A Tenth-Century Byzantine

Military Manual: The Sylloge

Tacticorum

The Sylloge Tacticorum is a mid-Byzantine example of the literary genre of mili-

tary manuals or Taktika which stretches back to antiquity. It was one of a num-
ber produced during the tenth century CE, a period when the Byzantine empire
enjoyed a large measure of success in its wars against its traditional enemy, the
Arabs. Compiled to record and preserve military strategies, know-how, and tac-
tics, the manual discusses a wide variety of matters: battle formations, raids,
sieges, ambushes, surprise attacks, the treatment of prisoners of war and defec-
tors, distribution of booty, punishment of military offences, how to mount effec-
tive espionage, and how to send and receive envoys. There is even advice on the
personal qualities required by generals, on how to neutralize enemy horses, and
on how to protect the troops against poisoned food. The work culminates in an
account of the stratagems employed by great Greek and Roman military com-
manders of the past. While, like so much of Byzantine literature, the Sylloge often
simply reproduces material found in earlier texts, it also preserves a great deal
of information about the military tactics being developed by the Byzantine army
during the tenth century. It is the first Byzantine source to record the reappearance
of a specialized heavy cavalry (the kataphraktoi) and of a specialized infantry (the
menavlatoi) used to repel the attacks of the opposing heavy cavalry. There is also
a great deal of information on new infantry and cavalry formations and on the new
tactics that required them.
This is the first complete translation of the Sylloge into English. It is accom-
panied by a glossary of the specialised Greek military vocabulary used in the
work and by footnotes which explain obscure references and identify the author’s
classical and Byzantine sources. An introduction places the work in its historical
and literary context and considers some of the questions that have remained unan-
swered over the centuries, such as its authorship and the date of its composition.

Georgios Chatzelis is a PhD student at Royal Holloway University of London, UK.

Jonathan Harris is Professor of the History of Byzantium at Royal Holloway

University of London, UK.
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A Tenth-Century Byzantine Military Manual

The Sylloge Tacticorum
Translated by Georgios Chatzelis and Jonathan Harris

Centre for Byzantine, Ottoman and Modern Greek Studies

University of Birmingham
A Tenth-Century Byzantine
Military Manual: The Sylloge
Tacticorum

Translated by
Georgios Chatzelis and
Jonathan Harris
First published 2017
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2017 Georgios Chatzelis and Jonathan Harris
The right of Georgios Chatzelis and Jonathan Harris to be identified
as translators and authors of this work has been asserted by them in
accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
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Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Chatzelis, Georgios, translator. | Harris, Jonathan, translator.
Title: A tenth-century Byzantine military manual : the Sylloge tacticorum /
translated by Georgios Chatzelis and Jonathan Harris.
Other titles: Sylloge tacticorum. English | Sylloge tacticorum
Description: Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, New York, NY : Routledge,
[2017] | Series: Birmingham Byzantine and Ottoman studies | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017002087 | ISBN 9781472470287 (hardback : alk.
paper) | ISBN 9781315565316 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Military art and science—Early works to 1800. |
Tactics—Early works to 1800. | Byzantine Empire. Stratos—Drill
and tactics.
Classification: LCC U43.B9 S95 2017 | DDC 355.4/749509021—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017002087
ISBN: 978-1-4724-7028-7 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-56531-6 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
by Apex CoVantage, LLC
Birmingham Byzantine and Ottoman Studies Volume 22
To Aristeides and Lemonia, for their sacrifices
Contents

Acknowledgementsviii
List of abbreviationsix
Glossaryx
Conventions used in the translationxii

Introduction1

Translation13

Notes119
Bibliography151
Index165
Acknowledgements

The translators would like to express their thanks to Andy Antzara, Charalam-
bos Dendrinos, David Gwynn, Eirene Harvalia-Crook, and Chrysa Zizopoulou
for their help, advice, and information and to Michael Greenwood of Routledge
and John Smedley of Ashgate for facilitating the acceptance and publication of
the volume. When it came to the production stage, they were fortunate to have
the assistance of Sheri Sipka and her colleagues at Apex CoVantage whose hard
work and eye for detail smoothed the path to the press. Their greatest debt is to
John Haldon, whose careful reading of the translation and introduction yielded
numerous and extremely valuable corrections, suggestions, and improvements.
Lastly, they would like to record their appreciation to the late Frank Trombley
(1947–2015) who, by supervising Georgios Chatzelis’s MA dissertation, helped
to lay the foundations of this translation.
Abbreviations

AB = Anonymous (1746). ‘Apparatus Bellicus’. In I. Lamis (ed.). Ioannis Meursi

Operum Volumen Septimum. 905–84. Florence: Regiis Magni Etruriae Ducis
typis
CFHB = Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae
CSHB = Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae
H = Anonymous (1887). ‘Hypothesis’. In J. Melber (ed.) Polyaeni Strategematon
Libri Octo. 427–500. Leipzig: Teubner
L = Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Florence, Ms Laurentianus Plut. 75–6
LT = Leo VI (2014). The Taktika of Leo VI. Ed. and trans. G.T. Dennis. 2nd ed.
CFHB 49. Washington DC: Dumbarton Oaks
MS = Maurice (1981). Das Strategikon des Maurikios. Ed. G.T. Dennis and trans.
E. Gamillscheg. Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
ODB = Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, ed. A.P. Kazhdan et al. Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press
OT = Anonymous (1947). De Obsidione Toleranda. Ed. H. van den Berg. Leiden:
Brill (reprint)
PG = J-P. Migne (1857–66), Patrologia Cursus Completus, Ser: Graeco-Latina.
161 vols. Paris: Migne
PP = Anonymous (2000). ‘Parangelmata Poliorcetica’. In D.F. Sullivan (ed. and
trans.) Siegecraft, Two Tenth-Century Instructional Manuals by ‘Heron of Byz-
antium’. 26–113. Washington DC: Dumbarton Oaks
PS = Syrianos Magistros (1985). ‘Peri Strategias’. In G.T. Dennis (ed. and trans.)
Three Byzantine Military Treatises. 11–135. CFHB 25. Washington DC: Dum-
barton Oaks
ST = Sylloge Tacticorum
Glossary

Allagion (plural: allagia) = Unit similar in numbers to a bandon

Bandon (plural: banda) = Unit of between fifty and 400 soldiers
Cheiropsella = Armour to protect the arms
Defensores = Troops in close order who supported assault troops
Dekarchia = Unit of ten soldiers
Dekarchos (plural: dekarchoi) = Commander of a dekarchia
Droungarios (plural: droungarioi) = Commander of a Droungos
Droungos (plural: droungoi) = Military detachment, smaller than a tourma
Ekatontarchos (plural: ekatontarchoi) = Commander of one hundred men
Epistates (plural: epistatai) = Second man in a file
Kataphraktos (plural: kataphraktoi) = Heavily armoured cavalryman
Kentarchos (plural: kentarchoi) = See ekatontarchos
Klibanion (plural: klibania) = Suit of lamellar body armour
Komes (plural: kometes) = Leader of a bandon
Koursatores = Light cavalry and, in ST particularly, that used for plundering
enemy territory
Kribantes = Auxiliary soldiers
Lochagos (plural: lochagoi) = Commander of a lochos
Lochos (plural: lochoi) = File of sixteen soldiers
Lorikion (plural: lorikia) = Type of armour
Menavlatos (plural: menavlatoi) = Soldier armed with a menavlion
Menavlion or menavlon (plural: menavlia) = Sturdy spear used for thrusting
Paramerion (plural: parameria) = Sword worn on the waist belt
Pentarchia = Unit of five men
Pentarchos (plural: pentarchoi) = Commander of a pentarchia
Pentekontarchos (plural: pentekontarchoi) = Commander of fifty men
Podopsella = Armour to protect the legs
Prokoursatores = Light cavalry who scouted ahead of the main army
Saka = Usually second line in a formation, but in the ST, the last line of battle in
general
Satrap = Governor of a province of the Persian empire
Stratiotes (plural: stratiotai) = Byzantine soldier holding land in return for mili-
tary service
 Glossary xi
Syntelestai = Taxpayers who shared the fiscal expenses of the poorer stratiotai in
order to fulfil their military obligations
Syskouton = Close infantry formation with locked shields
Tagma (plural: tagmata) = Originally, regiments under the direct command of
the emperor, but often used simply to mean a unit
Tagmatarches (plural: tagmatarchai) = Commander of a tagma
Taxiarchos (plural: taxiarchoi) = Commander of a taxis
Taxis (plural: taxai) = Formation or unit
Tetrachia = Unit of four men
Tetrarchos (plural: tetrarchoi) = Commander of a tetrachia
Thema (plural: themata) = Provinces of the Byzantine empire where stratiotai
were given land for military service
Tourma (plural: tourmai) = Military detachment of about three thousand men
Tourmarches (plural: tourmarchai) = Commander of a tourma
Vigla (plural: viglai) = Watchman, guard
Conventions used in the translation

* = Material supplied by the copyists in the margin of L

[] = Supplied by the translators
< > = Supplied by the editor of the 1938 edition, Alphonse Dain
Introduction

The Sylloge Tacticorum, or Συλλογή Τακτικών (hereafter ST), is a tenth-century

Byzantine handbook of military tactics, written in Greek. Its title translates as
A Compilation of Tactics and it belongs to the literary genre of military
handbooks or Taktika, which stretches back to antiquity. The earliest
extant example is from the fourth century BCE, the work of Aeneas the
Tactician, a Greek author who wrote on how to withstand a siege. Subse-
quent handbooks were produced by Asclepiodotus (fl. 40 CE), Onasander
(fl. 50 CE), Aelian Tacticus (fl. 120 CE), and Polyaenus (fl. 165 CE), all of
whom wrote in Greek. Such works continued to be produced until the late
sixth or early seventh century, when the influential military treatise known
as the Strategikon of Emperor Maurice (582–602 CE) appeared (hereaf-
ter MS).1 Thereafter there was a gap of some centuries until political and
cultural developments prompted the revival of the genre in the ninth- and
tenth-century Byzantine empire.

The historical context

It is likely that the ST was compiled in the Byzantine capital of Constan-
tinople, probably at some point during the first half of the tenth century
CE. It was a period when the Byzantine empire was ruled by the Mac-
edonian dynasty, which had been established by Emperor Basil I (867–
86). Basil’s sons Leo VI (886–912) and Alexander (912–13), and his
grandson, Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos (913–59), continued the
line which was to endure until 1056. Dynastic continuity was threatened
in 919, however, when Romanos Lekapenos, the admiral of the Byzan-
tine fleet, seized power in Constantinople. Crowned emperor as Roma-
nos I (920–44) the following year, he ruled alongside the legitimate
emperor Constantine VII, who was still only a child. Doubtless Roma-
nos hoped to substitute his own family as Byzantium’s ruling dynasty
in due course and as a step towards that he arranged the marriage of
2 Introduction
Constantine VII to his own daughter Helena. Romanos’s hopes were
thwarted when he was overthrown and exiled by his sons in 944. Con-
stantine VII, who was now grown up, was then able to reassert himself,
oust the Lekapenos family, and resume rule as sole emperor from 945
until his death in 959.
The dynastic uncertainty in Constantinople in the early tenth century
made the Byzantine empire vulnerable to attack. The greatest threat did
not come from the traditional enemy, the Abbasid Caliphate. The border
between Christian Byzantium and the Islamic caliphate in eastern Asia
Minor had long since been stabilised so that Arab-Byzantine warfare now
largely took the form of annual raids across the border which aimed only
to seize plunder and captives before withdrawing as quickly as possible.
Apart from that, defence, fortification, and consolidation were the main
preoccupations of both sides and from 720 to the third decade of the tenth
century the eastern frontier remained more or less unchanged.2 Rather,
the challenge came from the west, from Byzantium’s other long-standing
enemy, the Bulgars. Taking advantage of Byzantine weakness during
the minority of Constantine VII, the Bulgar khan Symeon (893–927)
expanded his territory into Thrace and Macedonia, wiped out a Byzan-
tine army at the battle of Achelous in 917, and twice brought his forces
to the very walls of Constantinople. Those fortifications and some astute
diplomacy held the Bulgars at bay until Symeon’s sudden death in 927.
Thereafter a treaty and marriage alliance with Symeon’s successor Peter
(927–69) preserved the peace between Byzantium and Bulgaria for forty
years.
Relieved from the threat in the west, the Byzantines were free to pur-
sue a more aggressive strategy on the eastern frontier, taking advantage
of the increasing weakness of the Abbasid caliphate. Their initial aim
seems to have been to neutralise the bases from which Arab raids into
Asia Minor had been launched for centuries: the towns of Melitene and
Theodosioupolis. The strategic fortresses of Marash, Samosata, and al-
Hadath were also repeatedly attacked. During the reign of Romanos I,
these campaigns were led by the leading Byzantine general of the day,
John Kourkouas, who held the office of the domestic of the scholae.3
The first attack took place in 926, when Kourkouas succeeded in break-
ing into Melitene for a short time before being repulsed. The following
year, Samosata was captured and sacked and Theodosioupolis was briefly
captured in around 930.4 The response of the Abbasid caliph al-Muqtadir
(908–32) to these attacks was to create autonomous or semi-autonomous
districts on the frontier so that defence could be organised locally. The
 Introduction 3
cities of Tarsus and Melitene, which had had their own autonomous emirs
for years, possibly served as a model for that practice, which was now
extended to northern Mesopotamia where the Hamdanid family provided
a series of militarily very able emirs.5 Even so Melitene finally fell to
John Kourkouas in 934. For the next ten years, Kourkouas was able to
mount a series of successful raids into Arab territory, reaching as far as
Edessa in 944. The Byzantine army had not ventured as far east as that
for three centuries.6 Constantine VII continued Romanos I’s policy after
945. Following an unsuccessful attempt to retake the island of Crete in
949, Constantine focused his entire resources on the eastern frontier. The
Byzantines pushed further and further into the frontier zone every year,
although they often found that their attacks were parried by the formida-
ble Hamdanid emir, Sayf ad-Dawla (945–67). Cities and key fortresses
such as Marash and al-Hadath were repeatedly stormed and raids were
mounted into the heart of the Hamdanid emirate. Cities which had been
taken several times in the past were now definitively annexed: Theodo-
sioupolis in 949 and Samosata in 958.7 These successes set the stage for
the even more dramatic Byzantine expansion in the east that was to take
place during the second half of the tenth century.8

The literary context

The changing military situation on the eastern frontier provided much of
the impetus for the production of military handbooks such as the ST. There
was, however, a literary and cultural dimension to these works as well. The
ST was the product of the Byzantine literary revival known as the Mac-
edonian renaissance. The term is misleading because the revival long pre-
dated the accession of the Macedonian dynasty in 867 and signs of it can
already be detected during the 780s.9 As the direct threat to the Byzantine
empire’s existence faded, literacy and education began to revive. Unlike
in the contemporary Christian west, where learning was the monopoly of
the Church, in Byzantium education was available at a very high level
to lay people and an important step in making it more widely accessible
was taken in 857 when the University of Constantinople was refounded
in the Magnaura palace with a view to providing educated administrators
for the imperial bureaucracy.10 The main concern of this educational and
literary revival was not so much the development of new curricula or the
production of new and original work but rather the teaching and preserva-
tion of the literature of the past, especially that written in classical Greek
in ancient and Hellenistic times. The curriculum at the new university
4 Introduction
involved the reading, appreciation, and imitation of ancient authors such
as Homer, Plato, Euclid, and Lucian and the late ninth and tenth centuries
were marked by a sudden increase in manuscript production of the works
of classical authors such as these, which were now in demand from wealthy
patrons. Another way in which the legacy of the past was preserved and
disseminated was through the compilation of handbooks. These were not
only reference manuals which described contemporary practices but also
compilations of ancient wisdom. An early example was the Kletorologion
of Philotheos, completed in 899, which listed the ranks and ceremonial
of the Byzantine court in Constantinople.11 The court of Constantine VII
was a centre for the production of such works. The emperor himself was
a well-educated man and one of his primary concerns, according to a con-
temporary, was bringing new life to what had been lost in the course of
time.12 As part of that concern, Constantine oversaw the compilation of
a number of handbooks which preserved information about the empire’s
administrative structure, its ceremonial, its history, its diplomacy, agricul-
tural methods, and even its veterinary practices.
It was during this period, and with the same end in view, that the first
Byzantine military handbooks since the early seventh century were pro-
duced, doubtless in conscious imitation of the military handbooks of antiq-
uity. The earliest that survives is the Peri Strategias of Syrianos Magistros
(hereafter PS) which seems to date from the ninth century, rather from the
sixth as was once thought.13 The Taktika, which is attributed to Emperor
Leo VI (hereafter LT) and which was completed in the early tenth century,
is a compilation of military practices, many of them drawn from ancient
authorities. The Praecepta Militaria, which is attributed to the emperor
Nikephoros II Phokas (963–9), belongs to the second half of the tenth
century. As a literary production, the ST belongs to this milieu, although
the exact date at which it was compiled is somewhat problematic and will
be discussed below.

The scope and significance of the text

The ST, as it has come down to us, consists of 102 chapters which can be
divided in three clear sections. The first section comprises chapters 1 to
56, where a wide variety of military matters is discussed including gener-
alship, sieges, battle formations, marching formations, division of booty,
defence against enemy raids, the conduct of raids, mounting of ambushes,
pitching camp, posting of officers, espionage, and the conclusion of truces.
The second section comprises chapters 57 to 75, which contain informa-
tion on what might be termed ‘war by other means’: how to protect the
 Introduction 5
army against poisoned food or drink, the preparation of poisonous arrows,
the use of flammable mixtures, and how to bring down enemy horses. The
third and final section comprises chapters 76 to 102, all of which contain
anecdotes about stratagems practised by ancient Greek and Roman mili-
tary commanders.
The ST is a typical product of the Macedonian renaissance in that
much of its material is recycled from previous works. Some passages are
clearly derived from earlier Byzantine works such as the LT, others from
classical writers such as Onasander. Nevertheless, it does reflect the par-
ticular conditions and concerns of the time of its composition, the early
tenth century, especially the different type of army that the new strate-
gic goals and aggressive policy on the eastern frontier would require.
In the past, when defence against annual Arab raids had been the prior-
ity, the backbone of the Byzantine army had been the stratiotai, soldiers
who held land in return for military service in the provinces known as
themata. There had also been a small permanent force under the direct
command of the emperor, known as the tagmata. In the new conditions,
the professional soldiers of the tagmata became much more prominent
than the part-time ones of the themata. A strong, disciplined, special-
ised infantry and cavalry would be essential to support and protect each
other during the march into hostile territory as well as during battles and
sieges. It became more and more important to stand and fight in a disci-
plined formation. That had never been the major priority of the armies of
the themata, whose main tactic had been to shadow Arab raiding parties,
picking off stragglers and avoiding pitched battles. In response to the
opportunities for attacks into Arab territory in the early tenth century, the
Byzantine army evolved new tactics, fighting in a hollow square forma-
tion, where the infantry served as a mobile operation base for the cav-
alry. Units became more specialised with an army typically comprising
heavy, light, and medium infantry; menavlatoi; kataphraktoi; lancers;
and horse-archers. In contrast to earlier military manuals such as the PS
and the LT, the ST is the first treatise to record the use of these kinds of
tactics.14

The date and authorship of the text

The dating of the ST is problematic even though, unusually for a Byz-
antine text, it gives a relatively precise time for its own composition in
the title: the year 6412 since the Creation, which works out to 903–4 CE.
For a long time, this date was universally accepted. The German classi-
cal scholar Friedrich Haase (1808–67) even used it to argue that the ST
6 Introduction
pre-dated the LT.15 Later generations were increasingly sceptical, partly
because the ST reads so differently from the PS and the LT and contains
much material that is not found in them. It has also been pointed out that
the oldest surviving manuscript of the work contains the Hippiatrica and
medical treatises that are attributed to Constantine VII so that some schol-
ars have concluded that the ST may well have been composed at the same
time as these works, perhaps around 950.16 There is, however, currently
no consensus on the dating issue. Taxiarchis Kolias has rejected the thesis
that the ST dates from the reign of Constantine VII. He argues instead that
the material of the treatise fits better into the context of the first half of the
tenth century, rather than the second. According to Kolias, the appearance
of the menavlatoi and the kataphraktoi cannot be used to support a dating
around 950, as their appearance in the ST could just as well be used in the
opposite way, namely to suggest that these forms of armament appeared
earlier in the tenth century.17 John Haldon has also questioned matters of
dating and tradition, considering whether the text was originally written in
the time of Leo VI but was later revised with the addition of material that
seems to come from the 950s.18 At the far end of the spectrum, it has even
been argued that the ST should be dated to the late tenth century or the
beginning of the eleventh.19
Current research is seeking to redate the work to the period 920–44.20 The
starting point for this argument is methodology proposed by Gilbert Dagron
(1932–2015) to determine the time at which a military treatise was written.
Dagron identified references to military innovations and technology, atten-
tion paid to enemy tactics, and the administrative and socio-political context
as the three main determinants.21 The internal evidence of the ST provides us
with certain information which, on the basis of Dagron’s criteria, strongly
suggests the second to fourth decades of the tenth century. As far as the first
is concerned, the Sylloge preserves a number of innovations which seem
to belong to the middle point of evolution between the Taktika of Leo VI
and the Praecepta Militaria of Nikephoros II Phokas. The many similari-
ties with LT, together with the gradual evolution in tactics and technology,
seem to fit with a time which was still close to the reign of Leo VI, but long
enough after to allow for these changes to have taken place. What is more,
the frequent offensives which occurred for the first time in this period seem
to provide a very appropriate context which justifies these developments. As
regards the second criterion, the Sylloge does not provide much new infor-
mation about enemy tactics but many of the Byzantine innovations that it
records correspond with developments in the Arab armies which took place
between 900 and 936, and could indeed be seen as a response to them. Last
but not least, the Sylloge describes a political and administrative context
 Introduction 7
which fits best with the first half of the tenth century. The military hierarchy
and ranks are almost identical to those of Leo VI, with just a few changes
which are by no means as radical as those recorded from the reign of Con-
stantine VII, around 950. Thus the reign of Romanos I Lekapenos appears
to be the most attractive period for the dating of the text.
The issue of authorship is closely related to that of the date, for the
title of the ST specifically attributes the work to Emperor Leo VI. Again,
the information in the title was accepted at face value for many years. In
his monumental history of Byzantine literature, published in 1887, Karl
Krumbacher (1856–1909) treated the ST as an additional work to the LT.22
Yet from an early stage there were those who were not convinced, again
mainly because the ST and the LT have such different styles and mate-
rial. One suggestion was that the work might have been written by Leo’s
brother and briefly reigning successor, Alexander.23 Current research is
investigating the possibility that the ST was written by or under the aus-
pices of Romanos I Lekapenos but that the attribution was changed during
the reign of Constantine VII, who hated his father-in-law for his intrusion
into the rights of the Macedonian dynasty. The substitution of Leo’s name
was a kind of damnatio memoriae, designed to withhold from Romanos
the credit for the achievements of his reign.24 Even if Romanos’s original
authorship or sponsorship of the text is accepted, it seems clear that more
than one author had a hand in its creation. After its initial composition, it
would seem that the ST was revised and edited at some later stage before
it was copied into the version that now exists. The relatively late date of
the oldest surviving manuscript and the fact that only one group of manu-
scripts survives, however, make it impossible to be certain how the origi-
nal version of the ST would have looked.

Sources of the text

Much of the information given by the author of the ST is clearly derived from
earlier texts. Previous Byzantine military manuals were quarried extensively,
including the MS, the PS, and the LT. Moreover, as was typical of Byzan-
tine literature of this period, the ST incorporates a large amount of material
derived from ancient Greek literature produced before 200 CE, including
the works of Isocrates, Onasander, Aelian Tacticus, and the work known as
the Hypothesis, a Byzantine treatise consisting of excerpts from Polyaenus.
It is likely too that the author of the ST used some intermediate sources that
are now no longer extant, although there has been some debate on this issue.
Some students of the text have envisaged two such lost sources, labelled Cor-
pus Perditum and Tactica Perdita, while others accept only one.25 At present,
8 Introduction
the most that can be said is that parts of the ST are clearly derived from a
lost source or sources but a great deal of the earlier material reworked by its
author can be identified and, where this is possible, it is noted in the footnotes
to the translation.26

The manuscript
The Greek text of the ST is preserved in three extant manuscripts. The
oldest, Laurentianus Plut. 75.6 (hereafter L), is in the Biblioteca Medicea
Laurenziana in Florence, a codex measuring 190 by 270 mm and consist-
ing of 278 folios in total. It is a later copy of the work, most probably
dating to the fourteenth or early fifteenth century, several hundred years
after the ST was first composed. The earliest evidence for the existence of
this manuscript dates from 1491. It was one of a number of items which
the Greek émigré scholar Janus Laskaris (1444/5–1534) brought back
from Corfu to Italy when he was on the second of two visits to Greece
which he undertook in search of Greek manuscripts for his patron, the
Florentine statesman, Lorenzo de’ Medici (1449–92). The manuscript did
not directly go to Lorenzo’s collection, however, as it was not until 1508
that it appears in the inventory of guardians of the Laurenziana Library
as number 381. It is also recorded on folio 108v of the so-called list of
Hannover, which is a list of works and authors featuring in the books that
Laskaris brought to Florence when he returned from his travels. It has
remained in Florence ever since.27 The other two manuscripts are more
recent copies. Bernensis 97, in the Swiss National Library in Bern, is a
direct copy of L and dates from the sixteenth century. Parisinus ms grec
2446, in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, is in turn a direct copy of the
Bernensis and dates from the seventeenth century. It is therefore L that
provides the primary authority for the text. It was copied by two different
scribes. The first wrote from the beginning up to the end of chapter 67,
whereupon a second hand continued the work up to the end.28 Daniele
Bianconi has suggested that two scribes from the circle of the Byzan-
tine scholar Nikephoros Gregoras (c.1291–c.1360), Krateros and another
known as ‘Anonymous G’, may have taken part in the creation of L and
that Krateros may even have been one of the copyists of the ST.29 Never-
theless, the exact identification of the hands which copied the ST remains
elusive.
L contains a number of other works besides the ST. Folios 1–71 con-
tain medical treatises, some of which are dedicated to Emperor Constan-
tine VII. Folios 116–24 preserve a series of military laws and martial
 Introduction 9
hymns, which both have since been edited and published.30 After that,
folios 124–247 are devoted the Hippiatrica, a veterinary treatise, which
was probably another of the handbooks written under the auspices of
Constantine VII.31 The remaining folios (247–75) are filled with various
treatises, mostly quite brief, some of which are dedicated to medicine
or geography.32 The ST occupies folios 72r–116r and a table of contents
(pinax) with the title of each chapter appearing on folios 72r–73v. How-
ever, the table of contents continues over to folios 73v–74v to cover not
only the contents of the ST, but also those of the other two works that fol-
low in the manuscript. That would suggest that the table of contents was
not initially part of the ST, but that it was added at a later date, when the
ST was included in a corpus dedicated to military matters that included
all three works, and thus the pinax served as a general table of contents
for the whole codex.33
L clearly does not preserve the work in its entirety as originally written.
In the first place, chapters 68 to 73 and half of chapter 74 are listed in the
table of contents but missing in the text. Second, in spite the fact that the
second title of the treatise states that it will cover strategic deeds of ancient
men in twenty-eight chapters, only twenty-seven appear in the treatise,
suggesting that one chapter has been lost.34 The first scribe, whoever he
was, made a note about the missing chapters in the margins of L, reporting
that they were already missing from the manuscript that he had copied. He
attempted to fill in some of the missing chapters in the margin of the manu-
script, using a lost source. Unfortunately, in spite of the fact that the table
of contents preserved the original titles, the missing chapters were filled up
in the wrong order. To add to the confusion, one of the added chapters (71)
does not correspond with any of the original chapters of the ST, as found
in the table of contents.
Also missing from all three surviving manuscripts are the illustrations.
According to the author of the ST, the manual originally included two
diagrams of infantry formations.35 The first one seems to have depicted
an array consisting exclusively of infantry, while the second one probably
illustrated a battle order in which the infantry were drawn up in a square
and the cavalry was stationed inside the formation. A small figure of the
second diagram is preserved in the lower right margin of folio 95r in L. It
bears little resemblance to surviving diagrams in other military treatises
such as the MS, so it is probably not a direct copy of the original one. More
likely it was designed by one of the later copyists to clarify the guidelines
found in the text and to make up for the absence of the original. The loss
of the diagrams is particularly regrettable.
10 Introduction
Editions and translations of the text
The first modern scholar to draw attention to the existence of the ST was
Angelo-Maria Bandini (1726–1803), the librarian of the Laurenziana. He
included L and the various works preserved in it in the catalogue of the
library’s manuscripts which he published in 1764–70. He did not publish
the text of the ST, however, but merely described some of its contents.36
The first edition of the ST appeared in 1854 when it was included in the
two-volume work of the German philologist, Hermann Köchly (1815–76).
This edition was unsatisfactory in many ways. It only included a selection
of the ST’s chapters (31–5, 38–9, 41–3, and 53–5) and the text was based
not on L but on the later copy, Bernensis 97, to which Köchly had easy
access.37 Nevertheless, for some years Köchly’s was the only available edi-
tion and in 1863 Jacques-Paul Migne (1800–75) included it in the Patrolo-
gia Graeca with the addition of a facing Latin translation.38 Subsequently
three partial editions appeared. In 1887, Johannes Melber, together with
the Swiss classicist Eduard Wölfflin (1831–1908), published an edition of
Polyaenus. Their volume also included those chapters of the ST (76–102)
which ultimately derive from Polyaenus, the text being based on L.39 In
1917, Rudolph (or Reszö) Vári included some previously unedited chap-
ters of the ST as a sort of a critical apparatus, to accompany his edition
of the LT, in order to compare and contrast the information given there.
Some of his quoted sections from the ST are no more than a word or a
sentence long, however.40 The last partial edition appeared in 1932, when
Jean-René Vieillefond edited chapters 57 to 75 as part of his study of the
work of Julius Africanus, one of the possible sources of the ST. He also
added a useful study regarding the sources and the date of the ST.41
The first and only complete edition of the ST, based on L, was published
by Alphonse Dain (1896–1964) in 1938. He included all the chapters of
the manual in his edition, as well as the chapters that were added by the
copyists in the margins of the manuscript. It is worth noting here that Dain
was one of the most influential scholars to have shaped our knowledge of
the ST and of Byzantine military manuals in general. He was the author
of numerous related books on military manuals from antiquity up to the
eleventh century, and investigated the thorny issues of lost works, adapta-
tions, and interpolations. His work is also of vital importance to the study
of manuscripts that preserve military treatises either as prototypes or as
later copies. Although now outdated in some respects, his books and arti-
cles still remain invaluable and among the standard works of reference.
A monumental article, published posthumously with Jules-Albert de Fou-
cault, provides a synopsis of a lifetime of scholarship.42
 Introduction 11
As regards translations, some parts of the ST have been rendered into
modern European languages. In 1939, Dain produced a French transla-
tion of the five chapters that the copyist of L inserted into the margins to
complete the missing part of the ST and in 1994 Everett Wheeler pub-
lished the first partial English translation, which included chapters 76 to
102. Wheeler’s translation was based on the text of Wölfflin and Melber
rather than that of Dain but an appendix with the different readings was
included.43 This book presents the first complete translation into English
and it is based on Dain’s text.
Translation

CONTENTS OF THE SYLLOGE TACTICORUM

(­COMPILATION OF TACTICS)

By Leo [VI] the Emperor, Ruler of the Romans, in the Year 6412 [903/904 CE]1

1 Introduction and also what the general should be like and

the number of his qualities 21

2 Which activities the general must approve more than others 27

3 Regarding land measurements 27

4 The general should not fight in person and he should not

be absent during a raid 28

5 In matters of the highest importance, the general ought to

be the first to act in person 28

6 Secret plans should not be shared with the rank and file 29

7 The general should not be carelessly swayed by rumours

and he should not join battle until he knows exactly the
dispositions of the enemy 29

8 The same operations should not always be conducted

repeatedly against the enemy and, in the case of an
imminent engagement, the surrounding landscape should
be reconnoitred as soon as dawn breaks 29

9 If battle is not imminent, the largest part of the army

should not be concentrated in one place 30
14 Translation
10 The general should not destroy his own defences so
as to make the men under his command bolder. It is
advantageous to do so, however, if it becomes evident that
there is a clear danger from not fighting. 30

11 During a siege, the country should not be ravaged

immediately, and what should be done 31

12 One should behave humanely to cities which surrender 32

13 Promises made to traitors should be rigidly adhered to 33

14 One should be prepared before the enemy; and if a rout

takes place, a pitched battle should not be organised
again supposedly in order to rectify the defeat, unless
it is absolutely necessary. Furthermore, as regards the
allies, they should be less numerous than the local army
and it [is] better if they do not consist of only one race. In
addition, they should not be mixed in with the local army,
not only during the march, but also while in camp. 33

15 When battle is expected, it is acceptable then for the

general to be remiss in punishing the soldiers, pretending
that he is ignorant or oblivious of their offences. In
addition, suspects should be removed from their posts
discreetly.34

16 One should be particularly careful in times of truce 34

17 The general should punish the offences of the rank and

file moderately, but he should take action properly against
those of individuals 35

18 The general should keep a steady eye on these two things

before battle 35

19 If the general campaigns in enemy territory, he will fight

more daringly, and one who has a small army should
prepare for battle at sunset 36

20 At the time of battle a large number of trumpets should

not be sounded, nor should the formation have too many
 Translation 15
banners. In addition, the soldiers should remove the
so-called pennons from their spears. 36

21 Concerning day and night outposts and how fires should

be lit 37

22 Concerning the camp and what the general should do

when the enemy attempts to attack it 39

23 Concerning the baggage train and how the army should

safely cross the defiles together with its spoils 41

24 Concerning the so-called ambuscades 43

25 Concerning spies 44

26 Concerning envoys 45

27 Concerning defectors and traitors and that they must

always be watched 45

28 How many types of fighting force there are 46

29 Concerning the types of formations of various peoples 46

30 Armament of the infantry, in the time of the Macedonians

under Philip and Alexander, and the rest of the Greeks 47

31 Cavalry armament of the same time 48

32 Infantry formations of the same time 48

33 Cavalry formations of the same time 49

34 Formations of a compound army of the same period 49

35 What the officers of the army and the tagmata under their
command are named, according to the Romans 50

36 How the stratiotai should be 52

37 How the stratiotes should arm himself 52

16 Translation
38 Armament of the infantry according to the Romans 53

39 Armament of the cavalry according to the same 54

40 The difference between the prokoursatores and

koursatores. And in addition, that after a withdrawal, our
raiders must not be complacent because they have arrived
at the borders of their own territory. 55

41 The names of the military manoeuvres 57

42 The shapes of the formation 58

43 Concerning the depth or thickness and the length of the

infantry as well as cavalry units, and also how much space
the infantryman and the cavalryman occupy in formation.
In addition, about the horizontal and vertical intervals
between the units and also regarding the bowshot. 58

44 What should be done before a battle and, in addition, that

prisoners of war should be trusted more than deserters 60

45 Infantry formations according to the Romans and about

the stationing and arrangement of each 62

46 Cavalry formations according to the same and about the

arrangement and stationing of each 67

47 Compound military formations according to the same, in

which the infantry is always the majority 75

48 Concerning night battle 80

49 Concerning the march of the composite army over level

and rough terrain. In addition, that the army should be
prevented from marching across cultivated places. 81

50 What the general must do after victory and regarding the

distribution of booty. In addition, those who die in battle
are worthy of burial and prisoners of war should not be
slain (and never the most honourable of them) while the
fighting is still in progress. 84
 Translation 17
51 The general must cautiously pursue during enemy retreats
and he should leave behind some lochoi in strategic
[positions], in order to withdraw safely. Furthermore, he
who turns about often during a retreat is asking for battle. 85

52 What the general should do if the enemy attacks

his own territory 86

53 What the general should do under siege 86

54 What the general will do when besieging the enemy 88

55 How a fort located near the enemy borders should be built

quickly without a pitched battle 90

56 The army should be trained by chasing and hunting wild

beasts, but only in times of peace, and how the military
hunt should take place 91

57 How the soldiers may easily be prevented from falling ill

from sun and fatigue 93

58 How the soldiers may become immune to poisonous drugs 93

59 How the soldiers are easily infected with plague by the

enemy through food 94

60 How the soldiers are overpowered by the enemy with wine 94

61 How [our soldiers are overpowered] with water 95

62 How drinking wine makes those who consume it sleepy

for two or three days, and how they wake up 95

63 How trees become desiccated 95

64 How the land becomes unsuitable for agriculture as the

season approaches 95

65 How horses are easily turned to flight 95

66 How horses are killed or made ill from drinking 96

18 Translation
67 How a horse will suddenly collapse and then recover 96

68 How galloping horses will be halted 96

69 How horses will not neigh 96

70 How the so-called liquid fire may be put out and how it
might not burn wood or walls when it is cast
upon them 96

71 How severe bleeding from a wound may be stopped 97

72 How wounded skin may be closed up without stitches 97

73 How both horses and mules may not become infected by

pestilential disease 97

74 How enemy weapons may be burned without fire 97

75 Coating of poisonous arrows 97

76 How written messages may be sent secretly 98

77 The enemy should be deceived through deserters and

consequently enemy deserters should be treated with
caution99

78 In the most urgent matters, the general is the first one

obliged to act in person 101

79 The general must be patient and able to bear hardship 101

80 The enemy’s benevolence must always be treated with

caution102

81 Especially in times of engagement cowards must not be

mingled together with the rest of the troops and how these
men are recognised 103

82 How friends are tested 104

83 Concerning both our own and the enemy spies 104

 Translation 19
84 One should fight at the right time and not at random and
the time which is [suitable] for battle 104

