ARTICLE 1159
the negligence. The Court has said in Vda. de
1. United Alloy v. UCPB
Petitioners do not deny their liability under the above
quoted Surety Agreement. As correctly held by both
the RTC and the CA, Article 1159 of the Civil Code
expressly provides that "o]obligations arising from
contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in
good faith." The RTC as well as the CA found nothing
which would justify or excuse petitioners from
noncompliance with their obligations under the
contract they have entered into. Thus, it becomes
apparent that petitioners are merely attempting to
evade or, at least, delay the
inevitable performance of their obligation to pay under
the Surety Agreement and the subject promissory
notes which were executed in respondent's favor.
The Court notes, however, that the interest rates
imposed on the subject promissory notes were made
subject to review and adjustment at the sole discretion
and under the exclusive will of UCPB. Moreover, aside
from the Consolidated Statement of Account attached
to the demand letters addressed to petitioner spouses
Cha and their co-defendants, no other competent
evidence was shown to prove the total amount of
interest due on the above promissory notes. In fact,
based on the attached Consolidated Statement of
Account, UCB has already imposed a 24% interest
rate on the total amount due on respondents' peso
obligation for a short period of six months. Settled is
the rule that any contract which appears to be heavily
weighed in favor of one of the parties so as to lead to
an unconscionable result is void. Any stipulation
regarding the validity or compliance of the contract
which is left solely to the will of one of the parties, is
likewise, invalid.
Moreover, courts have the authority to strike down or
to modify provisions in promissory notes that grant the
lenders unrestrained power to increase interest rates,
penalties and other charges at the latter's sole
discretion and without giving prior notice to and
securing the consent of the borrowers. This unilateral
authority is anathema to the mutuality of contracts and
enable lenders to take undue advantage of borrowers.
Although the Usury Law has been effectively repealed,
courts may still reduce iniquitous or unconscionable
rates charged for the use of money. Xxx
ARTICLE 1162
1. Dela Cruz v. Octaviano
In order for liability from negligence to arise, there
must be not only proof of damage and negligence, but
also proof that the damage was the consequence of
Gregorio v. Go Chong Bing:
xx × Negligence as a source of obligation both under
the civil law and in American cases was carefully
considered and it was held:
We agree with counsel for appellant that under the
Civil Code, as under the generally accepted doctrine in
the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that
under consideration, in order to establish his right to a
recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant
personally or some person for whose acts it must
respond, was quilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the
negligence and the
damage.
In the case, this Court affirms the findings of the CA. In
ruling that petitioner was
negligent, the CA correctly appreciated the pieces of
evidence presented by the respondents, thus:
First, with regard to the damage or injury, there is no
question that the plaintiffs suffered damage due to the
incident on April 1, 1999. Plaintiff Renato Octavian's
right leg was crushed by the impact of the Honda Civic
driven by defendant Dela Cruz against the tricycle
where the Octavians were riding and as a result
thereof, Renato's right leg was amputated. Plaintiff
Wilma Octaviano suffered traumatic injuries/hematoma
on different parts of her body as borne by the evidence
submitted to the trial court. The damages or injuries
were duly proved by preponderant evidence.
Second, with regard to the wrongful act or omission
imputable to the negligence of defendant Al Dela Cruz,
We hold that the trial court missed the glaring fact that
defendant Dela Cruz was guilty of negligence.
With regard to the third requisite, that there be a direct
relation of cause and effect between the damage or
injury and the fault or negligence is clearly present in
the case at bar. Had defendant Dela Cruz exercised
caution, his Honda Civic would not have collided with
the tricycle and plaintiffs leg would not be crushed
necessitating its amputation. The cause of the injury or
damage to the plaintiffs leg is the negligent act of
defendant Dela Cruz.
The last requisite is that there be no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties. It is
undeniable that defendant and plaintiffs had no prior
contractual relation, that they were strangers to each
other before the
incident happened. Thus, the four requisites that must
concur under Article 2176 are clearly established in the
present case. Plaintiffs are entitled to claim damages.
2. Visayan Electric Co., Inc. vs. Alfeche
Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that
VECO's negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury suffered by respondents Emilio, Gilbert, and
Manugas. All the elements for liability for a quasidelict
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code have been shown
to be attendant on VECO's part.
The elements of a quasi-delict are:
(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some
other person for whose act he must respond; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence and the
damages incurred.
On the first element, it is undisputed that the Alfeches
and Manugas suffered damage because of the fire.
