[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.

MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.

Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.

Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for

respondents Williams, Fragante and Bayan

City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.

FACTS:

The Director of Public Works established rules and regulations related to the restriction of Rosario Street and
Rizal Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic, as authorised by the Legislature.

Among others, petitioner Calalang, a concerned citizen, claims that the laws and regulations in question.

Infringe on the constitutional precept of promoting social justice in order to ensure the well-being and
economic security of all people, and that it represents unlawful interference with legitimate commerce or trade,
as well as abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of movement.

ISSUES:

Whether the respondents' rules and regulations established in accordance with the terms of Commonwealth Act
NO. 548 constitute an illegal interference with legitimate commerce or trade and infringed on the right to
personal liberty and freedom of movement.

Whether the complained-of laws and regulations violate the constitutional principle of promoting social justice
in order to ensure the well-being and economic security of all individuals.

CONCLUSIONS:

The National Assembly was motivated to pass the aforementioned statute by considerations of public
convenience and welfare.

The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered to not through erroneous compassion for any one group (e.g.,
the poor - because social justice is about providing the greatest good to the largest number, not necessarily
simply the poor, as the drivers of the animal-drawn vehicles).
Promotion of the general welfare, through the adoption by the government of measures calculated to ensure the
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of legally justifiable measures, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers behind the
existence of governments in general on the basis of the constitution or salus populi est suprema lex.

G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO,

vs.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF were due to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiation panels.

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF did not take place, however, because this Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same on the request of petitioners,
notably those who filed their petitions before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD.

The MILF invaded a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao from the end of 1999 to early 2000, and in
March 2000, it gained possession of the town hall of that response, then-President Joseph Estrada announced
and carried out a "all-out-war" against the MILF at Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

The parties undertook formal peace negotiations in Tripoli, Libya, from June 20-22, 2001, the result of which
was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001), which contained the main
principles and agenda for the following components of the negotiation:

The security aspect, the rehabilitation aspect, and the ancestral domain aspect are all important. In terms of the
Ancestral Domain Aspect, in the Tripoli Agreement of 2001, the parties simply agreed "that the same be
discussed further by the Parties at their next meeting.

ISSUES:

The MOA's constitutionality and legality are ready for review.

Violation of the right of the people to information on matters of public concern (Article 3 Sec. 7) as a result of
a state policy of full disclosure of all transactions affecting public interest (Article 2, Sec 28), including public
consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).

The signing of the Memorandum of Agreement would bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

1. to establish and recognise the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as an independent state or a legal,
geographical, or political entity;

2. to update or amend the Constitution and existing legislation in order to comply with the MOA

3. to grant or recognise the Moro Islamic Liberation Front's claim to ancestral domain in contravention of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), namely Section 3(g) and
Chapter VII (DELINEATION AND RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS).
CONCLUSIONS:

To summarise, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace procedure abused his authority by failing to carry out the
relevant consultation procedure, as prescribed by E.O. Republic Acts No. 3 and 7160, as well as Republic Act
No. 8371. The covert procedure by which the MOA-AD was created and produced violates and exceeds legal
power, and amounts to a capricious, capricious, repressive, arbitrary, and tyrannical exercise of it. It
exemplifies a flagrant breach of affirmative obligation and a virtual reluctance to discharge the prohibited duty.

The MOA-AD is incompatible with the current Constitution and legislation. Not only are its particular
provisions unconstitutional, but so is the concept behind them, namely, the associative connection envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, because the notion assumes that the associated entity is a state and indicates
that it is on its road to independence.

G.R No. 187167 August 16, 2011

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA,

vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA,

FACTS:

Congress enacted R.A. in 1961. 3046 delineating the marine baselines of the Philippines as an
Archepelagic State in accordance with UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying State parties' sovereignty over
their territorial sea. It was then revised in 1968 by R.A. 5446, which corrects certain inaccuracies in
R.A. 3046 is retaining the right to draw baselines around Sabah.

R.A. revised it once again in 2009. 9522, in order to comply with UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements were met by shortening one baseline, optimising the placement of several basepoints,
and classifying KIG and Scarborough Shoal as'regime of islands.

R.A. 3046 was approved, delineating the Philippines' marine baselines. After more than five
decades, RA 9552 was approved, modifying RA 3046 to conform to the conditions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The revised legislation reduced one baseline,
optimised the position of certain basepoints around the Philippine archipelago, and categorised
nearby areas, especially the Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of
islands, with their own applicable maritime zones.

ISSUES:

The petitioners had locus standi to file the claim, and they prevailed. The Republic Act (9522) is
unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court found that the complaint is a citizen suit, not a taxpayer or lawmaker suit,
because it is the people who would be directly affected and benefited if the remedy sought is
granted. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522. First, RA 9522 does not
delineate the territory of the Philippines but is merely a statutory tool to demarcate the country's
maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. The Supreme Court emphasised that
UNCLOS III is not a method of acquiring or losing a territory as provided by national laws. UNCLOS
III is a multilateral treaty that established uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., territorial
waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines],
and exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]).

CONCLUSION:

The UNCLOS III Convention on the Law of the Sea, Third Edition, has nothing to do with territory
acquisition disputes or losses. It is just a defined standard that governs state behaviour. RA 9522, on
the other hand, is a baseline statute that establishes basepoints along coasts to serve as geographic
beginning points for measuring. It just informs the international world about the extent of our marine
area.
Domestically, if passages are a concern, the legislature can adopt laws defining routes within
archipelagic seas to manage innocent and marine lanes crossings. In the absence of such
circumstances, however, international law standards will prevail.

The fact that archipelagic nations' waters are vulnerable to both passes does not put them on a
lower footing in comparison to continental coastal states. Furthermore, because RIOP is a
customary international rule, no modern state may use its sovereignty to prevent its passage.

Philippines v. China (PCA Case No. 2013-19)

FACTS:

The Philippines initiated arbitration proceedings against China on 22 January 2013 in a

disagreement about their respective "maritime entitlements" and the legality of Chinese actions in
the South China Sea. In response, China rejected the arbitration in a diplomatic message issued to
the Philippines on February 19, 2013. The Arbitral Tribunal lacked jurisdiction in the case, according
to China, because China's acceptance of dispute settlement under the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] - the basis advanced by the Philippines - was limited and excluded
sea boundary delimitation and the determination of historic titles.

The People's Republic of China has consistently refused to recognize and participate in the
Philippines' arbitral processes that have occurred in the last few trials. The tribunal, on the other
hand, did not regard this as a barrier: on 29 October 2015, it issued its first decision establishing
jurisdiction, and on 12 July 2016, it issued its award resolving on the merits of the matter.

ISSUES:

The tribunal did not rule who controlled the South China Sea's marine features, such as the Spratly
Islands, which are claimed by both China and the Philippines, or any other coastal state in the
region. Similarly, the tribunal did not establish any maritime limits in the South China Sea between
the Philippines and China.

The prize addresses three important substantive issues:

1. the so-called "Nine-dash line," and China's claim to ancient rights in the South China Sea.

2.the legitimacy of various South China Sea marine features; and .

3.China's operations in the South China Sea are legitimate. The Arbitral Tribunal, however, did not
resolve concerns of territorial sovereignty over the parties' disputed sea features due to jurisdictional
restrictions.

CONCLUSION:

The tribunal considered whether the People's Republic of China claims the said historic rights inside
the said "nine-dash line" were in accordance with UNCLOS law. It first observed that this area - in
which China claimed rights to living and non-living resources (i.e. fisheries and petroleum resources)
"formed in the long historical course" - partially overlaps with areas that would otherwise comprise
the Philippines' exclusive economic zone [EEZ] or continental shelf (CS). The tribunal believes that
UNCLOS establishes a comprehensive maritime area regime and assigns rights in these areas to
the coastal state and other states: in the EEZ and the CS, the coastal state has exclusive sovereign
rights to the exploitation of living and non-living natural resources.

G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), also
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules).

The Solicitor General believes that the IPRA is partially unconstitutional because it grants indigenous peoples
ownership of natural resources and requests that the petition be granted in part. They join the NCIP in
defending the constitutionality of the IPRA and requesting that the petition be dismissed.

Petitioners challenge the validity of the following IPRA and Implementing Rules sections. on the grounds that
they constitute an illegal loss of the state's ownership over public domain lands, as well as minerals and other
natural resources within, in contravention of the regalian theory established in Section 2. The Constitution,
Article XII. Section 2's regalian doctrine has been violated. Article XII of the Constitution states that ancestral
domains, ancestral lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are
private, but community property of indigenous peoples may include private lands found within said areas, and
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUES:

Sections 3 (a) and (b), 5, 6, 7, 8, and 57, and 58 of Republic Act 8371/Indigenous Potentials for Peace and
Resilience Academy, as well as their Implementing Rules and Regulations, are unconstitutional because they
unlawfully deprive the state of ownership over public domain lands, minerals, and other natural resources, in
violation of the regalian doctrine enshrined in Section 2. The Constitution, Article XII.

