Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Karen E. Rosenblum
George Mason University
Toni-Michelle C. Travis
George Mason University
viii Contents
SOCIAL CLASS
31. Cause of Death: Inequality
Alejandro Reuss 303
32. Why Are Droves of Unqualified, Unprepared Kids Getting into
Our Top Colleges? Because Their Dads Are Alumni
John Larew 307
Personal Account: That Moment of Visibility
Rose B. Pascarell 312
33. The Myth of the “Culture of Poverty”
Paul Gorski 313
DISABILITY
34. Public Transit
John Hockenberry 317
35. “Can You See the Rainbow?” The Roots of Denial
Sally French 325
36. Not Blind Enough: Living in the Borderland Called Legal Blindness
Beth Omansky 331
Personal Account: A Time I Didn’t Feel Normal
Heather Callender 337
SEXUALITY
46. Sex Education and the Promotion of Heteronormativity
Tanya McNeill 424
Personal Account: Learning My Own Privilege
Mireille M. Cecil 432
47. Gaga Relations: The End of Marriage
J. Jack Halberstam 432
48. Queers without Money: They Are Everywhere. But We Refuse
to See Them
Amber Hollibaugh 439
SOCIAL CLASS
49. Rethinking American Poverty
Mark R. Rank 443
50. Tearing Down the Gates: Confronting the Class Divide
in American Education
Peter Sacks 447
51. Wealth Stripping: Why It Costs So Much to Be Poor
James H. Carr 452
x Contents
DISABILITY
52. Disability Trouble
Bradley A. Areheart 456
53. Learning Disabilities: The Social Construction of a Special
Education Category
Christine E. Sleeter 468
54. (Re)Creating a World in Seven Days: Place, Disability, and Salvation
in Extreme Makeover: Home Edition
Emily Askew 473
xi
xii Preface
discussion of sexual identity or disability. How much of “x” does it take to locate
someone as gay or straight, disabled or nondisabled, Middle-Eastern or American?
Carola Suárez-Orozco’s discussion of identity formation in a globalized world
(Reading 21) can be applied toward an understanding of racial identity formation
and even to the formation of identities tied to sexuality. Similarly, Michael Oliver’s
rendering of an alternative Survey of Disabled Adults (Reading 18)—which
parallels Martin Rochlin’s classic Heterosexual Questionnaire (Reading 17)—
serves as an example of the insights that can be gained by a change of perspective.
In all, our aim has been to select readings that help identify both what is unique
and what is shared across our experiences of difference.
DISTINGUISHING FEATURES
Five features make The Meaning of Difference distinctive:
• First, it offers a conceptual framework by which to understand the common-
alities among these categories of difference. This encompassing conceptual
approach makes The Meaning of Difference unique.
• Second, no other book provides an accessible and historically grounded discus-
sion of the Supreme Court decisions critical to the structuring of these categor-
ical differences.
• Third, The Meaning of Difference has been designed with an eye toward the
pedagogic difficulties that often accompany this subject matter. In our experi-
ence, when the topics of race, sex and gender, social class, sexual orientation,
and disability are treated simultaneously, as they are here, no one group can be
easily cast as victim or victimizer.
• Fourth, no other volume includes a detailed discussion and set of readings on
how to challenge and change the constructions of difference.
• Finally, The Meaning of Difference is the first book of its kind to incorporate
disability as a master status functioning in ways analogous to the operation of
race and ethnicity, sex and gender, sexual orientation, and social class.
Several readings from the previous edition have been retained not only because
of their wide popularity among students and faculty, but also because they are
classics in the field. Included in this category are F. James Davis’s “Who Is Black?
One Nation’s Definition”; Ruth Frankenberg’s “Whiteness as an ‘Unmarked’
Cultural Category”; Michael Oliver’s “Disability Definitions”; Sally French’s
“Can You See the Rainbow?”; John Hockenberry’s “Public Transit”; C. J. Pascoe’s
“Dude You’re a Fag”; and Malcolm Gladwell’s “Blink in Black and White.” We
also believe several readings new to this edition will become classics: Cordelia
Fine’s “Delusions of Gender”; Lisa Diamond’s “Sexual Fluidity”; Laurence
Ralph’s “What Wounds Enable”; David Haines’s “Safe Haven in America?”;
Amartya Sen’s “The Many Faces of Gender Inequality”; and Eric Anderson’s
“Adolescent Masculinity in an Age of Decreased Homohysteria” all have this
potential.
SUPPLEMENTS
Instructor’s Manual/Test Bank
An Instructor’s Manual and Test Bank accompany this volume. In this edition,
we have added a special section of advice on how to teach this material. Instructors
can access this password-protected material on the website that accompanies the
seventh edition of The Meaning of Difference at www.mhhe.com/rosenblum7e.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many colleagues and friends have helped us clarify the ideas we present here.
David Haines has been unfailing in his willingness to help Karen think through
conceptual, technical, and ethical dilemmas. She could not imagine a colleague
more supportive or wise. Theodore W. Travis provided insight on Supreme Court
decisions, their relationship to social values, and their impact on American society.
Since this project first emerged, Victoria Rader has been generous in sharing her
knowledge as a teacher and writer. Her wisdom especially guided our develop-
ment of the “Bridging Differences” section. We are also grateful to our colleague
and friend Beth Omansky for helping us understand the critical relationship of
disability to our work. As a friend and friendly editor, none could be better than
Sheila Barrows. Finally, we owe thanks to our students at George Mason University
for sharing their experiences with us.
For this edition, we again convey our appreciation to Joan Lester and the Equity
Institute of Emeryville, California, for their understanding of the progress that can
be made through a holistic analysis.
Jamie Daron of McGraw-Hill and Melanie Lewis of ansrsource shepherded this
volume to completion. Fred Courtright’s work on acquiring permissions was espe-
cially appreciated. As in previous editions, McGraw-Hill proved itself committed
to a thorough review process by putting together a panel of accomplished scholars
Preface xv
with broad teaching expertise. All offered detailed and insightful critiques, and
we are much in their debt:
Naomi Greyser, University of Iowa
Shepherd M. Jenks, Jr., Central New Mexico Community College
Earnest Perry, University of Missouri
Gloria L. Rowe, Cincinnati State Technical and Community College.
Karen Rosenblum
Toni-Michelle Travis
George Mason University
SECTION I
CONSTRUCTING CATEGORIES
OF DIFFERENCE
1
2 SECTION I: Constructing Categories of Difference
FRAMEWORK ESSAY
In this book we consider how difference is constructed in contemporary American
society. We explore how categories of people are seen as significantly different
from one another and how people’s lives are affected by these conceptions of
difference. The four sections of the book are organized around what we consider
to be the key questions about difference: how it is constructed, how it is experi-
enced by individuals, how meaning is attributed to difference, and how differences
can be bridged.
