine. Vanunu’s long, isolating prison term sent a clear message that the
government would not relax its policy of opacity and that leaks will not be
tolerated or go unpunished. The secrecy surrounding the very existence of
Israeli nuclear weapons makes it impossible to discuss them in the region,
except in meetings that exclude Israel. The ACRS discussions were the closest
the region came to any attempt to address the nuclear issue, but the talks
foundered on that very topic in 1995.10 Subsequently, for nearly two decades,
there has been no regional negotiation on arms control, except for the
shouting matches in the media, in the United Nations, and the IAEA General
Conference.11
Israel’s opaque nuclear policy has been challenged by its neighbors for the
last 40 years. Having adopted the nuclear opacity doctrine whilst remaining
outside the NPT, Israel has avoided being held to account on this issue.
Meanwhile, Israel has long supported a regional approach to getting rid of
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, voting for many years in favor of a
Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD in the UN
General Assembly.12 Indeed, Israel has taken upon itself to play the role of a
nuclear nonproliferation enforcer in the region. Israel attacked and destroyed
Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 using a squadron of F-16As.13 In 2007,
Israel bombed an alleged facility that was under construction in the Deir al-
Zour region of Syria and has been threatening to attack Iranian nuclear
facilities “before it is too late.”14 Israel’s nuclear weapons capability is rarely
discussed in public, but it is attracting increasing attention thanks to Iran’s
uranium enrichment program; its progress with the Arak heavy water reactor;
and the threatening language that both countries are using against each other.
If the new atmospherics of the E3+3 (France, Germany, UK, China, Russia,
and the United States) talks result in the toning down of the language against
Iran’s nuclear program, then the Israeli nuclear program will likely similarly
be less exposed.
Current concerns over Israel’s and Iran’s nuclear capabilities are, in large
part, driven by real fears that nuclear weapons may be used in a conflict in
the region. Throughout the Cold War, the Middle East was seen as the most
likely theater for a nuclear exchange. Now, the tension between Israel and
Iran has caused unprecedentedly aggressive rhetoric between the two states.
Even though they are not historical enemies, the nuclear issue is engendering
deep anxieties about war in the region.
In late 2011, a survey carried out by the Saban Center for Middle East
Policy revealed that 65% of Israeli Jews preferred for neither Israel nor Iran
to hold nuclear arms and opted for a nuclear weapons-free Middle East.15 By
contrast, some 19% of respondents said they wanted both countries to have
nuclear capabilities. A recent Israeli opinion poll over whether to attack Iran’s
nuclear installations revealed similar lines of division.16 Arab states view the
Iranian nuclear program with mixed feelings: as revealed by the Guardian,
which based its findings on the WikiLeaks cache of US diplomatic cables,17
they have been pressing the United States for military action against Iran. For
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instance, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia repeatedly urged the United States
to attack Iran to destroy its nuclear program, asking the United States “to cut
off the head of the snake.”18 In 2009, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel agreed that a nuclear Iran
would lead others in the region to develop nuclear weapons, resulting in “the
biggest threat to nonproliferation efforts since the Cuban missile crisis.”19
Given the value that the nuclear-armed states assign to nuclear weapons, it is
not surprising that others might try to emulate them. Some leading Muslim
Brotherhood figures appeared to view Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capability as
potentially beneficial to the Arab world, in that it would serve as a counter-
balance to what they perceived as Israel’s military hegemony in the region.20
A recent article by the late Kenneth Waltz, “Why Iran should get the
Bomb,” is another example of how violent coercion dominates Middle East
security thinking: in his view – shared by very few experts – an Iranian
nuclear weapons capability would contribute to regional stability because it
would create symmetry and parity with Israel.21 Waltz’s approach is really not
that different from the prevailing Middle East strategic dogma. It is in fact a
logical extension of the dominant discourse on nuclear weapons elsewhere in
the world, where the belief in nuclear deterrence as “the ultimate war pre-
venter” persists. This philosophy is reflective of the same mentality of parity,
mutually assured vulnerability and destruction, and strategic balance of
power that prevailed during the Cold War. If the definition of insanity is
doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results,22 then in
order to affect change, we need to think outside the scope of achieving
security through coercion and terror.
Israel’s nuclear weapons are characterized as “existential” – weapons to
ensure the very existence of Israel in extremis.23 The nuclear opacity doctrine
has been entrenched in Israeli society to the level where, at a side event during
the 2010 NPT Review Conference on Establishing a WMDFZ in the Middle
East, an Israeli disarmament activist stated that amidst one of her conversa-
tions with an Israeli student, in which she was trying to question the value of
nuclear weapons to Israeli security, the student asked her to stop talking
immediately because the mere mention of nuclear weapons, he believed, could
threaten the security of Israel.24 In this sense, the weapon of ultimate violence
has come to lie outside the scope of discussion or rationality; it has been seen
as an absolute tool.
Using the threat of annihilation as the recipe for ensuring existence and sur-
vival, and being asked not to even discuss it, echoes the arguments that the
falling regimes used in the Arab Middle East without nuclear weapons:
“choose me or choose insecurity;” in other words, “choose oppression, torture,
corruption, and stagnation, or choose insecurity.” This was the way in which
the collapsing Libyan, Egyptian, Yemeni, and Tunisian regimes framed their
arguments, even as they were catching their final breath. The Iranian nuclear
program has likewise accentuated nuclear weapons and their symbolism of
coercive power so that an existential threat to Israel, the ultimate coercion, will
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remain the dominant paradigm unless addressed head-on. The idea that people
should either put up with coercive measures of the current systems of power or
pay the price of insecurity is a large part of what those with a new vision for
the Middle East are resisting. In this regard, efforts to create a WMDFZ in the
region could form part of the overarching political and social paradigm shift
sought by the civilian instigators of the Arab Uprisings. In this sense, the Zone
becomes a new idea in a new context, displacing the old finger-pointing with a
new approach to power relations in the region.
However, a thorough examination of the juxtaposition of nuclear weapons
as the ultimate tool of coercion with the clear rejection of this type of power
in the region will require a far wider and deeper approach than negotiation
on WMD in the region. Such a negotiation would likely be a final product of
a wider reexamination, not a first step. The nonviolent uprisings in the region
have specifically rejected the form of coercive power that nuclear weapons
represent.25 As Mohamed El Baradei has said, “the culture of fear has been
broken, and there is no going back.”26 The stark differences in perceptions of
security in the region need to be addressed, and a common vision and
understanding of what constitutes sustainable regional security needs to be
developed. The current divisions do not necessitate isolation or confrontation;
to the contrary, as seen in the Helsinki Process, they necessitate establishing a
process and a platform for cooperation.
While these dogmatic principles are being challenged, new ones are arising.
It is of the utmost importance to create a new sustainable framework for a
regional security discussion. If the countries in the region stay stuck in the
discourse of the past, they will just recreate the past. This is not the time for
states to cling to outmoded ways of speaking and dealing with each other.
The region needs a new dialogue. A Helsinki-style process may well provide
the example for a framework in which the interconnectedness of social, eco-
nomic, and military power can be explored. Similar ideas have worked in
other regions – the ASEAN way,27 for example, or the Palaver Tree approach
of West Africa28 – this is not about importing a Western idea and stretching it
to fit the Middle East; rather, it is about seeing how we can be inspired by
new ways of talking and finding peace within this volatile region, where there
has been so little hope of progress for so long and where we now see the
beginnings of radical change and new openings for new dialogues.
Setting the scene

The Middle East is in the midst of a dramatic transition, and it is hard to say
how the dust will settle over the next few years. However, we can look back
and see – as many analysts have pointed out over the past few decades – that
the previous situation with undemocratic, corrupt regimes, theocracies,
despots, and propped-up governments was unbearable and unsustainable.
Certainly, the fall of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak, Muammar
Gaddafi, and Ali Abdullah Saleh is not the end. At the time of writing,
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Syria is gripped by a raging conflict: Bashar al-Assad may not come out of it
alive, let alone remain in power. And change will not rest there. The Gulf
states, Iran, and Iraq will not remain immune to the call for popular change.
Israel – with systemic instabilities between the different ethnic, religious, and
political groups – has already been affected internally, leading to popular
demands for significant social and economic changes. There may be further
turmoil in the Maghreb – Morocco and Algeria in particular. The fear within
each of these governments is palpable. The road to full regional participatory
democracy will be rocky and split into various directions. The governments
that are elected will likely not be what a liberal Europe or United States
might have wished to see in power; nonetheless, these will be the elected
governments, accountable to the people and empowered by their courageous
revolts.
Because the democratic process has already begun, we are already in a dif-
ferent – and in some respects far better – position than that in which Europe
found itself in the 1970s and 1980s. The Helsinki Process that led to so much
change for the better in Europe contains important lessons for the Middle East,
as outlined in previous chapters of this volume. Most significantly, it could
serve as an experience not to be copied, but to be drawn on for inspiration.
There are already opportunities for a new discourse in the Middle East, and, in
turn, that discourse will open up opportunities further down the road. The
Arab Uprisings will not automatically lead to progress for peace and disarma-
ment. Just like in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, these conversations will not
be comfortable – nor should they be. We do not know where they will lead and
what the final outcome will be. We have to take risks and sorties into the
unknown. Structuring a discourse that is different from the old one is the key to
change. Demands from Arab states to Israel to dismantle its nuclear weapons
started some 40 years ago; how do we transform the current discourse in this
regard so as to engage Israel in a new, more constructive manner? The conflict
of ideas, opposing views, fear of change, and the future vision of the region all
need to be articulated, listened to, heard, and understood. Figuring out how to
do that, how to move on, and how to engage the next generation of leaders is
the key to forward momentum.
One of the keys to resolving any impossible, protracted conflict is based on
the principle of agreeing when we can and negotiating when we cannot. Any
study of the Helsinki Process will acknowledge that the vision of peace in
Europe could only have been realized through the determination to keep on
talking during the rough times. It is exactly this clarity of vision and deter-
mined engagement in what Winston Churchill dubbed “jaw-jaw”29 that is
sorely needed right now in the Middle East.
The omens for hope