Said provisions affirming indigenous "peoples' ownership of their ancestral lands and domains through native
title (definition lands held in private ownership since time immemorial) do not diminish the State's ownership
of lands within the public domain because said ancestral lands and domains are considered "private land and
never to have been "art of the public domain according to the Cario vs Insular Government doctrine.

CONCLUSION:

The petition was dismissed by seven votes. The Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and
Santiago joined Justice Kapunan's decision, which upheld the constitutionality of the disputed portions of R.A.
8371.

The petition was granted by seven other members of the Court.

G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR,
FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines filed the action, demanding that the Court of First Instance in Cebu overturn
its decision to seize public monies designated for the Philippine Armed Forces. In Special Proceedings, a
ruling was made in favour of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International
Construction Corporation, as well as the petitioner hereof, to confirm the arbitration award in the sum of
P1,712,396.40, subject to Special Proceedings. The respondent, Honourable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an
Order declaring the decision final and executory and ordered the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City, and
Manila to carry it out.

The appropriate Alia Writ of Execution was issued. The Provincial Sheriff of Rizal executed Notices of
Garnishment with many banks on the basis of the aforementioned Alias Writ of Execution. The money on
deposit with Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB are public funds properly appropriated and allotted for the
payment of retiree pensions, pay and allowances of military and civilian workers, and maintenance and
operations of the AFP.

ISSUES:

The key issue in the case is whether the order pronouncing the decision final and executory, as well as the alias
writ of execution against Armed Forces of the Philippines monies, are lawful

CONCLUSIONS:

The Court's ruling was founded on the idea of the state's non-suability, which is a basic premise of
constitutionalism. Unless it consents to be sued, the state and its government are immune from action. This
concept is founded on the logical and practical premise that no legal right may exist against the power that
establishes the legislation on which the right is based. Public money, including those of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, cannot be taken to fulfil judgements under writs of execution or garnishment since doing so
would impair the state's duties and public services. Disbursements of public monies are required by law to be
accompanied with the matching appropriation.

The Republic of the Philippines filed a suit contesting the legitimacy of an order and alias writ of execution
granted by Judge Guillermo P. Villasor. The order pronounced the ruling final and executory, and the alias writ
of execution was directed against the Armed Forces of the Philippines' finances. The Republic claimed that the
execution order and writ were null and unlawful due to an excess of jurisdiction or gross abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court decided in favour of the Republic, ruling the execution order and alias writ null and
invalid. The Court ruled that unless the state and its administration consent to being sued, they are immune
from action. Even if the state has agreed to be sued, public monies, including those of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, cannot be garnished. Disbursements of public monies are required by law to be accompanied with
the matching appropriation.
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER

FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
172, respondents.

Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.

FACTS:

The petitioners in the case are the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS) and the Director of
the Centre for Educational Measurement, while the respondents are Roberto Rey C. San Diego and Judge
Teresita Dizon-Capulong. The lawsuit was filed before the Branch 172 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Roberto Rey C. San Diego, the private responder, holds a Bachelor of Science in
Zoology from the University of the East. He had attempted and failed the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) three times. When he asked to take the test again, the petitioners denied his request since a student is
only permitted three chances to take the NMAT. San Diego then filed a mandamus petition to compel him
entrance to the test, citing his constitutional rights to academic freedom and decent education.

ISSUES:

Reasonable relationship between prescribing the NMAT as a requirement for admission to medical school on
the one hand, and ensuring the general public's health and safety on the other. A person who has failed the
NMAT three times is eligible to retake it.

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court found in favour of the petitioners and overturned the respondent court's ruling. The court
ruled that the three-flunk rule, which limits a student's ability to take the NMAT to three attempts, is lawful
and constitutional. The court also supported the NMAT's validity as a mechanism to guarantee candidates'
competency and readiness for medical school.

The Supreme Court found in favour of the petitioners, the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports
(DECS) and the Director of the Centre for Educational Measurement, in this case. The court ruled that the
three-flunk rule, which limits a student's ability to take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) to three
attempts, is lawful and constitutional. The court also supported the NMAT's validity as a mechanism to
guarantee candidates' competency and readiness for medical school. The court's ruling was based on the fact
that regulating entry to medical schools falls within the purview of the state's police authority, that the three-
flunk rule is a legitimate manner of ensuring the quality of medical education, and that, furthermore the right to
a good education is not absolute, and entrance conditions must be fair and reasonable.

G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

C.A. Mendoza & A. V. Raquiza and Alberto Cacnio & Associates for defendant-appellees.

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines has expropriated private property for public use in this instance. The land in
question was owned by Alfonso de Castellvi and had been leased to the Philippine Air Force (PAF) since
1947. The leasing deal was for one year, renewed yearly, and the PAF paid Castellvi monthly rent.

When the lease agreement ended in 1956, Castellvi refused to extend it, requiring the PAF to abandon the site.
The PAF, on the other hand, refused to leave, claiming permanent structures and amenities they had built on
the area. Castellvi then filed a petition at the Pampanga Court of First Instance to evict the PAF from the land.

The Republic began expropriation proceedings to take the property while the ejectment lawsuit was underway.
The Republic said that the "taking" of the property happened in 1947, when the PAF first occupied the area
under the leasing arrangement. The Republic claimed that all of the elements of an eminent domain "taking"
were present, including entry into private property, occupation for more than a momentary period, entry under
warrant or colour of legal authority, dedication of the property to public use, and ousting of the owner and
deprivation of beneficial enjoyment.

ISSUES:

Expropriation of properties began with the filing of the action or upon possession, and the case is the
determination of appropriate compensation for the expropriated lands.

CONCLUSION:

The court determines that the properties are, in fact, residential lands that might be developed into residential
subdivisions. The court references the decision of City of Manila vs. Corrales, which indicates that the worth
of expropriated land should be evaluated by its availability for desirable purposes. In evaluating the value of
the property in dispute, the court also takes into account the proposed subdivision plans.

The court rejects the Republic's position that because the lease agreement created a permanent right to occupy
the property, appropriate compensation should be based on the worth of the land at the time of occupation.
According to the court, a lease for a set period of time terminates on the date specified without the requirement
for a demand. The court further finds that the Republic's contention that it had the right and privilege to
purchase the property at the time of possession does not exist in the lease contract. The court rules that the
"taking" of the land begins on the date the complaint for eminent domain is filed.
G.R. No. L-67649 June 28, 1988

ENGRACIO FRANCIA, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and HO FERNANDEZ,

FACTS:

The lawsuit is a disagreement about the auction sale of Engracio Francia's land. Francia is the registered owner
of a Pasay City residential land and a two-story home. The government took a section of his land, and he
alleges that the money owing to him for the expropriation should have been taken off against his tax
delinquent. However, the court decides that this argument lacks legal support and that taxes cannot be adjusted
against any claims the taxpayer may have against the government. Francia failed to pay his real estate taxes for
14 years, leading in his property being auctioned off to Ho Fernandez. Francia claims that the auction should
be cancelled since he was not adequately advised of the sale and the sum paid for the property was shockingly
low.

ISSUES:

His P2,400.00 tax default was eliminated by legal compensation since the government owing him
P4,116.00 when a section of his land was expropriated, and the public auction was irregular due to a
lack of warning.

Francia's plea was denied, and the auction sale of his land to Ho Fernandez was affirmed. The court
determined that Francia's objections were without substance and that the auction transaction was
legal.

CONCLSUSIONS:

The court denied Francia's plea and affirmed Ho Fernandez's auction sale of his land. The court
determined that Francia's objections were without substance and that the auction transaction was
legal.

The court reasoned that the norms governing tax collection are reasonable and essential for the
state's operation. Allowing exclusions or leniency in tax collection would create confusion and
complexity in the collecting process, they emphasized. The court accepted that the value of the land
had increased due to the expropriation of nearby territories, but it deemed Francia's price to be
inflated. They also stated that Francia's failure to pay taxes for 14 years, failure to withdraw the
expropriation payment, and disregarding reminders about his tax delinquency were acts of
incomprehensible carelessness. The court found no evidence of ill faith or collaboration in
Fernandez's purchase of the property. They found that Francia lacked standing to plead equity in his
attempt to reclaim the property through a belated sale annulment.

G.R. No. L-23794 February 17, 1968

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON.
ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees.

Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo and Teehankee, Carreon & Tañada for plaintiff-
appellant.
Ramon O. de Veyra for defendants-appellees.
FACTS:

The lawsuit involves a tax legislation issued by the Ormoc City Municipal Board on January 29,
1964. The law levied a 1% municipal tax on the export sale of centrifugal sugar manufactured by the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. The tax was paid under protest by the corporation, totaling P12,087.50.
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed a case with the Leyte Court of First Instance, arguing that the
ordinance is illegal because it violates the equal protection clause and the uniformity of taxes
regulation. The corporation further claimed that the levy is an export tax, which is illegal under
Revised Administrative Code Section 2287.

ISSUES:

1. The Ormoc City Municipal Board has the ability to levy an export tax on centrifugal sugar
produced by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.

2. The tax ordinance breaches both the equal protection provision and the tax uniformity norm.

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court found in favour of Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., the plaintiff-appellant. The Court
ruled that the tax law was illegal and ordered the defendants-appellees to repay the money they had
paid in protest.

The issue involves a tax legislation enacted by the Ormoc City Municipal Board that imposes a
municipal tax on the export sale of centrifugal sugar manufactured by the Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc. The corporation protested the tax and filed a complaint saying that the ordinance is unlawful.
The Supreme Court found in the company's favour, ruling that the tax legislation was
unconstitutional and requiring a return of the money paid. According to Section 2 of Republic Act
2264, municipalities have the right to levy import or export taxes. The tax legislation, on the other
hand, violated the equal protection provision and the norm of uniformity of taxes since it only applied
to the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and excluded any later founded sugar central.

G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960

SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner,

vs.
SALIPADA K. PENDATUN,

FACTS:

This case is a petition filed by Congressman Sergio Osmena, Jr. against Congressman Salipada
Pendatun and fourteen other members of a Special Committee established by House Resolution No.
59. Osmena sought the resolution's annulment on the grounds that it breached his parliamentary
immunity, as well as an injunction to prohibit the committee from conducting its probe. The resolution
was enacted in reaction to Osmena's privilege speech, in which he levelled severe charges of
bribery against the President. The decision empowered the committee to investigate the veracity of
these allegations and compelled Osmena to back them up. If he fails to do so, he must demonstrate
reason why he should not be penalized by the house.

ISSUES:

The primary question in this case is whether the House of Representatives may penalise Congressman Osmea
retrospectively for his remarks, notwithstanding the fact that other business had intervened after the speech and
before any exception was taken to it.

CONCLUSION:

The court ruled that the House of Representatives could not penalize Congressman Osmena for his
comments retrospectively.

The court contends that House rules specify that a member should not be censured if other business
has intervened after the statements have been said and before an objection to them is taken. The
court emphasizes that the regulations do not require that the remarks be taken down in order for the
member to be exonerated. The court also cites a constitutional clause that allows each house of
Congress to choose its own procedural rules. The court does stress, however, that this power is not
unlimited and must not be used to undermine basic rights. The court further claims that the House
rules cannot be retrospectively altered to deprive a member of immunity that has already been
granted.

G.R. No. 225973 11/08/16

Ocampo vs. Enriquez

FACTS:

Several petitions have been filed in this matter opposing the burial of former President Ferdinand
Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB). According to the petitioners, the burial breaches the
1987 Constitution, statutes, and jurisprudence. They argue that the Court has a duty to investigate
the President's and public respondents' activities for gross abuse of discretion.

ISSUES:

Former President Ferdinand Marcos' interment at the LNMB is a violation of the Constitution, laws,
and jurisprudence.

Whether respondents Defence Secretary and AFP Rear Admiral committed grave abuse of
discretion when they issued the contested memorandum and directive in accordance with President
Duterte's verbal order to carry out his election campaign promise to have Marcos' remains interred at
the LNMB?

Whether historical facts, legislation established to reclaim ill-gotten riches from the Marcoses and
their associates, and Court declarations on the Marcos dictatorship have negated his right to be
buried at the LNMB as a soldier and former President?

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court denied the petitions and affirmed Marcos' interment at the LNMB. The Court
determined that President Duterte's and the public respondents' acts did not violate the Constitution,
statutes, or jurisprudence.

The Court initially considered whether the case involved a political matter. The Court agreed that
judicial power is a duty that cannot be abdicated, but judicial scrutiny has limits when it comes to
political issues. The Court applied the standard established in Francisco, Jr. v. House of
Representatives, which states that if there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred on political bodies, courts must examine whether the branch or instrumentality of
government acted within those limits. In this case, the Court determined that the petitioners failed to
establish that the constitutional provisions they invoked restrict President Duterte's executive power.
The Court further stated that AFP Regulations G 161-375, which permits Marcos' burial at the
LNMB, were issued by the DND Secretary, who has oversight and control over the AFP and the
PVAO. The Court maintained the regulation's constitutionality and determined that President Duterte
did not breach the due process or equal protection requirements by authorizing the burial.

G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner

vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA),

FACTS:
Three different petitions were filed in this case, each contesting the validity of Section 36 of Republic
Act No. 9165, generally known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The relevant
clause mandates drug testing for candidates for public office, students in secondary and higher
institutions, officials and workers in public and private offices, and anyone accused with specified
offences.

The petition, filed by the Social Justice Society (SJS), challenges Section 36 of RA 9165 paragraphs
(c), (d), (f), and (g). SJS claims that these clauses violate the equal protection clause, violate the
right to privacy, and violate the right to be free from excessive searches and seizures.

ISSUES:

Does Section 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an extra qualification
for senatorial candidates? Can Congress make legislation mandating requirements for senatorial
candidates in addition to those prescribed by the Constitution, and are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and
(g) of Section 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Do these passages, in particular, infringe the right to
privacy, the right against excessive searches and seizures, and the equal protection clause? Or do
they amount to an improper transfer of legislative power?

CONCLUSION:

The court rules that Section 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486, which imposes
an extra qualification for senator candidates, are unconstitutional. Paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of
Section 36 of RA 9165 are likewise declared unconstitutional for constituting an excessive
delegation of legislative power, breaching the equal protection provision, and infringing on the right
to privacy and protection against arbitrary searches and seizures.

G.R No. 188078 January 25, 2010

VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, and MINERVA

ALDABA MORADA, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
FACTS:

This case includes a move for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in
response to a court judgement. The COMELEC contends that relying on the Certification of Alberto
N. Miranda, Region III Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO), estimating the population of
Malolos City in 2010 is unjusticiable. Other sources of demographic statistics for Malolos City in
2007 and 2008, which Congress reportedly considered in drafting Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591),
are also mentioned by the COMELEC. The COMELEC's non-justiciability argument is extended to
these documents as well.

ISSUES:

For the purpose of forming a parliamentary district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010
elections, the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether real or anticipated.

The question in this case is whether Congress' reliance on Alberto N. Miranda's Certification and
other demographic data in passing RA 9591 was justiciable.

CONCLUSION:

The court refuses the COMELEC's plea for reconsideration and affirms its prior verdict. The court
concludes that Congress' reliance on Alberto N. Miranda's Certification and other demographic
statistics in passing RA 9591 is justiciable. The court further finds that the demographic indices
employed by Congress do not fulfil the standards of EO 135 and are thus untrustworthy and non-
authoritative. Furthermore, the court decides that Malolos City is not entitled to congressional
representation unless it exceeds the 250,000 population threshold before the 2018 elections. Finally,
the court concludes that RA 9591's establishment of a parliamentary district for Malolos City
breaches the criteria of continuous, compact, and adjacent territory.

G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
FACTS:

Several applications filed by various political parties attempting to overturn the Commission on
Elections' (COMELEC) decision excluding them from participate in party-list elections. The
petitioners in this lawsuit are numerous political parties that were barred from running in the party-list
elections by the COMELEC. The COMELEC made its decision based on a number of factors,
including a failure to represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors, a lack of track record in
working for marginalized rights, and a failure to comply with the standards of the party-list system.

ISSUES:

The question in this issue is whether the COMELEC's decision to bar the petitioners from running in
the party-list elections was legal.

COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction, in

disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denying
their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancelling their existing
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations. Second, whether the criteria for
participating in the party-list system laid out in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay

The case of National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections[49] (BANAT)

should be implemented by the COMELEC in the upcoming party-list elections on May 13, 2013.

CONCLUSION:

The Court ruled that the COMELEC's interpretation and execution of the party-list system was overly
restrictive, failing to take into account the law's objective to offer voice to marginalized and
underrepresented groups. The Court emphasized that the party-list system is intended to be
inclusive and should not be confined to historically marginalized groups such as labor, peasants, the
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and people with disabilities. The Court
reasoned that the COMELEC's stringent interpretation of the party-list system would
disproportionately limit the participation of marginalized and underrepresented groups. The Court
emphasized that the party-list system is a tool for empowerment and that it should be construed
broadly in order to achieve the broadest possible representation of marginalised sections. The Court
also determined that the COMELEC's reliance on track record as a reason for disqualification was
incorrect, because the law does not require a party-list organization to have a track record in order to
participate in elections.

G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.
FACTS:

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) filed a Petition for Certiorari against the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) challenging the COMELEC's rejection to certify Ang Ladlad as a party-list
organization under the Party-List System Act. Ang Ladlad is an organization made up of people who
identify as lesbians, homosexuals, bisexuals, or transgendered (LGBTs). They contend that the
LGBT community is marginalized and under-represented, and that it is subjected to prejudice and
violence. They also claim to have followed the rules established by the Supreme Court in a prior
case. The petition was denied on moral grounds by the COMELEC, which stated that Ang Ladlad
tolerates immorality and offends religious convictions.

They further contend that the party-list system is not intended to promote tolerance and acceptance
of misunderstood individuals or groups. When Ang Ladlad requested reconsideration, the
COMELEC was split. The Chairman affirmed the petition's dismissal, noting that Ang Ladlad's sexual
orientations do not help the nation as a whole and that LGBT people are protected under the same
Bill of Rights as all citizens.

ISSUES:

The refusal of Ang Ladlad's appeal for registration as a sectoral party breaches their constitutional
rights to privacy, free expression and assembly, and equal treatment under the law, as well as
international duties against sexual orientation discrimination.

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court found in favor of Ang Ladlad, granting their registration petition. The Court ruled
that Ang Ladlad's petition was denied in violation of their constitutional rights to privacy, free
expression and assembly, and equal treatment under the law. The Court also ruled that the refusal
breached international treaties against sexual orientation discrimination.

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
FACTS:

Cirilo Roy Montejo and Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, who filed a petition against the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). The major question in this case is whether Imelda Romualdez-Marcos fulfils
the residence criteria to compete for a congressional seat in Leyte's First District.

ISSUES:

The issue at hand in this case is whether Imelda Romualdez-Marcos fulfils the residence criteria to
compete for a congressional seat in Leyte's First Congressional District.

CONCLSUSION:

The Supreme Court declared that Imelda Romualdez-Marcos fulfils the residence requirement to
seek for a congressional seat in Leyte's First Congressional District. The court emphasized that for
political reasons, residence and domicile are equivalent, and that the reality of residence, rather than
a declaration in a certificate of candidature, should be the deciding element in establishing residency
qualifying criteria. The court further stressed that an individual does not lose their domicile just
because they have lived in numerous areas, and that marriage does not affect one's domicile
automatically.

G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995

AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO
ICARO, respondents.

FACTS:

Agapito A. Aquino filed a petition against the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Move Makati,
Mateo Bedon, and Juanito Icaro in this matter. The petitioner claims that following the May 8, 1995
elections, the COMELEC lost jurisdiction over the issue of his eligibility to compete for House of
Representatives. He says that the petition for disqualification is only before the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The central question in this case is whether the
COMELEC retains jurisdiction over the petitioner's eligibility after the elections.

ISSUES:

The question is whether the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over the petitioner's qualifications
following the elections.

And if the certificate of candidature mentions domicile enough to exclude Aquino from the post in the
electoral districts, as well as whether Aquino has proven the choice of domicile rather than merely
residency in the district he was running in.

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court declared that even after the elections, the COMELEC had jurisdiction over
qualifying matters. The court ruled that because the petitioner failed to show his domicile in Makati's
Second Legislative District, he was unable to run for representative. The court further stated that
votes cast for an ineligible candidate should not be considered, and that the candidate receiving the
most votes among the qualifying candidates should be declared the winner.

G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,
vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee

FACTS:

Plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert, and Jose L. Lukban filed a civil case against
defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. The plaintiffs claimed restitution for the publishing of the
defendant's allegedly libellous letter. The letter in question was an open letter to the President of the
Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, and was published in a number of Philippine newspapers of
public distribution. The defendant, who was a member of the House of Representatives and the
Chairman of the Committee on National Defence at the time the letter was published, requested to
dismiss the case on the grounds that the letter was not libellous and was a privileged communication
the plaintiffs filed an appeal after the lower court approved their request to dismiss.

ISSUES:

Is the publication in question a privileged communication, and is it libellous in a sense?

CONCLUSION:

The plaintiffs brought a civil action for damages against the defendant for the publishing of an
allegedly libellous letter in this case. The case also raises the question of whether the publishing is a
privileged communication and if it is libellous. The publication was not a privileged communication,
according to the court, because it was not made in the course of the defendant's official
responsibilities as a member of Congress. The court also determined that the letter did not support
the plaintiffs' damages claim because it implied that the plaintiffs were uninformed of the purported
intentions stated in the letter and were thus unsuspecting pawns of the planners. As a result, the
court upheld the lower court's dismissal of the suit.

A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009

ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant,
vs.
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent.

FACTS:

Antero J. Pobre filed a complaint against Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago for making disparaging
remarks against then-Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and other Supreme Court members. Pobre
claimed that Santiago's words constituted direct contempt of court and sought that she be disbarred
or face other disciplinary punishment. In her remark, Santiago confessed to making the statements
but argued that they were protected by parliamentary immunity since they were part of a speech she
gave in the course of her duties as a member of Congress. She stated that her goal was to reveal
what she saw as an unfair act by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) in the nomination process for
the office of Chief Justice.

ISSUES:

The primary question in the lawsuit is whether Senator Santiago's remarks are protected by
parliamentary immunity or if they violate proper conduct.

CONCLUSION:

Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago was accused of making derogatory remarks against the Supreme
Court. The court found in favor of Senator Santiago, recognizing the importance of parliamentary
immunity in protecting free expression and Congress' legislative powers. However, the court raised
worry over Senator Santiago's words and its influence on the administration of justice. It considered
her utterances to be in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and emphasized the need
of attorneys, particularly those in public service, to maintain the dignity and authority of the courts.
The court's ruling emphasizes the delicate balance between parliamentary immunity and the
obligation to practice free speech properly and with regard for other branches of government.

G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986

EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.

FACTS:

Javier and Arturo F. Pacificador were both Batasang Pambansa candidates in Antique in the May
1984 elections. Several Javier supporters were attacked and slain prior to the elections, reportedly
by Pacificador's men. Despite these circumstances, the polls were held, and Pacificador was
declared the winner by the Commission on polls' Second Division.

Javier petitioned the Supreme Court, claiming that the proclamation was invalid since it was issued
by a section of the COMELEC rather than the full Commission, as required by the Constitution.
Meanwhile, Pacificador took his oath as a Batasang Pambansa member based on his declaration.

Javier was slain while the lawsuit was pending, emphasizing the need of resolving the disagreement.
The Supreme Court dismissed the application to dismiss the lawsuit, emphasizing that it must not
ignore wrongs under the guise that the issue is now moot and academic. The Court emphasized that
it is not only the ultimate legal arbiter, but also the government's conscience, and that it must bring
justice to the public.

ISSUES:

The declaration of Arturo F. Pacificador as the winner of the Batasang Pambansa elections in
Antique is null and invalid since it was issued by a division of the COMELEC rather than by the
Commission en banc, as required by the Constitution.

CONCLUSION:

The announcement of the winner of the Antique Batasang Pambansa elections. Javier claims that
the proclamation is null and void since it was issued by a section of the COMELEC rather than the
whole Commission as required by the Constitution. The Supreme Court judges in Javier's favor,
ruling the declaration null and unconstitutional. The Court emphasizes the COMELEC's jurisdiction
to hear and determine election conflicts, as well as the significance of due process and the
impartiality of judges. The Court also condemns the practice of postponing protests using the grab-
the-proclamation approach.
G.R. No. 192791 April 24, 2012

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REYNALDO A. VILLAR, Responden

FACTS:

This case tackles a petition contesting the validity of Reynaldo A. Villar's appointment as Chairman
of the Commission on Audit (COA). Dennis A. B. Funa, the petitioner, contends that Villar's
appointment is unconstitutional and wants a judgement ruling it so.

Guillermo N. Carague was named Chairman of the COA by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for a
seven-year term beginning February 2, 2001. President Macapagal-Arroyo named Villar as the third
member of the COA on February 7, 2004, for a seven-year tenure beginning February 2, 2004. Villar
was chosen as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 until April 14, 2008, following
Carague's departure on February 2, 2008.

On April 18, 2008, he was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA, and on June 11,
2008, he was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Villar stated that his tenure as COA
Chairman expires on February 2, 2015, or seven years after his appointment as a COA
Commissioner on February 2, 2008.

However, before the petition could be heard by the court, Villar resigned from his post following the
nomination of his replacement, Ma. President Benigno S. Aquino III denied Gracia Pulido-Tan's
appeal, rendering it moot and academic.