We believe that race, sex, social class, sexuality, and disability are currently
the primary axes of difference in American society—they are also what social
scientists would call master statuses. In common usage, the term status means
prestige or esteem. But for social scientists, the term status refers to positions in
a social structure. In this sense, statuses are like empty slots (or positions) that
individuals fill. The most obvious kinds of statuses are kinship, occupation, and
age. At any time an individual occupies multiple statuses, including those of race,
sex, social class, sexuality, and disability.
This latter set of statuses—the ones we focus on in this book—are significantly
more powerful than most other social statuses. Social scientists refer to these as
master statuses because they so profoundly affect a person’s life: “in most or all
social situations master status will overpower or dominate all other statuses. . . .
Master status influences every other aspect of life, including personal identity.”1
These master statuses may be said to “frame” how people are seen by others—
especially strangers—as well as how they see themselves and much of what they
experience in the world.2 This does not mean, however, that people always under-
stand the impact of the master statuses or “frames” that they occupy. Indeed, much
of this book is about recognizing that impact.
This text will explore similarities in the operation of these master statuses.
Although there are certainly differences of history, experience, and impact, we
believe that similar processes are at work when people “see” differences of
color, sex and gender, social class, sexuality, and disability, and we believe
that there are similarities in the consequences of these master statuses for
individuals’ lives. Nonetheless, there are risks in our focus on similarities
across master statuses, not the least of which is the assumption that similarity
is a better ground for social change than a recognition of difference.3 Thus,
our focus on similarities across master statuses is literally only one side of
the story.
Racism, sexism, homophobia, and diversity have been pervasive topics for dis-
cussion in American society for at least the last fifty years. Although the substance
of these conversations has changed in many ways—for example, the term diversity
once flagged the need for equal opportunity but now functions more as a market-
ing tool—the intensity around most of these topics persists. Many Americans have
strong opinions on these subjects, and that is probably also the case for readers
of this text. Two perspectives—essentialism and constructionism—are core to this
book and should help you understand your own reaction to the material.
Framework Essay 3
The first umpire in the story can be described as an essentialist. When he says,
“I call them as they are,” he assumes that balls and strikes exist in the world
regardless of his perception of them. For this umpire, balls and strikes are easily
identified, and he is merely a neutral observer; he “regards knowledge as objective
and independent of mind, and himself as the impartial reporter of things ‘as
they are.’”5
Thus, the essentialist perspective presumes that items in a category all share
some “essential” quality, their “ball-ness” or “strike-ness.” For essentialists, race,
sex, sexual orientation, disability, and social class identify significant, empirically
verifiable differences among people. From the essentialist perspective, each of
these exists apart from any social processes; they are objective categories of real
differences among people.
The second umpire is somewhat removed from pure essentialism. His statement,
“I call ’em as I sees ’em,” conveys the belief that while an independent, objective
reality exists, it is subject to interpretation. For him, the world contains balls and
strikes, but individuals may have different perceptions about which is which.
The third umpire, who says “they ain’t nothing ’till I calls ’em,” is a construc-
tionist. He operates from the belief that “conceptions such as ‘strikes’ and ‘balls’
have no meaning except that given them by the observer.”6 For this constructionist
umpire, reality cannot be separated from the way a culture makes sense of
it; strikes and balls do not exist until they are constructed through social processes.
From this perspective, difference is created rather than intrinsic to a phenomenon.
Social processes—such as those in political, legal, economic, scientific, and
religious institutions—create differences, determine that some differences are
more important than others, and assign particular meanings to those differences.
From this perspective, the way a society defines difference among its members
tells us more about that society than the people so classified. The Meaning of
Difference operates from the constructionist perspective, since it examines how
we have arrived at our race, sex, disability, sexuality, and social class categories.
Few of us have grown up as constructionists. More likely, we are essentialists
who believe that master statuses such as race or sex entail clear-cut, unchanging,
and in some way meaningful differences. Still, not everyone is an essentialist.
Those who grew up in multiple racial or religious backgrounds are familiar with
the ways in which identity is not clear-cut. They grow up understanding how
4 SECTION I: Constructing Categories of Difference
definitions of self vary with the context; how others try to define one as belong-
ing in a particular category; and how, in many ways, one’s very presence calls
prevailing classification systems into question. For example, the experience Jelita
McLeod describes in Reading 23 of being asked “What are you?” is a common
experience for multiracial people. Such experiences make evident the social con-
structedness of racial identity.
Most of us are unlikely to be exclusively essentialist or constructionist. As
authors of this book, although we take the constructionist perspective, we have
still relied on essentialist terms we find problematic. The irony of questioning
the idea of race but still talking about “blacks,” “whites,” and “Asians,” or of
rejecting a dualistic approach to sexual identity while still using the terms gay
and straight, has not escaped us. Indeed, we have sometimes used the cur-
rently favored essentialist phrase sexual orientation over the more construc-
tionist sexual preference because sexual preference is an unfamiliar phrase to
many people.a
Further, there is a serious risk that a text such as this falsely identifies people on
the basis of either their sex, race, sexuality, disability, or social class, despite the
fact that master statuses are not parts of a person that can be broken off from one
another like the segments of a Tootsie Roll.7 All of us are always simultaneously
all of our master statuses, an idea encompassed by the concept of intersectionality
(a topic to which we will return in the Framework Essay for Section II).
While the readings in this section may make it seem as if these were separable
statuses, they are not. Indeed, even the concept of master status could mislead us
into thinking that there could be only one dominating status in one’s life.
Both constructionism and essentialism can be found in the social sciences.
Indeed, social science research routinely operates from essentialist assumptions:
when researchers report the sex, race, or ethnicity of their interviewees or
experimental subjects they are treating these categories as “real,” that is, as existing
independent of the researchers’ classifications. Both perspectives also are evident
in social movements, and those movements sometimes shift from one perspective
to the other over time. For example, some feminists and most of those opposed
to feminism hold the essentialist belief that women and men are inherently dif-
ferent. The constructionist view that sexual identity is chosen dominated the gay
rights movement of the 1970s,8 but today, the essentialist view that sexual identity
is something one is born with appears to dominate. By contrast, some of those
opposed to gay relationships now take the constructionist view that sexuality is
chosen and could therefore be changed. In this case, language often signals which
perspective is being used. For example, sexual preference conveys active, human
decision making with the possibility of change (constructionism), while sexual
orientation implies something fixed and inherent to a person (essentialism).
Americans are now about equally split between those who hold essentialist and
constructionist views on homosexuality—40 percent of those who responded to a
a
The term sexual identity seems now to be replacing sexual orientation. It could be used in either
an essentialist or a constructionist way.
Framework Essay 5
2012 Gallup Poll answered that being gay was something a person was born with,
compared to 37 percent who said that being gay was the result of upbringing or
other social factors. Thirty-five years ago those opinions were the reverse, with
56 percent saying sexuality was the result of upbringing or other environmental
factors.9 This shift toward a more essentialist view of sexuality began in the late
1990s, when, as Roger Lancaster describes in Reading 16, the media focused on
the biological (i.e., essentialist) research on the origin of homosexuality, much of
which has now been discredited. Later in this chapter we will describe what
appears to be another change in attitudes about sexuality, which is a turn toward
a constructionist approach, at least among college students.
This example from journalist Darryl Rist shows the appeal that essentialist
explanations might have for gay rights activists:
[Chris Yates’s parents were] Pentecostal ministers who had tortured his adolescence with
Christian cures for sexual perversity. Shock and aversion therapies under born-again doctors
and gruesome exorcisms of sexual demons by spirit-filled preachers had culminated in a
plan to have him castrated by a Mexican surgeon who touted the procedure as a way to
make the boy, if not straight, at least sexless. Only then had the terrified son rebelled.
Then, in the summer of 1991, the journal Science reported anatomical differences
between the brains of homosexual and heterosexual men. . . . The euphoric media—those
great purveyors of cultural myths—drove the story wildly. Every major paper in the country
headlined the discovery smack on the front page. . . . Like many others, I suspect, Chris
Yates’s family saw in this newly reported sexual science a way out of its wrenching impasse.
After years of virtual silence between them and their son, Chris’s parents drove several
hundred miles to visit him and ask for reconciliation. Whatever faded guilt they might have
felt for the family’s faulty genes was nothing next to the reassurance that neither by a per-
verse upbringing nor by his own iniquity was Chris or the family culpable for his urges and
actions. “We could never have condoned this if you could do something to change it. But
when we finally understood that you were born that way, we knew we’d been wrong. We
had to ask your forgiveness.”10
For example, John Hockenberry (Reading 34) describes how mass transit sys-
tems that are inaccessible to wheelchair users “disable” them by making it difficult
or impossible to work, attend school, or be involved in social activities. Beyond
architectural, educational, and occupational barriers, disability is also constructed
through cultural stereotypes and everyday interactions in which difference is
defined as undesirable. We once heard a student with spina bifida tell a story
addressing this point: In her first day at elementary school, other students kept
asking what was “wrong” with her. As she put it, she had always known she was
different, but she hadn’t thought she was “wrong.”
Not only can disability be understood as the result of disabling environments
and cultural stereotypes, the categories of impairment and disability are also them-
selves socially constructed through medical and legal processes. “[I]llness, dis-
ease, and disability are not ‘givens’ in nature . . . but rather socially constructed
categories that emerge from the interpretive activities of people acting together in
social situations.”17 Learning disabilities are an example of this process.
Before the late 1800s when observers began to write about “word blindness,” learning dis-
ability (whatever its name) did not exist, although the human variation to which it ambiguously
refers did—sort of! People who today might be known as learning disabled may have formerly
been known as “slow,” “retarded,” or “odd.” But mostly they would not have been known as
unusual at all. The learning difficulties experienced today by learning disabled youth have not
been experienced by most youth throughout history. For example, most youth have not been
asked to learn to read. Thus, they could not experience any reading difficulties, the most com-
mon learning disability. As we have expected youth to learn to read and have tried to teach
them to do so, many youth have experienced difficulty. However, until the mid-1960s we
typically did not understand those difficulties as the consequences of a learning disability.18
Framework Essay 7
The social model of disability first emerged out of the disabled people’s move-
ment in the 1970s in opposition to the “medical model,” which approached dis-
ability as a matter of individual deficiencies or defects, rather than societal
responses. From the perspective of the medical model, individuals have problems
that need to be treated by medical specialists; from that of the social model, indi-
vidual problems are the result of social structures that need to be changed. Thus,
for adherents of the social model, the important questions are about civil rights
such as equal access. The survey questions posed by Mike Oliver in Reading 18
show how the world is perceived differently from these two perspectives. Still, as
Laurence Ralph describes in Reading 19, the social model of disability becomes
less relevant when we consider the numbers of young black and Hispanic men
disabled by gun violence (second to car accidents, gunshot wounds are the most
common source of disability in urban areas). Ralph describes the case of a group
of Chicago ex-gang members, now paralyzed by spinal cord injuries from gunshots.
Although the social model would argue that society has disabled these young men,
the men themselves operate from the medical model—in their mission to save
teenagers from a similar fate, they focus on the defects of their bodies.
Why have we spent so much time describing the essentialist and construction-
ist perspectives? Discussions about race, sex, disability, sexual identity, and social
class generate great intensity, partly because they involve the clash of essentialist
and constructionist assumptions. Essentialists are likely to view categories of
people as “essentially” different in some important way; constructionists are likely
to see these differences as socially created and arbitrary. An essentialist asks what
causes people to be different; a constructionist asks about the origin and conse-
quence of the categorization system itself. While arguments about the nature and
cause of racism, sexism, homophobia, and poverty are disputes about power and
justice, from the perspectives of essentialism and constructionism they are also
disputes about the meaning of differences in color, sexuality, and social class.
In all of this, the constructionist approach has one clear advantage. From that
perspective, one understands that all this talk has a profound significance. Such
talk is not simply about difference; it is itself the creation of difference. In the
sections that follow, we examine how categories of people are named, dichoto-
mized, and stigmatized—all toward the construction of difference.
Naming
Difference is constructed first by naming categories of people. Therefore, con-
structionists pay special attention to the names people use to refer to themselves
and others—the times at which new names are asserted, the negotiations that
surround the use of particular names, and those occasions when people are grouped
together or separated out.
Asserting a Name Both individuals and categories of people face similar issues
in the assertion of a name. A change of name involves, to some extent, the claim
of a new identity. For example, one of our colleagues no longer wanted to be called
8 SECTION I: Constructing Categories of Difference
by her nickname because it had come to seem childish to her, so she asked people
to use her “real” name instead. It took a few times to remind people that this was
her new name, and with most that was adequate. One colleague, however, argued
that he could not adapt to the new name; she would just have to tolerate his con-
tinued use of the nickname. This was a small but public battle about who had the
power to name whom. Did she have the power to enforce her own naming, or did
he have the power to name her despite her wishes? Eventually, she prevailed.