A 2011 public opinion telephone survey of Iranians carried out by RAND
solicited views regarding the manufacturing of nuclear weapons.30 Respondents
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expressed different attitudes on nuclear weapons, depending on their educa-
tional level. Most people with a college education expressed opposition to the
development of nuclear weapons. However, among the less educated, the
majority supported the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon. The Ira-
nian Students’ Polling Agency in the Ministry of Higher Education carried out
surveys in 2008 and 2010 that showed Iranian public support for the nuclear
program has declined over the two-year period from 45.2% in favor to 22.1%.31
In addition, in 2010, 41% of respondents said that the Iranian administration
had done a “poor job handling the nuclear case,” whereas in 2008, only about
21% agreed with this statement. In July 2012, the Shabake Khabar (Iranian
news network controlled by the state) program “Voice and Visage of the Isla-
mic Republic” conducted a two-day online poll asking how Iran should
respond to international sanctions.32 Readers were asked to choose between:
“(1) suspend uranium enrichment in return for gradual lifting of the sanctions,
(2) close the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation for the sanctions, or (3) resist the
West (i.e. the current course of action) to preserve Iran’s nuclear rights.” By the
second day, the first response – to suspend uranium enrichment – had garnered
the support of 63% of respondents, while 20% agreed with the suggestion to
retaliate and 17% approved of continued resistance. The online poll was halted
at this point, and further views were not collected.
Later in July 2012, former Iranian Interior Minister and cleric Abdullah
Nouri called for a national referendum to measure public support for the
Iranian nuclear program. A reformer, Nouri suggested that the sanctions
regime is altering the equation for Iran, stating that:
the injuries, losses, and pressures that Iran has permitted to occur due to
its nuclear program have now passed the [acceptable] limit, and the gov-
ernment must reach a logical and wise decision that will be in the overall
interests of the country in order to exit this impasse … We should con-
sider the principle and consequences of pursuing the program.33
Many analysts believe that the latest Iranian presidential election results are
encouraging. The decisive victory of Rouhani reflects the Iranian will to
replace the hard-line and confrontational approach of the previous regime.
While the ultimate foreign policy decisions remain in the hands of the
Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the mere victory of Rouhani, a
somewhat more moderate figure, could be the first step toward adopting a
more reconciliatory approach when it comes to the nuclear program. One of
Rouhani’s first decisions was to streamline Iran’s nuclear negotiations and
place the dossier under the control of the Foreign Ministry, which indicates
the present intent to actually resolve the issue.34
Adopting a conciliatory policy to resolve the nuclear dilemma is but a reflec-
tion of what people in the broader region aspire to. A poll conducted in 2011 in
twelve Arab states revealed that 55% of the respondents throughout the region
support the creation of a regional zone free of nuclear weapons.35 However, it
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should be soberly noted that 55% also said that the Israeli acquisition of nuclear
weapons justifies their possession by other countries in the region.
Young people in the Middle East sparked the Arab Uprisings, and like every
generation before them, they want change and they have plans. They have
witnessed what happened to the hopes of their parents and grandparents, how
their plans encountered insurmountable obstacles and how they were side-
tracked by talks about talks with few tangible results to show for their efforts.
The young are full of energy and hope, while the old generation is disillusioned
and skeptical, and can no longer serve as agents of change. Also, the young
don’t carry the same perception of the other as an enemy; they are aware that
governments throughout the region36 have used the concept of the “other” as
an instrument to control their own populations and prevent change.
They want to see things get done. They are organized and work collectively
using new tools. Blogs and articles and social media are not just used to further
discussions and debate, they are used to organize and rally people for effective
demonstrations. For instance, the “April 6 Movement,” one of the major lead-
ing youth movements in Egypt, started in 2008 by organizing nationwide sup-
port for a strike in solidarity with factory workers. What started as a workers’
strike in Mahalla el-Kubra burgeoned into a nationwide general strike when
individuals on Facebook created an “April 6” group, calling for solidarity with
the workers and protesting skyrocketing inflation. It gathered 70,000 members,
prompting some commentators to call the newly active youth using new media
the “Facebook Party.” It was not surprising, therefore, when the “January 25”
uprising began or when, on December 18, 2010, an organization founded in
2004 – Nawaat.org – reported and communicated the anti-government rallies
that were being ignored in the Tunisian media and not widely understood
internationally.37 Being highly proactive, the youth in the Middle East utilized
new social media tools to organize themselves effectively and expose the cruel-
ties of their governments to domestic and international audiences; 9 out of 10
Tunisian and Egyptian protestors surveyed in March 2011 said they used
Facebook or Twitter to organize demonstrations and/or spread awareness.38
At the time of writing, three years after the Arab Uprisings had started,
Egyptian youth are still quite active. A second uprising backed by the military
took place in 2013, ousting the Muslim Brotherhood government. The message
is clear: people have high aspirations, and they are not going to tolerate impotent
governance that is unable to meet people’s hopes. People are also empowered;
they now know the way to express their views and get their voices heard. It is of
course not very comforting to outside observers – after all, familiarity and rou-
tine is what tends to provide a sense of security. In this situation, though, it is up
to the people of Egypt to make the decision when to stop revolting against old
ways of governance; they have certainly learned one of the ways to do so.
During the initial days of the Egyptian Revolution and shortly thereafter,
many of the participants described Tahrir Square as Egypt’s Hyde Park,
referring to the traditional Hyde Park Speakers’ Corner that has been a
designated site for public speeches, debates, and political gatherings in the
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UK since the 1870s. In Tahrir Square, political discourse took place and col-
lective expression through chants and art was seen everywhere. Tahrir Square
thus provided new forms of expression for the population – particularly the
young – of Cairo.
This form of expression has spread almost everywhere in the region. Not
every scenario has been the same, but they all share similar principles: a col-
lective resentment of coercion and paternalistic ways of governance. In Syria,
the uprising that has developed into an armed conflict is worsening by the
day, and the end result is yet to be known. In Turkey, a widespread grassroots
uprising against the government communicated this message to the Turkish
regime. Namely, the message is as follows: trying to rule without taking peo-
ple’s considerations into account will not be acceptable. This form of expres-
sion through mass protests played a great role in empowering people and
reviving their ability to get their voices heard.
The “spirit of Tahrir” goes beyond a call for regime change – it is a call for a
new way of thinking, one that carries the simple slogans repeated in collective
chants in the Middle East, “Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice.” This inno-
vation resonated in many cities around the world, with protest organizers
believing the new approach would carry the seeds for a new philosophy. In this
regard, the Arab Uprisings is not unlike the US Civil Rights Movement and the
“flower power” (Beat Generation) anti-war movement of the 1960s; the 1968 pro-
tests in Europe; the feminist movement; or the April 25 Carnation Revolution in
Portugal in 1974. All of these have had a major impact on political discourse; cre-
ated significant social innovation; and still invited backlash from the more con-
servative elements of the societies they were attempting to change.
Interviewing two dozen young people from the Middle East in 2011, the New
York Times presented a cross-sectional sample of their views.39 Different in
their uses of vocabulary, challenging in their ways of thinking and means of
solving problems, they expressed what they thought about the Arab Uprisings.
A number of them talked about the impact of Facebook and social media, and
many talked about creating a better opportunity for the next generation, one
that would have dignity at its heart. They also talked about the right to have
hope and about how old regimes had stripped that from them. Others talked
about the fact that they now had freedom to speak and that this in itself was a
major change: “now we actually know everyone’s political orientation, when in
the past people did not even bother to express their views.” “This in itself cre-
ates a political discourse,” one of the interviewees added, “and this discourse
will definitely lead to a better life.” One of the interviewees, addressing radic-
alism, said that it “is the result of oppression, poverty, and corruption, both
internal and external.” The 2012 presidential elections in Egypt, and even more
so the ongoing turmoil therein, showed how deeply that society is divided.
With democratic change sweeping through the Middle East, the buffer cre-
ated between people’s opinions and the decision-making process has started
to dissolve. For years, this buffer prevented any rhetoric that called for alle-
viating injustice and oppression from surfacing. This buffer has also
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suppressed the most extreme of views that called for forming a religious state
in a number of countries. Now, advocates of both of these previously sup-
pressed views have the right to speak and influence their countries’ future.
Extremist views do exist in the Middle East, and they have their followers:
grudges are held down through the generations. On the other hand, the
Arab world has an enlightened forward-looking youth movement that rejects
hatred and violence in all shapes and forms. Social media movements, which
build on individual-to-individual communication instead of government-
based communication, showed that many are not satisfied anymore with the
entrenched divisions. Another problem the revolutionaries are still struggling
with is the difficulty of communicating with the less fortunate, less well-
educated people in the region, who have little access to social media in parti-
cular and to modern means of communication in general. These communities
tend to be more conservative and resistant to change. Recent strong feelings and
violent demonstrations that have led to fatalities in the region over a poorly-
made cartoon and film, designed to insult and provoke, have shown how easy it
is to manipulate and how hard it is to educate.40 People who have had little
exposure to new ideas and have limited horizons cannot be expected to react
calmly to such situations. They have been fuelled by hatred of the “other” for
generations as a means to control them. Education will similarly take decades to
have an effect, just as we have seen in Northern Ireland and South Africa.
Many people are resentful of the status quo. They want to see a signal,
something that eliminates the security threat in the region, turning against
their governments’ paradigms. There are new movements on social media,
such as “Israel-loves-Iran” and “Iran-loves-Israel” Facebook campaigns,41
which are calling for a new paradigm for engagement between the popula-
tions of the two countries. On the other hand, there are also many young
people on social media networks who act as if showing the slightest sympathy
toward the other is a form of treason.
The Middle East Helsinki Process

In establishing a workable mechanism for a Middle East Helsinki-like process,
emphasis should be placed on elements that would facilitate a shift from
seeing security as a binary zero-sum game42 and create win-win situations for
all states in the region. Steps toward establishing a Middle East Helsinki-like
process could include the following components:
Setting up discussions for young people in their twenties and thirties within
each country in the Middle East – formed only of that country’s citizens –
to formulate ideas and proposals for sustainable peace and development.
These could include the participation of young cultural icons, such as
football players, musicians, actors, writers, poets, artists, etc.
Bringing together representatives from those discussions into a region-wide
forum of young people that can provide a safe space for breaking down
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barriers, discussing the proposals, and generating ideas for moving for-
ward. The views of women and men could be very different, and gender-
separated discussions may facilitate better dialogue.
Bringing in officials from governments into the discussions in a “listening
mode.”
Drafting a Declaration of Principles to guide a Helsinki-style regional
security process (RSP) forward. This could include, for example, a denun-
ciation of violence and coercion as a means to resolving conflict and the
delineation of the scope of the process.
Preparing a new regional process on a set of diverse negotiating tracks, akin
to Helsinki baskets, so as to meet the full range of concerns of different
parties – including all relevant parties and ensuring that a lack of progress or
a stalemate in one or more tracks does not destroy progress in other tracks.
The tracks could, for example, include some or all of the following (as well
as other proposals that are agreed upon):
Economic development in the region;

People-to-people cultural exchanges;
Science and technology for development;
Regional security discussions;
Arms control and disarmament measures;
Verification experiments and technology development;43
Cooperative antiterrorism measures;
Trust- and confidence-building measures;
Peace-building measures;
Democracy-building measures;
Border management; and
Resource management (water, energy, food, etc.).
Education for peace is a long-term project that requires investment in

regions that have suffered from extreme neglect. Developing programs for
poor communities that have no access to running water and electricity, let
alone the internet, will be quite a challenge. A fund for peace education in
these regions could be established.
Seemingly intractable issues, such as settlements, land rights, rights of
return, refugees, Jerusalem, etc., need to be addressed, not swept under the
carpet. The RSP could emphasize planting the seeds for resolving the most
contentious topics later on. This could include declarations of principles
and the establishing of working groups to develop frames of reference for
future negotiations and setting a timeframe for a negotiating conference.
However, the timing of such discussions needs to be carefully considered.
It may make sense to fix a time for discussions for later on in the process.
This would require significant trust that the process would continue and
not be prematurely ended before such discussions were scheduled to take
place or be concluded.
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Much could be achieved by creating successful breakthroughs in the less
contentious tracks. Such steps would build confidence in the process, reframe
relationships, and help avoid the persistent belief that confidence-building
measures are a deliberate distraction from the serious intractable issues.
In Europe, when the Helsinki Process began, there was a deep ideological and
geographical division, described as the Iron Curtain. This division did not stop
discussions, nor did the negotiators try to tackle this ideological division before
everything else. Instead, the wisdom of the Helsinki Process was to build con-
fidence and relations, and tackle symbolic aspects of the division. When the
moment for transformation of Europe came, the people were ready.
Keep rolling the dice

Finding and identifying the fundamental particles of peace in the Middle East
ought not to be more difficult, more delayed, and more costly than discover-
ing the Higgs Boson in the Large Hadron Collider at CERN. As our per-
ception of the atom’s behavior is changing, so perhaps could we alter our
perception of human behavior, particularly in terms of reducing and mana-
ging conflict. In the Middle East, we are witnessing a turbulent series of
uprisings that could change the old ways of interacting in the region.
We – the people of the region and those working from the outside – are on a
game board of the Middle East. It is not Chess – not even three-dimensional
speed Chess – and it is not Backgammon. It could have been Bridge, but the
partners do not trust each other. It is a game of Snakes and Ladders. We roll
the dice, we set off, talking past each other as one player goes up and another
goes down. We gain, we lose, and we go back to square one time and time
again. We need a new game. But until then, perhaps we can play with the rules
a little. Perhaps we can develop new ways of working so that we can charm and
tame the snakes, laying them a little more flat. Perhaps too, we can climb down
from our high ladders to listen to each other and discuss and plan the way to
reach the finishing post and win, together.
Notes
1 For a firsthand, detailed account of the CSCE process and its outcomes, see
Chapter 1 in this book and Grinevsky and Hansen, Making Peace.
2 The Helsinki Decalogue included statements on sovereign equality; respect for the
rights inherent in sovereignty; refraining from the threat or use of force; inviol-
ability of frontiers; territorial integrity of states; peaceful settlement of disputes;
nonintervention in internal affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief; equal
rights and self-determination of peoples; cooperation among states; and fulfillment
in good faith of obligations under international law.
3 Sometimes called “Chutes and Ladders,” Snakes and Ladders is an ancient board
game from India.
4 Ulbrich, “The New Generation in North Africa and The Middle East Next Gen-
eration of Arms Control Specialists (MENACS) Network (www.menacs.org).”
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5 Khalili and Schwedler, Policing and Prisons.
6 Ghoniem, Contemporary Egypt.
7 Cohen, The Worst-Kept Secret.
8 Cohen, Whistleblowers and the Bomb.
9 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb.
10 Landau, “What Worked, What Didn’t” and Jones, “Arms Control in the Middle
East.”
11 Indeed, since 1991, there was a tacit agreement in place that the resolution on Israeli
Nuclear Capabilities would not be tabled in Vienna at the IAEA General Conference.
That “gentlemen’s agreement” broke down in 2006, although procedural and political
moves prevented it from being tabled and voted on until it was adopted by a narrow
margin in 2009. In 2010, the Israeli Nuclear Capabilities (INC) resolution was
defeated, following successful NPT Review Conferences, where state parties unan-
imously agreed to the holding of a conference, to be attended by all states of the Middle
East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other
weapons of mass destruction. In 2011 and 2012, Arab diplomats refrained from push-
ing for avote on the INC resolution. In 2013, the INC resolution was voted upon at the
General Conference and defeated.
12 Cohen and Lewis, “Israel and the NWFZ in the Middle East.”
13 There had been other attempts to destroy the reactor earlier: unnamed secret
agents tried to compromise its parts in France before they were shipped to Iraq,
and Iran attacked the site in the early days of the Iran-Iraq War.
14 Politi, “Israeli PM Netanyahu Warns Iran.”
15 Telhami, “The 2011 Public Opinion Poll.”
16 Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA), “Most Israelis Oppose Attack.”
17 Black and Tisdall, “Saudi Arabia Urges US Attack on Iran.”
18 Adel al-Jubeir, Saudi Ambassador to the United States, according to a report on
Abdullah’s meeting with the US General David Petraeus in April 2008 (Black and
Tisdall, op. cit.).
19 Black and Tisdall, op. cit.
20 Said, “The Bomb and the Beard.”
21 See Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb.”
22 A saying frequently attributed to Benjamin Franklin, Albert Einstein, Rita Mae
West; it has also been thought to be an ancient Chinese proverb. See http://www.
quora.com/Did-Einstein-really-define-insanity-as-doing-the-same-thing-over-and-over-
again-and-expecting-different-results.
23 Sheffer, US Israeli Relations, 196.
24 As witnessed by Karim Kamel (May 21, 2010, New York).
25 The words of the Georgetown Palestinian Professor and Poet Tamim El-Barghouti
(Ya Shaab Masr) have resonated with young Arab protestors: “You people are the
ones being kind to your governors / The state can only rule through your kindness /
Show the state your tough-side and it will yield / There is no such thing as
oppressing a million.”
26 Mohamed ElBaradei, speech at the Cinema for Peace 2012, February 2012 (see
Cinema For Peace Foundation, “Newsletter January/February 2012,” p. 15, http://
www.cinemaforpeace-foundation.com/newsletter/cinema-for-peace-newsletter-2012/
Cinem%20for%20Peace%20Newsletter%20January%20-%20February%202012.pdf).
27 Acharya, “Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building” and Goh, “The ‘ASEAN Way’.”
28 Poulton and Youssouf, “A Peace of Timbuktu.”
29 Lawrence, “Churchill Urges Patience.” The exact expression that Churchill used is
disputed: Sir Martin Gilbert, speaking at a conference on “Churchill and the
Soviets” noted the following: “It was during this Washington visit [June 1954] that
Churchill said, in trying to persuade Congress that a high-level meeting with
Russia was a good thing: ‘Meeting jaw to jaw is better than war.’” See Finest Hour,
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Journal of the Churchill Centre & Societies 122 (2004): 12. See also http://www.
bartleby.com/73/1914.html.
30 Elson and Nader, “What Do Iranians Think?”
31 Sahimi, “63% Online Back Halt to Uranium Enrichment.”
32 Ibid.
33 Moradi, “Abdullah Nouri Calls for a Public Referendum.”
34 Nasseri, “Iran Signals Change in Nuclear File.”
35 Bishara, “Gauging Arab Public Opinion.”
36 For a superb discussion of “the other,” see Livingstone Smith, Less Than Human.
37 Radsch, “Core to Commonplace.”
38 Huang, “Facebook and Twitter.”
39 New York Times, “A New Arab Generation Finds its Voice.”
40 A movie was screened in a small theater in Los Angeles; the movie, which was backed
by anti-Islam groups, was designed to insult Islam and the Prophet Mohammed. The
movie portrayed the Prophet Mohammed as a womanizer, a ruthless killer, and a child
molester. It was met with rigorous anger from the Muslim world.
41 Iran-Loves-Israel Facebook page can be found at http://tinyurl.com/l5ncrjy.
42 Ekéus, “Preface.”
43 For example, one idea recently proposed is to build on the experiences of Norway
and the UK working with South Africa on how to dismantle capabilities in a
manner that allows for verification at a later date.
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Conclusion
Charting a course inspired by the Helsinki
experience
Chen Kane
Over the last few years, the Middle East has been undergoing tectonic changes.
Regional leaders that held the reins for over four decades, such as Tunisia’s
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, and Yemen’s Ali Abdullah
Saleh, were toppled by their own people. The monarchs of Jordan, Bahrain,
Oman, and Morocco had to repeatedly reshuffle their governments and enact
political and economic reforms in an attempt to reconcile persisting unrests. In
addition, the long-standing balance of power relations between regional states,
such as the one between Iraq and Iran, or Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have been
changing too, with traditional alliances shifting and ongoing civil wars or
unrest taking place in pivotal regional states such as Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya,
and Yemen. Indeed, the civil war in Syria has yet again brought into play a
regional ruler using chemical weapons against his own people. At the time of
writing, it seems close to impossible to find an island of stability in the region.
Under the regional circumstances where many states are concerned with
ongoing domestic unrest and undergoing processes of reevaluating their
national identities, the natural inclination of governments is to attend to
domestic affairs, with very limited interest or the appetite for taking risks with
new regional initiatives. These changes pose significant challenges for imple-
menting regional security cooperation, but we would be remiss to ignore the
opportunities they may bring.
This book examined the Helsinki Process not as an ideal, but as a model
that once succeeded in transforming inter-state relations in one region. The
objective of this book was to identify the conditions that enabled such a pro-
cess in Europe and the parameters that could be relevant to the Middle East.
While most of the contributors to this volume remain skeptical about the
adaptability of a Helsinki-like process to the Middle East, throughout the
book they offer a series of conditions that could make such a regional process
feasible and offer alternatives or modifications for creating the necessary
conditions for developing a more stable and secure Middle East. Overall,
there are six crucial lessons to be drawn regarding the relevance of the Helsinki
Process to the Middle East and any future framework aimed at transforming
relations in this region.
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234 Chen Kane
Now is not then, and here is not there
There is no doubt that Europe is not the Middle East and, in particular, that
the European regional setup of the 1970s looked nothing like the Middle East
regional setup of today. As many of the authors identify in their chapters, the
Middle East lacks strong pivotal states committed to regional cooperation
rather than conflict; there is no military stalemate and relative parity; and
there is no shared understanding that the use of force is not a legitimate
means to resolving political disputes. Furthermore, unlike Europe, the terri-
torial sovereignty of some states is not recognized by all, and the region is
plagued by active ongoing armed conflicts. In addition, regional states have
pursued or possessed all three categories of weapons of mass destruction
(nuclear, chemical, and biological), and established violent non-state actors
play an influential role in the region’s conflict dynamic.
Given these differences, it is hardly surprising that many of the book’s
contributors have serious doubts about whether a Helsinki-like process is
applicable or possible in the Middle East today. For example, Ehud Eiran
concludes that while Israel aspired to reside in a stable region, in which par-
ties adhere to international norms that regulate conflict, Israel’s experiences
made it highly skeptical about the feasibility of this vision ever becoming
reality, doubting that such a process can transform relations in the Middle
East. Ariane Tabatabai suggests that, from an Iranian perspective, the great-
est obstacle to implementing a Helsinki-like process in the Middle East is
shaping a security process around two regional powers, Iran and Israel, with
the former not recognizing Israel as a legitimate and sovereign state and the
latter considering Iran as the greatest threat to its existence since its creation.
While the Soviet Union and the United States did not see eye to eye on many
issues, unlike Israel and Iran, they could at least agree on the fact that they
were both sovereign entities with an undeniable right to nationhood and per-
ceive the process of engagement as serving their national interests.
Nabil Fahmy and Karim Haggag hold that, from an Egyptian perspective,
regional institutional structures per se cannot supersede or ameliorate the many
divisions within the Middle East. They warn that structure cannot replace pro-
cess and that creating a regional organization to deal with security issues will not
in itself generate trust or regional security. Fahmy and Haggag also note that the
Helsinki Process lacked any serious arms control or disarmament agenda.
Overall, they do not view the Helsinki Process as a central pillar for European
security and see the creation of a cooperative framework as complementary to,
but not a substitute for, conflict resolution and disarmament processes – which,
according to them, unfolded largely outside the Helsinki framework.
The above mentioned authors’ observations also indicate that the key
countries of the region, namely Egypt, Israel, and Iran – the participation of
which is essential for any future regional security process to succeed – do not
seem currently ready for such a transformative process. These observations
reflect a deep-seated fear of change in the region’s status quo and disbelief
WWW.EBOOK777.COM
Conclusion 235
that a change could serve the national interests of these states. In a successful
regional process, Israel may lose its conventional and strategic superiority;
Egypt could lose its leadership position as representative of the Arab states on
issues related to Israel and arms control; and Iran would lose its archenemy,
leaving the regime with a need to develop positivist domestic and foreign
policies, rather than ones built around uniting a nation through a shared
enemy. Indeed, these regional states will ultimately have to take a hard look at
what constitutes their national interests and which of these could be achieved
only through cooperation with their neighbors.
The multitude of regional vantage points presented by the authors of this
volume is therefore important for understanding the challenges that the
designers of a future regional process are likely to face, as well as the oppor-
tunities that could be embedded within it. There is no doubt that if and when
such a process was to take place, it would have to reflect the unique realities
of the Middle East; serve the interests of the countries of the region; and
ideally be initiated and sustained by them. Therefore, what guided this book
was not the concept of “importing” experience from one region to another,
but the desire to comprehend the transformational capacity of relations that
had unfolded, asking under what circumstances and by which means regional
relations can be transformed in the Middle East. While there may not be
agreement on how and when we should get there, and what “there” is, all the
authors agree on the need to develop an alternative to the regional zero-sum-
game terms of engagement. This is the question we have posed throughout
the book: what could change this zero-sum-game mentality?
Some strategic national interests can be attained only through

negotiation and cooperation
Since the end of the Cold War, a sense of regionalism has developed, or at least
advanced, throughout the world – except for the Middle East, where states
have never moved beyond the self-help mentality, ultimately depending on their
own resources to protect and promote their national interests. The Middle East
is a generally underperforming region, with 7.5% of the world’s population, but
only 2.5% of global gross domestic product1 and the lowest levels of cross-
regional collaboration and interconnectedness. In this context, the lack of cross-
regional collaboration – on issues ranging from financial transactions and
education to the environment and labor and security – is hardly surprising.
This is true even amongst the Arab states in the region, despite preferential
market access and significant cultural homogeneity. For example, according to
Geneva’s International Trade Center, only 11% of the trade of the League of
Arab States takes place inside the region – compared to an intra-regional trade
share of 60% amongst the European Union member states; 23% amongst the
members of ASEAN; and 17% within Latin America.2
Many, including Michael Yaffe in his chapter, try to explain why the Middle
East lacks regionalism and regionalization. These two terms describe parallel
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236 Chen Kane
but compatible processes of regional cooperation. Regionalism is a top-down
process, which helps build a framework for cooperation in the economic, insti-
tutional, defense, or security fields at a political decision-making level. Regio-
nalization defines an increase of region-based activity characterized by
undirected economic and social interactions between non-state actors – indivi-
duals, companies, non-governmental organizations, etc. Both are rare in the
Middle East, and the absence of any regional organization that comprises all
countries of the region is symptomatic of this lack of cooperation and trust.
In the face of such a staggering lack of cooperation even in trade – a rela-
tively straightforward profit-driven domain – one may ask how we can expect
to have cooperation among Middle Eastern countries on the most complex
and sensitive security issues. The answer is that while any state can trade with
whichever partners it chooses, a state’s security remains highly dependent on
its immediate geographic surroundings, over which it has little or no control.
The Helsinki Process was the framework European countries ultimately
chose to transform their relations but first they agreed to negotiations as a
strategy for attaining national interests. The problem of a zero-sum-game
mentality in the Middle East is so pervasive, however, that even the basic
concept of negotiation becomes a bargaining chip in itself, rather than a step
toward a solution. As Peter Jones describes in his chapter, the Middle East
suffers from deeply held suspicions, and, in particular, some countries perceive
any dialogue that includes Israel, whether official or not, as tantamount to
“normalizing” relations with it before the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict is resolved. As Gershon Baskin and Hanna Siniora noted, “conflicts do
not get resolved by not talking.” It is impossible to discuss solutions if the
mere notion of a dialogue is viewed as a fundamental concession. When and
only when states in the Middle East come to realize that, beyond a certain
point, their national interests can only be advanced through cooperation with
their neighbors, will a regional process be feasible and sustainable.
In Europe, the sides first agreed to negotiate and then accepted the give-
and-take logics as a negotiating tactic; compromised on which issues to dis-
cuss; and agreed to include issues they did not want to discuss for the sake of
enhancing trust, stabilizing relations, diminishing tensions, and avoiding
armed conflicts. Indeed, one of the first tasks in a regional dialogue in the
Middle East will be identifying the areas in which regional parties are willing
to structure give-and-take negotiations.
Indeed, many of this volume’s contributors reflect on the seemingly insur-
mountable complexities involved in negotiating the security basket, touching
upon the other baskets as either too controversial to be discussed or only
offering nonessential benefits that are merely a deflection from central issues
that remain unresolved. However, including additional topics that may not
necessarily cover traditional security issues, but that have direct implications
on states’ stability and survivability – for example, water and energy – will
expand the range of sensitivity of issues open for negotiation and therefore
the range of possible bargains.
WWW.EBOOK777.COM
Conclusion 237
Indeed, many countries in the region are embarking upon national nuclear
energy programs to address spikes in the demand for energy, but they often
lack the resources to finance their programs or the technical expertise to
design them. Regional cooperation in the Middle East on developing alter-
native energy resources that might be shared; joint training for people on
nuclear technology and management issues; and a common grid are just a few
sample avenues for promoting regional engagement that could support a
nascent regional security dialogue.
While the key issues for negotiations were confined to three baskets in the
European case, states in the Middle East region may identify more, or differ-
ent, issues, tailored to their threat perceptions, interests, and needs. In their
chapter, Patricia Lewis and Karim Kamel identify the measures to be taken in
the short term to deal with the less contentious issues provided that states in
the region can agree on negotiating. Such steps would build confidence in the
process; reframe relationships; and, by pursuing concrete achievements, could
help highlight the fact that such a process is more than just a distraction from
the more complex issues. Baskin and Siniora identify in their chapter a series of
measures the Israelis and Palestinians can take unilaterally and/or bilaterally to
enhance security, freedom, and economic development.
Many players in the Middle East have unique experience in select areas
that could be tapped for improving the prospects for future regional colla-
boration. For instance, Nilsu Gören points out Turkey’s experience in facil-
itating regional Track 2 and Track 1.5 dialogues that could be beneficial to a
future regional process. HRH Prince Turki Al-Faisal and Awadh Al-Badi
hold out the Saudi-developed Arab Peace Initiative and point to its potential
to be the basis for a regional process. Al-Faisal and Al-Badi also describe how
the development of nuclear energy Programs in the region can be an instru-
ment for increased cooperation on energy security.
With regard to the many measures that could help advance the process
suggested by the contributors to this volume, if even minor progress could be
made on each of them separately, the cumulative effect would be noticeable.
Nevertheless, before that phase can unfold, regional parties will have to come
to a realization that it is in their interest to reach an agreement.
Need to agree on the rules of the game

The 1975 Final Act served as a statement of basic principles for Europe as a
whole. It was the manifestation of the idea that diplomacy must be based on
an agreed set of fundamental norms. The Final Act was the culmination of
over 20 years of formal and informal discussions within Europe on the guid-
ing principles for relationships within that region. These rules were not only
to govern the dealings between the states of a then still-divided Europe –
respecting existing borders and foreswearing the threat or use of force – they
were also, no less importantly, to guide the governments in their manner of
treating their citizens.
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238 Chen Kane
Similarly, in his chapter Peter Jones describes the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), created in 1967, as Asia’s first regional body deal-
ing with a variety of common interests, adopting principles not too dissimilar
from those embedded in the Helsinki Final Act: respect for territorial integ-
rity, sovereignty, noninterference, the promotion of regional peace and iden-
tity, peaceful settlements of disputes through dialogue and consultation, and
the renunciation of aggression.
The governing principles collectively agreed upon by Middle Eastern countries
may be different. But, as Jones noted, time and space should be allocated for these
to be negotiated and agreed upon by the countries of the region. It is up to the
states of the Middle East to infuse the process with their own unique content.
Such a discussion will also have to address a set of issues that had not come up
during the Helsinki Process. Namely, any regional security dialogue will have to
delineate the geographic scope of the region in question, addressing the yet
unanswered question of which countries constitute the Middle East. Through
such a discussion, as Yaffe points out, the potential alternative of subregional
arrangements should be given special consideration, bearing in mind the unique
complexities, sets of interactions, norms, and principles that permeate the Per-
sian Gulf and the Mediterranean basin. Another issue that was not considered
during the Helsinki Process, but which is of paramount importance in the Middle
Eastern context, is the existence of influential non-state actors, who will have a
significant impact on the emerging shape and ultimate endurance of regional
security in the Middle East – contributing to or detracting from it. It will be
necessary to carefully consider the role, if any, of such actors at the negotiating
table, seeing that individuals and organizations in the region who have been
labeled as terrorists or outlawed in the past have found themselves elected as lea-
ders and governments.
Countries in the Middle East could decide to adopt a completely different
set of norms from those adopted in Helsinki or ASEAN, but it is hard to see
how any regional process would be sustainable in the long run without the
parties’ commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force in the resolu-
tion of political differences and to respect geographic boundaries, with the
recognition that some changes will have to take place through negotiations.
In order to start and maintain such a process over time, the parties need to
agree on the fundamental principles for dealing with each other and possibly also
the relationships between the state and its citizens. As many authors point out,
one obstacle to discussing this issue in the region is the sensitivity to interference
in domestic affairs, especially those related to human rights, as well as the strong
causal link seen by some Middle Eastern regimes between the advancement of
the Helsinki Process, especially the human rights basket, and the collapse of the
Soviet Union. The Helsinki Process is perceived by many in the region as an
instrument that galvanized dissident movements in the Eastern bloc, which exa-
cerbated the Soviet collapse. However, as Lewis and Kamel note, such a process is
already underway in the Middle East. Nearly every state in the region is under-
going a transformation instigated by young people’s demand for social,
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Conclusion 239
economic, and political change. Most regimes also face a mounting credibility
crisis, since public debate about the need to transform societies and governments
is no longer taboo.
People in the Middle East took to the streets and toppled long-time rulers,
demanding justice and equality. The public, especially the youth, do not carry the
same threat perceptions as their leaders, and they are highly suspicious of their
governments. In the past, when peace or arms control negotiations took place,
most of the work was based on a top-down approach, away from the public eye,
which left many not only unaware of the process, but also highly suspicious of its
legitimacy. Throughout the years, the Helsinki model has been able to credibly
convey the sense of a much wider community of stakeholders to be found
throughout its area of coverage. As several of the authors in the volume noted, a
regional mechanism in the Middle East that includes civic society, and discus-
sions of domestic political reforms and developments, would be able to build on
the opportunities arising from regional uprisings, allowing governments in the
region to manage the period of change and transition already underway.
This phase of negotiations, in itself, will enhance communication; reduce
the perceived threats; allow for the development of a cadre of experts; and
create the space for countries to examine how such a process may enhance
their security and promote their interests. In addition, as Jones mentions in
his chapter, it will allow regional countries to define and agree on what they
want to get out of the process. At the same time, a regional process set up for
exploring the possible avenues for cooperation does not necessitate for that
trust to come a priori – it hardly ever does. Trust develops over time through
repeated interactions and the collective overcoming of setbacks.
Trust is a product, not a precondition

The Helsinki Process created the space where European countries could meet
over the East and West divides to discuss their security concerns and develop
tools to address them. As described by Lynn Hansen and Rolf Ekeus, it was a
catalyst for change, forming a vital bridge between two camps that were fun-
damentally divided ideologically, politically, and economically. However, over
time, the personal relations that developed between the negotiators gradually
helped them identify important national interests that could be achieved and
promoted through the process.
There is no doubt that the process was initiated and took place when no
trust existed between Eastern and Western Europe, NATO and the Warsaw
Pact states, and the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact, as Lynn M.
Hansen describes, both the United States and the Soviet Union opposed the
process in its initial phases, and the negotiators were instructed to derail it. In
addition, public opinion (at least in the United States) was not sympathetic to
the process, especially when at times agreements were not implemented or
respected. For example, Hansen describes the negative US domestic reaction
to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, which was perceived as confirming
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240 Chen Kane
the postwar borders in Europe and therefore as a concession to the Soviet
Union. Starting a regional process or creating a regional organization in the
Middle East would not be easy. But, as Michael McFaul has observed:
Compared to the Middle East today, Europe in the first half of the twentieth
century had much deeper ideological divisions, ethnic tensions, and terri-
torial disputes … Creating a security organization, which included former
antagonists France and Germany or contemporary enemies such as the
Soviet Union and the United States, was as difficult as any set of security,
religious, ethnic, and ideological issues that now divide the Middle East.3
In fact, as Lewis and Kamel point out in their chapter, because the demo-
cratic process in the Middle East has already begun, we are in a different –
and in some respects far better – position than the one Europe was in during
the 1970s and 1980s.
Recognition by states that are in it for the long run

It must be remembered that the Helsinki Process unfolded over 40 years. It
originated in the early 1950s, with renewed calls for a conference in the mid-
1960s. It took another three years after Finland sent a memorandum in May
1969, offering Helsinki as a conference venue, for the preparatory talks to
convene in November 1972 and July 1973. The process then moved to
Geneva for nearly three years, concluding in July 1975. It took about 25 years
to convene the first conference and to produce the first agreed upon docu-
ment, the Final Act, also known as the Helsinki Accords or the Decalogue.
During these 40 years of negotiations, the process produced many measures
that over time transformed relationships within Europe from a zero-sum game
to cooperative security. Many of these measures, while initiated within the
Helsinki Process, developed to become independent processes over time. It
started with scientific forums and expert meetings on the peaceful settlement
of disputes, and it continued with the set of confidence- and security-building
measures adopted at the 1984 Stockholm Conference to strengthen Basket I
of the Helsinki Final Act. Among the adopted or expanded measures were
the refraining from the threat or use of force; prior notification of certain
military activities; the invitation of observers to certain military activities; and
the exchange of annual calendars of planned military activities. Even more
significant was the agreement on compulsory inspections as a means of ver-
ification – this was the first such instance in the history of arms control.
During the third follow-up meeting to the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), from 1986 to 1989, it was decided that
negotiations would begin on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
between the 23 CSCE participating states that were members of either NATO
or the Warsaw Pact. The CFE Treaty was signed in 1990. All of these devel-
opments, including the negotiations on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
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Conclusion 241
Forces Treaty (INF) of 1987 and the Strategic Arms Reeducation Treaty
(STRT) of 1991, took place prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The institutionalization phase of the Helsinki Process unfolded only in
the early 1990s as part of the need to meet the challenges of the new
Europe, when the CSCE became the Organization for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (OSCE). The Helsinki Process also supported the Soviet-
US Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) initiated in Helsinki in
November 1969 and the Treaty on Open Skies, which set out the framework
for a regime of unarmed observation flights over the territory of participat-
ing states and which was signed in Helsinki in 1992. These measures
evolved independently over time, but started or were supported by the Hel-
sinki Process to reduce tension, increase confidence, and establish arms
control agreements.
Attempts to establish a regional security dialogue in the Middle East began
for the most part in the 1990s, following the successful convening of the
Madrid Conference and the optimism around the bilateral Peace Process
between Israel and the Palestinians. These attempts stalled and halted when
the bilateral talks between Israel and the Palestinians failed. It would seem
that at least two issues will continue to have a direct influence on the prospect
of a regional dialogue. The first is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: historically,
the Arab states agree to continue to engage with Israel in a regional security
dialogue as long as significant progress is made on solving the Israeli-Palesti-
nian conflict. Also, Israel was reluctant to commit to a regional process that
may require strategic concessions being made before settling its border and
security issues with the Palestinians. Baskin and Siniora offer concrete short-
and long-term measures that could facilitate a better dynamic between these
two nations.
While there is no doubt that a regional process could not take place with-
out progress on solving the bilateral conflict between the Israelis and the
Palestinians, it would be unadvisable for a regional process to be tied struc-
turally to the existence or progress of Israeli-Palestinian bilateral negotiations.
Based on the Arab states’ call to start negotiating a WMDFZ, it would also
not seem to be as strong a precondition for them now as it was during the
multilateral negotiations after the Madrid Process.
The second issue that has direct implications on a regional process is Iran’s
nuclear program. Many nations in the region, especially those in the Gulf
Cooperation Council and Israel, are reluctant to enter any regional negotia-
tions without first having this question resolved. At the time of writing, it
seems that Iran’s new president, Hassan Rouhani, has committed himself to
salvaging his country from the crushing burden of international sanctions by
way of a negotiated settlement. Whether the current round of negotiations
will bear fruit is yet to be seen. In any case, there are significant benefits to be
found in a regional dialogue that includes Iran: it is a significant player in
almost all regional security issues, and its participation is necessary for any
agreement negotiated on a regional basis to be effective and sustainable.
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242 Chen Kane
Setbacks are to be expected; flexibility should be retained;
and regional ownership must develop
The Helsinki Process was not free of setbacks and tensions, and at several
points in time, it was on the brink of collapse. However, despite the setbacks,
the process was not suspended. Even in the darkest days of Soviet-US tension –
after the invasion of Afghanistan in the 1979 or when, for the first time, the
organization had to address violent conflicts in the region with the collapse of
the former Yugoslavia – member states continued to meet. Representatives
disagreed and often engaged in heated debates, but they did not sever their lines
of communication and did not place any conditions on maintaining their dia-
logue. In his chapter, Peter Jones describes a similar process in the ASEAN
region, under which a deliberate decision was taken early on in the process that
differences over political and even territorial matters would not be allowed to
stop the dialogue at either the official or civil society level.
The Helsinki Process also proved to be flexible enough to evolve dramati-
cally in both rationale and structure as political circumstances and expecta-
tions changed with time. For example, the negotiators agreed to be flexible on
the meaning of some of the principles agreed in 1975, while interpretations
were written into the record. The option to keep divergent opinions but still
agree on the principles was facilitated by the decision that the document was
to be a political document and not a legal one. Another example of flexibility
was the adding of states as members as previous governance formations dis-
integrated and new ones emerged; when, in the 1990s, it became clear that the
framework provided by Helsinki was no longer adequate to meet the security
challenges of the new Europe, member states decided to institutionalize the
process, giving it a permanent regional organizational status.
Another important aspect that demonstrated the flexibility of the Helsinki
Process was the involvement of civil society. In his chapter, Jones aptly cautions
about the viability of Track 2 diplomacy without the existence of formal nego-
tiations into which these efforts can feed. History in the Middle East has proven,
nevertheless, that real civil society benefits stem from active Track 1.5 and Track 2
dialogues, even in the absence of Track 1 talks. The Oslo Accords between
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization started as a Track 2 process.
Also, regional arms control discussions started in the 1980s as Track 2, long
before the Arms Control and Regional Security working group was conceived.
These efforts took place without any foreknowledge that they could serve
as the necessary spark for a formal diplomatic and negotiating process.
Similarly, foundational Track 1.5 and Track 2 work will need to take place in
the Middle East prior to, and in parallel with, any formal regional security
negotiations. It is the obligation of the participants in such efforts to update
officials in their home countries on the possibilities identified through these
efforts, so they could be brought up when formal regional negotiations com-
mence. In his chapter, Bilal Saab calls attention to the need for capacity
building in the region as the ongoing changes in the Arab world may well
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Conclusion 243
bring new actors to national and regional arms control decision-making pro-
cesses. An inclusive approach will allow these actors to better understand
their nations’ options, seize opportunities, and potentially make them feel like
they have a vested interest in a regional process – dissuading them from
becoming obstacles to negotiations and perhaps even getting them to actively
counter the spoilers that might come up.
The Helsinki Process succeeded because, among other reasons, it did not bear
the exclusive fingerprints of any one country and did not serve the interests of
any one state. While the Europeans who initiated the Process had different
interests than the United States or the Soviet Union, all managed to identify
common interests in building a sustainable regional security community. In the
Middle East, none of the past attempts to address regional security issues were
initiated, conceived of, or implemented by regional countries. This could partly
explain their failure. While it is only too easy to blame others in one’s failure, it
is important to recognize that, although outside powers will have a role to play
in a future regional process, they are not the ones that could or should carry it
forward in a sustainable manner. A signal of the Middle East developing a
sense of regionalism will be regional ownership of a regional security dialogue.
It happened in every other region of the world, and we believe that the countries
in the Middle East can make it happen there as well.
Notes
1 O’Sullivan, Rey, and Mendez, “Opportunities and Challenges.”
2 International Trade Centre, “League of Arab States’ Regional Integration.”
3 McFaul, Advancing Democracy Abroad, 221.
Bibliography
International Trade Centre. “League of Arab States’ Regional Integration: Executive
Summary.” Background paper for UNCTAD XIII, 2012. Available at: http://tinyurl.
com/msydp3g.
McFaul, Michael. Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should and How We Can.
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010.
O’Sullivan, Anthony, Marie-Estelle Rey, and Jorge Galvez Mendez. “Opportunities
and Challenges in the MENA Region.” In Arab World Competitiveness Report
2011–2012. Paris: OECD, 2011: 42–67. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/mena/
49036903.pdf.
WWW.EBOOK777.COM
Index
Abbas, Mahmoud 27–28, 32, 70, 80, Arab Peace Initiative 81, 108–9, 153–58,
149, 165 163, 189–90, 193, 237
Abdullah II of Jordan 6, 62–63, 108, Arab-Persian conflict 44–45
155, 177 Arab Uprisings 1, 7, 9, 99, 119, 162, 196,
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia 220 239; and civil society 179, 208; and
Able Archer 83 exercise 24 coercion 217–18, 221–22; conflict
Afghanistan 6, 41, 136, 138, 242 management and disarmament 77–78,
Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud 28, 119 81; and CSCE 53, 55; democracy 66,
AKP (Justice and Development) 72–74, 149–53, 170; Egypt 149, 152, 171,
government, Turkey 129, 138–40 225–26; EU and 151; future prospects
Albania 20, 94 223–26; Helsinki model 23, 29–30; and
Albright, Madeleine K. 27 Israel 150–53; Libya 149; and
Algeria 4, 223 Mediterranean regionalism 70–71; and
Aliboni, Roberto 69 the regional security framework 149–53;
Andorra 94 Tunisia 149, 225; and Turkish mediation
Andropov, Yuri 22–23 129, 136, 138; and United States 151
Annapolis Process 28, 80, 159 Arafat, Yasser 27–28, 154, 157
Antalya meetings 133 arms control 6, 63–64, 76–79, 234, 240;
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 58 and bureaucracies 175–77; civil society
anti-Western views 29, 31, 116, 121, 151 178–79; economics 179–80; Europe
applicability of the Helsinki model 6–8, 58–59; future prospects 170–81; and
134–35, 234 national security cultures 174–75;
April 6 Movement 225 weak parliaments 177–78
Al-Aqsa Mosque 157 Arms Control and Regional Security
Arab-Israeli conflict 6, 23, 28, 45–47, 55, Talks 4, 47, 140, 242; Antalya
57, 60, 63–66, 115, 236; Arab Peace workshop 33–34; cooperative security
Initiative 154–56; and civil society 203; aspirations 186–87, 189; future
conflict management 77, 81–82; prospects 173, 176; institutionalization
cooperative security aspirations 187, 62–64; Israeli perspective 91, 98;
190, 193, 196–97; and democracy 149, nuclear weapons 75, 79, 105–6, 160; as
152, 173; Israeli perspective 92, 98; part of the Peace Process 202–5;