ISSUES:

The nomination of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) is unlawful
because reappointment after seven years is prohibited.

And this brings us to the critical substantive question of whether Villar's appointment as COA
Chairman, while sitting in that body and after having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year
term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed by, and the
circumscribing concepts tucked into, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution states:

Petitioner now maintains that Sec. 1(2), Art. Reappointment of any kind within the commission is
prohibited by Article IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution, with the point being that a second appointment,
whether for the same position (commissioner to another position of commissioner) or upgraded
position (commissioner to chairperson), is a prohibited reappointment and is void from the start.
CONCLUSION:

Questioning the validity of Reynaldo A. Villar's appointment as Chairman of the Commission on

Audit (COA). The petitioner claims that Villar's appointment is unlawful since reappointment after
seven years is prohibited. The Court, however, determines that Villar's appointment is legal and
does not breach the restriction. The Court interprets the constitutional clause using the simple
meaning test and determines that a promotion from Commissioner to Chairman is permissible as
long as the Commissioner has not served the entire term of seven years. The Court also relies on
the Constitutional Commission's discussions and jurisprudence to buttress its view. In conclusion,
the Court concludes that Villar's appointment is legal and does not violate the constitutional limitation
on reappointment.

.
G.R. No. 176951 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.

FACTS:

The Cityhood Laws, notably Republic Act Nos. have been violated, 16 in total most and these are
the acts (9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435,
9436, and 9491.).The petitioners, represented by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), filed
a petition in which they asked the court to declare that the petitioners' petition was invalid, claimed
that the legislation violated Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution, Article X, and the equal protection
principle. The petitioners stated that the formation of local government entities must adhere to the
requirements outlined in the Local Government Code and no other legislation. They claimed that the
Cityhood Laws, which exempted some communities from the cityhood income criterion, were
unconstitutional.

ISSUES:

The key issue in this case is whether the Cityhood Laws are constitutional, and if they contravene (1)
Sec. 10. Art. X of the United States Constitution, as well as (2) the equal protection provision.

CONCLUSION:

Cityhood legislation is unlawful. The Court ruled that the given on the case legislation are violated a
provision of the Constitution that requires local government entities to be formed in accordance with
the criteria provided in the Local Government Code. The Court also rejected the use of the operative
fact doctrine, holding that while the results of the Cityhood Laws' execution may be recognized as
legal and effective, the laws themselves are unconstitutional. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the
exemption from the income criterion in the Cityhood Laws did not violate the equal protection
provision since it was based on legitimate categorization and applied to all members of the same
class in the same way as followed by legal procedures and etc.
G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE

vs.

ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL,

FACTS:

Six certiorari and prohibition petitions were filed contesting the validity of RA 9372, often known as
the Human Security Act. The Anti-Terrorism Council is named as a respondent in the various
petitions, with Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul
Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defence
Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government
Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members at the time the
petitions were filed. Except for the IBP, all petitions also included Armed Forces of the Philippines,
respondents include Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar
Calderon.

ISSUES:

The validity of Republic Act No. 9372, notably its clauses on the definition of terrorism, the
warrantless arrest and imprisonment of suspected terrorists, and the freezing of suspected terrorists'
assets, is raised in all of the petitions. According to the petitioners, these limitations violate their
constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, free expression, and free association.

The action also questions the legitimacy of Republic Act No. 9372 and its provisions on terrorist
definition, unwarranted arrest and detention, and asset freezing.

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court upholds Republic Act No. 9372 as constitutional. The legislation, according to
the Court, is a legal exercise of the state's police power to protect its citizens from terrorism. The
Court determines that the provisions of the statute concerning the definition of terrorism, warrantless
arrest and detention, and asset freezing are not unconstitutional since they are necessary counter-
terrorist measures. The Court decided that the law is a reasonable and necessary measure to
protect national security, that the definition of terrorism is clear and specific, that the provisions on
warrantless arrest and detention strike a balance between law enforcement and individual rights,
and that asset freezing is required to disrupt terrorist networks.
G.R. No. 167614 March 24, 2009

ANTONIO M. SERRANO, Petitioner,

vs.
Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC.

Facts:

Antonio M. Serrano, a Filipino sailor, questions the legitimacy of the final clause in Section 10 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042. In the event of an unlawful dismissal, Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs) are only entitled to a lump-sum compensation for the unexpired period of their work contract
or three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. Serrano claims that this
clause breaches OFWs' constitutional rights, jeopardizes the terms of their contracts, denies them
equal protection, and denies them due process.

Serrano was engaged by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. under a
Contract of Employment authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
He was, however, demoted to the post of Second Officer rather than Chief Officer, as promised by
the responders. Serrano refused to stay and was forced to return to the Philippines. He sued the
defendants for constructive dismissal and fulfilment of his money claims.

The Labour Arbiter (LA) ruled that Serrano's firing was unconstitutional and paid him a lump-sum
salary for the remaining three months of his contract. The National Labour Relations Commission
(NLRC) reversed the LA's ruling, reducing the lump-sum compensation to the relevant salary rate.
The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the NLRC's decision but did not examine Serrano's constitutional
challenge.

ISSUES:

The question in this case is whether the final phrase in Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, which
limits OFWs' rights in the event of wrongful dismissal, is constitutional.

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court judges in favour of Serrano and declares the final section of Republic Act No.
8042 Section 10 invalid.

The Supreme Court rules that the final clause of Republic Act No. 8042, Section 10, is
unconstitutional. The Court decides in Serrano's favour, declaring that the subject clause breaches
OFWs' constitutional rights to equal protection and fair process. In addition, the Court determines
that the subject clause violates the conditions of the OFWs' employment contracts. The Court
emphasizes the need of resolving the contradictory decisions on the matter in order to guide
impacted OFWs and defend their rights.
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON,

FACTS:

This case involves a petition filed by Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner) challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, also known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004." The petitioner contends that the law violates the Constitution's equal protection and
due process clauses and unduly delegated judicial power to barangay officials.

Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent), the petitioner's wife, filed a petition for a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) against the petitioner, citing physical abuse, emotional, psychological, and
economic aggression, as well as threats of loss of custody and financial support.

According to the private respondent, the petitioner's adultery resulted in physical and mental abuse,
including situations in which he seized her, punched her forcibly, and even beat their kid. Due to the
mental agony created by the petitioner's activities, the private respondent attempted suicide. She
further expressed concern that the petitioner would take away their children and deprive her of
financial assistance.

The Bacolod City Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued a temporary restraining order (TPO) in favour of
the private respondent, ordering the petitioner to remove his personal belongings from their home,
stay away from the private respondent and their children, surrender his firearms, provide financial
support, and not dissipate the conjugal business. The TPO was then amended to include additional
restrictions, such as the private respondent's ongoing use of certain cars and premises.

The petitioner opposed to the TPO's renewal, saying that it did not fulfil procedural criteria, and
demanded that the TPO be changed to include visiting privileges for his children. The TPO was
renewed and extended, with specific adjustments requested by the private respondent.

ISSUES:

The issue at hand is whether Republic Act No. 9262, better known as the "Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004," is constitutional.

and if RA Act No. 9262 violates due process of law, as well as to defend the family as an institution.

CONCLUSION:

Republic Act No. 9262 was affirmed as constitutional by the Supreme Court., also known as the
"Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004." The court explained that the law is
based on a valid classification and is required to address the problem of violence against women
and children. The legislation recognizes men and women's uneven power relationships and seeks to
protect women and their children from violence and abuse. The court further emphasized that the
statute does not overburden barangay authorities with judicial authority.
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.

vs.

HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON

FACTS:

The case questions the legitimacy of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, which temporarily
suspends the deployment of Filipino domestic and household workers, is challenged in this case.
The petitioner, the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), claims that the policy is
discriminatory because it only applies to domestic workers and women with comparable abilities.
PASEI further contends that the order infringes the right to travel and is an unconstitutional use of
legislative authority. PASEI further claims that the order was issued without previous discussions,
which breaches the Constitution's non-impairment article.

The defendants, the Secretary of Labour and Employment and the Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, believe that the order is a legitimate exercise of state police
authority. They argue that the injunction is required to protect Filipino female foreign workers who
have been exploited and abused. They further contend that the order does not violate the
Constitution's equal protection provision since it is based on substantive disparities and applies
equally to all members of the same class.

ISSUES:

Is Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988 discriminatory and an infringement on the right to travel?

Or the order is an invalid exercise of legislative authority.

Finally, the order was issued without previous consultation, which violates the Constitution's non-
impairment clause.

CONCLUSION:

The court dismisses the petition and affirms the order's legitimacy, finding that it is a legitimate
exercise of the state's police power. The court concludes that the order is founded on material
differences and does not violate the equal protection provision. The decree intends to safeguard
female domestic workers from exploitation and abuse while without favouring one individual or group
over another.
G.R. No. 168081 October 17, 2008

ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,

vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.

FACTS:

Armando G. Yrasuegui, a former international flight steward for Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), was
fired for failing to conform to the company's weight criteria. Yrasuegui had a history of weight issues
that dated back to 1984. He was urged to take an extended leave to address his weight issues, but
he did not match the company's weight requirements. After achieving the appropriate weight, he was
permitted to return to work, but his weight problem reappeared. He was on unpaid leave several
times and failed to meet the weight requirements. Despite many chances to comply, Yrasuegui
remained overweight and was finally sacked by PAL.

ISSUES:

The key issue in the case is whether Yrasuegui's firing was valid and if obesity may be used as a
reason for dismissal under paragraph (e) of Article 282 of the Philippine labour code.

CONCLUSION:

The court decided that Yrasuegui's firing was permissible under Labour Code Article 282 (e). The
court determined that PAL's weight limits are reasonable and essential for flight safety. The court
also dismissed Yrasuegui's claim that the weight requirements are not a legitimate occupational
criterion. As a result, the court upheld Yrasuegui's firing and ruled that his claims for reinstatement
and backwages were irrelevant.
G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC

FACTS:

The case questions the legitimacy of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, which temporarily
suspends the deployment of Filipino domestic and household workers, is challenged in this case.
The petitioner, the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), claims that the policy is
discriminatory because it only applies to domestic workers and women with comparable abilities.
PASEI further contends that the order infringes the right to travel and is an unconstitutional use of
legislative authority. PASEI further claims that the order was issued without previous discussions,
which breaches the Constitution's non-impairment article.

The defendants, the Secretary of Labour and Employment and the Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, believe that the order is a legitimate exercise of state police
authority. They argue that the injunction is required to protect Filipino female foreign workers who
have been exploited and abused. They further contend that the order does not violate the
Constitution's equal protection provision since it is based on substantive disparities and applies
equally to all members of the same class.

ISSUES:

Is Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988 discriminatory and an infringement on the right to travel?

Or the order is an invalid exercise of legislative authority.

Finally, the order was issued without previous consultation, which violates the Constitution's non-
impairment clause.

CONCLUSION:

The court dismisses the petition and affirms the order's legitimacy, finding that it is a legitimate
exercise of the state's police power. The court concludes that the order is founded on material
differences and does not violate the equal protection provision. The decree intends to safeguard
female domestic workers from exploitation and abuse while without favouring one individual or group
over another.
The statute is constitutional since it does not infringe on the ability to organize legitimate groups and
does not impose a religious test for exercising civil or political rights. The Court ruled that the
legislation is a permissible use of the State's jurisdiction to protect the essential interests of its
citizens and to preserve religious and belief freedom. The Court further emphasized that religious
freedom is superior to contractual rights and that contractual rights must yield to religious freedom.
G.R. No. 128845 June 1, 2000

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

FACTS:

During discussions for a new collective bargaining agreement, the International School Alliance of
Educators (ISAE), a labour union representing the International School, Inc.'s faculty members,
protested the discrepancy in compensation rates between foreign-hires and local-hires. The
International School is a domestic educational school primarily for foreign diplomatic personnel's
dependents and other temporary residents. The school recruits both international and local
instructors and divides them into two categories: foreign hires and local hires. Foreign hires are paid
more and enjoy more perks than local hires. The Department of Labour and Employment (DOLE)
took jurisdiction of the case and ruled in favour of the institution. This petition was filed after ISAE's
motion for reconsideration was refused.

ISSUES:

The main concern in this case is whether the wage disparity between international and local
personnel is valid.

CONCLUSION:

The court determined that the school's point-of-hire categorization, which was used to justify the
disparity in pay rates, was unlawful. There is no discernible difference between the services provided
by foreign workers and those provided by local hires. The court further emphasized that public policy
despises inequality and discrimination, and that paying greater wages to foreign-hires violates this
objective.
G.R. No. 164785 April 29, 2009

ELISEO F. SORIANO, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA,

FACTS:

This case contains two certiorari and prohibition petitions filed by Eliseo F. Soriano against the
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) in response to statements he made
on his television show, Ang Dating Daan. The MTRCB issued a preventative suspension order
against Soriano and later suspended him from his program for three months. Soriano contends that
the preventative suspension order, as well as the MTRCB's jurisdiction to issue it, are
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

If the MTRCB has the authority to order a preventative suspension.

CONCLUSION:

The court maintained the MTRCB's right to give Soriano a preventative suspension order. The court
found that the MTRCB's authority to impose preventative suspensions is indicated by its legislative
mission and is required for effective control and supervision of television programs.
G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) filed a Petition for Certiorari against the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) challenging the COMELEC's rejection to certify Ang Ladlad as a party-list
organisation under the Party-List System Act. Ang Ladlad is an organization made up of people who
identify as lesbians, homosexuals, bisexuals, or transgendered (LGBTs). They contend that the
LGBT community is marginalized and under-represented, and that it is subjected to prejudice and
violence. They also claim to have followed the rules established by the Supreme Court in a prior
case.

The petition was denied on moral grounds by the COMELEC, which stated that Ang Ladlad tolerates
immorality and offends religious convictions. They further contend that the party-list system is not
intended to promote tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood individuals or groups. When Ang
Ladlad requested reconsideration, the COMELEC was split.

Ang Ladlad petitioned the Supreme Court, claiming that the COMELEC's denial of accreditation
violated their constitutional rights to privacy, free speech and assembly, and equal protection under
the law, as well as international obligations against sexual orientation discrimination. The Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) endorsed Ang Ladlad's appeal, claiming that the COMELEC's claims of
immorality were without merit.

ISSUES:

Whether the denial of Ang Ladlad's petition for registration as a sectoral party violates their rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, equal protection under the law, and international
commitments against discrimination based on sexual orientation are the main questions at stake in
this case.

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court decided that Ang Ladlad's appeal for registration as a sectoral party was denied
in violation of their constitutional rights to privacy, free expression and assembly, and equal
protection under the law. The Court ruled that the LGBT community is not barred from participating
in the party-list system and that the COMELEC's refusal of accreditation was unconstitutional. The
Court emphasized that free expression includes not just those who are well welcomed, but also
those who offend, shock, or disturb.
The Court also acknowledged that the principle of non-discrimination required that election rules
apply equally to all people, regardless of sexual orientation. The Court further ruled that the denial of
Ang Ladlad's petition was not supported by any compelling state interest, and that it breached
international anti-discrimination treaties.
G.R. No. 191366 December 13, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ARNOLD MARTINEZ

FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) that upheld the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) that found the accused guilty of violating Section 13, and in relation to
that next is Section 11, of Article II of Republic Act No. (9165) for the Possession of Dangerous
Drugs During Parties, Social/Special Gatherings, or Meetings of any kind. Arnold Martinez, Edgar
Dizon, Rezin Martinez, and Rafael Gonzales were among those charged.

The prosecution called witnesses to testify that on September 2, 2006, a concerned citizen reported
a marijuana session taking place at Gonzales' home. When the cops arrived at the premises, they
discovered the accused in a room with open plastic sachets containing shabu/drugs residue and bits
of rolled and used aluminium foil. The defendants were apprehended, and the confiscated materials
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The defendants said they were in the
neighbourhood to meet someone and were detained without a warrant.

ISSUES:

The key issue in the case is whether the accused's arrest was legitimate and if the prosecution was
successful in establishing the chain of custody of the confiscated narcotics.

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court ruled that the accused's arrest was unconstitutional, and the relevant objects
were confiscated as a result. The Court emphasized the importance of the constitutional provision
against unjustified searches and seizures. The Court also determined that the prosecution failed to
show the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
G.R. No. 179478 July 28, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JINGGOY MATEO y RODRIGUEZ,

FACTS:
Jinggoy Mateo y Rodriguez, who was found guilty of breaching Republic Act No.9165, also known
as the 2002 Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.

The case arose from an information filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
103, alleging defendant-appellant of selling a transparent plastic sachet containing 0.20 gm(gram) of
the hazardous substance Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride.

The prosecution submitted the evidence of Police Officer 2 Joseph Ortiz (PO2 Ortiz), who posed as
the poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation against defendant-appellant, throughout the trial. PO2 Ortiz
stated that he was given marked money and was able to acquire illicit substances from the
defendant-appellant. A forensic analysis eventually revealed that the substances were shabu or
methylamphetamine hydrochloride.

In contrast, defendant-appellant claimed that he was unlawfully arrested and denied any role in the
narcotics transaction. He claimed he was outside his residence with a stomachache when he was
detained and brought into custody by police officers.