A more disquieting example was a young woman who wanted to keep her
maiden name after she married. Her fiancé agreed with her decision, recognizing
that he would be reluctant to give up his name were the tables turned. When his
mother heard of this possibility, however, she was outraged. In her mind, a rejec-
tion of her family’s name was a rejection of her family. She urged her son to
reconsider getting married.
Thus, asserting a name can create social conflict. On both a personal and soci-
etal level, naming can involve the claim of a particular identity and the rejection
of others’ power to impose a name. For example, is one Native American,
American Indian, or Sioux; African American or black; girl or woman; Asian,
Asian American, Korean, or Korean American; gay or homosexual; Chicano,
Mexican American, Mexican, Latino/a, or Hispanic? For instance,
[j]ust who is Hispanic? The answer depends on whom you ask.
The label was actually coined in the mid-1970s by federal bureaucrats working under
President Richard M. Nixon. They came up with it in response to concerns that the government
was wrongly applying “Chicano” to people who were not of Mexican descent, and otherwise
misidentifying and underserving segments of the population by generally classifying those with
ancestral ties to the Spanish cultural diaspora as either Chicano, Cuban, or Puerto Rican.
Nearly three decades later, the debate continues to surround the term Hispanic and its
definition. Although mainly applied to people from Latin American countries with linguistic
and cultural ties to Spain, it also is used by the U.S. government to refer to Spaniards
themselves, as well as people from Portuguese-speaking Brazil.19
Comedian Carlos Mencia (a Honduran-born American) captures this confusion
in a story about talking to college students twenty years ago, but its substance
applies just as easily today: “I said ‘Latinos,’ and they said, ‘We’re not Latin!’
And then I said ‘Chicano,’ and they said, ‘We’re not of Mexican descent.’ So I
said ‘I don’t know what to say—Hispanic? And they said, ‘There’s no such coun-
try as Hispania!’ ”20 As of 2011, 33 percent of Hispanic/Latinos preferred His-
panic, 14 percent preferred Latino, but 53 percent had no preference.21
Deciding what name to use for a category of people is not easy. It is unlikely
that all members of the category use the same name; the name members use for
one another may not be acceptable for outsiders to use; nor is it always advisable
to ask what name a person prefers. We once saw an old friend become quite angry
when asked whether he preferred the term black or African American. “Either one
is fine with me,” he replied, “I know what I am.” To him, the question meant that
he was being seen as a member of a category, not as an individual.
Because naming may involve a redefinition of self, an assertion of power, and
a rejection of others’ ability to impose an identity, social change movements often
claim a new name, while opponents may express opposition by continuing to use
Framework Essay 9
the old name. For example, in the 1960s black emerged in opposition to Negro as
the Black Power movement sought to distinguish itself from the Martin Luther
King–led moderate wing of the civil rights movement. The term Negro had itself
been put forward by influential leaders such as W. E. B. Du Bois and Booker T.
Washington as a rejection of the term colored that had dominated the mid- to late
19th century: “[D]espite its association with racial epithets, ‘Negro’ was defined to
stand for a new way of thinking about Blacks.”22 Similarly, in 1988, Ramona H.
Edelin, president of the National Urban Coalition, proposed that African American
be substituted for black. Now both terms are used about equally.b Among blacks
who have a preference, Gallup polls suggest a gradual trend toward the label “Afri-
can American.” Still, “a clear majority of blacks say they don’t care which label is
used”23 and some still prefer the term Negro. “The immediate reason the word
Negro is on the [2010] Census is simple enough: in the 2000 Census, more than
56,000 people wrote in Negro to describe their identity—even though it was already
on the form. Some people, it seems, still strongly identify with the term, which
used to be a perfectly polite designation,” but is now considered by many an insult.24
Each of these name changes—from Negro to black to African American—was
first promoted by activists as a way to demonstrate their commitment to a new
social order. A similar theme is reflected in the history of the terms Chicano and
Chicanismo. Although the origin of the terms is unclear, the principle was the
same. As reporter Ruben Salazar wrote in the 1960s, “a Chicano is a Mexican-
American with a non-Anglo image of himself.”25 (Anglo is a colloquialism for
white used in the southwestern and western United States.)
Similarly, the term homosexual was first coined in 1896 by a Hungarian physi-
cian hoping to decriminalize same-sex relations between men. It was incorporated
into the medical and psychological literature of the time, which depicted nonproc-
reative sex as pathological. In the 1960s, activists rejected the pathological char-
acterization along with the name associated with it, turning to the terms gayc and
lesbian rather than homosexual (and using gay to refer to men, or both men and
women). Later, the 1990s group Queer Nation transformed what had been a com-
mon epithet into a slogan—“We’re here! We’re queer! Get used to it!”
Well, yes, “gay” is great. It has its place. . . . [But] using “queer” is a way of reminding
us how we are perceived by the rest of the world. It’s a way of telling ourselves we don’t
have to be witty and charming people who keep our lives discreet and marginalized in the
straight world. . . . Queer, unlike gay, doesn’t mean male. . . . Yeah, queer can be a rough
word but it is also a sly and ironic weapon we can steal from the homophobe’s hands and
use against him.26
b
Thus, one can find Black Studies, Afro-American Studies, and African American Studies programs
in universities across the country.
c
In the 17th century, gay became associated with an addiction to social dissipation and loose moral-
ity, and was used to refer to female prostitutes (e.g., gay girl). The term was apparently first used in
reference to homosexuality in 1925 in Australia. “It may have been both the connotations of feminin-
ity and those of immorality that led American homosexuals to adopt the title ‘gay’ with some self-
irony in the 1920s. The slogan ‘Glad to Be Gay,’ adopted by both female and male homosexuals,
and the naming of the Gay Liberation Front, which was born from the Stonewall resistance riots
following police raids on homosexual bars in New York in 1969, bear witness to a greater self-
confidence.”27
10 SECTION I: Constructing Categories of Difference
Now, all terms—homosexual, gay and lesbian, gay as including both women
and men or just men, queer, and the acronyms GLBTQ (gay, lesbian, bisexual,
transgender, and questioning) and LGBTQ—appear to be in common use. People
who identify as asexual, that is, not experiencing sexual attraction, also appears
to be a growing category, with the likelihood that the LGBTQ umbrella will
someday expand to LGBTQA. While “queer” maintains some of its history as
both pejorative and defiant, it was apparently acceptable enough to serve as the
title of a popular reality show, Queer Eye, that aired from 2003 to 2007.
