Ristotle On Happiness

North American Philosophical Publications
THE UGLY, THE LONELY, AND THE LOWLY: ARISTOTLE ON HAPPINESS AND THE
EXTERNAL GOODS
Author(s): Matthew Cashen
Source: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (JANUARY 2012), pp. 1-19
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical
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History of Philosophy Quarterly
Volume 29, Number 1, January 2012
THE UGLY, THE LONELY, AND THE LOWLY:

ARISTOTLE ON HAPPINESS AND THE
EXTERNAL GOODS
Matthew Cashen
For anyone who is exceedingly ugly or basely born or alone and childless
won't be entirely happy.
Nicomachean Ethics 1.8
1. Introduction
When he it
that remarks in be
is hard to the firstwhen
happy bookphysically
of his Nicomachean
unattractiveEthics (E
or when
born into an undistinguished family or when living alone and childles
Aristotle introduces a notorious puzzle about his theory of happiness
The puzzle is notorious even if, to someone unfamiliar with his theory
what Aristotle says sounds perfectly plain: if someone were to suppos
that by "happy" Aristotle meant what we mean by "happy" today, hi
remark would come off as petty and small but hardly puzzling: peopl
often feel unhappy with or insecure about the way they look, and those
without family or friends do miss out on a dimension of happiness that
could enrich their lives. Of course, by "happy" Aristotle does not mea
what we mean today. For him, to be happy, or eudaimön, is to be actively
engaged in the life of virtue. So the puzzle is this: what do appearance
family, and social life have to do with the ability to act with justice,
courage, and moderation?
This puzzle is at the heart of a much larger interpretive question
concerning what Aristotle calls the external goods. In his ethical works,
Aristotle divides human goods into two rough categories: goods of the
soul and goods external to the soul. Goods of the soul, or psychologica
goods (ta peri psychën agatha), include the virtues of character and
intellect, like moderation and practical wisdom. Goods external to th
soul include goods of the body, or somatic goods (ta soma agatha) like
physical fitness and attractiveness, and goods external to the body, or as
2 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY
Aristotle sometimes simply calls them, external goods (ta

like wealth, political influence, and friendship. I call th
"rough" because, although Aristotle sometimes distingu
the body from goods external to the body, usually he tal
together under the general heading of the external good
phasize the crucial way in which they contrast with the
goods or virtues: namely, while the virtues are earned t
ation, hard work, and study, the external goods are largely
of luck.1 Now, Aristotle unambiguously thinks that happ
these goods, as his remark about the ugly, the lonely, an
lustrates. But because he defines happiness as virtuous
activity (as activity of psyché in accordance with arete),
why. That definition seems to imply that happiness con
virtue, and so in character, choice, and action, since Aristot
that virtue is expressed only through actions that are freely
consistent with a stable and mature character (EN 1106a3
interpretive question, then, is this: why should any goods e
soul impact happiness when these have so little to do wi
choice, and action?
Responses to this question have been diverse and scrupulou
but two general interpretive strategies have emerged, an
situated squarely in the middle of a debate between them
the traditional monist interpretation, defended lately by Ri
Aristotle maintains throughout EN that happiness cons
virtuous action and that external goods, therefore, imp
only indirectly, insofar as they help or hamper our abilit
ously. T. H. Irwin, John Cooper, and Martha Nussbaum, a
defend an inclusivist interpretation of happiness, howev
to them, Aristotle defines the happy life as a life that is
virtuous and sufficiently equipped with external goods. Beca
view, external goods are included among the constituents
Aristotle is able to maintain that their possession or de
impact happiness directly, irrespective of its impact on
ity.2 Inclusivists claim their interpretation is more pla
they are able to attribute to Aristotle a more plausible v
many ways in which happiness depends on good fortune
they charge, is stuck with an implausibly narrow view.
I aim to defend monism against this charge. After some
remarks about the context in which Aristotle introduce
external goods and after surveying monism and inclusi
have been defended so far, I will advance a new monist i
of the external goods. I then will apply my interpretation t
puzzling remark about the ugly, the lonely, and the lowly.
THE UGLY, THE LONELY, AND THE LOWLY 3
gue that two purportedly incompatible positions are compa

that Aristotelian happiness consists singly in living a virtu
monists maintain, and next, that loneliness and marginaliz
impede happiness directly, insofar as they prevent us from
life and finding it subjectively satisfying, as inclusivists m
"happy" Aristotle does not mean what we mean today. But
to accommodate a set of intuitions about the role of exter
the happy life that is not only plausible but also decidedly
2. The Endoxa
To understand the puzzle of the external goods, we need to begin with Ar

istotle's general approach to theorizing about happiness. Like our modern
concept of happiness, the ancient concept of happiness, or eudaimonia
is no philosopher's term of art. It is above all a deeply practical concept,
one people regularly would employ when describing, predicting, and
explaining behavior. As Gregory Vlastos (1991, 201) says, eudaimonia
fits perfectly with both street-Greek and Aristophonic slapstick. Now to
the extent that this ancient concept of happiness was so ubiquitous and
ordinary, Aristotle recognized that any philosopher who would co-op
the term for his own philosophical purposes must respect what people
ordinarily say about it and that we, therefore, should count any theoreti
cal analysis of happiness as unacceptable if the concept that emerges
from that analysis is unrecognizable from the perspective of people's
folk understanding of it. After all, as Aristotle writes, it is unreasonable
to think most people's views are "entirely wrong; instead, they get at
least something right, or even most things" (EN 1098b28-30).3 Thus,
even though there is relatively little consensus on what precisely happ
ness is (1095al4ff), the few points on which there is agreement outline
the parameters to which theories of happiness must conform: they ar
the endoxa, or the reputable opinions, about happiness that a theorist
must respect if his analysis is to remain recognizable as an analysis of
happiness at all. Within this context, Aristotle first raises the issue of
external goods, and his aim is to show that his identification of happ
ness with virtuous activity is consistent with the ordinary belief that no
one would call happy a life wracked by poverty, chronic illness, solitude,
or humiliation (1098b24-30). It is vital, I am going to suggest, to keep
this context in mind.
Within this context, too, Aristotle introduces another ordinary belief

he takes to be consistent with his account, and this belief also will prove
vital to my analysis: namely, Aristotle takes it that everyone agrees that
the happy life necessarily is pleasant (EN 1099a6-26, cf. 1153bl4). For
Aristotle, as for us, it would be nonsense to call happy a life that was
unpleasant, unsatisfying, or loathsome from the perspective

leading that life, so he is quick to explain that his identif
happy and virtuous lives does not allow for that possibili
possess a virtue, a person must enjoy and find satisfying
expresses that virtue: "no one is good who doesn't enjoy doing
he writes; "a person would neither call just someone who
acting justly nor liberal someone who doesn't enjoy acting li
it's the same with the other virtues" (1099al7-20). So, eve
devote my life to charity, for instance, taking every oppor
to contribute to the betterment of those less fortunate tha
did not enjoy that aspect of my life, I would not qualify
person; and to that extent, I would fail at realizing my o
As Aristotle puts it, to possess a virtue is to be "a lover"
of that virtue (1099a8); and, in fact, the central aim of mor
is to habituate us into loving and finding pleasant the ri
"that's why one must have been brought up in a certain way
hood on, as Plato says, so that one will enjoy and find painf
one should." (1104bl2).4 Now, if the happy life is necessa
a commonsensical explanation of the relationship betwe
and the external goods emerges: the external goods are
happiness because their deprivation causes pain, or bett
causes frustration, dissatisfaction, discomfort, isolation,
ment. The interpretation of Aristotle with which I begi
interpretation, traditionally rejects this commonsense e
3. Monism
Monism is the view that Aristotle is consistent throughout EN in think

ing that happiness consists exclusively in the exercise of a virtuous
character through virtuous activity. Now, if happiness consists exclu
sively in this, then when Aristotle claims that the ugly, the lonely, and
the lowly are not entirely happy, he cannot mean that, in lacking good
looks or a good family, they lack some constituent elements of happiness:
if happiness consists only in the psychological goods, then the external
goods cannot themselves be among its constituents. Instead, the monist
argues that nonpsychological goods are valuable only insofar as they
make the exercise of virtue possible. Richard Kraut (1989, 260) puts
the monist view as he endorses it succinctly: "[Aristotle] equates hap
piness with virtuous activity, and treats other goods not as components
of the ultimate end but as the equipment one needs to attain it." John
Cooper (1985, 189) puts the view in similar terms: the value of the ex
ternal goods to someone concerned with living well consists solely "in
what [they] make it possible for him, as a result of having them, to do.
Any value goods other than virtuous action itself might have just for
their own sake is denied." The idea is straightforward. If happ

life actively and self-consciously dedicated to virtue, then the
goods are valuable to happiness just insofar as they make it po
actualize virtue: a person may need money to act liberally and
influence to act justly, but surely money and political influence a
themselves elements of the happy life, as are liberality and ju
Now lacking the tools for the job clearly can impede activ
Aristotle clearly recognizes this: "no activity is complete when im
but happiness is complete," he explains in book seven; "that's
happy man needs somatic goods and external goods and goods
too, so that he won't be impeded in these ways" (EN 1153bl6).
book ten, he is even more explicit: "the liberal sort of person need
to do liberal things, and the just sort of person, too, to make ret
the benefits he receives" (1178a31). But being ill-equipped can
a person's activities in different ways, and being well-equippe
her in ways that are not straightforwardly instrumental in natu
not only must a person have the right tools for the job, she a
be situated in at least minimally favorable social conditions. N
how devoted to the principles of justice I am, for instance, and
ter how well-resourced, a corrupt political system may prevent m
affecting real social change, so I need workable political instit
actualize justice (cf. 1178a29-34). Chronic illness, disability, or
vored social status may make it difficult to see my projects throu
so my success depends on a fair degree of constitutive luck in bir
health, particularly in a deeply hierarchical society like Aristo
Kraut (1989, 256) rightly notes, even "social attitudes affect
portunities for virtuous action," since prejudice and social ostraci
seriously limit one's options and one's ability to successfully in
others.5 Monists, thus, traditionally recognize a second sense i
the external goods aid activity: not only are they the tools of vir
they provide the context that makes the expression of virtue
Put another way, the possession of external goods sometimes
specific contribution to specific virtuous feats, as when a person
resources to a charitable cause, while, at other times, the poss
external goods more generally opens up life possibilities.
Aristotle undeniably recognizes these different ways in which
chological goods aid and in some cases even are necessary to li
acting virtuously. But if it is clear that the external goods im
piness by helping or hampering virtuous acts in these ways, as
traditionally maintain, it also should be clear how impoveris
psychologically implausible Aristotle's view would be if that w
only impact. Consider what it would mean for Aristotle's underst
of friendship. For Aristotle, participating in meaningful relat
with others is vital to the happy life. In fact, of all the exter
one's friends and personal relations are the most important t
piness (EN 1069b9). But if friendships relate to happiness
as we are able to exploit them as opportunities for new virtu
then the loss of a friend or loved one, say, to death, only
happiness insofar as that death blocks certain prospects
action. One might have hoped that Aristotle would recog
direct and intimate sense in which such tragedies impact
however: surely, we might want to urge, the profound pai
loved one in itself impacts one's ability to live happily, ju
profound pain is itself inconsistent with happiness. Take one
favorite subjects: Priam, who in his old age met with tragedy
proportion. According to the traditional monist account,
piness was impacted by the slaying and brutalization of hi
only because Priam was thereby robbed of the opportunit
his virtue as a father. Kraut (1989, 256) puts this unfort
of the monist reading bluntly and remarkably without com
loss of a [loved one] is not in itself a decrease in happiness.
tunes diminish and destroy happiness indirectly, because
virtuous activity." But if that is what monism entails, if it r
accommodate the direct and devastating impact of a chil
a parent's happiness, then monism appears to be both an u
and an implausible view.
4. Inclusivem
Thus, the complaint against monism is that it seriously undersells t

value of somatic and external goods by relegating them to a subsidia
role in aiding virtuous action. And that role seems inadequate in explain
ing Aristotle's apparent acceptance ofendoxic opinions celebrating th
value: could friendship really be valuable to happiness only insofar a
it facilitates virtue? Is that why it is good not to be lonely, and if so, w
that explanation preserve the everyday beliefs about friendship that Ar
istotle wants to accommodate? Working from the conviction that monis
saddles Aristotle with an implausible account of the external goods, t
inclusivist interpretation attributes to him a more commonsense vie
and it does this by claiming that Aristotle revises his original and radic
monist definition of happiness as "an activity of soul in accordance with
virtue" after reflecting on the value of external goods. Inclusivists take
it that his considered view is expressed at the conclusion of 1.10, where
Aristotle rhetorically asks: "So, why not call happy the person active in
accordance with complete virtue and sufficiently equipped with externa
goods, not for a chance time but for a complete life" (EN 1101al4)? M
tha Nussbaum (2001,330) calls this passage "as formally definitional
any in the EN" and concomitantly represents the inclusivi

favors this way: "[Aristotle's] ethical works display a conce
best human life as inclusive of a number of different constitu
being defined apart from each of the others and valued for it
(ibid, 296; emphasis added).6 T. H. Irwin agrees. Noting that, f
happiness must be "comprehensive and lacking in nothing
he reasons, " [I] f happiness is comprehensive, and goods de
fortune are genuine goods, then happiness must include th
94; emphasis added).
The attraction of inclusivism is that it is capable of rec
more diverse range of contributions that the external good
to happiness. Because they join psychological goods as con
happiness, their deprivation can impact happiness directl
merely by cheating a person of some opportunity to express h
the death of a family member or the onset of illness can itsel
front to happiness, independent of however it impedes one
for virtuous activities, just because it is painful.7 Unfortun
who defend an inclusivist interpretation of Aristotelian ha
a serious problem, and although the plausibility of the inclusiv
cannot definitely be settled here, the existence of this problem
burden of proof with them. The problem is simple: Aristot
to identify happiness in EN with virtuous activity, not wi
activity supplemented by external goods. In fact, he ends
discussion of the external goods at the close of book one n
inclusivist characterization of happiness Nussbaum calls de
but rather, with a reaffirmation of his original definition: "s
ness is some activity of the soul in accordance with complete v
ought to discuss the subject of virtue" (1102a5), which is e
he does in book two.
The passage in which Nussbaum claims Aristotle defines happiness

in inclusivist terms really is no definition at all, and this becomes clear
when we recall the context in which the passage occurs. When Aristotle
asks his rhetorical question near the end of 1.10, he is not redefining
happiness. He is concluding his response to a Solonic challenge he in
troduced at the beginning of that chapter, namely, "how can we call a
person happy before he dies?" Aristotle's response is to demand a reason
that we should not call a person happy when everything goes his way,
when he is "active in accordance with complete virtue and sufficiently
equipped with external goods, not for a chance time but for a complete
life." According to conventional thinking, such a person is the paradigm
of happiness. Aristotle makes exactly the move here we should expect
him to make when squaring his account with the endoxa: he appeals
to people's ordinary, nonphilosophical views about happiness to show
that his own view is not so outrageous. "It is not so outrageo

predicate happiness of a living person," he is saying; "people
time in ordinary talk about happiness." Here, Aristotle i
that his theory is consistent with people's everyday belie
5. Blessedness and Happiness
Defenders of an inclusivist interpretation of Aristotelian happin

thus, need to look elsewhere for support for their view. Still, they
right to complain that, if Aristotle is a monist about happiness, hi
count appears implausible insofar as monism as it thus far has be
defended restricts the external goods' significance, implausibly, to the
instrumental role in aiding virtuous activity. I want to show now
this need not be the case. Aristotle can maintain that the happy lif
the virtuous life and at the same time maintain that deprivation a
hardship can wreck our happiness directly and nonderivatively,
by causing pain, sadness, suffering, and dissatisfaction. To that e
consider this passage inclusivists sometimes cite in support of th
interpretation:
Many things happen by chance, differing in magnitude. Small turn
of good fortune or of its opposite clearly don't change the scales of a
person's life, but frequent great turns of fortune will, if they're good
make a life more blessed [makarion], both because [A] they themselves
beautify life and because [B] their use is noble and worthwhile. But
if they turn out to be the opposite they crush and maim blessedness,
because they both [A] bring pain and [B] impede many activities.
(EN 1100b22-28)
There is much to be said about this notorious passage. First, as inclusiv