ISSUES:

The question in this case is whether the arresting authorities met the standards for appropriate
custody of the confiscated hazardous substances set out in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.

CONCLUSIONS:

The Supreme Court affirmed defendant-appellant Jinggoy Mateo y Rodriguez's conviction for
breaching Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. The Court decided that the claimed violation
of Section 21 did not invalidate the arrest or render the confiscated goods inadmissible as evidence.
The Court emphasized the significance of maintaining the integrity and evidential value of seized
materials, but found that failure to comply with specific procedural criteria did not render the arrest or
the confiscated objects inadmissible. The Court found no compelling basis to reject the trial court's
findings and upheld the defendant-appellant's conviction.
G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO,

FACTS:

Rosalie Tesoro charged the petitioner, Hortencia Salazar, with unlawful recruiting. Salazar was
summoned to appear before the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) in
connection with the matter. The POEA then issued a closure and seizure order against Salazar's
recruiting agency, claiming that she lacked a valid license and had committed labour code violations.
A team of police officers and media representatives went to Salazar's house and collected
documents and equipment used for illegal recruiting.

ISSUES:

The question in this case is whether the Secretary of Labour, or the POEA, has the jurisdiction to
issue search and seizure warrants or arrest warrants under Article 38 of the Labour Code.

CONCLUSION:

The legitimacy of the Secretary of Labor's ability to issue warrants of search and seizure or arrest
under Article 38 of the Labour Code is at stake in this case. Hortencia Salazar, the petitioner, was
charged with unlawful recruiting, and the POEA ordered the closure and seizure of her recruitment
firm. The Supreme Court determined that the Secretary of Labour does not have the jurisdiction to
issue search or arrest warrants under the new Constitution, since only judges are authorised to do
so. As a result, Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labour Code is deemed unconstitutional and null and
void.
G.R. No. 198701 December 10, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JAYSON ClJRILLAN HAMBORA

FACTS:
Jayson C. Hambora (Hambora) filed an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
upholding his conviction for breaching Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, also known as
the 2002 Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.

. The case began with a buy-bust operation carried out by police officers from the PNP's Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Butuan City. Hambora was charged with selling one
sachet of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, to a poseur-buyer for P400.00.

ISSUES:

The fundamental question in this case is whether Hambora's conviction for breaking Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is lawful, given his defence of being framed by police officials and
the claimed failure to follow correct arrest and search procedures.

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court upheld Hambora's conviction for breaching Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165. The Court deemed the police officers' statements in the buy-bust operation to be reliable
and adequate to prove Hambora's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court also dismissed
Hambora's argument that he was framed by police officers since he failed to produce any proof to
back up his claim. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the failure to follow correct arrest and
search procedures did not render the arrest illegal or the confiscated shabu inadmissible as
evidence, because the seized shabu's integrity and evidentiary value were maintained.
G.R. No. L-45284 December 29, 1936

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO DE LA CRUZ, ET AL.

FACTS:

Francisco de la Cruz, the appellant, was accused with robbery. The purported event occurred on
May 30, 1936, in the city of Manila. De la Cruz planned with Fernando Legaspi and three other
unnamed persons to assault Yu Wan. They attacked him and produced bodily injuries that needed
medical care for more than one but less than nine days. They also grabbed 26 pesos in cash from
Yu Wan without his permission. According to the report, de la Cruz had previous convictions for
stealing and estafa, making him a chronic offender.

ISSUES:

The argument hinges on whether de la Cruz is a repeat offender and if his guilty plea should be
considered a mitigating factor.

CONCLUSION:

Based on the claims in the evidence, De la Cruz should not be regarded a chronic delinquent. The
court, on the other hand, determined that the events described in the information constituted an
aggravating factor of recidivism. The court also ruled that de la Cruz's guilty plea should not be
deemed a mitigating factor under the Revised Penal Code since it was not spontaneous and came
after the prosecution presented evidence.
G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR.

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.

FACTS:
The validity of numerous parts of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, often known as the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012, is at stake in this case. The petitioners in these aggregated petitions
contend that the statutes in question infringe their constitutional rights to free speech, expression,
and privacy.

The case's facts center on the usage of cyberspace and the internet. According to the petitioners,
the internet is a crucial tool for getting information, engaging with people, and conducting business.
They do, however, accept that some people use the internet for bad objectives such as defamation,
bullying, and stealing.

ISSUES:

The question in this case is whether R.A. 10175 penalizes some internet actions, such as cyber libel,
cybersex, and identity theft. The petitioners contend that these laws are ambiguous and overbroad,
and that they infringe their right to free expression. They also claim that the law is unconstitutional
and infringes their right to privacy.

CONCLUSION:

In its decision, the Supreme Court deemed certain clauses of R.A. 10175 as unconstitutional. The
Court ruled that the clause on cyber libel is constitutional, but only to the extent that it penalizes the
original creator of the defamatory remark and not those who simply receive, respond to, or comment
on it. The Court also overturned the rule on internet libel because it imposes a harsher punishment
for online libel than traditional libel.

The Court also ruled that the regulations governing cybersex, child pornography, and unwanted
commercial messages are constitutional. However, it overturned the clause on identity theft because
it is overbroad and breaches the right to privacy.
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES

vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE

FACTS:

Petition for grant of a writ of habeas corpus filed by Rhonda Ave S. Vivares and Sps. St. Theresa's
College (STC), Mylene Rheza T. Escudero, and John Does are up against Margarita and David
Suzara. The petitioners are appealing the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City's dismissal of
their habeas data petition.

The following are the facts of the case: Nenita Julia V. Daluz and Julienne Vida Suzara, both minors
and graduating high school students at STC, snapped digital photos of themselves wearing just their
underwear while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party. Angela Lindsay Tan shared these
photos on Facebook. Mylene Rheza T. Escudero, a computer instructor at STC, discovered the
photos and presented them to school administrators. STC subsequently launched an inquiry and
discovered that the kids had broken the school's discipline policies. The pupils were prevented from
participating in the commencement rituals as a result.

ISSUES:

The primary issue in this case is whether a writ of habeas corpus should be issued in light of the
facts.

CONCLUSION:

The court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court determined that the school did
not infringe the kids' right to privacy and emphasised the significance of balancing that right with
other rights and interests. The court also acknowledged that schools had the jurisdiction to impose
disciplinary actions on pupils in order to preserve discipline and order.
G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

The case involves petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her spouse, private respondent Alfredo Martin.
Cecilia forcibly entered her husband's clinic without his knowledge or consent on March 26, 1982,
and took 157 documents, including private correspondence between Dr.Martin and his claimed
mistresses, as well as greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photos.

These records were seized as evidence in Cecilia's lawsuit for legal separation and disqualification
from practicing medicine against her husband. Dr. Martin filed a lawsuit against Cecilia seeking the
return of the documents and files as well as monetary damages.

ISSUES:

The issue in this case is whether Cecilia should return the documents and files she took from her
husband's clinic without his knowledge or approval, and if they may be used as evidence in the
formal separation action.

CONCLUSION:

Cecilia Zulueta and her husband, Alfredo Martin, are at odds over documents and files removed
from her husband's clinic without his knowledge or approval. The court found in Dr. Martin's favour,
ordering Cecilia to return the documents and papers and prohibiting her from using them as
evidence.

The court emphasised that the right to privacy in communication and correspondence applies to
people, including spouses, and that the only exemption is if there is a legal court order or where
public safety or order dictates otherwise. The court ruled that the intimacies between a husband and
wife do not excuse one of them invading the private of the other, and that entering marriage does not
revoke a person's right to privacy.
G.R. No. 82330 May 18, 1990

AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD and McELROY & McELROY FILM PRODUCTIONS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.

FACTS:

In this case, Juan Ponce Enrile filed a petition to prevent the respondent court from acting on the
private respondent's motion for damages resulting from the unlawful issuing of a writ of preliminary
injunction. Ayer Productions Pty Ltd, a private respondent, filed the complaint. Ltd. filed a petition
with the Makati Regional Trial Court seeking an injunction to prevent the petitioners from
manufacturing "The Four Day Revolution" without the private respondent's approval. The trial court
gave the petitioners a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The petitioners
filed separate certiorari petitions with the Supreme Court, which granted them and overturned the
lower court's ruling.

ISSUES:

The issue at hand in this case is whether the respondent court abused its discretion by granting the
private respondent's plea for damages.

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court ordered a temporary restraining order, preventing the respondent court from
carrying out its orders and going further. The Court ordered the respondents to answer to the
petition. After reviewing the parties' comments and pleadings, the Court granted the petition and
instructed the parties to file their memoranda.
G.R. No. 222702

RAPPLER, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
ANDRES D. BAUTISTA, Respondent.

FACTS:

Rappler, Inc. filed a petition against Andres D. Bautista, Chairman of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), seeking to overturn specific clauses of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on the
2016 presidential and vice-presidential debates. The COMELEC, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster
ng Pilipinas (KBP), and several media networks, including Rappler, carried out the agreement.

Rappler claimed that the MOA infringed its fundamental constitutional rights and was carried out
without or in excess of authority or with significant abuse of discretion. Part VI (C), paragraph 19 and
Part VI (D), paragraph 20 of the MOA were the precise clauses that Rappler sought to overturn.
These laws dealt with internet debate streaming and the usage of debate extracts and news
reporting.

ISSUES:

The topic in this issue is whether the MOA's restrictions on the 2016 presidential and vice-
presidential debates, notably Part VI (C), paragraph 19 and Part VI (D), paragraph 20, infringe
Rappler's fundamental constitutional rights.

CONCLUSION:

The Court ruled in favor with Rappler, partially granted the petition. It ruled that the MOA permitted
the discussions to be aired or live streamed in their entirety on Rappler and other websites, subject
to the copyright provision that the source be clearly identified. The Court emphasised that the
discussions were staged for the sake of the voters and that the widespread availability of information
via live streaming on numerous websites was justified. The Court ordered the COMELEC Chairman
to put the MOA clause enabling live broadcasting on Rappler and other websites into effect.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION

FACTS:

The Diocese of Bacolod, represented by Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, filed a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition against the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Election Officer
of Bacolod City, Atty. Majarucon vs. Mavil. The petitioners are attempting to overturn COMELEC's
Notice to Remove Campaign Materials and a letter demanding the removal of a tarpaulin carrying a
list of candidates classified as "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" based on their
vote on the Reproductive Health Law of 2012. The tarpaulin was placed within a private enclosure
that houses Bacolod's San Sebastian Cathedral.

ISSUES:

The issue in this case raises the question of whether COMELEC has the jurisdiction to regulate
expressions made by non-candidates during elections.

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court decided in favour of the petitioners, holding that COMELEC lacks the authority
to regulate expressions made by non-candidates during elections. The Court emphasized that all
government authority comes from the people, and that no unjustifiable limits on the electorate's basic
right to express itself during political campaigns can be accepted.

The Court further stated that the tarpaulin was not sponsored or paid for by any candidate, and that
it featured the names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but not legislators who helped enact the
RH Law but were not candidates in that election. The Court went on to say that the tarpaulin is a
form of expression and that COMELEC lacks the ability to control it. The Court also dismissed the
petitioners' allegation that the tarpaulin breached the concept of separation of religion and state,
ruling that their actions in placing the tarpaulin did not violate the constitutional principle. As a result,
the Court ordered the COMELEC orders unlawful and unenforceable, and permanently barred
COMELEC from executing such orders in the future.
G.R. No. L-1800 January 27, 1948

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign Manager of Coalesced Minority

Parties, petitioner,
vs.
VALERIANO E. FUGOSO

FACTS:

Cipriano P. Primicias, the General Campaign Manager of Coalesced Minority Parties, filed a
mandamus petition against Valeriano E. Fugoso, the Mayor of the City of Manila, in this matter.
Primicias requested that the Mayor give a permission for a public assembly to be held at Plaza
Miranda in Manila. The petitioner claimed that the permission was denied by the Mayor.

ISSUES:

The question in this case is whether the Mayor has the authority to refuse to provide a permission for
a public gathering or assembly to be held in Manila's streets or public areas.

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus in favour of the petitioner. The Court ruled that,
while the right to free expression and assembly is a basic personal right, it is not absolute and can
be controlled by the government's police power. The authority to establish laws to control the
exercise of these rights has been entrusted to the Municipal Board of the City of Manila.
G.R. No. L-31687 February 26, 1970

NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.
CITY MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, re

FACTS:

In Navarro vs. Villegas (G.R. No. L-31687), Navarro filed a petition against Villegas, the Mayor of
Manila. The petitioner requested a mandamus order to compel the respondent to provide a permit
for a public protest in Plaza Miranda. The response Mayor did not refuse the request outright, but
instead suggested another location at Sunken Gardens. Plaza Miranda, according to the Mayor,
provides a larger danger of public unrest and disruption than Sunken Gardens. The petitioner, on the
other hand, maintained that the Mayor has a clear legal obligation to accept their permission
application unconditionally.

ISSUES:

The primary issue in the case is whether the respondent Mayor has the authority to choose the
venue of public gatherings and if the petitioner has a clear legal right to organize the demonstration
at Plaza Miranda.

CONCLUSION:

The writ was rejected, and the petition was dismissed. The Court determined that the respondent
Mayor has reasonable discretion in determining or specifying which streets or public spaces may be
utilized for gatherings in order to protect public safety and order. The Court also took into account
prior gatherings and protests that produced anxiety, tension, and disturbance in the neighbourhood.
The Court determined that the petitioner failed to establish a clear particular legal responsibility on
the part of the respondent Mayor to accept their permission application unconditionally.
G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992

BLO UMPAR ADIONG, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FACTS:
Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate, filed a petition against the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in this matter. Adiong is challenging the limitation on putting decals and stickers on
"mobile" locations, whether public or private, except in COMELEC-designated zones. Adiong claims
that the restriction breaches the constitutional right to free expression. Adiong believes that, with the
restriction on radio, television, and print political adverts, the putting of decals and stickers on
automobiles is his only means of informing voters about his candidature.

ISSUES:

The main issue in this case revolves around if the COMELEC has the right to restrict the posting of
decals and stickers on "mobile" locations and limit their placement to authorized posting zones.

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court decided in favour of Adiong, ruling that the COMELEC's restriction was
unconstitutional. The Court ruled that the restriction violated the citizen's basic right to free
expression, as guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court emphasized that freedom of expression is
a preferred freedom and the matrix, or necessary condition, for practically every other right. The
Court also stated that the restriction served no significant government interest and posed no obvious
and present danger.
G.R. No. L-32066 August 6, 1979

MANUEL LAGUNZAD, petitioner,

vs.
MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES

FACTS:

The case includes a petition for certiorari seeking review of the Court of Appeals' decision in CA-
G.R. No. 34703, which upheld the ruling of the Negros Occidental Court of First Instance in Civil
Case No. 6414. The issue centres on a "Licencing Agreement" signed by petitioner Manuel
Lagunzad and private respondent Maria Soto Vda. On October 5, 1961, de Gonzales was born. Due
to coercion, intimidation, and undue influence, Lagunzad contends that the agreement is null and
invalid.

ISSUES:

The main issues in the case are whether the licensing agreement is null and void as a result of the
claimed pressure and if the arrangement violates the petitioner's fundamental right to free speech
and press.

CONCLUSION:

The petitioner's arguments were rejected by the court. They determined that the accounting required
by the lower court did not impact the decision's finality, and so the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction
over the matter. The court also determined that the licensing arrangement was legitimate and
enforceable since the petitioner still need the authorization of the deceased's heirs to publicly
represent his life. They noted an earlier ruling that recognized the right of surviving family to
safeguard the deceased's memory.

Furthermore, the court concluded that becoming a public figure does not immediately revoke one's
right to privacy. The petitioner's argument that his permission was gained under duress was also
dismissed, as the court determined that he made a free and unfettered decision to engage into the
agreement. Finally, the court determined that the licencing arrangement did not violate the
petitioner's constitutional rights since the boundaries of free expression are reached when
expression touches on basically private topics.
G.R. No. L-53487 May 25, 1981

ANDRES GARCES
vs.
Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO,

FACTS:

The case includes a disagreement over the custody of a wooden picture of the patron saint, San
Vicente Ferrer, in a Philippine barangay (village). The barangay council acquired the image with
private monies gathered via solicitations and contributions. To avoid favouring the Catholic church,
the council appointed a layman as the image's guardian. The petitioners, who included the parish
priest, Father Osmea, claimed that the barangay council's decisions violated constitutional principles
governing the separation of religion and state and the use of public funds for religious reasons.

ISSUES:

The primary issue in the case is whether the barangay council's resolutions involving the purchase
and custody of the wooden figure violates constitutional principles governing the separation of
religion and state and the use of public funds for religious purposes.

CONCLUSION:

The petitioners' claim was rejected by the Supreme Court, which found in favour of the barangay
council. The resolutions, the court said, did neither create or favour any religion, nor did they allocate
public funds for religious reasons. The picture was acquired with own means, and the building of a
waiting shelter (another option under consideration) was a secular concern. The court further
recognized that the barrio fiesta, with which the image was linked, was a socio-religious event and a
rural community tradition. The council's choice to choose a layperson as the image's guardian was
realistic and did not violate the constitution.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.

NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION