Ocean and Coastal Management 202 (2021) 105508

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Ocean and Coastal Management

journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ocecoaman

Evolutionary game analysis on behavior strategies of multiple stakeholders

in maritime shore power system
Lang Xu a, Zhongjie Di a, Jihong Chen a, b, c, *, Jia Shi a, Chen Yang d
a
College of Transport and Communications, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai, 201306, China
b
Qianhai Shengang Institute of International Finance,Shenzhen, 518052, Guangdong, China
c
Shenzhen Research Center for China Blue Oceans, Shenzhen, 518052, Guangdong, China
d
Zhuhai Port Holdings Group Co., Ltd., Zhuhai, 519015, Guangdong, China

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: This paper focuses on the mechanism of interaction among the strategic choices of a shore power system
Evolutionary game including government, port enterprises, and liner companies. Based on an evolutionary game model, the influ­
Multiple stakeholders ence of shore power implementation on the evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) of the multiple stakeholders is
Shore power system
discussed. The observations show that whatever stage they are in and whatever their initial strategies are, the
Government regulation
government always chooses to use incentives, port enterprises prefer to implement shore power, and liner
companies choose to modify shore power facilities. Furthermore, the initial strategy of government has a sig­
nificant influence on the strategic evolution of port enterprises and liner companies. Beyond that, the higher the
policy cost and the bigger the social benefits of implementing shore power without government incentives, the
sooner the government will move to the “non-incentive” strategy.

1. Introduction
The development of ports and shipping is a key driving force of world
economic growth, as well as an important element of global supply chain
(Dong et al., 2016). However, due to the increased shipping activities,
there has been a surge in emissions of a large number of harmful and
greenhouse gases. Port and shipping activities have also become major
energy consumers and pollution sources (Chen et al., 2019a,b,c). Pres­
ently, China has become a world port power. The energy consumption of
China’s ports in 2014 was much higher than that in 2005, increasing by
8.7% annually to 112%. The carbon dioxide emissions of ports in 2014
increased by 55% compared with 2005 (Chen et al., 2019a,b,c). These
figures, which have a direct effect on economic efficiency and deploy­
ment of environmental improvement, are higher than global growth
rates. As the air pollution caused by shipping emissions has gradually
caught up with that caused by automobile exhaust and industrial
pollution, it is urgent to improve the marine environment.
Notably, a number of regulations have been implemented in place by
governments and international organizations to limit emissions from
port areas (Yu et al., 2017), such as MARPOL (International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships) offers for sulfur limits on oil.
Beyond that, the establishment of emission control zones (ECAs) and
reduced speed zones (RSZs) has greatly facilitated the reduction of ship
emissions and the improvement of air quality (Chen et al., 2018, 2019).
Traditionally, the power generated by auxiliary engines (AEs) is essen­
tial for vessel’s onboard function such as ventilation, lighting and
communication during berthing in port. Nevertheless, the use of AEs in
port causes the emission of CO, CO2, SOX and NOX, as well as generates
noise pollution, thus resulting in the reduction of fuel-using efficiency.
To solve these problems, the widespread introduction of shore power
technology in port areas has become a new means of reducing emissions
and improving the environment (Styhre et al., 2017; Zis, 2019).
As early as 2000, high-voltage shore power technology was first
applied to ferry terminal in Gothenburg, Sweden (Zhang et al., 2015).
Since then, the use of shore power by ships in port has attracted the
attention of the industry. In 2001, Juneau Port applied shore power
system to luxury cruise terminal for the first time (Wen, 2017). Subse­
quently, major European countries such as Belgium, Norway and
Finland have in turn applied the technology in their own terminals.
Since 2010, the shore power system has been included in the imple­
mentation plan of European countries’ port modernization. By 2017,
more than 10 ports in the United States had provided high-voltage and