85 It [is] most advantageous to make the enemy suspicious

of his allies 105

86 The army is greatly moved to bravery and courage by the

general’s words and devotion 105

87 How the general could give the impression that his army is
numerous, if he has a small one 107

88 And likewise in turn how the general could give the

impression of a small army if he has a large one 108

89 In time of war the army is assisted by fire and wind 108

90 It [is] always advantageous to divert the enemy 109

91 How the general could make his army vigilant at night 109

92 In addition, how one could safely defeat the enemy

through sleep deprivation 110

93 One should hide one’s own misfortunes while in camp 110

94 How cavalry will easily be defeated by infantry 110

95 The enemy is also overpowered by false reports, feigned

actions, and similar signals 111

96 The general should make sworn agreements as safe

as possible 114

97 Concerning traitors 114

98 The enemy should always be slain mercilessly during a

pitched battle, but those who are in full flight should be
pressed upon more lightly, especially in narrow and
rough places 115

99 How one could retreat safely and without danger 115

20 Translation
100 Moderate punishments should be inflicted on disobedient
soldiers116

101 How one could preserve himself from danger when

returning from a raid, if the enemy attacks him in the
narrow passes 116

102 The general must fight more boldly on occasions when not
fighting presents evident danger 117
BEGINNING OF THE TREATISE ON STRATEGY

1 From the Taktika of Leo the ruler, emperor of the Romans;

introduction and also what the general should be like and the
number of his qualities, in the year 6412 [903/904]
1 When all the army consists exclusively of infantry or cavalry, or even
of both of them together, I think that those who choose to talk about
tactics should in their discussion treat each of the following in detail:
first, to recall the armament and formations of former ages, but then
place greater emphasis on those which are contemporary and close to
our times; further to expound the names of units and leaders, and their
armament and formations and all their doctrines and strategic opera-
tions. Thus those who read this book may have the means to know
accurately about these tactics, namely what has been said and done
by former generals and, on the other hand, anything which has been
devised by more recent ones.
2 Because if the book is ordered in this way, it should be thorough, and
those who read it diligently will not miss their goal in most of the mat-
ters that they seek. First of all, I think that the most important thing
[is] to go through in detail the things that pertain to the general, and to
show with my words how the general must be, and to enumerate his
qualities.
3 Concerning the general. – Above all, the general must be 1) pious; and
also 2) fair; 3) truthful; 4) prudent and not devoted to self-indulgence;
5) firm or undaunted, and brave or courageous; 6) both cunning and
sharp-witted; 7) patient and able to bear hardship; 8) open to counsel;
9) generous and indifferent to money; 10) peaceable and sympathetic;
11) affable and accessible; 12) skilled in speaking; 13) middle-aged;
14) certainly a father of children; 15) highly reputable; 16) rich rather
than poor; and 17) not excessively fearsome, but likewise not too
tolerant.2
22 Translation
4 1) Pious, because we know that piety [is] the safest foundation of all
and it bestows steadfastness and surety on all actions.3
5 2) Fair, because the general must bring himself forward as the stand-
ard for his subordinates. Therefore, if he does not prevent his subordi-
nates from acting unfairly, he will never be able to become free of this.
For not punishing those who act unjustly is the same as being unjust.
Whoever governs lawfully, but is tolerant of those who act unjustly,
will be judged by God with the same measure as those who are unjust.
6 3) Moreover, [he must] of course [be] truthful. Because if the general
proves to be untrue to his promises, he will not be able to accomplish
anything necessary. For neither army, city, nor defector will join him,
and in addition, neither will an allied force stand with him, nor will his
own troops be favourable.
7 4) Prudent, so that he might not abandon his devotion to the most
important [things] by being drawn to physical pleasures.4 Besides,
because the time at which God provides us with trophies and victories
against the enemy is whenever we make a stand against our passions,
and once we are victorious over invisible enemies, we then triumph
over visible ones.5 He who prevails over pleasure, then, is not the one
who refrains from it but he who is not carried away by it despite the
fact that he desires it. Just as for instance with the ship and the horse:
[it is] not the man who does not desire them, but he who wants to
travel somewhere.6
8 He [must] refrain from self-indulgence because extravagant indul-
gences always waste time instead of spending it.7
9 Besides they also do not allow for keeping vigilant in the most impor-
tant matters, because the deliberations of the general take place during
the night, when the many matters of the mind settle down.8
10 5) Furthermore, his spirit [must be] firm or brave and undaunted. Firm,
so as neither to be puffed up in times of victory and likewise not to be
devastated in times of failure, because the nature [of these things is]
common and the future unpredictable. At any rate, the sufferings of
the ancients should be a lesson to contemporaries.9 Additionally, the
firm man should not carelessly believe those who promise to do some-
thing, because he who [is] not steadfast will be regarded by people as
lightweight.10
11 Brave, because while it is by all means advantageous to attempt to live
safely, when danger is expected, one should seek security in battle. For
death is common to all mankind, but to die gloriously is a character-
istic of the great.11 Besides, whenever the enemy is reinforced by the
arrival of an allied force or by some other advantage, and timidity and
 Translation 23
fear befall the army, it is especially then that the general will need to
be seen as brave and undaunted.
12 Cheerful, jovial, and speaking to everybody in person, because the
demeanour of the commanders is always accustomed to make a cor-
responding change in the hearts of their subordinates. And so, when
they see him cheerful, the whole army regains courage, as if there is no
danger. But when, on the other hand, the commanders cower in fear, it
is also usual for the army to let its spirits fall, as if the greatest danger
is manifest.12
13 6) In addition, [the general must be] both cunning and sharp-witted,
as it is safe and advantageous to prevail over the enemy by design and
intelligence or subtlety, rather than with arms or force, since the first is
conducted without harm to us, whereas the second comes with some
kind of loss.13
14 Therefore, one should remember things that have taken place and act
with sagacity in the present, so as to secure those events which will
happen in the future. Besides, when the general knows the minds and
abilities of his subordinates exactly, he firmly dispatches each one for
pressing tasks.14
15 The general must act like a good wrestler; he must show something
different through which he would be able to trick the enemy, but he
must use the right timing and methods so he may prevail without
harming himself. In fact, the wisest generals become distinguished
by keeping this in mind. This becomes possible if attacks against the
enemy are made cunningly and unexpectedly, because if they are con-
ducted thoughtfully, they prove to be effective not only against equal
forces, but also against those which are much superior in size. For
some generals, after receiving envoys from the enemy and speaking
to them with gentle and flattering words, immediately followed and
unexpectedly attacked them.15
16 Others, after they had sent their own envoys along with rather mod-
erate words, unexpectedly made their attack. Some other generals
attacked the enemy during a night with a full moon, two or three hours
before sunrise, after they [had sent envoys] in the very camp of the
enemy and discovered that the enemy had not bivouacked securely.16
17 When others learned that the enemy were unguarded during the march,
they inflicted casualties on them by attacking while they were on the
road. Others suddenly made an assault against the enemy, after they
had concealed themselves in strategic positions. Others again, after
they had pretended to withdraw, attacked the enemy unexpectedly and
defeated17 them by force.
24 Translation
18 Others, after they had sent forward herds of animals and thereby
aroused the enemy to depredation, attacked them irregularly and
turned them to flight. There are also those who attack the enemy in
another way: if there is a river flowing between both camps, especially
if it [is] impassable to the cavalry, commanders have quickly obtained
victory when they have suddenly appeared against the enemy, after a
bridge has been built there and the army has safely crossed over it.
19 7) Patient and able to bear hardship, so that if cold, heat, thirst, hunger,
sleeplessness, or something else of that sort occur, he may not become
weary first among his comrades but last. For the general must partake
more than anybody else in the hardships, but less in the gains, because
in this manner he may acquire every glory for himself.18
20 8) In addition, [he must be] open to counsel, because the general must
deliberate before doing or saying anything. For it will not be seemly
for him to revoke anything of what has been done or said. Foul, slan-
derous, defamatory, and undiscerning men should be equally excluded
from the consultation, because it is never possible for those who have
the habit of mischief to be restored to something better.
21 [The general] must use the better men as commissioners. They will
participate in every consultation and will share their judgement with
him. On account of this, they confirm what he says. Otherwise, if some
of the officers have a different opinion, the general must first deliber-
ate with all the officers, then he must privately confirm the matters
which have been discussed with the two or three closest to him. After
he chooses the best judgement, he should keep it to himself until the
time is right.19
22 For as the decision which is made alone and without assistance is
accustomed to fail for the most part, due to the private character of
the judgement, in the same way the decision which is confirmed by
many is accustomed to furnish both security and certainty to those
who make it.20
23 Consequently, he must neither be so unstable in his thinking, so as not
to trust in himself, nor likewise so stubborn that it is impossible for
something better to be thought, considered, and said by anybody else.
For such a man is compelled either to act multifariously and inconven-
iently, by taking council from everybody and never from himself, or
to place himself and those under him in the greatest danger by always
entrusting everything to himself and not to anyone else.21
24 9) Munificent and indifferent to money, because the general who seeks
money and is a slave to it is destructive towards his own people and
 Translation 25
easily despised by the enemy. Furthermore, if he does not boast the
wisdom and judgement of Solomon, the strength of Samson and Her-
cules, the tactical experience and ability of Cyrus and Alexander, and
the fortune of Caesar, he will not able to accomplish anything benefi-
cial.22 In addition, it was an ordinance of the Roman senate never to
call to power a money-loving and avaricious man.23
25 Munificent, because many of the enemy’s men have betrayed the cities
and armies of their own people, after they were fairly rewarded by the
grants of our generals. Furthermore, our army has sometimes crushed
the greatest of dangers and dared to undertake more than its natural
capacity, after it was most handsomely rewarded by its own generals.
26 There should also be rewards in every case and, in accordance with the
legal customs, those suitable for the general are: armour; military dec-
orations; distribution of booty; horses; promotions to pentekontarchos,
to ekatontarchos, to lochagos, to commander of regiments; and all the
other promotions of rank.24
27 10) He [must] truly be peaceful and sympathetic, because, at the
beginning of the war, the generals should always be careful that they
may become illustrious by fighting for the right cause, and not for the
hope of earnings or profit. For it is then that men face hardships more
willingly, and God becomes favourable and a comrade of the army.25
28 Because they know that they did not begin hostilities, but that they act in
defence, and having their souls free of evil, they deploy their full bravery.
The general, therefore, should be warlike in his knowledge and prepara-
tions, but also peaceful, as long as this does not outweigh in any way the
fulfilment of duty.26
29 11) Nevertheless, [he should] also [be] affable and accessible, because
one should receive everyone who wants to report, both slaves and free
men, during the day and during the night, while on the march and
while in camp, and during bathing and eating. For they who procras-
tinate and [are] not easily accessible and who order their retinue to
send away those who approach, fail utterly in many great affairs and
generally such men err by being idle. [This is] because sometimes
some of those who want to report come forward and sensibly proclaim
something which can be anticipated by the course of events, but also
because a stiff and solitary mind in the presence of everybody [is]
too much of an evil: it makes him who possesses it hateful and it is
regarded as the worst of all evils.27
30 12) As regards speaking, the general [must be] skilled, because
I believe that the greatest benefit can be given to the army from that.
26 Translation
For if the general draws up his army for battle, the exhortation of his
speech will make it despise all hardships and desire all the commen-
dations. Moreover, the sound of the calling trumpet does not arouse
the heart to strength as much as the <speech>, given to urge valour in
times of battle, revives the spirit to its height against dangers. If some
disaster were ever to befall the army, an encouraging speech would
refresh hearts. In addition, if the general’s speech is competent, it is
more useful to encourage the army during misfortunes than the doc-
tors who approach the wounded.28
31 This is because the doctors only treat the wounded with their medi-
cines, whereas the general both encourages the distressed and fur-
thermore revives the uninjured to courage. Moreover, just as invisible
diseases are more difficult to treat than visible ones, it is likewise more
difficult to cure a heart with lack of spirit than to heal the diseases
of the body. The general who is incapable of giving a speech should
never be chosen, since no general in his right mind dispatches an army
without giving a speech.29
32 13) Being middle-aged, namely neither young nor old, since the first
cannot inspire confidence and the second [is] weak, whereas he who is
neither of the two [is] steadfast. This is so that a young general should
not blunder due to irrational boldness while the old one would not be
inferior because of physical weakness.30
33 The best choice [is] the middle one, and it is so because strength is
observed in he who is not too old and prudence in he who is not too
young. For those who possess bodily strength without a prudent mind
or a prudent mind without a trained body have accomplished nothing,
since prudence and strength are of more benefit to those who possess
them a little than to those who completely lack them. The most excel-
lent man may be he who [is] reputable in both. Because people wel-
come him with a natural good intention, they quickly obey him when
he commands, assist him when he is in danger, and believe him when
he speaks.31
34 14) I rather prefer [the general to be] a father of children, but I do not
reject him who is childless if he is a good man. So then, if the chil-
dren happen to be young, they are powerful spells for the mind and
unbreakable bonds of nature, which can bind those held by them to
loyalty. If they happen to be adults, they help in achieving the common
goals by becoming advisers, fellow-generals, and confidants.32
35 15) In addition, [he should] also [be] highly reputable, since the rank
and file become distressed if they are under the command of ignoble
men, because nobody easily bears having a sovereign or officer who is
inferior to him.33
 Translation 27
36 16) I said that [he should] rather [be] rich than poor, without rejecting
the good poor man on account of his fortune, just as I do not praise
the rich man for his abundance of money, if he benefits from it in
an immoral way. Both of these are wrong, either to be favoured or
rejected on account of fate; rather he must be chosen on account of his
manner of life.34
37 The good wealthy general, in fact, will surpass the good poor one to
such an extent as armour gilded with gold and silver surpasses bronze
and iron. The gilded is advantageous in decoration, in addition to being
protective, whereas the others solely take credit for their efficiency.
Therefore, the poor general who has valour should also be chosen, or
of course the rich one who has equal valour.35
38 17) In addition, he [should] neither [be] extremely severe, nor likewise
too tolerant. Not too fearsome so that he may not be hated by every-
body and not too tolerant so that he may not be disregarded on account
of his laxity. The most excellent choice [is] the middle one.36

2 Which activities the general must approve more than others

Compared to all the rest then, there are two businesses and activities that
the general must be especially fond of: farming, because it gives us food,
and the art of tactics since it defends those who feed us. Therefore, the
general must take care of them both, just as we said, and generally he must
have responsibility for their protection.37

3 Regarding land measurements38

1 Since it [is] necessary to give a reminder about feet, fathoms, cubits,39
and the rest, one must, in fact, speak about these before all the others:
2 So, first of all, is the finger,40 just as number one comes first of all the
numbers. The palm41 equals four fingers. The foot equals four palms,
namely sixteen fingers. The cubit equals one and a half feet, namely six
palms, that is to say twenty-four fingers. The pace42 equals two cubits,
namely three feet, that is to say twelve palms. The fathom equals two
paces, namely four cubits, that is to say six feet or nine and a quarter
of a span.43 The rod44 equals one and a half fathoms, namely six cubits,
that is to say nine feet or thirty-six palms. The plethron equals ten
rods, namely fifteen fathoms, that is to say thirty paces, or sixty cubits,
or ninety feet. The stade equals six plethra, namely sixty rods, that
is to say a hundred fathoms, or 240 paces, or four hundred cubits, or
six hundred feet.45 According to the precise geographers Eratosthenes
and Strabo, the mile equals eight and a quarter stades.46 However,
28 Translation
according to the present prevalent convention, it equals seven and a
half stades, namely 750 fathoms, that is to say 1,500 paces, or three
thousand cubits, since nowadays the mile comprises 750 geometric
fathoms and < . . . > regular ones, because the hundred geometric fath-
oms comprise a hundred < . . . > regular fathoms.
3 The parasang is a Persian measure. It is not accepted by everyone as
having the same measurement. According to most people it comprises
forty stades, but thirty according to Xenophon. According to some
though, it comprises sixty stades and to others it consists of even more,
as Strabo says, citing the knowledgeable Posidonius as his source.47
4 [Note] that the schoinos is a Greek measure identical to the parasang,
sometimes comprising forty stades and sometimes sixty.

4 The general should not fight in person and he should not be

absent during a raid
1 The general should fight prudently rather than daringly, or he should
altogether refrain from coming to blows with the enemy. He would
not aid his men in anything if he happened to prevail while fighting, as
much as he would harm them if he were slain, even if he were to show
himself unrivalled in bravery and strength during the battle. Conse-
quently, the judgement of the general prevails over strength, since
even a soldier would be capable of performing something great with
his physical strength. However, nobody else but the general can make
judgement and plans for necessary matters.48
2 Therefore, just as the captain, who abandons the handling of the rud-
der and carries out tasks which the sailors must perform, is considered
responsible by those who judge properly for the dangers, the same
applies if the general abandons his duties so that he may lower himself
to those of the soldiers.49
3 The same holds while the army is away on a raid; the general must
observe closely from a great distance.

5 In matters of the highest importance, the general ought to be the

first to act in person
1 Nevertheless, when an essential piece of state business presses, in
which the army has to serve the general with manual labour, the gen-
eral himself should be the first to begin the work. For thus the soldiers
are not compelled to act so much by the threats of the officers, as by
the manual labour of those who out-rank them. Because if somebody
 Translation 29
is idle, he will be ashamed and frightened not to obey when he sees
the officer working with his hands. And so, he will no longer act as a
slave who is commanded but he will be constrained to believe that he
is being summoned as an equal.50
2 Whenever the general may wish to share dinner and food, having cho-
sen one of the most highly reputable men, he should organise the work
according to the man who is armed with tactical experience. In this
manner, the general also makes the army eager for the work.

6 Secret plans should not be shared with the rank and file51
He who shares secret plans, not only with the very best men, but with all
the soldiers, would be considered by me as senseless and with imperfect
intelligence. Because it is especially during this situation that malcontents
defect, believing at this time that they will gain gifts and honours from the
enemy by revealing and pointing out the secrets to him. There is no army
from which both slaves and free men do not desert, especially before battle.

7  The general should not be carelessly swayed by rumours and he

should not join battle until he knows exactly the dispositions of
the enemy
1 Of course, the unpleasant rumours which are spread by the enemy
or even by us must be closely scrutinised and not ignored, because
these rumours are often true. Entire armies suddenly fall into the
greatest dangers when the general is neglectful towards them and
does not take the proper precautions.52
2 The general must neither engage the enemy nor reveal his own strength
first, before he is clearly informed about the enemy’s dispositions. He
will achieve this by always sending spies throughout their camp and
by placing them in ambuscades, as well as by reconnoitring the nearby
places for lying in wait, in case the enemy might be hiding in them, and
by taking care of everything that pertains to the safety of his army.53

8  The same operations should not always be conducted repeatedly

against the enemy and, in the case of an imminent engagement,
the surrounding landscape should be reconnoitred as soon as
dawn breaks
1 I say that it is disadvantageous always to conduct the same opera-
tions against the enemy, even if the general believes that it is to his
30 Translation
advantage. Because after a long time, once the enemy are able to
understand the successive and identical design of the operations, that
is when they will repay the debt many times over and with interest.54
2 Of course at the time of the engagement, the general must reconnoitre
the surrounding landscape at the break of day using scouts55 because this
[is] absolutely vital, as we will discuss more thoroughly in chapter 44.
For it [is] likely that ambushes and ruses will be devised by the enemy
in the surrounding landscape. Consequently, in this case it is advanta-
geous for battle to be put off until the enemy abandons the aforemen-
tioned places. After that, the enemy should be eagerly engaged for the
sake of rendering the countryside henceforth secure and clear.

9  If battle is not imminent, the largest part of the army

should not be concentrated in one place
1 If the enemy causes no disturbance, the largest part of the army should
not be congregated in one place, but accustomed to bivouacking sepa-
rately in divisions and units.56 Furthermore, the general must tell the
men what is suitable, encourage and groom them for battle, both by
recalling to their memory brave deeds of the past and proclaiming the
rewards of the emperor, as well as the recompense for their goodwill
on behalf of the nation.57
2 I said that the bulk of the army should not be assembled in one place
on account of two [considerations]: because the army will easily
acquire the necessities when it is divided into divisions and groups,58
and so that the soldiers may not readily quarrel with each other, or
even occupy themselves with troublesome and foul ideas by living in
leisure and idleness. For this usually happens to all kinds of crowds
and especially to soldiers.59
3 It is likewise disadvantageous to assemble the army for the sake of
counsel, because unrest easily bursts out in such cases. The general
must receive counsel, as we said in the first chapter, where the discus-
sion of the need for the general to be open to counsel dictates that first
[he ought to take counsel] in the presence of all the officers together,
then privately, in the presence of the two or even three of the most
excellent and most suitable men. Next, after he has selected the better
proposal, he must keep it to himself until the time is right.60

10  The general should not destroy his own defences so as to make

the men under his command bolder. It is advantageous to do so,
however, if it becomes evident that there is a clear danger from
not fighting.
 Translation 31
1 Of course I cannot praise as much as blame generals who destroy their
own defences, or cross rivers, or put steep cliffs and gulfs behind their
men, so that they might prevail if they hold fast, or perish if they want
to escape. Because I think that this [tactic] which is risky or too dar-
ing and dangerous [is] not a product of good judgement and tactical
knowledge, but of luck.61
2 For on an occasion in which it is possible either to prevail if he wins
or to be utterly overthrown if he is defeated, how could anybody praise
the one who is victorious, or fail to censure the one who has been
defeated?62
3 However, I would allow [some] soldiers to run risks out of desire for
distinction (for if they accomplish something greater they have helped,
and if they fail they do not cause so much harm), but I completely dis-
approve of the tradition of putting the armies at risk and of using dice
rather than judgement.63
4 Nevertheless, if a clear danger from not fighting were to appear,
I would believe that in this case the general is not mistaken if he
makes use of a daring stratagem and if he completely stifles the
hopes which his own men have of flight. In this case, it [is] better
for the soldiers to face danger by acting courageously than to invite
a manifest and inglorious destruction by cowering with fear and
doing nothing noble.64

11  During a siege, the country should not be ravaged immediately,

and what should be done
1 While the general is besieging a city, he should freely ravage
the surrounding countryside with fire and sword without mercy,
because the loss of money and the lack of food diminish resistance.
However, he should proclaim these [intentions] before carrying
them out and he should send envoys, therefore giving time for the
enemy to change their minds. This is because on many occasions,
the expectation of suffering, before the actual experience of it, has
easily forced those in peril to consent to things which were not
at first desirable. Sometimes, however, when the besieged experi-
ence suffering at the outset, they resist the invaders more boldly
out of despair. If they remain unyielding after the embassy, then it
is appropriate to ravage the country mercilessly in the manner we
have described.65
2 The general should ravage the country [only] to the extent that he,
together with his army, will not lack necessary provisions for the whole
period of the siege. For these provisions must be preserved in every
32 Translation
way possible until the retreat. However, at the time of the retreat, it is
fitting to destroy them as well, with fire and sword.66
3 If there is a deficiency of necessary provisions, the general should
not linger any longer in his own land or in an allied one, because
although he is not an enemy, he would harm his own lands more than
the enemy.67
4 If the general then were to arrange for a long-term siege, after aban-
doning the idea of capturing the city by assault, and intends to capture
it by famine, he should assign himself the task of always attentively
hindering any interaction with the outside, while he should capture
those who go out for the collection of necessary provisions by mount-
ing ambushes. From the captives, he should make use of those who are
strongest and in the prime of life as he thinks best, but he should send
the women, children, and old people back to the city. This is because
the latter [are] useless to the general for labour, but they will consume
the food of those within [the walls] more quickly.68
5 If the general is setting out to have the city delivered by betrayal at
a specific time, he should first capture and deal with those whom he
encounters on his way, so that none of them may inform those who are
inside about the assault by running on ahead, and so that our army’s
attack might be completely unexpected by them.69
6 Of course, betrayals and sieges require from the general bravery, tacti-
cal thinking, and preparation of siege engines. So it is appropriate for
the general to be no less steadfast than the besieged, if not more so.
Because he who is the subject of plots becomes more inventive and
perspicacious out of need, but the plotter is very much off his guard,
since he thinks that he is supposedly out of danger.70

12  One should behave humanely to cities which surrender71

1 The general must behave more humanely to cities which surrender,
because in this way he may occupy other cities easily, through the
hope that they will receive the same [treatment].
2 However, he who is inclined to be more exacting and kills, ravages
the vineyards, or seizes whatever comes in his way, both alienates the
cities from being favourable and makes the others unlikely ever to
surrender to him. As a result, he renders the war difficult and inhibits
hope of victory.
3 Because when the enemy knows that the general is unmerciful in the
punishment of those whom he captures, they hold out, doing and suf-
fering absolutely anything in order not to surrender their cities.
 Translation 33
4 For nothing makes men so brave as the fear of the evils which they
will suffer after they surrender, because in times of danger, the expec-
tation of suffering creates a strong incentive for honour.
5 Thus it is a most difficult thing to fight against desperate men.

13  Promises made to traitors should be rigidly adhered to

1 The general must always honour his offers and promises to traitors,
not just to those in the present, but <to> those in the future. For when
they know that a reward is due for all traitors who choose the enemy
side, others may easily turn to treason. He who gives to the traitor,
receives more than he spends on him.72
2 Therefore, the general must willingly pay the rewards completely,
because it is not his concern to be an avenger of the wronged city, but
to be a champion of his own country.

