Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 1986 by the Am rican Psychological Association, Inc.

1986, Vol. 51, No. 1,55-65 0022-3514/86/S00.7J

Physiological Arousal, Dissonance, and Attitude Change: Evidence for a

Dissonance-Arousal Link and a "Don't Remind Me" Effect

Roger A. Elkin and Michael R. Leippe

Adelphi University

Two experiments replicated and extended research by Croyle and Cooper (1983) indicating that
cognitive dissonance involves physiological arousal. In Experiment 1, subjects wrote counterattitudi-
nal essays under conditions of high or low choice, and, to assess arousal effects owing to effort, with
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or without a list of arguments provided by the experimenter. In high-choice conditions only, and
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regardless of effort, subjects showed both arousal (heightened galvanic skin response) and attitude
change. Arousal, however, did not decline following attitude change. The more effortful task (no
arguments provided) produced increased arousal but not greater attitude change. In Experiment
2, the opportunity to change one's attitude following a freely chosen counterattitudinal essay was
manipulated. As in Experiment 1, arousal increased following the essay but did not decline following
a postessay attitude change opportunity. When subjects were not given an attitude change opportu-
nity, however, arousal did decline. Thus, dissonance seems to create arousal, but attitude change
sustains rather than reduces the arousal. It is suggested that if dissonance is a drive state, drive
reduction typically may be accomplished through gradual cognitive change or forgetting.

Cognitive dissonance exists when two or more cognitive ele-
ments (e.g., an attitude and knowledge of one's behavior) are
experienced as logically inconsistent (Festinger, 1957). This in-
consistency is presumed to produce discomfort or tension that
the individual is motivated to reduce. Dissonance occurs, for
example, when someone engages in attitude-discrepant behav-
ior (e.g., writing a counterattitudinal essay) while under the im-
pression that he or she freely chose such behavior. When this
happens, and the individual also is committed to the attitude-
discrepant behavior (Brehm & Cohen, 1962) and perceives its
consequences as negative (Cooper & Goethals, 1974), the per-
son reliably shows evidence of dissonance reduction, often in
the form of attitude change in the direction of the behavior.
Festinger (1957) originally posited that the attitude change
is motivated by the psychological discomfort that accompanies
cognitive inconsistency. This idea of "motivated attitude
change," however, has been difficult to assess. Indeed, among
the most serious challenges to dissonance theory have been in-
terpretations based on dispassionate, self-attributional pro-
cesses (e.g., Bern, 1967). To strengthen support for the classic
motivational explanation of dissonance effects, it must be dem-
onstrated that "psychological discomfort" is present under
high-dissonance conditions and that this discomfort is allevi-
ated by attitude change or some other means of dissonance re-
duction.1
Arousal as a Concomitant of Dissonance
There is some evidence for the first of these required condi-
tions: Numerous studies suggest that the high-dissonance state
Special thanks to Bob Bedell for his help in conducting Experiment
1, and to four anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Mi-
chael R. Leippe, Department of Psychology, Adelphi University, Gar-
den City, New York 11530.
involves undifFerentiated physiological arousal that, in turn, is
labeled and experienced as a negative (unpleasant) state if the
individual attributes the arousal to his or her attitude-discrep-
ant behavior (Cooper & Fazio, 1984; see, also, Kiesler & Pallak,
1976). It has been demonstrated, for example, that subjects ex-
perimentally induced into a high-dissonance state make more
dominant responses than control subjects on word recognition
(Cottrell, Rajecki, & Smith, 1974) and color-word interference
(Pallak & Pittman, 1972) tasks, just as do people who are anx-
ious. The most suggestive indirect evidence that dissonance is
arousing, though, has come from the work of Cooper and his
colleagues. Zanna and Cooper (1974) found that subjects did
not change their attitude following counterattitudinal behavior
if they believed that a drug (actually a placebo) they had been
given caused arousal. Presumably, these subjects misattributed
dissonance-produced arousal to the drug, thereby negating the
need to reduce tension through attitude change. Subsequently,
Cooper, Zanna, and Taves (1978) used actual drugs to mimic
1
Evidence of discomfort and alleviation of discomfort will not be
construed in this article as supporting dissonance theory over alterna-
tive explanations of the effects of counterattitudinal behavior. Recent
self-presentation analyses such as Schlenker's (1982) identity-analytic
model propose that heightened arousal following counterattitudinal be-
havior may reflect social anxiety or embarrassment about public viola-
tion of one's identity-relevant standards (Schlenker, 1982, pp. 222-223).
It seems reasonable that reduced discomfort following attitude change
could similarly be construed by a self-presentation model as a conse-
quence of the psychic relief that accompanies "setting things straight."
Thus, no "crucial test" seems possible at this time (Tetlock & Manstead,
1985), and the present contribution is offered in the spirit of paradig-
matic progress within the current, "revised" dissonance framework (cf.
Greenwald & Ronis, 1978). To use Schlenker's (1982) description, dis-
sonance is used here to define a recognition by the individual that his
or her attitude-discrepant behavior carries "responsibility-for-negative-
consequences-that-threaten-the-self" (p. 238).

55
 56 ROGER A. ELKIN AND MICHAEL R. LEIPPE

the arousal states proposed to exist under high- and low-disso-
nance conditions. They found that a sedative suppressed atti-
tude change and an amphetamine enhanced attitude change
among high-dissonance subjects who believed they had taken a
placebo. Cooper et al. reasoned that in the amphetamine group,
subjects attributed the otherwise inexplicable drug-induced
arousal to their inconsistent cognitions thereby increasing the
drive to restore consistency. In the sedative group, on the other
hand, arousal associated with counterattitudinal behavior was
suppressed, and subjects felt no "drive" to change their atti-
tudes.
Cooper et al.'s results constitute impressive, albeit indirect,
evidence for a dissonance-arousal link. Of course, the drugs uti-
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not previously considered supporting evidence for the opposing
point of view. Also, more effort may be exerted if the counterat-
titudinal essay is written under high- relative to low-choice con-
ditions. Involvement may be less when behavior is seen as
"manded" (low choice), resulting in little effort investment. In
Experiment I , we tested this alternative explanation by manip-
ulating the effortfulness of an essay-writing task independently
of choice and direction of essay.
Arousal Reduction as a Consequence of Attitude
Change (Dissonance Reduction)

