International Studies Perspectives (2014) 15, 459–476.

The Drama of International Relations:

A South China Sea Simulation1
TANYA KEMPSTON
University of Hong Kong
AND

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NICHOLAS THOMAS
City University of Hong Kong

A fundamental challenge in teaching international relations is the need

to bridge the students’ learning gap between knowledge and practice,
providing them with opportunities to reflect on what they have learned
and allowing them to develop a greater cognition of their own abilities
in the area. The South China Sea is one of the most long-running and
complex disputes in contemporary international affairs. It remains one
of the few flashpoints around the globe that holds the potential to
directly escalate into a great-power conflict. Understanding this issue is
therefore an important task for students of IR and strategic studies, but
the complexity of the dispute makes teaching it in a regular seminar/
lecture format problematic. This article describes a simulation run in a
masters-level class in the spring 2012 semester designed to address this
pedagogical challenge. It started with a jeopardized security operation
on a disputed oil platform in a real-world territory claimed by multiple
states. This article explores the theoretical conception of the simulation,
its structure and design, the post-simulation debriefing as well as consid-
erations as to how the simulation might be modified to be more engag-
ing to students and more relevant to intended learning outcomes.

Keywords: South China Sea, simulations, role-playing, ASEAN

On Tuesday April 10, 2012, the BRP Gregorio del Pilar, a Philippines naval cutter,
intercepted eight Chinese fishing vessels on the Scarborough reef in the South
China Sea. Upon boarding the ships, the naval officers found a large quantity of
illegally harvested corals, giant clams, and sharks. Before the Chinese sailors
could be arrested, two Chinese naval vessels placed themselves between the fish-
ermen and the Philippines navy. The ensuing stand-off saw a rapid escalation of
diplomatic claim and counterclaim as well as military and social tensions
between the two countries and other interested states (the United States, in par-
ticular). While the Chinese vessels—along with their illegal catches—were even-
tually allowed to leave the area, the overarching problem of competing
sovereign claims in the South China Sea remained unaddressed.

1
This research was partly supported by a City University of Hong Kong Teaching Development Grant—Perceiving
Pseudo-reality: The Utility of Simulations, Project Number: 6000403. We are grateful to the three referees for their help-
ful comments. For any further information, please email ndthomas@cityu.edu.hk.
[Corrections added November 14, 2014 after original online publication. Grammatical changes have been made
to this article to improve clarity.]

Kempston, Tanya and Nicholas Thomas. (2014) The Drama of International Relations: A South China Sea
Simulation. International Studies Perspectives, doi: 10.1111/insp.12045
Ó 2013 International Studies Association
460 The Drama of International Relations

The April incident was by no means an isolated one for the South China Sea. In
the 6 months prior to the April confrontation, there had been numerous
diplomatic, military, and social confrontations between China and the South-East
Asia claimant states, usually Vietnam and the Philippines. Indeed, since the killing
of 70 Vietnamese sailors by Chinese forces in 1988, it is rare for a single year to go
by without some skirmish in the region. Complicating these tensions is the fact
that Japan, South Korea, Taiwan as well as China all receive a major portion of
their trade and energy supplies through this sea. Further complicating this issue is
the renewed presence of the United States in Asia and the importance it places on
an international solution to the sovereignty problem, diametrically opposite to the
bilateral-level solution that China seeks. In a region that is pursuing deeper inte-

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gration between the 10 states of South-East Asia and the three main states of
North-East Asia, continued hostilities in this sea could not only derail the wider
Asian community-building project, but also hold the very real potential of a major
military confrontation, one that could draw in the United States against China.
So, how can such a complex issue be taught? How can students in a classroom
setting be exposed to the myriad aspects that together comprise this unresolved
issue and develop the perspective to appreciate it beyond the classroom? These
questions are ones that are frequently faced by those who teach other complex
problems in contemporary IR (Steinbrink and Helmer 2004; Gautier and Rebich
2005; Enterline and Jepsen 2009; Moizer et al. 2009; Korosteleva 2010). The pur-
pose of this article is to explore the pedagogical utility of this simulation as a
teaching tool. The exercise starts with an attempt by the Philippines and Viet-
nam to install an offshore oil platform in the South China Sea. The project is
financially supported by Singapore, but is in territory claimed by China, which
opposes the platform. Understanding and negotiating around these conflicting
positions is a cornerstone of the exercise. The crisis commences when the oil
platform explodes with a small fleet of Chinese naval vessels that have recently
engaged in war-games nearby. It is unknown what caused the explosion and what
the role of the Chinese fleet was. As the information is incomplete, the eight
states involved in the exercise are tasked with resolving the crisis. However, two
states (Singapore and the United States) set a secondary challenge: recover a
covert listening post onboard the oil platform without its existence becoming
public knowledge and ensure that no technology falls into the wrong hands.
Through a discussion of pre-simulation exercises, the design and structure of
the simulation as well as the post-simulation feedback, it is intended that an
overall evaluation of the exercise and its place within an array of learning exer-
cises can be developed.

The Educational Value of Simulations

Simulations enable participants to work collaboratively and creatively in purposeful
situations. The pedagogical value of such simulations has been carefully docu-
mented by Crossley-Frolick (2010), Raymond (2010), and Enterline and Jepsen
(2009) who have described using simulations to provide meaningful, relevant con-
texts in which participants collaborate to confront crises and attempt to articulate
proposals to problems. They provide opportunities for the creation of a Vygotskian
“Zone of Proximal Development” or ZPD (1960/1978) in which learning occurs
due to the interplay of support and stimulus provided by co-equals in the group,
which enables participants to more efficiently understand and internalize what is
being learned. In the case of simulations, participants are placed into the position
of assuming a role and responding in role to the particular challenges of a situation.
Within the ZPD, students are scaffolded, supported, and challenged not just
by the instructor, but by one another as they begin to take on the “mantle of the
expert” (Heathcote and Bolton 1996) when making recommendations and
 T ANYA K EM PSTON AND N IC HOLAS T HOMAS 461

responding to the complexities of the situation with which they are dealing. For
example, students who may have difficulties in fully assessing the risks of a rec-
ommended course of action can be both challenged and assisted by peers within
the group to more fully examine the implications of their recommendation. This
interaction of co-equals, or contingent scaffolding (Lantolf 2000), enables simula-
tion to be located as a learning strategy within the socioconstructivist tradition of
learning. The result of these types of activities is a better learning environment
for the students—one where their “metacognitive abilities, their capacity to apply
newly acquired skills and knowledge to real-life simulations, and the ability to
become self-directed learners” are enhanced (Boggs, Mickel and Holtom
2007:833).

