Police Power Cases
Department Head, discretionary authority as to the
Agustin v. Edu
On December 2, 1974, Philippine President Ferdinand
Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 229,
mandating all motor vehicles to have early warning devices
(EWD) for road safety. These devices were red and yellow
triangular reflectorized plates. LOI No. 229 aimed to prevent
accidents caused by obstructions on the road and align with
international road safety standards.
The decision emphasizes that LOI No. 229 was issued
under the exercise of police power and was intended to
promote public safety. The court rejects the petitioner's
arguments that the law violated due process and equal
protection, asserting that such claims lack substantial
evidence.
The court also points out that similar measures, like the
Reflector Law, have been upheld in the past. It underscores
that the presumption of constitutionality stands unless there
is concrete evidence to the contrary. The requirement for
early warning devices is deemed not oppressive and can be
met through various means.
Additionally, the court dismisses claims of unlawful
delegation of legislative power, stating that there is a clear
standard related to public safety within the law. The
decision concludes by emphasizing the importance of
adhering to international commitments, as indicated by the
ratification of the 1968 Vienna Convention.
In essence, the court affirms the legality and validity of LOI
No. 229, asserting that it serves a legitimate public interest
in ensuring road safety.
Binay v. Domingo (Burial Assistance Program)
(1) Yes. COA is not attuned to the changing of the times.
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it
incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As
correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General,
"the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared
towards state policies to provide adequate social services
(Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the
general welfare (Section 5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10,
Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights.
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public
duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted
exercise of police power in the promotion of the common
good.
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code,
the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial
governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the
execution of the law. This is necessary since the provincial
governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge
"when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest
of law and order".
As officials charged with the administration of the
province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are
better fitted to select sites that have the conditions
most favorable for improving the people who have the
misfortune of being in a backward state.
Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the
Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a
department head.
US v. Dominador Gomez Jesus (Practicing medicine
without a license)
Defendant’s contention is not meritorious because the
Board of Medical Examiners where given such a
responsibility through the exercise of the State’s police
power.
The state has general power to enact such laws, in
relation to persons, and property within its borders, as
may promote public health, public morals, public
safety, and the general prosperity and welfare of its
inhabitants.
This power of the state is generally denominated in its
police power. It has been held that the state cannot be
deprived of its right to exercise this power. The police
power and the right to exercise it constitute the very
foundation, or at least one of the cornerstones of the state.
For the state to deprive itself or permit it to be deprived of
the right to enact laws to promote general prosperity and
welfare of its inhabitants, and promote public health, public
morals, and public safety, would be to destroy the very
purpose and objects of the state.
No legislature can bargain away the public health, public
safety, or the public morals. The people themselves cannot
do it, much less their servants. Governments are organized
with a view to preservation of these things. They cannot
deprive themselves of the power to provide for them. (Stone
vs. Mississippi)
In order to enforce the police power of the state, it may,
under certain conditions become necessary to deprive its
citizens of property and of a right providing for the
continuance of property, when the property or the exercise
of the right may tend to destroy the public health, the public
morals, the public safety, and the general welfare and
prosperity of its inhabitants. (Slaughter House Cases)
Ichong v. Hernandez
Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending
that:
(1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
process of law;
(2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended
in the title thereof;
(3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of
the Republic of the Philippines.
Whether or not Republic Act 1180 violates the equal
protection of laws. (NO)
No. According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of
police power.It was also then provided that police power
cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty
or a contract.
The enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police
power of the State. The law does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in
the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due
process of law clause,because the law is prospective in
operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their
privilege.The petition is hereby denied, with costs against
petitioner.
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the
disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat
and danger to national economy posed by alien
dominance and control of the retail business and free
citizens and country from dominance and control; that
the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police
power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its
own personality and insures its security and future; that the
law does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of
the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law
clause, because the law is prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in
the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege;
that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its
objectives appear to us to be plainly evident
Lawrence v. Texas
Harris County Police officers were dispatched to a private
home in response to a reported weapons disturbance.
They entered (the right to enter does seem to have been
questioned) the home where John Geddes resided, and
observed Lawrence and another man, Tyron Garner,
engaging in a sex act. The men were arrested, held over
night and charged with violating a Texas statute making it a
crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain
intimate sexual conduct.
The issue is whether a statute prohibiting specific sex acts
violates liberty under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (YES)
Court held that the Texas statute making it a crime for two
persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate
sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. After
explaining what it deemed the doubtful and overstated
premises of Bowers, the Court reasoned that the case
turned on whether Lawrence and Garner were free as
adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of
their liberty under the Due Process Clause.
"Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause
gives them the full right to engage in their conduct
without intervention of the government," wrote Justice
Kennedy.
"The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest
which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private
life of the individual," continued Justice Kennedy.
Accordingly, the Court overruled Bowers. Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, with whom
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Thomas
joined, filed dissents.
Churchill v Rafferty
Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait, who are in the
billboard advertising business in the Province of Rizal. The
Collector of Internal Revenue ordered the removal of their
billboards based on complaints and the provisions of Act
No. 2339. The appellees argue that their billboards are not
offensive or a nuisance to the community and challenge the
Collector's authority to order their removal.
W/N there valid exercise of police power in this case?
(YES)
Due process of law does not always require, in respect to
the Government, the same process that is required
between citizens, though it generally implies and includes
regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial
according to some well settled course of judicial
proceedings.
A citizen's property, both real and personal, may be taken,
and usually is taken, by the government in payment of its
taxes without any judicial proceedings whatever. In this
country, as well as in the United States, the officer charged
with the collection of taxes is authorized to seize and sell
the property of delinquent taxpayers without applying to the
courts for assistance, and the constitutionality of the law
authorizing this procedure never has been seriously
questioned.
An Act of the Legislature (Sec. 100 of Act No. 2339, in this
case) which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of
the purposes of the police power and interferes with the
ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be
held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a
proper consideration of and care for the public health,
safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts.
unsightly advertisements which are offensive to the sight
are not dissociated from the general welfare of the public.
DECS v. San Diego
Respondent failed to pass the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT) 3 times and he was denied admission to take
the test for another time by the petitioner under its rule that
a student is allowed only to take the NMAT 3 times and
after 3 consecutive failures a student shall not be allowed to
take NMAT the 4th time. Respondent invoke his
constitutional rights on academic freedom and quality
education
The court held that police power is validly exercised if
(a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require the interference of
the State, and
(b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The proper exercise of the police power requires
the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful
method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is
certainly within the ambit of the police power.
It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to
insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust
their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not
irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate
the medical schools and ultimately the medical
profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to
be doctors.
Del Rosario v. Bengzon
All government health agencies shall use generic
terminology or generic names in all transactions related to
purchasing, prescribing, dispensing, and administering of
drugs and medicines. It also includes medical, dental and
veterinary, private practitioners shall write prescriptions
using the generic name.
Whether or not the Generics Act is constitutional (NO)
The court has been unable to find any constitutional
infirmity in the Generics Act. It implements the
constitutional mandate for the State “to protect and
promote the right to health of the people” and “to make
essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost”.
The alleged unequal treatment of government physicians,
dentists and veterinarians on one hand and those in the
private practice in the other, is a misinterpretation of the
law.
The salesgirl at the drugstore counter merely informs the
customer of all available products, but does not determine
all the other drug products or brands that have the same
generic name and their corresponding process.
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association,
Inc. v City Mayor of Manila
Ordinance No. 4760 with the following provisions
questioned for its violation of due process:
- refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest
or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in
the lobby in open view;
- prohibiting admission of less than 18 years old;
- usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and
6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue
also);
- making unlawful lease or rent more than twice
every 24 hours; and
- cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. There is no
violation or constitutional due process for being reasonable
and the ordinance enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. .As such
a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the
command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor
arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity
for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises
could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being
devoted. Taxation may be made to implement a police
power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is
dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of
lower court reversed and injunction lifted.
Javier v. Earnshaw
Facts: The plaintiffs, who own a piece of land in Manila,
entered into a contract with Asiatic Petroleum Co. (P.I.),
Ltd., allowing them to install a pump and underground
tank for gasoline on the plaintiffs' property. plaintiffs later
violated the agreement by selling gasoline to the public
instead of exclusively to Makabayan Taxicab Co., Inc.
leading to protests from a nearby gas station.
Held: Municipal board of a City, in the exercise of police
power, may reasonably regulate professions, business
enterprises, and the use of private property within its
territorial limits when the public health, safety and
welfare of its inhabitants so demand.
Thus, an ordinance can prohibit the installation of
gasoline stations within the distance of 500 meters from
each other not only to prevent ruinous competition
among merchants engaged in the business of sale of
gasoline, but also to protect the public from any harm or
danger that may be occasioned by said inflammable
substance. The ordinance is general and applicable to all
persons in the same situation.
MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association
Facts: Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked
with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila, including
“transport and traffic management.” Respondent Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc. is the registered owner of Neptune
Street, a private road inside Bel-Air Village.
• Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein,
received a letter of request from the petitioner to open
Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public.
• The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe
and convenient movement of persons and to regulate the
flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA
law or Republic Act No. 7924.
• On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the
perimeter wall separating the subdivision and Kalayaan
Avenue would be demolished.
• Bel-Air instituted against MMDA a case for injunction and
prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune
Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.
• MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune
Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state
endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services
in Metro Manila so that there is no need for the City of
Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune Street to the
public.
W/N MMDA exercises police power (NO)
No. The Court held that the MMDA does not have the
capacity to exercise police power. Police power is
primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However,
police power may be delegated to government units.
Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a
political government unit.
Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power
because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a
legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924
does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of
the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act
that grants MMDA police power.
People v. Chan
Chan, manager of the Capitol Theatre, sold to the public
tickets in excess of seating capacity.
 The MTC charged and sentenced him to pay a fine for
doing such act as it violates ordinance No. 2347.
o In section 1 it provides that all first run theatres or
cinematographs should register their seating capacity with
the City Treasurer, and in section 2 it prohibits the sale of
tickets in said theatres or cinematographs in excess of their
registered seating capacity.
W/N Ordinance No. 2347 and 2188 are unconstitutional for
being discriminatory (NO)
No. The said ordinances are not discriminatory thus both
are CONSTITUTIONAL.
Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring
others is prohibited. But classification on a reasonable
basis, and to made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted.
The trues governing classification are briefly as follows:
-The classification must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences;
-it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
-it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
must apply equally to each member of the class.
To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal
protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to
be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all
of a class.
ISSUE: WON Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration,
branding and slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of police power. (NO)
US v. Toribio
NO. Act no. 1147 is not a taking of the property for
public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a
just and legitimate exercise of the power of the
legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use
of the property as would be inconsistent with the rights
of the publics.
All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition
that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of
others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the
community.
people. Police power has been used as justification for
numerous and varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not
eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit
sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by
themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of
these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the
Constitution.

The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the

Philippines like an epidemic that wiped 70-100% of the
population of carabaos.. The Supreme Court also
said that these animals are vested with public
interest for they are fundamental use for the production
of crops. These reasons satisfy the requisites of a valid
exercise of police power

White Light Corporation v. City of Manila

Facts: An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission,

Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes
in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses,
and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila” (the
Ordinance).” The ordinance sanctions any person or
corporation who will allow the admission and charging of
room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms
more than twice a day.

ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise

of police power of the State

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. it must

not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to
the following substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct

business practices, namely wash rate admissions and
renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is
evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as
conferred on local government units by the Local
Government Code through such implements as the general
welfare clause.

Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the

State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its