ists maintain, Aristotle here clearly does recognize that nonpsychological
goods can affect our lives in diverse ways, both [A] bringing beauty or
pain and [B] aiding or obstructing our ability to act virtuously. We also
can begin to glimpse Aristotle's strategy for prioritizing external goods
and their value: utter deficiencies, reasonably enough, affect us in more
significant ways than do the ordinary upsets and accidents that litter our
daily lives. But before we address these issues, we need to address the
fact that Aristotle is not talking directly about happiness, eudaimonia,
but rather about blessedness, makariotës.
The relationship between happiness and blessedness in the EN is,
in fact, disputed and in no way simple. Nussbaum (2001, 329-36), for
example, argues that Aristotle uses the two terms interchangeably and
that there is no difference in meaning between them. H. H. Joachim
(1951,59-60), on the other hand, thinks the terms pick out two entirely
distinct things: happiness is the product of a person's behavior, while
blessedness is the product of good fortune. Such diametrically

interpretations are possible, I believe, because Aristotle does
the term blessedness in a consistent way. He sometimes pass
and forth between blessedness and happiness in the course of
argument, clearly meaning the same thing by each. For instance,
discussion of friendship in book nine, Aristotle asks whether
person needs friends and then immediately explains the motiv
his question, namely, people say the blessed do not need friends b
they are self-sufficient ( 1169b4). At other times, however, Aristot
does distinguish the happy from the blessed. For instance, in b
he explains that, if a good man faces great hardship nobly, w
him happy but not blessed (llOlal). In passages such this one, A
seems to treat blessedness not as something distinct from ha
but rather, as a more perfect form of happiness. Given this, I
that the blessed life represents not something different in kind
happy life but, rather, the fully happy life, the life in which ev
comes together: conditions are favorable, virtue is cultivated,
tune smiles. And if I am right, it is easy to see why Aristotle doe
each and every passage respect his own distinction between h
and blessedness: he uses the term blessedness to pick out the
life only when he wants to emphasize the fact that happiness
degrees and that, among the happy, some are happier than others
who realize the highest happiness lead lives that are not only
their lives are unmarred by significant pain and deprivation,
are, thereby, more beautiful and blessed (1100b27).
Thus, blessedness is a more perfect form of happiness, an id
sits atop a range of lives that achieve happiness to different
In this sense, the blessed life transcends ordinary human ha
and comes to resemble the life of a god. That Aristotle shou
ate the blessedly happy human life with the godlike life shou
as no surprise. Aristotle himself puts things in just this way
when distinguishing the kind of praise we owe humans and
accomplishments from the kind of praise we owe the gods and
complishments. We do not praise the gods in the way we praise o
men, for the gods are more perfect and realize a more perfect ex
Instead, "we call the gods and the most godlike of men blessed an
(.EN 1101b22). So, those who realize the highest happiness live
extent that humans are able, as though they are gods. Of course,
not gods, and humans can at best approximate the divine, for hum
divine lives are fundamentally different. The gods are self-suffic
no human can lead an entirely self-sufficient life.8 That is why A
concludes in book nine that the blessed do need friendship, for f
is among the most important human goods, and any human w
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY
the best human life needs the most important human goods (1169b9).
The difference between the happy (eudaimön) and blessed (makarion)
is not that the blessed are like the gods in being self-sufficient, then.
Rather, they are like the gods in being free from the ordinary suffering
and lack that characterize more ordinary human lives—even the lives
of the happy, who remain subject to the "small turns" of fortune that, as
Aristotle puts it, "don't change the scales of a person's life" (1100b22).
Bearing in mind the relationship between the happy and the blessed
life, we can return to the passage in which Aristotle claims that there
are two ways in which the external goods contribute to blessedness,
namely, their deprivation [A] inflicts pain and [B] obstructs virtue. It
should be clear now that, in talking about blessedness, Aristotle is not
talking about something altogether different from happiness, so this
passage is, in fact, relevant to Aristotle's understanding of eudaimonia.
Because he is here concerned with those who experience "frequent great
turns of fortune," both for better and for worse, it should be clear too that
Aristotle means his claim about the external goods to apply to people
leading a diverse range of lives, from those so blessedly happy that they
appear godlike in their good fortune at the one end, to those forced to
suffer the worst of reversals at the other end. If Aristotle is a consistent
monist about happiness as I maintain he is, we therefore need to ask
how to reconcile these two contributions the external goods make to the
happy person's life, [A] and [B], with Aristotle's singular identification
of happiness with virtuous activity.
6. Corrupting Attitudes
To do this, it is important to be clear about what Aristotle means when

he distinguishes the two ways in which external goods impact happiness
beginning with [A], the claim that deprivation can impact happine
directly, just by causing pain. Elsewhere in the Nicomachean Ethic
Aristotle discusses the impact of deprivation and hardship on happiness
When total or insurmountable, he explains, these may render a pers
so pitiful that no one would dare call him happy. It would be obvio
nonsense, Aristotle writes in a famous passage, to call a prisoner t
tured on the rack happy, even if he is just (JEN 1153b20). Likewise,
hardly makes sense to say of a person whose life is marked by chro
illness or disabling poverty or utter solitude that he is living happi
"It's possible for the most prosperous to fall into great misfortune in o
age, just like it's told of Priam in the Trojan War, and a person who has
experienced those sorts of chances and who has ended miserably no o
calls happy" (1100a5). Now, it is crucial to keep in mind exactly wh
Aristotle is saying in these passages. Those who call the prisoner hap
THE UGLY, THE LONELY, AND THE LOWLY
talk nonsense, while no one calls Priam happy (oudeis eudaimonizei).

