CASES TO READ FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

G.R. No. 108619 July 31, 1997

EPIFANIO LALICAN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

The issue posed for resolution in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order is whether or not a charge of illegal possession of "lumber" is excluded from the crime of
illegal possession of "timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of
the Philippines), as amended, to warrant the quashal of an information charging the former offense or a "nonexistent
crime."

On July 23, 1991, an information for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No.
277, was filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against petitioner Epifanio Lalican,1 Ruben Benitez,
Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo before the Regional Trial Court of that city. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 9543, the
information reads:

That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan, City of Puerto
Princesa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without lawful authority or permit, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and
control 1,800 board feet of assorted species and dimensions of lumber on board two (2) passenger
jeeps, with a value of Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P14,000.00), Philippine Currency, to the damage
and prejudice of the Government in the amount aforestated.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

At their arraignment on August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged
did not constitute an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber and other forest products"
and not to "lumber," and asserting that "timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed into beams, planks or
boards, petitioner alleged that said decree "does not apply to 'lumber.'" He added that the law is "vague and
standardless" as it does not specify the authority or the legal documents required by existing forest laws and
regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that the information should be quashed as it violated his constitutional rights
to due process and equal protection of the law.2

The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not for the courts to determine the wisdom of
the law nor to set out the policy of the legislature which deemed it proper that the word "timber" should include
"lumber" which is a "product or derivative after the timber is cut." The position of the prosecution was that to hold
otherwise would result in the easy circumvention of the law, for one could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have
it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. The prosecution asserted that the issue raised by petitioner
was more semantical than a question of law.3

On September 24, 1991, the lower court, 4 guided by the principles that penal laws should be construed strictly
against the state and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, issued an order quashing the
information. It held that the distinction between "timber" and "lumber" is not artificial nor a matter of semantics as the
law itself distinguishes the two terms. Sec. 3(q) of P.D. No. 705 classifies "timber" as a forest product while Sec.
3(aa) thereof considers "lumber" as a finished wood product. Adding that unlicensed cutting, gathering and/or
collecting of "timber" is penalized under Sec. 68 while sale of "lumber" without compliance with grading rules
established by the government is prohibited by Sec. 79, the lower court categorically stated that:

Logically, lumber, being a manufactured wood product, poses no more danger to forest lands by
being cut, gathered, collected or removed. It is in fact, only bought and sold. Thus, Sec. 68 cannot
be made to apply to lumber.

The court, however, refrained from exploring the constitutional issues raised by petitioner upon a holding that the
case could be resolved on some other grounds or issues.5

The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of this Order, pointing out that under the Primer on Illegal
Logging of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), timber is not just any piece of wood for it may
consist of squared and manufactured timber or one which has been sawn to pieces to facilitate transportation or
hauling. It stressed that to consider a person who had made lumber out of timber as not criminally liable is an
absurd interpretation of the law.

Moreover, the prosecution underscored the facts that when apprehended, the accused presented Private Land
Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had expired; that while the certificate of origin indicated
Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the product were not
equipped with certificates of transport agreement. Added to this was the fact that, if the product were indeed lumber,
then the accused could have presented a certificate of lumber origin, lumber sale invoices in case of sale, tally
sheets and delivery receipts for transportation from one point to another.6

Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration contending that the DENR primer's definition of "timber" is
erroneous because the law itself distinguishes "timber" from "sawn lumber." The non-inclusion of "lumber" in Sec.
68 could only mean a clear legislative intent to exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized under that
section.7

Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the Presiding Judge of Branch 49 inhibited himself from taking
cognizance of Criminal Case No. 9543. The case was subsequently assigned to Branch 52.

On June 10, 1992, the lower court8 issued the herein questioned order setting aside the quashal Order of the
previous judge. It declared that from the law itself, it is evident that what is sought to be penalized is not the
possession, without the required legal documents, of timber only but also of "other forest products." It stated that
even if lumber is not timber, still, lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is
equally prohibited by the law which includes "wood" in the definition of forest products.

Petitioner sought the reconsideration of this Order but the lower court denied it. Hence, the instant petition arguing
that the lower court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the quashal order
and in denying his motion for reconsideration on the ground that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 neither specifies nor
includes "lumber" in the phrase "timber or other forest products."

The petition is devoid of merit.

Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 which was issued on July 25, 1987 by then
President Corazon C. Aquino, provides:

Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. —
Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable,
and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
 The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment,
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Punished then in this section are: (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products
from the places therein mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of timber or other forest products without
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.

In the recent case of Mustang, Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals9 this Court, thru Justice Hilario Davide, held:

The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is
included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph
(aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the
processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard,
blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood product.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the
Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after
being prepared for the market ." Simply put , lumber is a processed log or timber.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a
statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as
possession of timberwithout the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.

Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the
expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive Order No. 277, are the following:

WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the
benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant
enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;

WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain
inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, to overcome these difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts to make our
forestry laws more responsive to present situations and realities; . . .

To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. A
law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to
afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of
the law.10 After all, the phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is
manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely result in tautology. As the lower court said:

Even should it be conceded that lumber is not timber and is thus not covered by the prohibition, still
it cannot be denied that lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents
is equally and, to the same extent, prohibited. Sec. 3(q) of PD 705 as amended or otherwise known
as the Revised Forestry Code defines forest products, viz., . . .
 Stress must be given to the term WOOD embodied in the definition of forest product (supra). If we
are to follow the rather tangential argument by the accused that lumber is not timber, then, it will be
very easy for a person to circumvent the law. He could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it
sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. It is rather too narrow an interpretation. But the
law also provided a plug for the loophole. If lumber is not timber, then surely, lumber is wood. . . . .

If in seeking to abate the proceedings the accused also seek to imply that lumber seized in their
possession were procured from lawful source, all they have to do is produce the legal documents
contemplated by the law. It is not the mere cutting or possession of timber, forest products or
whatever that is prohibited and penalized by the law. What is prohibited and penalized is the act of
cutting or possessing of timber, wood, or other forest products without lawful authority.

The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the quashal of the
information. The petition simply has no legal basis. Certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown that there
is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. 11 Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of power. 12

On the other hand, certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or
exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion. 13 Where the court has jurisdiction over the case,
even if its findings are not correct, its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari. 14 As this Court said:

. . . When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it
of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a
court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment.
This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently,
an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible
through the original civil action of certiorari. 15

In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure
or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions. 16

The unavailability of the writ of certiorari, and even that of prohibition, in this case is borne out of the fact that what
petitioner considers as grave abuse of discretion in this case is the denial of his motion to quash the information filed
against him and three others. This Court has consistently defined the proper procedure in case of denial of a motion
to quash. The accused has to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses
he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in
the manner authorized by law. 17

Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied. That the appropriate recourse
is to proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction, as well as the denial of the motion to
quash, is impelled by the fact that a denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory procedural aspect which cannot
be appealed nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. 18 The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive. 19 An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only
when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 20However,
this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of
allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari would not only delay the administration of
justice but also would unduly burden the courts. 21

Petitioner may not seek refuge under Flordelis v. Himalaloan 22 for his contention that a denial of a motion to quash
may be the subject of a petition for certiorari. That case has an entirely different factual milieu from the one at bar.
The information herein not being "patently defective" nor that the offense charged has prescribed, 23 this case may
not be considered an exception to the rule on the proper remedy for the denial of a motion to quash.

With respect to the constitutionality of Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 which petitioner would have this Court consider, 24this
Court has always desisted from delving on constitutional issues. Thus, even if all the requisites for judicial review of
a constitutional matter are present in a case, 25 this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question unless it is
the lis mota of the case or if the case can be disposed of on some other grounds, such as the application of the
statute or general law. 26

The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable problem of deforestation in this country, considering that the
deleterious effects of this problem are now imperiling our lives and properties, more specifically, by causing
rampaging floods in the lowlands. While it is true that the rights of an accused must be favored in the interpretation
of penal provisions of law, it is equally true that when the general welfare and interest of the people are interwoven
in the prosecution of a crime, the Court must arrive at a solution only after a fair and just balancing of interests. This
the Court did in arriving at the foregoing interpretation of Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Reform Code. This task,
however, has not at all been a difficult one considering that, contrary to petitioner's assertion, his rights to due
process and equal protection of the law have not been clearly shown to have been jeopardized.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED. The lower court is enjoined to
proceed with dispatch in the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9543. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs
against, petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 205015 November 19, 2014

MA. MIMIE CRESCENCIO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This case stemmed from Ma. Mimie Crescencio's (petitioner) conviction for violation of Section 681 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 705,2 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (Forestry Code), as
amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277,3 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofTalibon, Bohol, Branch
52, in Criminal Case No. 96-27, on August 12, 2008.4 The Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 01162,
dismissed the appeal in its Resolution5 dated April 15, 2011 for failure to serve a copy of the Appellant’s Brief to the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). The CA, in its Resolution6 dated November 19, 2012, also denied the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.

The Facts

Acting on an information that there was a stockpile of lumber or forest products in the vicinity of the house of the
petitioner, Eufemio Abaniel (Abaniel), the Chief of the ForestProtection Unit of Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) - Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Talibon, Bohol, together with
Forest Rangers Urcino Butal (Butal), Alfredo Bastasa and Celso Ramos (Ramos) went to the petitioner’s house at
Balico, Talibon, Bohol on March 15, 1994 at 3:00 p.m. Upon arriving thereat, they saw forest products lying under
the house of the petitioner and at the shoreline about two meters away from the petitioner’s house. As the DENR
personnel tried to investigate from the neighborhood as to who was the owner of the lumber, the petitioner admitted
its ownership. Thereafter, the DENR personnel entered the premises of the petitioner’s house without a search
warrant.7

Upon inspection, 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber, which is equivalent to 452 board feet, were discovered. When the
DENR personnel asked for documents to support the petitioner’s claim of ownership, the latter showed to them
Official Receipt No. 35053 issued by Pengavitor Enterprises where she allegedly bought the said lumber. However,
when the DENR personnel scaled the lumber, they found out that the dimensions and the species of the lumber did
not tally with the items mentioned in the receipt. The said receipt showed that the petitioner bought 10 pieces of red
lawaan lumber with sizes 2x6x18 and 5 pieces with sizes 2x8x16 on March 13, 1994. On the other hand, the lumber
in the petitioner’s house, on March 15, 1994, was 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber of three different sizes, to wit: 20
pieces 2x6x18; 3 pieces 2x8x18; and 1 piece 2x10x12.8

Since the petitioner could not present any other receipt, Abaniel ordered the confiscation of the lumber, asked for
police assistance, and told the petitioner that they were going to transport the confiscated lumber to the DENR office
for safekeeping. Seizure Receipt No. 004157 and a Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber
Being Confiscated,9 which showed the value of the lumber to be 9,040.00, were issued to the petitioner. Forest
Rangers Butal and Ramos corroborated Abaniel’s testimony.10

SPO1 Desiderio Garcia testified that upon the request of Abaniel for police assistance, he and PO3 Antonio
Crescencio went to the house of the petitioner where they saw some lumberwhich was later loaded on a cargo
truck. Thereafter, they escorted the transport of the lumber to the DENR office in San Roque, Talibon, Bohol.11

On the other hand, the lone witness of the defense, Lolita Crescencio, admitted that the seized lumber were owned
by the petitioner but claimed that the latter bought it from Pengavitor Enterprises of Trinidad, Bohol and from Java
Marketing in Ubay, Bohol.12 However, the defense had only the Official Receipt No. 35053 issued by Pengavitor
Enterprises which, however, did not tally with the forest products confiscated.

On May 17, 1994, the petitioner was charged by the Provincial Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, with violation of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. The Information13 alleged:
That on or about the 15th day of March, 1994, in the municipality of Talibon, Bohol, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to possess and to gain for her own
benefit, without any legal document as required under existing jurisprudence, laws and regulations, and without any
lawful authority under existing rules and regulation of DENR Forest Management Sector, willfully, unlawfully and
illegally possess and have under her custody and control forest products consisting of twenty-four (24) pieces of
magsihagon lumber with a volume of 452 board feet and a total value of Nine Thousand Forty (₱9,040.00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency; to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.14

During the arraignment on July 15,1997, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.Thereafter, trial
ensued.15

On August 12, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment16 convicting the petitioner of the offense charged and sentenced
her to imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to eleven (11) years and six (6)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayoras maximum. The RTC also ordered the confiscation of the
seized lumber owned by the petitioner.17

As expected, the petitioner appealed the decision to the CA. However, in its Resolution18 dated April 15, 2011, the
CA dismissed the appeal outright because the petitioner failed to furnish the OSG a copy of the Appellant’s Brief in
violation of the Rules of Court. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA,in its
Resolution19 dated November 19, 2012. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The Issue

The core issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA’s dismissal of the appeal due to the petitioner’s failureto
serve a copy of the Appellant’s Brief to the OSG is proper, in view of the attendant factual circumstances and in the
interest of substantial justice.

Ruling of the Court

In this case, the petitioner asks for a relaxation of the rigid rules of technical procedure and submits that the CA
erred in dismissing her appeal purely on the basis of mere technicalities.

Confronted with issues of this nature, this Court is mindful of the policy of affording litigants the amplest opportunity
for the determination of their cases on the merits and of dispensing with technicalities whenever compelling reasons
so warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it.20

The Court has constantly pronouncedthat "[t]he rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,technical
sense, for they have been adopted to help secure – not override – substantial justice. For this reason, courts must
proceed with caution so asnot to deprive a party of statutory appeal; rather, they must ensure thatall litigants are
granted the amplest opportunity for the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free from the constraint of
technicalities."21

It is clear that without at all touching on the substantive aspects of the petitioner’s cause, the appellate court opted
not to decide the case on the merits. The subject of the appeal was the decision of the RTC convicting the petitioner
of violation of the Forestry Code and sentencing her to suffer an imprisonment of no less than six (6) years to eleven
(11) years.

In this case, there is nothing in the record that shows any deliberate intent on the part of the petitioner to subvert
and delay the final disposition of the case. In fact, when the petitioner learned that her appeal was dismissed by the
CA for failure to serve a copy of her Appellant’s Brief to the OSG, she immediately confronted her previous counsel
who denied having filed such brief. Asthe petitioner was very much worried of being incarcerated, she asked her
previous counsel to withdraw from the case. Thus, the petitioner submits that the outright denial of her appeal is due
to the incompetence and ignorance of her former counsel who even lied about the fact thathe has indeed filed an
Appellant’s Brief.

As a general rule, the inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an adequate excuse as to call for the
appellate court’s indulgence except: (a) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law; (b) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or
(c) where the interests of justice so require.22

Here, the petitioner submits that the inadvertence of her counsel to serve a copy of the Appellant’s Brief tothe OSG
is a persuasive reason or a compelling justification to forego the Rules of Procedure as the wanton recklessness or
gross negligence of her counsel has deprived her of due process of law which will result in the outright deprivation of
her liberty.

In this regard, the Court agrees that the CA should have taken a liberal view of the rules and ruled on the meritsof
the appeal, especially when what is involved is no less than the petitioner’s liberty.

Nonetheless, even if the Court brushes aside the technicality issue, it will still find that the prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the petitioner’s culpability.

In attempting to escape liability, the petitioner contends that: (a) she had the supporting documents to show that she
bought the questioned lumber from legitimate sources; and (b) the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the
DENR personnel was illegal and, thus, the items seized should not have been admitted in evidence against her.

The Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.23 Nonetheless, the constitutional prohibition against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of certainexceptions, one of which is seizure of evidence in plain view. Under the
1âwphi1

plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that
view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.24

There is no question that the DENR personnel were not armed with a search warrant when they went to the house
of the petitioner. When the DENR personnel arrived at the petitioner’s house, the lumbers were lying under the
latter’s house and at the shoreline about two meters away from the house of the petitioner. It isclear, therefore, that
the said lumber is plainly exposed to sight. Hence, the seizure of the lumber outside the petitioner’s house falls
within the purview of the plain view doctrine.

Besides, the DENR personnel had the authority to arrest the petitioner, even without a warrant. Section 8025 of the
Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of the DENR or any personnel of the Philippine National
Police to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the
offenses defined by the Forestry Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in committing the
offense orthe forest products gathered or taken by the offender. Clearly, in the course ofsuch lawful intrusion, the
DENR personnel had inadvertently come across the lumber which evidently incriminated the petitioner.

The fact of possession by the petitioner of the 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber, as well as her subsequent failure to
produce the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations constitute criminal liability for
violation of the Forestry Code. Under Section 68 of the Forestry Code, there are two distinctand separate offenses
punished, namely: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land withoutany authority; and (2)
possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and
regulations.26

In the second offense, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products
are legal or not. Mere possession of forest products withoutthe proper documents consummates the crime. Whether
or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because the Forestry Code is a special law which
considers mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper documentation as malum
prohibitum.27

In the present case, the magsihagonlumber were admittedly owned by the petitioner but unfortunately no permit
evidencing authority to possess said lumber was duly presented. Thus, the Information correctly charged the
petitioner with the second offense which is consummated by the mere possession of forest products without the
proper documents. The prosecution adduced several documents to prove that the lumber was confiscated from the
petitioner, namely: a Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated on March
15, 1994, seizure receipt, a photograph of the house of the petitioner, and a photograph of the confiscated lumber.
Moreso, the direct and affirmative testimony of the DENR personnel as state witnesses on the circumstances
surrounding the apprehension well establishes the petitioner’s liability.

As to the imposable penalty on the petitioner, the RTC imposed an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayoras minimum to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayoras maximum.

The Court does not agree. This Court notes that the estimated value of the confiscated pieces of lumber, as
appearing in the Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated is ₱9,040.00
which is alleged in the Information. However, except for the testimonies of Abaniel and Butal that this amount is the
estimate based on prevailing local price as stated in the apprehension receipt they issued, the prosecution did not
present any proof as tothe value of the lumber.

Clearly, this evidence does not suffice. The Court had ruled that in order to prove the amount of the property taken
for fixing the penalty imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the
prosecution must present more than a mereuncorroborated "estimate" of such fact. In the absence of independent
and reliable corroboration of such estimate, courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the
value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case.28 Hence, the lower court erred in
finding that the value of the confiscated lumber is ₱9,040.00 for no evidence of such value was established during
the trial.

Accordingly, the Court imposes on the petitioner the minimum penalty under Article 309(6)29 of the RPC, whichis
arresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods. However, considering that violation of Section 68 of the Forestry
Code is punished as Qualified Theft under Article 31030 in relation to Article 309 of the RPC, the statutory penalty
shall be increased by two degrees, that is, to prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods or within the
range ofthree (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10)
days, considering that there are no attending mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
offense.

In accordance with current jurisprudence31 and taking into account the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court finds
it proper to impose on the petitioner, in view of the circumstances obtaining here, the penalty of frmr (4) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional, as maximum. WHEREFORE, the Decision on August 12, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Talibon,
Bohol, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 96-27, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Ma. Mimie
Crescencio is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four ( 4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO R. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Additional member per Special Order No. 1872 dated November 4, 2014 vice Associate Justice Francis H.
Jardeleza.

1
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without License. Any person
who shall cut, gather, collect, removed timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That
in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty,
be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery, equipment,
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.

2
Revising PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 389, otherwise known AS THE FORESTRY REFORM CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES.

3
Amending Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines, for the purpose of penalizing possession of timber or other forest products
without the legal documents required by existing forest laws, authorizing the confiscation of illegally cut,
gathered, removed and possessed forest products, and granting rewards to informers of violations of
forestry laws, rules and regulations.