* Corresponding author. College of Transport and Communications, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai, 201306, China.
E-mail addresses: xulang@shmtu.edu.cn (L. Xu), zhongjiedi16@sina.com (Z. Di), cxjh2004@163.com (J. Chen), jiashi0625@163.com (J. Shi), 13611698743@
163.com (C. Yang).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2020.105508
Received 26 July 2020; Received in revised form 27 November 2020; Accepted 20 December 2020
Available online 5 January 2021
0964-5691/© 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
L. Xu et al.
low-voltage shore power systems for different types of ships (Liu et al.,
2020).
Compared with the European and American countries, China did not
begin to adopt the low-voltage shore power system until 2009. Qingdao
Port, Waigaoqiao Phase II container terminal of Shanghai Port and
Lianyungang Port also successively carried out configuration and
transformation of shore power system (Zhu, 2016). However, affected
by multiple factors, the actual development of shore power is not ideal
currently. From the perspective of shipping firms, although shore power
is beneficial to environment, the requirements of the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) and shore connection capacity result in
the high cost of the initial renovation of ships (Kumar et al., 2019).
Although the difference between shore power and fuel oil can be used to
make up for it, the recovery period is so long that shipowners have little
willingness to use it. At present, there is a lack of unified standard for
low-voltage shore power interface (Radwan et al., 2019), which greatly
affects the utilization rate of shore power. As for port enterprises, in
addition to the high investment cost of retrofitting berths and port
infrastructure (Innes and Monios, 2018), they also have to bear attached
operating and maintenance costs to keep the shore power system in good
condition. Therefore, without the participation of other stakeholders,
port enterprises cannot afford this complex system on their own. Thus,
as policy maker, the government should promote the implementation of
shore power from multiple aspects (Dai et al., 2019). Additionally, in
order to normalize the implementation of shore power in ships, ship­
owners and ports should be guided to sign a cooperation agreement to
improve their willingness to use it (Radwan et al., 2019).
Hence, the main objectives of paper are to construct a one-
population evolutionary game model for government, port enterprises
and liner companies, as well as study the effects of tripartite behaviors
on the shore power implementation. Under this structure, the govern­
ment, as regulator, choose either non-incentive strategy or incentive
strategy. Port enterprises’ behavior strategies are classified into two
options: implementation of shore power and non-implementation of
shore power. And, liner companies have two strategies, which are
modification and non-modification of shore power facilities. We aim at
answering some questions to accomplish the research targets of this
paper, which are described as follows:
(1) How to construct the payoff matrices of multiple stakeholders in
tripartite evolutionary game model? And what are the
determinants?
(2) How to calculate the equilibrium points in the model? What are
the corresponding evolutionarily stable strategies and under
what conditions can they be achieved?
(3) What influence will the variation trends of relevant model pa­
rameters have on the evolution of multiple stakeholders’
behavior strategies?
To solve the above questions, the evolutionary game theoretical
model is adopted to establish the tripartite payoff matrices among
government, port enterprises and liner companies. And, the replicator
dynamic equation of tripartite stakeholders are obtained, and the
evolutionarily stable strategies and corresponding conditions are
calculated with Jacobian matrix. Finally, numerical simulations are
carried out with Zhuhai port as an example to illustrate the influence of
the variation trend of relevant parameters on the evolutionary game
among the tripartite stakeholders.
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows: Section 2
reviews and sorts out the related literature in the context of government
regulations, cooperation strategy, and evolutionary game theory. In
Section 3, the problems and parameters are defined to establish the
models for multiple stakeholders. Moreover, some analytical results are
obtained. In Section 4, a case study of Zhuhai Port is provided to conduct
sensitivity analysis. And finally, we conclude the managerial insights
and point out the directions of future development.
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Ocean and Coastal Management 202 (2021) 105508
2. Literature review
The existing literature on the three relevant issues in this section is
reviewed as follows: (a) government regulations on shipping emission,
(b) cooperation strategy on shore power system, and (c) evolutionary
game theory.
2.1. Government regulations on shipping emission
In recent years, the topic of government regulations on shipping
emissions has become a research hotspot for a large number of scholars
in the shipping industry. Currently, government regulation has become
more stringent whereas the international community is committed to
reducing shipping emissions. Further, on behalf of better accommoda­
ting the new emission regulation, Abadie et al. (2017) proposed an
economic evaluation method based on the installation of scrubbers and
the application of Marine low-sulfur diesel engines under uncertain
conditions, which, in their view, was the best option in any given time,
considering the installation costs and fuel prices. Similarly, Kim and Seo
(2019) conducted an empirical analysis on three emission reduction
schemes - installing scrubbers, switching to low-sulfur fuels and retro­
fitting liquefied natural gas-powered vessels - with the aim of investi­
gating the actual impact of SOX regulations on Korean shipping
companies. Kontovas (2020) presented a way to combine greenhouse
gas emissions from ships with other gases, such as sulfur and nitrous
oxides on a common scale and to estimate their overall impact, leading
to better decisions by policy makers. Schwartz et al. (2020) studied the
operating and technical measures of shipping companies, which could
not only reduce CO2 emissions, but also obtain economic returns, with
findings that were in accordance with previous literature arguing that
the shipping sector could make profits by reducing a large amount of
CO2 emissions.
For the sake of exploring the influence of ECA regulations on cruise
shipping, a solution method combining mixed integer planning model
with Tabu search algorithm was proposed by Zhen et al. (2018), which
conducted computational tests based on the actual data of cruise lines.
According to compositive shipment level data prior to implementing
ECA regulations, Svindland (2018) effectively illustrated how empirical
data supported the need to adopt stricter SOX regulations so that mari­
time operations could maintain a green image in competitive trans­
portation modes. Dai et al. (2018) considered the carbon emissions and
operating costs of lines from Asia to Europe under different geographic
network configurations, with the observations revealing market distor­
tions and regulatory costs related to regional emission regimes. An in­
tegrated model was developed by Sheng et al. (2017) to study the
impacts between unilateral maritime emission regulation and unified
maritime emission regulation on economic and environmental benefits.
2.2. Cooperation strategy on shore power system
Several studies on shore power system mainly have focused on the
exploration of the strategies among government, port firms and shipping
enterprises. Considering that implementing shore power has a signifi­
cant effect on shipowners’ decisions on whether to retrofit ships, Yu
et al. (2019) obtained the renovation strategies of container ships with
different types and sizes in Dalian Port under a planned visiting fre­
quency through an improved multi-objective genetic algorithm, which
validated the proposed methodology for shipowners to investigate when
investing in shore-power application to improve shipping environment.
Winkel et al. (2016) quantified the economic and environmental bene­
fits of shore power in Europe by estimating ship emissions in ports and
associated energy needs, providing insights into the expected obstacles
to implement shore power and proposing policy recommendations and
actions to facilitate the implementation of shore power. Based on the
integer programming model of OPS allocation, Peng et al. (2019) pro­
posed a solution method based on simulation to solve the optimization
L. Xu et al.
model, whose experimental results proved to be sensitive and empha­
sized the significance of electricity price to the optimal configuration.
To study a shore power deployment problem in a container shipping
network, Wu and Wang (2020) developed a tailor-made labeling algo­
rithm and formulated the problem as a mathematical model that
captured the involved relationships among the government, container
ports, and shipping lines. Through extensive numerical experiments, it
was proven that this method could be used to make a subsidy program
for the government in order to achieve the utmost reduction of at-berth
emissions in the network. Dai et al. (2020) quantified the environmental
benefits of shore power and the delayed impacts of reductions in carbon
emissions, whose results showed that limited by generating efficiency,
container ships could only endure a very short delay while staying at
berth, and the delays related to shore power caused by larger vessels
accounted for a larger proportion of CO2 over-emission than those
caused by smaller ones. Given that ship-to-shore power technology still
faces some technical and regulatory issues, Kumar et al. (2019) pre­
sented cutting-edge and future marine solutions, which aimed at a
general review of existing standards, technical aspects, practices and
major challenges in modeling and designing in a harbor grid for
shore-to-ship power.
2.3. Evolutionary game theory
Evolutionary game theory is widely used in the study of large-scale
interactive systems and the analysis of individual behavior strategies
in complex systems (Brunetti et al., 2016). With the help of evolutionary
game theory, Can et al. (2019) acquired an asymptotic formula for the
continuity probability of a positive full line with a random polynomial,
whose key ingredient was to border on a degree-indexed order of
random polynomials through a proper centrally-stationary Gaussian
process. Sekiguchi and Ohtsuki (2015) described the stochastic evolu­
tionary dynamics of 2 × 2 bi-matrix game infinite populations, which
obtained the fixed probability of evolutionary dynamics from a given
original state converging to a particular absorption state and proved that
evolutionary dynamics favored fairness. Garay et al. (2017) illustrated
the role of time constraints in a matrix game through the prisoner’s
dilemma game, where additional time constraints could guarantee the
existence of a singular evolutionarily stable strategy. Chacoma et al.
(2016) proposed an evolutionary game in which the dynamics rules
originated from the field observation of human behavior actuated by
social imitation and confidence, and finally studied the influence of this
property on dynamics through numerical analysis. Since the analysis of
random games has been limited to independent income entries, Duong
and Tran (2019) overcame this restrictive assumption by considering the
income matrix entries as correlated random variables in multi-player
dual-strategy evolutionary games, whose results showed that reducing
the correlation among incomes brought about the increase in the aver­
ages of equilibrium points, proposing that increasing the independence
of income entries could promote the behavioral diversity of systems or
populations.
In short, previous studies have analyzed the economic effectiveness
of different regulations on shipping emissions, explored the different
strategies adopted by government, port enterprises and shipping com­
panies regarding shore power, and introduced the current development
of evolutionary game theory. Unfortunately, there are few studies on
synergies among multiple stakeholders in the implementation of shore
power. It is not enough to confine ourselves to some qualitative policy
analysis. Therefore, this paper will analyze and discuss the behavior
strategies of multiple stakeholders in the shore power system on the
basis of evolutionary game theory, for the sake of providing better de­
cisions for the promotion of shore power by the government.
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Ocean and Coastal Management 202 (2021) 105508
3. Evolutionary game model
3.1. Model descriptions
Generally speaking, an evolutionary game assumes that players are
bounded rational, and then studies the dynamic evolutionary process of
their strategies (Long et al., 2019). This paper clarifies the game re­
lationships among multiple stakeholders and studies the effect of envi­
ronmental regulation on the implement of shore power system, which
includes government, port enterprises and liner companies. The game
relationship among multiple stakeholders are as follows:
(1) The game between government and port enterprises
Port enterprise is one of the important elements for shore power
technology. Their environmental attitude is crucial to realize energy
saving and emission reduction. Ports, as the starting point in the appli­
cation of shore power technology, aim to obtain economic benefits and
improve the port environment. Since the decline in oil and electricity
prices, the price mechanism of shore power system has not yet been
established, resulting in high construction cost of shore power and
difficult recovery in a short term. Therefore, the enthusiasm of port
enterprises to implement shore power is generally not high. In addition,
the technical standards of construction of shore power facilities need to
be enhanced, and the capacity increase of electricity is difficult, which
hinders the promotion of shore power technology to some extent. The
government should continue to maintain and increase support for port
enterprises to apply shore power technology through financial subsidies
and other methods.
(2) The game between government and liner companies
As another stakeholder in the application of shore power system,
liner companies are currently facing a series of technical difficulties,
such as the matching of ports’ electricity supply system and ships’ power
receiving system, seamless grid connection technology for shipboard
power supply connection and automatic cable design. For purpose of
meeting the needs of shore-power facilities, liner companies need to
spend a long time and bear a considerable investment to retrofit the
ships’ power supply system. At the same time, the retrofitting of the
ships’ shore power interface also needs to pass the technical certification
of classification society with many procedures and slow process. The
government should implement a reward system to improve the enthu­
siasm of liner companies to retrofit the power interface.
(3) The game between port enterprises and liner companies
In this game, port enterprises and liner companies maximize indi­
vidual benefits. In the shore power system, it’s difficult for port enter­
prises to get returns for increasing investment in shore power
construction within a short time; liner companies will lack enthusiasm
due to high cost of retrofitting power system and shore power interface.
However, participating in the construction of shore power system can
actively promote the improvement of coastal environment and port ef­
ficiency. At the same time, it can also reduce the maintenance costs of
marine auxiliaries and operating costs of shipping. Thus, port enter­
prises and liner companies need to measure the benefits and costs
brought by shore power construction, so as to determine whether to
apply shore power system.
Hence, the tripartite participants involved in evolutionary game are
governments, port enterprises and liner companies. The interactive
behavior strategies for tripartite participants are shown in Fig. 1. The
governments, as a regulator, have two choices of regulatory strategies:
incentive (G1 ) and non-incentive (G2 ). Port enterprises’ behavior stra­
tegies are classed into two options: implementation of shore power (P1 )
and non-implementation of shore power (P2 ). Liner companies have two
L. Xu et al. Ocean and Coastal Management 202 (2021) 105508

Fig. 1. Interactive strategic behavior framework among tripartite participants.

strategies, which are modification of shore power facilities (L1 ) and non- company chooses L1 strategy with the probability z, relatively,
modification of shore power facilities (L2 ). 1 − z is the probability of opting for L2 strategy.

3.2. Basic assumptions and model parameters From the above assumptions, the relevant notations and definitions
are further described in Table 1.
As per the analysis of dynamic game relationships among multiple
stakeholders, several assumptions are made as follows:
3.3. Evolutionary game analysis of replicated dynamic equations
(1) The government, as a regulator, supervises the behavior of port
enterprise and liner company. The initial social welfare of gov­ Through analyzing the behavior strategies of government, port en­
ernment is denoted by R0 . When the government chooses to adopt terprises and liner companies, eight kinds of combinations are obtained.
incentive measures, it needs to pay the policy cost C1 . However, if According to the principle of profit maximization and analytic method
port and liner company prefer P2 and L2 , respectively, the gov­ depicted by Zhang (2012), this paper lists the payoff matrices of the
ernment has to bear an equivalent loss C2 caused by the resulting tripartite game when government uses incentives and does not use
reduction of social and environmental benefits. We assume that
the social and environmental benefits are represented by R1 if the Table 1
government, port and liner company choose G2 , P1 and L1 , Parameters symbol descriptions.
respectively, whereas the social and environmental benefits are Parameters Descriptions
expressed in R2 if the government, port and liner company choose
R0 Government’s initial social welfare
G1 , P1 and L1 , respectively. In accordance with the reality, gov­
C1 Policy cost when government chooses G1
ernment incentives can bring more benefits, thus R1 < R2 .
C2 Government’s equivalent loss if port and liner company choose P2 and
(2) For a port, the initial incomes of non-implementing shore power
L2
are denoted by I0 . With government incentives, the port’s incre­
R1 Benefits if the government, port and liner company choose G2 , P1 and
mental benefits of implementing shore power are represented by L1
I1 . Meanwhile, since the behavior of port and liner company is R2 Benefits if the government, port and liner company choose G1 , P1 and
closely related, when liner company chooses to modify shore L1
power facilities, port can receive the proceeds I2 . In addition, port I0 Port enterprise’s initial incomes
needs to pay the construction costs S. I1 Incremental benefits brought by incentive policies if port chooses P1
(3) The liner company’s initial earnings of non-modifying shore I2 Proceeds received by port if liner company chooses L1
power facilities are represented by D0 . After government in­ S Construction cost if port chooses P1
centives, when liner company chooses to modify shore power D0 Liner company’s initial earnings
facility, the benefits D1 will be obtained. At this time, liner D3 Saved fuel cost if liner company chooses L1
company needs to bear the berthing cost D2 and the expenses F of D1 Benefits from incentive policies if liner company chooses L1
retrofitting a ship emission control system. In addition, the saved D2 Berthing cost when liner company chooses L1
fuel cost is denoted by D3 . F Expenses of retrofitting a ship emission control system if liner
(4) If the government chooses G1 strategy with the probability x, then company chooses L1
1 − x is the probability of opting for G2 strategy. When port Variables Descriptions
chooses P1 strategy with the probability y, 1− y is correspond­ x The probability of government choosing G1 strategy
ingly the probability of opting for P2 strategy. When liner y The probability of port choosing P1 strategy
z The probability of liner company choosing L1 strategy

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L. Xu et al. Ocean and Coastal Management 202 (2021) 105508

Table 2 Table 3
Payoff matrix of government’s incentive strategy (x). Payoff matrix of government’s non-incentive strategy (1 − x).
Liner Company
Liner Company
L1 strategy (z) L2 strategy (1 − z)
L1 strategy (z) L2 strategy (1 −
z) Port enterprise P1 strategy (y) (R0 + R1 ， (R0 − C2 ,
I0 + I2 − S, I0 − S,
Port P1 strategy (y) (R0 − C1 + R2 ， (R0 − C1 − C2 ,
D0 − D2 − F) D0 − D2 − D3 )
enterprise I0 + I1 + I2 − S, I0 + I1 − S,
D0 + D1 − D2 − F) D0 − D2 − D3 ) P2 strategy (1 − y) (R0 − C2 ， (R0 − C2 ,
I0 , I0 ,
P2 strategy (1 − (R0 − C1 − C2 ， (R0 − C1 − C2 ,
D0 − D2 − D3 − F) D0 − D2 − D3 )
y) I0 , I0 ,
D0 + D1 − D2 − D3 − D0 − D2 − D3 )
F)
The mean utilities of port enterprises can be deduced as:

Up = yUp1 + (1 − y)Up2 = − Sy + I0 + xyI1 + yzI2 (7)

incentives, respectively. The payoff matrices of government, port en­
terprise and liner company are separately shown in Table 2 and Table 3,
where the functions in each table indicate the proceeds of government,
port enterprise and liner company.
In this paper, Uij symbolizes the proceed of j strategy of i stakeholder,
where i = g, p, l represents government, port enterprise and liner
company. j = 1, 2 separately implies the first and the second strategy.
For instance, Ug1 symbolizes the proceed of government choosing the
“incentive” strategy; Ug2 typifies the proceed of government choosing the
“non-incentive” strategy. According to Xiao and Yu (2006), the replicated
dynamic system is a dynamic differential equation depicting the fre­
quency with which a specific strategy changes over time by means of
evolutionary game theory. Combined with the above payoff matrices,
the replicator dynamic equations of tripartite strategies are calculated,
respectively.
(1) The government’s replicator dynamic equations under G1 and G2
strategies are separately given as follows:
Ug1 = z[y(R0 − C1 + R2 ) + (1 − y)(R0 − C1 − C2 )]
+ (1 − z)[y(R0 − C1 − C2 ) + (1 − y)(R0 − C1 − C2 )]
Ug2 = z[y(R0 + R1 ) + (1 − y)(R0 − C2 )]
+ (1 − z)[y(R0 − C2 ) + (1 − y)(R0 − C2 )]
The mean utilities of government can be described as:
The replicator dynamic equation when port enterprises choose the
strategy of “implementing shore power” can be represented by F(y), which
is shown as follows:
( )
F(y) = y Up1 − Up = ( − 1 + y)y(S − xI1 − zI2 ) (8)
(3) The liner companies’ replicator dynamic equations under L1 and
L2 strategies are separately given as follows:
Ul1 = x[y(D0 + D1 − D2 − F) + (1 − y)(D0 + D1 − D2 − D3 − F)]
+ (1 − x)[y(D0 − D2 − F) + (1 − y)(D0 − D2 − D3 − F)] (9)
Ul2 = x[y(D0 − D2 − D3 ) + (1 − y)(D0 − D2 − D3 )]
+ (1 − x)[y(D0 − D2 − D3 ) + (1 − y)(D0 − D2 − D3 )] (10)
The mean utilities of liner companies can be deduced as:
Ul = zUl1 + (1 − z)Ul2 = − Fz + D0 + xzD1 − D2 − D3 + yzD3 (11)
(1) The replicator dynamic equation when liner companies choose the
strategy of “modifying shore power facilities” can be represented by F(z),
which is shown as follows:
( )
(2) F(z) = z Ul1 − Ul = ( − 1 + z)z(F − xD1 − yD3 ) (12)

Ug = xUg1 + (1 − x)Ug2 = − xC1 + (− 1 + yz)C2 + R0 + yzR1 − xyz(R1 − R2 ) 3.4. Stability analysis of agent evolution game
(3)
The replicator dynamic equation when government chooses the (1) Calculation of equilibrium points in the evolutionary game model
strategy of “using incentives” can be represented by F(x), which is shown
as follows: In this paper, the stability of the equilibrium points is derived from
( ) analyzing Jacobian matrix (Friedman, 1991). Based on Lyapunov sta­
F(x) = x Ug1 − Ug = ( − 1 + x)x[C1 + yz(R1 − R2 )] (4) bility analysis, the Jacobian matrix J of the replicated dynamic system
described above is as follows:

⎡ ⎤
( − 1 + 2x)(C1 + yz(R1 − R2 )) ( − 1 + x)xz(R1 − R2 ) ( − 1 + x)xy(R1 − R2 )
J = ⎣ − ( − 1 + y)yI1 ( − 1 + 2y)(S − xI1 − zI2 ) − ( − 1 + y)yI2 ⎦ (13)
− ( − 1 + z)zD1 − ( − 1 + z)zD3 ( − 1 + 2z)(F − xD1 − yD3 )

(2) The port enterprises’ replicator dynamic equations under P1 and
P2 strategies are separately given as follows:
Up1 = x[z(I0 + I1 + I2 − S) + (1 − z)(I0 + I1 − S)]
+ (1 − x)[z(I0 + I2 − S) + (1 − z)(I0 − S)] (5)
Up2 = x[zI0 + (1 − z)I0 ] + (1 − x)[zI0 + (1 − z)I0 ] (6)
and
Det[J] = ( − 1 + 2z)(F − xD1 − yD3 )(( − 1 + 2x)( − 1 + 2y)(S − xI1 − zI1 )(C1
+ yz(R1 − R2 )) + ( − 1 + x)x( − 1 + y)yzI1 (R1 − R2 )) + ( − 1 + x)xy(1
− z)z(S − 2Sy + x( − 1 + 2y)I1 + yzI2 )D1 (R1 − R2 )
− (1 − y)y(1 − z)zD3 (( − 1 + 2x)I2 C1 + y(( − 1 + x)xI1 + (1 − 2x)zI2 )
( − R1 + R2 )) (14)

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L. Xu et al. Ocean and Coastal Management 202 (2021) 105508

Tr[J] = ( − 1 + 2y)(S − xI1 − zI2 ) + ( − 1 + 2z)(F − xD1 − yD3 ) z=

√̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
̅
+ ( − 1 + 2x)(C1 + yz(R1 − R2 )) (15) [ ]
(FI1 − SD1 )(R1 − R2 )+ − 4I1 I2 C1 D1 D3 +(FI1 − SD1 )2 (R1 − R2 ) (R1 − R2 )
According to the local stability analysis, the equilibrium point is an −
2I2 D1 (R1 − R2 )
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) when the eigenvalues of Jacobian (17)
matrix J are all negative; the equilibrium point is an unstable point,
when the eigenvalues of Jacobian matrix J are all positive; the equi­ When the government selects G1 and G2 strategies with equal ex­
librium point is a saddle point, when there are one or two positive pected returns, the best probability of port enterprises can be obtained
numbers in the eigenvalues. In other words, when Det[J] > 0, Tr[J] < 0, under the game equilibrium condition. Let Ug1 = Ug2 , namely z[y(R0 −
the replicated dynamic system tends to the evolutionarily stable strat­ C1 + R2 )+ (1− y)(R0 − C1 − C2 )]+ (1− z)[y(R0 − C1 − C2 )+ (1 − y)(R0 −
egy. Finally, eight local equilibrium points are obtained, which are C1 − C2 )] = z[y(R0 + R1 ) + (1 − y)(R0 − C2 )]+ (1− z)[y(R0 − C2 )+ (1−
separately (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0) y)(R0 − C2 )], we get Formula (18):
and (1, 1, 1). In our model, since the equilibrium solution of tripartite √̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
[ ] ̅
evolutionary game is a strict Nash equilibrium, only the above eight (FI1 − SD1 )(R1 − R2 )− − 4I1 I2 C1 D1 D3 +(FI1 − SD1 )2 (R1 − R2 ) (R1 − R2 )
y=
points are considered. The main eigenvalues of Jacobian matrix J with 2I1 D3 (R1 − R2 )
different equilibrium points are shown in Table 4. (18)
As can be seen from Table 4, since F > 0 , S > 0 and C1 > 0, the
When liner companies opt for L1 and L2 strategies with equal ex­
equilibrium points (0, 0, 1) (0, 1, 0) (1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 1) (1, 1, 0) all have
pected returns, the best probability of government can be obtained
positive eigenvalues, so it cannot be an evolutionarily stable strategy, so
under the game equilibrium condition. Let Ul1 = Ul2 , namely x[y(D0 +
only the potential evolutionarily stable strategies (0, 0, 0) (0, 1, 1) (1, 1,
D1 − D2 − F)+ (1− y)(D0 + D1 − D2 − D3 − F)]+ (1 − x)[y(D0 − D2 − F) +
1) are studied. Further, the above local equilibrium points form the
(1− y)(D0 − D2 − D3 − F)] = x[y(D0 − D2 − D3 )+ (1− y)(D0 − D2 − D3 )]+
boundary of solution domain, the region Ω is {(x, y,
(1− x)[y(D0 − D2 − D3 )+ (1 − y)(D0 − D2 − D3 )], we get Formula (19):
z)|0 < x < 1, 0 < y < 1, 0 < z < 1}. In order to obtain the stable strategy
√̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
̅
of dynamic system, according to Long et al. (2019), we assume that the (FI1 +SD1 )(R1 − R2 )+
[
− 4I1 I2 C1 D1 D3 +(FI1 − SD1 )2 (R1 − R2 ) (R1 − R2 )
]
replicator dynamic equation of government, port enterprises and liner x=
2I1 D1 (R1 − R2 )
companies equals zero, which is:
(19)
F(x) = 0, F(y) = 0 , F(z) = 0 (16)
As a result, we get the Nash equilibrium solution of the tripartite
Generally speaking, there exists such an equilibrium solution E = game as follows:
(x, y, z) satisfying Formula (16) in the region Ω, which makes the game

√̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
[ ]
(FI1 + SD1 )(R1 − R2 ) + − 4I1 I2 C1 D1 D3 + (FI1 − SD1 )2 (R1 − R2 ) (R1 − R2 )
x= , y
2I1 D1 (R1 − R2 )
√̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
[ ]
(FI1 − SD1 )(R1 − R2 ) − − 4I1 I2 C1 D1 D3 + (FI1 − SD1 )2 (R1 − R2 ) (R1 − R2 )
= , z=
2I1 D3 (R1 − R2 )
√̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
[ ]
(FI1 − SD1 )(R1 − R2 ) + − 4I1 I2 C1 D1 D3 + (FI1 − SD1 )2 (R1 − R2 ) (R1 − R2 )
− (20)
2I2 D1 (R1 − R2 )

reach an equilibrium state when the anticipated returns of tripartite

hybrid strategy are equal. Hence, when port enterprises choose P1 and P2 In line with the nature of an evolutionary game, if the conditions
strategies with equal expected returns, the best probability of liner dF(x)/dt < 0 dF(y)/dt < 0, and dF(z)/dt < 0 hold simultaneously, then
companies can be obtained under the game equilibrium condition. Let the stable strategy of government, port enterprises and liner companies
Up1 = Up2 , namely x[z(I0 + I1 + I2 − S) + (1 − z)(I0 + I1 − S)] + (1 −
x)[z(I0 + I2 − S) + (1 − z)(I0 − S)] = x[zI0 + (1 − z)I0 ] + (1 − x)[zI0 +
(1 − z)I0 ], we get Formula (17):

Table 4
The eigenvalues of Jacobian matrix J.
Equilibrium points Eigenvalue 1 Eigenvalue 2 Eigenvalue 3

(0, 0, 0) − F − S − C1
(0, 0, 1) F − S + I2 − C1
(0, 1, 0) S − C1 − F + D3
(0, 1, 1) S − I2 F − D3 − C1 − R1 + R2
(1, 0, 0) − S + I1 C1 − F + D1
(1, 0, 1) − S + I1 + I2 C1 F − D1
(1, 1, 0) S − I1 C1 − F + D1 + D3
(1, 1, 1) S − I1 − I2 F − D1 − D3 C1 + R1 − R2
Fig. 2. Replicated dynamic phase diagram of government.

6
L. Xu et al. Ocean and Coastal Management 202 (2021) 105508

in the evolutionary process can be separately symbolized by the Nash

equilibrium solution (x, y, z) shown in Formula (20). The derivative of
the replicator dynamic equation of each stakeholder is expressed as
follows:
dF(x) dF(y)
= ( − 1 + 2x)[C1 + yz(R1 − R2 )], = ( − 1 + 2y)(S − xI1
dt dt
dF(z)
− zI2 ), = ( − 1 + 2z)(F − xD1 − yD3 ) (21)
dt

(2) Incremental stability analysis of individual behavior strategies

According to the properties of ESS and the stability theorem of dif­

ferential equations described by Jiang et al. (2019), the ESS points are
robust to small perturbations. More precisely, when x < x* , F(x) > 0, Fig. 4. Replicated dynamic phase diagram of liner companies.
while when x > x* , F(x) < 0. Therefore, F(x) = 0 and F (x) < 0 must be
′

guaranteed for ESS, F(y) and F(z) to be similar. On the basis of this
theory, the incremental stability of government’s behavior strategies is
firstly analyzed and the following propositions are put forward.
Proposition 1.
1) When y = y* = C1 /z(R2 − R1 ), F(x) = 0, all behavior strategies are
Proof. Two circumstances can be discussed separately according to the
second expression of Formula (21):
(1) If I2 + I1 < S, with 0 < x < 1, 0 < y < 1 and 0 < z < 1 con­
straints, it can be further inferred that zI2 + xI1 − S < 0 is con­
stant, F (y)|y = 0 < 0 and F (y)|y = 1 > 0. Thus, y = 0 is the ESS,
′ ′

in a stable state. as shown in Fig. 3(b1).

2) When y ∕ = y* , presupposing F(x) = 0, then the two stable points for x (2) If I2 + I1 > S, then:
are x = 0 and x = 1, respectively. 1 When z > zo , F (y)|y = 0 > 0 and F (y)|y = 1 < 0. Thus, y = 1 is
′ ′

the ESS, as shown in Fig. 3(b2).

2 When z < zo , F (y)|y = 0 < 0 and F (y)|y = 1 > 0. Thus, y = 0 is
′ ′

Proof. Two circumstances are discussed separately according to the the ESS, as shown in Fig. 3(b2).
first expression of Formula (21):
Finally, we will analyze the incremental stability of liner companies’
(1) If R2 − R1 < C1 , under the restraints of 0 < x < 1, 0 < y < 1 and behavior strategy.
0 < z < 1, it can be deduced that yz(R2 − R1 ) − C1 < 0 holds, Proposition 3.
F (x)|x = 0 < 0 and F (x)|x = 1 > 0. Thus, x = 0 is the ESS, as
′ ′

shown in Fig. 2(a1). 1) When y = yo = (F − xD1 )/D3 , F(z) = 0, all behavior strategies are in
(2) If R2 − R1 > C1 , then: a stable state.
1 When y > y* , F (x)|x = 0 > 0 and F (x)|x = 1 < 0. Thus, x = 1 is
′ ′
2) When y ∕ = yo , presupposing F(z) = 0, then the two stable points for z
the ESS, as shown in Fig. 2(a2). are z = 0 and z = 1, respectively.
2 When y < y* , F (x)|x = 0 < 0 and F (x)|x = 1 > 0. Thus, x = 0 is
′ ′

the ESS, as shown in Fig. 2(a2). Proof. Two circumstances can be discussed separately with the third
expression of Formula (21):
Then the incremental stability of port enterprises’ behavior strategy
will be analyzed. (1) If D3 + D1 < F, under the conditions of 0 < x < 1, 0 < y < 1 and
Proposition 2. 0 < z < 1, yD3 + xD1 − F < 0 can be further demonstrated con­
stant, F (z)|z = 0 < 0 and F (z)|z = 1 > 0. Thus, z = 0 is the ESS,
′ ′

1) When z = zo = (S − xI1 )/I2 , F(y) = 0, all behavior strategies are in a as shown in Fig. 4(c1).
stable state. (2) If D3 + D1 > F, then:
2) When z ∕ = zo , presupposing F(y) = 0, then the two stable points for y
are y = 0 and y = 1, respectively. 1 When y > yo , F (z)|z = 0 > 0 and F (z)|z = 1 < 0. Thus, z = 1 is the
′ ′

ESS, as shown in Fig. 4(c2).

2 When y < yo , F (z)|z = 0 < 0 and F (z)|z = 1 > 0. Thus, z = 0 is the
′ ′

ESS, as shown in Fig. 4(c2).

(3) Incremental stability analysis of tripartite hybrid strategy

In the evolutionary process, the probability x, y and z of tripartite

strategies are correlated with time t, namely x(t), y(t) and z(t) ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore, the resolution domain of the replicator dynamic differential
equations are expressed as [0, 1] × [0, 1] × [0, 1]θ. For the convenience of
simulation, we can discretize the replicator dynamic differential equa­
tions to study the asymptotic stable evolution path of evolutionary
game, where the time increment is set as Δt. As per the derivative
definition, the government’s replicator dynamic equation is rewritten
as:

Fig. 3. Replicated dynamic phase diagram of port enterprises.