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In IR courses, a simulation is one of an array of tools that can be deployed by
instructors to enhance students’ abilities to “develop and test theories of decision-
making and other processes” (Starkey and Blake 2001:537). Simulations in this
field mirror usage in other fields, wherein immersive techniques are relied upon
to “replace and amplify real experiences with guided ones…that evoke or repli-
cate substantial aspects of the real world” (Lateef 2010:348). Within the field, any
course that includes a study of conflicts particularly lends itself to the use of simu-
lations and games, where engaging in real-world situations is simply not practical
from a course management (or student safety) perspective. However, by drawing
upon simulation techniques, instructors and students are able to undertake a
series of actions that illuminate the complex realities of a given conflict. As
Yilmaz, Ören, and Ghasem-Aghaee (2006:535) note, “novel simulation gaming
formalisms, not conflicting with already proven theories and approaches, may be
useful for the proper formulations and resolutions of conflicts.”
From an instructor’s viewpoint, the key challenge in developing a successful
simulation is ensuring that it is reasonably well aligned with the real world but
without creating a scenario too complex for students to develop an affinity with.
As deLeon (1975:52) concluded, “a plausible and consistent set of conditions—
carefully researched, without unexplained or radical alteration from the present
environment—is the hallmark of a good scenario.” Here, the need for the
instructor to successfully scaffold and manage the simulation is critical, requiring
manifold roles to be adopted as the exercise progresses (Oliver 1996). One part
played by the instructor is that of a more knowledgeable other (Wood, Bruner
and Ross 1976): one who stimulates the learner’s interest, provides essential data
to inform students’ understanding, maintains students’ motivation, and helps
deal with frustrations by monitoring the progress of groups. However, if students
are to fully engage in contingent scaffolding—in order to tackle the problem
with which they are faced—the instructor must be careful not to oversupply
alternatives or suggestions so that students become reliant upon him/her in
order to provide a “magical fix” to the crisis. The instructor also needs to posi-
tion herself as a reflective presence, one who provides “support only on an as-
needed basis” (Hacker and Tenent 2002:700). Such strategies are part of what
Tharp and Gallimore term “instructional conversations” (1988, 1989), that is,
instructional discourse which is natural and spontaneous in structure and used
by instructors to help students move through the ZPD. These conversations
empower “teachers to create classroom environments where learning is a hands-
on adventure [that] not only facilitates student learning of class content, but also
makes teaching a stimulating and exciting experience” (Shakarian 1995:24).
In order for a simulation to provide ample opportunities for students to
respond to the challenge and complexity of the situation, the simulation itself
must be well structured with sufficient use of real or high-quality “pseudo-real”
input (such as that outlined in the section below) and provide participants with
sufficient challenge to keep them interested in negotiating the complexities of
the situation (Shaw 2004; Chasek 2005). As Murnighan (1991:474) observed,
462 The Drama of International Relations

“asymmetric dilemmas require much more complicated negotiations…[where]

the complexity of the game soon adds more dynamic considerations.” Murni-
ghan’s study was, however, only dyadic based. Although his observations are still
relevant to our simulation, the introduction of multiple teams (with subsets of
actors in each team) creates additional layers of complexity for the students,
allowing them to engage with different facets of the exercise as it progresses.
These types of situations are controversial, problematic, and provide a great deal
of challenge to the students as they are highly affective in nature. No two simula-
tions will be the same as participants will respond differently to the situation
with which they must deal. The open-ended nature of this type of exercise also
mirrors the real world, providing a higher degree of verisimilitude for the partic-

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ipants.
A number of studies (Chasek 2005; Enterline and Jepsen 2009) have also high-
lighted the potential benefits of having a control group (one that does not par-
ticipate in the simulation) in this type of pedagogical research, so as to gauge
the effectiveness of the simulation. Alternatively, Bots, Wagenaar, and Willemse
(2010) divided their students into two different groups for a role-playing exercise
with the first group adopting a rational process approach and the second group
viewing the “process as a matter of political negotiation” (2010:745). While both
ideas have the potential to enhance the pedagogical utility of the simulation,
neither was followed. For the first suggestion, we concluded given that the signif-
icant time allocated to the preparation and running of the simulation would
have to be replaced by other activities or assessment items, the presence of a
control group would, in effect, require only a similar—rather than an identical
—course to be taught in parallel. The Bots et al.’s strategy is one that could have
been adopted; however, that exercise involved 177 students, a far larger cohort
than our graduate class. Given the size difference between the two cohorts (177
vs 31), this approach could not be practically implemented, although it remains
an option if the class size were to substantially increase.
With these meta-pedagogical issues framing the intellectual development of
our crisis, the following section will first review the real-world issue behind the
exercise, before exploring the structure and process of the simulation and then
moving on to evaluate its utility as a learning tool.

The South China Sea Dispute

At its heart, the dispute over the South China Sea is as much about defining the
national territories of the regional states as it is about securing their economic
future through access to energy resources and trade routes. More broadly, it is
also concerned with determining the future geopolitical shape of the region:
one led by China and the other by ASEAN. Given the confluence of these high-
level strategic interests, it is not surprising to conclude that the ongoing struggle
for sovereign control over the South China Sea between China and six ASEAN
states (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam) is
one of the most intractable conflicts in Asia. The involvement of Japan, the Uni-
ted States, and (most recently) India only serves to further raise this issue from a
regional challenge to a potential threat for global stability. Over the last 50 years,
there have been periodic attempts by regional and extra-regional states to resolve
the control question or (at least) to develop a status quo agreement. All these
attempts have failed. Snyder noted that the absence of measures to peacefully
resolve the disputed territorial claims remained “a dangerous source of conflict”
(1996:1). As the events of the past two years demonstrate, this source of conflict
remains a key threat to regional stability and security, one that retains the possi-
bility of spilling over into armed conflict between the claimant and observer
states.
 T ANYA K EM PSTON AND N IC HOLAS T HOMAS 463

International law fails to offer a clear solution to this problem (Scott 2012). As
Rahmen and Tsamenyi note, “the inconsistent perspectives and interpretations
of the law of the sea held by both littoral and user states ensure that the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) [UNCLOS] is an inade-
quate basis for the establishment of [a] stable maritime regime” (2010:315–316).
ASEAN has also held meetings and issued Codes of Conduct on the South China
Sea issue, but these have all had a relatively limited policy impact. Complicating
the situation is the fact that all parties need to agree to binding arbitration to
resolve their claims, yet not all states have agreed to do so (most notably,
China). Given that the priorities of the states involved (in terms of resource
acquisition, access to sea lanes, and maintaining territorial integrity) are as

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domestically focused as they are regionally based (cf. Tønnesson 2000; Ba 2011),
it remains politically difficult for any party to subordinate themselves to a supra-
national body. In the absence of an enforceable regime, states must deal with
each other to not only reach a solution but also to negotiate the structure on
which a solution could be based. Some states prefer bilateral negotiations, and
others favor multilateral approaches. In other words, before there can be talks
between the claimant states, there first have to be talks about the talks.
Hence, this is a difficult situation to resolve diplomatically or legally, one
whose nature mitigates against a simple solution. Nonetheless, any course on
regional politics and/or security can be realistically expected to include the topic
in the curriculum. It is also one whose complexities are mirrored in other regio-
nal disputes over territory (Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, Kashmir, or the East China
Sea, for example). Thus, a comprehensive understanding of the South China
Sea dispute provides an initial analytical foundation for understanding these
other flashpoints. We would suggest, therefore, that it is important for students
to appreciate the issue and be able to assess its role in regional affairs more
deeply. In order to achieve this understanding, we would argue that it is useful
for faculty to consider teaching methodologies other than standard lectures or
seminars. With such complex case studies, simulations and role-plays become
useful pedagogical tools, expanding opportunities for student learning without
comprising core teaching objectives.

Structure of the Simulation

Pre-simulation
At the start of the course, students were asked to form groups and select one of
eight countries (China, Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore,
Vietnam, and the United States) that they would represent.2 The countries were
chosen for their real-world engagement in the South China Sea issue, albeit to
differing degrees. The students remained in these groups for other cluster activi-
ties (such as presentations), so as to reinforce group trust (Brammer 1973).
Once the groups were formed, they were given 6 weeks to prepare a country-cen-
tric position paper on the South China Sea. At this stage, the groups were una-
ware of the exact nature of the simulation, but were encouraged to explore:
(i) what was their chosen country’s position on the South China Sea, (ii) any
current challenges, and (iii) what would be the best outcome for their country
on a resolution to the competing sovereignty claims in the region. The purpose
2
With more students, the number of countries could be expanded (to include, for example, Brunei, India, or
Taiwan). However, given the size of the class and the nature of the simulation, these countries were the ones
deemed to be most relevant. With fewer students, there is a possibility of smaller teams (although given the
demands of the simulation activities any team with less than three students would have difficulties) or altering the
simulation to operate with one country either removed or played in an automatic mode via the newscasts or brief-
ing materials.
464 The Drama of International Relations

of this paper was to develop students’ awareness both of the general problem as
well as the country perspective. In addition, the students were required to collect
10 documents (briefing papers, press releases, think-tank studies) from their
country. It was stressed that these documents should reflect their chosen coun-
try’s real-world position on the South China Sea. These documents and the final
position paper were then uploaded to a common folder on Blackboard. Between
Week 6 (when the documents were submitted) and Week 11 (when the simula-
tion formally commenced), all groups were encouraged to read the other teams’
outputs, so that they could be well prepared for the exercise.
During Weeks 8–10, students were also provided with bundles of real news
reports from the preceding week on the South China Sea disputes. Again, it was

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recommended that students read these materials as they were on critical events
in the region over the past seven days. Unbeknown to the students, each of
these weekly bundles contained a single false media report, which was the pre-
cursor to the simulation (see Appendix 1 for the reports). The purpose of these
false reports was to develop a pseudo-reality, which could engage the students in
the simulated crisis to a deeper level than if the reports had simply been viewed
as fictitious background pieces. As Ebner and Efron observed, “by creating
pseudo-reality, trainers can overcome strong preconceptions or biases that can
interfere with the learning process while at the same time preserving the advan-
tages of working within a familiar, realistic environment” (2005:377).
In order to imbue the simulation with a higher degree of pseudo-reality,
names of real persons, companies, and governments were used in the articles.
Obviously this did not necessarily reflect any real-world stance or actions by any
of these individuals and/or entities and was completely fictitious for the pur-
poses of the simulation, although the statements or claims made were hoped to
be reasonably close to what could possibly be stated in such a situation. To
deepen the pseudo-reality, these articles were designed using actual but altered
news mastheads and were bundled with other real news reports on contemporary
South China Sea issues.3
Hence, by the start of the simulation in Week 11, the students not only had
been exposed to contemporary issues and problems concerning East Asian poli-
tics but also had developed a detailed understanding of the problems associated
with the disputed region. This layered approach to the pre-simulation learning
was—in part—intended to address a critical observation of simulation tech-
niques, namely that they are usually employed at the expense of students’ expo-
sure to pre-requisite knowledge (Oliver 1996). Instead, in this case, a mutually
reinforcing teaching structure was used, one that encouraged depth in the simu-
lation topic within a general context. This approach also aligned with several of
the course’s intended learning outcomes, namely assisting the students to
(i) develop a critical understanding of the processes of regional integration in
Asia, (ii) understand how the different regional institutions and networks oper-
ate, and (iii) understand how and why different actors seek to influence regional
policy outcomes.

Simulation Exercise
The simulation is designed to be completed in two 3-hour lecture periods,
although the open-ended nature of the exercise allowed for a longer period of
time if needed. As the simulation was run over two weeks, students were
encouraged to use the intervening time to develop alliances or to further

3
Once the simulation began, the students better understood the utility of these pre-simulation documents. Dur-
ing the debriefing session and in the feedback questionnaire, students suggested that there should be “more mate-
rials from web-sites or newspapers before the simulation exercise.”
 T ANYA K EM PSTON AND N IC HOLAS T HOMAS 465

negotiations: face-to-face, through email, or via Facebook or Twitter-style social

media networks. The simulation was run in the third last and penultimate
weeks of semester, after the conclusion of the formal lectures and other
learning activities.
Each of the country groups was comprised of a President/Prime Minister, a
Trade Minister, a Defense Minister, and a Foreign Minister.4 Within each period,
the country groups would receive public and secret information from the con-
vener as well as watch a “live” newsfeed on the crisis. The public information was
available to all members of the team. The secret information was only available
to the President/Prime Minister and any specified Minister (usually Defense). It
was up to the team leader to decide whether this information should be shared

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among the team members or kept restricted. The team leader also had to decide
how much of the public and secret information should be shared with other
teams during the bargaining rounds.
The simulation started with a “live” news broadcast, which had been developed
with the help of a doctoral student. In this opening broadcast, the teams are told
that:
This is [reporter’s name] reporting from Bangkok.
We have breaking news that a massive explosion has occurred on the controver-
sial Ramos 1 oil platform located near Thitu island in the South China Sea. This
information is based on a report from a Japanese ship that was passing near the
island and saw the fireball. Speaking by satellite phone, the ship’s captain—Mr
Tanaka Abe—said there were a number of Chinese naval vessels were in the
immediate vicinity of the platform that prevented it from stopping.

The Chinese government has reminded the international community that the
accident has happened in Chinese territorial waters and it is the responsibility of
China to render assistance.

The Singaporean and Vietnamese governments are calling on the Chinese gov-
ernment to supply any assistance and to allow access for consular officials.

Philippines President Aquino called for international help, while urging his coun-
trymen to remain calm.

At the same time as this broadcast, the eight teams are provided with their first
set of public/secret information briefs. Reflecting this type of scenario, the infor-
mation contained in the briefs is asymmetrically provided with the main players
given more complete information, while the countries peripheral to the immedi-
ate event are given less information. However, countries that—in the real
world—are more likely to have better information on their neighbors were simi-
larly provided with equivalent levels of information in the simulation. For exam-
ple, Malaysia and Singapore were often better informed on each other’s issues
than—by contrast—Japan and Indonesia. This asymmetry was also reflected in
the objectives provided to each of the teams. While most of the teams were
required to find a multilateral or bilateral solution to the problem, two teams
(Singapore and the United States) were also required to undertake a recovery
operation of a covert listening post that was placed onboard the oil platform
and which may or may not have been responsible for the fire. In the second ses-
sion, Malaysia was also given the additional task of forging an ASEAN consensus
on the crisis.

4
Given the uneven number of students in the class (31), the group playing Japan only had three members with
the Trade and Foreign Affairs portfolios being merged into one. That was a result of classroom discussions as to
which group would have fewer members rather than any preconceived decision.
466 The Drama of International Relations

In addition to their generally asymmetric information, different teams were

also provided with partial but complementary data. If this information was
shared with other teams, then the teams involved gained a better understanding
of the situation than if they proceeded alone. However, it was only through
negotiations that the synergies between the different data sets became apparent.
This required students to build confidence and trust in their negotiating part-
ners. To help in the confidence-building, all teams were assigned work spaces
(“embassies”) with flags and country names. Team members were also given bad-
ges with their assigned roles.
During the first session, the briefing documents were distributed every half
hour. This usually coincided with a news broadcast, although during the first

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hour the broadcasts appeared more frequently so as to suggest a sense of
urgency. At each of these half-hour marks, team leaders were asked to briefly
report their findings and the state of their negotiations. This enabled students
to pause and reflect on what the wider trends were across the classroom before
accessing the next set of information briefs and/or a news broadcast. During the
second session, the briefing documents were released every 45 minutes, although
the news broadcasts remained on a 30-minute cycle. The purpose behind the
shift was to provide for a looser structure to the simulation in the second
session, so as to allow the outcomes from the negotiations to chart which way
the exercise would conclude rather than forcing a pre-determined conclusion.
The simulation did not have a pre-determined conclusion. Although all teams
had a resolution to the crisis as an initial objective, this was to encourage negoti-
ations and other forms of interaction. But that was only the illustrative aspect of
the simulation. As noted above, the purpose was to deepen students’ knowledge
around the three intended learning outcomes, seeking a deeper understanding
of regional politics and processes as well as a more nuanced appreciation of the
role (and limitations) of theory in analyzing East Asian affairs. However, the
dynamics between the teams and the seriousness with which the students
approached the simulation drove them to try to seek a solution. In the end, this
was not achieved, largely because the challenge of identifying “whose solution”
was optimal was problematic within the context of an unfolding crisis and
against a backdrop of national interests. While this endpoint reflects the reality
of the South China Sea as a frequent crisis environment (and so supported the
intended learning outcomes), it was not until the debriefing session that most of
the students seemed to appreciate this.

Evaluation
Observations
The simulation ran largely according to expectations. The combination of pre-
simulation exercises and lectures meant that students were generally well
informed of the situation in the South China Sea and the roles of regional states
and institutions in developing possible solutions. The time lag between these
exercises and the simulation also provided us with a deeper assessment of the
students’ strengths and weaknesses, both individually and within their teams.
The findings from this assessment allowed the simulation documents to be
re-edited to allow for a better fit between capabilities and objectives. This
background—along with the regular news broadcasts and information
briefs—successfully scaffolded the negotiation phases: allowing teams to realize
their objectives in creative ways while ensuring that “unreal” possibilities (for
example, Indonesia declaring war on China) did not eventuate.
Although the scaffold generally directed the flow of the simulation, at the
heart of the exercise were the bi- and multilateral negotiations run by the
 T ANYA K EM PSTON AND N IC HOLAS T HOMAS 467

students during the two sessions. These negotiations were initially slow to start.
The first broadcast and information release were reviewed by the teams, who
then developed a preliminary strategy, which then led to a flurry of diplomatic
activity. Initially, both the China and United States teams remained apart from
the main negotiations. The United States preferred to work through Singapore,
while China was more passive—wanting other teams to approach them rather
than make the first approaches. The ASEAN states were divided in their negotia-
tions. As expected, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore discussed mutual
strategies as a core group, with Malaysia and Indonesia in more peripheral roles
and adopting more inclusive negotiations to realize their objectives. A similar
tactic was also employed by Japan, although the real-world alliance of Japan and

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the United States and the presence of the Japanese ship in the simulation soon
after the explosion of the oil platform—unexpectedly—meant that the other
teams were more suspicious of Japanese intentions.
As the simulation progressed, the ASEAN states found it difficult to develop a
common position given their differing (but not incompatible) national goals.
This was exacerbated by Singapore prioritizing its alliance responsibilities to the
United States over its regional obligations. To overcome this policy block, Malay-
sia called for an ASEAN-only summit toward the end of the first session. Even
though some headway was made on developing a common position, national
objectives were generally prioritized over a regional united front. Malaysia’s ini-
tiative in this area also caused resentment from other regional countries (partic-
ularly Indonesia), which generated significant tensions in the second session,
especially after Indonesia was designated by ASEAN as the lead country to
develop a common solution to the crisis. In an effort to overcome this backlash,
a subsequent ASEAN-US meeting was held at the end of the first session, but
again divided the teams—some of whom were opposed to the inclusion of non-
ASEAN states.
The inability of the five ASEAN states to forge a common consensus—because
the five states instead preferenced national objectives, economic ties with China,
or strategic relations with the United States—was a constant throughout the sim-
ulation, despite a series of mini-summits in the second session intended to over-
come this problem. This allowed the group to be divided between those allied
with China and those closer to the United States (Japan and Indonesia adopted
more neutral positions). While it could be argued that this outcome mirrors the
reality of politics in the South China Sea, it was arrived at from interpersonal
negotiations and the pre-simulation foundation rather than from instructions in
the information releases. Whether or not this suggests that the ill-unified group
dynamics of ASEAN (in the real world) inherently restricts its members to be
secondary players in regional affairs against the stronger, singular states of China
and the United States is a topic for another paper. However, the difficulties stu-
dents faced in forging a clear consensus across a large number of actors with
competing national interests and policy priorities mirrors the real-world situation
in South China Sea diplomatic efforts. This would suggest that higher degrees of
pseudo-reality provide a stronger pedagogical foundation for simulations as part
of the teaching toolkit.
In addition to the negotiations and mini-summits, there were a number of
other unscripted actions that consciously (and unconsciously) developed during
the simulation that also echoed the real world. In the background documents,
the simulation was described as a diplomatic activity. It was suggested to students
that issues of trust and mutual confidence were paramount, but teams were not
prevented from undertaking negative actions (such as lying or misdirection).
Students were, however, cautioned that such actions could jeopardize their coun-
try’s ability to work with others. Teams were also allowed (as determined by the
President/Prime Minister) to disclose compartmentalized or secret information.
468 The Drama of International Relations

For most of the simulation, students supported a positive negotiation environ-

ment, one where compartmentalized information was rarely disclosed outside of
key negotiation sessions. This behavior supports Reilly’s conclusion that partici-
pants in diplomatic-type simulations “seek transparency and predictability in
light of their tenuous security” (2003:305).
There were two exceptions to this behavior. During the first session, when stu-
dents were less clear on countries and roles, a number of individuals tried to
obtain information by using other players’ name badges. A similar tactic was
employed to spread disinformation. Given the size of the class and the rapidity
of negotiations, these efforts were soon uncovered—without any lasting damage
—and by the end of the first session had ceased altogether. Teams also normally

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conformed to an unwritten rule that general information could be shared but
secret information remained with the team, except on a quid pro quo basis dur-
ing negotiations. However, at times when negotiations became particularly
fraught, some teams used their secret information in an effort to forcibly realize
their objectives. While this tactic did show short-term gains for some teams, the
revealed data were usually folded into the overall pool of knowledge available to
everyone, informing rather than altering the negotiation pathway.
Although English was the medium of instruction, a point of pedagogical and
political interest was the unconscious linguistic shift that occurred between the
two sessions. [Indeed, most students were unaware of this point until it was raised
during the debriefing.] The class that participated in this simulation came from
very diverse backgrounds. Approximately one-quarter of the students were from
Hong Kong, with a further quarter from a wide range of international countries,
and the remaining half of the class was drawn from mainland China. Across these
cohorts in excess of 80% of the class was (at least) bilingual, with many having a
third language. In the first session, when there was a clearer dominance of the
negotiations by the teams from the United States and Singapore, English was
used extensively by most of the students. However, in the second session, when
the team representing China began to assert its position (with a mix of economic
threats and political intransigence), almost all the teams began to prioritize either
Mandarin or a mix of Mandarin and English in their negotiations. This use of
language also led to new alignments being formed between members of teams
that had competency in the chosen language and those that did not.

Debriefing
The debriefing was held in the final week of semester, with a semistructured
feedback session as well as a review questionnaire. The purpose of the debriefing
was twofold: first, it was designed to explore the pedagogical utility of running a
simulation. In particular, we were seeking to understand how the simulation
added value to the intended learning outcomes for this course, especially in
terms of enhancing students’ awareness of contemporary politics and deepening
their awareness of the theoretical models drawn upon during the semester; sec-
ond, in receiving the feedback, to determine whether the simulation should be
retained for future iterations of this class and—if so—how could its utility be
strengthened.
As noted elsewhere, debriefing sessions are an integral aspect of simulation
exercises (Chapin 1998; Lantis 1998; Smythe 2002; Dougherty 2003; Zeff 2003;
Shaw 2004; Asal 2005; Weir and Baranowski 2008). This is especially important
where the structure of the simulation and/or the participants’ individual per-
spectives strengthen an identification with the issue. As Ebner and Efron have
noted, “participants often want to relieve the story, working out their anger, frus-
tration, and sense of accomplishment, while trainers need to focus on analyzing
the dynamics, the tools used, and the skills practiced” (2005:391).
 T ANYA K EM PSTON AND N IC HOLAS T HOMAS 469

The debriefing session also allowed students the space to develop more holis-
tic conclusions on the simulation. Rather than simply being concerned with how
their country performed relative to the other teams, the debriefing allowed stu-
dents the space to collectively reflect on the real-world South China Sea situa-
tion, in addition to current Sino-US and Sino-Japanese relations. During the
debriefing, students variously noted the difficulties of balancing domestic and
regional priorities for individual states and how this balance became even more
problematic as the number of states with deeper levels of engagement increased.
Students were also able to use the debriefing to collectively reflect on the theo-
retical models they had been exposed to in the main part of the course. While
no students declared that they deliberately adopted a realist, institutionalist, or

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constructivist position that guided their actions, they were less clear as to
whether or not the actions of their teams reflected one of these schools of
thought. As one student declared, “actions that I took may have confirmed to a
particular theory but at the time an incremental pragmatic approach took over.”
What followed was an interesting debate—led by the students—as to where one
theoretical school explicitly finished and another began and how the actions of
one state could possibly be analyzed from multiple theoretical positions or sim-
ply as a response to an action by another state. Although the topic was unantici-
pated and with more preparation could have been better explored, the debate
begins to show the potential of the simulation as a theoretical learning tool.
Following the formal debriefing, a two-part questionnaire was distributed to
the students. The first part (derived from Enterline and Jepsen 2009) was a ser-
ies of nine questions (see Table 1), designed to ascertain students’ views on the
simulation as a learning tool, for a deeper theoretical understanding of the
issues as well as a more comprehensive appreciation of the behavior of regional
states, institutions, and networks. The second section asked students to evaluate
the strengths and weaknesses of the simulation and sought their suggestions for
improving the exercise. Although the questions in the latter section were cov-
ered in the main debriefing, their inclusion in the questionnaire allowed for
some students to expand on their earlier comments and also provided students
who did not respond to that part of the debriefing with an opportunity to
respond. As Crossley-Frolick (with reference to Hertel and Millis 2002) observed,
“written debriefings also give students the opportunity to provide more com-
ments and in a more private manner” (2010:193). This observation is especially
pertinent in cross-cultural settings where different patterns of students’ class-
room engagement are best supported by multiple feedback channels.

TABLE 1. Post-simulation Survey. Please Score the Following Items on a 1–5 Scale with the Corre-
sponding Weights: 1 (Very Poor/Strongly Disagree), 2 (Poor/Disagree), 3 (Neutral/No Opinion, 4
(Good/Agree), and 5 (Very Good/Strongly Agree)

Question Text

1 The simulation enhanced my knowledge of regional politics and governance

2 The simulation enhanced my knowledge about IR theories beyond lectures, readings, and
class discussions
3 The simulation enhanced my knowledge about foreign relations in East Asian affairs
4 The simulation enhanced my knowledge about conflicts in East Asia
5 The simulation enhanced my knowledge about the effects of different domestic sectors on
regional crisis management and resolution
6 The simulation enhanced my knowledge about how regional actors’ interests might
influence regional integration
7 The simulation was an enjoyable experience
8 The simulation was worth the class time we devoted to it
9 The simulation should be utilized as a teaching tool in future classes
470 The Drama of International Relations

As the results in Table 2 demonstrate, the simulation was well received by the
students—as an enabling mechanism for a deeper appreciation of regional poli-
tics and crises as well as an assessment exercise. The results from questions 1–6
(those focused on the pedagogical value of the simulation) showed a positive cor-
relation between the simulation and the development of students’ knowledge of
regional politics and crises. However, these results also show that more work needs
to be done to deepen the links between scholarship and simulation, particularly
the links between theory and practice. This had already been raised during the
debriefing session. (Some areas where changes might be instigated to address this
shortcoming are discussed below.) Finally, as the results from questions 7–9 high-
lighted, there was strong support from the students for the simulation to be

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retained for future cohorts. In their written feedback, some students stated that
“the idea of ‘simulation’ as a teaching tool is good,” “I think that a larger, longer
simulation should be mandatory,” and “it was really interesting and helped me
understand theory, bring it all back to the real-world, less academic.”
From the debriefing session and our own observations, there are several ways
the simulation could be strengthened. First, although the students identified the
level of information being presented in the materials as challenging, they equally
suggested that these should be more varied aims for the different team portfo-
lios. One suggestion was that the trade ministers be required to conclude a
trade-related agreement within the simulation. This would provide an interesting
new level to the simulation. On the one hand, it would more accurately reflect
the reality of regional crises—where crisis management infringes on the normal
political agendas at the domestic and regional levels, even as the aims of these
normal agendas remain valid. Adding this layer to the exercise would create
more intragroup demands as different time-sensitive agendas would be forced to
compete for resources (especially time and personnel). On the other hand, how-
ever, this additional objective would further stretch the teams’ information-
processing and decision-making capacities, exacerbating the problem of informa-
tion overload previously identified. One way around this bottleneck would be to
increase the size of the teams so that two members focused on trade and eco-
nomic issues. In many instances, this would reflect real-world policy divisions,
but the size of the class (with projected maximums of approximately 35 stu-
dents) would mean a reduction in teams from eight countries to seven or six to
ensure sufficient members in each team. Alternatively, teams representing larger-
capacity countries (such as China, Singapore, the United States) could have an
additional member, while other countries might need to pool responsibilities
more creatively.
Second, as noted above, during the simulation, students representing the
South-East Asian countries spontaneously held ASEAN and ASEAN+1 meetings,

TABLE 2. Post-simulation Survey Results

Frequency of response scores

Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Median % 4 and 5 Total resp.

1 – – 1 15 3 4.10 4 95 19
2 – – 7 11 1 3.68 4 63 19
3 – – 5 11 3 3.89 4 74 19
4 – – 6 7 6 4 4 68 19
5 – 1 6 11 1 3.63 4 63 19
6 – – 3 10 6 4.15 4 84 19
7 – – 1 4 14 4.68 5 95 19
8 – – 2 8 9 4.36 4 89 19
9 – – 1 7 11 4.52 5 95 19
 T ANYA K EM PSTON AND N IC HOLAS T HOMAS 471

which were attended by all team members from the relevant countries. The
debriefing session identified these meetings as potentially very useful additions,
if they were more structured events. It was suggested that these meetings be
more restricted to only the team leaders or their representatives. It was further
recommended that sidebar meetings only involving foreign, defense, or trade
ministers should be held at regular intervals during the simulations. It was noted
that such “mini-summits” would not only reflect real-world practices but also
would provide a greater voice for all team members.
Third, the debriefing session yielded useful ideas as to the composition of
the teams. All the teams were comprised of ministerial and presidential/prime
ministerial positions. The briefing documents were tailored to these portfolios

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but also included information on domestic political and social debates and
activities in response to the unfolding crisis (usually in the form of protests
held, editorials in leading newspapers, or parliamentary debates). The purpose
of this information was to better ground the teams’ decisions in a wider
national context, as well as to provide a greater sense of reality for the stu-
dents. For future versions of the simulation, we had already decided to com-
bine two portfolios in order to allow one participant to represent civil society.
This decision was independently supported by the students, who also suggested
that this would help develop a two-level approach behind each of the teams’
actions.
As the post-simulation survey and debriefing session indicate, the structure
and flow of the exercise worked well. This is not to suggest that no changes
should be made. The debriefing conclusions argue for more inclusive roles for
all team members, with simultaneous objectives to be set for different portfolios
as well as a greater depth of the simulation from a state–regional model to a
local–state–regional game. These outcomes suggest that—in participating in sim-
ulations as a teaching exercise—students want a greater degree of reality, so as
to maximize the scope for their intended learning outcomes.
All of these interactions—and the lessons that students derived from them—
would have been impossible within a standard lecture/seminar format. The new
perspectives and knowledge that the students gained in applying their research
to a practical problem allowed them to understand a complex situation in a rela-
tively short space of time. Moreover, the contingent scaffolding of the exercise
provided an intellectual space for students to go beyond the directed aims of
the exercise. Here, for instance, the self-directed nature of this simulation led
the students into a more complex understanding of the role of language and
culture in developing international agreements than had been intended. This is
a valuable lesson and, again, one that would be difficult for students to fully
appreciate in a normal lecture/seminar format. Future iterations of the exercise
will, no doubt, yield new insights as different cohorts bring fresh ideas and
approaches to the negotiations.

Conclusion
This article charted the implementation of a graduate-level simulation, one
based on real-world tensions and issues. In a globalized world, where the impacts
of crises in distant corners of the world can have a near-immediate impact on
our lives, ensuring that students of IR have a better understanding of the inter-
play between diplomacy and crisis negotiation is an important pedagogical tool.
In the absence of any involvement in actual crises, simulations allow students to
develop an appreciation for the interplay of different actors, objectives, and out-
comes. As Wilkenfield (2002:540) noted, such activities allow us all to “fill in the
gaps in our knowledge and ultimately allow us to generalize beyond our limited
experiential environment.”
472 The Drama of International Relations

According to the 2005 report by the National Intelligence Council, Mapping

the Global Future, Asia—led by a rising China and a rising India—will be the
hub of a new multipolar world order. That may still be the case; however, it
is equally true that the Asian region contains more flashpoints for great-power
conflict than anywhere else in the world. The South China Sea, the Senkaku/
Diaoyu tensions, North Korea, the Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistan borders, are
all potential war sites that would draw in major powers on opposing sides. If
a conflict were to erupt at any one of these sites, the global future would
have to be rewritten. Hence, we would argue that developing pedagogical
tools that enable students to more deeply appreciate the complex nature of
regional politics, diplomacy, and crisis negotiation should be an important

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aspect of the learning experience. Indeed, the difficulties the students experi-
enced in forging a solution to the problem when being forced to take into
account national priorities closely mirrors the negotiation landscape confront-
ing their real-world counterparts. Although this does not suggest that the sim-
ulation can be used as a training tool for those involved in the resolution of
maritime territorial disputes, it does suggest that it is a relevant pedagogical
approach for those seeking to begin to understand how such issues are
managed.
The feedback from the students during the debriefing session and in their sur-
veys strongly suggested that—despite the demanding nature of this simulation in
terms of basic knowledge required and the speed at which new information had
to be processed during the negotiation sessions—the simulation be retained as a
key component of the program. In the future, all of the suggestions raised dur-
ing the debriefing session will be adopted, namely the development of discrete
policy goals for the different portfolios, a greater structure to the exercise, and
the inclusion of a civil society position on each of the teams. These changes will
not be restricted to the simulation period but will be incorporated into the pre-
simulation activities and documents as well. While these changes will mean more
work for the instructors, they should result in a more engaging simulation for
the students with all the attendant pedagogical benefits for studying this com-
plex issue.

Appendix 1: Pre-simulation Newspaper Reports

News Report 1 (3 weeks to simulation)
Title: Oil rig announcement
The Philippines government has surprised the regional community by announc-
ing advanced plans to site an oil platform off the Thitu Island chain in the
South China Sea. The oil rig will be located approximately 10 nm WSW of the
main island. Once onstream the rig, co-funded by Singaporean and Vietnamese
public funds and to be managed as a Shell–BP joint venture, is intended to help
ensure energy security for the three countries involved.
The Chinese government deplored the lack of consultation from the Philip-
pines government, despite recent warming ties following President Aquino III’s
visit. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman has stated that any oil extraction
operations in the South China Sea need its approval. A spokesman from the Chi-
nese Ministry of Land has warned Shell and BP that their involvement in the
drilling operations may jeopardize ongoing operations in China.
Secretary of State Clinton has urged all parties to continue to discuss their
respective sensitivities and has offered to convene a mediation meeting. ASEAN
Secretary General Surin has supported Secretary Clinton’s call for calm and also
stated his willingness to host a meeting of all governments. There has been no
response from the four governments concerned.
 T ANYA K EM PSTON AND N IC HOLAS T HOMAS 473

News Report 2 (2 weeks to simulation)

Title: Launch of oil rig/Launch of Chinese war-games
The Philippines oil rig—named Ramos I—has reached its site off Thitu Island.
Crews from Shell and BP are now on site, preparing to stabilize the platform
ahead of test drilling operations. The Philippines towing vessels will remain on-
site during the setup phase.
In an unrelated announcement, the Chinese PLA Navy has announced a
large-scale naval exercise near Subi Reef in the South China Sea. The purpose of
the exercise—named Shui-xing [Water Star]—is “to practice command and coor-
dination networks during a limited scale incursion by a hostile country.”

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News Report 3 (1 week to simulation)
Title: Interruption of oil rig operations
The Philippines government today condemned the Chinese naval operations in
the South China Sea, stating that the live-fire exercises were interrupting the com-
mencement of drilling tests on its Ramos I oil platform. A spokesman for Philip-
pines President Aquino called for a cessation of Chinese naval operations and a
withdrawal from Philippines territory. Rear Admiral Yi Zhang warned that any
attempt by the Philippines to restrict China’s naval operations near Subi Reef
would be “tantamount to confrontation” and that China would “act with the
utmost vigor to defend its sovereign authority.” A Chinese foreign ministry spokes-
man stated that the actions by the Philippines were contrary to its obligations
under the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
and the outcomes of the 2011 China-ASEAN discussions on the South China Sea.
The Singaporean and Vietnamese governments are understood to have made
diplomatic representations in Beijing for a cessation of the Shui-xing exercises
until after the oil platform is fully operational. There have been no reports of
China’s response to these overtures.
ASEAN Secretary General Surin has called for the issue of oil platforms to be
tabled at the upcoming meeting of the ASEAN+3 Foreign Ministers in July. A
spokesperson for Secretary of State Clinton stated that the United States was fol-
lowing the issue closely “and would act in the best interests of the international
community.” Highlighting the complex nature of US politics in an election year,
Republican nominee Mitt Romney put aside their differences to call on Presi-
dent Obama to move the US 7th Fleet into the South China Sea. Republican
Senator Santorum went on to call President Obama “another guy happy to out-
source the world’s authority to China.”

Appendix 2: Examples of Newscasts

Phase 5: Interception [01:30]
Official sources are reporting that a US naval vessel has been stopped by a Chi-
nese PLA naval fleet near Gaven Reef in the South China Sea.
A PLA spokesperson—Yi Zhang—has stated that the ship was in Chinese sover-
eign waters without the necessary authority. The ship is the USS Leahy.
The Leahy had been heading to the Thitu Islands to assist in the rescue and
recovery efforts at the Ramos I oil platform at the request of the Philippines and
Vietnamese governments.
US reports indicate that the Chinese navy forced the vessel to stop after box-
ing it in and using onboard water cannons.
US Defense Secretary Panetta has said that the Leahy was in international
waters and he has called upon the Chinese vessels to immediately cease their
474 The Drama of International Relations

provocative escalation of the current crisis and allow the Leahy to continue on
its humanitarian mission.
In related news, there has been a massive surge in support for China’s actions
from its online community, with many calling for more aggressive action to
safeguard Chinese sovereignty. We expect that there will be demonstrations in
support of this action throughout China. There may also be online pledges of
further support given the strength of emotions here over these disputed islands.
We can only wait to see how the authorities in Vietnam and Singapore will
respond to this latest challenge.

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Phase 8: Returning to Hainan [02:30]
Satellite images have confirmed that the PLA naval vessels at the heart of the
Ramos I crisis are now sailing northwards and appear to be returning to their
port on Hainan Island.
Chinese PLA naval spokesman Yi Zhang has stated that many of the Ramos I
oil workers require more advanced medical care than that the PLA naval vessels
can provide.
Rear Admiral Yi went on to declare that there should be due recognition of
the valiant efforts of the Chinese crews who dealt professionally with a difficult
and dangerous situation.
US CINCPAC Admiral Ross again called on China to allow communication
with the crew of the USS Leahy. In related news, President Obama requested that
any crew of the Leahy who wished to be transferred back to their ship should be
allowed to do so.
A joint Vietnamese–Philippines naval taskforce is also sailing to the site of the
Ramos I oil platform to continue recovery operations. They are expected to be
on site within the hour.

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