Dissonance, as noted, has been viewed traditionally as a ten-

lized in their study can only be assumed to have effects similar
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sion state with drive properties. Drive theories of behavior (e.g.,

to those of dissonant behavior. It might be argued instead that
Hull, 1943) postulate that internal needs (e.g., hunger) and
the drugs merely influenced information processing ability.
goals (e.g., solution of a complex cognitive problem) energize
Drugs may affect the extent to which people expend energy on
behavior (increase drive) directed toward the satisfaction of
sorting out inconsistencies and on seeking information about
those needs or goals and that once the need or goal is satisfied,
the environment.
behavior returns to "less energetic" levels. If autonomic arousal
Perhaps a more fundamental shortcoming of the misattribu-
is a correlate of drive (e.g., Berlyne, 1965), behavior that re-
tion studies is that they did not directly observe the arousal ac-
duces underlying need should be followed by arousal reduction.
tually produced by attitude-discrepant behavior. Croyle and
This view is supported by research on goal-directed cognitive
Cooper (1983) recently reported two experiments designed for
activity. Blatt (1961), for example, found increases in physiolog-
this purpose. In the first experiment, the traditional attitude
ical arousal among individuals while they pondered a complex
change following counterattitudinal essay writing occurred for
problem and abrupt decreases once they discovered the solu-
high- but not low-choice subjects. In a second experiment,
tion. Similarly, tension that occurs among people who are inter-
Croyle and Cooper used exactly the same procedure, but mea-
rupted in their quest to complete a task (the "Zeigarnik effect")
sured subjects' arousal (skin conductance response; SCR) be-
decreases following the opportunity to complete the task (Man-
fore and following the essay-writing task. Greater increases in
dler, 1975).
arousal were observed among subjects in the high-choice condi-
If dissonance creates drivelike tension, a similar reduction in
tion, leading the authors to conclude that dissonance caused
arousal should follow behavior that restores consonance. Ac-
heightened autonomic activity. Interestingly, however, no atti-
cordingly, some reduction in any dissonance-produced arousal
tude change differences were found in the second study, an out-
should be evident after dissonance is reduced through attitude
come Croyle and Cooper argued was because of high-choice
change or some other means. To our knowledge, no direct dem-
subjects' misattribution of their arousal to the tension produc-
onstration of this derivation of dissonance theory exists. There
ing effects of the physiological recording apparatus. Thus, al-
is indirect evidence, however. Pallak and Pittman (1972) found
though it was shown that a reliable dissonance manipulation
that like other drive states, dissonance produced by an attitude-
produces arousal, it was not demonstrated that attitude change
discrepant, freely chosen decision was associated with a high
and arousal are common, co-occurring effects of dissonance.
frequency of dominant responses that inhibited performance
One purpose of the present research was to look for the co-
on a difficult verbal task and improved it on an easy verbal task.
occurrence of arousal and attitude change among subjects expe-
However, when the experimenter provided high-dissonance
riencing cognitive dissonance. To do so, we used a procedure
subjects with a strong justification for their attitude-discrepant
designed to minimize the possibility of misattribution of any
decision, these effects disappeared. This implies that once disso-
dissonance-produced arousal to our physiological recording
nance is reduced, drive and its associated tension is reduced.
equipment.
We sought more direct evidence for this relation by tracking the
The lack of within-experiments correspondence of attitude
course physiological arousal takes following dissonance-reduc-
change and arousal points up the complexity of the measure-
ing attitude change.
ment and meaning of arousal effects. Electrodermal activity as
measured by Croyle and Cooper may result from many specific
neural systems and therefore from many types of activities (So- Experiment 1
kolov, 1963). Cacioppo and Petty (1979), for example, found
that heightened arousal evidenced by five different physiological In Experiment 1, we modeled Croyle and Cooper's strategy
measures accompanied subjects' anticipatory counterarguing of comparing arousal changes of subjects in the low- and high-
of an expected attitude-discrepant message. This suggests that dissonance conditions of a well-established forced compliance
the effort involved in mental activity may itself be arousing. manipulation. Several changes in the Croyle and Cooper proce-
Conceivably, the effort-arousal link rather than a dissonance- dure were made, however. Galvanic skin response (GSR) was
arousal association could account for Croyle and Cooper's data. our measure of arousal. GSR is a measure of skin resistance,
Writing a counterattitudinal essay normally may require more the reciprocal of the skin conductance response measured by
effort than writing a proattitudinal essay because subjects have Croyle and Cooper. Research (e.g., Sourek, 1965; Wang, 1957,
 AROUSAL AND DISSONANCE
1958) suggests that GSR reliably correlates with nervous sys-
tem activity known to be indicative of tension and anxiety.2
To acclimate subjects to the physiological recording proce-
dure, four filler tasks were given subjects prior to baseline re-
cording of GSR. This contrasts with two filler tasks used by
Croyle and Cooper. In addition, unlike in Croyle and Cooper's
procedure, no statements implying the possibility of apparatus-
related tension were made by the experimenter. These proce-
dures were followed to reduce the likelihood of misattribution
of dissonance arousal to the recording procedures. We also took
a postattitude change measure of arousal in addition to pre-
and postdissonance manipulation measures to assess whether
attitude change serves to reduce arousal.
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Finally, to test the possibility that the cognitive effort in-
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volved in high-choice counterattitudinal essay writing, and not
dissonance per se, is responsible for heightened arousal, Experi-
ment 1 included a manipulation of essay task effortfulness that
was crossed with the dissonance variable of high versus low
choice. This involved varying the availability to subjects of in-
formation to be used in their essays. Half the subjects were given
the arguments that they were to write into an essay (low effort-
fulness), whereas the other half were required to generate their
own arguments (high effortfulness). We predicted that subjects
in the high-effortfulness condition would become more aroused
than those in the low-effortfulness condition, but would not en-
gage in greater attitude change. When there is no dissonance
associated with writing the essay, subjects should correctly attri-
bute effort-produced arousal to task difficulty. Only when there
is dissonance should arousal be tied to dissonance-reducing
drive. Although it is possible that effort-produced arousal will
combine with dissonance-produced arousal among high-disso-
nance subjects to yield a particularly strong dissonance-reduc-
tion motive, the fact remains that following dissonance theory,
arousal and attitude change should only co-occur when disso-
nance is experienced.
It should be noted that the effortfulness manipulation is not
expected to itself influence dissonance. Although some studies
have found that attitudes toward the outcome of a task are more
positive the more effortful the task (e.g., Aronson & Mills, 1959;
Zimbardo, 1965), other studies have failed to observe this effort
justification effect (cf. Insko, 1967). More importantly, effort
justification studies differ from the present research in that in
the former, variation in effortfulness is the dissonance manipu-
lation. In the present case, dissonance is initially created by
freely choosing to perform attitude-discrepant behavior. Stud-
ies that used manipulations resembling our effortfulness vari-
able (e.g., reading versus improvising a counterattitudinal mes-
sage) have observed no effect of these manipulations on attitude
change among subjects in high-choice, high-commitment con-
ditions (Rabbie, Brehm, & Cohen, 1959; Zimbardo, 1965). As
Carlsmith and Freedman (1968) have suggested, task details in-
troduced following a dissonance-arousing decision should not
affect the magnitude of dissonance unless they could have been
foreseen before the decision (see also Cooper & Goethals, 1974).
Finally, in low-choice conditions, we would not expect differen-
tial dissonance or attitude change across effortfulness levels, be-
cause most of the great many counterattitudinal advocacy stud-
ies have used the high effortfulness instance of our manipula-
57
tion and seldom found significant attitude change (relative to a
control group) among low-choice subjects.
In sum, the following predictions were made:
1. Relative to low-dissonance subjects, high-dissonance sub-
jects will show (a) greater increases in arousal and (b) more atti-
tude change after they write a counterattitudinal essay.
2. Relative to those in the low-effortfulness condition, sub-
jects in the high-effortfulness condition will show (a) greater in-
creases in arousal but (b) equivalent attitude change after they
write a counterattitudinal essay.
3. Following an opportunity to reduce their dissonance
through attitude change, high-dissonance subjects will experi-
ence a decline in arousal.
Method
Subjects, Design, and Apparatus
Twelve male and 28 female undergraduates, distributed by sex in rela-
tively equal proportions across conditions, participated to partially ful-
fill the requirements of 100-level psychology courses. At the time of
recruitment, they were told that physiological measurements would be
taken during several tasks. The subjects were run individually. The de-
sign was a 2 X 2 (High vs. Low Choice X Essay Arguments Available vs.
Not Available) between-subjects factorial (« = 10 subjects/cell) in
which, as described later, repeated measures were taken on attitude (2
occasions) and GSR (3 occasions).
A Biofeedback Instruments G.S.R. Model P-976 preamplifier was
used to measure skin resistance. A current of 10 microamps was passed
through copper tipped electrodes. All measures were taken from a digi-
tal readout. The P-976 model requires no skin preparation and no elec-
trolyte. Measurement drift is no greater than 1 ohm per 15-min mea-
surement period.3
1
Of course, it is also the case that electrodermal activity is sensitive
to factors (e.g., attentional changes) that other physiological measures
(e.g., heart rate) may not be measurably influenced by. We relied on the
logic of experimentation and random assignment to control for addi-
tional influences on electrodermal activity across conditions. We should
also note that physiological researchers believe skin conductance is a
more preferable measure of electrodermal activity than our measure
of skin resistance (see Venables & Christie, 1980). Conductance more
precisely reflects what is occurring on the surface of the skin. Our pri-
mary purpose, however, was not a precise measure of the sweat re-
sponse. Rather, we looked for evidence of underlying physiological
change and whether such change is systematically related to manipu-
lated psychological variables. Resistance serves this purpose (see
Sourek, 1965; Wang, 1957, 1958). A related, and more relevant short-
coming of resistance relative to conductance is that the size of a resis-
tance response to a stimulus (phasic activity) is more highly correlated
with existing (tonic) resistance activity. Known as the "law of initial
values," this means that the meaning (in terms of change in physiologi-
cal activity) of a resistance response varies as a function of prestimulus
activity levels. The law of initial values mandates that premanipulation
levels of tonic activity should be within the same range in all experimen-
tal conditions in order for phasic changes to be comparable. Checks on
this requirement in both experiments, as reported in the Results sec-
tions, found no evidence of a confounding because of the law of initial
values. Accordingly, changes in skin resistance are a valid index of
changes in arousal in the present context.
3
Personal communication with Philip Brotman of Biofeedback In-
struments Co., Westchester, NY, July 1985.
 58 ROGER A. ELKJN AND MICHAEL R. LEIPPE
Procedure and Dependent Measures
Subjects were seated at a desk in a temperature and humidity con-
trolled room and given a consent form to sign that gave a general de-
scription of the tasks to be performed and explained that "harmless and
painless recordings" would be taken from the surface of their skin. After
this form was signed, the experimenter stressed the innocuous nature
of the recording apparatus, stating that absolutely no electric shock
would be run through the wires. The electrodes were attached to the
distal phalanx of the index and second fingers of the subject's nonpre-
ferred hand. It was explained that the study was concerned with what
naturally occurs on the surface of the skin as people engage in everyday
tasks. All of five subsequently administered tasks were then performed
while the experimenter was out of the room.
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The first task was a "Student Attitudes Questionnaire" containing 10
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campus issues for which subjects expressed their attitudes on 31-point
scales ranging from disagree to agree. Issue 5 was the focal issue and
read as follows: "All students should pay a parking fee of $15 per
semester."4 This served as the attitude premeasure. When subjects had
completed the entire questionnaire, the experimenter returned, intro-
duced the first filler task (an anagrams task), and left the room for 3
min. The second filler task (a math problem) was introduced next, and
subjects were given 3 min to grapple with it.
Subjects were then asked whether they felt relaxed. It was hoped that
a response to such a question would have the force of a commitment
and would help avoid misattribution. All subjects reported that they
were indeed relaxed. The experimenter then called to his assistant in
the next room to inquire as to whether this corresponded to the readings
being recorded. The assistant came to the room and said, "Yes, accord-
ing to the machine you seem relaxed." This statement was made to re-
duce nervousness about the experimental setting by suggesting that
none existed. No mention was made during any phase of this study
about anxiety or tension produced by the machine.
The subjects next spent 3 min each on a third (memory) and fourth
(brightness magnitude estimation) filler task.
After this, there was a 3-min rest period during which baseline GSR
data were taken. During the 3 min, 18 recordings (one every 10s) were
taken from a digital readout.
At the end of this 3-min period, the experimenter entered the room
and read the following:
In exchange for these research facilities, the psychology depart-
ment has agreed to do a survey for the administration. The Univer-
sity in conjunction with the Board of Trustees has set up a commit-
tee on campus to investigate the possibilities of a parking fee for
those students who either live on campus or drive to school every-
day. The fee would be about $ 15 per semester. After reviewing what
they find, the committee will make a recommendation to the ad-
ministration regarding a change in parking policy.
Choice manipulation. In the high-choice condition, subjects were fur-
ther told that
. . . the committee has asked to have arguments gathered from
both sides of the issue in order to make a more educated decision.
In the past it has been shown that a good way of doing this is simply
to ask people to list arguments from a particular side of the issue.
The experimenter added that he had just been informed that morning
that the committee had finished gathering antiparking fee essays and
was now ready to gather proparking fee essays. The experimenter con-
tinued:
So while / would like to stress the voluntary nature of which side
of the issue you decide to write on, the committee needs strong,
forceful arguments in support of parking fees for students. Your
arguments will be sent directly to the committee for evaluation.
Subjects in the high-choice conditions were further given a release
form to sign that stated:
I realize what is involved in this task and that I am performing it
of my own free will. The essay I write will be sent to a committee
on campus that is intending to make decisions on this issue based
on the arguments it receives from me and other students. I am
aware that I may stop participating in this survey now without loss
of participation credit. . .
All subjects signed and dated the form and checked a space indicating
release of their essay.
Low-choice condition subjects were not given the release form but
were given slightly different information about the task:
In the past it has been shown that a good way of doing this is simply
to ask people, no matter how they feel personally, to list arguments
from a particular side of the issue. Therefore, I have assigned you
to write strong, forceful arguments in support of parking fees for
students. \bur arguments will be sent directly to the committee for
evaluation.
All subjects were given 5 min to write the essay. Subjects then placed
their essays in an envelope addressed to the "Bursar's Committee on
Availability manipulation. Half of the subjects in the experiment
were provided with five arguments (arguments-available condition).
They were told they could elaborate on these but that they should use
them exclusively. The other half of the subjects were not provided with
these arguments (arguments-unavailable condition), but, instead, gen-
erated their own.
After the essay-writing task another 3-min rest period ensued during
which GSR was recorded. This postessay measurement procedure was
the same as during the baseline measurement. Afterward, subjects were
presented with a single 31-point item identical to the premeasure on
parking fees. It was explained that the committee was interested in their
opinion on this issue and that this item was to accompany their essay in
the envelope. When subjects had placed this measure in the envelope, a
final 3-min rest period followed during which postattitude change op-
portunity GSR was recorded.
Manipulation checks then were administered to determine subjects'
perceptions of how much freedom they had to decline to write the essay
and of the effortfulness of the essay-writing task. Both these measures
were on 31-point scales in which higher numbers indicate greater free-
dom and effort. When these were completed subjects placed these mea-
sures with the other material in the envelope. The subjects were then
asked what they thought the study was concerned with. No subjects
expressed suspicion of deception regarding the campus committee. The
subjects were fully debriefed and thanked.
Results
Choice Manipulation Check
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that subjects in the
high-choice conditions reported greater perceived decision free-
dom (M = 24.3) than subjects in the low-choice conditions
(M= 5.3), F(\, 36) = 196.14, p < .001. Effortfulness had no
effects on perceived freedom, either through a main effect or
interaction, Fs < 1.
* Parking is free for students at the subjects' campus.
 AROUSAL AND DISSONANCE
16
Available
«o> 12 Not Available
I
o puted. This mean change score constitutes an estimate of base-
1 •
•*•«
i tion, a Levene test for equal variances (Levene, 1960) revealed
I '
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This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Low High
CHOICE
Figure 1. Experiment 1: Mean pre- to postessay attitude change
as a function of choice and argument availability.
Effort Manipulation Check
The only significant effect on perceived effortfulness of the
essay-writing task was a main effect for availability of essay ar-
guments, F(\, 36) = 142.01, p < .001. (Fs < 1 for choice main
effect and Choice X Availability interaction.) Subjects provided
with arguments saw the essay task as less effortful (M = 7.4)
than those not provided with arguments (M = 25.5).
Attitudes
There were no differences among the four experimental
groups on the premeasures of attitude toward a student parking
fee, F < 1 (overall M - 1 .58). Attitude change was determined
by subtracting each subject's attitude premeasure score from
his or her postessay score. Mean attitude change in each condi-
tion is depicted in Figure L. A main effect was found for choice,
F(l, 36) = 60.39, p < .001, with high-choice subjects (M= 13.7)
showing greater attitude change than low-choice subjects (M =
0.85). Neither the main effect of argument availability nor the
interaction of choice and availability approached significance,
GSR
During each of the three 3-min recording periods, a GSR was
taken every 10 s. A subject's score for a measurement period
was the mean of the 18 GSR estimates for that subject within
a recording period. The overall correlation (n = 40) between
individuals' mean baseline GSR and their baseline-mean-to-
postessay-mean GSR change was .53 (p < .001 ), suggesting that
as expected (see Footnote 2), stimulus-produced (phasic) GSR
responses depend in part on prestimulus baseline (tonic) GSR
activity. Accordingly, several preliminary analyses of baseline
responses were made, which collectively suggest that this depen-
59
dence or "law of initial values" does not invalidate the between-
conditions results described later. First, a two-way ANOVA of the
mean GSR estimates revealed no premanipulation differences
among the four conditions, all Fs < 1. Next, for each subject,
absolute GSR change for each 10-s measurement interval was
determined and the mean of these 17 change scores was com-
line GSR fluctuation. One-way ANOVA revealed that baseline
fluctuation did not differ across conditions, F < 1. Overall,
mean within-subjects fluctuation was 9.474 kohms. In addi-
that within-groups variability in level of fluctuation did not
differ across conditions, F(3,36) = 1.75, p > . 17,
Mean GSR estimates served as the unit of analysis for all sub-
sequent analyses. To examine manipulation and attitude mea-
surement effects on GSR, a repeated measures ANOVA was
performed that included the choice and availability between-
subjects factors and timing of GSR assessment—baseline, post-
essay, and postattitude change opportunity—as the repeated
measure. This analysis revealed a main effect for timing, F(2,
72) = 50.82, p < .001, characterized by an overall decrease in
GSR (increase in arousal) between baseline and postessay as-
sessment. The main effect, however, was qualified by significant
interactions between timing and choice, F(2, 72) = 34.94, p <
.001, and timing and availability, F(2, 72) = 2.98, p = .057.
Figure 2 indicates that both high choice and high effort (argu-
ments-unavailable) associated with the essay task served to
heighten arousal at the postessay measurement period, in a
fashion that was primarily additive [the three-way interaction
of choice, availability, and timing was nonsignificant, F(2,72) =
1,02, p > .36]. Using the Bonferroni procedure (Myers, 1972), a
series of planned comparisons (contrasts-wide alpha = .05, df=
72), revealed an increase in arousal (decrease in GSR) from
baseline to postessay measurement in the high-choice/argu-
ments-unavailable condition, M = 344, M - 249 (in kohms),
/ = 9.65, and the high-choice/arguments-available condition,
M = 310, M = 250, t = 6.10, but not in the low-choice/argu-
ments-unavailable condition, M = 2\3,M=202,t = 1.15, and
low-choice/arguments-available condition, M = 266, M = 263,
t = .26.
No postessay to postattitude change opportunity trend in
GSR was apparent within any of the experimental conditions,
all » < .2 (Ms - 249. 245, 201, 262, in the high/unavailable,
high/available, low/unavailable, and low/available conditions,
respectively).5
Attitude-Arousal Relation
The overall correlation between attitude change and arousal
shift (from baseline to postessay) was .73 (df= 38, p < .001).
The correlation between attitude change and arousal shift was
a nonsignificant .36, df= 18,p> .10, when calculated forhigh-
s
In the two high-choice conditions in which the baseline to postessay
increase in arousal was significant, the increase continued to be signifi-
cant in the two high-choice conditions as evidenced by Bonferroni t
contrasts between baseline and postattitude change opportunity levels
of arousal, /s> 6.5.
 60 ROGER A. ELK1N AND MICHAEL R. LE1PPE
100
Not Available
80
60
Available
40
cc
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20
Low High
CHOICE
Figure 2. Experiment 1: Mean arousal shifts (skin resistance on a kohms
scale) from baseline to postessay as a function of choice and argument
availability. (Shifts are in the direction of increased arousal [decreased
GSR].)
choice conditions only. The only significant within-cells correla-
tion was that for the high/available condition, r = .63, p = .05.
Discussion
The results are consistent with the findings of Croyle and
Cooper (1983). As predicted, subjects who performed counter-
attitudinal behavior under dissonance-producing conditions of
high choice showed heightened postbehavior arousal, whereas
subjects who performed counterattitudinal behavior without
perceived free choice, and therefore should not have experi-
enced dissonance, did not. Moreover, as also predicted, these
same groups of subjects showed patterns of attitude change that
were strikingly isomorphic with the arousal patterns: High-
choice subjects changed their attitude following their attitude-
discrepant behavior, low-choice subjects did not. These parallel
patterns of arousal and attitude change concur with research
that suggests arousal is necessary for dissonance-produced atti-
tude change (cf. Cooper et al., 1978; Kiesler & Pallak, 1976).
The conclusion that dissonance produces a tension which
"drives" attitude change is bolstered further by the effects of
the argument availability manipulation. Judging from subjects'
perceptions of the effort required by the essay tasks, generating
counterattitudinal arguments was, as expected, more effortful
than embellishing arguments made available. And, indeed,
arousal increased more in the former case. Importantly, how-
ever, no difference in attitude change occurred between the ar-
guments-unavailable and arguments-available groups, suggest-
ing it is not arousal per se that is related to attitude change.
Rather, it is the arousal uniquely associated with dissonance.
These results suggest that Cooper and Croyle's results cannot be
explained on the basis of differential arousal-producing effort
across their high- and low-dissonance conditions. This possibil-
ity is further ruled out by the fact that subjects did not perceive
the task as more eifortful when given high as opposed to low
choice.
The results raise interesting questions about the combined
effects of two sources of arousal: dissonance tension and task
difficulty. Among high-choice subjects, essay requirements did
not influence attitude change. If all arousal was misattributed
to the recognizable task difficulty in the arguments-unavailable
condition, we would expect no attitude change among high-
choice/high-effort subjects, because they would "feel" no disso-
nance. This form of misattribution seems untenable given the
large number of studies showing significant attitude change fol-
lowing arguments-unavailable essay writing. If all arousal was
misattributed to dissonance tension, high-choice/high-effort
subjects should experience the most dissonance and possibly
change more. That this did not occur suggests two possibilities.
Subjects may indeed correctly differentiate the two sources of
arousal. Misattribution may require special environmental cir-
cumstances, such as an ingested drug (a la Zanna & Cooper,
1974), camouflaged influences on bodily cues such as facial ex-
pressions (Zuckerman, Klorman, Larrance, & Spiegel, 1981),
or temporal lag that removes attention from the "true" source
of arousal (Zillmann, 1971). Alternatively, combining of the
arousal from dissonance and the mental exertion required by
the task may indeed have occurred. However, the increase in
arousal over that produced by dissonance alone may need to
reach a certain threshold before it compels more extreme disso-
nance-reducing cognitive change. This threshold may not have
been reached in the high-choice/high-effort condition.
In contrast to the presumed tension reduction properties of
dissonance-driven attitude change, high-dissonance subjects'
arousal did not decline after they indicated their postessay atti-
tude. This finding may be because of any number of factors.
Perhaps attitude does not change in order to reduce tension, but
rather as a result of cognitive reorganization prompted by the
awareness of dissonance. That is, arousal may signal an incon-
sistency rather than drive its resolution (cf. Schlenkei; 1982). If
so, dissonance is not a drive state in the classic sense. Alterna-
tively, the sustained measured arousal may reflect residual pal-
mar activity that obscured observation of subjects' relief. Fi-
nally, perhaps the attitude change opportunity makes the indi-
vidual's dissonant state more acutely salient and therefore
sustains arousal or recreates dissonance that the individual re-
duced in his or her own way before the attitude change opportu-
nity. Experiment 2 examined these possibilities.
Experiment 2
Our second experiment (a) tracked the course of arousal for
a longer postessay time period and, (b) for some subjects, did
not provide an opportunity for explicit (i.e., written) attitude
change. The first of these procedures should allow for assess-
ment of arousal reduction after any obscuring residual physio-
logical activity has ceased. The second procedure, in combina-
tion with the first, should permit a test of whether explicit atti-
tude change sustains or reduces arousal or, in fact, is irrelevant
to the postdissonance induction course of arousal, by yielding
 AROUSAL AND DISSONANCE 61

comparisons of the temporal course of arousal among subjects
given and not given an explicit attitude change forum. Although
we acknowledge the possibility of private attitude change
among subjects whose postessay attitude is left unmeasured, it
seems reasonable that attitude change will have greater impact
on subjects' phenomenology if it is symbolized on an attitude
scale.
In addition to high-dissonance conditions in which subjects
either did or did not receive an attitude posttest, Experiment 2
included a third theoretically relevant high-dissonance group
that not only received the posttest on the focal dissonance atti-
tude issue but also posttests on all the issues comprising a pre-
manipulation questionnaire. This condition was included to ex-
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changes. One filler task was eliminated. The three GSR recording peri-
ods occurred at the same points in the procedure as in the previous
study, but were followed by a fourth 3-min recording period, the post-
postattitude change opportunity measure. This measure was taken be-
ginning 1 min after completion of the postattitude change opportunity
period.
There were four high-choice conditions with 10 subjects in each. In
the replication group, subjects performed counterattitudinal behavior
and were given an attitude change opportunity as in the high-choice/
arguments-unavailable condition of Experiment I . In the no-attitude-
change opportunity condition, the procedures were identical to the rep-
lication group except that instead of the attitude change opportunity,
subjects were provided with a magazine to browse through during that
same time period (60 s). A third group, the dissonance/multi-item con-

amine the possibility that dissonance arousal involves an un- dition, performed the counterattitudinal behavior, received the attitude
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differentiated state of cognitive unrest that results in erratic
attitudinal responses. That is, we wondered if attitude change
on the focal issue might occur, not for the purpose of reducing
dissonance, but as a byproduct of diffuse, arousal-related cogni-
tive activity. If attitude change is dependent on arousal in this
undifferentiated way, shifts should be found also on issues for
which counterattitudinal behaviors are not performed.
Method
change opportunity, and then was given the remaining nine items of the
initial student attitudes questionnaire received at the start of the study.
Finally, in the consonance/multi-item condition, subjects wrote a proat-
titudinal essay and received the multi-item attitude change opportunity.
This group served as an arousal control because heightened arousal
should not occur when performing a proattitudinal behavior. These lat-
ter two groups were told that "we thought that the committee would
also be interested in how the students felt about the remaining issues.
So, I'd like you to fill out this questionnaire again, except this time I'd
like you to include it in the envelope."

Subjects
Seven male and 33 female undergraduates participated to partially
fulfill a requirement for 100-level psychology courses. Males and fe-
males appeared in each condition in similar proportions.
Procedure and Design
The same GSR equipment as employed in Experiment 1 was used.
The basic procedure was identical to that of the first study with a few
Results
Decision Freedom
No differences in perceived decision freedom were obtained
between groups, F < 1. All of the group means were on the
high choice side of the 31-point scale (replication = 17.20; no-
attitude-change opportunity = 18.80; dissonance/multi-item =
17.90; consonance/mum-item = 21.70).

160

183
§
O 206
o
o
= 229
ill
O
252

co 275
K
? 298
CO
321

344

BL PE PACOPPACO BL PE PACOPPACO BL PE PACO PPACO BL PE PACO PPACO

REPLICATION NO ATTITUDE CHANGE DISSONANCE/ CONSONANCE/
OPPORTUNITY MULTI-ITEM MULTI-ITEM
Figure 3. Experiment 2: Mean arousal levels within and between conditions. (BL = Baseline; PE = Postes-
say; PACO = Postattitude Change Opportunity; PPACO = Post-Postattitude Change Opportunity. The
numbers on the ordinate axis have been placed in inverse order to make the numbers placed higher on the
axis correspond to heightened levels of arousal.)
 62 ROGER A. ELK1N AND MICHAEL R. LE1PPE
Attitude Change
There were no differences among the groups on the premea-
sures of attitude toward a student parking fee, F < I . ANOVA on
pre- to postessay attitude change scores on the focal parking fees
issue revealed that the three groups that received an attitude
change opportunity differed in amount of attitude change, F(2,
27) = 8.96, p< .001. A Duncan range test showed that the con-
sonance/multi-item group (M = 0.50) changed significantly less
than the replication and dissonance/multi-item groups (Ms =
9.50 and 13.10, respectively) at the .01 level. These latter two
groups did not differ from each other.
To assess whether erratic responding to attitude scales of any
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sort was occurring, absolute change scores (postessay score —
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preessay score!) were computed for all the remaining attitude
items completed by subjects in the dissonance/multi-item and
consonance/multi-item conditions. Neither group showed sig-
nificant absolute change on any of the nine items, all ps > . 12.
GSR
Mean baseline GSR did not differ across conditions, F(3,
36) = 1.29, p > .29.' Average fluctuation, as measured in Exper-
iment 1, was 10.487 kohms overall, and did not differ across
conditions, F < 1. Within-conditions variances in fluctuation
were equivalent, Levene test F < 1.
A Group X Timing of Measurement repeated measures AN-
OVA revealed a main effect for time of measurement, f\3,
108) = 6.93, p < .001, and an interaction between time of mea-
surement and group, F(9, 108) = 2.75, p < .006. No main effect
for group was obtained, ^3, 36) = 2.15,;» .1. These relations,
depicted in Figure 3, were examined further in a series of analy-
ses that first assessed pre- to postessay changes in arousal and
then the course of postessay arousal among dissonance groups.
As seen in Figure 3, arousal means are higher at postessay
measurement than at baseline in all three dissonance condi-
tions, whereas baseline and postessay arousal are the same in
the consonance condition. Because the dissonance conditions
were identical in procedure through postessay measurement, a
statistical contrast between baseline and postessay arousal in
the three dissonance conditions combined was performed using
the overall repeated measures error term (df= 108) from the
ANOVA just described. This test revealed that arousal increased
significantly following dissonant behavior,; = 4.43, p < .001. A
contrast of baseline and postessay arousal in the consonance
condition revealed no such increase, t <l.
To investigate the course of postessay arousal over the three
measurement periods in the dissonance conditions, a repeated
measures ANOVA was performed excluding the consonance/
multi-item group and the baseline GSR measure. This analysis
revealed a significant main effect for condition, F(2,27) = 3.64,
p < .04, and near-significant Time of Measurement X Condi-
tion interaction, F(4, 54) = 2.43, p = .058, and no overall effect
for time of measurement, F < 1.
Breakdown of the interaction into time of measurement sim-
ple main effects and trend tests for each condition revealed, first,
that there were no overall postessay changes in GSR among sub-
jects in either the replication or dissonance/multi-item condi-
tions, Fs < 1. In the no-attitude-change opportunity group,
however, a significant effect of time of measurement was ob-
tained, F(2, 54) = 5.51, p < .01, characterized by a significant
decreasing linear trend component, jFU, 54) = 5.48, p < .05,
and a nonsignificant quadratic component, F < 1. Postdisso-
nance arousal then tended to decrease over time for subjects
whose postessay attitudes were not assessed.
Attitude-Arousal Correlations
The overall, across-conditions correlation between attitude
change and baseline to postessay changes in arousal was signifi-
cant, r = .34 (dj'= 28, p = .05). In the dissonance conditions
only (i.e., the replication and dissonance/multi-item groups),
the correlation between attitude change and arousal change was
nonsignificant, r = -.01. None of the within-cells correlations
were significant.
Discussion
Dissonance and Arousal
As in Experiment 1, subjects who performed counterattitudi-
nal behavior under high-choice conditions showed evidence of
heightened arousal following that behavior. This arousal oc-
curred in all three high-dissonance conditions and was accom-
panied by attitude change in the two conditions in which post-
behavior attitude was assessed. Thus, arousal appears to be a
reliable consequence of dissonance. Moreover, attitude change
only occurred on the issue that was the focus of counterattitudi-
nal behavior. Dissonance-produced arousal, then, does not sim-
ply energize cognitive changes of any sort.
Relevant to the evidence that both attitude change and
arousal are coresults of cognitive dissonance are the attitude
change-arousal correlations observed in Experiments 1 and 2.
Interestingly, across the high-dissonance conditions of both
experiments, only one of six within-cells and within-high-
dissonances conditions correlations was significant. This overall
absence of a relation may have both methodological and sub-
stantive roots. Methodologically, the correlations are based on
small sample sizes and apt to be unstable estimates of a relation.
In addition, any actual relation may be obscured by restriction
of range of both arousal and attitude changes within high levels.
Theoretically, arousal and attitude change may be genuinely un-
correlated among individuals experiencing dissonance. Physio-
logical responses to inconsistent behavior, as well as the amount
of attitude change prompted by a given level of arousal, proba-
bly vary widely from person to person, depending on individual
6
Though not nearly significant, the presence of an F value greater
than 1.00 creates a concern that small baseline differences between con-
ditions might "grow" into large differences on subsequent measurement
of galvanic skin response (GSR) in accord with the law of initial values.
Such a phenomenon does not seem to pose a rival explanation of the
experimental results of Experiment 2. Figure 3 depicts mean arousal in
the four conditions at each GSR measurement period. It can be seen
that baseline GSR is not agood predictor of GSR shift between baseline
and postessay measurement [r(3) between condition mean baseline val-
ues and condition mean shifts = - .09]. In addition, the correlation (« =
40) between individual mean baseline GSR and baseline-to-postessay
change was a modest .32 (p - .05).
 AROUSAL AND DISSONANCE
tolerances for dissonance and characteristic ways of handling
dissonance (cf. Zanna & Aziza, 1976).7
Dissonance Reduction and Arousal
As in Experiment 1, arousal did not decline once high-disso-
nance subjects indicated change on the postessay scale, even 4-
7 min following the attitude response. In fact, in one condition
(dissonance/multi-item), arousal increased following attitude
change. Arousal, however, did decrease for some high-disso-
nance subjects, specifically those who were not asked to indicate
their postessay attitude. These results cast some doubt on the
view that dissonance arousal reflects a tension state that moti-
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vates cognitive change in and of itself. But, clearly they do not
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rule out this thesis. First, although subjects showed no evidence
of "relief" after indicating attitude change on a scale, it is still
possible that the dissonance reduction accomplished by their
attitude change would eventually serve to quell their arousal.
Indeed, dissonance theorists typically construe dissonance re-
duction as a cognitive process that requires time (Festinger,
1964; Pallak & Pittman, 1972; see, also, McGuire, 1960). Sec-
ond, there is no reason to believe that those subjects not pro-
vided with an explicit attitude change opportunity—whose
postessay arousal did decrease—did not also resolve their in-
consistency. They may have changed their attitudes privately,
for example.
There are other possible accounts of the postattitude change
arousal pattern. Among those offered earlier, the notion of re-
sidual palmar activity seems rather untenable given the ex-
tended GSR recording period and the evidence of arousal de-
cline in one condition. It is possible, though, that our extended
recording period was still not long enough to observe a decline
in arousal in those conditions involving a postessay attitude
question. Any form of mental stimulation, including being
asked a question, may create a "spike" in electrodermal activity
which, in the present study, would add to existing dissonance
arousal. In turn, even if attitude change mitigated arousal, a
lengthier period might be required for the combined arousal to
dissipate than for dissonance-produced arousal alone (i.e., the
no-attitude-change opportunity condition) to be reduced.
We also suggested that arousal may be a built in response to
inconsistency, but one that functions to signal inconsistency
rather than drive its reduction. This information processing ac-
count is plausible if it is assumed that the postessay attitude
change opportunity brings the inconsistency back into focus,
creating a second arousal signal. Thus, arousal may have begun
to decline for all subjects once the signal was registered, but this
decline may have been interrupted for those given an attitude
The notion of the attitude change opportunity as a rearouser
or sustainer of arousal may also make sense within a dissonance
framework. As noted, when individuals are not confronted with
a request for attitude espousal in the immediate aftermath of
their attitude-discrepant behavior, dissonance- and arousal-re-
ducing cognitive activity may occur in a gradual fashion that
does not require the direct attention of the individual. Asking
people to state their attitudes just after their inconsistent act
may heighten conscious awareness of the inconsistency and,
thus, "rearouse" dissonance tension (rather than simply adding
63
an irrelevant GSR spike as discussed earlier). Moreover, after
resolving the inconsistency via attitude change, a new sense of
dissonance may be experienced—between original and postes-
say attitude espousal—to the extent that the original response
is recalled. This new dissonance may be readily resolved (e.g.,
"My essay convinced me to change") but be arousing nonethe-
less. Though not inconsistent with dissonance theory, the idea
that rearousal occurs when an explicit and public attitude
change opportunity is offered perhaps can be viewed as more
indicative of self-presentational concerns (Baumeister, 1982)
and concomitant anxiety (Schlenker, 1982) rather than a disso-
nance state of heightened salience. Newly cognizant of his or
her previous attitude-discrepant behavior, the individual may
now be confronted with the task of how to "account" for the
discrepancy in a way that presents the self in a positive light.
For the impression-conscious person, this task, like the essay
task itself, may prove anxiety provoking.
An alternative (but not incompatible with the heightened sa-
lience account) interpretation of the arousal results is that in
the natural course of dissonance, people typically use a rather
undramatic (and unarousing) method of dealing with their dis-
sonance, namely, forgetting. As several researchers (e.g., Har-
dyck & Kardush, 1968; Rosenberg, 1960; Zanna & Aziza,
1976) have suggested, dissonance may create tension, but, in a
Freudian-like fashion, people might deal with the inner conflict
by repressing the inconsistency, or, in a way that suggests recent
research on "mindlessness" (e.g., Langer & Imber, 1980), they
might do so by ceasing to think about it. Accordingly, our no-
attitude-change opportunity subjects may have achieved reduc-
tion in arousal because we allowed them to forget their disso-
nance. Indeed, we may have made it easy for them to forget by
providing a distraction in the form of a magazine to browse
through (cf. Zanna & Aziza, 1976). Our remaining high-disso-
nance subjects enjoyed no luxury of forgetting because we inter-
rupted the forgetting process with an attitude question, thereby
sustaining the conflict and its concomitant arousal. Perhaps the
dissonance-plagued person would prefer that you "don't re-
mind me."
Two observations enhance the plausibility of forgetting as a
common dissonance reduction strategy. First, research suggests
many people are unable to recall their previous attitudes follow-
ing counterattitudinal behavior (e.g., Bern & McConnell, 1970;
Ross & Schulman, 1973). Second, cognitive inconsistency is
surely something people deal with every day (cf. Aronson,
1969). Forgetting may be a more efficient, less time-consuming
strategy than cognitive reorganization, attitude shifts, and so
on, particularly because many attitude changes are reverber-
ating—changing one attitude may require other attitudes and
beliefs to change.
General Discussion and Conclusions
A major implication of the foregoing discussion is that disso-
nance may not be the forceful attitude-changing process it has
' The arousal-attitude changerelationmay be much like the message
comprehension-attitude change relation in persuasion. Variables that
influence comprehension also influence persuasion (Eagly, 1974), but
within-conditions comprehension-attitude change correlations are sel-
dom reliable (Greenwald, 1968).
 64 ROGER A. ELK1N AND MICHAEL R. LEIPPE
long been considered. Dissonance and dissonance reduction
certainly may be everyday phenomena, but the sharp and rapid
cognitive and behavioral changes attributed to dissonance re-
duction may occur mainly when, as in laboratory studies, indi-
viduals are questioned (by others or by themselves) about their
attitudes shortly following their attitude-discrepant behavior.
Otherwise, people may do less, less effortfully, to deal with in-
consistencies than we think. Perhaps future research should be-
gin studying more subtle effects of dissonance in situations that
approximate the more steady flow of everyday interplay be-
tween attitudes, behavior, and physiology.
The major issue addressed in these two studies is the motiva-
tional conceptualization of both arousal and attitude change in
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cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance theory argues that
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dissonance is unpleasantly arousing and that attitude change
reflects motivation to reduce the unpleasantness. We indeed
found that attitude-discrepant behavior under the illusion of
high choice reliably produces increases in arousal as indexed
by GSR, and that this arousal is followed reliably by attitude
change when people are asked to make an attitude judgment.
However, the presumed unpleasantness of the arousal cannot
be determined from GSR data because GSR does not reliably
indicate evaluative reactions (Lacey, 1959). Therefore, it is only
through the arousal's subsequent reduction that motivation can
be implied, and we found no evidence that explicit attitude
change reduced arousal. On the contrary, arousal only de-
creased in the absence of an attitude change opportunity.
Cognitive dissonance, then, may or may not be a motivational
state. Reminiscent of the dissonance versus self-perception de-
bate of more than a decade ago (see Greenwald, 1975) and in
line with the current intrapsychic-impression management
controversy (Tetlock & Manstead, 1985), our research leaves a
major question unanswered: Does dissonance arousal just sig-
nal inconsistency to the individual or, as dissonance theorists
would have it, is arousal a consequence of inconsistency that
fuels a drive to resolve it in some way? Though an answer to this
question would have theoretical value, an equally important is-
sue, as we have implied, may be how people typically deal with
cognitive inconsistency, driven or not.
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Received March 11, 1985
Revision received January 22, 1986