Just as each of these social movements has involved a public renaming that
proclaims pride, the women’s movement has asserted woman as a replacement for
girl. A student who described a running feud with her roommate illustrates
the significance of these terms. The student preferred the word woman, arguing
that girl, when applied to females past adolescence, was insulting, almost as if
one could never grow up. Her female roommate just as strongly preferred the term
girl and regularly applied it to the females she knew. Each of them had such
strong feelings on the matter that it was clear they would not last as roommates.
How could these two words destroy their relationship? It appears that English
speakers use the terms girl and woman to refer to quite different qualities. Woman
is understood to convey adulthood, power, and sexuality; girl connotes youth,
powerlessness, and irresponsibility. (The same qualities of age, power, responsibil-
ity, and sexuality operate in the choice between boy and man.) The two roommates
were asserting quite different places for themselves in the world. One claimed
adulthood; the other saw herself as not having achieved that yet. This explanation
is offered by many females: It is not so much that they like being girls, as that
they value youth and/or do not yet feel justified in calling themselves women.
But the effort to remain a “girl” can create its own inconsistencies. We once
overheard a woman describe a friend as a “girl”—the friend was fifty and about
to adopt a child.
It seems to us that college students now often refer to themselves as “girls”
and “boys.” Sociologist Michael Kimmel argues that the use of boys, but more
importantly, guys, speaks to the development of a new age demographic for
American males, specifically an extended period in which they are neither depen-
dent (like boys) or responsible (like men). On the use of woman, some of our
students have said that they avoid the word because it is associated with feminism,
and they are right to conclude that it is. After all, it is called the women’s move-
ment, not the girls’ movement! The name conveys an identity: “we cannot be girls
anymore, we must be women.” In a now classic essay, political philosopher Penny
Weiss (Reading 27) “diagnoses” the phrase that has been used by women for at
least the last fifty years: “I’m not a feminist, but. . . .”
In all, different categories of people may claim a wide range of names for
themselves. A name may reflect the analysis and aspirations of a social movement,
and it may be the battleground for competing conceptions of the world. The name
invoked by movement activists may have no immediate bearing on the language
used by people in the streets, or everyday language may come to be shaped
Framework Essay 11
In all, the names that we call ourselves and others are rarely a matter of indif-
ference; they are often carefully chosen to reflect worldview and aspirations, and
they can materially shape our lives.
FIGURE 1
Questions from the 2010 Census.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census.
For our purposes, the most notable recent change in the census has been
recognition that a person may identify himself or herself as being a member of
more than one racial group, although the census did not include a category called
multiracial. This change was one outcome of a comprehensive review and revision
of OMB’s Directive No. 15 that included public hearings, sample surveys of
targeted populations, and collaboration among the more than thirty federal agen-
cies that collect and use data on race and ethnicity. While this change was spurred
by activists who identified themselves as multiracial, the Bureau’s pretesting also
indicated that less than 2 percent of respondents would mark more than one race
for themselves, and thus the historical continuity with previous censuses would
not be compromised. The Bureau’s expectation was close to the mark for the 2000
census—2.4 percent of the population, 6.8 million people, marked two or more
races for themselves. But by the 2010 census, that figure had risen to 2.9 percent,
or 9 million people.34
One change that has not been made in the census, however, is the inclusion of
an ethnic category called Arab or Middle Eastern, because public comment did
not indicate agreement on a definition for this category. For census purposes, white
“refers to a person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, the
Middle East, or North Africa. It includes people who indicated their race(s)[on
the Census] as “white” or reported entries such as Irish, German, Italian, Lebanese,
Arab, Moroccan, or Caucasian.”35
As in previous censuses, undercounting remains an important fiscal and polit-
ical issue, given the disproportionate undercounting of people of color and the
poor. Still, gay couples may well be the most undercounted population. Since
the 1990 census, the form has provided unmarried partner as a possible answer
to the question of how the people in the household are related to one another.
The 2010 census showed 131,729 same-sex couples who identified as spouses
(which is a rate of 2.3 same-sex spouses per 1,000 male/female spouses) and
514,735 same-sex couples who identified themselves as unmarried partners (a
rate of 70 same-sex, unmarried partners for every 1,000 unmarried male/female
partners).36 Certainly the unmarried, same-sex partner category is a significant
undercount, attributable to respondents’ reluctance to report.
We end this phase of our discussion with three cautions. First, on a personal
level, many of us find census categorizations objectionable. But as citizens, we
still seek the benefits and protections of the laws and policies based on these
data—and as citizens we share the goal of eliminating discriminatory practices.
For example, in the case of racial discrimination,
[r]eliable racial data are crucial to enforcing our basic laws against intentional racial dis-
crimination, which enjoy broad public support. For example, in order to demonstrate that
an employer is engaging in a broad-based “pattern or practice” of discrimination in viola-
tion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a plaintiff must rely on statistical proof that goes
beyond the plight of an individual employee. Supreme Court precedent in such cases
requires plaintiffs to show a statistically significant disparity between the proportion of
qualified minorities in the local labor market and the proportion within the employer’s
Framework Essay 15
work force. A disparity of more than two standard deviations creates a legal presumption
that intentional discrimination is occurring, since a disparity of that magnitude almost never
occurs by accident.
Demographic information, in other words, provides the “big picture” that places indi-
vidual incidents in context. Voting rights cases require similar proof, as do many housing
discrimination cases and suits challenging the discriminatory use of federal funds. Without
reliable racial statistics, it would be virtually impossible for courts or agencies to detect
institutional bias, and antidiscrimination laws would go unenforced. More fundamentally,
we simply cannot know as a society how far we’ve come in conquering racial discrimination
and inequality without accurate information about the health, progress and opportunities
available to communities of different races.37
Second, we need to remember that although the census is a fairly direct count
of how people classify themselves, many other “counts” are taking place that may
not be consistent with census categorization. For example, a student who describes
herself as of multiple race and ethnic ancestry will be considered “Hispanic” by
the federal Department of Education if even one of those categories can be classed
as that, but she will be classified as Asian and Hispanic by the National Center
for Health Statistics. Her birth certificate may have no racial designation or an
option for multiple designations; these designations may be assigned by her
mother or by the attending nurse or doctor. In all, we cannot expect consistency
across data collection instruments.38
Last, when considering official counts of the population, we must be careful
not to assume that what is counted is real. Although census data contribute to the
essentialist view that the world is populated by distinct, scientifically defined
categories of people, this brief history demonstrates that not even those who
collect the data make that assumption. As even the Census Bureau notes, “The
concept of race as used by the Census Bureau reflects self-identification by people
according to the race or races with which they most closely identify. These
categories are socio-political constructs and should not be interpreted as being
scientific or anthropological in nature. Furthermore, the race categories include
both racial and national-origin groups.”39
d
The Census Bureau’s Hispanic or Latino origin categories are Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban,
Dominican; Costa Rican, Guatemalan, Honduran, Nicaraguan, Panamanian, Salvadoran, and Other
Central American; Argentinian, Bolivian, Chilean, Colombian, Ecuadorian, Paraguayan, Peruvian,
Uruguayan, Venezuelan, and Other South American; and finally Other Hispanic or Latino, including
Spaniard, Spanish, Spanish American, and All other Hispanic or Latino.40
16 SECTION I: Constructing Categories of Difference
The groups that are lumped together in this aggregate have historically regarded
one another as different, and thus in people’s everyday lives the aggregate cate-
gory is likely to disaggregate, or fragment, into its constituent national-origin
elements. For example, a 2013 survey of adults found that “when describing their
identity, more than half (54%) of Hispanics say they most often use the name of
their ancestors’ Hispanic origin (such as Mexican, Dominican, Salvadoran or
Cuban).” Only 20 percent said they most often described themselves as “Hispanic”
or “Latino.” (Twenty-three percent reported most often describing themselves as
“American.”)43 Not surprisingly, 69 percent of Latinos surveyed in the 2011 Cen-
sus Bureau’s American Community Survey said that they do not share a common
culture with other Latinos.44
And how do “Hispanics” identify themselves by race? In 2011, census data
showed that 36 percent identified themselves as white, 10 percent identified them-
selves as black, 26 percent identified themselves as some other race, and 25 percent
identified their race as Hispanic/Latino.45 Indeed, most of those who choose “some
other race” on the Census are Latinos.46 Nonetheless, as Tanya Golash-Boza and
William Darity, Jr. write in Reading 6, the way that Latinos describe their race is
changeable, because it is responsive to their skin color and experiences of dis-
crimination, and—for those who are recent immigrants—also responsive to defini-
tions of race in their home country. All of these factors interact, and not
necessarily in predictable ways.
In the same way that many differences are masked by the terms Latino and
Hispanic, the category Asian Pacific American or Asian American includes groups
with different languages, cultures, and religions, and sometimes centuries of mutual
hostility. Like Hispanic/Latino, the category Asian American is based more on geog-
raphy than on any cultural, racial, linguistic, or religious commonalities. “Asian
Framework Essay 17
Americans are those who come from a region of the world that the rest of the world
has defined as Asia.”47e
Much the same can be said for the terms Middle East and Middle Eastern. As
John Tehranian writes in Reading 24, the term Middle East emerged at the begin-
ning of the 20th century as part of political strategies. As a region that encom-
passes multiple continents, languages, ethnic groups, and religions, “the term is
riddled in ambiguity, sometimes encompassing the entire North African coast,
from Morocco to Egypt and other parts of Africa, including the Sudan and
Somalia, the former Soviet Caucasus Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and
Armenia, and occasionally Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkistan. The Middle East
is therefore a malleable geopolitical construct of relatively recent vintage.”
Aggregate classifications have also been promoted by social movements; terms
such as Latino or Asian American were not simply the result of federal classifica-
tions. Student activists inspired by the Black Power and civil rights movements
first proposed the terms. Asian American, Hispanic, Middle Eastern, and Latino
are examples of panethnic terms, that is, classifications that span national-origin
identities. Student activists inspired by the Black Power and civil rights move-
ments supported (and sometimes initiated) these panethnic classifications as a way
to highlight the experiences of discrimination that groups within each classifica-
tion shared. Thus, panethnic terminology often signaled the development of bridg-
ing organizations and other forms of solidarity across groups.
The concept of panethnicity is useful at many levels, but unstable in practice.
“The elites representing such groups find it advantageous to make political demands
by using the numbers and resources panethnic formations can mobilize. The state,
in turn, can more easily manage claims by recognizing and responding to large
blocs as opposed to dealing with the specific claims of a plethora of ethnically
defined interest groups.”50 At the same time, competition and historic antagonisms
make such alliances unstable. “At times it is advantageous to be in a panethnic
bloc, and at times it is desirable to mobilize along particular ethnic lines.”51
The disability movement is similar to panethnic movements in that it has
brought together people with all types of impairments. This approach was a
e
In census classification, the category Asian includes Asian Indian, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese,
Korean, Vietnamese; Other Asian includes Bangladeshi, Bhutanese, Burmese, Cambodian, Hmong,
Indo-Chinese, Indonesian, Iwo Jiman, Laotian, Malaysian, Maldivian, Mongolian, Nepalese,
Okinawan, Pakistani, Singaporean, Sri Lankan, Thai, and Taiwanese. The category Pacific Islander
includes Native Hawaiian, Guamanian or Chamorro, Samoan; Other Pacific Islander includes
Carolinian, Chuukese, Fijian, Kirabati, Kosraean, Mariana Islander, Marshallese, Melanesian,
Micronesian, New Hebridian, Palauan, Papua New Guinean, Pohnpeian, Polynesian, Saipanese,
Solomon Islander, Tahitian, Tokelauan, Tongan, and Yapese.48
In 1980, Asian Indians successfully lobbied to change their census classification from white to
Asian American by reminding Congress that historically, immigrants from India had been classed as
Asian. With other Asians, those from India had been barred from immigration by the 1917 Immigra-
tion Act, prohibited from becoming naturalized citizens until 1946, and denied the right to own land
by 1920 Alien Land Law. Indeed, in 1923 the U.S. Supreme Court (in U.S. v. Thind) ruled that Asian
Indians were nonwhite, and could therefore have their U.S. citizenship nullified.49 Thus, for most of
their history in the United States, Asian Indians had been classed as Asian.
18 SECTION I: Constructing Categories of Difference
historic “first,” running counter both to the tradition of organizing around specific
impairments and to the fact that the needs of people with different impairments
are sometimes in conflict. For example, some of the curb cuts that make wheel-
chair access possible can make walking more difficult for blind people who need
to be able to feel the edges of a sidewalk with their canes. The aggregating of
disabled people that began with the disability rights movement was reinforced in
the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
The terms Native American and African American are also aggregate classifica-
tions, but in this case they are the result of conquest and enslavement.