and nuclear weapons 105–6, 108; and regional security 193, 208; Turkey
regionalism aspirations 185–86; and 129–34; weapons of mass destruction
Turkey 132–33, 136–39; two-state 216, 220
solution 74–75 ASEAN civil society dialogues 198–202,
Arab-Israeli Peace Process 1, 69, 204–5, 207–8, 222, 238, 242
80, 189 ASEAN ISIS 202, 207
Arab League 54, 93, 120, 133, 138, aspirations 184–97; cooperative security
154–55, 157, 189–90, 192, 195 185–90; regionalism 184–85, 190–95
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al-Assad, Bashar 112, 115, 119–20, 153, Bush, George W. 28
157, 171–72, 174, 223 Buzan, Barry 185
Assad regime 29, 45, 73, 112, 152 Byelorus 25
asymmetries 187
authoritarian regimes 65, 70–72, 82, 115, Camp David 28
155, 171, 174–76, 185, 188, 222, 239 Canada 2, 21, 23, 30, 32, 38, 160
autocracies 72, 151, 171, 178–79, 195 Capie, David 200–201, 207–8
Al-Badi, Awadh 11–12, 237 Cardin, Benjamin 61
Carter administration 41
Baghdad Pact 53 cascade scenario 76–77
Bahr, Ahmad, Sheik 150 Cast Lead operation 161
Bahrain 73, 188, 233 Caucasus 44
Baker, James A., III 23, 131 Central and Eastern Europe 41, 56, 58
balanced participation 94 Central Asia 44
balance of power 73, 79, 94, 139, Central Treaty Organization 53
196, 221 Charta 77 group 41–42
Balfour Declaration 53 chemical weapons 29, 45–46, 105, 110,
Balkans 44 120, 161, 189, 218–19, 233
Baltic states 38 Chemical Weapons Convention 46, 48,
El Baradei, Mohamed 222 135, 178
Barak, Ehud 28, 92 Chernenko, Konstantin 22
Barcelona Process 5, 54, 68–71, 187–88 China 9–10, 31, 75, 108, 122, 160
Bar Ilan University speech 159 Christopher, Warren 27
Barkey, Henri 138–39 Churchill, Winston 223
baskets structure 2, 4–5, 28–29, 39, 53, civil-military relations 174–75
96–100, 202, 216, 237 civil society 10, 66, 100, 130, 164, 172,
Baskin, Gershon 12, 95, 237 178–79, 192, 196, 242; ASEAN
Beirut Summit 154 dialogues on regional security 198–202;
Belgrade Follow-Up Meeting 21, 40 Middle East dialogues on regional
Ben Ali, Zine El Abidine 150, 172–73, security 202–8; United States 178
222, 233 Clinton, Bill 27–28, 80
Ben-Gurion, David 92 closed-door discussions 35
Berlin Wall 38 closed regimes 65–67, 178
Bikdeli, Alireza 139 “coalition of the willing” approach 7
bilateral negotiations 19, 47, 64, 74–75, Code of Conduct on Politico-Military
119, 125, 163, 241; civil society 203; Aspects of Security 25
Cold War 42, 54, 58; cooperative coercion for WMD: and cooperation
security aspirations 186–87; Israel- 217–18; and oppression 218–19; and
Palestine 26, 28, 93, 95; Mediterranean security 219–22
region 68–69; Turkish mediation 130, Cold War 20, 23, 38–41, 53–59, 65–67,
132–33 93, 116, 129, 136, 163, 171, 177,
biological weapons 218 190, 221
Bishkek OSCE Academy 20 Common Security 190–91
Bosnia 20, 58 Common Security and Foreign Policy
Bosnia-Herzegonina conflict 3 58, 69
Bouazizi, Mohamed 180 Conference on Security and Cooperation
Brezhnev, Leonid 22–23 in Europe 5–7, 19–20, 42, 48–49,
British Mandate for Palestine 53, 74 53–60, 65, 100, 129–31, 134, 185–86,
Broader Middle East and North Africa 190–91, 216, 240–41 see also CSCE
Initiative 6, 66–67, 71–72 Forum; CSCE-like regime
Bull, Hedley 179 Conference on Security and Cooperation
bureaucracies 175–77 in the Gulf 195
Bush, George H. W. 26, 53–54, 61, Conference on Security and Cooperation
65–67, 172 in the Mediterranean 67–69, 71
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Conference on Security and Cooperation Defense Cooperation Pact, Syria-Iran
in the Middle East 4–5, 54, 62, 64, 119–20
129, 134–35 Defensive Shield operation 154
confidence- and security-building democracy 41, 65–66, 72–74, 139,
measures 3, 21, 42–44, 48–49, 58, 60, 149–52, 170–80, 192, 195, 223
64–65, 69, 121–25, 130–33, 140, 202–3; Democracy Assistance Dialogue 66
Helsinki model 24–25 Détente policy 41, 56
confidence-building measures 2–7, 28, deterrence 22, 46, 77, 79, 96, 107, 161,
33–35, 62–63, 98, 105, 114, 123, 164, 218, 221
204; European experience 38–49; Diamond, Larry 66
military 42–44 disarmament 49, 64–65, 80, 103–4,
conflict management 57–59, 63, 65, 229; 106–7, 109, 160 see also arms control;
and disarmament agenda 77–82 Nonproliferation Treaty
Conflict Prevention Center, Vienna 43 domestic contexts approach 171
consensus 2, 32, 53, 57, 67, 69, 81, 103,
106, 139–40 E3+3 talks 220
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty 3, East Prussia 38
20, 25, 39, 43–44, 48, 58–59, 240 East-West relations 1, 10, 22, 39, 41–43,
cooperation 235–37; and coercion 54, 58, 172, 191, 241–42
217–18; economic 2, 69–71, 99, economics/economic cooperation 2, 69–71,
121–22, 179–80; future prospects 99, 121–22, 179–80 see also trade
116–21; strategies 134; technological Egypt 4, 6, 30, 33–34, 44, 46, 48, 64, 79,
2, 175, 204, 237 117, 233–35; ACRS 176; arms control
“Cooperation in Humanitarian and 130, 132–34; civil society 203;
Other Fields” 29, 40 democracy 155, 173; disarmament
“Cooperation in the Field of Economics, 107; and Iran 221; and Israel 74–75,
of Science and Technology, and of the 92, 96, 98–99, 158, 160–61, 164–65,
Environment” 29, 40 186; military 174; regional dynamics
cooperative security frameworks 53–82; and security and cooperation prospects
aspirations 185–90; deconstruction 118–19; regionalism 191–94; and
59–65; Helsinki model 56–59; Turkey 138; uprising 53, 66, 72, 136,
imperative of conflict resolution and 149, 151–52, 171, 218, 225–26
disarmament agenda 77–82; Egyptian Peace Initiative 92–93
institutionalization of Mediterranean Egyptian SAMs 97
regionalism 67–71; institutionalization Eiran, Ehud 11, 234
of security regime 61–65; new Middle Eisenhower, Dwight 43
East security landscape 71–77; opening Ekéus, Rolf 10–11, 239
of closed regimes 65–67 energy industries 12, 70, 76, 106, 113,
counterterrorism 67, 120, 188 122, 135, 139, 162, 194, 237
CSCE Forum 25 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 138, 140
CSCE-like regime 55, 57, 60–62, 67, 71 Estonia 38
see also Helsinki-like process Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 5,
Cyprus 94 67–72, 187, 195, 216–17
Czechoslovakia 41 European Community 5, 31, 67–68, 133
European Defense and Security
Davutoğlu, Ahmet 135, 138 Policy 69
Deauville Partnership 71 European Neighborhood Policy 70
Decalogue 97, 129, 240 see also Final European regional security 1–3
Act; Helsinki Accords European security 68–69
“Declaration of Principles Guiding European Security Conference 47
Relations between States” 29, 97 European Union 3, 8, 32, 55, 69–70, 72,
“Declaration of Principles on Interim 75, 114, 160, 187–88, 191–94; and the
Self-Government Arrangements” 26 Arab Uprisings 151
deconstruction of Helsinki model 59–65 exceptionalism 65, 112
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facilitators 12–13, 27, 106, 120, 129, 133, Gorbachev, Mikhail 22, 172
137, 140, 163, 207, 215, 237 Gören, Nilsu 12, 237
Fahmy, Nabil 11, 79, 234 gradualism 95–96
Al-Faisal, Turki, HRH Prince 11–12, 237 Greater Middle East Initiative 6, 54
Faisal-Weizmann Agreement 92 Grinevsky, Oleg 22, 25, 33
Fatah 32, 151, 153, 165 Gromyko, Andrey 22
Feindbild 22, 25, 34–35 ground-launched cruise missiles 22
Feldman, Shai 6, 62–63 Guardian 220
Final Act 2, 4, 7, 123–24, 129, 188, 216, Gulf Cooperation Council 44, 54, 73,
237–40 see also Decalogue; Helsinki 106–7, 117, 162, 241
Accords; confidence-building measures Gulf Research Center 203
24, 39–40; CSCE 54, 57, 59–60; Gulf Wars 23, 100, 105, 107, 118,
follow-up 40–42; frontiers and borders 137, 160
28–29; historical context 19–21;
military CBMs confidence-building Haggag, Karim 11, 234
measures 42–44; sovereignty 113–14 Hamas 28, 30–33, 53, 67, 97–98, 112,
Finland 2, 27, 106, 162, 215 115, 150–51, 153–54, 158, 165, 194
Finnish Karelia 38 Hamas Charter 32
First Intifada 100 Hansen, Lynn M. 10–11, 25, 124, 239
flexible participation 94–95, 242 El Hassan bin Talal, Prince 5, 62, 135
flexible response doctrine 22 Hauser, Zvi 96
follow-up meetings 21, 40–42, 68 Havel, Václav 41
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Helsinki Helsinki Accords 2–3, 10, 21, 111,
Process 39 113–14, 122–23, 240 see also
foreign policy 58, 69, 72, 135–39, 171, Decalogue; Final Act
178–79 Helsinki Committees 41–42
fortress mentality 134 Helsinki-like process 91–96, 98–100,
Forum for Security Cooperation 43 105–6, 113, 118, 123–24, 217, 233–34
Forums for the Future 66, 189 see also CSCE-like regime; and
France 21, 75, 191–92 Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-Free
frontiers and borders 9, 28–29, 39–40, Zone 222, 227–29
47, 63, 81, 97, 108, 130, 137, 152–57, Helsinki model 19–35, 123–24 see also
165, 184 CSCE-like regime; Helsinki-like
future prospects: arms control 170–81; process; applicability of 6–8, 23, 44,
cooperation 116–21; regional issues 134–35, 234; Camp David and
33–35, 140–41; Weapons-of-Mass- Annapolis 28; confidence- and
Destruction 223–27 security-building measures 24–25;
criticisms of 7–10; deconstruction of
G-8 summit, Sea Island 6, 54, 66, 71, 189 59–65; future prospects for regional
Gaddafi, Muammar 149, 155, 172–73, issues 33–35; historical contexts
176, 222 19–21; instability in the Middle East
gas warfare 46 29–30; negotiations 26–27; non-state
Gaza 26, 30, 32–33, 74–75, 93, 151, actors and state-sponsored terrorism
157–58, 161, 164, 193; flotilla incident 31–33; Organization for Security and
138; as independent port 165–66 Cooperation in Europe 24–25;
generational difference 225–28, 239 participation 30–31; Stockholm
Geneva Protocol (1925) 46, 48 Conference 21–24; viability of
Georgia conflict 20, 58 cooperative security frameworks
Germany 38, 41, 68, 75, 109, 191 56–59
give-and-take logics 236 Helsinki Process 1–5, 14, 53, 67, 70,
global governance 129–30 91–95, 111, 113, 130–31, 149, 161,
Global Jihad movement 98 196, 215–17, 222–23, 233–43 see also
Golan Heights 157, 192 baskets structure; Helsinki Accords;
Goldberg, Arthur 21 Helsinki-like process; Foreign
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Ministers’ Meeting 39; and Israel 91; 116–17, 122, 139, 159–63, 170, 194,
and Warsaw Pact and NATO states 1 220–21, 224, 241; and Palestine 153;
Hezbollah 29–30, 32, 45, 53, 73, 98, 112, and Saudi Arabia 117–18; sovereignty
115, 120, 150, 152–53, 160, 194 113–16; and Syria 45, 119–20; and
High Commissioner on National Turkey 120–21, 136–39
Minorities 44 Iran-Iraq War 44, 46, 105, 107, 118, 124,
historical contexts 19–21, 218 161, 186, 219
holistic approach 55, 59 Iraq 6, 30, 32, 45–46, 49, 62, 67, 73, 95,
Hopmann, P. Terrence 54 130, 173, 194, 203, 219, 233; and Iran
Horowitz, Dan 96 112; and Turkey 137–38
Hoyer, Steny 61 Islamic Revolution, Iran 46, 112, 115,
humanitarian aid 2 118, 136
human rights 2, 10, 20–21, 40–42, 56–57, Islamists 151, 172–74, 180
65–66, 95, 99–100, 117, 123, 139, isolationism 135
186–87, 219, 238 Israel 4–5, 33–34, 45–46, 60, 70, 77, 81,
Hussein, Saddam 44, 46, 121, 137, 160 130–32, 191–92, 194, 203, 234–35 see
also Arab-Israeli conflict; and the Arab
Ibrahim, Saad Eddine 66 Uprisings 150–53; bilateral
ideational process 207 negotiations 26–27; domestic and
ideological systems 44, 116, 118, 137, 228 regional factors 157–59; and Egypt 64,
implementation 4–6, 42–44 74–75, 92, 96, 152; and Iran 45–48,
Inbar, Efraim 97 100, 111, 113–17, 122, 124–25, 164,
inclusivity 5, 62, 93, 185, 188, 190, 192, 220–21, 227; nuclear program 79–80,
202, 208, 242 104–5, 107–9, 159–63, 219–21, 223;
India 108 and Turkey 134, 137, 139
individual actors approach 171 Israel-Egypt peace treaty 165
instability in the Middle East 29–30, 53, Israeli Defense Force 30
55, 57, 63, 67, 73, 77, 105, 158, 217 Israeli-Palestinian conflict 164–66, 236,
institutionalization 54, 61–65, 67–71, 93, 241 see also Gaza; West Bank; Arab
140–41, 240–41 Peace Initiative 153–57; baskets
intelligence services 3, 23, 134, 174, 177–78 structure 97, 100; conflict management
interdependencies 2, 121, 138, 218 and disarmament 78, 80–82;
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces democracy 149–51; future prospects
Treaty 3, 20, 22, 58 170; future prospects/aspirations 186,
internal security practices 218–19 189, 193; instability 29–30;
International Atomic Energy Agency 49, institutionalization 62–63; and Iran
76, 78–79, 106, 108–9, 160, 220 114; non-state actors 31–33; nuclear
International Commission on Nuclear programs 108; threat perceptions 159,
Nonproliferation 103 163; and Turkey 135; two-state
International Court of Justice 103 solutions 74–75
internationalization 80–81, 194 Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process 6,
international law 97, 103 27–28, 96, 241
International Quartet 151, 163 Israeli Peace Initiative 154, 190
Iran 6, 28, 30–33, 53, 62, 67, 73, 80, 91, Israeli perspective 91–100
95, 130, 133–34, 173, 177, 191–93, 203, Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty 5, 61–63, 216
233–35; domestic politics 111–25; issue avoidance, process/framework as 8
economic cooperation 121–22; Istanbul Cooperative Initiative 188
and Egypt 118–19; future prospects
116–21; hegemony 193–94; human Jabotinsky, Zeev 92
rights 123; internal dichotomy 111–13; James Martin Center for
and Israel 45–48, 100, 111, 113–17, 122, Nonproliferation Studies 205
124–25, 164, 220–21, 227; non-regional Japan 9–10, 32