7
L. Xu et al.
dFx (t) x(t + Δt) − x(t)
≈ = x(t)[1 − x(t)][C1 + y(t)z(t)(R1 − R2 )]
dt Δt
Similarly, the replicated dynamic equations of port enterprises and
liner companies can be separately reworded as:
dFy (t) y(t + Δt) − y(t)
≈ = y(t)[1 − y(t)][S − x(t)I1 − z(t)I2 ]
dt Δt
dFz (t) z(t + Δt) − z(t)
≈ = z(t)[1 − z(t)][F − x(t)D1 − y(t)D3 ]
dt Δt
4. Numerical simulation of tripartite evolutionary game
4.1. Evolutionary game model based on system dynamics
In this section, we establish a system dynamics (SD) simulation
model combined with tripartite evolutionary game, where the long-term
evolutionary behavior among government, port enterprises and liner
companies is described by analyzing the evolutionary game model. We
also assessed the mixed strategies adopted by government, port enter­
prises and liner companies under different values of parameters. Hence,
the specific analytical procedures of SD are outlined as follows:
(1) The primary variables of the system are identified by payoff
matrices and stability analysis. The variables Ug1 and Ug2 mean
the expected returns of government incentives and non-
incentives; Up1 and Up2 typify the expected returns of port en­
terprises implementing and non-implementing shore power; Ul1
and Ul2 denote the expected returns of liner companies modifying
and non-modifying shore power facilities. The other variables are
defined in Section 3.2.
(2) Moreover, the parameters are differentiated in the light of a
causal-cycle diagram to build the stock-flow diagram. In this
procedure, x, y and z symbolize stock variables, respectively;
dF(x)/dt, dF(y)/dt and dF(z)/dt demonstrate the three rate vari­
ables, respectively; Ug1 , Ug2 , Up1 , Up2 , Ul1 and Ul2 represent the six
intermediate variables, respectively; R0 , C1 , C2 , R1 , R2 , I0 , I1 , I2 , S,
D0 , D1 , D2 , D3 and F indicate the exogenous variables,
respectively.
Fig. 5. SD simulation model of government, port enterprises and liner companies.
Ocean and Coastal Management 202 (2021) 105508
(3) In accordance with Formulas (1)-(12), the functional relation­
(22)
ships between stock variables and rate variables, between inter­
mediate variables and stock variables, and between intermediate
variables and exogenous variables are written, respectively.
(4) According to the actual situation, the original value of each
exogenous variable is determined, which defaults to positive in
(23)
this paper. Additionally, sensitivity analysis is considered in the
simulation process. Meanwhile, the expected returns of govern­
ment, port enterprises and liner companies may be negative in
(24)
the preliminary stage, because the initial input cost of shore
power system is relatively high and cannot be recouped in the
short term.
Following the procedures above, the SD simulation model of
tripartite evolutionary game system is established, as shown in Fig. 5.
Considering the limitation of length, the ESS points (0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1) and
(0, 1, 1) are selected for simulation analysis. On the basis of life cycle
theory (Wang et al., 2019), the development process of shore power
implement is divided into three stages: preliminary, intermediate and
mature stage.
In the preliminary stage of industrial development, the government
is under stress from social problems and environmental degradation
caused by pollution from ports and ships. Hence, the government may
adopt incentive measures to facilitate the implementation of shore
power. However, due to the high cost and technical difficulties of shore
power implementation, port enterprises will choose “non-implement
shore power” strategy. Liner companies can pay less for berthing to ports
which do not implement shore power and choose “non-modify shore
power facilities” strategy. As for the government, the incentives are
beneficial to environmental improvement, but the cost far exceeds the
environmental effect brought by shore power implementation. Finally,
the government will choose “non-incentive” strategy. Consequently, this
stage converges to the ESS (0, 0, 0). Along with the continuous
improvement of government incentives, the industry enters the inter­
mediate stage, and the tripartite occupy leading positions in the market.
As the government invests more policy investment, the reformation of
shore power and the improvement of ship power supply technology are
realized gradually.
Meanwhile, the social and environmental benefits of adopting shore
power for port enterprises and liner companies are considerable, leading
to the government’s strategy of using incentives, the port enterprises’
8
L. Xu et al.
strategy of implementing shore power and the liner companies’ strategy
of modifying shore power facilities. This stage converges to the ESS (1, 1,
1). When the industry has evolved to a certain scale and formed a fairly
complete shore power system, the government no longer needs to
implement market intervention and the industry enters the mature
stage. At this stage, the government has gradually withdraws from the
market, and port enterprises and liner companies have benefited more
from the implementation of shore power, both of whom have constituted
the backbone of the market. This stage converges to the ESS (0, 1, 1) in
this paper. Considering that the sustainable development of shore power
system industry can be promoted by studying the internal synergistic
effects of multiple stakeholders, the three ESS points corresponding to
the above three stages of industrial development are selected for
particular analysis.
4.2. Numerical simulation analysis: a case study of Zhuhai Port
In this paper, we use MATLAB to simulate SD game among tripartite
stakeholders. Government, port companies and liner companies are
adjusting their optimal strategies to maximize their objectives. As one of
the earliest ports to build shore power in China, Zhuhai port has added
shore power facilities in the port areas such as Gaolan, Yunfu and
Wuzhou. Among them, the high-voltage shore power project in Gaolan
Port area is the first large-scale shore power demonstration project with
the highest connection rate and normal operation in China invested and
completed by China Southern Power Grid at the end of 2016. Since the
completion of the project, it has saved energy costs of about 1 million
yuan and reduced CO2 emissions of about 5620 tons for ships berthed
each year. In addition to the actual cost value and environmental pro­
tection value, the project has also formed a significant demonstration
and leading effect for the whole country and the Pearl River Delta re­
gion, laying a good foundation for pollution control from ships and
building green ports (Hua et al., 2020). Therefore, in order to visually
depict dynamic evolution of tripartite participants in the game, we carry
out numerical simulation, taking Zhuhai Port’s strategy of implementing
shore power as an example. As per the relevant literature and collected
information, the following data is obtained.
Concerning the policy cost, in 2016, 2017 and 2018, it was 60%, 50%
and 40% of the construction cost, respectively. Taking a set of High-
Fig. 6. The evolution path of the equilibrium point (0, 0, 0).
9
Ocean and Coastal Management 202 (2021) 105508
Voltage Shore Connection (HVSC) system (Chou et al., 2017) of 8.5
million yuan as an example, this paper uses the average value of 4
million yuan. According to the information and related literature, a set
of HVSC system can reduce the emissions of 5000 tons of CO2, 50 tons of
SO2 and 50 tons of NOx annually, equivalent to the environmental
benefits of about 3.03 million yuan. A set of HVSC system covers two
berths, which can generate about 40–50 million yuan of annual revenue
for Zhuhai Port. The incremental revenue brought to Zhuhai Port from
government incentives, namely the charge for using shore power facil­
ities, is about 25,000 yuan each. The income obtained from imple­
menting shore power is about 20,000 yuan each. As for the operation,
management and other costs, the value is equivalent to the sum of a set
of two MVA HVSC system and a set of 40 KVA Low-Voltage Shore
Connection (LVSC) system (Paul et al., 2018), about 8.6 million yuan.
Generally, a liner company can make about 700,000 yuan from a voyage
of 4000 TEUs. By implementing shore power, a liner company can save
fuel value of about 60,000 yuan each. The revenue from government
incentives to a liner company is 50% of the construction fund, about 2.5
million yuan. As for the berthing cost and expenses of retrofitting shore
power facilities, the values are 50,000 yuan each and 5 million yuan.
(1) The tripartite evolution path chart and the influence of parame­
ters’ variations on the behavioral evolution in the preliminary
stage of industrial development
In the preliminary stage, the probabilities of the tripartite behavior
strategies are set as 0.8, 0.5 and 0.4, respectively. Considering the
