Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 371 – 386

Studying the reach of deterrence: Can deterrence theory help

explain police misconduct?
Greg Pogarskya,*, Alex R. Piquerob
a
School of Criminal Justice, University at Albany, 135 Western Avenue, Albany, NY 12203-1011, USA
b
Center for Studies in Criminology and Law, University of Florida, 201 Walker Hall, P.O. Box 115950,
Gainesville, FL 32611-5950, USA

Abstract

This article reports the first perceptual deterrence study of a sample of police officers. The study investigated
the influence of traditional deterrence considerations, extralegal sanctions, and impulsivity on the intention to
commit several hypothesized acts of police misconduct. The results were largely consistent with perceptual
deterrence findings from samples of college students, experienced offenders, and corporate managers. In
particular, this study found that both legal and extralegal sanction threats potentially deter police misconduct.
Further, it found that impulsivity diminished the deterrent influence of both sanction forms. The study also found
that some of the effects of the explanatory variables depended on whether officers had prior punishment
experience. The article discusses the implications of its findings for combating police misconduct and for
deterrence research generally.
D 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction Saltzman, Paternoster, Waldo, & Chiricos, 1982). This

Of all social control theories generally, and crimi-
nological theories in particular, perhaps none has re-
ceived as sustained an amount of research attention as
the deterrence framework. Under deterrence theory, an
increase in the certainty, severity, or celerity of poten-
tial punishment for a contemplated offense increases
its perceived costliness to the actor, and can thereby
discourage it (Andenaes, 1974; Beccaria, 1963; Gibbs,
1975; Tittle, 1980; Zimring & Hawkins, 1973).
Although early research on deterrence employed
macro-level data, more recent research employed
surveys that often query individuals directly about
hypothetical offending opportunities (cf. Nagin &
Paternoster, 1993, 1994; Piquero & Tibbetts, 1996;
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-518-591-8755; fax:
+1-518-442-5212.
E-mail address: pogarsky@albany.edu (G. Pogarsky).
method generated detailed information about the con-
textual and contingent nature of offending decisions,
consistent with calls for a more situationally-oriented
understanding of criminal events (cf. Cornish &
Clarke, 1986). That said, perceptual studies were
criticized for relying on ‘‘convenience samples’’ of
college students who, it was argued, did not necessar-
ily reflect the wider population of would-be offenders
(Jensen, Erickson, & Gibbs, 1978; Williams & Haw-
kins, 1986). In response, researchers began to investi-
gate non-college student populations (cf. Decker,
Wright, & Logie, 1993; Makkai & Braithwaite,
1994; Simpson & Piquero, 2002). These studies large-
ly corroborated perceptual findings that deterrence
considerations were important to crime decision-mak-
ing, at least for some offenses and some individuals.
Moreover, research recently expanded the scope
of deterrence theory in at least two respects. First,
research established that the deterrent potential of
informal (extralegal) sanctions threats, such as guilt,

0047-2352/$ – see front matter D 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2004.04.007
372 G. Pogarsky, A.R. Piquero / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 371–386
shame, and embarrassment, often exceeds that of
formal (legal) sanction threats (Grasmick & Bursik,
1990; Williams & Hawkins, 1986). Second, research
found that personal characteristics affected the deter-
rence process in a variety of ways. For example,
individuals who were impulsive or who lacked self-
control were disproportionately crime prone, in part,
because they were less influenced by sanction threats
(Nagin & Paternoster, 1994; Nagin & Pogarsky,
2001; Piquero & Tibbetts, 1996).
This study examined the reach and/or scope of
this refined version of deterrence theory. In so doing,
the article applies the deterrence framework to police
misconduct, a topic not heretofore subject to percep-
tual deterrence work. Certainly, scholars investigated
police misconduct (cf. Greene, Hickman, & Piquero,
2004; Lundman, 1980; Sherman, 1974; Walker,
2001), but this area of research was slow to develop
and apply formal theories of police deviance (Hick-
man, Piquero, Lawton, & Greene, 2001; Kappeler,
Sluder, & Alpert, 1994; Sherman, 1992). Conse-
quently, empirical research on police misconduct
remains underdeveloped relative to other criminolog-
ical research.
This study administered a survey about police
misconduct to several hundred police officers from
a mid-sized southwestern United States police de-
partment. The study examined the extent to which
formal and informal sanction threats influenced offi-
cers’ decisions to commit misconduct, and whether
these processes were conditional on the impulsivity
and prior punishment experience of respondents.
Explaining police misconduct
Police work entails a range of decisions that affect
the daily lives of ordinary citizens. For example,
police officers stop, frisk, and arrest individuals,
assess the strength of evidence, prioritize investiga-
tions and patrols, staff squads and stations, and decide
which areas to patrol (Davis, 1975; Macintyre &
Prenzler, 1999; Walker, 1992). In sum, ‘‘policing
requires officers to exercise authority over others
and to engage in a variety of activities that require
confidentiality and trust; the most fundamental re-
quirement for a police agency’s aspirations to deliver
high quality service is the integrity of its own
personnel’’ (Fyfe, Klinger, & Flavin, 1997, p. 449).
Since officers exercise this broad discretion under
little direct supervision, police work is particularly
vulnerable to undue external influences and personal
biases (Chan, 1997).
Several recent studies on police misconduct were
particularly relevant for the present study (see Walk-
er, Alpert, & Kenney, 2001 for an overview). In a
recent large-scale, cross-national study, Klockars,
Ivkovich, Harver, and Haberfield (1997) undertook
an organizational/occupational culture approach to
the study of police integrity. Relying on scenario
methodology, they examined officer estimations of
the seriousness of behaviors, level of discipline
warranted, and willingness to report the misconduct
of fellow officers. The study found that the serious-
ness of the transgression was strongly related to the
willingness to report (as well as the level of disci-
pline). Moreover, the data were used to characterize
agencies’ occupational culture for integrity relative to
other national and international agencies.
In a recent study of police ethics and discretion,
Macintyre and Prenzler (1999) explored whether
officers who received gratuities were less apt to
prosecute their benefactors. The authors gave a sam-
ple of officers from Queensland, Australia a ‘hospi-
tality scenario’ in which an officer had to determine
whether to give a traffic citation to a café proprietor
who had previously given the officer free food and
drinks. Several findings emerged from this study.
First, 57 percent of officers identified with not writing
a ticket. Of the 43 percent who agreed with writing a
ticket, almost 37 percent indicated they would con-
tinue to accept the free food, 44 percent stated they
would begin paying for their meals at the café, and 17
percent would stop going to the café. In sum, Mac-
intyre and Prenzler (1999) found that gratuities in-
deed influenced law enforcement.
Hickman, Piquero, and Greene (2004) built on the
work of Klockars et al. (1997) in a study that both
supported the scenario approach to the measurement
of police integrity and contributed to a multi-level
theory of police integrity. These authors found results
similar to those obtained by Klockars et al., and only
a few response differences across gender and race of
officer. For example, ANOVA models indicated a
statistically significant amount of Level-2 (district-
level) variance in the likelihood of reporting a fellow
officer for most of the scenarios. The greatest pro-
portion of Level-2 variance to be explained was
found for a physical abuse scenario. Focusing in on
this scenario in subsequent analyses, the authors
found that, in addition to the seriousness of the
behavior at both the individual- and district-levels,
the proportion of male officers in a police district was
negatively related to the likelihood of reporting
fellow officers who engaged in physical abuse.
The aforementioned studies invited inquiry about
possible policy responses from police departments.
One of the goals of departmental oversight is, of
course, to deter potential police misconduct (Walker,
2001). Perhaps the most increasingly used tool for
quelling misconduct is the early-intervention (EI) or
early-warning system (EWS). These approaches are
 G. Pogarsky, A.R. Piquero / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 371–386
designed to provide interventions, such as counseling
or supplemental training, for officers frequently the
subject of complaints (Walker et al., 2001). These
systems are generally part of a larger effort to
increase accountability in a department, and to com-
municate to officers that repeated misconduct will not
be tolerated (Walker, 2001). A recent survey of police
managers who were members of the Police Executive
Research Forum (PERF) suggested the EI and EW
systems had a positive impact on officer performance,
strengthened supervision, received little opposition
from rank and file or from police unions, and did not
negatively affect officer morale (Walker et al., 2001).
Although policing studies have long investigated
officer decision-making (cf. Goldstein, 1977; Muir,
1977; Sherman, 1974; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; West-
ley, 1970; Wilson, 1968), there was little theoretical
work on police deviance (Sherman, 1992). Two
recent exceptions involved ‘‘techniques of neutrali-
zation’’ (Hunt & Manning, 1983) and ‘‘control bal-
ance theory’’ (Hickman et al., 2001). Under the
former approach, officers used commonly accepted
rationalizations for misbehavior found in the general
culture to justify and/or excuse police misconduct.
Under the latter approach, developed by Tittle (1995),
individuals possessing either control deficits (i.e.,
they were subject to more control than they exer-
cised) or control surpluses (i.e., they enjoyed more
control than they were subject to) were likely to
commit deviant acts. In testing the applicability of
control balance theory to police deviance with a
sample of police officers in Philadelphia, Hickman
et al. (2001) found that officers who were experienc-
ing control deficits were more likely to report fellow
officers for misconduct. In general, however, there
were relatively few efforts that systematically applied
formal criminological models to the study of police
misconduct.
Enter deterrence
The research above provided the point of depar-
ture from which this study extended the application of
extant criminological theory to police misconduct. In
particular, this study had several objectives. First,
applying extant theory to police behavior will further
inform the debate about whether a unified theoretical
framework can explain the range of criminal and
socially sanctioned behaviors, or whether different
types of transgressions require separate theories (Cor-
nish & Clarke, 1986). Second, applying deterrence
theory to police misconduct will provide evidence for
an important, unstudied link in the deterrence pro-
cess. Law enforcement personnel are the primary
means through which society implements deterrence
373
(and many other) policies upon its citizens. This said,
research has not directly investigated whether the
decision processes of police officers regarding sanc-
tion threats resemble those of the individuals police
officers are charged to enforce the law against.
Third, the advent of perceptual deterrence re-
search produced important insights into the individ-
ual-level decision processes underlying crime. That
said, perceptual deterrence studies were criticized for
their heavy reliance on college students who, it was
argued, might not accurately reflect ‘‘real-world’’
offending. In response, perceptual work began to
study non-college student populations, such as
‘‘high-risk’’ youths (cf. Foglia, 1997), experienced
offenders (Block & Gerety, 1995; Decker et al., 1993;
Piquero & Rengert, 1999), and corporate executives
(Hagan, Nagel, & Albonetti, 1980; Makkai &
Braithwaite, 1994; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996;
Simpson & Koper, 1992). The present study expand-
ed the types of populations subject to perceptual
deterrence work by adding a sample of police officers
to the samples catalogued above.
Lastly, the current study was designed to provide
further insight into the etiology of police misconduct.
Transgressions by law enforcement, particularly high-
ly publicized ones, have potentially widespread
impacts by eroding public confidence in the criminal
justice system and thereby disrupting social order. A
more thorough understanding of the decision process-
es surrounding police misconduct would help devel-
op sensible approaches toward reducing it. For these
reasons, this article examines the extent to which the
deterrence framework applies to police misconduct.
The article outlines that framework next.
Under deterrence theory generally, and the
rational choice framework in particular, an individual
is expected to commit a crime if the benefits from
offending outweigh the potential costs (Andenaes,
1974; Cornish & Clarke, 1986). An increase in the
certainty, severity, or celerity of potential punishment
for an offense can increase its perceived costliness
and discourage individuals from committing it
(Gibbs, 1975; Zimring & Hawkins, 1973).
Research on deterrence generally found that
threats of criminal sanctions dettered crime (Blum-
stein, Cohen, & Nagin, 1978; Cook, 1980; Nagin,
1998; Sherman, 1992). This became particularly
evident when deterrence work exited the confines
of its initial macro-level orientation and sought per-
ceptual data that more directly reflected the individ-
ual-level processes underlying decisions to commit or
refrain from crime. As this trend progressed, support
for deterrence became stronger.1
Two recent developments in deterrence research
are particularly noteworthy. First, such research found
that, beyond criminal penalties, extralegal sanctions,
374 G. Pogarsky, A.R. Piquero / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 371–386
such as shame, embarrassment, and moral inhibition,
also provide powerful sources of conformance. Sec-
ond, recent deterrence work relaxed the strict demar-
cation between situational and individual difference
theories of crime and integrated the influence of
individual traits into the deterrence framework. One
of the most oft-studied of these personal traits, both in
the deterrence literature and throughout crime schol-
arship, was impulsivity. The article next addresses
these two refinements to deterrence theory in greater
detail.
Extralegal sanctions
Clearly, deterrence requires the threat of a sanc-
tion. Yet, as Meier and Johnson (1977, p. 294; see
also Williams & Hawkins, 1986) observed, ‘‘the
anticipation of legal sanctions, obviously, is not the
only possible influence on behavior. . .the task for the
student of deterrence is to explain the relationship
between behavior, on the one hand, and both legal
and extralegal sanctions on the other.’’ There are at
least two distinct types of extralegal sanctions: em-
barrassment and shame. Embarrassment, or ‘‘social
disapproval,’’ involves the condemnation of peers or
others whose opinions the actor values. Shame or
‘‘self-disapproval,’’ encompasses ‘‘the belief in the
legitimacy of the law, moral commitment to a legal
norm, internalization of norms, and conscience’’
(Grasmick, Blackwell, & Bursik, 1993, p. 684).
Extralegal sanctions were found to deter crime at
least as strongly as threatened (formal) criminal
penalties (Bachman, Paternoster, & Ward, 1992;
Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001).
Research on extralegal sanctions yielded several
additional findings. First, among extralegal sanctions,
the effect of self-disapproval appears strongest (Gras-
mick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Kinsey,
1991; Makkai & Braithwaite, 1994). Braithwaite
(1989, p. 115) suggests why: ‘‘it (self disapproval)
can begin to influence the actor as soon as an act is
contemplated and before it is committed, whereas
social disapproval and formal punishment can only
be mobilized after the event and only in circum-
stances where others acquire evidence of who com-
mitted the act.’’
Second, beyond their direct impact on offending,
extralegal sanctions also appear to moderate the
influence of legal sanction threats (Andenaes, 1974;
Burkett & Ward, 1993; Etzioni, 1988; Makkai &
Braithwaite, 1994; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996).
Other extralegal sources of conformance may also
obviate the necessity for legal deterrence, especially
in the case of moral proscriptions against illegal acts.
On this point, Paternoster and Simpson (1996, p. 574)
observe: ‘‘strongly held moral beliefs that proscribe a
given action may so effectively inhibit conduct that
considerations of cost and benefit are not even
brought into play.’’
Impulsivity
Criminology has traditionally segregated individ-
ual difference and situational theories of crime
(Nagin & Paternoster, 1993). Recently, scholars
relaxed this strict dichotomy by integrating the role
of at least several personal traits into deterrence
theory (cf. Finley & Grasmick, 1985; Loewenstein,
Nagin, & Paternoster, 1997; Nagin & Paternoster,
1994; Piquero & Tibbetts, 1996; Wright, Caspi,
Moffitt, & Silva, 1999). Of these traits, few appear
more closely linked to criminal and imprudent
behavior than impulsivity (cf. Farrington, 1992;
Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Nagin & Pogarsky,
2001; Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985). These efforts
yielded several findings.
First, there is typically a strong positive associa-
tion between impulsivity and either crime or impru-
dent behavior (Arneklev, Grasmick, Tittle, & Bursik,
1993; Babinski, Hartsough, & Lambert, 1999; Mof-
fitt, 1993). Impulsivity describes a ‘‘here and now’’
orientation, with the commensurate tendency to de-
value or discount delayed consequences. As Wilson
and Herrnstein (1985, pp. 44 – 45) observed: ‘‘the
extent to which people take into account distant
possibilities. . ..will affect whether they choose crime
or noncrime.’’ Under this view, the trait predisposes
one to fulfill immediate urges, and eschew future
consequences. This makes impulsive individuals
more prone to crime.
Second then, aside from its direct relationship
with offending, impulsivity also appears to dilute
the influence of legal sanction threats. Since impul-
sive individuals tend to discount the future, the
prospect of a delayed penalty is simply less compel-
ling for the impulsive person (Zimring & Hawkins,
1973). On this score, several recent studies reported
that impulsivity diminished the deterrent efficacy of
legal sanction threats (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001;
Piquero & Tibbetts, 1996).
Current focus
Based on the foregoing theoretical discussion, this
study examined several research questions. On a
general level, the study investigated whether police
officers were influenced by deterrence considerations.
On the one hand, as a general theory of law, social
control, and crime, deterrence theory does not distin-
guish between crime types or categories of offenders.
Instead, the theory applies straightforward principles
 G. Pogarsky, A.R. Piquero / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 371–386
of human motivation to the study of all socially
sanctioned behaviors. On the other hand, police work
is unique. Officers continuously find themselves in
isolated and unsupervised situations that lend them-
selves to potential deviance (Alpert, Kenney, &
Dunham, 1997; Kappeler et al., 1994). Therefore,
the study tested whether the primary tenets of deter-
rence theory, that offending should relate inversely to
the certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment,
applied to police transgression.
Moreover, the study addressed several additional
research questions. First, beyond the deterrent effects
of legal sanctions, it examined the extent to which
extralegal influences deterred police misconduct. Sec-
ond, it tested whether and to what extent impulsivity
conditioned the effect of legal and extralegal sanctions
on police misconduct. Third, work on deterrence had
long considered prior offending experience an impor-
tant aspect of the deterrence process (Bridges &
Stone, 1986; Nagin & Paternoster, 1991; Stafford &
Warr, 1993; Zimring & Hawkins, 1973). Along these
lines, this article examines whether and how involve-
ment in prior misconduct conditions the manner in
which sanction threats deter future misconduct.
Data and methods
Sample
The study was conducted with a sample of police
officers from a mid-sized southwestern United States
police department. Access to the subject population
was strictly conditional on officer participation being
both voluntary and anonymous. Blank surveys were
given to the captain, who in turn distributed them to
several shift sergeants. Before the next shift, each
sergeant announced the opportunity to participate in
the study. Thereafter, a stack of blank surveys was
left on a table next to a receptacle in which completed
surveys could be returned.
Of the approximately 500 officers in either a
supervisory capacity or that were assigned to respond
to calls for service, completed surveys were obtained
from 210 officers. Of these, five had attained the rank
of captain, commander, or chief; fifteen were ser-
geants; and the rest were line officers. The sample of
officers corresponded closely with the department as
a whole on two dimensions. First, the sample was 78
percent male, compared to 85 percent of the 500 or so
officers eligible for inclusion in the study. Second, the
average length of service of sample respondents was
seven years, compared to an average of 6.2 years for
the reference group from which the sample was
drawn. All told, the sample appeared reasonably
representative of the population of officers from this
375
particular department who were eligible for inclusion
in the study.
Survey
The survey presented two hypothetical scenarios
involving acts of police misconduct. The scenarios
were similar to those used in recent studies of police
integrity and deviance (cf. Greene et al., 2004;
Klockars et al., 1997; Macintyre & Prenzler, 1999),
which were pre-tested, revised, and implemented
with numerous samples both nationally and interna-
tionally, and were reported by the majority of officers
taking the survey as both ‘‘believable’’ and typical of
the types of situations officers find themselves in.
The scenarios were intended to present situations
with which respondents would have reasonable ex-
periential familiarity to provide meaningful survey
responses. In the first scenario, the subject was asked
to assume they had made a motor vehicle stop of a
clearly intoxicated driver, who turned out to be an
off-duty police officer. The question was whether the
subject would pursue a clearly warranted drinking
and driving investigation. The second scenario asked
subjects about a new neighbor who ‘‘seemed suspi-
cious’’ but had committed no apparent crimes. The
issue was whether the officer would perform an
unauthorized background check on the new neighbor.
Appendix A contains the complete scenarios.2
Certainty of punishment
After reading each scenario, respondents reported,
on a scale from 0 to 100, the likelihood they would be
caught and punished if they committed the hypothe-
sized misconduct.
Severity and celerity of punishment
The survey manipulated each of the severity and
celerity of the sanction threat randomly over two
levels. For severity, some officers were asked to
assume the potential punishment was a reprimand,
while others were informed that the punishment
would be a five-day suspension without pay. This
variable was dummy-coded so that respondents in the
latter group received a ‘‘1.’’ For celerity, some sub-
jects were informed the potential sanction would
begin immediately, while others were informed there
would be a three-month delay. This variable was
dummy-coded so that ‘‘1’’ corresponded to the im-
mediate punishment.
Likelihood of offending
Next, subjects estimated on a scale from 0 to 100
the likelihood they would commit the hypothesized
376 G. Pogarsky, A.R. Piquero / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 371–386
misconduct. This measure provided the dependent
variable for later analyses.
Extralegal sanctions
To measure the influence of self-disapproval or
shame, subjects indicated the extent to which they
would feel guilty if they committed each hypothetical
act of misconduct. Subjects answered on a five-point
Likert scale, on which responses ranged from ‘‘not at
all’’ to ‘‘overwhelming.’’
The survey also measured the influence of two
forms of social disapproval or embarrassment. First,
for each scenario, subjects reported ‘‘how big a
problem’’ it would create for them if other officers
found out they had committed the hypothesized
misconduct. Second, and for each scenario, subjects
reported how big a problem it would create for them
if ‘‘non-officers whose opinions they valued’’ found
out they had committed the hypothesized misconduct.
Each measure employed a five-point Likert scale
ranging from ‘‘none at all’’ to ‘‘an overwhelming
problem.’’
Since in each scenario the three extralegal sanc-
tion variables were highly inter-correlated,3 a com-
posite extralegal sanction index was created for each
scenario. Thus, for each scenario, the three extralegal
sanction measures were summed to create an index,
varying from 3 to 15, for which higher scores
indicated greater overall influence from extralegal
sanctions.
Impulsivity
Impulsivity was measured with a four-question
subscale from the Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik, and
Arneklev (1993) twenty-four-item self-control scale.
Each officer provided a four-point Likert assessment
of their level of agreement with the following state-
ments: ‘‘I often act on the spur of the moment
without stopping to think,’’ ‘‘I don’t devote much
thought and effort to preparing for the future,’’ ‘‘I
often do whatever brings me pleasure here and now,
even at the cost of some distant goal,’’ and ‘‘I’m
more concerned with what happens to me in the
short run than in the long run.’’ After appropriate
reverse coding corrections, the four responses were
summed to create an impulsivity index varying from
4 to 16, for which higher scores connoted greater
impulsivity. To address the negative skew of this
variable (i.e., 75 percent of the officers scored very
low on the impulsivity measure), this variable was
dummy coded so that subjects in the upper twenty-
fifth percentile of the distribution of impulsivity
scores received a ‘‘1’’ (see Farrington & Loeber,
2000).
Other control variables
Respondents supplied several additional control
measures. First, they indicated whether they were
male or female. Second, they indicated the number
of years they had served on the police force.
Finally, respondents indicated whether or not they
had ever been subject to departmental disciplinary
action (no/yes).
Results
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics and zero-
order correlations for all study variables. Most of the
theoretical relationships postulated in the earlier dis-
cussion were supported by the bivariate correlation
coefficients in Table 1. In both scenarios, all three
deterrence variables, measuring the perceived certain-
ty, severity, and celerity of punishment, related neg-
atively to the offending intention. Moreover, in both
scenarios, the magnitude of the negative association
between offending intention and perceived sanction
certainty far surpassed that between offending inten-
tion and either the severity or celerity of punishment.
This finding was consistent with extant work finding
that, of the three primary aspects of sanction threats
identified by deterrence theory, the deterrent effect of
certainty was largest (cf. Horney & Marshall, 1992;
Nagin, 1998).
The correlations between each extralegal sanction
variable and offending were negative and substantial
(all were less than .29). Moreover, the magnitude
of the negative correlation between all extralegal
sanction variables and offending exceeded that for
all but one of the correlation coefficients for the
deterrence variables (in the background check sce-
nario, r = .34 between the offending intention and
perceived certainty). This comported with research
finding that the deterrent potential of extralegal
sanctions exceeded that of legal sanctions (cf. Gras-
mick & Bursik, 1990; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996).
The length of police service correlated positively
and fairly substantially with the offending intention
(r = .21, .17 for the vehicle stop and background
check scenarios, respectively). Such tenure also
related inversely to the estimated sanction risk and
the influence of self and social disapproval. One
interpretation of this finding is that veteran police
officers may be more jaded than their younger
counterparts, and thereby less fearful of the con-
sequences from minor transgressions. Another inter-
pretation is that longer tenure increases the
possibility that an individual has ‘‘avoided’’ punish-
ment for minor transgressions, thus diluting their
receptiveness to sanction threats.
 G. Pogarsky, A.R. Piquero / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 371–386 377

Table 1
Descriptive measures and bivariate correlations for study variables
Scenario A (vehicle stop)
Variable M SD V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12
V1:OL 37.5 29.8 1.0
V2:Certainty 44.8 25.7 .22 1.0
V3:Severity .40 .49 .08 .14 1.0
V4:Celerity .32 .47 .13 .10 .21 1.0
V5:Male .79 .41 .17 .11 .02 .04 1.0
V6:Years 7.2 6.76 .21 .17 .04 .02 .17 1.0
V7:Guilt 2.1 1.3 .40 .40 .11 .03 .17 .32 1.0
V8:Embarrass (officers) 2.0 1.2 .30 .38 .13 .01 .11 .27 .64 1.0
V9:Embarrass (public) 2.2 1.2 .33 .32 .11 .02 .12 .25 .64 .78 1.0
V10:Exlegal 6.3 3.3 .39 .41 .13 .01 .15 .32 .86 .90 .90 1.0
V11:Impulsive .26 .44 .16 .09 .02 .01 .07 .08 .08 .02 .07 .05 1.0
V12:Action .45 .50 .18 .11 .02 .10 .13 .38 .25 .26 .30 .30 .23 1.0

Scenario B (background check)

Variable M SD V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12
V1:OL 14.5 19.6 1.0
V2:Certainty 50.3 15.7 .34 1.0
V3:Severity .40 .49 .05 .03 1.0
V4:Celerity .31 .47 .09 .10 .21 1.0
V5:Male .79 .41 .12 .03 .01 .02 1.0
V6:Years 7.2 6.8 .15 .17 .05 .02 .19 1.0
V7:Guilt 2.5 1.5 .45 .47 .04 .06 .16 .22 1.0
V8:Embarrass (officers) 2.2 1.2 .39 .52 .09 .08 .02 .15 .72 1.0
V9:Embarrass (public) 2.3 1.2 .32 .45 .07 .04 .05 .16 .65 .81 1.0
V10:Exlegal 7.0 3.5 .43 .53 .07 .07 .09 .20 .89 .93 .90 1.0
V11:Impulsive .26 .44 .16 .01 .02 .01 .01 .08 .11 .05 .07 .09 1.0
V12:Action .45 .50 .13 .06 .01 .10 .13 .39 .16 .09 .14 .15 .25 1.0

Consistent with prior research on gender differ-
ences, male officers were more likely to commit
misconduct than female officers. In particular, the
bivariate correlations between being male and offend-
ing were .18 and .12 in Scenarios A (vehicle stop)
and B (background check), respectively. Finally,
pursuant to the earlier discussion, impulsivity corre-
lated positively with the offending intention (r = .16
in both scenarios). This finding corresponded with a
long line of research establishing a linkage between
impulsivity and offending (cf. Dolan, Anderson, &
Deakin, 2001; Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Nagin &
Pogarsky, 2001, 2003; Prentky & Knight, 1986).
Table 2 presents four Tobit regressions in which
the dependent variable is the respondent’s estimated
offending intention. The table contains two regres-
sions for each scenario. Models 1A (vehicle stop)
and 1B (background check) regress the offending
intention against the certainty, severity, and celerity
of punishment, and three personal control variables,
age, gender, and years of service. Consistent with a
preponderance of empirical work on deterrence, the
deterrent impact of punishment certainty far sur-
passed that of punishment severity (cf. Blumstein et
al., 1978; Cook, 1980; Nagin, 1998; Paternoster,
1987; Williams & Hawkins, 1986). Indeed, the
severity coefficient was statistically indistinguish-
able from 0 for each scenario. The magnitude of
the certainty effect was nearly identical across
Models 1A and 1B.4 For both scenarios, an in-
crease in perceived punishment certainty of ten
percentage points translated to an approximate
two-percentage point reduction in the intention to
commit misconduct.
The results regarding punishment celerity were
mixed. For the vehicle stop scenario, sanction celerity
exerted a statistically significant, inverse, and sub-
stantial effect on the behavioral intention. For the
background check scenario, the coefficient was neg-
ative, as predicted by deterrence theory, but not
statistically distinguishable from zero. This pattern
was obtained throughout the empirical analysis. That
is, only a subset of the statistically significant pre-
dictors in the vehicle stop scenario were also signif-
icant in the background check scenario. Yet when the
results across models conflicted in this regard, the
background check coefficient virtually always had
the same sign as its counterpart in the vehicle stop
378 G. Pogarsky, A.R. Piquero / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 371–386
Table 2
Tobit regressions of offending likelihood against study variables
Scenario A: vehicle stop
Model 1A
Certainty .27** (.09)
Severity 1.50 (4.86)
Celerity 11.31* (5.11)
Male 14.25* (5.90)
Years .46 (.38)
Action 10.06* (5.07)
Extra legal sanctions
Impulsive
Log likelihood 892.15
Pr(y > 0) .79
N 213
Notes: 1 – Constant included in both models; standard errors in parentheses.
2 – * denotes p < .05 and ** denotes p < .01 for H0: b = 0.
model, but was just smaller. This pattern appeared at
least partly attributable to the fact that the vehicle
stop scenario produced far greater variation in the
offending intention than did the background check
scenario. Fully 51 percent of respondents indicated
they would ‘‘never’’ commit the misconduct hypoth-
esized in the background check scenario, compared to
only 21 percent for the vehicle stop scenario.
Table 2 further provides findings largely in
accord with extant deterrence research. The coeffi-
cient for gender (male = 1) was positive across
scenarios, though only statistically significantly so
in the vehicle stop scenario. Further, having been
subject to disciplinary action related positively to the
intention to commit future misconduct. This corre-
sponded with prior work finding a strong association
between past and future offending (Nagin & Pater-
noster, 1991). There are several possible explana-
tions for this association. Past offending may be a
marker for a personal disposition that inclines one
toward misconduct. Alternatively, past instances of
offending may contribute to a stock of ‘‘punishment
avoidance’’ experiences, which serve to diminish
sanction risk perceptions and embolden future
offending (Piquero & Pogarsky, 2002; Stafford &
Warr, 1993).
Models 2A (vehicle stop) and 2B (background
check) added the extralegal sanction and impulsivity
indices. There were several noteworthy aspects of the
comparison between these and the initial model
specifications. First and foremost, both additional
variables predicted misconduct in accordance with
extant research. More impulsive officers indicated a
greater intention to offend.5 In Model 2A, for
example, the coefficient + 10.36 suggested that
officers in the upper twenty-fifth percentile of the
distribution of impulsivity scores were approximate-
ly (10.36)*(.79) = 8.2 percentage points more likely
Scenario B: background check
Model 2A Model 1B Model 2B
.09 (.10) .43** (.10) .21 (.11)
.82 (4.75) .33 (5.14) 3.96 (4.95)
11.30* (4.98) 4.21 (5.47) 3.99 (5.16)
12.93* (5.84) 4.11 (6.17) 1.49 (6.00)
.22 (.38) .22 (.41) .21 (.39)
.78 (5.36) 8.76 (5.50) 2.05 (5.49)
3.80** (.83) 4.17** (.88)
10.36* (5.25) 9.26 (5.35)
852.07 585.67 565.63
.79 .49 .49
213 213 213
to commit the vehicle stop misconduct. This finding
comported with a long line of research from crime
scholars on impulsivity and on the related constructs
of low self-control and future discounting (cf. Arne-
klev et al., 1993; Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Nagin
& Pogarsky, 2001; Piquero & Tibbetts, 1996; Wilson
& Herrnstein, 1985). That work suggested at least
two possible bases for the correspondence between
impulsivity and offending, both involving the manner
in which individuals were influenced by threatened
future punishments. Under one view, which was most
akin to the rational choice conception of discounting
future consequences, impulsive individuals greatly
discounted the future and were, therefore, least in-
fluenced by potential future punishments. An alter-
native ground for the relationship between
impulsivity and offending emerged from research
establishing that individuals with a low capacity for
executive cognitive functioning were prone to crime
and aggression (Seguin, Boulerice, Harden, Tremblay,
& Pihl, 1999). Under this view, rather than conscious-
ly ‘‘devalue’’ potential future consequences, such
individuals have limited cognitive capacity to even
become fully aware of and process the potential
adverse consequences from their behavior, particular-
ly when they are under the influence of urges and
emotions. Finally, also in accord with extant work, the
strength of extralegal influences correlated negatively
and substantially with offending.
The addition of variables in Models 2A and 2B
also produced several changes in the original Model 1
coefficients. In both scenarios, expanding the model
substantially reduced the coefficient for prior disci-
plinary action. For the vehicle stop scenario, the
reduction was effectively to zero. This result
appeared attributable to the fact that previously
disciplined officers were more impulsive and less
influenced by extralegal sanctions than were their
 G. Pogarsky, A.R. Piquero / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 371–386
undisciplined counterparts. In particular, in the vehicle
stop scenario, the correlations between prior disciplin-
ary action and both high impulsivity and extralegal
influences were substantial (r =.23, and .30, respec-
tively). In Model 1, therefore, it appeared that having
been disciplined was at least partly a proxy for the
effect of impulsivity and extralegal influences on
misconduct decisions.
Expanding the specification also reduced the
certainty effect. This was particularly true for the
vehicle stop scenario, in which the reduction was
virtually to zero. In subsidiary analyses in which the
extralegal sanction and impulsivity variables were
added to Model 1 separately, the extralegal sanction
variable accounted for most of the reduction in the
magnitude of the certainty coefficient. This coin-
cides with Table 1, in which the bivariate correlation
between sanction certainty and the extralegal sanc-
tion variable is far stronger than that between
certainty and impulsivity.
The analysis next tested for possible interactions
among explanatory variables. Based on the previous
discussion, tests were conducted for interactions
between impulsivity and four other explanatory var-
iables—certainty, severity, celerity, and the influence
of extralegal sanctions. Both components of each
interaction were mean-centered to reduce the impact
of multicollinearity between the component variables
and their product terms (Jaccard, Turrisi, & Wan,
1990). Each interaction was tested individually.
Table 3 reports four interaction specifications for
the vehicle stop scenario.6 These results reinforce the
proposition that impulsivity diminishes the deterrent
efficacy of sanction threats (cf. Nagin & Pogarsky,
2001; Piquero & Tibbetts, 1996). The first column in
Table 3
Interaction tests – Tobit regressions: dependent variable is offending likelihood (standard errors in parentheses)
Scenario A: vehicle stop
Certainty .05 (.09)
Severity 1.60 (4.71)
Celerity 12.21** (4.93)
Male 12.39* (5.78)
Years .34 (.37)
Action .95 (5.28)
Extra legal sanctions 3.97** (.83)
Impulsive 12.42* (5.24)
Interaction: impulsive*certainty .59** (.22)
Interaction: impulsive*severity
Interaction: impulsive*celerity
Interaction: impulsive*extralegal sanctions
Log likelihood 848.50
Notes: 1 – In each model, both components of the interaction term are mean-centered.
2 – Constant included in both models; Standard errors in parentheses.
3 – * denotes p < .05 and ** denotes p < .01 for H0: b = 0.
4 – Pr(y > 0) = .79 and N = 210 for each model.
379
Table 3 reports a positive and statistically significant
interaction between impulsivity and certainty. This
suggests that impulsivity counteracted the negative
(deterring) relationship between certainty and offend-
ing. Column 3 reports a similar finding, although the
interaction coefficient was not quite statistically dis-
tinguishable from zero. Still, its positive sign has a
similar interpretation as that for the interaction be-
tween impulsivity and certainty. That is, the celerity
effect (bcelerity = 11.46) was effectively eliminated
for impulsive individuals.
The fourth column in Table 3 reports a novel
finding that demonstrates the full reach of the capac-
ity of impulsivity to interfere with deterrence. The
first three columns replicated a result that was previ-
ously reported for non-officer samples—that impul-
sivity diminished the deterrent efficacy of legal
sanction threats. Yet research had not previously
tested, as the present study did, whether impulsivity
also diminished the deterrent efficacy of extralegal
sanction threats. On this score, the analysis found an
interaction result that was conceptually analogous to
the previous two. Column 4 reports a positive and
statistically significant interaction between impul-
sivity and extralegal influences that was about as
large as the deterrent effect of extralegal sanctions
(bimpulsivity*extralegal = 3.88; bextralegal = 3.65). This
suggested that for highly impulsive officers, the
deterring influence of extralegal sources of confor-
mance was eliminated. (Note also that the additive
effect of impulsivity was both positive and statisti-
cally significant in all models in Table 3).
The analysis finally examined how prior depart-
mental discipline affected the deterrence of police
misconduct. Scholars have long believed prior expe-
.09 (1.0) .09 (1.0) .11 (1.0)
.81 (4.75) 1.26 (4.74) 1.03 (4.69)
11.37* (5.00) 11.46* (5.00) 12.24* (4.94)
12.92* (5.84) 12.92* (5.82) 12.44* (5.78)
.22 (.38) .25 (.37) .33 (.37)
.78 (5.36) .08 (5.37) .71 (5.29)
3.80** (.83) 3.91** (.83) 3.65** (.83)
10.35* (5.26) 10.60* (5.24) 10.60* (5.24)
.74 (10.25)
15.47 (10.95)
3.88* (1.59)
852.06 851.10 849.11
380 G. Pogarsky, A.R. Piquero / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 371–386

rience with punishment plays an important role in the
deterrence process (cf. Bridges & Stone, 1986; Staf-
ford & Warr, 1993; Zimring & Hawkins, 1973). In
particular, extant research shows that prior (punish-
ment-oriented) experiences tend to erode the deter-
rence process (Paternoster & Piquero, 1995; Piquero
& Paternoster, 1998; Piquero & Pogarsky, 2002).
Pogarsky and Piquero (2003) articulated two possible
explanations for this finding. First, punished individ-
uals may thereafter believe they are less apt to face
punishment again. Second, individuals who experi-
ence punishment may determine that the sanction
experience is not as ‘‘aversive’’ as originally antici-
pated. Table 4 examines the effects of prior punish-
ment in the current context by estimating the Tobit
specifications from Table 2 for two groups: officers
who had previously received departmental discipline
versus officers who had not.7
Several findings emerge from Table 4. The first
involves the propensity for prior punishment experi-
ence to condition the influence of traditional deter-
rence concerns. Generally, the effects of the three
deterrence variables were larger among officers with-
out prior punishment experience.8 In Model 1A, there
were significant certainty and celerity effects among
officers with no prior punishment experience, but not
for officers who had previously been disciplined. A
similar pattern occurred for severity and celerity
effects in Model 2B. In particular, the severity effect
was nearly twice as large among individuals who had
never been disciplined than among individuals who
had. Further, although neither celerity coefficient was
significant at conventional confidence levels in Mod-
el 2B, the magnitude of the point estimate for
individuals who had not previously been punished
dwarfed that for individuals who had ( 8.20 versus
.46). The only major deviation from this pattern of
findings involved the comparison of certainty effects
across groups for the background check scenario. The
article addresses this point further in a moment.
Second, the analysis more specifically addressed
those aspects of Table 4 that related to expanding the
specification (from Model 1 to Model 2) to include
measures of impulsivity and extra-legal influences.
For example, in the vehicle stop scenario, expanding
the specification in this fashion eliminated the cer-
tainty effect among individuals with no prior punish-
ment experience. It appeared from Model 2A that the
certainty effect was mediated almost entirely by the
influence of extra-legal sources of conformance,
which were strong and prohibitive of police miscon-
duct. In contrast, in Model 2A, extralegal influences
did not appear to mediate the celerity effect among
officers with no prior punishment experience. In-
stead, celerity was still negatively and significantly
related to police misconduct among officers with no
prior experience. In Model 2A, among individuals
with prior punishment experience, the only explana-
tory variable that significantly predicted offending
was gender. This suggested that deterrence consider-
ations, whether legal or extralegal, appeared irrele-
vant for officers who had personal experience with

Table 4
Tobit regressions: comparison of officers by whether or not they had previously been disciplined
Variable Vehicle stop Background check
Model 1A: Model 2A: Model 1B: Model 2B:
No prior exp Prior exp No prior exp Prior exp No prior exp Prior exp No prior exp Prior Exp
Certainty .37** .16 .13 .05 .46** .45** .19 .27*
(.12) (.15) (.12) (.16) (.14) (.14) (.14) (.14)
Severity 4.17 6.11 9.88 6.17 8.50 10.45 12.81* 6.90
(7.03) (6.85) (6.53) (6.98) (7.49) (7.06) (6.86) (6.93)
Celerity 17.69** 7.49 19.89** 7.78 4.18 5.51 8.20 .46
(7.38) (7.28) (6.86) (7.68) (7.78) (7.38) (7.07) (7.33)
Gender 15.04** 14.36 11.37* 16.99* 2.24 11.34 .44 13.25
(7.47) (9.67) (6.85) (10.31) (7.78) (9.90) (6.92) (10.33)
Years .46 .49 .30 .50 1.35* .77* 1.36* .77*
(.67) (.45) (.62) (.46) (.81) (.46) (.75) (.45)
Extra legal 4.99** 1.80 4.69** 4.15**
sanctions (.98) (1.57) (1.16) (1.34)
Impulsivity 9.56 9.17 18.65** 1.05
(7.74) (7.15) (7.87) (6.75)
Log likelihood 468.91 421.78 451.26 396.64 289.34 290.62 277.97 279.31
Notes: 1 – Constant included in both models; Standard errors in parentheses.
2 – * denotes p < .05 and ** denotes p < .01 for H0: b = 0.
3 – Pr(y > 0) = .79 and N = 210 for each model.
 G. Pogarsky, A.R. Piquero / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 371–386
prior departmental discipline. Again, however, the
findings were not entirely uniform across scenarios.
Therefore, a third (and unexpected) aspect of
Table 4 relates to the differences across scenarios.
For example, in contrast to the vehicle stop scenario,
with respect to the background check, Model 1B
indicated that the certainty effect was virtually iden-
tical across groups. Further, in Model 2B, the cer-
tainty effect was larger for individuals with prior
punishment experience. Another difference across
scenarios related to the impact of extralegal sanctions.
While they did not deter misconduct among officers
with prior punishment experience in the first scenario,
extralegal influences were a significant deterrent in
the second scenario, whether or not the respondent
had prior experience with punishment.
The differences across scenarios may relate to
differences in perceived offense gravity. Apparently,
respondents considered the second hypothesized
transgression to be far more serious than the first.9
This suggests that the potential for prior punishment
experience to condition the deterrence process may
depend on the gravity of the contemplated transgres-
sion. For more serious transgressions, prior punish-
ment may not dilute deterrence concerns as much as
for less serious transgressions.
Discussion
This study examined the extent to which deter-
rence theory could explain two types of police
misconduct. To accomplish this task, this study used
data from a sample of police officers in a mid-sized,
southwestern police department. This type of sample
offered several benefits. First, it was useful for policy
purposes to know whether police officers had incli-
nations with respect to deterrence that were similar to
those of individuals that police officers were charged
to enforce the law against. Second, this study added
results from an unexamined subject population to the
growing body of perceptual deterrence research.
Third, this research offered insight into the etiology
of police misconduct and, in particular, whether
punishment-based policies were an effective means
for combating police misconduct. The current study
was the first that systematically examined the role of
perceptual deterrence considerations in police mis-
conduct decisions.
This article reports several findings. First, deter-
rence considerations appear to figure prominently in
police misconduct decisions. For example, although
perceived sanction severity offered little deterrent
threat, perceived sanction certainty and celerity were
negatively associated with police misconduct, a pat-
tern similar to that observed in other samples. In
381
addition, extralegal sanctions also provided a strong
deterrent against misconduct, again consistent with
extant deterrence work.
Second, impulsivity was strongly and positively
associated with police misconduct. In particular,
more present-oriented officers reported they were
more likely to commit misconduct. Again consistent
with prior work using other subject populations,
impulsivity diminished the deterrent influence of
legal sanction threats. Notably, on this score the
study reported a novel finding that impulsivity also
appeared to reduce the deterring influence of extra-
legal sanctions.
The third set of findings concerned the moderating
role of prior experience with department discipline, or
what Stafford and Warr (1993) termed ‘prior experi-
ence with punishment.’ Some of the effects of the
explanatory variables depended on whether the offi-
cer had prior punishment experience. In the vehicle
stop scenario, none of the legal or extralegal deter-
rence variables corresponded with the offending
intention among officers who had previously been
punished. There was a different pattern of findings for
the background check scenario. In that case, there
was a significant and substantial certainty effect that
did not depend on whether the officer had previously
been disciplined. Neither did the deterring influence
of extralegal sanctions depend on the level of prior
experience of punishment. Therefore, the potential
for prior punishment experience to moderate the
operation of deterrence may depend on the gravity
of the contemplated offense.
By no means is this article meant as the last word
on this issue. Several limitations should be acknowl-
edged. First, the data came from one, relatively large
police department in one city in the United States.
The present study could not assess whether officers
in different departments would respond differently
than the ones presently investigated. Second, the
study only examined two relatively minor types of
hypothetical acts of police misconduct, and one of
these (background check) provided limited variation
in the intention to offend. Future research should
undertake a more exhaustive examination of the
range of possible police misconduct, including more
serious forms of police deviance. This is especially
important since much of the prior work in this regard
tended to examine relatively minor forms of police
deviance, and research had not studied the extent to
which deterrence theory holds for both minor and
serious forms of police misconduct. Third, future
work should also explore whether the propensity for
misconduct varies within units of a single depart-
ment. For example, drug and vice units may en-
counter more opportunities to offend and their
experience with these opportunities may affect the
382 G. Pogarsky, A.R. Piquero / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 371–386
way deterrence considerations enter into their deci-
sion processes.
Finally, this study used a response variable in
which respondents estimated the likelihood they
would commit two hypothesized transgressions on a
scale from 0 to 100. The form of the response
variable in perceptual deterrence studies using the
behavioral intention measure was the subject of some
debate in the deterrence literature. For example,
Decker et al. (1993) found that experienced offenders
simply did not conceptualize their intention to offend
in this fashion and that a several category Likert-type
response set offered a more realistic way to capture
respondents’ judgments. On the other hand, the 0 –
100 scale was successfully employed in a number of
perceptual studies, both with experienced offenders
(cf. Piquero & Rengert, 1999) and college students
(Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001). Moreover, recent research
found that the intention to offend corresponded with
the contemporaneous propensity toward cheating and
rule violation (Pogarsky, 2004). Since this was the
first such study on a sample of police officers, further
attention should be given to replicating the present
findings for alternative outcome measures, and ulti-
mately, determining which response form appears
best suited for the decision processes underlying
police misconduct.
The results suggest the deterrence framework
holds promise for helping researchers and policy
officials understand police misconduct. On this score,
there exist a healthy number of important future
projects. First, researchers should not ignore other
possible correlates of misconduct, in particular, at the
community-level (cf. Lawton, Hickman, Piquero, &
Greene, 2001). Sherman (1974), for example, argued
that police corruption was linked to the values and
norms of community. In particular, he suggested that
corruption was likely in communities where there
was more diversity both in terms of social values and
economic opportunity. Further, he argued that cor-
ruption was less likely in communities where civic
leaders saw their job as serving the community rather
than serving themselves or a small set of constituents.
As many other types of police behavior and misbe-
havior were correlated with community character-
istics (Alpert & Dunham, 1988), future work should
seek an understanding of police misbehavior that
integrates deterrence and community-level concerns.
Second, police behavior was also shown being
influenced by the culture of the particular police
organization in which officers worked. Although this
study was based on only one police department,
thereby limiting its ability to delve into organizational
factors in great detail, the influence of organizational
factors and pressures were felt from both the formal
organizational structure and from informal relation-
ships between members of the police agency (Lang-
worthy & Travis, 1994, p. 351). For example,
researchers found that officer behavior varied by the
particular organizational style of the police depart-
ment (Smith, 1984; Wilson, 1968). These organiza-
tional factors, therefore, appear to be important
determinants of police behavior and future efforts
should consider the possibility that departments have
unique organizational cultures, some that foster and
encourage deviance, and others that do not.
Third, on a basic policy level, these results have
implications for controlling police misconduct. The
results suggest police officers are ‘‘deterrable’’ by
both legal and extralegal factors. At the same time,
however, a subgroup of highly impulsive officers
appears unresponsive to sanction threats. An issue
of critical importance both intra-departmentally and
for the communities in which such officers patrol is:
How can these latter cases be identified?
One method by which police departments can
gauge the perceptions of their officers is to initiate,
monitor, and continue some form of integrity test-
ing. Macintyre and Prenzler (1999, p. 200) suggest
that integrity testing can be used as a research tool
to diagnose the size and nature of a potential
misconduct problem and as a potentially important
form of general deterrence by threatening officers
with disciplinary sanctions should willingness to be
improperly influenced translate into action. Such a
method, especially when combined with internal
controls and periodic analysis of complaints against
officers, has the ability to monitor and identify
officers with a propensity for wrongdoing (Hickman
et al., 2004).
Another effective method for affecting the per-
ceptions of police officers regarding misconduct
involves administrative rule making. Such efforts,
both within and outside of police departments, have
successfully circumscribed aspects of police discre-
tion (such as the use of a firearm) (Walker, 1992,
p. 32). Of course, the efficacy of formal policies
depends on the existence of meaningful departmental
discipline. In an insightful review of a case of police
misconduct prosecuted in Ironton, Ohio, Perez (2000,
p. 53) recalled that, ‘‘The prosecution sent a clear
message to the officers that the federal government
will vigorously investigate police misconduct. Years
later, officers vividly recalled the prosecution and
expressed a strong desire to avoid a repeat.’’
Perhaps the most promising approach to identify-
ing officers who appear headed for trouble is through
an early-intervention/early-warning system. As stated
earlier, these approaches are a relatively new man-
agement strategy for identifying ‘‘problem’’ officers,
defined as those who receive an abnormally high
number of citizen complaints or have other indicators
 G. Pogarsky, A.R. Piquero / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 371–386
of problematic performance (Walker, 2001, p. 110).
These systems provide some kind of intervention, in
the form of counseling and training, designed to
correct the officers’ behavior. As they are an informal
part of police oversight within the agency, they may
not be seen as officially-based punishment. Although
preliminary evidence offers support for utilizing these
systems (Walker et al., 2001), future efforts still need
to determine if they reduce police misconduct over
lengthy periods of time.
Although an effective and accountable system of
policing is essential to a democratic society (Bayley,
1997), it is also very difficult to establish and maintain
(Perez, 2000, p. 47). The present results suggest that
one way to do this might be to operationalize some of
the major tenets of deterrence when developing pol-
icies to combat police misconduct. Yet consistent with
the larger body of recent deterrence work, deterrence
considerations are conditional on other situational and
individual characteristics. Therefore, the ability to
maintain an effective and accountable system of
policing ultimately depends on policies that recognize
these contingencies in the deterrence process and that
account for the influence of both community-level and
organizational correlates.
Appendix A.
Scenario 1 (vehicle stop):
During one holiday weekend you have been
advised to watch for drunk drivers. As you are
driving down a four-lane highway, a car speeds past
you and you observe that it is clearly weaving. You
make a traffic stop. As you approach the vehicle you
notice a law enforcement sticker in the back window.
It turns out that the driver is an off-duty officer from a
neighboring jurisdiction. He informs you that his
weapon is in the glove box and that he and his wife
are returning from a party. You smell alcohol on his
breath and he admits having had a few beers. Under
ordinary circumstances, you would probably require
the driver to perform some field sobriety tests.
Scenario 2 (background check):
Recently, a new neighbor moved in several houses
away from you. He lives alone and while you can’t
put your finger on it, something about him doesn’t
seem right. You haven’t observed anything illegal,
but there are many children in the neighborhood, and
you can’t rid yourself of the nagging suspicion that
he’s up to something. As you are driving to work one
morning, you consider using the department com-
puters to ‘‘run’’ a background check on the man.
383
Notes
1. In general, the evidence suggests deterrence works
for some offenses in some cases (Nagin, 1998), but in other
instances, individuals are ‘‘undeterrable’’ (cf. Pogarsky,
2002).
2. The scenario method, and in particular, the use of
offending intention to measure criminal behavior was a
successful aspect of perceptual deterrence work (cf. Nagin &
Paternoster, 1993, 1994; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001; Piquero
& Rengert, 1999; Piquero & Tibbetts, 1996). Research on
the validity of the behavioral intention reports a strong
correspondence between it and actual criminal and/or
deviant behavior (Green, 1989; Kim & Hunter, 1993;
Pogarsky, 2004).
3. As shown in Table 1, the bivariate correlation
between any pair was at least r = .6.
4. In a Tobit model, a one-unit change in the value of a
predictor does not change the response by the full amount of
the corresponding regression coefficient. Instead the impact
must be factored down by the probability of an unclustered
response, which in this case is a nonzero offending intention.
The ensuing discussion of results will make this adjustment
where appropriate. Correction factors are reported in the row
labeled Pr(y>0) in Table 1.
5. p < .05 in the vehicle stop scenario and p < .08 in the
background check scenario.
6. None of the interaction variables were statistically
significant for Scenario B.
7. The sample was about evenly split along this
dimension: 46 percent of the respondents reported having
received departmental discipline while 54 percent of the
respondents reported they had not.
8. Though this pattern was by no means uniform.
9. This was most evident from the fact that 79 percent
of respondents indicated they would at least consider
committing the first act of misconduct (vehicle stop), while
only 49 percent indicated they would consider committing
the second (background check).
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