players 121–22; nuclear program 1, Al Jazeera 155
74–79, 97–98, 104, 107–9, 112, 114, Jihad 98, 153, 158, 160
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Job, Brian L. 199–201, 207 Maoz, Zeev 96
Jones, Peter 7, 13, 236, 238–39, 242 March 15 movement 153
Jordan 4–6, 33–34, 53, 62–63, 74–75, Marchetti, Andreas 6
108, 131, 133, 135, 155, 177, 187, 233; McFaul, Michael 66, 135, 240
civil society 178–79; and Israel 5, mediator roles 140–41
61–63, 99, 156, 216 Mediterranean Dialogue Program 188
Mediterranean Free Trade Area 68, 70
Kamel, Karim 13–14, 237–38, 240 Mediterranean regionalism 67–71
Kampelman, Max 4, 60 Michnik, Adam 41
Kane, Chen 14 Middle East as a region 8–9, 192–93, 234
Kerry, John 33, 35, 153, 163 Middle East Cooperative Security
al-Khalifa regime 73 Framework 62–63
Khalili, Laleh 217 Middle East Nuclear Weapons-Free
Khamenei, Ali, Ayatollah 31, 112–13, Zone 78–79
177, 224 Middle East Peace Process 4, 9, 54,
Khatami, Mohammad 118 66, 186
Khomeini, Ruhollah, Ayatollah 112, 114 migrant labor 2, 194
Kissinger, Henry 19, 56–57, 152, 176 military confidence-building measures
Kosovo 58 42–44, 133
Kurdish North Iraq 30, 137–38, 219 military dominance 174–75
Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK) 120, military manouvers 24–25
137–39 moderate Arab camp 53
Kuwait 46, 177, 188 Mohammad Reza Shah 112
Kyrgyzstan 20 Morocco 4, 70, 193, 223, 233
Morsi, Mohamed 30, 53, 72, 119, 136,
Laajava, Jaakko 27, 106 151, 164
Landau, Emily B. 98, 131 Moscow Treaty 38
Latvia 38 Moussa, Amr 156, 176
League of Arab States 45, 154–56, 159, Muasher, Marwan 156
162, 235 Mubarak, Hosni 72, 150, 160, 171, 173,
Lebanon 4–5, 26, 29–30, 32, 45, 95, 130, 176, 188–89, 221–22, 233
157, 173, 192; civil society 179; and mukhabarat states 218
Israel 96–97, 189; and Turkey 138 multidimensional view to regional
legitimacy 117 security 62
Lesser, Ian 54 multigenerational process 205–6
Levite, Ariel 98 multilateral negotiations 19–20, 26, 32,
Lewis, Patricia 13–14, 79, 237–38, 240 47, 62, 95, 130, 135, 163, 186, 203, 241
liberalization 71 Multilateral Steering Group 27
liberals 174 Multilateral Working Group on Arms
Libya 4, 53, 71, 95, 130, 149, 172–73, Control and Regional Security 5
203, 221, 233; and Israel 99–100 Muslim Brotherhood 119, 136, 138,
Likud government 149 152, 221
Lithuania 38 Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
Livni, Tzipi 159 19, 38–39, 41, 56–58
long-termism 240–42
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 3, 20
Madrid commitments 33 Nasrallah, Hassan 29
Madrid Conference 2, 5, 19–21, 26–27, national identities 233
34, 42, 61, 80, 129–30, 163, 241 national interests 14, 72, 114–15, 120,
Madrid Follow-Up Meeting 23, 124, 134, 174, 179, 195, 219, 234–39
31–32, 41 nationalism 74, 112, 185
Madrid Process 41, 92–93, 105, 131, 160, national security cultures 174–75
186–87, 192–93, 216, 241 NATO 23, 39, 43, 53, 55, 58–59, 67, 69,
Mansfield, Mike 19 71, 188, 191, 195, 215, 240; Final Act
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follow-up 41; and Turkey 121, 132–33, Organization for Security and
136, 138–39 Cooperation in Europe 3–5, 20,
NATO states 3, 8, 21–22 42–43, 48, 54–55, 58–60, 62, 68, 100,
Nawaat.org 225 185–88, 190, 204, 217, 241; Helsinki
Netanyahu, Benjamin 5, 28, 33, 62, 93, model 24–25
97, 99–100, 124, 131, 158–61, 221 Organization for Security and
New Cold War 42–43 Cooperation in Europe and the
new leaders 172–74 Mediterranean 195
New York Times 226 Organization for Security and
Next Generation Network 205 Cooperation in the Mediterranean and
NGOs 66, 131 Middle East: proposal of 4
Nixon administration 56–57, 176 Organization for the Prohibition of
Non-Aligned Movement 116, 119 Chemical Weapons 45, 49
nonproliferation commitments 31 Organization of Islamic Cooperation 138
Nonproliferation Treaty (Treaty on the Oslo Accords 4, 26–27, 62, 75, 153, 158,
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 164, 216, 242
Weapons) 7, 46, 48, 64, 76–77, 104–6, Oslo Process 80, 93, 96, 131, 156
117, 160–62, 164, 204, 218–20 Ottoman Empire 53, 136
Nonproliferation Treaty Review
Conference 27, 215 Pahlavi dynasty 112
non-state actors 45, 91, 98, 238; Helsinki Pakistan 108
model 31–33 Palaver Tree approach 222
normalization 158, 203, 236–37 Palestine 26, 28, 67, 160–61, 192 see also
normative foundation 65, 96–97, 100, Israeli-Palestinian conflict
113, 156–57 Palestine Liberation Organization 4–5,
norm entrepreneurs 207–8 26–27, 33–34, 75, 97, 150–51, 153,
North Korea 108–9, 162 155–57, 186, 242
Nouri, Abdullah 224 Palestinian Authority 74–75, 150, 157,
nuclear disarmament/renunciation 206 159, 165
nuclear energy development 106 Palestinian Interim Self-Government
nuclear opacity 219–21 Authority 26
nuclear programs 32, 218, 237; Iran 1, Palestinian Legislative Council 150
74–79, 97–98, 104, 107–9, 112, 114, parallel tracks approach 6
116–17, 122, 139, 159–63, 170, 194, Paris Charter 3, 20, 23
220–21, 224, 241; Israel 79–80, 104–9, parliaments, weakness of 177–78
159–63, 219–21, 223 participation 30–31, 93–95, 130,
nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle 203, 242
East 103–10, 163, 216 “Partnership for Progress and a
nuclear weapons 22–24, 45–48, 56, Common Future with the Region of
63–64, 219; civil society debate the Broader Middle East and North
224–25 Africa” 189
patronage policies 176
Obama, Barack 1, 28, 53, 80, 155 Peres, Shimon 5, 27, 93, 99, 152
Öcalan, Abdullah 137 Pershing II missiles 22, 24
Office for Democratic Institutions 44 Persian identity 111–12, 117–18
Ogarkov, Nikolai 24 Poland 38, 41
oil market 118, 136, 180 policing 218
Olmert, Ehud 28, 80 political extremism 29, 45, 227
Oman 33–34, 233 political Islam 150–52, 159
on-site inspections 25, 45, 160 Pommeria 38
Open Skies Consultative Commission 43 populism 176
Open Skies Treaty 43, 49, 58, 241 post-9/11 context 6, 65, 69, 134, 194
oppression: and coercion 218–19 power projection 116, 134, 233
Orchestra initiative 164 public opinion surveys 220, 223–26
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Qaddafi, Muammar 149, 155, 172–73, Saudi Arabia 34, 44–46, 53, 73, 106–7,
176, 222 117, 155, 189, 191–94, 237;
Al-Qaeda 152, 158 disarmament 108; and Israel 105;
Qatar 33, 45, 130–31, 187–88, 193 regional dynamics and security and
Quadripartite Rights and cooperation prospects 117–18; and the
Responsibilities 56 US 220–21
Qualifying Industrial Zones 99 Schwedler, Jillian 217
“Questions relating to Security in scientific cooperation 2
Europe” 29 Search and Rescue exercise 133
Second Intifada 97
Rabin, Yitzhak 4, 27, 46, 60 Second Lebanon War 160–61
radical Arab axis 53 sectarian tensions 44–45, 73
Reagan, Ronald 20, 22–24, 53, 172 secularization 112
regional competition 73–74, 138–39 self-reliance 96–97, 100, 235
regional context/dynamics 116–21, sensitive issues 31, 111, 173, 236
184–85, 222–23 setbacks 241–42
regional governance 54, 61 Shabake Khabar 224
regional identity 62, 72, 78, 192–93, 233 Sharansky, Natan 99
regionalism 138, 184–85, 190–95, 235–36 Sharon, Ariel 154
regionalization 235–36 Shebaa Farms issue 157
regional organizations 93 Shevardnadze, Eduard 22
regional ownership of the process Shiite theocracy 32
9, 242–43 Sinai 96, 99, 152, 158, 164–65
Regional Peace Initiative 190 Siniora, Hanna 12, 95, 237
regional security 72, 76–79, 82, 92–93, skepticism 11, 13, 20, 35, 38–39, 91–93,
96–99, 117, 140–41, 187; and non- 96, 157–58, 170, 184, 215, 233–34
regional players 121–22; process 228; social networking 225–26
Turkey’s role in talks 129–41 Solidarity movement 41
regional security framework: Arab Peace South Korea 9–10, 106
Initiative 153–57; Arab Uprisings sovereignty 174
149–53; domestic and regional factors Soviet Union 2, 19, 21–24, 26, 30, 38–39,
157–59; nuclear threat perceptions 56, 59, 95, 116, 191, 234, 239–40;
159–63; objectives 20, 63 breakup 43–44, 65–66; collapse of 20;
Reliant Mermaid exercise 133 Final Act follow-up 41; human rights
renationalization 69 and democracy issues 41; START 172;
Representative on Freedom of the and Turkey 136–37
Media 44 Soyuz-81 exercise 24
revisionism 57 Spain 26
Reza Shah 112 spontaneously organized groups 40–41
rhetoric and policy 115–16, 119, 164 state recognition 29–30, 63, 74, 111, 124,
Rifkind, Malcolm 62, 188 151–53, 158–59, 234
Roadmap 28, 31 state-sponsored terrorism: Helsinki
Rouhani, Hassan 31, 114–15, 117, 121, model 31–33
139, 161–62, 224, 241 status quo stabilization 56–57, 60, 65
Russia 9, 27, 29, 31, 35, 45, 75, 122, 160 Stimson Center 34
Stockholm Accords 2–3, 7, 22, 25
Saab, Bilal 13, 242 Stockholm Conference 20–24, 33, 35,
Sabah al-Ahmad, Sheik 177 39–40, 42–43, 240
Sadat, Anwar El 118 Stockholm International Peace Research
Sakharov, Andrei 41 Institute 7
Salafi politics 172 Stovall, Donald, Colonel 25
Saleh, Ali Abdullah 222, 233 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 20, 22,
sanctions 79, 108–9, 121–22, 139, 160, 224 56–58, 172, 176, 241
Sarkozy, Nicolas 70, 188 Strategic Defense Initiative 22
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strategic environment 44, 46, 64, 235–37 Turkey 5, 31, 35, 62, 94, 191–94, 237;
structural differences, European/Middle AKP government 129, 138–40; arms
Eastern 56 control 33–34, 129–41; cooperation
Suez Canal 97 prospects 120–21; and Egypt 138; and
Sunni-Shiite conflict 44–45, 47, 73, 118, the EU 188; foreign policy towards the
120 Middle East 135–39; and Gaza 165–66;
superpower rivalry 1, 10, 22, 39, 41–43, and Iran 120–21, 136–39; and Iraq
54, 56–59, 172, 191, 241–42 137–38; and Israel 134, 137, 139; and
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces Lebanon 138; mediator role 129–41;
152 and NATO 121, 132–33, 136, 138–39,
Sykes-Picot Agreement 53 165; as political model 152; and Soviet
Syria 4–5, 26, 29, 32, 45–48, 53, 72–73, Union 136–37; and Syria 136–39; and
95, 110, 130, 157, 161, 173–74, 192; United Nations 138; and United States
and Iran 119–20, 194; and Israel 136–38; zero problems policy 138–39
98–100, 186, 189; regional dynamics two-state solutions 28, 31, 74–75, 78, 81,
and security and cooperation prospects 114, 159
119–20; and Turkey 136–39
Syrian civil war 136, 139, 150, 152–53, U2 aerial surveillance 49
170–72, 223, 226, 233 Umar, Süha 33–34
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood 29 ummah 112–13
Union for the Mediterranean 70
Taba negotiations 80 United Arab Emirates 34, 106, 175, 188
Tabatabai, Ariane M. 12, 234 United Kingdom 27, 75
taboo subjects 34–35 United Nations 19–20, 25, 97, 113, 138,
tactical warfare 46 153–54, 156, 160, 162, 220
Tatarnikov, Viktor, General 21–22, 34 United Nations Partition Resolution
al-Tayyeb, Ahmed 157 (1947) 53
technological cooperation 2, 175, 204, 237 United Nations Security Council 45, 49,
terrorism 31–33, 65, 69, 135, 152, 154, 75, 80, 104–5, 110, 139, 161
158–59, 238; counterterrorism 67, United States 2, 6, 8–10, 19–26, 30–32,
120, 188 35, 38, 45, 59, 67–69, 75, 80–81,
Test Ban Treaty 178 116–17, 160–61, 191, 194, 234, 239–40;
13th Socialist International Congress, and the Arab Uprisings 151; Final Act
Geneva 4, 60 follow-up 41; inspections by 25;
threat perception/reduction 140, 159–63 invasion of Iraq 7, 65, 77; and Iran
timing issues 7–8 113, 124; and Israel 63, 94, 97; nuclear
tourism 2, 119 program 106; Oslo Accords 27; and
“Towards a Regional Security Regime Saudi Arabia 220–21; START 172;
for the Middle East” (Jones) 7 and Turkey 136–38
Track 1 process 206–8, 237, 242 UNSCOM 49
Track 2 process 134–35, 163–64, 180–81, USSR 8, 94
196, 207–8, 237, 242 Uzbekistan 20
Track 3 process 205, 207, 242
trade 68, 70, 194, 235–36 see also Vanunu, Mordechai 219
economics/economic cooperation verification 177, 240
transactional logic 95 Vienna Documents 39–40, 42–44, 48
Transdniestrian conflict 20 Vietnam 56
transformation of Middle East security vocational training 2
71–77, 235, 238–39 volatility 29
transparency 2, 43, 107 voluntary/compulsory measures 24, 42
trust as a product 239–40
Tunisia 4, 34, 70, 131, 149–52, 155, Wahhabism 118
172–73, 180, 187, 193, 218, 221, Waltz, Kenneth 221
225, 233 War of Attrition 97
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Index 253
Warsaw Pact 3, 23–24, 39–41, 130, 191, West Bank 26, 28–30, 32, 45, 74–75, 151,
215, 240; breakup 43–44 153–54, 159, 165, 193
Warsaw Treaty Organization 19, 38 Western imperialism 8
Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-Free Zone WikiLeaks 220
1, 7, 27, 130, 132, 135, 140, 164, winners and losers 8
215–29; civil society 202–4, 206–9; Wolfowitz, Paul 66
coercion and security 219–22; coercion World War II 38–39, 45, 47, 55, 136
to cooperation 217–18; confidence-
building measures 48–49; future Yaffe, Michael 13, 235, 238
prospects 223–27; future prospects/ Yassin, Ahmed, Sheikh 32
aspirations 171–73, 180–81, 189; Yemen 155, 221, 233
Helsinki-like process 227–29; Yom Kippur War (1973) 45, 100
institutionalization 64; nuclear Yugoslavia 95, 242
weapons 75, 104–8, 117, 161–63;
oppression and coercion 218–19; Zapad-81 exercise 24
regional context of transition 222–23 zero problems policy, Turkey 138–39
Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction zero-sum games 1, 208, 235–36
proliferation 82, 91 Zionism 33, 91–92, 99–100
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Regional Security Dialogue InThe Middle East

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Regional Security Dialogue in the

At this time of considerable political turmoil in the Middle East, there is a

Egle Murauskaite is Research Associate at the James Martin Center for

UCLA Center for Middle East Development (CMED)

Edited by Elizabeth Matthews,

1. The Struggle over Democracy in the Middle East

2. Women in the Middle East and North Africa

3. The Israel-Palestine Conﬂict

4. Gender and Violence in the Middle East

5. Non-State Actors in the Middle East

6. Regional Security Dialogue in the Middle East

Regional Security Dialogue

First published 2014

ISBN: 978-1-138-01838-9 (hbk)

Typeset in Times New Roman

List of contributors vii

1 Cautious optimism: The Helsinki Process as a model for

2 A zone in the Middle East: Conﬁdence-building measures and the

3 The Helsinki Process and the Middle East: The viability

4 The Helsinki Process and its relevance in a changing Middle

6 Domestic politics in Iran and a future regional process 111

7 Lessons learned: The Turkish role in arms control and regional

8 The Helsinki Process in the Middle East: Promoting security,

9 The future of arms control in the Middle East 170

10 The Middle East and the Helsinki Process: Unfulﬁlled

11 Civil society dialogues and Middle East regional security:

12 A Helsinki Process for the Middle East? New discourse,

Conclusion: Charting a course inspired by the Helsinki experience 233

Jaakko Laajava is the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Security

ACRS Arms Control and Regional Security

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European regional security: the road to Helsinki and beyond

… the Parties recognize the achievements of the European Community

Similarly, Section 7 of Article 4 states that the parties:

Undertake to work as a matter of priority, and as soon as possible, in

Starting in 1995, the Barcelona Process grew out of the Euro-Mediterranean

Academic thought on the applicability of the Helsinki Process

Criticism of the Helsinki Process as a model

Structure and contributions of this book

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The Stockholm Conference

Conﬁdence- and Security-Building Measures in the OSCE

 First, to craft a strong joint statement in support of the Madrid Con-

The Middle East and aspects of the Helsinki Process

Instability in the Middle East

Non-state actors and state-sponsored terrorism

They will take all appropriate measures in preventing their respective

Prospects for future progress on regional issues

2 A zone in the Middle East

In 1966, the Soviet Union proposed a Conference on European Security, with

The follow-up to the Final Act

Military conﬁdence-building measures

Security in the Middle East

Conﬁdence-building measures in the Middle East

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3 The Helsinki Process and the

… the OSCE is to some degree a product of its history, especially its

Drawing the right lessons from Helsinki

Transferring Helsinki to the Middle East: Deconstructing the history

Institutionalizing a security regime for the Middle East

States may choose to consider an attack on any member of the frame-

First, to craft a strong joint statement in support of the Madrid Con-

The Declaration of Principles and Statements of Intent on Arms Control

Structural opportunity (a moment when the regional system is looking for