feasibility of model simulation, some parameters used in simulation
have been modified. In other words, given the unit is million yuan, the
values of parameters are as follows: C1 = 1, R1 = 8, R2 = 10, I1 = 5,
I2 = 3, S = 8, D1 = 4, D3 = 3, F = 2, which guarantee the local stability
condition that − F < 0, − S < 0 and − C1 < 0, and the evolution path is
shown in Fig. 6. As time wears on, the port enterprise reaches equilib­
rium with the fastest speed and chooses “non-implement shore power”
strategy. The government reaches equilibrium at a slower pace and
chooses “non-incentive” strategy. However, it takes the liner company a
long time to reach equilibrium, who finally chooses “non-modify shore
power facilities” strategy, thus the three curves converge to the ESS point
(0, 0, 0).
Next, we separately make numerical simulations on policy cost C1 ,
social and environmental benefits R1 and social and environmental
benefits R2 . In relation to the policy cost C1 , the values are assumed to be
1, 2 and 3, respectively. On the grounds of the replicated dynamic
equations, the results are shown in Fig. 7. When C1 = 1, both x and y
Fig. 7. The impact of policy cost (C1 ) on the evolution of tripartite behaviors.
L. Xu et al.
Fig. 8. The impact of social and environmental benefits (R1 ) on the evolution
of tripartite behaviors.
constantly increase, which indicates that suitable policy cost can effec­
tively mobilize the enthusiasm of the port enterprise while promoting
the government to take incentive measures. When C1 = 1, x finally
stabilizes at 1, and y finally stabilizes at 1. When C1 = 2, x decreases to a
certain degree and ultimately stabilizes at 0.4413, which demonstrates
that as more policy cost is put in, the government is less willing to choose
the “incentive” strategy. Meanwhile, the growth rate of y slows down and
ultimately stabilizes at 1. It shows that the government’s reduced will­
ingness to choose the “incentive” strategy has a negative impact on the
“implement shore power” strategy of the port enterprise.
While C1 = 3, x continually decreases and finally stabilizes at 0, y
drops to a certain degree after increasing and stabilizes at 0.7948. This
means that when the policy cost rises to a certain value, it will restrain
the initiative of the government’s incentives, and thus impede the port
enterprise’s passion for implementing shore power. Moreover, z in­
creases steadily at roughly the uniform rate in three situations. This
reveals that the liner company is not susceptible to the changes in C1 . In
brief, reasonable policy cost can effectively promote the positive
development of shore power system industry. If the policy cost continues
Fig. 9. The impact of social and environmental benefits (R2 ) on the evolution
of tripartite behaviors.
(2) The tripartite evolution path chart in the intermediate stage of industrial
development
10
Ocean and Coastal Management 202 (2021) 105508
to rise, the behavior of the government and port enterprise will evolve to
the “non-incentive” and “non-implement shore power” strategy.
As for the social and environmental benefits R1 , let the values be 3, 5
and 7, respectively. In line with the replicated dynamic equations, the
results are shown in Fig. 8. When R1 = 3, x progressively increases and
finally stabilizes at 1. This means that if the social and environmental
benefits from implementing shore power are low without government
incentives, the government is more likely to change the strategy and
chooses to adopt incentives. When R1 = 5, x decreases to a certain de­
gree and eventually stabilizes at 0.09588, which indicates that with the
improvement of social and environmental benefits when there is no
government incentive, the government tends to choose the “non-incen­
tive” strategy. When R1 = 7, x continually decreases and finally stabi­
lizes at 0. This demonstrates when the social and environmental benefits
are high enough without government incentives, it is a wise strategy for
the government not to adopt incentives. In addition, both y and z have
gradually changed from the original trend of increasing to decreasing in
three cases. Hence, high social and environmental benefits without
government incentives are unfavorable to the evolution of tripartite
stakeholders to the best strategy. In other words, the low social and
environmental benefits without government incentives can lead to the
evolution of tripartite behavior strategies to the optimal solution.
As for the social and environmental benefits R2 , the given values are
separately 9, 11 and 13. According to the replicated dynamic equations,
the results are shown in Fig. 9. When R2 = 9, y decreases to a certain
extent after increasing for a while and finally stabilizes at 0.8487,
whereas the growth rate of z slows down and eventually stabilizes at
0.9994. That is to say, low social and environmental benefits with
government incentives decrease the enthusiasm of the port enterprise’s
“implement shore power” strategy and the liner company’s “modify shore
power facilities” strategy. When R2 = 11 and R2 = 13, both y and z
continuously increase, which implies that if the social and environ­
mental benefits with government incentives are pretty high, the port
enterprise is more delighted with choosing the “implement shore power”
strategy and the liner company is more inclined to choose the “modify
shore power facilities” strategy. In addition, x has gradually changed from
Fig. 10. The evolution path of the equilibrium point (1, 1, 1).
(3) The tripartite evolution path chart in the mature stage of industrial
development
L. Xu et al.
Fig. 11. The evolution path of the equilibrium point (0, 1, 1).
the original trend of decreasing to increasing in three circumstances. In a
word, low social and environmental benefits with government in­
centives may prevent the tripartite stakeholders from evolving to the
best strategy. Along with the increase of the social and environmental
benefits, the behavior strategies of the tripartite gradually evolve to the
optimal solution.
In the intermediate stage, the probabilities of the tripartite behavior
strategies are set as 0.8, 0.6 and 0.5, respectively. Then the values of
parameters are as follows: C1 = 4, R1 = 8, R2 = 14, I1 = 5, I2 = 3, S =
4, D1 = 4, D3 = 3 and F = 2, which guarantee the local stability con­
dition that S − I1 − I2 < 0, F − D1 − D3 < 0 and C1 + R1 − R2 < 0, and
the evolution path is shown in Fig. 10. As time wears on, the government
spends a long time in reaching equilibrium and eventually chooses the
“incentive” strategy. On the other hand, both the port enterprise and the
liner company reach equilibriums at an extremely rapid rate and choose
the “implement shore power” strategy and the “modify shore power facil­
ities” strategy, respectively, thus the three curves converge to the ESS
point (1, 1, 1).
In the mature stage, the probabilities of the tripartite behavior
strategies are set as 0.7, 0.6 and 0.5, respectively. Then the values of
parameters are as follows: C1 = 3, R1 = 12, R2 = 14, I1 = 5, I2 = 4,
I2 = 4, I2 = 4, S = 2, D1 = 4, D3 = 4 and F = 1, which guarantee the
local stability condition that S − I2 < 0, F − D3 < 0 and − C1 − R1 +
R2 < 0, and the evolution path is shown in Fig. 11. The probability of the
government’s “incentive” strategy falls slowly over time and finally the
government chooses “non-incentive” strategy. Both port enterprise and
liner company reach equilibriums at a relatively rapid speed and choose
“implement shore power” strategy and “modify shore power facilities”
strategy, respectively, thus the three curves tend to the ESS point (0, 1,
1).
5. Conclusions and policy suggestions
5.1. Conclusions
Considering that shore power system is a huge and complex system
composed of multiple stakeholders, including the government, port
enterprises and liner companies, how to effectively promote the imple­
mentation of shore power has always been the focus of the shipping
11
Ocean and Coastal Management 202 (2021) 105508
industry. However, most previous literatures on shore power imple­
mentation conducted quantitative analysis based on the economic
benefits of one or both parties, and ignored the synergies among mul­
tiple participants, which is also crucial for shore power implementation.
Therefore, as per the background of maritime shore power system, this
paper applied evolutionary game theory to the establishment of tripar­
tite evolutionary game model covering the government, port enterprises
and liner companies, and further used MATLAB software for numerical
simulation analysis to demonstrate the evolutionarily stable strategies at
different stages and explore the main factors affecting the evolutionary
equilibrium. The following conclusions can be summarized from the
research results of this paper.
(1) Whatever stage the participants are separately in and whatever
their preliminary strategies are, they can change their strategies
through observing, learning and imitating each other’s behavior
to make them evolve to the optimal stable strategy, where the
government chooses incentives, port enterprises select the
implementation of shore power and liner companies opt for
modifying shore power facilities.
(2) Government has a significant influence on the evolution of
behavior strategies of port enterprises and liner companies. If the
preliminary strategy of government is to choose incentives, port
enterprises (liner companies) will reach the “implement shore
power” (“modify shore power facilities”) strategy at an extremely
fast speed or the “non-implement shore power” (“non-modify shore
power facilities”) strategy at a relatively slow pace. In addition, the
strategies of port enterprises and liner companies have important
influence on each other. When port enterprises prefer to imple­
ment shore power, the willingness of liner companies to modify
shore power facilities will enhance. Similarly, when liner com­
panies’ initial strategy is to modify shore power facilities, port
enterprises will develop into the “implement shore power” strategy
sooner.
(3) The more the policy cost is invested, and the higher the social and
environmental benefits of implementing shore power without
government incentives are, the earlier the government will
develop into the “non-incentive” strategy. Otherwise the govern­
ment will be more inclined to choose incentives. Meanwhile, port
enterprises and liner companies will accomplish the stable
strategy of implementing shore power and modifying shore
power facilities at a relatively fast speed, respectively.
(4) The higher the social and environmental benefits of the imple­
mentation of shore power when there are government incentives,
the sooner the port enterprises (liner companies) will develop
into the stable strategy. Especially, the more the social and
environmental benefits exceed the policy cost, the earlier the
government will reach the stable strategy.
5.2. Policy suggestions
The tripartite evolutionary game model effectively promoted the
dynamic analysis of the evolution of multi-stakeholder behavior stra­
tegies in the shore power system. On this basis, the evolution path
simulations of participants’ behavior strategies in different stages of the
industry were carried out by changing the relevant parameters, and the
main factors affecting the evolutionary equilibrium were found by
sensitivity analysis. According to the research findings of this paper,
considering that the application of shore power may be related to na­
tional development conditions and other factors, we put forward some
policy suggestions, which are more applicable to some developing
countries including China, in order to better promote the implementa­
tion of shore power and reduce marine environmental pollution, spe­
cifically as follows:
L. Xu et al.
(1) Considering the significant influence of government regulation
on the other stakeholders’ stable strategies in the shore power
system, when choosing incentives, the government needs to keep
an eye on the behavior of the other two parties and make ad­
justments according to their changes in real time, so as to effec­
tively promote the evolution of the whole system to the optimal
stable strategy. To be specific, in the early stage of the shore
power system industry, the government should take appropriate
incentive measures to mobilize the initiative of port enterprises
and liner companies to implement shore power. In the middle
stage of industrial development, because part of the input and
construction costs have been repaid, and social and environ­
mental benefits have been generated, the government can
consider reducing certain policy cost and encourage other
stakeholders to achieve autonomy. As the industrial development
gradually enters the mature stage, the economic benefits brought
by the implementation of shore power have exceeded the sum of
the input costs of all stakeholders, which will promote the sub­
sequent virtuous cycle development of shore power industry. As a
result, the government can no longer take incentives and gradu­
ally withdraw from the market.
(2) The government should start with the conception of green ship­
ping and constantly improve the social responsibility and envi­
ronmental protection awareness of port enterprises and liner
companies. The behavior strategies of port enterprises and liner
companies have conclusive influences on each other. On the one
hand, port enterprises, as pioneers of shore power implementa­
tion, will effectively promote the evolution of the whole system to
a stable strategy if they actively participate in the construction
and implementation. Therefore, the government should try its
best to promote the participation of port enterprises by means of
publicity and education. On the other hand, the cooperation and
response of the liner company to the implementation of shore
power will also affect the stability of the whole system. The
government must carefully take this point into consideration and
strengthen liner companies’ recognition of the green develop­
ment concept of shore power industry with economic subsidies
and other forms.
(3) The government should improve the specific laws and regulations
related to the implementation of shore power. In China, the
government has issued the layout plan of shore power of ports
and revised the management methods of shore power in ports and
ships. At the same time, the government should urge domestic
shipping companies to take concrete actions to actively support
the construction of green ports and improve the shore power
connection system of ships. For international ships, the govern­
ment should, in accordance with the plan of ECA for ships, su­
pervise the implementation of the plan, and seriously deal with
the illegal discharge of ships. In addition, the charging items and
standards for ports and ships using shore power should be clari­
fied as soon as possible. Moreover, the government should
continue to maintain and increase supports for port and shipping
enterprises to implement shore power in terms of financial sub­
sidies or tax adjustments.
(4) The government should combine rewards and punishment in
incentive measures with reasonable degree. In view of the high
construction cost, renovation cost and other expenses, the gov­
ernment’s economic support is essential for port enterprises and
liner companies willing to participate in the implementation of
shore power system. At the same time, for those shipping enter­
prises unwilling to cooperate with or hinder the development of
the shore power industry, the government also needs to take
measures such as forced suspension of business and imposition of
fines to regulate their behavior. However, the input cost of these
incentives should be controlled within a reasonable scope. Too
high or too low may bring a great burden to the government
12
Ocean and Coastal Management 202 (2021) 105508
itself, or even have a negative influence on the industrial devel­
opment of the whole shore power system.
5.3. Limitations
It is undeniable that due to the assumptions of the basic model, this
study still has some limitations, which can provide avenues for further
research. First, we assume that all participants are information sym­
metric, that is, any party can adjust according to the evolution of other
parties’ behavior strategies, so as to reach their own evolutionarily
stable strategies. In practice, information between participants is
asymmetric. Therefore, in the case of information asymmetry, it is of
great significance to explore how to take into account the interests of all
parties to effectively promote the development of shore power industry.
Secondly, when the game model converges to the equilibrium points,
our study only reveals sufficient but potentially unnecessary stability
conditions, and the current work cannot complete the summary of the
stable equilibrium conditions of the general three-party evolutionary
game model. Finally, in our study, we only consider government, port
enterprises and liner companies as the participants of shore power sys­
tem. However, in reality, stakeholders such as the state grid, power
plants and shore power equipment manufacturers will also be involved.
How to build completely different models based on the game relations
among these participants to provide more insights remains to be further
explored in the future.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper
Acknowledgments
The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the National Nat­
ural Science Foundation of China (Grant No.51409157, 51879156,
71704103 and 71974123), Shanghai Pujiang Program(17PJC053), and
Innovation Program of Shanghai Municipal Education Commission
(2017-01-07-00-10-E00016). However, the authors are solely respon­
sible for all the views and analyses in this paper.
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