BROOKES BELL – Questionnaire for Potential MASTER MARINER Recruits

Version 3 – 2023
Please limit your response to each of the following questions to 350 words:

1. What do you understand to be the role of a Master Mariner - Marine Consultant?

2. Please explain how you would undertake a Passage Plan verification following its
preparation by the Navigating Officer.
By counter-checking all 4 stages of the passage planning namely – Appraisal, Planning,
Monitoring and Execution, it can be done by cross checking the ADP, Enp, ATT, Routing
guide etc. Then by ensuring all these pubs are of latest editions and up-to-date. Till last
NTM published by IHO. Next is to verify via ENCs catalogue and ECDIS that all ENCs for
planned voyage are available with valid permit, updated and routes are planned in safe and
efficient manner. All the Nav C/L as per SMS such as Passage plan forms and other checklists
are complied with.

3. Please
As perdescribe
companyinSMS
your own
and alsowords what
Passage you understand
planning aboutcalculations
guide and hence ECDIS safety settings,
sheets/format
alarms, and alerts
is normally and how
incorporated they
with can be used
in Passage to enhance
plan form. situational
We need to feed inawareness.
the required info
such as drafts, tides, CATZOC, depths available as per ENCs in particular leg. It provides the
safety parameters values and after verifying as per manual calculations, same parameters
must be set in ECDIS for getting early cautions, warnings, alarms if approaching any such
area which is not complying as per Safety parameters settings and hazardous for navigating
within.

4. Please list the cargoes you carried in your career at sea and briefly explain how you
cared for each during loading/passage/discharge.
GASOLINE, GASOIL, NAPHTHA, AVGAS, JET A1, ULSD, LCO,
BASRAH/AZERI/XICOMBA/KISSANJE BLEND/GIRASSOL/ DJENO CRUDE OILS.

(THESE CARGO WERE CARED DURING LOADING/PASSAGE/DISCHARGING AS PER MSDS

SHEET, SHIPPER SPOT GUIDELINES, ISGOTT, TANKER SAFETY GUIDE ETC)

SM, EDC, XYLENES, METHANOL, MTBE, BENZENE, CAUSTIC SODA, AN, ETHANOL, ETC.

(THESE CARGO WERE CARED DURING LOADING/PASSAGE/DISCHARGING AS PER MSDS

SHEET, SHIPPER SPOT GUIDELINES, IBC, CHRIS CODE ETC)
Please limit your response to the following question to a maximum of 1,000 words:
5. Please describe
The incident hashow
beenyou would approach
investigated an investigation
in accordance with the Codeintoofathe
multiple mooring line
International
failure on your
Standards last vessel. ForPractices
and Recommended context,for
thea incident should be into
Safety Investigation assumed to have
a Marine Casualty or
occurred due to high
Marine Incident (The winds and
Casualty which resulted
Investigation Code)inadopted
an allision with
by IMO Resa MSC
jetty.255(84).
Please
Include details of what evidence you be looking to collect for the preparation of a
The purpose
report during of
anthis investigation is to determine the circumstances and the root causes of
attendance.
the incident with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea and avoiding similar incident
in future.

Further the outline and contents of this investigation are as follows:-

1. Summary 2. Description of the vessel 3. Sources of Evidence

4. Outline of Events 5. Analysis 6. Conclusions 7. Recommendations

8. Submission

1. Summary :
1.1 On 10 September 2022, the Liberia registered oil/chem tanker ‘’MT Moonlight’’,
laden with 35,000 tons of ULSD in bulk, arrived at the pilot station in Ulsan,
South Korea and dropped anchor.
1.2 In the morning on 12 September 2022, the vessel was shifting to a berth at
YNCC Pier 2. The chief officer was the person in charge of the mooring
operation at the forward station, assisted by other crew members.
1.3 The vessel was planned to moor with her starboard side alongside berth. The
wind was off-shore with 20-25 knots. At about 0815 hours, the forward spring
line and aft spring line was delivered to the shore mooring team and it was put
on a shore bollard.
1.4 The pilot ordered to tighten up the fwd/aft spring lines, and same time gusting
wind starts increasing upto 30-35 knots, whereas shore provided tugs fwd/aft
were quite old and available with less power which could not push the vessel
continuously towards berth. Due to which vessel swung out a short distance
from the berth fender and resulted in further increase mooring lines tension.
Mooring lines parted and since tugs were pushing from port side, vessel has
allusion with the jetty. Fortunately there was no fatal injury caused.
1.5 The investigation into the accident revealed the main contributory factors as
follows :
(a) the communication among the mooring teams was ineffective - the chief
officer failed to report the improper lining up of the forward spring line to
the master of the vessel and continued to apply force on the rope causing it
suddenly bounced off; and
(b) the pilot communication with the tugs was in local language even after
several request by the master, which could not be understand by the
master for pilot orders to the tugs.

2. Description of the vessel

Name of vessel: MT MOON LIGHT
IMO No. : 9336751
Call Sign: VRJO8
Flag: Liberia
3. Sources of Evidence:

3.1 The management company.

3.2 The ship’s master and crew members of “MT MOON LIGHT”.
3.3 Autopsy report.

5. Analysis Certification and experience of the master and crew:

5.1 All the statutory certificates of the vessel were valid at the time of the accident.
5.2 The master held a valid Certificate of Competency as Master issued by Shenzhen
Maritime Safety Administration of the People’s Republic of China and a Licence (Deck Officer)
Class 1 issued by the Hong Kong Marine Department. He served as master since April 2007.
He joined the vessel on 6 June 2015.
5.3 The chief officer held a valid Certificate of Competency as Master issued by Shenzhen
Maritime Safety Administration of the People’s Republic of China and a Licence (Deck Officer)
Class 1 issued by the Hong Kong Marine Department. He served as chief officer since May
2013 and joined the vessel on 20 January 2015.
5.4 The management company established Safety Management System (SMS) with
procedures of recruiting and engaging of competent seafarers through a dedicated manning
agency to serve the company’s fleet.
5.5 Shipboard trainings for all crew members on board the vessel were conducted once or
twice a month, covering the aspects of fire-fighting, life-saving, environmental protection
and shipboard operations.

The mooring operation and risk assessment:

Ship mooring is a systematic team-work operation under the command of ship’s master on
the bridge (the bridge team) and assisted by mooring teams at the forward and aft stations
of a ship. Mooring operation should be well planned and be executed in accordance with
plan, whilst maintaining with effective cooperation and communication among crew
members of the mooring teams, shore side and tug boats workers. During mooring
operation, the master and persons in charge of forward and aft stations should closely
monitor and supervise the work to ensure safety of ship and crew. 5.14 In the incident, the
risk assessment of the mooring operation was carried out by the Fig.4-The forward spring
line was in good condition. 9 chief officer and verified by the master of the vessel in
accordance with the SMS requirement. The hazard of personal injuries was rated “High”.