The “Indian,” like the European, is an idea. The notion of “Indians” was invented to distin-
guish the indigenous peoples of the New World from Europeans. The “Indian” is the person
on shore, outside of the boat. . . . There [were] hundreds of cultures, languages, ways of
living in Native America. The place was a model of diversity at the time of Columbus’s
arrival. Yet Europeans did not see this diversity. They created the concept of the “Indian”
to give what they did see some kind of unification, to make it a single entity they could
deal with, because they could not cope with the reality of 400 different cultures.52f
f
The idea of Europe and the European is also a constructed, aggregate category. “Physically, Europe
is not a continent. Where is the water separating Europe from Asia? It is culture that separates Europe
from Asia. Western Europe roughly comprises the countries that in the Middle Ages were Latin
Christendom, and Eastern Europe consists of those countries that in the Middle Ages were Eastern
Orthodox Christendom. It was about A.D. 1257 when the Pope claimed hegemony over the secular
emperors in Western Europe and formulated the idea that Europeans, Christians, were a unified
ethnicity even though they spoke many different languages.”54
Framework Essay 19
might divide them as men and women, people of color, or people of different
social classes. And, just as in the cases we have previously discussed, the forma-
tion of alliances between gays and lesbians will depend on the circumstances
and specific issues.
Still, our analysis has so far ignored one category of people. From whose
perspective do the categories of Native American, Asian American, African
American, Middle Eastern American, Arab American, and Latino/Hispanic exist?
Since “difference” is always “difference from,” from whose perspective is “dif-
ference” determined? Who has the power to define “difference”? If “we” are in
the boat looking at “them,” who precisely are “we”?
Every perspective on the social world emerges from a particular vantage point,
a particular social location. Ignoring who is in the boat treats that place as if it
were just the view “anyone” would take. Historically, the people in the boat were
European; at present, they are white Americans. As Ruth Frankenberg frames it
in Reading 7, in the United States “whites are the nondefined definers of other
people,” “the unmarked marker of others’ differentness.” Failing to identify the
“us” in the boat means that “white culture [becomes] the unspoken norm,” a
category that is powerful enough to define others while itself remaining invisible
and unnamed.
Thus,
[F]or most whites, most of the time, to think or speak about race is to think or speak about
people of color, or perhaps, at times, to reflect on oneself (or other whites) in relation to
people of color. But we tend not to think of ourselves or our racial cohort as racially distinc-
tive. Whites’ “consciousness” of whiteness is predominantly unconsciousness of whiteness.55
Because whites do not usually identify themselves by race, they do not easily
understand the significance of racial identities.56 In all, those with the most power
in a society are best positioned to have their own identities left unnamed, thus
masking their power.
The term androcentrism describes the world as seen from a male-centered
perspective. For example, if we define a good employee as one who is willing to
work extensive overtime, we are thinking from a male-centered perspective, since
women’s child-care responsibilities often preclude extra work commitments. We
may also describe Eurocentric and physicalist57 perspectives, that is, viewpoints
that assume everyone is of European origin or physically agile. Similarly, the term
heteronormativity turns our attention to the ways that heterosexuality is built into
the assumptions and operation of all aspects of daily life, both sexual and non-
sexual.58 Heteronormativity is one of a set of terms that has emerged to describe
individual- and societal-level treatment of homosexuality. In 1972, in Society and
the Healthy Homosexual, psychologist George Weinberg offered the term
homophobia to describe the aversion to homosexuals that he found among people
at the time. As he said later, “It was a fear of homosexuals which seemed to be
associated with a fear of contagion, a fear of reducing the things one fought
for—home and family. . . . [I]t led to great brutality as fear always does.”59 The
term was a watershed; it defined the problem as heterosexual intolerance, not
homosexuality.
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DANCE ON STILTS AT THE GIRLS’ UNYAGO, NIUCHI
I see increasing reason to believe that the view formed some time
back as to the origin of the Makonde bush is the correct one. I have
no doubt that it is not a natural product, but the result of human
occupation. Those parts of the high country where man—as a very
slight amount of practice enables the eye to perceive at once—has not
yet penetrated with axe and hoe, are still occupied by a splendid
timber forest quite able to sustain a comparison with our mixed
forests in Germany. But wherever man has once built his hut or tilled
his field, this horrible bush springs up. Every phase of this process
may be seen in the course of a couple of hours’ walk along the main
road. From the bush to right or left, one hears the sound of the axe—
not from one spot only, but from several directions at once. A few
steps further on, we can see what is taking place. The brush has been
cut down and piled up in heaps to the height of a yard or more,
between which the trunks of the large trees stand up like the last
pillars of a magnificent ruined building. These, too, present a
melancholy spectacle: the destructive Makonde have ringed them—
cut a broad strip of bark all round to ensure their dying off—and also
piled up pyramids of brush round them. Father and son, mother and
son-in-law, are chopping away perseveringly in the background—too
busy, almost, to look round at the white stranger, who usually excites
so much interest. If you pass by the same place a week later, the piles
of brushwood have disappeared and a thick layer of ashes has taken
the place of the green forest. The large trees stretch their
smouldering trunks and branches in dumb accusation to heaven—if
they have not already fallen and been more or less reduced to ashes,
perhaps only showing as a white stripe on the dark ground.
This work of destruction is carried out by the Makonde alike on the
virgin forest and on the bush which has sprung up on sites already
cultivated and deserted. In the second case they are saved the trouble
of burning the large trees, these being entirely absent in the
secondary bush.
After burning this piece of forest ground and loosening it with the
hoe, the native sows his corn and plants his vegetables. All over the
country, he goes in for bed-culture, which requires, and, in fact,
receives, the most careful attention. Weeds are nowhere tolerated in
the south of German East Africa. The crops may fail on the plains,
where droughts are frequent, but never on the plateau with its
abundant rains and heavy dews. Its fortunate inhabitants even have
the satisfaction of seeing the proud Wayao and Wamakua working
for them as labourers, driven by hunger to serve where they were
accustomed to rule.
But the light, sandy soil is soon exhausted, and would yield no
harvest the second year if cultivated twice running. This fact has
been familiar to the native for ages; consequently he provides in
time, and, while his crop is growing, prepares the next plot with axe
and firebrand. Next year he plants this with his various crops and
lets the first piece lie fallow. For a short time it remains waste and
desolate; then nature steps in to repair the destruction wrought by
man; a thousand new growths spring out of the exhausted soil, and
even the old stumps put forth fresh shoots. Next year the new growth
is up to one’s knees, and in a few years more it is that terrible,
impenetrable bush, which maintains its position till the black
occupier of the land has made the round of all the available sites and
come back to his starting point.
The Makonde are, body and soul, so to speak, one with this bush.
According to my Yao informants, indeed, their name means nothing
else but “bush people.” Their own tradition says that they have been
settled up here for a very long time, but to my surprise they laid great
stress on an original immigration. Their old homes were in the
south-east, near Mikindani and the mouth of the Rovuma, whence
their peaceful forefathers were driven by the continual raids of the
Sakalavas from Madagascar and the warlike Shirazis[47] of the coast,
to take refuge on the almost inaccessible plateau. I have studied
African ethnology for twenty years, but the fact that changes of
population in this apparently quiet and peaceable corner of the earth
could have been occasioned by outside enterprises taking place on
the high seas, was completely new to me. It is, no doubt, however,
correct.
The charming tribal legend of the Makonde—besides informing us
of other interesting matters—explains why they have to live in the
thickest of the bush and a long way from the edge of the plateau,
instead of making their permanent homes beside the purling brooks
and springs of the low country.
“The place where the tribe originated is Mahuta, on the southern
side of the plateau towards the Rovuma, where of old time there was
nothing but thick bush. Out of this bush came a man who never
washed himself or shaved his head, and who ate and drank but little.
He went out and made a human figure from the wood of a tree
growing in the open country, which he took home to his abode in the
bush and there set it upright. In the night this image came to life and
was a woman. The man and woman went down together to the
Rovuma to wash themselves. Here the woman gave birth to a still-
born child. They left that place and passed over the high land into the
valley of the Mbemkuru, where the woman had another child, which
was also born dead. Then they returned to the high bush country of
Mahuta, where the third child was born, which lived and grew up. In
course of time, the couple had many more children, and called
themselves Wamatanda. These were the ancestral stock of the
Makonde, also called Wamakonde,[48] i.e., aborigines. Their
forefather, the man from the bush, gave his children the command to
bury their dead upright, in memory of the mother of their race who
was cut out of wood and awoke to life when standing upright. He also
warned them against settling in the valleys and near large streams,
for sickness and death dwelt there. They were to make it a rule to
have their huts at least an hour’s walk from the nearest watering-
place; then their children would thrive and escape illness.”
The explanation of the name Makonde given by my informants is
somewhat different from that contained in the above legend, which I
extract from a little book (small, but packed with information), by
Pater Adams, entitled Lindi und sein Hinterland. Otherwise, my
results agree exactly with the statements of the legend. Washing?
Hapana—there is no such thing. Why should they do so? As it is, the
supply of water scarcely suffices for cooking and drinking; other
people do not wash, so why should the Makonde distinguish himself
by such needless eccentricity? As for shaving the head, the short,
woolly crop scarcely needs it,[49] so the second ancestral precept is
likewise easy enough to follow. Beyond this, however, there is
nothing ridiculous in the ancestor’s advice. I have obtained from
various local artists a fairly large number of figures carved in wood,
ranging from fifteen to twenty-three inches in height, and
representing women belonging to the great group of the Mavia,
Makonde, and Matambwe tribes. The carving is remarkably well
done and renders the female type with great accuracy, especially the
keloid ornamentation, to be described later on. As to the object and
meaning of their works the sculptors either could or (more probably)
would tell me nothing, and I was forced to content myself with the
scanty information vouchsafed by one man, who said that the figures
were merely intended to represent the nembo—the artificial
deformations of pelele, ear-discs, and keloids. The legend recorded
by Pater Adams places these figures in a new light. They must surely
be more than mere dolls; and we may even venture to assume that
they are—though the majority of present-day Makonde are probably
unaware of the fact—representations of the tribal ancestress.
The references in the legend to the descent from Mahuta to the
Rovuma, and to a journey across the highlands into the Mbekuru
valley, undoubtedly indicate the previous history of the tribe, the
travels of the ancestral pair typifying the migrations of their
descendants. The descent to the neighbouring Rovuma valley, with
its extraordinary fertility and great abundance of game, is intelligible
at a glance—but the crossing of the Lukuledi depression, the ascent
to the Rondo Plateau and the descent to the Mbemkuru, also lie
within the bounds of probability, for all these districts have exactly
the same character as the extreme south. Now, however, comes a
point of especial interest for our bacteriological age. The primitive
Makonde did not enjoy their lives in the marshy river-valleys.
Disease raged among them, and many died. It was only after they
had returned to their original home near Mahuta, that the health
conditions of these people improved. We are very apt to think of the
African as a stupid person whose ignorance of nature is only equalled
by his fear of it, and who looks on all mishaps as caused by evil
spirits and malignant natural powers. It is much more correct to
assume in this case that the people very early learnt to distinguish
districts infested with malaria from those where it is absent.
This knowledge is crystallized in the
ancestral warning against settling in the
valleys and near the great waters, the
dwelling-places of disease and death. At the
same time, for security against the hostile
Mavia south of the Rovuma, it was enacted
that every settlement must be not less than a
certain distance from the southern edge of the
plateau. Such in fact is their mode of life at the
present day. It is not such a bad one, and
certainly they are both safer and more
comfortable than the Makua, the recent
intruders from the south, who have made USUAL METHOD OF
good their footing on the western edge of the CLOSING HUT-DOOR
plateau, extending over a fairly wide belt of
country. Neither Makua nor Makonde show in their dwellings
anything of the size and comeliness of the Yao houses in the plain,
especially at Masasi, Chingulungulu and Zuza’s. Jumbe Chauro, a
Makonde hamlet not far from Newala, on the road to Mahuta, is the
most important settlement of the tribe I have yet seen, and has fairly
spacious huts. But how slovenly is their construction compared with
the palatial residences of the elephant-hunters living in the plain.
The roofs are still more untidy than in the general run of huts during
the dry season, the walls show here and there the scanty beginnings
or the lamentable remains of the mud plastering, and the interior is a
veritable dog-kennel; dirt, dust and disorder everywhere. A few huts
only show any attempt at division into rooms, and this consists
merely of very roughly-made bamboo partitions. In one point alone
have I noticed any indication of progress—in the method of fastening
the door. Houses all over the south are secured in a simple but
ingenious manner. The door consists of a set of stout pieces of wood
or bamboo, tied with bark-string to two cross-pieces, and moving in
two grooves round one of the door-posts, so as to open inwards. If
the owner wishes to leave home, he takes two logs as thick as a man’s
upper arm and about a yard long. One of these is placed obliquely
against the middle of the door from the inside, so as to form an angle
of from 60° to 75° with the ground. He then places the second piece
horizontally across the first, pressing it downward with all his might.
It is kept in place by two strong posts planted in the ground a few
inches inside the door. This fastening is absolutely safe, but of course
cannot be applied to both doors at once, otherwise how could the
owner leave or enter his house? I have not yet succeeded in finding
out how the back door is fastened.