Caso 2 - 422098-PDF-ENG

9- 4 2 2 - 098
JULY 18, 2022
BORIS GROYSBERG
GREG GOULLET
KATHERINE CONNOLLY BADEN
SARAH L. ABBOTT
Operation Overlord
“We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with
growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, we
shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we
shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender,”
— Winston Churchill, June 4, 19401
On June 6, 1944, nearly 5,000 ships, 11,000 planes, and 160,000 infantrymen under an Allied joint-
command of American, British, and Canadian leaders were sent across the English Channel, with hopes
of re-establishing a foothold in Nazi-occupied France. Known as D-Day, June 6 marked a definitive
turning point in World War II and was viewed by many as the most significant military campaign in
history. It was also one of the riskiest. The initial commanders in charge of drawing up the invasion
frequently shared pessimistic feelings regarding the invasion, code named Operation Overlord, noting
that the odds seemed overwhelmingly against them. 2 And even in the days leading up to the invasion,
concerns remained. General Eisenhower, who led Operation Overlord, prepared a speech to deliver
to the troops in the event that the invasion failed. 3
Operation Overlord required years of diligent planning and countless hours of labor from Allied
soldiers and citizens. Before they could attempt a successful invasion of continental Europe, British and
American leadership recognized large scale preparatory efforts must take place: the establishment of a
leadership team and organizational structure, the arrival of Allied troops in England and subsequent
training sessions, the containment of German air superiority over Europe as well as its supply lines,
and finally, the development and use of innovative information sources in planning the attack.
Background
The unprecedented slaughter of World War I, known at the time as the Great War, left much of
Europe in a state of despair. The gruesome conflict resulted in an estimated 40 million casualties, both
civilian and soldier, a significantly higher number than had been seen in previous wars. In June of 1919,
Professor Boris Groysberg, independent researcher Greg Goullet, and Research Associates Katherine Connolly Baden and Sarah L. Abbott prepared
this case. This case was developed from published sources. Funding for the development of this case was provided by Harvard Business School
and not by the company. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources
of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management.
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This document is authorized for use only in jaime.salomon@epg.usil.pe's Prospectiva - Doctorado de Administración at Universidad San Ignacio de Loyola (USIL) from Dec 2023 to Jun 2024.
422-098 Operation Overlord
the Great War had come to a conclusion when Germany signed the Treaty of Versailles, written by the
victorious Allied nations, mainly France, Great Britain, the United States, Russia, Japan, and Italy. The
Treaty placed sole blame for the war on Germany, and forced them to pay heavy reparations as well
as give up significant territories. 4 Germans, politically embarrassed and economically devastated, felt
betrayed by their leaders who had misled the population on the true state of the war. Germans
demanded the crown of William II and installed the democratic Weimar Republic, marking the end of
the German Empire. Unfortunately, the Weimar Republic never truly had a chance to stabilize after the
severe impact of WWI, and faced further turmoil once the Great Depression of 1929 laid waste to the
global economy. Such uncertain and tough times lead to the rising popularity of extremist political
parties and strong leaders. 5 The emergent Nazi party and Adolf Hitler gained popularity, especially
among young men who felt great pride for their German ancestry and extreme anger at the
embarrassing defeat of WWI. Promising to return glory to Germany along with wealth and power,
after he was elected president on August 19, 1934, Hitler immediately began rebuilding the military,
which had been heavily restricted by the Treaty of Versailles. In 1936, Hitler had German troops retake
the culturally German region of the Rhineland in France that had been stripped from them by the
Treaty. In 1938, Germany annexed Austria. The British and French, still reeling from the effects of
World War I, had very little desire for another large-scale conflict and offered little opposition.
Germany, Italy, Great Britain, and France signed the Munich agreement, giving Germany control over
the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia (another German speaking area taken from Germany
following World War I). British Prime Minister Chamberlain insisted upon a policy of Appeasement,
in an effort to prevent another war. Essentially, this policy acknowledged that the punishments for
Germany had been overly harsh, and dismissed Hitler’s unchecked aggression and territorial
expansion. Chamberlain and much of the British parliament —Churchill was notably critical of the
policy — believed or hoped that Hitler’s expansionist desires would be satisfied with just the
Rhineland, Austria, and the Sudetenland. 6 Appeasement ultimately failed, and Great Britain and
France declared war on Germany after its troops invaded Poland on September 1, 1939.
Prior to Germany’s invasion of Poland, Hitler and Joseph Stalin, leader of the Soviet Union, had
signed a Nonaggression Pact. The agreement stated the Soviets would work with the Nazis in dividing
up Poland. Poland fell soon after. The Soviets captured Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania before moving
up to defeat Finland. Meanwhile, German U-boat submarines carried out major blows to the British
navy as well as civilian merchant ships. By April of 1940, German troops had entered Norway and
Denmark. In May, the Nazis quickly took Belgium and the Netherlands. Their Blitzkrieg style of
warfare proved incredibly effective, as they rapidly marched through Europe with few casualties and
little resistance. (Meaning “lightning war,” Blitzkrieg utilized surprise attacks and overwhelming force
to secure quick wins.) After forcing the retreat and evacuation of British soldiers at the French port of
Dunkirk in May, the Germans took Paris by mid-June. Hitler, now allied with Italy and its fascist
dictator Mussolini, turned his attention towards Great Britain. Since Hitler could not yet carry out a
sea-to-land invasion of Britain, the Germans began a long and deadly bombing campaign, targeting
industrial centers and cities, mostly London. Known as the Battle of Britain, this bombing lasted from
September 1940 to May 1941. Eventually, the British Royal Air Force managed to force Hitler and the
German Luftwaffe (air force) to temporarily abandon their bombing efforts and plans to invade.
On June 22, 1941, the Nazis embarked on Operation Barbarossa, a surprise invasion of the Soviet
Union. Though they had up until this point been allies, albeit shaky ones, Hitler had always planned
to invade the Soviet Union for its vast territory. To Hitler, who hated communism and Stalin’s regime,
this land was valuable as “Lebensraum” or “living space,” for the citizens of his thousand year Reich
(kingdom). 7 Stalin and the Soviets were totally unprepared for war, and the German army moved
towards Moscow, Stalingrad, and Leningrad, slaughtering soldiers and civilians in their way.
Operation Overlord 422-098
However, the Soviet army was large, and the Nazis were unprepared for the winter weather.
Overextended and overwhelmed, they were eventually forced to retreat. 8
On December 7, 1941, Japanese planes attacked a U.S. Naval fleet (planes and battleships) stationed
at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The next day, the U.S. declared war on Japan. Germany and Italy, in turn,
declared war on the U.S. Prior to this, the U.S. had been supplying war equipment to Great Britain
under its Lend Lease program, allowing Great Britain to defer payment on goods received. Following
the Pearl Harbor attack, Winston Churchill, who had succeeded Chamberlain as prime minister in 1940,
traveled to Washington D.C. to meet with President Franklin Roosevelt. The two decided on a
“Germany First” strategy to fighting the war, believing that Germany posed a greater threat than
Japan. 9 After the German army began its retreat from Russia, Stalin urged the United States and Britain
to open up a second front in Europe, in order to give the Allies the best chance at pushing the Nazis
back into Germany for a sure defeat. 10
Leadership and Organization

The cohesive nature of the U.S.-British alliance in planning and waging Operation Overlord started
at the very top. President Roosevelt’s decision to prioritize the war in Europe over the war in Asia
(despite U.S. public opinion, which was firmly in favor of retaliation against Japan) was critical.
Churchill commented to the press after the U.S. formally joined the war, “I can’t describe the feelings
of relief with which I find . . . the United States and Britain standing side by side…It is incredible. Thank
God.” 11
US. and British and military cooperation took place under the auspices of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff, comprised of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
Normandy invasion was led by the binational Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
(SHAEF). Below SHAEF, troops were grouped by military brand (army, navy, air force) but the
binational command structure was maintained−ensuring cooperation and information sharing were
occurring at all levels of the military 12 Allied leadership tried to break down as many silos as possible
to ensure cohesion. One author noted, “It was no coincidence that the commanders who had shown
themselves most adept in joint, interservice operations in the Mediterranean theater—Eisenhower,
Tedder, Ramsay—were brought back to London in late 1943 to run the show.” 13 See Exhibit 1 for a
graphic overview of the D-Day chain of command.
The first official preparations for the Allied invasion of Europe were headed by British Lieutenant
General Frederick E. Morgan. Morgan was named Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander
(COSSAC) in March 1943 before a Supreme Allied Commander had even been appointed. With no boss
and vague and often conflicting guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Morgan began to prepare
an attack. Morgan and the other British commanders who headed the initial invasion plans were fully
aware that if they failed it would be several years before another campaign would be possible. Before
handing off command to the American General and Supreme Allied Commander, General Morgan and
his team had finalized the selection of the beaches of Normandy as the landing spot for the invasion
and had a plan in place that solved most of the large problems associated with such a landing. 14
Supreme Commander Eisenhower

In December 1943, General Dwight D. Eisenhower was named the Supreme Commander of the
Allied Forces in Europe — a position tasked with invading Europe under Nazi control, establishing a
secure foothold on the continent, and finally completely eradicating the German armed forces. Despite
a pacifistic upbringing by parents who were avid practitioners of the Jehovah’s Witnesses religion,
Eisenhower reigned as the most powerful man in the West, likely the entire world, from 1943 until the
end of World War II. Eisenhower had very little combat experience as a field commander, but his
reputation as a skilled diplomat and strategist had earned the highest respect of military and political
leaders. 15
Eisenhower was frequently characterized by his people skills, notably his ability to listen to and
cooperate with everyone around him. He had a true knack for getting along with people. British Field
Marshal Bernard Montgomery, with whom Eisenhower worked closely in preparation for D-Day, said
“His real strength lies in his human qualities. He has the power of drawing the hearts of men toward
him as a magnet attracts the bit of metal. He merely has to smile at you, and you trust him at once.”16
Though he ultimately bore the weight of responsibility for the entire combined Allied force,
Eisenhower continuously surrounded himself with peers and subordinates alike so as to listen to their
advice and debate any differences in thought. A booklet on Eisenhower, developed by the U.S. Army
Center of Military History wrote:
Achieving a consensus was more important to him than merely winning an argument,
however, because success depended upon enthusiastic execution of the plans SHAEF
[Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force] approved. Eisenhower consistently
won over men with different ideas by assuring that their points of view had a full airing
and fair consideration. He was rarely abrupt and never arbitrary and applied the
particular genius of his own personality to persuade other men to accept a common
strategy. Eisenhower's reputation for honesty and openness had much to do with his
success in developing and implementing a truly Allied plan of campaign, rather than
parallel national plans. 17
To help bridge the gap between the Allied forces, separate in nation yet unified in purpose, prior to
D-Day, Eisenhower enacted a policy to boost diversity within each unit under his command.
Essentially, he rebuilt units so that “if a leader of a department was British, his deputy must be
American, and vice versa. All the way through his command structure, he made sure it was alternate,
and that it was a coalition force from top to bottom.” 18 Similarly, Eisenhower even “implemented a
system of American-style coffee breaks in the morning and British-style tea breaks in the afternoon.”19
It was this ability to work with others that cemented his status as the best pick for Supreme
Commander.
Troops and Weaponry

Training
In order to prepare the on-ground soldiers for what they faced across the English Channel, a
rigorous training initiative was headed by Allied Command to better equip infantrymen. The goal was
to transform soldiers “from standard infantrymen to assault specialists.”20 The three-week course took
place on the Southern English coast, where the soldiers learned how to properly exit landing craft as
well as disarm mines and other explosives or obstacles. 21 These training sessions boosted physical
health and bolstered confidence within units, as they became more skilled and capable soldiers. Joseph
Balkokski, leading D-Day historian and author, noted, “The Assault Training Center managed to
narrow the differences between an infantry-man and an engineer. Soldiers who had formerly been
proficient only with rifles and machine guns were taught how to use the complex array of weapons
formerly associated only with sappers, such as bangalore torpedoes, flamethrowers, wire cutters, and
satchel charges.” 22 This transformation from standard infantry to a more specialized soldier adept in
invasion techniques played a large role in Allied victory, especially on the heavily defended Omaha
Beach. German explosives and obstacles were disarmed quickly, clearing a way for vehicles and tanks.
Equipment
Operation Overlord showcased a number of unique armaments designed as solutions to the specific
challenges presented by the beaches of Normandy. Perhaps the most and useful example was the
Mulberry. During the initial planning stages of Operation Overlord, Allied Command struggled to
decide where to land their troops, Normandy or Pas-de-Calais. The obvious choice was Pas-de-Calais,
as the major French port sat at the closest point to England across the channel, roughly 20 miles away.
(See Exhibit 2 for a map of the French coastline.) This was the obvious choice according to the Germans
as well, however, and as such they set up heavy defenses along the port. British leaders knew they
must land somewhere near a harbor in order to ensure steady reinforcements but wanted to avoid
heavy defenses. Normandy, 150 miles south of Pas-de-Calais, was lightly defended but held no nearby
port and little tactical advantage. Fortunately, a proposed solution offered to rectify the issue of
Normandy’s lack of nearby ports — Mulberries, or large artificial harbors that could be transported to
shorelines without preexisting ports. The idea was originally conceived following the Allied’s
disastrous attempt to land in Dieppe, France, in 1942. These floating docks allowed for large scale
transportation of ships, with their cargo or passengers, to reinforce the invasion efforts. Each Mulberry
could handle up to 7,000 tons worth of supplies and ships per day; ten months after D-Day, one
Mulberry had supported the passage of 2.5 million troops, 4 million tons of supplies, and half a million
vehicles. 23 The strategic significance of Mulberries could be described as follows:
Until their invention, it was axiomatic that invading armies would need to capture a
major, functioning port soon after landing, to replenish those forces already ashore and
to sustain the build-up (...) it made the task of the would-be defenders relatively clear:
deny the invader a major port (...) it permitted the Allies to avoid confronting those
segments of the ‘Atlantic Wall’ to which the Germans would, quite rationally, give top
priority. Its implicit purpose, indeed, was to enable an exercise in manoeuvrism of a scale
unsurpassed since Hannibal. 24
Similarly, British Major General Percy Hobart incorporated vehicles specifically designed for the
unique problems present in amphibious landings into his battle plan. One example was the floating
tank known as the Sherman DD (double drive), developed in 1941 by Nicholas Straussler. 25 The DD
floated by extending a large canvas screen and attaching a propeller to the bottom of the vehicle. These
floating tanks were thus able to arrive on the beaches of Normandy at the same time as infantry,
without needing a ship for transport. 26 Another invention, the Crocodile, was a tank “designed as part
physical and part psychological weapon.” 27 This widely feared tank substituted the standard machine
gun with flamethrowers that could reach over 100 meters while towing a trailer carrying 2,000 liters of
fuel and proved to be extremely impactful in wiping out enemy bunkers. 28 These innovations became
known as Hobart’s “Funnies.” Hobart encouraged his troops to be creative when it came to thinking
about equipment. “The success of the operation depends on the element of surprise caused by new
equipment. Suggestions from all ranks for improvements in equipment are to be encouraged,” he told
them. 29
Air Supremacy
In the year leading up to D-Day, the Allied Air Forces carried out a devastating bombing campaign
targeting German aircraft factories. British and American Air Forces had operated separately from each
other until the 1943 Casablanca Directive, in which the combined Chiefs of Staffs of the Allies drew
together a coordinated bombing campaign known as Operation Pointblank. Allied Command deemed
it necessary to combine their efforts in order to ensure aerial dominance before the imminent sea-land
invasion as it became evident the Normandy landings could not succeed under German-controlled
skies. Operation Pointblank targeted German aircraft factories to not only halt their production of
fighter planes, but also to draw out a large response from the German Luftwaffe. Since the British and
American aircraft factories continued production at industrious rates, undisturbed by enemy bombers,
they were able to replace and repair downed planes much faster than the Germans could; losing an
aircraft was much more significant blow to the Germans, as Germany could not keep up with the Allied
production rates. 30 The combined efforts of Allied pilots and aircraft manufacturers outlasted
Germany’s ability to keep up. Though the bombers’ mainly targeted factories, Allied pilots shot down
a considerable number of German planes in dogfights as well. In the end, the German Luftwaffe was
hindered less by a lack of planes than by a lack of trained pilots. 31 Allied decimation of German aerial
presence from 1943 to 1944 proved absolutely vital in the overall success of invasion and subsequent
transition towards Germany. By D-Day, German lacked the air power to contest either the landings or
the vessels that fed the swelling flow of men, machines, and supplies into the countryside of northern
France. 32
The Allied leadership also enacted the Transport Plan with the goal of delaying German response
to the invasion of Normandy. Starting in March of 1944, British and American bombers destroyed
numerous important bridges, roads, and railways. The results proved incredibly effective for the Allies,
as a German Air Ministry report detailed, “The raids...have caused the breakdown of all main lines;
the coast defenses have been cut off from the supply bases in the interior (...) large scale strategic
movement of German troops by rail is practically impossible at the present time and must remain so
while attacks are maintained at their present intensity.” 33 German reinforcements struggled to react:
“It took no less than five days for the 17th Panzer Grenadier Division to cover 200 miles; movement by
railroad was out of the question. The SS Division Das Reich probably set the record for transportation
frustration. Tracked elements of the division left Limoges on June 11, but failed to arrive in Normandy
until the end of the month.” 34
Information
Information, in the form of general information gathering, espionage, and counter-espionage, was
a key feature of the detailed planning of the D-Day invasion and critical to the endeavor’s success.
Allied Deception
“In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.”
−Winston Churchill 35
Perhaps the most impressive preparatory measure employed by Allied command leading up to D-
Day was the incredibly effective and elaborate efforts in deceiving German leadership as to the when
and where of the imminent invasion. Allied intelligence reports revealed that Nazi headquarters fully
expected a large-scale amphibious landing along Hitler’s “Atlantic Wall,” a series of German
fortifications that ran along shorelines from Western France all the way to Northern Norway. As Pas-
de-Calais seemed to be the obvious selection for an invasion from England, Hitler heavily reinforced
the port and surrounding area. Allied Command, desiring every advantage possible over the German
war machine, capitalized on Hitler’s expectations through strict containment of the date and location
of D-Day, the employment of double agents trusted by Nazi leadership, and the construction of a fake
Army unit poised to invade Pas-de-Calais.
Allied Headquarters went to great lengths to ensure as little information as possible regarding the
true details of Operation Overlord were revealed. Though Stalin had been persistent in calling for the
Americans and British to establish a Western Front to alleviate pressure from the Eastern Front, the
Soviets held very limited information about the invasion. In fact, most Allied soldiers present on D-
Day only knew of their destination hours before the operation officially launched: “Strict OPSEC
[Operations Security] was observed at all levels of the military, and to ensure that no information
leaked from the forces mustering in the south coast ports, movement in the south of England was
severely restricted in the months leading up to D-Day, with civilians being most restricted of all.” 36
Allied Command launched Operation Bodyguard in an effort to mislead Nazi leadership as to the
true invasion plans of Europe. The British in particular were incredibly effective in constructing and
spreading false information through their network of German double agents. MI5 employed fifteen
double agents who were present since the early stages of the war, and therefore deemed trustworthy
by German leadership.MI5 confidently knew that it controlled “at least 80 percent of German agents
based in Britain.” 37 One of the most impactful of these double agents, Juan Pujol García, nicknamed
Garbo, initially volunteered to spy on Germany on behalf of Britain due to his strong disdain for
fascism in Spain. After being denied by British intelligence, Garbo created a fake identity on his own
and was employed by the Germans. After a year of feeding Germany falsified news of Britain, MI5
realized his value in deceiving Nazi leadership. Garbo constructed a completely fictional network of
spies who supposedly reported to him, allowing Garbo an excuse from any blame placed on him for
misinformation. Following his lead, other double agents used these fake subordinates to leak news of
Allied plans to invade Pas-de-Calais, with a feint attack aimed at Normandy. 38
Allied headquarters further played into this game of deception by creating and placing a decoy
invasion force. The First United States Army Group (FUSAG), composed of reserve soldiers and men
unfit to fight, was sent to Southeast England, directly across the Channel from Pas-de-Calais.
Eisenhower handpicked General George Patton, as Nazi leadership regarded him as one of the best
American leaders in battle. The fake army unit was accompanied by inflatable trucks, tanks, and
airplanes that fooled German reconnaissance planes. While British and American recon missions were
kept away from the true landing location, “the Royal Air Force was instructed to allow the Luftwaffe
the occasional look over Kent and Essex to photograph FUSAG preparations. This aspect of the
deception was reinforced by spoof radio and W/T [wireless telegraphy] signals to simulate the amount
of communications traffic which could be expected to emanate from an army group size formation.” 39
As a result of the Allied deception campaign, Nazi leadership were completely fooled as to the date
and location of invasion. In fact, Operation Bodyguard was so effective, German commanders still
expected the ‘actual’ invasion force at Pas-de-Calais as late as a month after D-Day. While perhaps the
Normandy Invasion still would have succeeded without Operation Bodyguard, the deception efforts
undoubtedly saved lives. 40
Painting a Picture of Normandy

As the initial planning phases for Operation Overlord began, Allied Leadership realized a severe
lack of available maps, photographs, or any topographical information detailing the European
coastline. The eventual landing site of the Allied invasion of Europe had to meet a set of specific
requirements: flat beaches able to host large numbers of troops, close enough to England for aerial
coverage and timely reinforcements by sea, suitable for constructing a defensible beachhead, and
positioned for a straight shot into the heart of Germany. 41 Allied planners not only had to locate a
landing site that fit said qualifications, but also had to avoid high-density areas of formidable German
defenses.
Before any reconnaissance aircrafts were sent out to scout the shores, British leadership, with help
from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), staged a large-scale appeal to its citizens for any
relevant images of the mainland European coastline as early as 1942. Framed as a public competition,
the BBC’s appeal called for anyone to send in postcards or photographs taken on holiday that featured
beaches or coastal towns. 42 The BBC received close to ten million objects, which were then immediately
sent to the War Office — many of the items received provided substantial information to the invasion
planners, playing a significant role in the eventual decision of Normandy as Overlord’s landing site. 43
Allied preparations also relied on the valuable intelligence provided by French Resistance soldiers.
These French men and women risked the arrest and probable execution of themselves as well as their
families in order to reveal key movements and constructions of their German occupiers. The Resistance
fighters sent the Allies copious amounts of information regarding where Nazi troops were located,
how heavily they were armed, and how experienced they were. Allied planners knew well beforehand
which German units would be present at Normandy, and were able to take steps in preparation for
more effective combat against them. Major General Leonard T. Gerow, commander of American
infantry on Omaha Beach for D-Day, had received intelligence about the German defenses at Omaha
informing him that “at least 40 percent of the division consisted of non-German soldiers, mostly Poles,
who supposedly were not enthusiastic about risking their lives for the Third Reich.” 44
The resistors took note of where and how German fortifications were built and relayed these plans
to help “create a record of German construction of Atlantic Wall defenses, especially as they were
beefed up following the appointment of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel to oversee them.” 45 The French
Resistance fighters would relay their intel to London through the use of carrier pigeons and radio
transmitters, while Allied command responded with personal messages on BBC radio shows. 46 From
1940 to 1944, the BBC operated a radio station named Radio Londres (Radio London), which
transmitted to Nazi-occupied France. Broadcasts were introduced by 15 minutes of coded, seemingly
nonsensical messages in order to communicate with the French Resistance. 47 In preparation for D-Day,
Allied intelligence gave orders to French Resistance fighters to target and sabotage certain key
locations, structures, and towns aided by their extensive knowledge of the terrain and peoples. French
laborers conscripted by Nazis paced distances between obstacles or kept track of German troop
movements. A house painter, hired to redecorate German headquarters in Caen, stole a blueprint of
Atlantic Wall fortifications. French Resistance networks passed on precious bits of information,
particularly the condition of bridges and canal locks. Wireless telegraph operators transmitted in bursts
to evade German radio-detection teams. 48 General William Donovan, head of the Office of Strategic
Services, estimated that 80% of useful information acquired during the Normandy landings came by
way of the French resistance. 49
Reconnaissance
In response to the disastrous Allied amphibious invasion of Dieppe in 1942, Lord Louis
Mountbatten created a division of highly trained and specialized soldiers to scout out potential
invasion spots. These ‘Combined Operations Pilotage Parties’ (COPPs) carried out numerous secretive
missions to the French coast in the lead up to Operation Overlord. Utilizing small submarines and
sometimes canoes, the COPPs would sneak ashore at late hours to collect various information about
the Normandy beaches, such as sediment samples to determine if the ground could support heavy
vehicles, as well as create depth charts to show how close transport ships could get to shore without
getting stuck.
On the night of New Years’ Eve of 1943, one COPP carried out a swim reconnaissance mission to
the French beach west of Ver sur Mer, which would ultimately be codenamed Gold Beach. Despite the
rough water conditions and frigid winter temperatures, two men, Logan Scott-Bowden and Bruce
Ogden Smith, were transported silently until their ships reached the edge of an underwater minefield.
From here, Scott-Bowden and Ogden Smith had 400 yards to swim, while avoiding lighthouse beams
and choppy waters. The tides were so strong that they were swept three-quarters of a mile east of their
target, 50 and Scott-Bowden later reported being able to hear German singing and shouting, as they
celebrated the New Year. 51 On the shore, the two men collected samples of wet sand, and examined a
patch of exposed soil, previously captured by recon planes, that concerned Allied planners. After
taking great care to make sure no piece of equipment had been left behind that may expose the
otherwise clandestine operation, they departed. Scott-Bowden heard his partner cry out repeatedly on
the intense swim back to their transport ships. Expecting the worst, Scott-Bowden swam over to
potentially save Ogden Smith, before realizing he was shouting “Happy New Year.”52
In the months leading up to D-Day, the Allied Expeditionary Force placed high priority on
reconnaissance; the Allies conducted over 3,200 photo-recon missions from April to June of 1944. So as
not to reveal the intended landing site of Normandy, Allied pilots were instructed to fly up and down
the European coastline, from Spain to Belgium. British and American spy planes captured millions of
photographs, detailing every relevant aspect possible, from beach terrain to defense fortifications —
the Allied Central Interpretation Unit employed 1,700 soldiers to study over 80,000 images per day. 53
Though recent developments in camera technology allowed pilots to capture detailed images at 30,000
feet, precise photographs of German defense obstacles at low tide required pilots to fly just 15 feet
above the ground, showing “anti-tank barriers with steel prongs in zigzag placement and rows of
barbed wire not visible at high tide. Others revealed the concrete blocks, steel scaffolding, minefields,
pillboxes, and heavy artillery that awaited the amphibious invasion forces. Preparation for these
impediments was vital.”54 Colonel George Goddard of the US Air Force recalled:
Aerial photography was now being conducted on a twenty-four hour basis using every
available photographic airplane in England, and many stereoscopic shots of the beaches
and their defenses were made. From these photographs exact models were constructed so
that our troops could be trained in techniques to capture the real thing (...) On D-Day I
visited two of our busiest reconnaissance activities and marveled at their tremendous
activity. Recce [reconnaissance] airplanes were landing and taking off continually. The
crews were dashing into the photographic laboratories with their freshly exposed film
magazines, and messengers were rushing to the Intelligence department with armfuls of
aerial photographs. Around the clock thousands of photographs were being produced
and without a hitch in the entire operation. 55
American and later British planes adopted a policy of disarming their reconnaissance planes, so that
their sole objective would be to capture valuable images and useful information without engaging the
enemy. According to one description:
The plans featured complex charts and diagrams, detailing the positions and
movements of the assault vessels like the choreography of a grand ballet. Ship captains
and army officers were provided with top secret Omaha Beach maps, portraying
hydrographic and coastal terrain features with astonishing thoroughness. Updated just a
few days before the invasion from information acquired from air photographs, these maps
reputedly displayed the correct locations of all the different types of German beach
obstacles, as well as enemy pillboxes, barbed wire belts, and minefields. Superimposed
along the bottom of the map was a detailed panoramic sketch of the coastline as it would
appear from about one mile offshore. The scales of both sketch and map matched
precisely: To determine what any point on the map actually looked like from the
perspective of a landing craft approaching the shore, a coxswain simply had to glance at
the corresponding point on the sketch (...) With such detailed information at their
disposal, the sailors of Force O and the soldiers of V Corps had come to know well a piece
of terrain that none of them had ever seen. When sunrise on June 6, 1944, illuminated this
coast, these men would recognize all of its natural and man-made landmarks.56
Ultra
In the early stages of the War, the British government established a military intelligence project
stationed at a Victorian mansion and estate known as Bletchley Park. Numerous listening stations
throughout England intercepted German messages from military communication channels, which
were then immediately relayed to headquarters in Bletchley. The operation recruited the best and
brightest mathematicians and linguists from Oxford and Cambridge, as well as winners of a crossword
puzzle competition hosted by the Daily Telegraph, to decode these highly encrypted messages. Churchill
considered the information interpreted from these transmissions to be of the utmost importance, and
began referring to it as Ultra, short for “Ultra Secret,” a step above the top security category of “Most
Secret.” 57 Although the accounts of Bletchley Park were kept secret from the public for decades
following the war, the incredible and tireless work carried out by the men and women at Bletchley
played a significant part in hastening Nazi defeat, by two years if not more, 58 as well as saving countless
lives, both civilian and military.
For the most part, the team members at Bletchley Park were tasked with decoding messages
scrambled by the incredibly complex Enigma Machine. The machine, patented and sold commercially
in early 1920s Germany, served as the standard encryption device employed by Nazi military
commanders throughout the war to transmit long-range messages via radio. Resembling a typewriter,
the Enigma machine consisted of a keyboard and “a lamp board consisting of 26 stenciled letters, each
with a small lightbulb behind it. As a cipher clerk typed a message on the keyboard in plain German,
letters were illuminated one by one on the lamp board. An assistant recorded the letters by hand to
form the enciphered message, which was then transmitted in Morse Code.”59 The intended receiver,
using the same machine, could unscramble the letters so long as they were provided with the key
combination. British intelligence learned of an early exploit of the machine from Polish mathematician
Marian Rejewski in 1939, as Poland sought Allied assistance following the country’s surrender to the
Nazis. The German Navy, however, soon suspected the Allies of being able to crack their coded
messages and added extra components to the Enigma Machine in May of 1940. 60 The British military
intelligence stationed at Bletchley suddenly found themselves unable to decode German transmissions
resulting in an alarming, exponential rise in British supply ships carrying vital resources, such as food,
oil, and ammunition being sunk by German U-boats, or submarines. As a consequence, by 1941, there
was concern that Germany would succeed in its plan to starve the British. 61
British mathematician Alan M. Turing and his team at Bletchley cracked the updated Enigma code
in June of 1941, and used the decoded messages to uncover the locations of German vessels.
Transportation and supply ships were now able to circumnavigate the nearly invisible, wholly
destructive U-boats, allowing Britain to replenish their depleted reserves of resources. Occasionally,
the British Navy found and decoded Enigma codebooks when searching captured German ships and
submarines. To convince Germans that they did not possess the ability nor the means to understand
10
encrypted messages, British command created a completely fictional spy stationed in Germany
nicknamed Boniface, whose vast network supposedly relayed information, which had actually been
decoded, back to the British. Controversially, Allied commanders even occasionally made decisions to
not act on intercepted intelligence, arguably condemning their own troops to death or capture at the
hands of the Nazis.62
Towards the end of the war, the Germans unveiled an even more complex encryption machine,
nicknamed the Tunny, which transmitted only the highest grade of German military secrets. Ultimately
cracked by mathematician William Tutte, these messages revealed detailed counter-preparations for
anticipated Allied invasion, which would ultimately be D-Day.63 From these messages, Allied
commanders planning for D-Day were confident that while German forces were present in Normandy
to repel an invasion, Nazi leadership remained adamant that the bulk of the landing troops would
arrive in Pas-de-Calais, not Normandy. They also gleaned from these messages that it was Hitler, rather
than military leaders, who was leading Germany’s war strategy. Understanding this helped the team
at Bletchley predict the German army’s next steps. 64
Abraham Wald and Survivorship Bias

Towards the end of 1942, United States leadership established several teams composed of renowned
academics and scientists, focused on providing mathematical, precise solutions to war-related issues.
One of these teams, the Statistical Research Group (SRG), put together a roster of mathematicians and
statisticians at the top of their fields. Author of the book How Not to Be Wrong, Jordan Ellenberg writes
that the SRG was “a classified program that yoked the assembled might of American statisticians to
the war effort — something like the Manhattan Project, except the weapons being developed were
equations, not explosives.”65 Of all the brilliant minds that took part in the SRG, perhaps none shone
as brightly as Abraham Wald, an Austrian Jewish mathematician who fled the Nazi advancement to
work in the United States. Viewed by Ellenberg as “the smartest person in the room,” 66 Wald and his
colleagues sacrificed a great deal of time trying to work out the logistical dilemmas of the War.
Although the true extent of their efforts and proposed solutions remain mostly classified, one particular
story has become popularized and taught as a prime example of Survivorship Bias and thinking
outside the box.
The United States Navy approached the SRG with data pertaining to Allied aircraft that had been
shot down and recovered. Military leadership studied the downed planes, riddled by German anti-
aircraft flak, and proposed reinforcing the parts of the planes where the bullet holes were most
abundant. The military officials seemed pleased with their resolution, until Abraham Wald suggested
that the areas most in need of strengthening were the places where the planes received the least amount
of enemy fire. Wald reasoned that the Navy’s officials only studied Allied aircraft that had made it
back to friendly territory — they had not accounted for all the aircraft that had been shot down behind
enemy lines. Assuming a random spread of bullet holes, Wald deduced that of the studied downed-
aircraft, the low amount enemy flak present around the engines suggested that the planes that were hit
in the engines were less likely to make it back to Allied territory. 67
Weather Reports
Preparations for Operation Overlord included an extensive weather reporting system. The
coordination of such large numbers of land, air, and sea units required very specific weather and lunar
conditions. The Air Force required a clear sky so the bomber pilots’ vision was unimpaired. Though
usually aerial invasions preferred a dark night sky so as to make the planes harder to see for anti-
aircraft machinery, D-Day preparations also needed a full moon. In order to land infantry on the shores
11
of Normandy, Allied leadership demanded low tides, so that they could see and avoid the obstacles
and mines on the beach that would have lay hidden by high tide. The ships also needed rising water,
in order to not be stranded for 12 hours after reaching the beach. 68 As a result, Allied leadership had
a very limited window for possible invasion days: “The proper conditions of tide and moon occurred
only twice in June.”69 These limitations were further compounded by the unpredictability of the
English Channel’s weather and tidal changes.
As the initial invasion date for D-Day approached, Eisenhower’s chief meteorological adviser James
Stagg approached the General with alarming news of incoming storms. Prior to June 5, England’s
weather had been calm and sunny for over a month; Stagg’s prediction of “severe storms that were
unprecedented for that time of year” were met with disagreements, notably from his colleague, an
American weatherman. 70 Ultimately, Stagg was correct and “the English Channel was lashed by heavy
rain and high winds which would have capsized many of the flat-bottomed landing craft carrying
troops and tanks to the beaches.” 71 Unlike his counterpart, Stagg paid attention to altitude, measuring
the air pressure and wind speeds at various altitude levels. In contrast, the standard approach to
weather forecasting at this time was:
Based on surface level observations of air pressure and wind speed combined with
historic comparisons of similar situations to predict outcomes (...) This approach worked
very well with predictable and relatively slow-moving weather systems (...) Stagg’s use
of high altitude readings gathered from planes and weather balloons was capturing the
behaviour of what we now call the Jetstream. However, at the time the existence of jet
streams was still just a scientific theory. 72
D-Day
After months of rigorous planning, 20-hour work days, and unimaginable levels of stress,
Eisenhower gave the command to go ahead with the massively complicated land, air and sea invasion
of Normandy. Though initially scheduled for June 5, 1944, Eisenhower postponed Operation Overlord
24 hours due to the storm that Stagg projected. At 4 am on June 5, Eisenhower called an emergency
meeting with his command team, as Stagg predicted an 18-hour window of calmer weather for the
following day. With only minutes to decide on the best course of action, Eisenhower asked for the input
of each of his advisers, listening to their recommendations and heeding their hesitations. Of the six
men at the time, three said go, one abstained, and the two leaders of the air forces argued for
postponement. After five minutes of silence, Eisenhower gave the command: “OK, let’s go.” 73 With
that, rigorously developed plans were set into motion. Naval transport vessels departed with their
infantry units at 10 PM on June 5 so that the soldiers arrived on the beach precisely as the sun rose at
6:30 AM. That the infantry arrived on schedule at 6:30 was crucial, as aerial bombers were to conclude
their preliminary bombardment of the Nazis’ coast-line fortifications just a few minutes before the
transport vessels landed ashore; arriving any sooner would have resulted in Allied soldiers bombed
by their own air support. Hours prior to the landings, American Paratroopers were dropped silently
via parachute, tasked with capturing key land-marks like bridges and roads so as to stop German
reinforcements. (See Exhibit 3 for a map depicting D-Day invasion routes.)
Eisenhower wrote and distributed a speech for his soldiers, in which he famously began, “Soldiers,
Sailors and Airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Force! You are about to embark upon the Great
Crusade, towards which we have striven these many months. The eyes of the world are upon you. The
hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you,” and closed with, “I have full
12
confidence in your courage, devotion to duty and skill in battle. We will accept nothing less than full
Victory!” 74
Eisenhower trusted each individual unit under his command to make decisions and act upon them
in real time and “despised rigid adherence to preconceived plans as unimaginative, closed-minded,
and potentially dangerous. Thus, while Eisenhower hewed closely to the broad outlines of the strategic
plan he had enunciated before D-Day, he had no objection to deviations at the tactical level.” 75 In
contrast, Hitler was untrusting and did not delegate. 76 He was also a strict believer in the chain of
command. At each level below him, subordinates were expected to follow the orders of their superior
to the letter. 77 Within the German Armed Forces, day-to-day tasks and large-scale operations alike
suffered from micromanagement and overwhelming, unnecessary bureaucratic processes.
On June 6, 1944, Erwin Rommel, commander of the German defenses along the French coast, as well
as his immediate subordinate, were both away on vacation. Left in charge was Field Marshal Von
Rundstedt, who was at his headquarters in France, but could not immediately act upon learning of the
6 AM invasion of Normandy — Von Rundstedt required Hitler’s personal permission to move the ill-
positioned German tank divisions, but Hitler slept soundly until midday as his aides feared his wrath
too much to wake him up. Even before June 6, Hitler had refused to act upon the advice of Erwin
Rommel, whom he had placed in charge of defending the French coast from British invasion. 78
Ultimately, history proved Eisenhower’s rushed command to invade Normandy on June 6, 1944, to
be the correct decision. The next best day, June 19, was plagued with the worst gale in a century, most
likely fatal to small landing crafts. 79 Fall weather would have deterred command, leading to a probable
invasion in 1945, in which case the Germans would have had ample time to fortify their defenses as
well as potentially learn of the kept-secret date and time of invasion. Any delay past June 6 could have
easily spelt disaster for the Allied Expeditionary Forces.
Conclusion: Overlord’s Impact

The successful Allied landings in Normandy marked a pivotal moment in the war, as it opened up
a second front in Europe that would eventually push the Nazis back into Berlin. Within a week of D-
Day, the Allies secured the beachheads and transported over 326,000 soldiers, 50,000 vehicles, and
100,000 tons of equipment. 80 Within 90 days, the Allies liberated Paris and Northern France from Nazi
occupation. Hitler refused his generals’ calls for retreat, insisting on “reinforcing failure,” thereby
giving the Allies “a more complete victory than they could have hoped for, as enemy units were sucked
into the maelstrom and destroyed.” 81 Hitler’s diverting troops and armored vehicles to the Western
Front all but guaranteed the Soviets continued their devastating counteroffensive in the Eastern Front.
The Allies in France had crippled the German Army in the West by the end of August 1944, “with the
loss of an estimated 200,000 killed or wounded, and another 200,000 captured.” 82 Allied advancement
towards Germany was slowed by one final push by Hitler at the Battle of the Bulge from December
1944 to January 1945, but victory was inevitable. The liberation of France had allowed America’s
rapidly growing army a critical foothold in mainland Europe. The Normandy Landings marked the
beginning of the end of Nazi occupation in Western Europe and ensured the timely demise of Hitler’s
empire.
In keeping with his leadership style, Eisenhower took full responsibility for the success or failure of
D-Day. Unknown to public knowledge until years after the war, Eisenhower had also written a speech
to be delivered if the invasion had failed; he wrote:
13
Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold
and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based
upon the best information available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that bravery
and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine
alone. 83
14
Exhibit 1 D-DayChain of Command
Source: “Anglo-American Chain of Command in Western Europe, June 1944,” https://www.britannica.com/topic/Anglo-

American-Chain-of-Command-in-Western-Europe-June-1944-1673115, accessed May 2022. Reprinted with permission
from Encyclopædia Britannica, © 2020 by Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.
15
Exhibit 2 Map: French Coastline Along the English Channel
Source: Greg Hope , “Remembering D-Day: 10 Important Facts to Know” , Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective,
June, 2014. https://origins.osu.edu/connecting-history/top-ten-origins-d-day-70-years-
ago?language_content_entity=en.
16
Exhibit 3 D-Day Invasion Routes
Source: Plan d'attaque du débarquement en Normandie. From Center for Military History, US Army
(http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/BOOKS/WWII/utah/maps/Map2.jpg), accessed May 2022.
17
Endnotes
1 Winston Churchill, June 4, 1940, House of Commons, https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1940-the-finest-

hour/we-shall-fight-on-the-beaches/, accessed May 2022.
2 Joseph Balkowski, “Omaha Beach : D-Day, June 6, 1944,” 1st ed., (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2004), p. 7.
3 Antal, “7 Leadership Lessons,” Appendix C.
4 ”Treaty of Versailles,” History Channel, October 29, 2009, https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-i/treaty-of-

versailles-1.
5 ”The World at War - Global Timeline 1918-48,” http://worldatwar.net/timeline/18-48.html.
6 Imperial War Museums, ”How Britain Hoped To Avoid War With Germany In The 1930s,”
https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/how-britain-hoped-to-avoid-war-with-germany-in-the-1930s.
7 Imperial War Museums, ”Operation Barbarossa And Germany's Failure In The Soviet Union,”
https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/operation-barbarossa-and-germanys-failure-in-the-soviet-union.
8 The Wiener Holocaust Library, “The Second World War,” https://www.theholocaustexplained.org/life-in-nazi-occupied-
europe/the-second-world-war/invasion-of-the-soviet-union/, accessed May 2022.
9 “From Arsenal to Ally: The United States Enters the War,” https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/arsenal-
ally-united-states-enters-war, accessed May 2022.
10 Joseph Balkowski, “Omaha Beach : D-Day, June 6, 1944,” 1st ed., (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2004), p.12.
11 “From Arsenal to Ally: The United States Enters the War,” https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/arsenal-
ally-united-states-enters-war, accessed May 2022.
12 Encyclopedia Britannica, “Anglo-American Chain of Command in Western Europe, June 1944,”
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Anglo-American-Chain-of-Command-in-Western-Europe-June-1944-1673115.
13 Paul Kennedy, “Engineers of Victory,”(New York: Random House, 2013), p. 251.
14 David T. Zabecki, “OVERLOOKED OVERSEER: FREDERICK E. MORGAN,” February 15, 2017,

https://www.historynet.com/overlooked-overseer-frederick-e-morgan/, accessed May 2022.
15 Penrose, “D-Day Companion,” ch. 4.
16 Excerpt from an essay by Stephen Ambrose, Public Broadcasting Service,

https://www.pbs.org/newshour/spc/character/essays/eisenhower.html.
17 U.S. Army Center of Military History, “Dwight David Eisenhower.”
18 WDHB Strategic Learning, “Managing Change And Breaking Down Silos: Lessons From Normandy And D-Day On The
75th Anniversary,” https://wdhb.com/blog/adaptive-leadership-breaking-down-silos-lessons-normandy-d-day-75th-
anniversary/.
19 Andrew Whitmarsh, “D-Day in Photographs,” 2012, p. 24.
20 Balkowski, “Omaha Beach,” p. 12.
24 Edited by Jane Penrose, “The D-Day Companion: Leading historians explore history’s greatest amphibious assault,”
accessed via Kindle, ch. 7.
25 Dwight Jon Zimmerman, “Hobart and His Funnies: Gen. Omar Bradley and the D-Day Controversy,”
https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/hobart-and-his-funnies-gen-bradley-and-the-d-day-controversy/, accessed
May 2022.
18
26 “The strange tanks that helped win D-Day,” https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20160603-the-strange-tanks-that-helped-

win-d-day, accessed May 2022.
27 Stephen Darlow, “D-Day Bombers, the Veteran’s Story: RAF Bomber Command and the US Eighth Air Force Support to the
Normandy Invasion, 1944.”
28 Stephen Darlow, “D-Day Bombers, the Veteran’s Story: RAF Bomber Command and the US Eighth Air Force Support to the
Normandy Invasion, 1944.”
29 Dwight Jon Zimmerman, “Hobart and His Funnies: Gen. Omar Bradley and the D-Day Controversy,”
https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/hobart-and-his-funnies-gen-bradley-and-the-d-day-controversy/, accessed
May 2022.
30 “The Mighty Eighth: From Big Week to Overlord,” https://www.mightyeighth.org/the-mighty-eighth-from-big-week-to-
overlord/, accessed May 2022.
32 “Luftwaffe and Navy on D-day,” https://d-dayinfo.org/en/landings/luftwaffe-and-navy-on-d-day/, accessed May 2022.
33 Darlow, “D-Day Bombers, the Veteran’s Story.”
35 English Heritage, “D-DAY’S BODYGUARD,” https://www.english-heritage.org.uk/visit/places/dover-castle/history-

and-stories/d-day-deception/, accessed May 2022.
38 MI5, “Introduction to Agent Garbo,” https://www.mi5.gov.uk/agent-garbo, accessed May 2022.
40 “Operation Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign That Fooled The Nazis,”
https://www.history.co.uk/article/operation-fortitude-the-d-day-deception-campaign-that-fooled-the-nazis, accessed May
2022.
43 British Broadcasting Corporation, “D-Day on the BBC,” May 14, 2004,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2004/05_may/14/dday_facts.shtml.
45 History Extra, “The Road to D-Day: The Masterplan,” June 4, 2019, https://www.historyextra.com/period/second-world-
war/d-day-masterplan-deception-ww2-commanders-eisenhower-churchill-montgomery/.
46 D-Day Overlord, “French Resistance in Normandy,” https://www.dday-overlord.com/en/battle-of-normandy/resistance.
47 Barrett Tillman, “D-Day Encyclopedia: The Normandy Invasion,” January 1, 2004.
48 Thomas B. Allen, “Untold Stories of D-Day,” National Geographic, June 2002, pp. 2-37,
https://www.ewing.k12.nj.us/cms/lib6/NJ01001291/Centricity/Domain/122/Untold%20Stories%20of%20D%20Day.pdf.
49 D-Day Overlord, “French Resistance in Normandy.”
50 Ian Trenowden, “Stealthily by Night: Clandestine beach reconnaissance and operations in World War II,” 2012, accessed via
Kindle, ch. 16.
Kindle, ch. 16
Kindle, ch. 16
19
53 Dorothy Cochrane, “D-Day: Aerial Photography in Action,” Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, June 2, 2019,
https://airandspace.si.edu/stories/editorial/d-day-aerial-photography-action.
56 Balkowski, “Omaha Beach,” pp. 67-69.
57 Ronald Lewin, “Ultra Goes to War,” p. 64.
58 Encyclopedia Britannica, “Ultra: Allied intelligence project,” https://www.britannica.com/topic/Ultra-Allied-intelligence-

project/Tunny.
project/Tunny.
project/Tunny.
61 “The Battle against the U-boat in the American Theater,” uboat.net, https://uboat.net/allies/documents/usaaf_asw1.htm,
accessed May 2022.
62 David Cox, “The Imitation Game: how Alan Turing played dumb to fool US intelligence,” The Guardian, November 28, 2014,
https://www.theguardian.com/science/blog/2014/nov/28/imitation-game-alan-turing-us-intelligence-ian-fleming, accessed
May 2022.
63 Andrew Lycett, “Breaking Germany’s Enigma Code,” BBC, February 17, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/enigma_01.shtml#:~:text=According%20to%20Hinsley%2C%20Overlord
%20would,much%20it%20meant%20to%20them.
64 “Intelligence,” D-Day Revisited, https://d-dayrevisited.co.uk/d-day-history/planning-and-preparation/intelligence/.
65 Jordan Ellenberg, “How Not to Be Wrong,” https://medium.com/@penguinpress/an-excerpt-from-how-not-to-be-wrong-

by-jordan-ellenberg-664e708cfc3d.
68 Jamie Carter, “What Has The Moon Got To Do With D-Day? As It Turns Out, Everything,” Forbes,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamiecartereurope/2019/06/05/what-has-the-moon-got-to-do-with-d-day-as-it-turns-out-
everything/?sh=67d1c6927bf5.
69 U.S. Army Center of Military History, “Dwight David Eisenhower,” https://history.army.mil/brochures/Ike/ike.htm.
70 David Axson, “How Analytics Saved D-Day from Disaster,” Bradbury Science Museum, July 10, 2018,
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-analytics-saved-d-day-from-disaster-david-axson/.
73 Brian W. Clark, “Eisenhower’s D-Day Decision,” November 4, 2012,
https://eisenhowersleadership.com/2012/11/04/eisenhowers-leadership-d-day/.
74 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Order of the Day,” National Archives, https://www.archives.gov/global-pages/larger-
image.html?i=/historical-docs/doc-content/images/ww2-eisenhower-d-day-order-l.jpg&c=/historical-docs/doc-
content/images/ww2-eisenhower-d-day-order.caption.html.
20
75 U.S. Army Center of Military History, “Dwight David Eisenhower.”
76 Caroline Newman, “Remembering D-Day,” University of Virginia UVAToday, June 3, 2016,

https://news.virginia.edu/content/remembering-d-day-leadership-lessons-wwiis-turning-point.
77 Geoffrey Megargee, “Hitler's Leadership Style,” March 30, 2011,
https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/hitler_commander_01.shtml, accessed May 2022.
80 Amy Irvine, “What Happened on D-Day and How Successful Were the Landings?” HistoryHit, January 25, 2021,
https://www.historyhit.com/operation-overlord-d-
day/#:~:text=Operation%20Overlord%2C%20D%2DDay%2C,total%20defeat%20was%20now%20inevitable.
81 Imperial War Museums, ”Why D-Day Was So Important to Allied Victory,” https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/why-d-day-
was-so-important-to-allied-victory.
21

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JULY 18, 2022

KATHERINE CONNOLLY BADEN

— Winston Churchill, June 4, 19401

Leadership and Organization

Supreme Commander Eisenhower

Troops and Weaponry

Painting a Picture of Normandy

Abraham Wald and Survivorship Bias

Conclusion: Overlord’s Impact

Exhibit 1 D-DayChain of Command

Source: “Anglo-American Chain of Command in Western Europe, June 1944,” https://www.britannica.com/topic/Anglo-

Exhibit 2 Map: French Coastline Along the English Channel

Exhibit 3 D-Day Invasion Routes

1 Winston Churchill, June 4, 1940, House of Commons, https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1940-the-finest-

3 Antal, “7 Leadership Lessons,” Appendix C.

4 ”Treaty of Versailles,” History Channel, October 29, 2009, https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-i/treaty-of-

14 David T. Zabecki, “OVERLOOKED OVERSEER: FREDERICK E. MORGAN,” February 15, 2017,

16 Excerpt from an essay by Stephen Ambrose, Public Broadcasting Service,

20 Balkowski, “Omaha Beach,” p. 12.

21 Balkowski, “Omaha Beach,” p. 12.

22 Balkowski, “Omaha Beach,” p. 12.

23 Andrew Whitmarsh, “D-Day in Photographs,” 2012, p. 11.

26 “The strange tanks that helped win D-Day,” https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20160603-the-strange-tanks-that-helped-

32 “Luftwaffe and Navy on D-day,” https://d-dayinfo.org/en/landings/luftwaffe-and-navy-on-d-day/, accessed May 2022.

33 Darlow, “D-Day Bombers, the Veteran’s Story.”

34 Penrose, “D-Day Companion,” ch. 6.

35 English Heritage, “D-DAY’S BODYGUARD,” https://www.english-heritage.org.uk/visit/places/dover-castle/history-

37 Penrose, “D-Day Companion,” ch. 3.

38 MI5, “Introduction to Agent Garbo,” https://www.mi5.gov.uk/agent-garbo, accessed May 2022.

39 Penrose, “D-Day Companion,” ch. 3.

42 Andrew Whitmarsh, “D-Day in Photographs,” 2012, p. 11.

43 British Broadcasting Corporation, “D-Day on the BBC,” May 14, 2004,

47 Barrett Tillman, “D-Day Encyclopedia: The Normandy Invasion,” January 1, 2004.

57 Ronald Lewin, “Ultra Goes to War,” p. 64.

58 Encyclopedia Britannica, “Ultra: Allied intelligence project,” https://www.britannica.com/topic/Ultra-Allied-intelligence-

65 Jordan Ellenberg, “How Not to Be Wrong,” https://medium.com/@penguinpress/an-excerpt-from-how-not-to-be-wrong-

75 U.S. Army Center of Military History, “Dwight David Eisenhower.”

76 Caroline Newman, “Remembering D-Day,” University of Virginia UVAToday, June 3, 2016,

79 Antal, “7 Leadership Lessons,” Appendix C.

83 Antal, “7 Leadership Lessons,” Appendix C.

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