CASE DIGESTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Pobre v Defensor-Santiago, 597 SCRA 1 (2009)

Facts: In this case, Antero Pobre filed an administrative complaint
against Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago regarding the speech the
latter delivered on the Senate floor. On the other hand, Senator
Santiago did not deny making those statements. However, she invoked
parliamentary immunity contending that it was delivered in the
discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee.
Issue: Whether or not Santiago can be subject to a disciplinary
action?
Ruling: No. The Court held that Senator Santiago’s privilege speech is
not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the
Rules of Court. The immunity she claims is rooted primarily on the
provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which
provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall,
in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." The
Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in
upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of
free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the
legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this
representative body to look diligently into every affair of
government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the
country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere
with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their
functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of
an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement
uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.
The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the
courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in
the name of parliamentary immunity.
Aquino III v Comelec, 617 SCRA 623 (2010)
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

Facts: This tackles the case of the four legislative districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur, wherein each district has populations of
over 250,000 thousand. In this regard, there was a law reapportioning
the composition of the first and second legislative districts in the
province of Camarines sur and thereby creating a new legislative
district from such reapportionment or the Republic Act 9716. Pursuant
to this law, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
reconfigured to create an additional legislative district for the
province, which resulted in a decrease in the population of the first
district to 176,383. Petitioners then argued that RA 9716 is
unconstitutional contending that it is contrary to Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution prescribing a minimum population
of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district. Accordingly,
petitioners contend the reapportionment by RA 9716 will leave the
first district of Camarines Sur with less than 250,000 in population.
In respondents’ defense, they contended that the 250,000-population
requirement applies only to the creation of legislative districts in a
city, and not in provinces.
Issue: Whether or not the population of 250k an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative
district in a province?
Ruling: No. In Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211 (1995), the Court
clarified that while Sec 5(3), Art VI of the Constitution requires a
city to have a minimum population of 250k to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by another
250k to be entitled to an additional district. There is no reason why
the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional
district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts
in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created
within a city is not required to represent a population of at least
250k to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional
district in a province, considering moreover that a province is
entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and
regardless of its population.
Aldaba v Comelec, 611 SCRA 147 (2010)
Facts: This case revolves around the topic of Republic Act 9591 which
was enacted to create the legislative district of Malolos City. The
Congress relied on the Certification of Alberto Miranda, Region III
Director, of the NSO, projecting that Malolos City's population in
2010 will reach more than 250,000 to satisfy the constitutional
threshold as established by Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The
congress also employed the 2007 Census of Population Progress
Enumeration Report and Certification of the City of Malolos Water
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

District, both dated July 31, 2008, and August 22, 2008. The Comelec
maintains that these population indicators are reliable and
authoritative, and hence cannot be challenged in court.
Issue: Whether or not the population indicators can be subject to
judicial review?
Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that if laws creating legislative
districts are unquestionably within the ambit of its judicial review,
then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions
impacting on their constitutionality, such as their compliance with a
specific constitutional limitation under Section 5(3), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000
constituents are entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfil
this obligation, the Court must inquire into the authoritativeness and
reliability of the population indicators Congress used to comply with
the constitutional limitation. It is well settled that the passage of
apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the political power of
the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their
constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it. To
deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review over RA 9591 is to
contend that the Court has no power to determine whether there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, a duty mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Naval v Comelec, 729 SCRA 299 (2014)
Facts: As illustrated in this case, Angel Naval was elected and served
as a member of Sanggunian, Second from 2004 to 2010. Camarines Sur
district. RA 9716 was passed sometime in 2009, reapportioning the
legislative districts of Camarines was passed. Eight of the ten towns
were selected from Camarines Sur's second district. to establish a
third district. The second district included the remaining two towns
as well as the Gainza and Milaor are from the first district. Naval
campaigned and won as a Democrat in the 2010 elections. Sanggunian
from the third district. She ran again in 2013 and was re-elected to
the same position. position. When Naval's election was called into
question because to the three-term limit, she said that she was merely
there to help.
Issue: Whether Naval’s election for the year 2013 is valid?
Ruling: No. The Court held that RA 9716 created a new second district
for Camarines Sur, but it merely renamed the third district which
elected Naval into the position. Therefore, she was elected by the
same inhabitants in the same territorial jurisdiction. The three-term
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

limit rule provided by the Constitution is inflexible. The rule

answers the need to prevent the consolidation of political power in
the hands of the few, while at the same time giving to the people the
freedom to call back to public service those who are worthy to be
called statesmen.

Bagabuyo v Comelec, 573 SCRA 290 (2008)

Facts: This case discusses when Cagayan de Oro previously had only one
legislative district. However, its Congressman Constantino Jaraula
backed legislation in 2006 to create two legislative districts in CdO
instead. Because the statute (RA 9371) was passed, two legislative
districts were established. Rogelio Bagabuyo challenged the law's
constitutionality, and he promptly petitioned the Supreme Court to
prevent the COMELEC from applying the law in the next elections.
Bagabuyo claimed that the 2nd district was established without a
plebiscite, as required by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in this case?
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that a plebiscite is not required in this
case. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro
City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod
pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the
criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city,
municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government
unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in
Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income classification;
hence, no plebiscite is required. What happened here was a
reapportionment of a single legislative district into two legislative
districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative
districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
Reyes v Comelec, 699 SCRA 522 (2013) and 708 SCRA 197 (2013)
Facts: Petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes was elected and sworn in as
Marinduque's representative. However, prior to the elections, COMELEC
revoked her certificate of candidacy due to ineligibility. She was not
eligible to run for the seat because she was not a Filipino citizen.
Regina was opposed to the Comelec's jurisdiction claiming that the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has exclusive
jurisdiction over her qualifications.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

Issue: Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction to investigate

Regina’s qualifications as representative of Marinduque?
Ruling: No. The Court held that HRET's constitutional jurisdiction
extends to the qualification of its members, who are appointed only
after a constitutionally and legally based declaration. HRET has sole
and exclusive authority over the qualifications of its members.
However, Regina's proclamation is no longer legal because, before to
the elections, the Comelec's decision to annul her certificate of
candidacy became final. As a result, there is no foundation for her
proclamation, hence she was not elected to the House of
Representatives.
Banat v Comelec, GR 179271 (2009)
Facts: This case revolves around the May 2007 elections wherein
petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) filed before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party-list
representatives provided by the Constitution. The latter, sitting as
the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the
winners in the party-list elections. In proclaiming the winners and
apportioning their seats, the Comelec considered the following rules:
(1) In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative
districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list
representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution); (2) Pursuant
to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list
which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list
elections shall be entitled to one seat; (3) If a party-list garners
at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least
6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6
rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation
Party vs Comelec; (4) In no way shall a party be given more than three
seats even if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-
list election (3 seat cap rule, same case). Moreover, the COMELEC
declared the BANAT’s petition moot and academic and declared further
that the total number of seats of each winning party-list will be
resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before
the Supreme Court assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives
provided in Sec 5(2), Art VI of the Const. mandatory?
(2) Whether or not the three-seat limit provided in Sec 11(b) of RA
7941 constitutional?
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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

(3) Whether or not the 2% threshold vote to qualify a party-list to

congressional seats prescribed by the same Sec 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
(4) Whether or not major political parties participate in the party-
list elections?
Ruling:
(1) No. The court ruled that 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot
be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling-up of the
entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the
Constitution. The Constitution, in Sec 5(1) of Art VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress.

(2) Yes. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats

that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, is a valid
statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-
list elections.

(3) The court held that as to the guaranteed seats, yes; but, as to
the additional seats, no. The 2% threshold vote for additional seats
makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party list seats when the number of available party list
seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the 2% threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. It
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec
5(2), Art VI of the Const. and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives.”

(4) No. By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue to disallow

Major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly. Notably however, neither the
Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibit major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers
of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to
participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings.

Ang Ladlad v Comelec, GR 190582 (2010)

 CASE DIGESTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

Facts: In this case, there is a political party called “Ang Ladlad”,

which is composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays bisexuals or transgendered individuals. In 2006, they
applied for registration with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) as
a party-list organization under the RA 7941 or the Party-List System
Act, a law that mandates the state to promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system. The COMELEC denied the
application twice contending that accrediting Ang Ladlad would expose
our youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of
our faith and cited the following grounds: (1) they tolerate sexual
immorality, citing provisions of the Bible and the Koran; (2) they
collide with Articles 695, 1306, and 1409 of the Civil Code, and
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code; and (3) that the LGBT sector is
not enumerated in the Constitution and in the Party-List System Act.
In Ang Ladlad’s defense, they claimed their compliance with the 8-
point guidelines enunciated in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC and argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and
underrepresented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of
their sexual orientation and gender identity. Ang Ladlad then appealed
the COMELEC’s decision to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation be
denied?
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Ang Ladlad complied with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. The enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors [in the Constitution and RA
7941] is not exclusive. Taking note of the size of the LGBT sector and
the extensive affiliation of Ang Ladlad, the Court ruled that Ang
Ladlad sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal
requirements for accreditation. It was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the
Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Morality referred to in
the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious. Otherwise,
if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public
policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require
compel the non-believers to conform to a standard of conduct
buttressed by a religious belief, anathema to religious freedom.
Likewise, the government would thereby tacitly approve or endorse that
belief and tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious
views that would not support the policy. On the other hand, COMELEC
has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented,
or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the
COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to
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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. COMELEC’s reference to

purported violations of our penal and civil laws is flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. The remedies for which are a prosecution under
the RPC or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without
judicial proceedings [and not denial of accreditation]. In ruling for
the accreditation Ang Ladlad, the Court further cited the equal
protection clause, the guarantees of freedom of expression and
association, and our international obligation to protect and promote
human rights.
Walden Bello v Comelec GR 191998 (2010)
Facts: In this case, Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List (AGPP) filed its
Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the May 10, 2010 Elections
with the Commission on Elections they also filed its Certificate of
Nomination along with the Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees.
On the other hand, the COMELEC published Resolution No. 8807, which
established the procedures for petitions to disqualify a party-list
nominee for the May 10, 2010 elections. certiorari petitioners Liza L.
Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo, and Bayan Muna Party-List, represented by
Teodoro Casi, filed a petition for disqualification against Arroyo
with the COMELEC in accordance with Resolution No. 8696, in relation
to Sections 2 and 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 (the Party- List
System Act). The certiorari petitioners argued that not only must the
party-list organization factually and truly represent the marginalized
and underrepresented; the nominee must also be a Filipino citizen
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations, and parties, citing the case of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. COMELEC. The certiorari petitioners decided that Arroyo
cannot be regarded a member of the underprivileged and
underrepresented sector, particularly the sector that the AGPP
represents, tricycle drivers and security guards, because he is not
simply a member of the First Family, but is also (a) an incumbent
member of the House of Representatives; (b) the Chairman of the Houses
Energy Committee; and, (c) a member of key committees in the House,
namely: Natural Resources, Aquaculture, Fisheries Resources, Ethics
and Privileges, Justice, National Defense and Security, Public Works
and Highways, Transportation and Ways and Means. Moreover, petitioners
Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales (mandamus petitioners) sent
a letter to the COMELEC Law Department requesting a copy of the
documentary evidence submitted by AGPP in accordance with Section 6 of
Resolution No. 8807. Thereafter, the COMELEC Law Department responded
that the AGPP had not yet submitted any documentary evidence required
by Resolution No. 8807. The mandamus petitioners asked the COMELEC and
its Law Department to act in accordance with Section 10 of Resolution
No. 8807 and declare AGPP nominees disqualified for failing to comply
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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

with Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807. Section 6 of the Resolution

requires the party-list group and the nominees to submit documentary
evidence proving that the nominees belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector/s, as well as the sectoral party,
organization, political party, or coalition that they wish to
represent. It further states that the COMELEC Law Department will
require party-list groups and nominees to submit the necessary
documentation. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed Arroyo's
petitions for disqualification in its Joint Resolution. It pointed out
that Section 9 of RA 7941 only required the nominee to be "a bona fide
member [of the party or organization for which he seeks to represent]
for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the elections." The
petitioners filed their Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction with the Supreme Court. They sought to compel the COMELEC
to disqualify the AGPP nominees on the basis of their failure to
comply with Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807, as well as to stop the
COMELEC from granting the AGPP due course in the May 10, 2010
elections. Additionally, the certiorari petitioners petitioned the
Supreme Court in two (2) separate certiorari petitions to annul the
COMELEC Second Division's May 7, 2010 joint resolution and the COMELEC
en banc's July 19, 2010 consolidated resolution that dismissed their
petitions for disqualification against Arroyo as AGPPs nominee. In the
meanwhile, AGPP received the required proportion of votes in the May
10, 2010 elections to secure a single seat. As AGPP's first nominee,
Arroyo was granted a seat in the House of Representatives. Thus, the
COMELEC, acting as the National Board of Canvassers, declared Arroyo
to be the AGPP's validly elected party-list representative in the
House of Representatives.
Issue: Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of
Arroyos qualifications as AGPPs nominee after his proclamation and
assumption to office as a member of the House of Representatives?
Ruling: Yes. The court said that consistent judicial holding is that
the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of party-
list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office; they
are, for all intents and purposes, "elected members" of the House of
Representatives although the entity directly voted upon was their
party. Hence, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his qualifications end sand the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins. Since Arroyo, AGPP’s first nominee, has already been
proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, Thus, following the lead of Abayon and Perez, we hold
that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present petitions and that
the HRET now has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and rule
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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

upon Arroyo’s qualifications as a Member of the House of

Representatives.
Atong Paglaum v Comelec, GR 203766
Facts: In this case, to overturn several Comelec resolutions
disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list contest, 52 party-list
groupings and organizations filed separate petitions with the Supreme
Court. In its contested resolutions issued in October, November, and
December of 2012, the Comelec determined, among other things, that
these party-list parties and organizations failed to represent a
marginalized and disenfranchised population. Their nominations were
not from a marginalized or underrepresented sector, and/or some of the
organizations or groups were not authentically reflective of the
sector they intend to represent in Congress.
Issue: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the May 2013 party-
list election?
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that COMELEC merely followed the
guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However,
cases were remanded back to the COMELEC because petitioners may now
possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court. In
determining who may participate in the party-list elections, the
COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system:
(1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented sector.”
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided
they register under the party list system and do not field candidates
in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and

underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains
to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women,
and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly,
a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector
they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent
those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that
they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
Coalition of Asso. of Senior Citizens in the Phil. V. Comelec, 201
SCRA 786 (2013)
Facts: The SENIOR CITIZENS nominees signed an agreement named
"Irrevocable Covenant" in May 2010 that lists their candidates and
specifies how their authority will be divided. It included a decision
of which candidate will fulfil the terms outlined in the power sharing
agreement. Due to the term-sharing arrangement, Kho's time serving as
a member of the HR was shortened to 1 year and 6 months. As a result,
Kho submitted his resignation, which will take effect on December 31,
2011. In the meanwhile, on February 21, 2012, COMELEC Resolution was
published. Section 7 Rule 4 thereof stated that vacancies caused by
term sharing agreements among Nominees from winning party-list
organizations or groups are prohibited. the 12th of March 2012, the
Kho's resignation from the SENIOR CITIZENS Board of Trustees was
recalled, and he was given permission to represent the party-list
indefinitely. COMELEC decided to CANCEL the registration of the
candidate despite the recall of resignation because it regarded the
term sharing agreement to be against public policy.
Under the Party-List System of Representation, SENIOR CITIZENS.
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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC can disqualify and cancel the
registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS solely on account of
its purported violation of the prohibition against term-sharing?
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that there was no indication that the
nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less
succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing agreement. Before this
Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of
non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all intents and
purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served his term as a
member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably, if the term-
sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto,
it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had
been unfairly and arbitrarily the COMELEC En Banc imposed penalties.
As a matter of fact, how can SENIOR CITIZENS disobey when their
nominees didn't follow through on their commitment? There was
therefore no apparent breach of any election law, rule, or regulation.
Therefore, it is evident that SENIOR CITIZENS has been disqualified
and that its registration and accreditation have been revoked without
any legal justification.

Lico v Comelec, GR 205505, Sep 29, 2015

Facts: Isidro Lico, the first nominee, took the oath of office after
Comelec declared Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list
organizations. Prior to being named one of the successful party-list
organizations, Ating Koop released a Resolution that contained a term-
sharing agreement that its nominees had signed. The three-year term
stipulated that petitioner Lico would hold the position of Party-list
Representative for the first year. Then when held its Second National
Convention, it introduced amendments which would short the three-year
term of the incumbent members then was replaced by the Rimas group.
Almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, a petition
was filed expelling him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. Apart from
allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee
cited petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as
factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under
Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws. Comelec Second Division
upheld the expulsion of petitioner while Comelec en banc dismissed the
petition holding that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico
from the House of Representatives, considering that his expulsion from
Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the House, and
therefore it was the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) that had jurisdiction over the petition. However, it upheld the
validity of his expulsion.
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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

Issue: Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction over the expulsion of a

Member of the House of Representatives from his party-list
organization?
Ruling: No. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the
HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of
members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the
HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and
assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives. In
this case, the Comelec proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list
group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he assumed office in the
House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the Comelec,
that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
Abang Lingkod v Comelec, 708 SCRA 133 (2013)
Facts: The registration of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list organization
was revoked by Comelec. It was noted that ABANG LINGKOD has not
demonstrated a history of advancing the cause of the weak and
oppressed, and
underrepresented; that it just provided images of some purported
activities it engaged in following the May 2010 elections. It further
asserted that ABANG LINGKOD had failed to demonstrate that any of its
nominees were themselves underrepresented and marginalized, or that
they had participated in initiatives to better the situation of the
groups they purportedly represented.
Issue: Whether or not Comelec gravely abused its discretion in
cancelling ABANG LINGKOD’s registration under the party-list system
for the latter’s failure to prove its track record?
Ruling: Yes. The Court held that contrary to the Comelec's claim,
sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no
longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e.
proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of
the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented
by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the
sector/s, which they represent. There is thus no basis in law and
established jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking registration
under the party-list system still comply with the track record
requirement. Indeed, nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is it mandated that
groups seeking registration thereunder must submit evidence to show
their track record as a group.
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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

Akbayan v HRET, 612 SCRA 375 (2010)

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Aquino v Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 (1995)

Facts: In this case, there is a petitioner who was a resident of
Concepcion, Tarlac for over 50 years and it is also stated in his
birth certificate Concepcion, Tarlac is the birthplace of both his
parents. For the 1992 congressional elections, he indicated in his
Certificate of Candidacy that he was a resident of Concepcion, Tarlac
for 52 years. For the 1995 elections, he also ran for the Congress
representing the new 2nd district of Makati City. He stated in his
Certificate of Candidacy that he has resided “in the constituency
where” he sought “to be elected” for only “10 months.” However, he has
just transferred to a leased condominium in Makati from his residence
in Tarlac. On the other hand, private respondents filed a petition to
disqualify petitioner on the ground that he lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman mandated in Article VI,
Section 6 of the Constitution. After such petition, petitioner amended
his Certificate of Candidacy, indicating there that he has been a
resident in said place for 1 year and 13 days. Meanwhile, elections
were held, and he garnered the highest number of votes. However,
COMELEC, acting on the private respondents’ petition, suspended his
proclamation permanently.
Issue: Did Aquino satisfy the constitutional residence requirement in
the 2nd district of Makati City as mandated by Art VI, Sec 6?
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court held that the essence of representation
is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and
sensitive to the needs of a particular district. Clearly, petitioner’s
domicile of origin was Concepcion, Tarlac, and the same is not easily
lost. That coupled with the fact that he himself claims to have other
residences in Metro Manila and that he claims to be resident of the
condominium unit in Makati for only a short length of time “indicate
that” his “sole purpose in transferring his physical residence” is not
to acquire a new residence of domicile “but only to qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the 2nd district of Makati City.” The
absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment
of domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of
identification— sentimental, actual or otherwise—with the area, and
the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement [of the
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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

condominium unit in Makati (instead of buying one)] was effected all

belie his claim of residency for the period required by the
Constitution.
Daryl Grace J. Abayon v. The Honorable House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, et al., G.R. Nos. 189466 and 189506, 612 SCRA 375,
11 February 2010
Facts: In the 2007 elections, the Aangat Tayo party-list organization
and the Bantay party-list group, which both won seats in the House of
Representatives, first nominated Daryl Grace Abayon and Jovito
Palparan. Respondents contested the eligibility of Abayon, Palparan,
and their respective party-list organizations in two separate quo
warranto applications. Both Abayon and Palparan contested the HRET's
authority, arguing that the party-list, not them as its nominees, was
elected to the House of Representatives. On both petitions, the HRET
issued an order rejecting the petition against the party-list groups
on the grounds that the Party-List System Act gave the COMELEC
authority over the question of the party-list group's eligibility.
However, it upheld its authority about the issue of Abayon and
Palparan's qualifications.
Issue: Whether the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the
eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats
in the lower house of Congress?
Ruling: YES. The members of the House of Representatives are of two
kinds: "members x x x who shall be elected from legislative districts"
and "those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
This means that, from the Constitution’s point of view, it is the
party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not their
parties or organizations. Once elected, both the district
representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like
manner. Sec. 17, Art. VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other
things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are
"elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the
district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list
nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
Santiago v Guingona, G.R. 134577, (1998)
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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

Facts: This case illustrates the time when the Senate held its
election of officers wherein Senator Fernan was declared duly elected
Senate President. Thereafter, the Senate failed to arrive at a
consensus on the matter of the Minority leader for which Senator Tatad
and Senator Guingona of the PRP and Lakas-NUCD-UMDP83 (both “minority”
parties, LAMP being the “majority”) respectively were being
considered. After 3 session days of debate on the issue, Senate
President Fernan formally recognized Senator Guingona as minority
leader upon receiving information that all Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators
signed in agreement for the latter. Senators Santiago and Tatad of the
PRP instituted this present petition for quo warranto alleging that
Guingona had been usurping a position which, to them, rightfully
belongs to Tatad. They assert the definition of “majority” in Art VI,
sec 16(1) of the Constitution refers to a group of senators who (1)
voted for the winning Sen. Pres. and (2) accepted committee
chairmanships, therefore those otherwise comprise the “minority.”
Accordingly, they are of the view that Guingona, having voted for
Fernan, belongs to the “majority.” In view thereof, they assert
Article VI, sec 16(1) has not been observed in the selection of the
Minority Leader.
Issue: Whether or not Guingona unlawfully usurp the position of
Minority Leader in the view that Art VI, sec 16(1) of the Constitution
was not observed?
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that in dismissing the petition, the term
“majority” simply “means the number greater than half or more than
half of any total”. Art VI, sec 16(1) does not delineate who comprise
the “majority” much less the “minority”. Notably, the Constitution [in
Art VI, sec 16(1)] is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate
President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the
manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress.
All that it says is that “each House shall choose such other officers
as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who
will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of
the prerogative conferred [to the House] xxx. In the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines xxx this Court is devoid of any
basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto.
Avelino v Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (1949)
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

Alejandrino v Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1924)

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

De Venecia v SB, G.R. No. 130240 (2002)

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Pobre v Defensor-Santiago, 597 SCRA 1 (2009)

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Philconsa v Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966)

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Ligot v Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974)

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

People v Jalosjos, G.R. NO. 132875

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JURIS DOCTOR

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Adaza v Pacana, 135 SCRA 431 (1985)

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Puyat v De Guzman 113 SCRA 31 (1982)

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Liban v Gordon, 593 SCRA 68 (2009) and 639 SCRA 709 (2011)
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Makalintal v Comelec, GR 157013, Jul 10, 2003

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Abakada group Party List v Purisima, GR 166715, Aug 14, 2008

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Bengzon v Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767

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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Arnault v Nazareno, G.R. L-3820

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation v. Senate, G.R. No. 180308, June 19,

2012
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (549 SCRA

77 AND 564 SCRA 152
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Balag, v Senate, G.R. No. G.R. No. 234608, July 03, 2018
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Senate v Ermita, G.R. 169777 (2006)

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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Belgica (G.R. 208566, 2013)

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Araullo v Abad (G.R. 209287)

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty [LAMP] v. The Secretary of Budget

and Management, G.R. No. 164987, Apr. 24, 2012
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Arnault v Balagtas, 97 Phil 358

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Imbong v Ochoa, 721 SCRA 146 (2014)

Facts: The case revolved around the topic of Republic Act No. 10354 or
the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012,
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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

famously known as the RH Law. This law aims to inform and give free
access to every person in the country about contraception, women’s
health, population control, and the like. However, it was challenged
by different groups as, according to them, it violated various
constitutional rights (such as the rights to life, health, freedom of
religion and speech, and privacy). In this regard, through an order,
the Supreme Court prevented the law from going into effect pending a
final judgment.
Issue: Whether or not Whether the RH law is unconstitutional, with
regards to the Delegation of Authority to the FDA?
Ruling: NO. The RH Law is not unconstitutional with regards to the
delegation of authority to the FDA. The Court ruled that FDA does not
only have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and
cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity
empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so.
Health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are
associated with what is ordinarily understood as “health products.”
Being the country’s premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety
of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped
with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant
to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to
the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and
medicines that are safe includes “service” and “methods.” From the
declared policy of the RH Law, Congress intended that the public be
given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-
abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the
permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of
Justice, as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government
and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated
problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and
the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say
specific solutions.
Tanada v Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
Facts:
Issue:
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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

Ruling:

Abbas v SET, 166 SCRA 651 (1988)

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Bondoc v Pineda, 201 SCRA 732

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Codilla v De Venecia, G.R. 150605 (2002)

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Cunanan v Tan 5 SCRA 1 (1962)

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Velasco v Belmonte, G.R. 211140 (2016)

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

Ty-Delgado v HRET G.R. 219603 (2016)

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR