SLAVE SOLDIERS AND STATE POLITICS

IN EARLY 'ALAWI MOROCCO, 1668 - 1727

AlZZen R. Meyers

There have been two recent interpretations of imperial politics

in precolonial Morocco; they differ mainly in their respective
interpretations of the political basis of the 'Alawi state. The
earlier interpretations stress the sultans' limited effective
powers, their inability to rule despotically, and their consequent
reliance upon other political means. Geertz, for example, has
stressed the sultans' manipulation of charisma, both personal
charisma and what he, following Max Weber, calls "hereditary charis-
ma" - the fact that they were believed to the Shurfa', agnatic des-
cendants of the Prophet Muhammad. In another important study,
Waterbury has characterized them as brokers and mediators, orches-
trating disparate factions, playing one against the others to
achieve their own political ends.1 Both of these sources accept
that the sultans were strongmen and despots, at least to some
degree, but they stress that these roles have always been subordi-
nate to their other, more manipulative roles, as Shurfa', marabouts
(holy men, miracle workers), and brokers. According to this inter-
pretation, Baraka, mystical power, rather than armed force, has been
the sultans' most consistent and most effective tool.
The second and more recent interpretation stresses the effective
powers of the 'Alawi Makhzan (sultanate) and the sultans' abilities
to rule despotically, by a combination of public service, public
relations, and armed force.2 In this view, charisma and brokerage
were only two of several weapons in the sultans' political arsenals
and not necessarily the weapons of first choice. Moreover, I have
argued that those who have emphasized the limits of imperial author-
ity have dealt almost exclusively with the nineteenth and twentieth-
century sultans, among the weakest and least stable in 'Alawi
history with few tangible political resources.3 They had to rely
upon charismatic authority if they were to rule at all. In contrast,
seventeenth and eighteenth-century rulers had stronger economic and
political bases and were, therefore, able to rely more heavily upon
other means.

1Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed (Chicago, 1971), 44-54; John

Commander of the Faithful (London, 1970), esp. 15-32; compare Ernest Gellner,
Saints of the Atlas (London, 1969), esp. 1-34.
Germain Ayache, "La fonction d'arbitrage du Makhzen," paper presented at a
conference on "Modern Morocco," Durham, U.K., July 1977; Allan R. Meyers, "Famine
Relief and Public Policy in Early Modern Morocco: The Political Functions of Public
Health," American Journal of Public Health. LXXI,ll (1981), 1, 266-1, 273.
Meyers, "Famine Relief," 1, 267; Allan R. Meyers, "Power and Charisma: The
Sultans of Morocco as Amir al-Mu 'minin," paper presented at a conference on "Modern
Morocco," Durham, U.K., July 1977.

International Journal of African Historical Studies, 16, 1 (1983) 39

40 ALLAN R. MEYERS

This paper describes the development of a slave army, the 'Abid al

Bukhari , which enabled one such sultan, Ismail ibn al-Sharif (fl.
1672-1727), to establish a large and relatively durable Moroccan
state. With the army's support, he was able to govern that state
despotically - to collect taxes, suppress rebellion, and maintain
public order, in some cases, in direct defiance of both religious
authority and popular will. After his death, largely as a conse-
quence of the slave army's rebellion, the state disintegrated and
there was a tumultuous thirty-year interregnum and succession
battle, during which his sons and would-be successors relied much
more upon mystical and political skills to maintain their respective
regimes.4
The paper begins with a summary of the historical context of
Mawlay Ismail's succession, followed by descriptions of the estab-
lishment of the slave army, its growth and development, and its
political functions in M. Ismail's regime.

Historical Background

The first Alawi Shurfa' reportedly came to Morocco in the thir-

teenth century from the Arabian town of Yanbu'.5 Although the
'Alawis always enjoyed considerable power and prestige in the oasis
of Tafilalt, where they had originally settled, they did not become
dynastic contenders until the long interregnum which followed the
death of the last powerful Saadi sultan, Ahmad al-Mansur al-
Dhahhabi, in 1603.6
During the middle third of the seventeenth century, the 'Alawis
were one of the several contenders for political preeminence in
Morocco. Gradually they overcame their most important rivals, until,
in 1666, the first 'Alawi sultan, Mawlay al-Rashid, was proclaimed
at Fos. However, his Makhzan was highly precarious, because he had
still to contend with powerful opposition from tribal forces, mara-
boutic states, local power centers - what Abdallah Laroui has called
Villes - Etats , "7 dynastic challenges, and threats of foreign
interference by both Europeans and Ottoman Turks.8
M. al-Rashid made considerable headway against these forces; in
this regard his greatest achievement was probably the conquest of
the Middle Atlas maraboutic state and the destruction of its capi-
tal, the Zawiya of al-Dila'. But M. al-Rashid died suddenly, in 1672,
before the conquest was complete, and imperial responsibility then
fell to his half-brother and successor, M. Ismail ibn al-Sharif.
Insofar as they were able, both sultans tried to negotiate with
their enemies, either by stressing their Sharifian claims, thereby

The interregnum is one of the most obscure periods in modern Moroccan history.
A reasonable summary appears in Henry Terrasse, Histoire du Maroc (New York, 1975),
II and J. Brignon and others, Histoire du Maroo (Paris, 1967), 257-262.
Terrasse, Histoire du Maroc, II, 239-242; Brignon and others, Histoire du
Maroc, 236-238.

B.A. Mojuetan, "Legitimacy in a Power State: Moroccan Politics in the Seven-

teenth Century," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, XIII, 3 (1981),
347-360; Dahiru Yahya, Morocco in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1981), 168-193.
7Abdallah Laroui, Histoire du Maghreb: un essai de synthese (Paris, 1970),
236 ff.; the most important viZZes-etats were Rabat, Sale, Tetouan, and Marrakech.
8The most powerful maraboutic states were those ofal-Khidhir Ghaylan, in
northern Morocco, the marabouts of al-Dila', in the Middle Atlas, and the marabouts
of Illigh in the Anti-Atlas and Sus; see Terrasse, Histoire, I, 244-252; Brignon
and others, Histoire, 238-241; Mojuetan, "Legitimacy in a Power State," 353.
 SLAVE SOLDIERS AND STATE POLITICS 41

emphasizing the religious virtue of submission to 'Alawi domination,

or by offering to incorporate local leaders into the administrative
hierarchy of the 'Alawi state. This policy was probably most suc-
cessful in northwestern Morocco, which was ruled for more than fifty
years by Pashas who were nominally loyal to the 'Alawi sultans and
who regularly paid tax and tribute, but who nonetheless maintained
considerable autonomy in local affairs.9 In most cases, however,
M. al-Rashid and M. Ismail were not so fortunate. They could neither
coax nor cajole their enemies into compliance; instead, they had to
conquer them by armed force.

The 'Alawi Army

We know little about the 'Alawi army in the pre-dynastic period,

ca . 1640-1666, but available evidence indicates that the 'Alawis
attracted soldiers by a variety of means.10 There was certainly a
large contingent of soldiers from Tafilalt, the 'Alawis' oldest and
most dedicated followers, and there were also some "Arab" tribes
which considered themselves the 'Alawis' allies by virtue of their
common claims to Sharifian or, at least, Arabian descent. But most
of the 'Alawis' soldiers seem to have joined the army as part of a
process: each victory attracted more soldiers, and as the army grew
larger, successive victories were easier to achieve.11 These
soldiers were attracted mainly by the prospect of material gain, in
the form of either booty or land grants. They were often effective
and loyal soldiers, but the extent of their commitment to the impe-
rial cause was always in doubt. For that reason, both sultans
diverted a large part of their growing resources to create a profes-
sional military corps. In fact, there is a legend that M. al-Rashid
became a serious dynastic contender only after he had destroyed a
powerful Jewish principality in the Middle Atlas mountains and used
the spoils to equip a professional force.12
There were precedents in Moroccan history for the use of profes-
sional soldiers. Earlier dynasties employed Renegados (Christians,
nominal converts to Islam) and European mercenary soldiers. They had
also developed relationships with so-called Jaysh (Ar., "Army")
tribes, which exchanged military service for land grants or other
considerations from the regime, and slaves.13 However, in no case
had earlier dynasties relied so completely upon professional armies
as M. Ismail who made mercenary soldiers, especially slave soldiers,
the military bulwark of his regime.

9Compare Georges Salmon, "Essai sur l'histoireVpolitique du nord-marocain,"

Archives Marocaines, II (1904), 1-14. These pashas supported the 'Alawis against
Ghaylan and provided most the Mujahhidun (holy warriors) who maintained the sieges
of the European enclaves.

1There were many potential recruits: for example, vestigialSa'adi renegades and
Jaysh tribes, European adventurers, and self-styled Mujahhidun.
11The conquering 'Alawis seem to have incorporated conquered soldiers into their
army without fear of recrimination: for example, when M. al-Rashid killed Karum al-
Hajj and installed his own governor at Marrakech, in 1669, he seems to have automati-
cally assumed command of Karum's Shabanat Jaysh.
12Pierre de Cenival, "La Legende du juif ibn Mechal et la fete du sultan des
tolbas a Fes," Hesperis, II (1925, 137-218.
3Magali Morsy, "Moulay Ismail et l'armee de metier," Revue d'Histoire Moderne
et Contemporaine, XIV (1967), 97-100.
42 ALLAN R. MEYERS

Recent studies by Crone and Pipes show that slave armies were an
ancient - perhaps fundamental - feature of Muslim statecraft, and
that they had existed in Morocco since at least the time of the
Almoravid Dynasty (5th-6th centuries A.H./llth-12th centuries
A.D.).14 However, according to one perhaps apocryphal story, M.
Ismail based his decisions to create a slave army upon practical
experience rather than historical precedent or theories of the
Islamic state.

M. Ismail and His 'Abid

According to this tradition, he made his decision shortly after

his proclamation, in 1674, following a disastrous campaign against
the Ottoman regency of Algiers. The sultan's army consisting mainly
of tribal contingents, met the Ottoman army along the Wad Chelif, on
the Algerian border. When they saw the enemy, the tribal forces
reportedly fled without a fight:

The Turkish army was at full strength, armed with can-

nons and muskets. At nightfall, they opened fire, with
both cannons and light arms, simultaneously lighting
torches and beating drums. When they heard this tumult,
the Arabs [levies] immediately fled, terrified. The
following morning, the sultan had only his regular army,
which was routed by the enemy without significant loss
of [Turkish] life.15

Later in the same year, M. Ismail's army suffered a double blow:

first, a defeat in battle by forces loyal to his half-brothers and
dynastic rivals; then, in retreat from this battle, a snowstorm,
which inflicted heavy losses of both equipment and lives.16
After this series of setbacks, and in the face of growing
opposition, M. Ismail began a desperate attempt to build an army
which was both loyal and large. In 1678, for example, he married Lalla
Khinatha bint Bukkar, the daughter of an important tribal Shaykh.
This marriage confirmed an alliance between the Makhzan and the
Wadaya' tribal confederation, of which Shaykh Bukkar was a leader.
By the terms of this alliance, the Wadaya' provided the sultan with
a large and powerful Jaysh (army corps).17 Then, in 1680, he
revoked the exemptions from military service which had customarily
been granted to Shurfa', Tulba (religious students), and certain
Ikhwan (adepts of religious brotherhoods), and ordered them to
prepare for Jihad.18 This edict ensured that he had a ready supply
of soldiers which had either ethnic loyalty to the dynasty or a
14Patricia Crone, Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic Pol
(Cambridge, 1980), 61-81; Daniel Pipes, Slave Soldiers and Islam: The Genes
'Military System (Chicago, 1981), 45-53.
5Ahmad ibn Khalid al-Nasiri al-Salawi, Kitab Elistiqsa', translated by Etienne
Fumey, Archives Marocaines, IX, 1 (1906), 72.
Ibid., 80; cf., George Spillman, "Districts et tribus de la Haute Vallee du
Dra'," Villes et Tribus du Maroc, Tribus Berberes, IX, 2 (1931), 61-63.
17Magali Morsy, "Une Reine du Maroc: Lalla Khenatha bint Bekkar el-Mghafri,"
in Charles-Andre Julien and others, eds., Les Africains, I (Paris, 1976); Magali
Morsy, "Moulay Ismail," 100.
18Abou Abd Allah Sayyidi Muhammad ben al-Tayyib ben 'Abd al-Salam el-Hasani al-
Qadiri, Nachr al-Mathani,translated by A. Graulle and E. Michaux-Bellaire, Archives
Marocaines, XXI, 1 91913), 337.
 SLAVE SOLDIERS AND STATE POLITICS 43

demonstrated commitment to Islam. But he made his most momentous

tactical decision sometime between 1674 and 1676: to create the r'Aid
aZ-Bukhari, an army of black slaves and Harratin 19
He reportedly began by confiscating three thousand male slaves
from the residents of Marrakech and its environs; by 1678, he is
said to have had fourteen thousand slaves and Harratin, who had been
either confiscated from their masters or given as tribute to M.
Ismail. Somewhat later, he confiscated large numbers of black and
Harratin women, to be his soldiers' wives, reimbursing the former
owners, as he had done the masters of the male slaves. In the same
way, he armed and equipped the slave soldiers, at public expense,
and garrisoned them at a new camp, Mashra al-Ramal, between Sale and
his imperial capital, M&knEs. Then, he and his 'Abid swore an oath
of holy service upon a sacred book, al-Bukhari's Jami' al-Sahih ?
According to al-Nasiri, the 'Alawi chronicler, this book became the
slave army's battle standard, which they carried before them into
battle, "just as the Children of Israel carried the Holy Ark."20
Al-Nasiri also described the army's training program, which
suggests that M. Ismail wanted a corps of versatile soldiers, who
could serve as both shock troops and an occupation force. Young
soldiers' training reportedly lasted for seven years, the first five
of which were actual training, and the last two, a sort of military
apprenticeship. Significantly, the young recruits spent the first
three years learning a variety of vocational skills, including
masonry, carpentry, and muleteering; only then did they begin to
learn military skills.21
In later years, the army was largely self-sufficient, because
each conquered town and tribe was taxed to support the occupation
force, which was, in turn, responsible for collecting the tax.
However, the initial assembly, training, and equipment of the 'Ab
al-Bukhari was, most likely, very expensive, particularly for a new
and relatively unstable sultan, and sources indicate that he fi-
nanced the original slave army in several ways. In some cases, for
example, he directed his subjects to use their Quranic tithe, or
'Ushur (sing., 'Ashira ) to outfit the 'Abid. 23 In others, he
levied special taxes for their benefit. He also had considerable
revenues from port duties, from his share of corsairs' prizes, and
especially from the redemption of European captives; these, too,
helped to defray the initial costs.24
M. Ismail did not rely exclusively upon the 'Abid al-Bukhari.
Rather, he kept a military balance by maintaining a renegade corps
and several powerful tribal Jayshs .25 But the slave army was the
t9Harratin (Masc. sing , Harrtani; fem. sing., Harrtaniya) are non-white,
non-tribal people, most of whom live in southern Morocco. They are legally distinct
from slaves ('Abid), but neither do they have the same status as free people; see
Allan R. Meyers, "Class, Ethnicity, and Slavery: The Origins of the Moroccan Abid,"
International Journal of African Historical Studies, X, 1 (1977), 427-442.
20In al-Nasiri, Kitab Etistiqsa', 77-78.
Ibid., 94-95; see Abou el-Qasim ibn Ahmad el-Zayyani, Le Maroc de 1631 a 1812:
extrait de 1 'ouvrage intitule Ettordjeman elmoarib ad DoueZ elmachriq ou 'Zmaghreb
(Amsterdam, 1969), 34.
22Morsy, "Moulay Ismail," compare Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful, 17-18.
23Al-Nasiri, Kitab Elistiqsa', 75.
H. Koehler, L'Eglise Chretienne au Maroc et la Mission Franciscaine (1221-
1790), (Paris, 1934); Charles Penz, Les Captifs Francais du Maroo au XVIIIe Si%cle,
(Paris/Rabat,1944), esp. 73-74.
25Morsy, "Moulay Ismail," 99.
44 ALLAN R. MEYERS

largest part of his army - at least 50,000 soldiers by 1727 - and

they were entrusted with the most vital responsibilities, including
the protection of the sultan himself.26 Moreover, the 'Abid were
directly engaged in the conquest and administration of tribal terri-
tories in all parts of Morocco; by 1700, there were 'Abid garrisons
in all of the cities and at least twenty rural kasbahs.27 Each of
the other non-slave forces was concentrated in one or two locales.
The 'Abid were the sultan's most visible representatives; to most of
his subjects, they embodied the regime.
Crone has written that slave soldiers played so important a part
in early Islamic politics because their relationship to the caliph
was "characterized by both personal dependence and cultural dissoci-
ation." Pipes, speaking more generally about the role of slave
armies in Islamic history, suggests that a slave soldier was "tied
to his master by bonds of both control and loyalty; indeed, his
interests and his master's are nearly inseparable."28 This combi-
nation of dedication and dependence, which epitomizes the 'Abid's
relationship to M. Ismail and his Makhzan, derived from several
related aspects of their status as slaves and Harratin.29
First, both slaves and Harratin were nontribal, so that they had
no political loyalties apart from those to their master and patron,
M. Ismail. Secondly, they were phenotypically distinct from the free
tribal and urban populations, and despised by them because of their
skin color, their slave birth, and their role as conquering soldiers
and imperial police. And, finally, they were economically vulner-
able; unlike tribal soldiers, they had no independent subsistence
base in animals or land. Instead they had to rely upon booty, lar-
gesse, and tax revenue, much of which they were empowered to col-
lect. Their military vocation was their means of production, and the
fact that M. Ismail sanctioned their livelihood with imperial
decrees and a royal charter made the 'Abid even more committed to
his regime.

Imperial Politics During M. Ismail's Reign

With the certainty of the slave army's support, M. Ismail was in

a stronger political position than most of his successors would ever
be. He used military force judiciously, but the fact that he had
such a large and reliable army changed his relationships with the
forces and factions which have traditionally limited the effective
power of 'Alawi regimes. Among these, two of the most prominent were
the tribes, especially the tribes of the Middle Atlas, and the 'Ulama'
(jurisconsults) of F,s.

The Middle Atlas Campaigns

Like later sultans, M. Ismail governed most effectively in the

northern cities, but because he had a professional army, he was also
able to enforce his authority in the countryside. With a large
26F. Pidou de St.-Olon,Estat Present de Z'Empire de Maroc (Paris, 1694)
John Braithwaite, The History of the Revolutions in the Empire of Morocco [172
(Miami, 1969), 350; Henry de Castries, Les Sources inedites de Z'histoire du Maroc,
2eserie, Dynastie filalienne (France) (Paris, 1925), III, 317.
Al-Nasiri, Kitab Elistiqsa', 82-83; el-Zayyani, Le Maroc de 1631, 35.
28Crone,Saves on Horses, 74; Pipes, Slave Soldiers, 28.
2Meyers, "Class, Ethnicity, and Slavery," 427-444.
 SLAVE SOLDIERS AND STATE POLITICS 45

standing army deployed permanently in a number of kasbahs, he did

not have to govern exclusively by Harka (ad hoc punitive campaign)
as did so many later sultans. Consequently, he was able to collect
taxes on a regular basis (every two or three years) and to keep the
routes of trade and communication reasonably secure. He was also
able to move swiftly and decisively against rebels. Moreover, since
the 'Abid were full-time soldiers, they were able to wage wars of
attrition, something which the tribes were usually not able to do.
The most prominent of these wars of attrition was the long
series of Middle Atlas campaigns (ca. 1684-1694), the goal of which
was the control of the Tariq al-Sultan, the main route between the
Tafilalt oasis and the imperial cities of Meknes and Fes. Detailed
descriptions of the individual conquests appear elsewhere,30 but
certain features characterize nearly every phase of the campaign.
For example, the sultan usually avoided pitched battles with the
rebels, letting them retreat from his army to higher terrain. He
then built a series of kasbahs to besiege the rebels and to prevent
the transhumant tribes from returning to their lowland homes
the tribes withdrew to higher elevations, the army countered with a
new series of kasbahs. Eventually, usually within a year, the rebels
either capitulated peaceably and agreed to pay taxes and indemnitie
or they were so weakened by starvation that they were easily - and
brutally - defeated in decisive battles with imperial troops.
In most cases, the imperial troops were 'Abid al-Bukhari ; in
fact, the Middle Atlas expeditions account for most of their m
tary actions during M. Ismail's regime. There is no evidence that
they won these battles because they were better soldiers or because
they had better arms. Rather, they appear to have won mainly because
they were able to devote all of their time and attention to fight-
ing, without having to worry, as the tribes did, about food and
supplies. Moreover, once the conquests were completed, the defeated
tribes were taxed to maintain the local occupation forces; so, as
the Makhzan grew stronger, the sultan was able to suppor
army, which was, in turn, able to increase the effective power of
the state. To be sure, imperial expansion was accomplished at an
enormous cost in human suffering, but as M. Ismail became more con-
fident of the loyalty and effectiveness of his army, he became
progressively less sensitive to popular opinion, because he could
meet dissent or rebellion with brute force.

The 'Ulama'

In the same way that the army strengthened M. Ismail's

vis-a-vis the tribes, it also changed his relationship to the reli-
gious elite: marabouts, Shurfa, and 'Ulama'. Geertz points out,
correctly, that M. Ismail, like M. al-Rashid, courted influential
holy men, even when they were openly critical of the state; he cite
the example of Sidi Lahsan al-Yusi, who had formerly been associate
with the maraboutic state of al-Dila'.32 It is true that M. Ismail
was more tolerant of marabouts than many of his successors, but he

3Al Nasiri, Kitab EZistiqsa', 86-109.

31Ibid., 86-88. General Guillaume used the same tactic when the French pacified
the Middle Atlas in 1919; see Jacques Berque, French North Africa (London, 1967),
117-118.

32Geertz, IslZa Obsered, 29-35; compare Jacques Berque, AZ-Yousi: Pr

Za culture marocaine au XVIIe siecle (Paris, 1958).
46 ALLAN R. MEYERS

also kept them under close control. Both he and M. al-Rashid patron-
ized only those marabouts who were either apolitical - al-Yusi, for
instance - or those whose followers were consistently loyal to the
regime. Both of them dealt brutally with religious leaders who tried
to organize or articulate popular dissent. Significantly, M.
Ismail's sharpest confrontations with holy men concerned the 'Abid al-
Bukhari . His opponents in these confrontations were the 'Ulama' of
Fss.
There is evidence that M. Ismail had had difficulty with the Fes
religious establishment as early as 1681: a French source reports
the persecution of certain "Talbes" (Tulba) who had criticized the
sultan's excessive taxation and profligate ways.33 But the most
serious crisis took place somewhat later, in 1697, when the Qadi
(chief judge) of Fes ruled that the slave army was an illegal insti-
tution. He based his decision upon two concerns: first, that the
slave and Harratin soldiers had been illegally confiscated, and
second, that slaves had no right to fight in Jihad (holy war), which
was the only kind of war allowed by Islamic law.34
The sultan promptly dismissed the Qadi and his notaries ('Udul)
and prepared a long defense of his 'Abid. The Qadi and notaries were
not convinced, nor would the sultan reinstate them until they
recanted; from all evidence, it appears that the affair ended in a
stalemate.
In 1700, however, the 'Ulama' acted against the 'Abid a second
time. An influential and powerful Qaid , 'Abd al-Khaliq ibn 'Abd
Allah al-Rusi, killed a slave whom he caught trespassing in his
home. He fled, but despite the intercession of the 'Ulama', he was
apprehended and brought before M. Ismail. Again, the 'Ulama' and the
Shurfa'35 interceded on al-Rusi's behalf, pleading that he not be
killed. The sultan acknowledged their plea and pardoned al-Rusi, but
then killed him, on a pretext, within a year.36 There is no evi-
dence that M. Ismail killed 'Abd al-Khaliq only to avenge his dead
slave, but his death, coming so soon after the plea for mercy, was,
at least, an indirect affront to the 'Ulama'.
In the next phase of the confrontation, both the sultan and the
'Ulama' were more direct. In 1708, M. Ismail ordered the 'Ulama' to
approve the inscription of slaves into the army, threatening to
punish those who refused. Nearly all of them complied with the
order. Among those who refused, the sultan dealt especially harshly
with a popular and venerated scholar, Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam ibn
Hamdun Jasus. "He arrested the members of the Jasus family and con-
fiscated their possessions, and he compelled ... Shaykh ... Muhammad
..* Jasus to sit, chained, in the marketplace and to beg for his
ransom. He then had him transported to Mdknes [from Fes] where he
was put in prison."37
According to one version of the story, after a year's imprison-
ment, both the sultan and Muhammad Jasus relented: M. Ismail
pardoned Muhammad, who then helped enroll Harratin in the sultan's
Pere Dominic Busnot, The History of the Reign of Muley IsmaeZ (London, 1717),
228-229.

34Al-Nasiri, Kitab Elistiqsa', 120-121; see el-Zayyani, Le Maroc de Z63Z, 48-49;

Muhammad al-Fasi, "Lettres inedites de Moulay Ismael," Hesperis-Tcmnuda, Supplement
(1962), #10-18; De Castries, Sources inedites, 228-229.
35These were probably Idrisi, rather than 'Alawi Shurfa'; for the rivalry between
the two groups, see Terrasse, Histoire. . ., II, 342-343.
36Al-Nasiri, Kitab Elistiqsa;, 123; el-Zayyani, Le Maroc de 1631, 48.
37El-Zayyani, Le Maroc de 1631, 50-51.
 SLAVE SOLDIERS AND STATE POLITICS 47

Jaysh .38 According to a second version, there was no such recon-

ciliation. Muhammad Jasus spent a year of humiliating captivity,
following which he still refused to comply with the sultan's com-
mands. Al-Nasiri, the author of the account, quotes a letter which
Muhammad wrote to the sultan at the end of that year:

I have not refused to grant the legitimacy of your

ownership of the 'Abid . However, neither have I found
the ways and means, according to Quranic law, to do
so.If I had approved the action capriciously or against
mybetter judgment, I would have sinned against God,
against his Prophet and against the Sharia (Islamic Law)
. . God will judge between me and those who think other-
wise.39

Two days later, the governor of Fes ordered Muhammad's execution by

garrotte.
Muhammad Jasus was clearly an influential figure in Moroccan
politics. There was widespread popular sympathy for him; in Mdknes,
M. Ismail's capital, there was a public subscription to try to
redeem him from captivity. Even al-Nasiri, a strongly pro-'Alawi
chronicler, could only apologize for M. Ismail, labelling the whole
affair "a sad thing for Islam."40 M. Ismail himself may have been
affected, because it is reported that in 1709 he dismissed the
governor of Fes, who had been nominally responsible for Muhammad
Jasus's death.
The controversy which led to Muhammad Jasus's execution is high-
ly complicated, having been expressed in terms of law, theology, and
personal honor. However, the implications of the episode are clear:
both the sultan and the 'Ulama' recognized the strategic importance
of the army - especially the slave army - in M. Ismail's adminis-
trative plans. In attacking the 'Abid , the 'Ulama' were attacking
the sultan's political independence. The sultan, for his part, was
trying to preserve the army while continuing to work with the 'Ulama'.
To a large degree, he was successful, except for such stubborn
resisters as Muhammad Jasus. In the final analysis, the army was
more important than the 'Ulama' M. Ismail based his Makhzan upon
his relationship to his army, a relationship with which not even the
most venerated jurist could interfere.

Conclusion

The 'Abid al-Bukhari differed in certain important respects from

Pipe's paradigmatic "military slaves": for example, the great major-
ity were probably of local rather than foreign origin, spoke local
rather than foreign languages, and learned building trades and ani-
mal husbandry during their training program, as well as military
skills.42 However, in other, more important respects, their expe-
38Al-Nasiri, Kitab EZistiqsa', 128.
39Ibid., 129-130.
40Ibid., 130.
4 Ibid.
42Pipes,Slave Soldiers, 5-23. Pipes contends that the 'Abid were "black Africans"
(p. 50). If, by this, he means that they were of sub-Saharan origin, the evidence
suggests that he is not correct; see the discussion in Meyers, "Class, Ethnicity,
and Slavery," 427-444.
48 ALLAN R. MEYERS

rience corresponds closely with his model slave armies, particularly

in terms of their personal loyalty to the sultan, their alienation
from the subject population, and their substantial independence from
subsistence tasks.
The 'Abid enabled M. Ismail to resolve, albeit temporarily, the
internal political weaknesses that Geertz and Waterbury have identi-
fied, and which Crone suggests were fundamental features of Islamic
states. M. Ismail's Makhzan differed from most of his successors'
because he had a large, loyal, and effective army. For that reason,
he could rely more upon force and less upon mediation and manipula-
tion in the conduct of political affairs.
This is not to say that he ignored public opinion; on the
contrary, both he and M. al-Rashid used political and mystical means
to underwrite their respective regimes. The both stressed their
Sharifian ancestry, and both took care to observe religious forms;
hence, the importance which M. Ismail attached to the approval of
the 'Ulama' of Fes. Furthermore, historical sources indicate that M.
Ismail's ultimate recourse was armed force.
Geertz, Waterbury, and others have not misinterpreted historical
data; rather, they have not taken a sufficiently long view of modern
Moroccan history. 'Alawi politics has always consisted of a balance
between force, persuasion, and mystification, with one or another
factor prevailing at any given time. By concentrating upon the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, when the Makhzan was in a state of
hopeless decay which ended with the establishment of the French and
Spanish Protectorates (1912), they have ignored the fact that there
have also been episodes of strength in 'Alawi history, the last of
which did not end until 1780, during the reign of S. Muhammad
ibn 'Abd Allah (fl. 1757-1790).43
Studies of the periods of weakness in Moroccan history have
shown some of the Makhzan's characteristic features which distin-
guish it from other monarchies: for example, the sultans' Sharifian
claims and their abilities to use these claims to maintain popular
loyalty and control tribal dissent. Studies of seventeenth and
eighteenth-century politics, during periods of relative strength and
political stability, reveal another equally important dimension of
Moroccan government: the sultans' despotism and their ability to
rule by armed force.

4The 'Abid also figured prominently in S. Muhammad's imperial strategy; see

R.P. Ram6n Lourido Diaz, EZ Sultanato de Sidi Muhammad b. Abd Allah (Granada, 1970
29-33, 57-62, and E. Szymanski, "Les Tribus de 'guich' et le makhzen sous le regne de
Sidi Mohammad ben Abd Allah," Revue de 1 'Occident Musulman et de la Mediterranee,
Numero Special (1970), 195-202; Allan R. Meyers, "Sidi Muhammad ibn Abdallah: ou le
faux depart du Maroc moderne," in Julien, and others eds, Les Africains, VII, 235-259.