What has hitherto remained unresolved is which
between VECO and M. Lhuillier is liable to indemnify
them.
Fault is "a voluntary act or omission which causes
damage to the right of another giving rise to an
obligation on the part of [another."
On the other hand, "Negligence is the failure to
observe for the protection of the interest of another
person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand.
Between VECO and M. Lhuillier, it is VECO which this
Court finds to have been negligent.
M. Lhuillier was not negligent in installing its sianage. It
installed its signage in 1995 well before the road-
widening and drainage projects commenced and
ahead of VECO's relocation of its posts. Solon and
Camuta both emphasized that the signage was
installed free of any obstacle. Other than VECO's
evasive accusations, there is no proof to the contrary.
It was VECO that was negligent. It is apparent that it
transferred its posts and wires without regard for the
hazards that the transfer entailed, particularly with
respect to the installations which had previously been
distant from the wires and posts but which had since
come into close proximity.
VECO is a public utility tasked with distributing
electricity to consumers. It is its duty to ensure that its
posts are properly
and safely installed. As the holder of a public
franchise, it is to be presumed that it has the
necessary resources and expertise to enable a safe
and effective installation of its facilities.
By installing its posts and wires haphazardly, without
regard to how its wires could come in contact with a
previously installed signage, VECO failed to act in
keeping with the diligence required of it.
Proximate cause is defined as
"that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury and without
which the result would not have occurred."
VECO's negligence was the proximate cause of the
damage suffered by the Alfeches and Mangas. It is
settled that the confluence of proximity, abrasion, and
short-circuiting led to the fire. The first of
these-proximity arose because of VECO's relocation of
posts and wires. Installed in such a manner that its
wires constantly touched M. Lhuillier's signage, this
"led to the failure of the insulation thereby causing a
short circuit which eventually led to the breaking and
burning of the wire."
It was this burning wire that fell on the Alfeches'
residence's roof and burned down their house and
store, as well
as Mangas' adjacent shop.
VECO would have this Court sustain a flimsy excuse
for evading liability. Attempting to break the all too
apparent causal connection between its negligence
and the injury suffered by the plaintiffs, it would insist
on absurdities that strain common sense and vainly
attempt to discredit even its own witness. This Court
finds no merit in VECO's pretenses and sustains the
Court of Appeals decision.
3. Imperial vs. Heirs of Bayaban
One of the issues in Castilex was determining who had
the burden of proving that the act was within the scope
of the employee's assigned tasks. On this issue, this
Court said that the burden of proving the existence of
an employer-employee relationship and that the
employee was acting within the scope of his or her
assigned tasks rests with the plaintiff under the Latin
maxim "ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat" or
"he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove."
Therefore, it is not incumbent on the employer to prove
that the employee was not acting within the
scope of his assigned tasks. 70 Once the plaintiff
establishes the requisite facts, the presumption that
the employer was
negligent in the selection and supervision of the
employee arises, disputable with evidence that the
employer has observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. Though
vicarious, the liability of employers under Article 2180
is personal and direct.
Applying the foregoing, this Court finds that
respondents have discharged the burden of proof
necessary to hold Imperial vicariously liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
There is no question here that Laraga was petitioner's
driver, hence, his employee, as this fact was admitted
by petitioner. This Court likewise finds that
respondents have established that Laraga was acting
within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of
the accident. It was 3:00 p.m. and Laraga was driving
in Antipolo City, where, as alleged by petitioner, his
greenhouse and garden were located. It is worth
noting that according to petitioner, he loaned the van to
Pascua for the maintenance of his greenhouse and the
repair of the water line pipes in his garden. The logical
conclusion is that Laraga was driving the van in
connection with the upkeep of petitioner's Antipolo
greenhouse and garden. Laraga was driving the van in
furtherance of the interests of petitioner at the time of
the accident. xxX
Considering that petitioner failed to dispute the
presumption of negligence on his part, he was
correctly deemed liable for the damages incurred by
the Bayaban Spouses when the tricycle they were
riding collided with the van driven by petitioner's
employee, Laraga. It must be noted that the accident
happened because Laraga tried to overtake another
vehicle and, in doing so, drove to the opposite lane
when the van collided with the approaching tricycle.
Laraga was negligent in operating the van.
4. VDM Trading & Sps. Domingo v.
Carungcong
To constitute quasi-delict, the alleged fault or
negligence committed by the defendant must be the
proximate cause of the damage or injury
suffered by the plaintiff.
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury and without
which the result would not have occurred.
Stated in simple terms, it must be proven that the
supposed fault or negligence committed by the
respondents, i.e., the undertaking of plumbing works
on Unit 2308B-1, was the cause of the damage to the
Unit. Such was not proven by the petitioners.
First, as correctly observed by the CA, the claim that a
supposed leak in the plumbing works located in the
balcony of Unit 2308B-1 caused the leakage of soapy
water in various parts of the Unit, including the various
bedrooms inside the Unit, is highly doubtful and
illogical. As noted by the CA, the subiect plumbing
works are isolated in the balcony area of Unit 2308B-1.
The petitioners do not dispute that the said area is
separated from the other areas of the unit and sealed
off by a wall and beam. Hence, if a leakage in the
plumbing works on the balcony of Unit 2308B-1 indeed
occurred, it is highly improbable that such leak would
spread to a wide area of the Unit.
Second, aside from the unsubstantiated self-serving
testimony of Atty. Villareal, there was no evidence
presented to show that the supposed widespread leak
of soapy water in the various parts of the Unit was
caused by plumbing works on the balcony of Unit
2308B-1. No witness or document establishing a
causal link between the plumbing works and the
damage to the Unit was offered. The petitioners could
have utilized assessors or technical experts on
building and plumbing works to personally examine
and assess the damage caused to the Unit to provide
some substantiation to the claim of proximate cause.
However, no such witness was presented. The
petitioners relied solely on the testimony of their own
counsel, Atty. Villareal. Proximate cause cannot be
established by the mere say-so of a self-serving
witness.
Lastly, the fact that the plumbing works done in Unit
2308B-1 was not the cause of the damage suffered by
the petitioners' Unit is further supported by the factual
finding of the CA that a case before the HLURB was
previously filed by the petitioners against Golden
Dragon. In this complaint, which was offered in
evidence by the petitioners themselves, the latter
alleged that in 1996, way before the installation of the
subject plumbing works in Unit 2308B-1, they had
already discovered water leaks in the Unit which
damaged the interiors thereof. It was the petitioners'
allegation that the water leakage in the Unit was made
possible due to Golden Dragon's delivery of a
"defective and/or substandard unit "40 in fact, the CA
noted that the HLURB issued a Decision dated July 9,
2009 holding Golden Dragon liable for the water
leakage suffered by the petitioners. It is of no
coincidence that the award for actual damages ranted
to the petitioners is similar to the award for actual
damages sought by the petitioners in the instant case.
5. Heirs of Mendoza vs. ES Trucking
Forwarders
In this case, it has been proven by preponderant
evidence that Timtim recklessly drove the prime mover
truck which caused the death of Catalina. Although the
employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes
the employer vicariously liable on the basis of the civil
law principle of paterfamilias for failure to exercise
due care and vigilance over the acts of one's
subordinates to prevent damage to another. When the
employee causes damage due to his own negligence
while performing his own duties, there arises a
presumption that the employer is negligent. This may
be rebutted only by proof of observance of the
diligence of a good father of a family. The' "diligence of
a good father" referred to in the last paragraph of
Article 2180 means diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees.
In the selection of its prospective employees, the
employer is required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records. ES
Trucking did not require Timtim to present any
document other than his professional driver's license
and job application form.
XxX
ES Trucking was not only negligent in hiring Timtim but
even in supervising the latter. ES Trucking permitted
Timtim to drive the subject vehicle to transport goods
of its customers knowing that the vehicle is not duly
registered with the LTFRB.
6. Maitim vs. Aguila
Jurisprudence has established that under Article 2180,
"when an injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection or
both."
"The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is
direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior
recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of the insolvency of such employee."
Applying these concepts to the present case, the
finding of negligence against Santos gave rise to the
presumption of negligence on the part of Maitim in the
latter's selection and/or supervision of the former.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon Maitim to prove that
she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of her employee,
Santos.
XxXX
In Manliclic v. Calaunan. this Court ruled that:
In the selection of prospective employees, employers
are required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience and service records. In the supervision of
employees, the employer must formulate standard
operating procedures, monitor their implementation
and impose disciplinary measures for the breach
thereof. To fend off
vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete
proof, including documentary evidence, that they
complied with everything that was incumbent on them.
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, it was explained that:
Due diligence in the supervision of emplovees on the
other hand, includes the formulation of suitable rules
and requlations for the quidance of emplovees and the
issuance
of proper instructions intended for the protection of the
public and persons with whom the employer has
relations through his or its employees and the
imposition of
necessary disciplinary measures upon emplovees in
case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the
performance of acts indispensable to the business of
and
beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual
implementation and monitoring of consistent
compliance with said rules should be the constant
concern of the employer, acting through dependable
supervisors who should regularly report on their
supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees may be
deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to
emptilv invoke the existence of said companv
quidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As
the negligence of the emplovee gives rise to the
presumption of negligence on the part of the employer,
the latter has the burden of proving that it has been
diligent not only in the selection of employees but also
in the actual supervision of their work. The mere
allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and
supervisory policies, without anything more, is
decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to
all employers, that "the formulation of various company
policies on safety without showing that they were being
complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from
liability arising from negligence of its emplovees. It is
incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting
and employing the erring driver the recruitment
procedures and company policies on efficiency and
safety were followed. " xxx. (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)
Given the above, Maitim's attempt to deflect liability
clearly falls short as she was not able to present
concrete proof that she exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a familv in the selection
and supervision of her emplovee, Santos. Therefore,
the presumption of negligence against her stands, and
she must be held solidarily liable with Santos.
DISTINGUISHED TYPES OF CULPA
1. Cancio Jr. vs. Isip
The legal issues for resolution in the case at bar are:
1) whether the dismissal of the estafa cases against
respondent bars the institution of a civil action for
collection of the value of the checks subject of the
estafa cases; and
2) whether the filing of said civil action violated the
anti-forum-shopping rule.
An act or omission causing damage to another may
give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of
the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2)
independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not
arising from an act or omission complained of as
felony [e.g. culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil
Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and
culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code]; or (b)
where the injured party is granted a right to file an
action
independent and distinct from the criminal action
[Article 33, Civil Code]. Either of these two possible
liabilities
may be enforced against the offender subject,
however, to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil
Code that
the offended party cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission or under both causes.
Anent the independent civil actions under Articles 31,
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the old rules
considered them impliedly instituted with the civil
liability ex-delicto in the criminal action, unless the
offended
party waives the civil action, reserves his right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action. Under the present Rules,
however, the independent civil actions may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without
any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to
make a reservation in the criminal action is not a
waiver of the right to file a separate and independent
civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, a reading of the complaint filed by
petitioner show that his cause of action is based on
culpa contractual, an independent civil action.
2. LG Foods Corp v. Pagapong-Agraviador
Article 1161 of the Civil Code provides that civil
obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be
governed by penal laws subject to the provision of
Article 2177 and of the pertinent provision of Chapter
2, Preliminary Title on Human Relation, and of Title
XVIll of this Book, regulating damages. Plainly, Article
2177 provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff
may choose from in case the obligation has the
possibility of arising indirectly from the delict/crime or
directly from quasi-delict/tort. The choice is with the
plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his
initiatory pleading or complaint, and not with the
defendant who can not ask for the dismissal of the
plaintiff's cause of action or lack of it based on the
defendant's perception that the plaintiff should have
opted to file a claim under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the
employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned
upon prior recourse against the negligent employee
and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee.
Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death
of the couple's minor son was caused by the negligent
act of the petitioners' driver; and that the petitioners
themselves were civilly liable for the negligence of their
driver for failing "to exercise the necessary diligence
required of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of [their] employee, the driver, which
diligence, if exercised, would have prevented said
accident."
Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the
petitioners based on Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, they would have alleged that the guilt of the
driver had been proven beyond reasonable doubt; that
such accused driver is insolvent; that it is the
subsidiary liability of the defendant petitioners as
employers to pay for the damage done by their
employee (driver) based on the principle that every
person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Since there
was no conviction in the criminal case against the
driver, precisely because death intervened prior to the
termination of the criminal proceedings, the spouses'
recourse was, therefore, to sue the petitioners for their
direct and primary liability based on quasi-delict.
3. Lim v. Kou Co Ping
Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those
arising from other sources of obligations are
authorized by law to proceed independently of each
other, the resolution of the present issue hinges on
whether the two cases herein involve different kinds of
civil obligations such that they can proceed
independently of each other. The answer is in the
affirmative.
The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it
having been instituted together with the criminal action.
On the other hand, the second action, judging by the
allegations contained in the complaint, is a civil action
arising from a contractual obligation and for tortious
conduct (abuse of rights). xxx
Thus. Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves onlv the
obliaations arisina from contract and from tort,
whereas the appeal in the estafa case involves only
the civil obliaations of Co arisina from the offense
charged. Thev present different causes of action,
which under the law, are considered "separate,
distinct, and independent" from each other. Both cases
can proceed to their final adjudication, subject to the
prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177 of
the Civil Code.
4. Keihin-Everett v. Tokio Marine
Finally. Keihin-Everett maintained that at the time when
the cargoes were lost, it was already in the custody of
Sunfreight Forwarders. Notwithstanding that the
cargoes were in the possession of Sunfreight
Forwarders when they were hijacked, Keihin-Everett is
not absolved from its liability as a common carrier.
Keihin-Everett seems to have overlooked that it was
the one whose services were engaged by Honda
Trading to clear and withdraw the cargoes from the
pier and to transport and deliver the same to its
warehouse. In turn, Keihin-Everett accredited
Sunfreight Forwarders to render common carrier
service for it by transporting inland goods. As correctly
held by the CA, there was no privity of contract
between Honda Trading (to whose rights Tokio Marine
was subrogated) and Sunfreight Forwarders. Hence,
Keihin-Everett, as the common carrier, remained
responsible to Honda Trading for the lost cargoes.
In this light, Keihin-Everett, as a common carrier, is
mandated to observe, under Article 1733 of the Civil
Code, extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods it transports according to all the circumstances
of each case. In the event that the goods are lost,
destroyed or deteriorated, it is presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves
that it observed extraordinary diligence. 29 To be sure,
under Article 1736 of the Civil Code, a common
carrier's extraordinary responsibility over the shipper's
goods lasts from the time these goods are
unconditionally placed in the possession of, and
received by, the carrier for transportation, until they are
delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to
the consignee, or to the person who has a right to
receive them. Hence, at the time Keihin-
Everett turned over the custody of the cargoes to
Sunfreight Forwarders for inland transportation, it is
still required to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance of the goods. Failure to successfully establish
this carries with it the presumption of fault or
negligence, thus, rendering Keihin-Everett liable to
Honda Trading for breach of contract.
It bears to stress that the hijacking of the goods is not
considered a fortuitous event or a force majeure. 30
Nevertheless, a common carrier may absolve itself of
liability for a resulting loss caused by robbery or
hijacked if it is proven that the robber or hijacking was
attended by grave or irresistible threat, violence or
force. In this case, Keihin-Everett failed to prove the
existence of the aforementioned instances
Finally. Keihin-Everett maintained that at the time when
the cargoes were lost, it was already in the custody of
Sunfreight Forwarders. Notwithstanding that the
cargoes were in the possession of Sunfreight
Forwarders when they were hijacked, Keihin-Everett is
not absolved from its liability as a common carrier.
Keihin-Everett seems to have overlooked that it was
the one whose services were engaged by Honda
Trading to clear and withdraw the cargoes from the
pier and to transport and deliver the same to its
warehouse. In turn, Keihin-Everett accredited
Sunfreight Forwarders to render common carrier
service for it by transporting inland goods. As correctly
held by the CA, there was no privity of contract
between Honda Trading (to whose rights Tokio Marine
was subrogated) and Sunfreight Forwarders. Hence,
Keihin-Everett, as the common carrier, remained
responsible to Honda Trading for the lost cargoes.
In this light, Keihin-Everett, as a common carrier, is
mandated to observe, under Article 1733 of the Civil
Code, extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods it transports according to all the circumstances
of each case. In the event that the goods are lost,
destroyed or deteriorated, it is presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves
that it observed extraordinary diligence. 29 To be sure,
under Article 1736 of the Civil Code, a common
carrier's extraordinary responsibility over the shipper's
goods lasts from the time these goods are
unconditionally placed in the possession of, and
received by, the carrier for transportation, until they are
delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to
the consignee, or to the person who has a right to
receive them. Hence, at the time Keihin-Everett turned
over the custody of the cargoes to Sunfreight
Forwarders for inland transportation, it is still required
to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance of
the goods. Failure to successfully establish this carries
with it the presumption of fault or negligence, thus,
rendering Keihin-Everett liable to Honda Trading for
breach of contract.
It bears to stress that the hijacking of the goods is not
considered a fortuitous event or a force majeure. 30
Nevertheless, a common carrier may absolve itself of
liability for a resulting loss caused by robbery or
hijacked if it is proven that the robber or hijacking was
attended by grave or irresistible threat, violence or
force. 31 In this case, Keihin-Everett failed to prove the
existence of the aforementioned instances
5. De Jesus vs. Uyloan
The above complaint indeed states a categorical
declaration of the case being brought on the basis of a
"medical contract between the Plaintiffs
and Defendants Uyloan and Ojeda" under the
statement of cause of action against said doctors. 30
However, the rest of the allegations and
arguments unmistakably show that the cause of action
is premised upon the law and jurisprudence on
damages in general and medical
negligence under the Civil Code provisions on
quasi-delict. There is no mention at all of any express
promise on the part of the defendant doctors
to provide medical treatment or achieve a specific
result. The absence of an express agreement as basis
for contractual liability is evident from a
plain invocation of an implied contract between the
parties.
In Casumpang v. Cortejo, 31 We expounded on the
establishment of a physician-patient relationship, as
follows:
A physician-patient relationship is created when a
patient engages the services of a physician, and the
latter accepts or agrees to provide care to
the patient. The establishment of this relationship is
consensual, and the acceptance by the physician
essential. The mere fact that an individual
approaches a physician and seeks diagnosis, advice
or treatment does not create the duty of care unless
the physician agrees.
The consent needed to create the relationship does
not always need to be express. In the absence of an
express agreement, a physician-patient
relationship may be implied from the physician's
affirmative action to diagnose and/or treat a patient, or
in his participation in such diagnosis
and/or treatment. The usual illustration would be the
case of a patient who goes to a hospital or a clinic, and
is examined and treated by the
doctor. In this case, we can infer, based on the
established and customary practice in the medical
community that a patient-physician relationship
exists. 32 (citations omitted, emphases supplied)
The fact that the physician-patient relationship is
consensual does not necessarily mean it is a
contractual relation, in the sense in which
petitioner emplovs this term by equating it with any
other transaction involving exchange of monev for
services. Indeed, the medical profession is
affected with public interest. 33 Once a
physician-patient relationship is established, the legal
duty of care follows. The doctor accordingly
becomes duty-bound to use at least the same
standard of care that a reasonably competent doctor
would use to treat a medical condition under
similar circumstances. 34 Breach of duty occurs when
the doctor fails to comply with, or improperly performs
his duties under professional
standards. This determination is both factual and legal,
and is specific to each individual case. 35 If the
patient, as a result of the breach of duty,
is injured in body or in health, actionable malpractice is
committed, entitling the patient to damages.
6. Fagarido and Milan v. Alcantara
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that "employers
shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees .
. acting within the scope of their assigned tasks[.]" 57
As this
Court has said, "foince negligence on the part of the
employee is established, a presumption
instantly arises that the employer was negligent in the
selection and/or supervision of said
employee." 58 The employer may refute this
presumption by presenting adequate evidence
that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision
of their employee. 59
A review of the records reveals that petitioner Milan,
the registered owner of the jeepney, had
never personally vetted petitioner Fegarido when he
was applying as driver. She delegated
her legal duties to her husband Nestor, who admitted
having tested Fegarido's driving skill
only once. Nestor likewise testified that he never
experienced riding with Fegarido as the
driver. Moreover, Fegarido was required to submit only
clearances from the police and the
National Bureau of Investigation, but was not required
to undergo a medical, physiological, or even drug test.
Petitioner Milan failed to exercise the diligence that the
law requires of her in selecting and
supervising her employees. Nestor's testimony
confirms the insufficient screening process
petitioner Fegarido had gone through before being
employed. Accordingly, this Court affirms
the Court of Appeals' ruling that she is vicariously
liable for Alcantara's death, and must
solidarily pay with petitioner Fegarido the liabilities they
owe respondents.
ARTICLE 1164 - RIGHT OF CREDITOR TO THE
FRUITS
1. PNB vs. Maranon
Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the
property producing it by right of accession. The rightful
recipient of the
disputed rent in this case should thus be the owner of
the subject lot at the time the rent accrued. It is beyond
question that
Spouses Marañon never lost ownership over the
subject lot. This is the precise consequence of the final
and executory
judgment in Civil Case No. 7213 rendered by the RTC
on June 3, 2006 whereby the title to the subject lot was
reconveyed
to them and the cloud thereon consisting of Emilie's
fraudulently obtained title was removed. Ideally, the
present dispute
can be simply resolved on the basis of such
pronouncement. However, the application of related
legal principles ought to
be clarified in order to settle the intervening right of PB
as a mortgagee in good faith.
The protection afforded to PB as a mortgagee in good
faith refers to the right to have its mortgage lien carried
over and
annotated on the new certificate of title issued to
Spouses Marañon as so adjudged by the RTC.
Thereafter, to enforce
such lien thru foreclosure proceedings in case of
non-payment of the secured debt, as PB did so
pursue. The principle,
however, is not the singular rule that governs real
estate mortgages and foreclosures attended by
fraudulent transfers to
the mortgagor.
Rent, as an accessory follow the principal. In fact,
when the principal property is mortgaged, the
mortgage shall include all
natural or civil fruits and improvements found thereon
when the secured obligation becomes due as provided
in Article
2127 of the Civil Code. Consequently, in case of
non-payment of the secured debt, foreclosure
proceedings shall cover not
only the hypothecated property but all its accessions
and accessories as well. × xX
It is beyond question that PNB's mortgagors, Spouses
Montealegre, are not the true owners of the subject lot
much less of
the building which produced the disputed rent. The
foreclosure proceedings on August 16, 1991 caused
by PB could not
have, thus, included the building found on the subject
lot and the rent it yields. PNB's lien as a mortgagee in
good faith
pertains to the subject lot alone because the rule that
improvements shall follow the principal in a mortgage
under Article
2127 of the Civil Code does not apply under the
premises. Accordingly, since the building was not
foreclosed, it remains a
property of Spouses Marañon; it is not affected by
non-redemption and is excluded from any
consolidation of title made by
PB over the subject lot. Thus, PNB's claim for the rent
paid by Tolete has no basis.
2. Magdalino vs. Bragat
It is not disputed that the spouses Azur and Profitiza
Pastrano had previously sold on
November 18, 1968, via a Deed of Definite Sale of
Unregistered Coconut and Residential
Land, the property to Eustaquio Ledesma. Therefore,
as early as such date, it is
established that the Pastranos no longer had
ownership over the property.
Then, as Ledesma subsequently sold, in 1970, a
portion of the property to the petitioner
Spouses Badilla, who immediately took delivery and
possession, ownership of this portion
had also been transferred to the said spouses.
Although that sale appears to be merely
verbal, and payment therefor was to be made on
installment, it is a partially consummated
sale, with the Badillas paying the initial purchase price
and Ledesma surrendering
possession. That the parties intended for ownership to
be transferred may be inferred from
their lack of any agreement stipulating that ownership
of the property is reserved by the
seller and shall not pass to the buyer until the latter
has fully paid the purchase price. The
fact is, Ledesma even delivered to the Badillas the
owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P.
2035. The Civil Code states that ownership of the thing
sold is transferred to the vendee
upon the actual or constructive delivery of the same.35
And the thing is understood as
delivered when it is placed in the control and
possession of the vendee. Payment of the
purchase price is not essential to the transfer of
ownership as long as the property sold
has been delivered; and such delivery (tradition)
operated to divest the vendor of title to the property
which may not be regained or recovered until and
unless the contract is resolved or rescinded in
accordance with law.
ARTICLE 1166
 1. Delos Reyes v. Municipality of Kalibo
It must be noted that the Peraltas, the petitioners in the
instant case, are not even registered owners of the
area adjacent to the
increment claimed, much less of the subject parcels of
land. Only the late Juanito became the registered
owner of Lot 2076-A,
the lot next to the supposed accretion. Assuming that
the petitioners are Juanito's rightful successors, they
still did not register
the subject increment under their names. It is settled
that an accretion does not automatically become
registered land just
because the lot that receives such accretion is covered
by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is one
thing; registration
under the Torrens system of that ownership is another.
Ownership over the accretion received by the land
adjoining a river is
governed by the Civil Code; imprescriptibility of
registered land is provided in the registration law.
Registration under the Land
Registration and Cadastral Act does not vest or give
title to the land, but merely confirms and, thereafter,
protects the title
already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to
obtain this protection, the land
must be placed under the operation of the registration
laws, wherein certain judicial procedures have been
provided. xXX
Article 457 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, under
which the Peraltas claim ownership over the disputed
parcels of land,
provides:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects
of the current of the waters.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited
along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be
considered accretion,
must be:
(a) gradual and imperceptible;
(b) made through the effects of the current of the
water; and
(c) taking place on land
adjacent to the banks of rivers.
XXX
Indeed, by reason of their special knowledge and
expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction,
administrative agencies,
like the DENR, are in a better position to pass
judgment on the same, and their findings of fact are
generally accorded great
respect, if not finality, by the courts. Such findings must
be respected as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence,
even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even
preponderant. Hence, the questionable character of
the land, which could most probably be part of the
public domain, indeed bars Jose from validly
transferring the increment to any of his successors.
ARTICLE 1167
1. Pascua vs. G&G Real TV Corp.
All told, we are not persuaded with respondents bare
claim that petitioner caused the delay in the completion
of the project. On the contrary, testimonial and
documentary proof strongly show that the delay was
caused
by the additional works and change order works
required by respondent which were not part of the
original
Agreement.
Apropos, Dieparine, Jr. v. Court of Appeals I,ri½all
states that "a construction contract necessarily
involves
reciprocal obligations, as it imposes upon the
contractor the obligation to build the structure subject
of the
contract, and upon the owner the obligation to pay for
the project upon its completion.
Pursuant to the aforementioned contractual
obligations, petitioner completed the construction of
the four-
storey commercial building and two-storey kitchen with
dining hall. Thus, this Court finds no legal basis for
respondent to not comply with its obligation to pay the
balance of the contract price due the petitioner.
What's more, in Heirs of Ramon Gaite v. The Plaza,
Inc., 19},rill this Court held that "under the principle of
quantum merit, a contractor is allowed to recover the
reasonable value of the thing or service rendered in
order to avoid unjust enrichment. Quantum merit
means that in an action for work and labor, payment
shall
be made in such amount as the plaintiff reasonably
deserves. To deny payment for a building almost
completed and already occupied would be to permit
unjust enrichment at the expense of the contractor."
As in this case, petitioner already completed the
construction of the project. Hence, it would be the
height of injustice to allow respondent to enjoy the
fruits of petitioner's labor without paying the contract
price.
2. BF Corp. vs. Werdenberg International
Petitioner wrote respondent a letter of turnover dated do all things necessary for the proper construction and
August 16, 1995. On August 18, 1995, respondent completion of all work shown and described in the
replied, detailing its Contract
comments on the turnover list. A recurring comment Document," 59 in this case, a "water distribution and
was the need to either re-paint or to complete the elevated steel water reservoir," 60 the reasons given
painting job. by HSPCDC in not
Respondent rejected the turnover until such time that finishing the well-drilling and elevated water steel tank
petitioner would have "favorably remedied cannot excuse it for non-delivery.
(respondent's] complaints on As correctly ruled by the RTC, HSPCDC's failure to
the defects xox and generally on workmanship of the comply with its obligation to undertake the well-drilling
building." Petitioner acknowledged these defects in a and to put up the
letter dated steel water tank renders it liable under Article 1167 of
October 11, 1995 and informed respondent that it will the Civil Code which provides:
proceed with repainting. Clearly, the defects in the Art. 1167. If a person obliged to do something fails to
painting job were do it, the same shall be executed at his cost.
covered by the guarantee of petitioner. This same rule shall be observed if he does it in
The bid proposal of petitioner stipulates the following: contravention of the tenor of the obligation.
"All works shall be under our guarantee for a period of Furthermore, it may be decreed
one (1) year. Any that what has been poorly done be undone.
defects that may arise due to poor workmanship and Under this provision, a contractor shall be liable for the
inferior quality of material supplied from the date of costs incurred by the developer in hiring the services
acceptance and of other
guarantee period shall be repaired and replaced by us subcontractors to complete the unfinished work left by
without any cost to the Owner. Section 15 of the the original contractor. Here, there is no question that
Construction HSPCDC failed to
Agreement provides in part: finish the well-drilling and elevated steel water tank
15. GUARANTEE - It is expressly agreed and and SDC had to engage the services of other
understood that the CONTRACTOR guarantees the subcontractors to finish
work against all defects of these projects, the costs of which were duly supported
materials and workmanship for a period of (1) one year by receipts admitted and given weight by the courts a
from the date of issuances [sic] of the letter of quo.
acceptance. Any defects
discovered during said period shall be made good by
the CONTRACTOR at its own expense upon
notification in writing by the
OWNER, xx x"
However, the repainting job still proved deficient. In a
letter dated May 31, 1996,121 respondent informed
petitioner that it has
taken the initiative to get an outside contractor for the
subsisting deficiencies. Respondent subsequently
contracted Silver Line
Builders for the repainting job in the contract price of
Php 1,050,000.00.122 Petitioner should answer for
these expenses,
pursuant to Article 1167 of the Civil Code:
Art. 1167. If a person obliged to do something fails to
do it, the same shall be executed at his cost.
This same rule shall be observed if he does it in
contravention of the tenor of the obligation.
Furthermore, it may be decreed
that what has been poorly done be undone.

3.H.S. Power Construction v. Shaughnessy Dev't

As HSPCDC bound itself under the contract "to fully

and faithfully perform all labor, furnish all tools xxx
material xxx and will