In these passages, Aristotle is concerned again with the endoxa, and he
concedes what those opinions treat as indisputable: some lives are so
marked by suffering that it would be too outrageous to assess them as
happy, irrespective of whatever ostensibly virtuous feats a person might
accomplish. To call such lives happy would be bald abuse of the term.
Of course, if Aristotle is to make this concession to ordinary opinions
legitimate, he must be able to tell a theoretical story to back it up.
With that in mind, consider next the claim [B] that deprivation can
impede virtuous activities. To understand what Aristotle means, we need
to think anew about the different ways in which virtuous actions may be
impeded. Often enough deprivation straightforwardly renders a person
unable to perform some task she has set for herself, as if she has been
deprived of the necessary equipment, as monists traditionally maintain.
Deprivation also might close off life possibilities more generally, again
as monists traditionally maintain. But it also can be understood in an
other way once we recall that a person does not qualify as possessing
or as expressing a virtue if her behavior is grudging or uninterested or
unpleasant to her. One must take pleasure in one's virtuous activity
(1099al7-20). And so another sense in which one's virtuous actions
can be impeded seems to be this: sometimes deprivation may impact
happiness by changing a person's attitude toward behavior that poten
tially expresses virtue. That is to say, sometimes deprivation damages
a person in such a way that she can no longer enjoy or take appropri
ate satisfaction in the tasks she sets for herself. To be sure, Aristotle
nowhere explicitly claims this about deprivation, but there is no reason
to exclude this from his meaning. It follows naturally from his account
of virtuous behavior. And if this is right, we can see a sense in which
Aristotle's identification of happiness with virtuous activity can allow
for the commonsense idea that deprivation spoils happiness outright,
just by causing pain: namely, deprivation causes a kind of pain or dis
satisfaction that makes it impossible—not to engage in certain forms
of behavior, but rather—to engage in certain forms of behavior with the
appropriate attitude. In such cases, the hope of acting virtuously is a
nonstarter because the actor does not possess the psychological makeup
that is prerequisite for virtue.
If the proceeding suggestion is correct, we can draw a connection
between the claims that deprivation ruins happiness [B] by thwarting
virtuous behavior and [A] by causing pain: deprivation thwarts virtuous
behavior by causing pain. This does not yet make sense of the passage
in question or save monism, however, since this suggestion collapses
[A] and [B] into one another, while Aristotle treats them separately. To
make sense of the passage and save monism, deprivation must impact
happiness irrespective of the loss's effects on some specific, specifiable

virtuous action. Can such a position be rendered consistent with Aris
totle's monism about happiness? I think that it can, for the following
reason. We need not imagine, as we just did, that, to prevent happiness,
some particular deprivation (poverty, say) must impede some particular,
corresponding virtue (magnanimousness), as though we must be able
to trace a direct link between the loss or absence of this particular good
on the one hand and that discrete action on the other (poverty pollutes
my attitudes about donating money). We can imagine instead a life so
damaged by loss or absence that a person is unable to develop at all
the sorts of attitudes that are prerequisite to cultivating virtue. Real
poverty, for instance, might prevent me not only from taking appropriate
satisfaction in magnanimous acts; it might prevent me from developing
a capacity for any real sense of satisfaction at all. Similarly, the loss of
a loved one to tragedy surely forecloses some avenues for excellence: it
prevents me from distinguishing myself as a friend to that person. But
it also is the loss of someone about whom I care deeply, and, as such, it
affects the quality of my life in a way that is both more intimate and,
potentially, more global.
This sort of global contamination of character, I suggest, is the thrust
of [A], which tells us that the psychological effect of being deprived of
external goods might itself stifle any hopes for happiness by poison
ing a person's vision of the world, her attitudes, and her motivational
makeup. Such perversion of character ultimately does prevent people
from developing the capacity to act virtuously, and that is what renders
Aristotle's claim consistent with monism. But focusing on that point and
the theoretical story that makes Aristotle's claims all hang together
misses the commonsense endoxic point he wants to accommodate, the
point that suffering and dissatisfaction can render any description of
a life as happy plainly inappropriate. Now, as Aristotle stresses, for
misfortune to have such a profound effect on a person's psychological
makeup, the misfortune itself must be profound: only "frequent and
great turns of fortune" will ruin a person in this way, for happiness is
not easily taken from a person. And that is just what we should expect.
Aristotle is talking about extremes in this passage: the person whose
life seems "blessed" and "beautified" by godlike good graces, on the one
hand, and on the other hand, the person who suffers the fate of Priam.
Thus, it appears that a full complement of external goods is necessary
for a life to be blessedly happy, while thorough deprivation can prevent
even ordinary happiness. It does so either by obstructing particular
avenues for virtue or by ruining the capacity to develop virtue at all by
polluting a person's character. Between these extremes of blessedness
and wretchedness, however, there is vast space in which to cultivate
a happy existence. At one end, as we have seen, a person needs no ex

traordinary fortune, for "one shouldn't think that the happy person will
need many grand things even if he cannot be blessed without external
goods" (EN 1179al). So, happiness clearly is attainable for the lot of
us who are neither abundantly blessed nor particularly cursed. And at
the other end, even faced with considerable hardships, "the man who is
truly good and wise bears all of the chances of life gracefully and always
makes the best of his circumstances, just like a good general makes the
best strategic use of his soldiers." And in such cases "the happy man
will never become miserable, although neither will he be blessed, if he
should meet with the fortunes of Priam" (110 lai). So, while it is possible
for tragedy to disrupt our happiness, it also is possible through hard
work and determination to overcome those hardships that render our
struggle to live well the struggle it inevitably is. Inclusivists, thus, are
right to see in Aristotle a complex view about the relationship between
happiness and the goods of this world. I have tried to show, however,
that Aristotle's characteristic sensitivity to the complexity of our ethi
cal lives and to their dependence on external goods is compatible with
a monist understanding of happiness.
7. The Ugly, the Lonely, and the Lowly
Bearing all this in mind, I now want to return to the problematic remark
that inaugurated this investigation: the remark that the ugly, the lonely,
and the lowly are unlikely to lead happy lives. I already have tried to
show that Aristotle's remark here should sound, if not shallow, at least
not inconsistent with his theory of happiness. But it is not yet obvious
what precisely he means. A careful reading of this passage should il
lustrate exactly how the loss of external goods impinges on our ability to
lead what Aristotle takes to be good and happy human lives. And if the
interpretation I have advanced so far makes good sense of this passage,
that will count as strong evidence in its favor. So, consider the passage
in its entirety, divided into seven parts [C]—[I] :
[C] Yet as we were saying, it [happiness, eudaimonia] evidently re

quires the external goods as well. [D] For it's not possible, or it's not
easy, to do fine things when unequipped, since [E] on the one hand
many fine things are done through friends and wealth and political
influence, as though through instruments, and [F] on the other hand,
the deprivation of some goods, like a noble birth and good children
and physical beauty, tarnishes one's blessedness. [G] For a person
who is exceedingly ugly or basely born or who is alone and childless
won't be entirely happy. [H] And perhaps he'd be even less happy if
he had children or friends who were thoroughly wicked, or if he had
good children or friends who had died. [I] Thus, as we were saying,
happiness seems to require this sort of prosperity as well. And that's

why some people identify happiness with good fortune while others
identify it with virtue. (EN 1099a32-b8)
To give my interpretation a context, consider first the two interpreta

tions of the relationship between happiness and the external goods that I
so far have found lacking. Initially, the inclusivist reading seems to make
good sense of the passage. It alleges that [E] and [F] pick out two entirely
different manners in which the deprivation of external goods impacts
happiness, just as [A] and [B] did in the earlier passage from EN 1.10:
here, deprivation either [E] deprives a person of the instruments needed
to render her good character in good actions, or it [F] "tarnishes blessed
ness" in ways unrelated to the deprivation's effects on a person's capacity
to act well.9 Closer inspection renders this inclusivist interpretation less
attractive, however. I already have suggested that, outside the context of
passages such as this one, the inclusivist interpretation of happiness is
difficult to maintain. I also have argued that Aristotle thinks pain can spoil
happiness by corrupting a person's attitudes toward virtuous behavior. In
this passage specifically now, the inclusivist interpretation fails to respect
the grammar of Aristotle's claim: he clearly employs both [E] and [F] to
specify his claim in [D] further, that fine deeds are difficult or impossible
when improperly equipped. Thus, [E] and [F] give two distinct reasons
why the external and somatic goods are ultimately relevant to a person's
capacity for expressing virtue.10
Alternatively, the traditional monist interpretation insists that we
treat all the goods that Aristotle introduces here—friendship, wealth
and influence, good looks and family—as valuable because of their causal
contribution to successful performance. That immediately challenges us
to imagine ways in which, say, physical attractiveness affects a person's
ability to perform (that is, actually pull off) virtuous feats. John Cooper
(1985, 182-83) has produced one response to this challenge: if I am
abhorrently ugly, I will never have the opportunity to be tempted into
sexual promiscuity because nobody will want to sleep with me; thus, I
will never have the opportunity to develop the virtue of temperance. But
surely this stretches interpretive credibility.11 Not only does Cooper's
interpretation ignore a significant distinction between the two conjuncts
in [E] and [F], but it also saddles Aristotle with at best a superficial
view about how such conditions obstruct our potential for virtue. In fact,
Aristotle plainly signals that, in moving from [E] to [F], he is shifting
from those resources we use as tools to those resources whose absence
tarnishes blessedness. Now, I already have suggested that by blessed
ness Aristotle sometimes means perfect happiness, in the conventional
sense endorsed by the endoxa: the blessedly happy life is a life in which
everything goes well. And here we have new evidence for my suggestion,
for Aristotle immediately glosses his use of "blessedness" in [F] with the
claim in [G] that those deprived of noble birth, good children, and beauty
won't be "entirely happy" (panu eudaimonikos). Moreover, the earlier
passage (1100b22-28) from EN 1.10 give us strong reason to suppose
that, in talking about blessedness, Aristotle is not concerned with the
external goods' immediate instrumental contribution to the performance
of an activity: a catastrophic loss, he wrote there, may deprive me of the
tools I need to act virtuously, but such a loss also brings with it pain,
and that pain may directly impact my happiness, just as we ordinarily
would expect. Unfortunately, the traditional monist reading that limits
the role of external goods to tools used in the performance of actions
cannot make sense of this crucial claim. So, neither traditional reading
can explain this passage adequately.
A sensitive reading must recognize Aristotle's attentiveness to the
fact that we interact with and are constrained and enriched by the
world around us in immensely various ways. One significant sense in
which we need nonpsychological goods, but only one, recognizes the
basic instrumental value of having social influence, of being well liked
and financially comfortable. With friends, I can express my kindness,
my warmth, my fidelity in ways I never could were I solitary. With
wealth and political prestige, I can influence my community, improve
social conditions, publicly encourage the right kinds of values in ways
I couldn't if I occupied a more marginal social space. It is precisely this
sort of instrumental value that Aristotle means to capture in [Ε], where
he writes that "many fine things are done through friends and wealth
and political influence, as though through instruments." But as we have
seen, the lack of resources can mean different things for one's happiness,
affecting the quality of experiences in ways inadequately captured by
traditional instrumentalist analyses that focus on performance. Thus, in
[F] through [H], we see Aristotle progressively introducing more severe
ways in which deprivation works against us by introducing pain into
our lives. Surely, as he implies in [F], if I am just a little unattractive
or if I am not especially well off or if my children are, say, frequently
though not unexceptionally disobedient, I may regret that things did not
turn out better than they did. Surely, the lack of some things "tarnishes
blessedness," making life inevitably less than godlike. But just as surely
in [F], Aristotle does not mean to say that, by defiling our blessedness,
such routine disappointments wreck or even disturb our hopes for lead
ing happy lives. The person who is "truly good and wise" and who "bears
all the chances of life gracefully," we remember from before, may be
eudaimön though not makarion (EN llOlal). So, sometimes bad luck
in our personal affairs impacts us only mildly: pain stings and, thus,
disturbs our blessedness, but it hardly thereby obstructs our happiness.
Yet Aristotle also affirms that happiness sometimes is vulnerable to

the hardships of deprivation and bad luck, especially when those hard
ships compound, confronting us not as life's ordinary hurdles but as
extraordinary obstacles. Thus, as he writes in [G], nobody will be entirely
happy if he is exceedingly ugly to look at (not just mildly unattractive
but panaiskës) or basely born (not just born into an undistinguished
family) or both solitary and childless (not just unpopular or a little
lonely). And, finally, in [H] we are asked to consider genuine tragedy,
the kind of tragedy that completely turns a life upside down: surely a
person would be "even less happy if he had children or friends who were
thoroughly wicked, or if he had good children or friends who had died."
So in the most extreme instances of deprivation, the kind Aristotle in
troduces in [Η], social circumstances and tragedy can prevent us from
leading minimally happy lives. And while Aristotle does not explicitly
tell us why such considerations strip us of happiness, he hardly needs
to: for Aristotle, the fact that a person wracked by poverty or suffering
from a deformity or mourning the death of a family member does not
possess the minimum level of external resources required for happiness
goes without saying. It is an assumption brought in by the endoxa that
Aristotle cannot challenge. Those sorts of misfortunes can simply ruin
us, making any application of happiness—that ordinary concept whose
practical value any theoretical analysis must respect—just wildly in
appropriate. Perhaps Aristotle also is thinking about the way in which
these impede performative success. But more likely, he is thinking about
the brute impact that pain or disappointment or disenfranchisement
can have on one's psychological makeup, about the fact that sudden
tragedy or constant frustration or a demoralizing existence can pervert
one's character. It is difficult to nurture kindness, after all, in a relent
lessly cruel world; it is difficult to form meaningful relationships when
all one's friends are wicked; and it is difficult to develop proper pride
under constant ridicule about one's appearance.
8. Conclusion
We should, of course, be hesitant—perhaps outright offended even—b

Aristotle's small-mindedness with respect to those he calls "exceed
ingly ugly, basely born, or alone and childless." In fact, we have goo
reason to rejoin him with observations of our own about how superficial
inadequacies can open us to new possibilities: they provide us with op
portunities to prove ourselves in surprising ways, to shatter stereotypes
and to set examples that help others see their ostensible shortcomin
as occasions for unexpected excellence. But while Aristotle is sad
insensitive to these possibilities, we should not take the insensit
ity of his comments as an excuse to ignore the broader philosophic
point he is making about the significance of external goods in the good

human life. Different strategies have emerged for squaring Aristotle's
recognition of that significance with his definition of happiness, and I
have argued that, contrary to appearances, the monist strategy allows
Aristotle both to maintain his identification of happiness with virtue
and to tell a plausible story about how the deprivation of external
goods impacts happiness. Namely, deprivation sometimes stops us in
our tracks and prevents us from accomplishing what we have set out
to do, but it also sometimes spoils happiness just in virtue of the brute
suffering or disappointment it inflicts and the effects that suffering
and disappointment have on our character. In either case, Aristotle's
point is pragmatic. Like the capable military general who makes the
best strategic use of his army, so too we should make the best use of
the cards fate has dealt (EN llOlal). But also, just as we can hardly
predict that general's chances for military success without considering
the resources at his disposal, neither can we predict a person's chances
for leading a happy and good life without considering the resources at
her disposal, the obstacles that stand in her way, and the tricks of fate
that sometimes remove those obstacles.12
Southern Illinois University Edwardsville
NOTES
1. Aristotle inherits his division of human goods into psychological

matic, and external from Plato, who treats the division as commonplace
Euthydemus 279b, Philebus 48e, and Laws 743e.
2. For a defense of inclusivism, see Cooper 1985, Irwin 1985, and Nussbaum
2001. For the monist view, see especially Richard Kraut 1989.
3. This is a basic assumption in the contemporary philosophy of happin
too, sometimes called the criterion of descriptive adequacy. See Sumner 1
10-20; Haybron 2003, 317-18.
4. Aristotle's happiness even requires something like contemporary
satisfaction: although "all men desire" life, eudaimön people desire life m
"since for them life is most desirable," or "most choiceworthy" (toutois gar
bios airetötatos) (1170a26-28). Happiness requires enjoying life's pleasur
and positively endorsing them as good—that is, endorsing them as the k
of pleasures that make life worth living.
5. On the importance of succeeding in our virtuous activities, cf. 1098
where it is said that virtue must produce "good results," and 1099a4, where t
virtuous man and the victorious athlete are compared.
6. Cooper 1985, 174, agrees: the external goods mentioned here are not
just instruments of virtue; they are part of Aristotle's definition of happiness.
7. It should be noted that John Cooper's position is a bit anomalous. He
explicitly commits himself to inclusivism but also maintains that the external
goods are included in Aristotle's considered account of happiness only because
of their role in aiding virtue. For instance, he writes that "external goods are a
second component of eudaimonia, alongside virtuous activity, only because of
the effect they have in enabling the virtuous person to live, and go on living, a
fully virtuous life" (1985,196).
8. One should not confuse my claim here that a human life cannot be
self-sufficient with Aristotle's claim in 1.7 that eudaimonia is self-sufficient
(1097b5-15). When he says that eudaimonia is self-sufficient (autarkeias), he
means the activity characteristic of the eudaimön life is self-sufficient, not that
the life of the eudaimön person is self-sufficient in all ways. Thus, theoretical
contemplation, the activity Aristotle identifies in 10.7 as characteristic of per
fect happiness (teleia eudaimonia), is self-sufficient in that its practice requires
very few resources: one does not need to be equipped with much to engage in
the activity of contemplation. Yet the perfectly happy person's life is not itself
self-sufficient, for, like any life, it requires much to sustain it, from nutrition
and shelter to, as Aristotle acknowledges in book nine, friendship. On Aristotle's
meaning in claiming that eudaimonia is self-sufficient, see Heinaman 1987.
9. This is Irwin's reading (1985, 95-96).
10. The Ross-Urmson revised Oxford translation obscures this point by failing
to make explicit the men-de construction Aristotle employs in [E] and [F].
11. Sophie Botros (1986, 113) goes further, calling Cooper's suggestion
here "ludicrously contrived." Although I think that is much too strong, another
interpretation can render Aristotle's claim more plausible.
12. For many helpful comments, I want to thank Joshua Hochschild and
audience members at the 2005 meeting of the American Philosophical Associa
tion Central Division, where I presented an abbreviated version of this paper.
I also would like to thank audience members at Southern Illinois University
in Edwardsville, where I discussed this topic in a 2008 colloquium talk. Most
of all, I thank Eric Brown for invaluable input on multiple drafts of this paper.
REFERENCES
Aristotle. 1984. The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxfor

tions. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University P
Botros, Sophie. 1986. "Precarious Virtue." Phronesis 21:101-31.
Broadie, Sarah. 2002. "Philosophical Introduction and Commentary." In Aristo

tle: The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Christopher Rowe, 9-91. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Cooper, John. 1985. "Aristotle on the Goods of Fortune." Philosophical Review
94, no. 2: 173-96.
Haybron, Daniel. 2003. "What Do We Want from a Theory of Happiness?"

Metaphilosophy 34, no. 3: 305-29.
Heinaman, Robert. 1987. "Eudaimonia and Self-Sufficiency in the Nicomachean
Ethics." Phronesis 33: 31-53.
Irwin, T. H. 1985. "Permanent Happiness: Aristotle and Solon." Oxford Studie

in Ancient Philosophy. Vol. 3. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 89-124.
———. 1998. "The Virtues: Theory and Common Sense in Greek Philosophy." In
How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues, edited by Roger Crisp, 37-56
Clarendon Press: Oxford.
Joachim, H. H. 1951. Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon

Press.
Kraut, Richard. 1979. "Two Conceptions of Happiness." The Philosophical Re

view 88, no. 2:167-97.
. 1989. Aristotle on the Human Good. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press.
Nussbaum Martha. 1993. "Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach." In

The Quality of Life, edited by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, 242-69.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
. 2001. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and
Philosophy. Rev. Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sumner, Larry Wayne. 1996. Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon
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Vlastos, Gregory. 1991. Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.

Ristotle On Happiness

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North American Philosophical Publications

University of Illinois Press, North American Philosophical Publications are collaborating

THE UGLY, THE LONELY, AND THE LOWLY:

Aristotle sometimes simply calls them, external goods (ta

gue that two purportedly incompatible positions are compa

To understand the puzzle of the external goods, we need to begin with Ar

Within this context, too, Aristotle introduces another ordinary belief

unpleasant, unsatisfying, or loathsome from the perspective

Monism is the view that Aristotle is consistent throughout EN in think

their own sake is denied." The idea is straightforward. If happ

Thus, the complaint against monism is that it seriously undersells t

any in the EN" and concomitantly represents the inclusivi

The passage in which Nussbaum claims Aristotle defines happiness

that his own view is not so outrageous. "It is not so outrageo

5. Blessedness and Happiness

Defenders of an inclusivist interpretation of Aristotelian happin

There is much to be said about this notorious passage. First, as inclusiv

blessedness is the product of good fortune. Such diametrically

To do this, it is important to be clear about what Aristotle means when

talk nonsense, while no one calls Priam happy (oudeis eudaimonizei).

happiness irrespective of the loss's effects on some specific, specifiable

a happy existence. At one end, as we have seen, a person needs no ex

7. The Ugly, the Lonely, and the Lowly

[C] Yet as we were saying, it [happiness, eudaimonia] evidently re

happiness seems to require this sort of prosperity as well. And that's

To give my interpretation a context, consider first the two interpreta

Yet Aristotle also affirms that happiness sometimes is vulnerable to

We should, of course, be hesitant—perhaps outright offended even—b

point he is making about the significance of external goods in the good

Southern Illinois University Edwardsville

1. Aristotle inherits his division of human goods into psychological

Aristotle. 1984. The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxfor

Broadie, Sarah. 2002. "Philosophical Introduction and Commentary." In Aristo

Haybron, Daniel. 2003. "What Do We Want from a Theory of Happiness?"

Irwin, T. H. 1985. "Permanent Happiness: Aristotle and Solon." Oxford Studie

Joachim, H. H. 1951. Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon

Kraut, Richard. 1979. "Two Conceptions of Happiness." The Philosophical Re

. 1989. Aristotle on the Human Good. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Nussbaum Martha. 1993. "Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach." In

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