14  One should be prepared before the enemy; and if a rout takes

place, a pitched battle should not be organised again supposedly
in order to rectify the defeat, unless it is absolutely necessary.
Furthermore, as regards the allies, they should be less numerous
than the local army and it [is] better if they do not consist of only
one race. In addition, they should not be mixed in with the local
army, not only during the march, but also while in camp.
1 Let us muster our men for battle earlier than the enemy, because it will
be in our power to accomplish those things that we have as a goal and
the enemy will no longer be able to prepare themselves safely.
2 In addition, if it sometimes happens that our army is routed, the gen-
eral must be careful not to rush headlong purportedly to rectify the
defeat with a pitched battle. For this is difficult for all nations, but for
the Romans [it is] more or less impossible.73
3 The general, therefore, must refrain from a pitched battle; neverthe-
less, he must first hasten to overcome the enemy with guile and stra-
tegic thoughtfulness. Because in the meantime, when those who have
previously cowered in fear are filled with courage, they will draw up
anew more willingly for a second battle, and especially if reinforced
by an army of allies from some place or another, of foreigners, or even
of our own race.74
4 [A quality] then, of a wise general is also to summon a force through
an alliance which is no larger than his own army, because sometimes
the allied force has become master of the territory after it conspired
together and drove out the local force. At any rate, the sufferings of the
ancients should be a lesson for contemporaries. It is more advantageous
34 Translation
then for the allies to be of different races and not of one, because in
this way, they would be less united in case of treachery. Those allied
forces should not be mixed with your own army, and separation must
also be done during the march and they must always prepare their own
camps.75
5 Besides, it [is] beneficial to hide from them, as far as possible, the
Roman order of battle and generalship because if they are practically
involved in such things, they will very easily press upon our army
during hostilities. Finally, it [is] dangerous to provide them with arms
before the battle, due to the uncertainty of their intentions.76

15  When battle is expected, it is acceptable then for the general to

be remiss in punishing the soldiers, pretending that he is ignorant
or oblivious of their offences. In addition, suspects should be
removed from their posts discreetly.
1 Of course if the enemy is already approaching and a pitched battle
is expected, it is appropriate for the general at that time to be very
remiss about punishing the soldiers who commit offences, pretend-
ing that he is ignorant or oblivious of their offences and mitigating,
as far as possible, those who are under suspicion as well as having a
disposition towards leniency. However, if this appears to be impos-
sible, perhaps due to the grave nature of the insubordination, they
should then be removed from their posts, supposedly for an urgent
military matter, until the final outcome of the battle, so that they will
not defect to the enemy and reveal whatever they happen to know.77
2 One should also be careful of the same thing if our allies [are] of the
same race as the enemy, so it is proper to move them in advance as
well, cleverly and with a logical pretext, and not oblige them [to fight]
against people of the same race and language.78

16  One should be particularly careful in times of truce

1 When the general makes a treaty or truce he should neither attack nor
be unguarded, but he must maintain inactivity towards the enemy as in
times of peace, and in turn maintain his precautions as in times of war,
so as not to suffer [harm].79
2 The general must also be firm in the times of a truce. He should neither
begin hostilities, nor should he be unguarded, due to the deceitfulness
of [the enemy’s] disposition. For their intentions are uncertain, even if
the enemy may be under treaty.
 Translation 35
3 From the side of the general then, good faith will be guaranteed
because of piety, but from the side of the enemy dishonesty should be
suspected because of barbarian morality.80

17  The general should punish the offences of the rank and file
moderately, but he should take action properly against
those of individuals
1 The general must be moderate towards the offences of the rank and file
and he should not aim his punishments at the masses so that common
discontent may not unite them in revolt.81
2 At any rate he should only inflict sentences and punishments on those
who were the ringleaders of indiscipline. When the trial is for all the
soldiers, it is suitable for the general to display fatherly affection to all.82
[He should] often advise and discuss those things which will be profit-
able by common consent, and always take thought for the gathering of
the necessary provisions and for the expenses of the so-called custom-
ary gratuities, without which it is impossible to lead the army with dis-
cipline. However, during the individual punishments, it is right for the
general to be seen as severe by the offenders, because evil acts must be
cut out by the roots right from the beginning, and not [be neglected] until
they [are] fully grown, or else a worse turn of events must be expected.83
3 Therefore this [is] also a quality of a general, to appear fearsome and
undaunted to the soldiers, but also to be solicitous not only of everyone
in the camp, but also of the so-called syntelestai,84 for they must also be
kept unmolested.

18  The general should keep a steady eye on these two

things before battle
1 Now if the general is likely to fight against warlike and tactically expe-
rienced races while having with him an equal or larger army, he should
eagerly engage with them and without any kind of fear. However, if
his army [is] not fit for fighting, but is much inferior to the enemy, he
should postpone the engagement in any possible way, unless perhaps
an evident danger may appear from not fighting. On such occasions,
he will not be considered as reckless at all by those who judge cor-
rectly, but rather as firm and very cautious. As we said then, this is the
first [thing] that must be observed.
2 The second [is] to draw up his formation, precisely in accordance
with the enemy’s. If the enemy is greatly extended in length, the gen-
eral must draw up his forces reciprocally and always defend against
36 Translation
encirclements. In turn, if they are divided into a very large number of
units, the general must then stand in array against [them] in the same
way, and must draw up the infantry against the infantry and the cav-
alry against the cavalry.85

19  If the general campaigns in enemy territory, he will fight

more daringly, and one who has a small army should
prepare for battle at sunset
1 When the general campaigns in hostile [lands], if he were to learn
perhaps that the enemy had prepared for battle, and was neither will-
ing to allow for negotiations, nor, for the most part, to shy away from
the unpredictability of battle and the uncertainty of victory, he should
immediately slay the prisoners of war for two reasons. By doing this,
the general’s army would proceed to pitched battle in full strength,
since it becomes free of captives, and because the massacre of their
compatriots will undoubtedly instil great cowardice into the enemy.
2 He should in no way put off the engagement, but he should rather
march against the enemy more eagerly, knowing of course that his
army will fight better in hostile [territory] than in its own. However, if
his army is by far smaller, [it is advisable] to engage in battle chiefly
when the sun is about to set, because to a small and worn out army,
night is the greatest hope for safety.86

20  At the time of battle a large number of trumpets should not be

sounded, nor should the formation have too many banners. In
addition, the soldiers should remove the so-called pennons from
their spears.
1 In the time of battle, a very large number of trumpets must not be
sounded in each formation, nor bugles,87 nor copper drums, because
they create confusion in the army. For when there is silence, it seems
enough for one trumpet to be sounded in each formation, if it is in the
middle of it, in the same place where the general [stands]. When it is
impossible to hear the voice of the messenger, if perhaps there is a
strong wind blowing or a river babbling, then we order a trumpet or
a bugle to be sounded in both divisions of the formation, namely the
right and the left.88
2 Likewise, we do not allow a large number of banners to be raised by
each tagma in the very moment of battle, except only the banner of the
commander of each tagma, because the multitude of banners causes
confusion at the time of engagement. However, during the march,
 Translation 37
every komes, kentarchos, and pentekontarchos should know [how] to
raise banners in the tagmata which each commands. Because a large
number of banners can give the impression of a numerous army and
can astonish the enemy, and [it] can in addition give a most decorous
appearance to the army.89
3 In the same manner, during the march, each of the soldiers must have
pennons on their spears. Because if this is done, it too helps the army,
causing fear and wonder to the enemy and granting a goodly appear-
ance to our formations, as in fact we said happens with the banners of
each tagma.90 However, in the very moment of battle, most of the ban-
ners in the tagmata must be removed at a distance of approximately
one or two miles, and the same applies to the small banners on the
soldiers’ spears which are also called pennons. For in the time of bat-
tle, they become a hindrance to those who stand in the back as regards
the release of missiles.91
4 So then, the banners of the pentekontarchoi should be the smallest,
the banners of the ekatontarchoi should be larger, the banners of the
kometes should be even bigger than the latter, and the banners of
the droungarioi even larger still, but the banners of the tourmarchai
should be the greatest of all.92
5 The banners close to the generals or the tourmarchai should become
signals indicating the beginning of marches, so that every movement
of the army becomes familiar to everybody. This will take place if
the banners are suddenly raised higher than the others, or if they lean
slightly towards the right or left, or forwards or backwards, and if
shortly afterwards they revert to their former position. Every soldier
should be trained in advance in all of these [signals] during drills, to
start the march when the bugle is sounding, but to halt [at the sound
of] the trumpet because the greatest armies are accustomed to this.93

21  Concerning day and night outposts and how fires should be lit
1 The general should assign some of the cavalry as guards at night and
post them in strategic positions. If the night is especially moonless
and with absolutely no stars or light, the guards should approach
each other and the camp’s trench not only vertically but also horizon-
tally, so that it would not escape their notice if some spies slipped in
between them.94 Each outpost should consist of six men (for it seems
that an outpost of only two men [is] far too small and [capable of]
almost nothing remarkable, for when it is observed, it rather indi-
cates a severe shortage of men). But whenever it is divided into three
38 Translation
through the course of the night, some of them take turns to sleep and
the others keep watch. One must neither compel men, nor trust those
who volunteer, to stay up all night long for, contrary to popular belief,
it is likely for sleep to come spontaneously when limbs submit.95
2 Additionally at night, three picked men must run between the afore-
mentioned guards, meet with one another and rouse them to vigilance.
At the same time, having been informed by the guards about what has
happened during the night, they must report to the general.96
3 It is appropriate for the outposts to light the fire further than the army
and further from one another. Because in this manner, due to the fire,
the outposts will surely see from a great distance those whom the
enemy has placed nearby, but the enemy will not observe those who
are in the darkness.97
4 So if there is an infantry army in the camp, the cavalry outposts may
be sufficient in this manner, since the trench becomes very secure. If
the camp is established, and if the infantry tagmata diligently spend
the night near the trenches, as is the custom, there [is] no need at all for
more watches. However, if the camp is neither very safe, nor are the
infantry tagmata vigilant in the camp’s trench, in this case only, there
is need for a very large number of cavalry outposts to be present at
night. For now, the outpost which is close to the enemy will not consist
of only six men, but of at least ten, and sometimes even more, when it
is separated from the camp at a distance of approximately three or four
miles, or in proportion to the location of the site and the preparations
of the enemy, as I have said.98
5 Since all hope for safety will rest entirely with these very guards, all
the units will remain awake alternately; especially [if] the camp [is]
slightly far off, approximately at a distance of two bowshots, and, in
fact, sometimes more or less, namely depending on the location of the
site and the state of affairs during the night. But sometimes half of
the army will remain awake, namely if a night battle is expected; that
is when half of the men inside the camp will also be at arms through
the whole night, naturally in accordance with the numbers of our own
army and with the enemy’s strength and preparation.
6 Between the furthest outpost and the one which is closest to the camp,
there will be others successively, each keeping intervals from one
another of approximately one or two bowshots at most. Each of them
should comprise six men as has been said, or even eight. But, again
[in case of emergency] they should draw up at a distance of a third of
a bowshot, in the interests of greater safety, rather than at the same
[distance] of two [bowshots].
 Translation 39
22  Concerning the camp and what the general should do
when the enemy attempts to attack it99
1 As regards the camp and wintering, a site with especially level ground
must be chosen, where the army will live without fear. The site should
neither [be] rocky nor swampy (for both [are] useless). In addition,
it should not [be] too close to rivers either, for if the horses become
accustomed to drink frequently, they will suffer at times when water is
scarce.
2 Still, however, the army must not dwell for many days on the same
site, due to pestilential diseases which break out from putrefaction
among both horses and men, especially during spring and summer, as
well as autumn, but not during winter because [then] there is no such
apprehension, due to the frozen temperature of the season. Besides,
when cold weather is expected, the soldiers cannot easily move
wooden huts and dwell under roofs made of grass. And as I discussed
then, this shall be how the army dwells without anxiety in the camp
during winter or any other time.100
3 In dangerous places, however, when the attack of the enemy is
expected, or if the army is short of men, or is weak in some other way,
the roughest and most hilly location must be chosen. But if the army is
in a sufficient state, having a large number of men fit for combat and
possessing great resources, a location must be chosen which [is] level
and suitable for horsemanship and has drinking water nearby: a place
which is neither densely forested nor has high and easily accessible
places nearby, because from such spots the enemy may easily crush
those who are in the camp, especially at night. Therefore, for up to
three days the general [must] keep an eye on hostile territory, bearing
in mind that he should seek particularly the safest locations, where
there will be a canyon or an inaccessible river or some other rough
ground at the rear of those who encamp.101
4 The general should surround the remaining site with an artificial trench,
which is approximately five or six feet wide, and seven or eight feet
deep. The gathered soil from the trench should not be thrown outside but
inside, that is to say towards the side of the encampment. Whenever the
ground is hard and cannot be easily dug, he should secure the camp in
every direction either with a wall made of bricks, stones or tree trunks,
or with fences102 or with a large number of wagons, due above all to
enemy surprise attacks and especially ones at night, as I said.103
5 It seems that a rectangle [is] the best shape for the camp. Yet, as
I already said,104 it [is] advantageous to throw iron caltrops, attached
to one another by the so-called wire,105 all around from each part of the
40 Translation
trench at a distance of approximately eight or even ten fathoms. Next,
it [is] better to make the so-called horse breakers,106 namely round pits,
not in straight lines, but alternately, each being a foot wide and two or
even three feet deep.107
6 In addition, a very sharp stake with bells hanging from cords [should
be] fixed into the same pit, so that if an enemy were sent to spy on
the camp and manages to pass through the aforementioned caltrops
or pits, the bells would provide the guards of the camp with precise
information about the spies. Of course mounted guards should also be
present at a short distance beyond the trench and the camp, keeping
such vertical and horizontal intervals from one another, as are enough
to prevent any of the enemy spies from slipping in between [them].
This in fact must be kept in mind particularly during a moonless night,
when there is very much scope for the ruses of the enemy. We have
already discussed these in detail in chapter 21.108
7 What has been said about the outside and the perimeter of the trench
should be sufficient. Now, inside the trench and the camp, after first
gathering all the wagons throughout the encampment, the general must
array these around the camp. After the wagons, the tents of the infantry
will also be arrayed from all sides around the perimeter of the trench.
Then, there should be an empty space, of about three hundred feet all
around, so that the horses and the men in the tents may not easily be
slain by the enemy.109 Immediately after this empty space, the tents of
the tourmarchai and of the other officers will be arrayed, each in the
middle of their own tagma. However, the tent of the general should
be separated, being neither mixed with the rest of the multitude, nor
placed close to a road. For if the tent is kept this way, it will be free of
noise.110
8 There should be four straight roads in the camp, from east to west, and
from north to south, each measuring fifty feet, so as for five horsemen
to traverse them simultaneously without trouble. The gates should
number the same as the roads, not being straight but bending like the
[letter] gamma [Γ]. There should also be dividers between the tagmata
ending at the aforementioned roads, in the manner of an alley. In addi-
tion, the more excellent of the kometes or the ekatontarchoi should
be detached close to the very gates of the camp, together with their
tagmata, in order to prevent those who wish to go in or out whenever
they desire, especially when the sun is setting. Each of the taxiarchoi
should have his own messenger who stays beside the general’s tent, in
order to be reliably informed by the general about important matters
during the night.111
 Translation 41
9 During the early morning and evening [service] it is always proper for
the so-called extended litany to take place.112 After dinner, it is suit-
able to call for silence and to suspend every kind of noise, in short,
every kind of fluting and dancing. It is fit to deal with all indiscipline
leniently.113
10 Each of the tagmata should gather rations of food in the camp for three
or four days: fodder, chaff, and barley, so that the rank and file may not
fall into mortal peril in collecting them, since, in fact, it is customary
for the enemy to lie in ambush at such times.114
11 Above all, however, the general must always keep an eye with devo-
tion on this: that neither he, nor any of the picked officers with the
stronger tagmata under their command, should dismount from their
horses before the camp is safely completed and the watches set one
or even two hours before sunset, as is customary. This is because
the greatest misfortunes befall the army precisely during such times,
namely when it is occupied with establishing the camp or with the
release of the horses for grazing, or when it is dismounted and almost
unfit for battle.
12 After dinner, the general should always command everyone through
messengers that nobody among the men should dare to mount a horse
if the enemy attacks the camp during the night. For this is risky and
causes casualties to the whole army. Therefore, when everybody is
ready, they [must] bear the burden of battle as infantry until the fol-
lowing morn, which is when the army may array itself for a cavalry
battle. So much for the camp.

23  Concerning the baggage train and how the army should

safely cross the defiles together with its spoils115
1 It [is] very important to take care of the baggage train as well and
not let it [be] unguarded, but to assign to it a commander of its own,
and likewise a banner. One should also leave it with a suitable guard
of its own and always draw it up separately in the rear. If the battle
is expected at the front, the baggage train must stand behind the tag-
mata. But when the assault of the enemy is expected from the rear,
the baggage train must lead the way ahead of the tagmata, while the
best of the latter must act as a rear guard. If the battle is expected
from the right, it should be drawn up on the left side, but on the other
hand, if battle is expected from the left, it should be drawn up on the
right. If battle is expected from all sides it must be drawn up inside the
formation.
42 Translation
2 The same thing should take place after a raid. The generals should
by all means prevent those with large baggage train or with a large
amount of booty from crossing narrow and rough [passes]. For the
army easily falls into the greatest dangers in these places, since such
things always become a hindrance in the defiles and, in general, they
frustrate the bravery of the soldiers. If [there is] an imminent need to
lead the army through such passes, [the general must] not proceed
without an infantry army. Because once the infantry pre-empts the
strong and advantageous positions, they thus ensure the safe [passage]
of the rest of the army.116
3 If the general is going to invade a hostile territory through narrow
and rough passes, and he has a very large army of both infantry and
cavalry under his command, he should leave most of the infantry with
a worthy division of cavalry outside, namely around the defiles, in the
more naturally fortified positions, with orders to wait until his return.
If he is withdrawing with a great quantity of booty, he should send
anew another force to occupy the defiles in advance and to unite with
the other tagmata.117
4 However, if he has a small army under his command, he should keep
the entire force with him and conduct his withdrawal by another road,
only on condition that he has local officers who possess the utmost
experience of these roads. This is the most strategically correct [course
of action], and at the same time the safest, namely not to withdraw
by the same road by which the army made the incursion into enemy
territory, especially if a sufficient infantry and cavalry force was not
left behind in the defiles. For then, the enemy has only to pre-empt
the defiles and to rekindle hostilities during our withdrawal, when
our army [is] burdened by the spoils. In addition, it [is] likely that the
enemy will emerge victorious, since they fight fresh and on ground to
their advantage, against those who are weary. But if there is no other
road by which the army may safely conduct its withdrawal, the general
should send a force, as we said, during his return, to capture the defiles,
while he should follow in good order, slowly and in marching step.
5 If the enemy is not at the defiles, then [there is] no difficulty. If, how-
ever, they have arrived there first, our army should dispatch envoys in
order to surrender the spoils, and in turn the enemy should allow the
army to pass through without trouble. But if the enemy are unyielding
and uncompromising, and if they generally do not accept the afore-
mentioned agreement, it is especially then that the general must pre-
pare for battle in every way, and henceforward seek salvation in it.
Therefore, under these circumstances, the general should mercilessly
 Translation 43
slay all the prisoners of war and, in addition, wreak complete havoc on
all of the booty that is carried and commit it to utter destruction. For
in this way, the army will give up hope of a treaty and will fight more
daringly, since it understands that the only remaining hope comes
from battle.118
6 Nevertheless, the general must not join battle in the defiles and gener-
ally he must not force his way through, because this is in fact the most
dangerous course of action. On the contrary, [he must] turn to raiding
and plundering the region, to destroying and to subjecting whatever
he finds to fire and sword. And so, [he must] provoke the enemy to an
engagement and press for battle in a terrain which is flat and particu-
larly suitable for horses, where the cavalry will be most serviceable
and most capable of being successful.119
7 The battle order of a Roman army withdrawing with its spoils after
a raid is as follows: in front of the booty come those from the army
who are unarmed and not fit for fighting. After [the booty comes] the
baggage train, then the third line, next comes the second, and then the
vanguard. Next, at a distance of about two bowshots, [come] those
who are drawn up as rear guard, namely the so-called light cavalry, as
many picked, well-armed, well-mounted, and daring [men] as possi-
ble, having mixed some of the lancers together with them. In this case,
particularly because the fighting is expected to come from the rear,
we accordingly order the formation to be in the aforementioned way,
so that if we suddenly turn about towards the enemy, the rear guards
would become prokoursatores.
8 Let the so-called vanguard engage first in battle, as is customary, and
directly after it the second line. The third line shall be drawn up last.
After it, the baggage train shall be drawn up and then the spoils, being
behind the other units for the sake of security. As we already said, this
is to be the order of the tagmata at the time of battle.

24  Concerning the so-called ambuscades120

1 Most of the races of the various peoples mount ambuscades, espe-
cially the Persians, Turks, and Arabs. But sometimes the Romans
mount ambuscades as well, having in fact been taught by these races.
For after the Romans had suffered many times, they learned by expe-
rience from heavy losses and they contrive against this very thing.
Nevertheless, they do not mount ambuscades conventionally, because
while they conceal a division of some tagma, the rest march out sup-
posedly for a pitched [battle], aiming to provoke the enemy.
44 Translation
2 Now then, he who has a very limited tactical experience should suspect
that the enemy had set ambuscades, when [he observed that] although
they were only a few, they were marching against many more with the
greatest degree of insolence. As a result, he will conduct the pursuit
with much circumspection and not for long.
3 For this reason therefore, they should not march out openly as in a
pitched battle, but as if they have come across the enemy unexpectedly
and by chance. Those who march ahead then, must neither be too far
from those who are concealed, since they might easily be captured by
the enemy because they are unable to join up with their own [men];
nor on the other hand too close, so as for those who pursue them not
to break their own ranks;121 for both are unsatisfactory. An interval of
approximately two miles should be reasonable, depending on the loca-
tion of the site and the distance of the enemy.122
4 It [is] also useful for the men who have gone ahead, when they are
feigning retreat, to drop some of the weapons they bear, especially if
some of them were to be made of silver.
5 Because the pursuers are immediately attracted by the dropped weap-
ons and are occupied with gathering them up, they will most certainly
carry out the pursuit in confusion and disorder. And that is how our
ambuscades should be made. However, if the enemy mounts ambus-
cades against us, it is possible to prevail against them with other
ambuscades, if only we were to know accurately of this in advance
from deserters or captives, and if the location were suitable for a coun-
ter-ambush. For if the location does not allow it, it [is] all in all disad-
vantageous to persist.

25  Concerning spies123
1 Spies must be at least thirty years old and have children, parents,
or siblings so that they may not easily desert to the enemy and give
counsel against us. In addition, they must be prudent and bold, know
the customs and the language of the enemy and also have a precise
knowledge of the roads and the topography. Furthermore, they must
be steady in spirit and seek glory rather than money, and carefully
guard the Roman race with all honesty and goodwill.
2 Now, when we want to send them to conduct espionage, we take each
one privately and suitably instruct them one by one about those things
which they should know, so that they may communicate with one
another under the pretence of buying or selling when they are in hos-
tile territory, and thus reveal what is happening.
 Translation 45
3 The spies must not associate with the more prudent and curious men
of the enemy for long, but with the more straightforward and simple
[folk], and must bivouac close to them.

26  Concerning envoys124
1 Envoys should always be received with honour and every kind of care
should be shown to them. Nevertheless, as regards those who serve
them, every kind of precaution [should] be taken, so that they are not
easily able to observe what state our affairs are in.
2 If they who sent the envoys are stronger [than us], it is neither fit to
show them wealth, nor the beauty of women, or anything else of that
sort; but only the firmness of the walls, the weapons and the multi-
tudes of armed men. On the other hand, if they are weaker, it is then
permissible to display everything in order to amaze and intimidate
them.
3 The envoys that we despatch must above all be pious and it is neces-
sary that they have not been convicted of any crime against the coun-
try. In addition, they must be prudent and preserve a good will towards
the Roman race, of the kind that Roman history describes in the case
of Regulus.125

27  Concerning defectors and traitors and that they

must always be watched
1 It is proper to receive defectors very kindly and to treat them very
well, but on the other hand they must be watched, even if perhaps
some of them may be of our own race. Therefore, if the enemy is
attacking, the most prominent of the defectors should be kept in the
cities, but, undoubtedly, the lower ranking ones should be distributed
to the provinces of Our Majesty, which are very distant and far away
from the enemy.126
2 Even if some of the defectors or traitors come at a certain time, pro-
posing an attack or promising to lead the way through roads unknown
to most men, the so-called trails,127 or to fall unexpectedly upon the
enemy, the general must keep them under observation after chaining
them up close to him. He must safeguard himself with the most hor-
rible oaths that, if they tell the truth and do everything for the safety
and victory of his army, he will release them from their bonds and he
will provide them with worthy gifts, but if they lie and prove guilty
of desiring to put our army into the hands of the enemy, they will be
46 Translation
immediately butchered with swords, limb by limb, by those who are
guarding them.128
3 The general must not, therefore, easily believe in such men. But he
must closely investigate first, and so in his actions he must always try
to be wary of what is proposed by them. He must secure himself and
the army, as much as if the enemy were nearby. For many generals
together with their armies have succumbed to utter destruction, after
they heedlessly believed traitors.

28  How many types of fighting force there are129

The fighting force is divided into both infantry and cavalry and in turn,
from these, the infantry into: heavy infantry, medium infantry, and light
infantry.130 The cavalry is divided into: the so-called kataphraktoi, lancers,
javelin-men, and archers. We will discuss them in detail later on.

29  Concerning the types of formations of various peoples

1 The types of formations of the various peoples should be the follow-
ing: the first will be the formation which divides the army into two
divisions. From these, the smaller division is appointed as prokoursa-
tores (these will be those who go ahead of the formation and withstand
the first clash) and the other, that is to say the larger, is separated as
defensores, and is a rectangular battle order which they call saka.131
2 The second [is] the formation which divides the defensores into three
divisions, keeping a distance of about a hundred fathoms from one
another in the flanks or in accordance with the strength of the prokour-
satores. The formation has the prokoursatores on both sides, namely at
the two outmost flanks of the array and a little ahead of the defensores.
Therefore, as is customary, the engagement begins with the [pro]
koursatores in this position. Whenever the enemy’s divisions become
dominant, the prokoursatores retreat in order at once, and they stand
in the two aforementioned intervals of the defensores’ array. Then, the
prokoursatores engage with the enemy again, together with the defen-
sores. If perhaps cowardice grips the prokoursatores, they remain in
the two intervals and the defensores bravely endure the whole effort of
the fighting.132
3 The third [is] the formation which divides the army into only three
divisions, having all the prokoursatores in the middle and the defen-
sores on both sides. As is customary then, the array of the prokour-
satores leads the way and the defensores follow on both sides, drawn
 Translation 47
up in two units. If the prokoursatores are repulsed by the enemy, the
defensores harbour them within their interval and they fight together
with them. If the prokoursatores are affected by cowardice, the defen-
sores withstand the burden of battle alone. So then, the various peo-
ples have many light-armed troops and particular confidence in their
bows.133 After the prokoursatores, they immediately draw up their for-
mation, dividing it into one or two parts, as I have already said. The
Romans also do this, but [only] when they have a very insignificant
and small army. Whenever they have a sufficient army and dispatch a
force for raiding or draw up for battle, they array their formations in
another way, not similar to the various peoples, as I will say later on.134

30  Armament of the infantry, in the time of the Macedonians under

Philip and Alexander, and the rest of the Greeks
1 So then, the Macedonians under Philip and Alexander and the rest of
the Greeks were armed in this way, as Aelian and the rest say.135
2 The heavy infantry was very heavily armed, having big round shields
measuring five spans, which were called thyreoi, and also others
measuring three spans, round as well, covered with bronze on the
outer side. They used also to wear mail armour and iron klibania136
and had parameria137 on their waist belts and wore helmets which
covered the entire face. They had both arm guards and greaves on
their arms and legs, the first of which are popularly called manikel-
lia, and the second chalkotouba, and shin guards. They used to bear
spears, measuring eight cubits, and other very long ones, no less
than fourteen cubits. They called these sarissai, and four cubits were
behind [the grip], whereas ten protruded at the front. So much for the
heavy infantry.138
3 The light infantry, however, had none of the aforementioned equip-
ment, for all of them used to fight from a distance, shooting with the
bow, throwing the javelin, or releasing stones, some by hand, but cer-
tainly most of them with slings. They were also accustomed to wear
very thick garments made of linen, which reached the knees and a
little further down.
4 The medium infantry had, of course, heavier armament than the light
infantry, but were much inferior to the heavy infantry themselves,
since their shields were no more than three and a half spans. In addi-
tion, they had spears of about two and half fathoms, and two javelins
each. In the infantry formation each one used to occupy a space of no
more than two cubits.
48 Translation
31  Cavalry armament of the same time139
1 Among the cavalry, the heavily armed troops used to wear mail
armour and klibania of iron or even horn, and full helmets, as well
as arm and leg guards. They carried double-edged swords and oblong
shields, both no less than five spans. In addition, they had spears of
two and a half cubits. They covered the heads of the horses with the
so-called front-piece and their necks and breasts with iron scales or
with klibania.
2 The lancers had torso-armour and swords in the same manner as the
heavy cavalry. They also had shields of four spans, and two spears
each, of no more than two fathoms. After throwing the first against
the enemy, the lancer engaged in close combat with the second, and
sometimes, when this was broken, he then fought with a sword or even
a small axe.
3 The javelin-men used to fight bearing only small round shields, or by
hurling their javelins from afar or approaching from all sides, and they
threw with great accuracy. The archers were armed in the same way,
apart from the shields. Both the archers and the javelin-men then were
likewise called light [cavalry].

32  Infantry formations of the same time140

1 Each of the infantry tagmata was composed of 4,096 men, all heavy
infantry and shield bearers. The tagma had sixteen ranks and each
rank was composed of 256 men. Therefore, their so-called perfect for-
mation was composed of four tagmata. It was divided into the left,
right, middle right, and middle left parts, so as for this formation to
amount to 16,384 men.
2 According to the ancients, this number was serviceable as regards the
formations, since it was divisible into two equal parts and it never
resulted in having one part with an odd number.
3 This formation also had light infantry, always half of the heavy and
medium infantry, namely 8,192 men. They always drew themselves
up separately and on their own, either a little ahead of the shield
bearers, in order to pursue the enemy if they happened to retreat,
or even on both sides of the shield bearers, or behind them, as the
need arose. Therefore, the whole formation came to a total of 24,676
men.141
4 However, they also drew [themselves] up in another way. They divided
those aforementioned 16,384, which as you know the ancients called
 Translation 49
the perfect formation, into two equal parts, namely each of 8,192 men.
They called the right one the right horn, and the left one [the left horn],
the front rank of the right horn the head, and likewise the last rank the
tail. The left parts were also named in the same way.
5 They called the interval between the two horns, where the general
was positioned, the mouth or navel of the formation. Nevertheless,
the 8,192 light infantry were also, in this case, drawn up separately
and on their own, as we have already said. The intervals in the
flanks of these tagmata were no more than eight fathoms from one
another.

33  Cavalry formations of the same time

1 The cavalry rarely used to fight alone, since its numbers were few
among the Greeks. To be sure, when they were arrayed for a cav-
alry battle, they divided the heavy cavalry together with the lanc-
ers into two tagmata, the middle right and the middle left. The
so-called light [cavalry], namely the javelin-men and the archers,
were divided into another two, the right and left, and they were
a little ahead of the heavy cavalry at a distance of approximately
eight fathoms. However, the depth of the tagmata was no more
than four ranks, two ranks of heavy cavalry who were at the front,
and in turn two ranks of the so-called light [cavalry], who were
behind.
2 The interval in the flanks of these cavalry tagmata from one another
was approximately twenty fathoms. However, throughout the length
of the ranks, two [men] of the heavy cavalry occupied a space of one
fathom, whereas among the so-called light [cavalry] each [man] occu-
pied a space of one fathom.

34  Formations of a compound army of the same period

1 When the army was compound, namely of both infantry and cavalry,
they arrayed the infantry, I presume, in one of the aforementioned
ways, with the cavalry either in front or in the back of the infantry
formation, namely as the occasion demanded and the need pressed.
They also drew the cavalry up on the outermost flanks of the infantry
formation, so that assaults against the enemy would be made easily,
and retreats likewise. If, for instance, they suffered casualties and were
unable to carry on with the battle, they would easily and without trou-
ble seek refuge in the rear.142
50 Translation
2 Therefore, just as we said that the so-called perfect infantry forma-
tion is reckoned to a total of 16,384 and the light infantry to half
of the latter, namely 8,192 men; in the same way they converted
the cavalry to half that of the light infantry, namely 4,096 men, so
as for this compound formation to be reckoned at a total of 28,772
men.
3 As I said, that is how the Macedonians and all the Greeks were
drawn up and armed. However, as regards the Roman armament and
formations which correspond to our time, they [are] to be discussed
shortly.

35  What the officers of the army and the tagmata under their
command are named, according to the Romans
1 Undoubtedly the first of all the officers is the general, next the tour-
marchai (who are also called merarchai), after them the droungarioi,
next the kometes, [and] then the kentarchoi (they are also called eka-
tontarchoi). After them, they are the lochagoi, the dekarchoi, and
the pentarchoi, and besides also the so-called tetrarchoi.143 The aux-
iliaries of each tagma are the standard-bearers,144 the messengers,145
both the auxiliaries and the kribantes,146 and those who are called
responsible for the baggage train; in addition, [there are] doctors,
trumpeters, and those called surveyors or minsouratores.147
2 The general is the leader of the whole army. He has been entrusted
with absolute authority by Our Majesty, and so he rules over all the
officers. The tourmarches [is] he who has three droungoi under his
command. The droungarios [is] he who commands a droungos, for
droungos should be a corps which has up to three thousand men.
Therefore, a corps of more than three thousand men may not be a
droungos, nor may a corps of less than one thousand. Because, the
tourmarches should be the leader of at least three thousand men and
up to nine thousand; likewise, the droungarios should be the leader of
one thousand men at the least, and up to three thousand. The komes
[is] the leader of a bandon.148
3 According to the ancients, bandon, in its proper sense, should be des-
ignated what is unofficially known as a banner.149 In a non-strict sense,
however, an assembled corps of two hundred to four hundred men is
called bandon. For a corps of two hundred men and more is deemed
worthy enough to display some kind of authority for itself and to raise
its own banner. The komes, therefore, will be the leader of at least two
kentarchoi.
 Translation 51
4 Nowadays then, as far as the infantry tagmata are concerned, a ban-
don [is] a corps of two hundred men and more, up to four hundred. As
regards the cavalry though, [a bandon is] a corps of at least fifty men,
that rises up to 350 or four hundred, which is effectively identical to
what is nowadays called allagion.150
5 Because, at present, a corps of fifty men is also called allagion. The
regular allagion extends as high as 150, and the so-called royal allagia
extend up to 320, 350, or four hundred men at the most, such as nowa-
days are the Thrakesion of 320 men, the Charsianon of 350,151 and in
turn some of the western tagmata, which comprise up to 400 men.
6 The ekatontarchos is also called kentarchos and kenterion, in the same
way that the pentekontarchos is he who commands fifty men.152
7 The lochagos is he who commands those who are arrayed by the depth
or file of the tagma, which used specifically to comprise sixteen men.
For in a proper sense, a lochos denotes a corps of sixteen men but in a
non-strict sense, a corps of up to thirty-two men is also called a lochos.
In fact, the lochagos is also called file-leader and first-fighter.
8 The dekarchos is not the leader of ten men, but the first among ten.
This is because if there are ten men, one commands the remaining
nine, exactly like the pentarchos, who is not the leader of five men, but
the first among five, and likewise the tetrarchos.153
9 Sometimes, not only the lochagos, but also the dekarchos is called
first-fighter and file-leader, because if the depth or the file of the tagma
is not of sixteen men, but of ten, then the dekarchos is also called file-
leader and first-fighter. He who stands second after either the lochagos
or after the dekarchos is called the epistates. He [who stands] last in
the file of the tagma [is called] the file-closer.154
10 In addition, it must be known that the taxis is also part of the for-
mation, just like the tagma, and so the tagmatarches is also called
taxiarchos. In [my] opinion, the tagma should compose of at least
two hundred men, because anything which is smaller should no longer
be called a tagma, but a portion of one. The main body [of the army]
which is numerous and already arrayed is called the formation.
11 The central part of the formation, where the general is placed together
with the standards, is called the mouth and navel. The first rank, of the
so-called first-fighters, is called the front, just as the last rank of each
unit is called the tail, as we have said.
12 The depth or file of each tagma is called kontoubernion. And so much
for the officers.155
52 Translation
13 Those who support each tagma [are:] the standard-bearers who carry
the commonly called banners; the messengers, who convey the orders
of the officers to the soldiers; and the auxiliaries and kribantes who
follow behind, quickly retrieve the wounded, and carry them to the
doctors.156
14 They who are entrusted with the baggage train of the whole army
are called [men] of the touldon, because the baggage train is named
touldon.157
15 Those who go out before the battle, rousing the enemy to fight, [are
called] prokoursatores. Those who are dispatched to loot and to plun-
der the enemy’s land [are called] koursatores. Those who are always
behind the prokoursatores, and receive them if they turn to flight, as
well as fight in their defence, [are called] defensores.
16 Those who stand at the right end of the formation in order to encircle
the enemy are called out-flankers. On the other hand, those who stand
at the left of the formation in order to guard against enemy encir-
clements and, as far as possible, to resist and fight back, are called
flank-guards.158
17 Those who are detached from the army to advance ahead, smooth the
roads, and look for the horses’ pasturage159 and for water and addition-
ally for the disposition of the camp and every other service [are called]
surveyors or minsouratores.160

36  How the stratiotai should be161

1 The stratiotai must be chosen to be neither too young nor too old; that
is to say neither younger than twenty years old nor older than forty.
They must be daring and strong, and must also be of good means and
not poor.
2 Their so-called associates162 should be free of all public duties, so that
they may take care of the estate and farming labours if the stratiotai
leave for their assigned campaign. Because we do not allow the house-
holds of our stratiotai, who choose to endanger themselves for Our
Majesty and for the Christ-loving state of the Romans, to be subject to
any kind of imposition. Indeed, we only want them to pay the public
tax and nothing else.

37  How the stratiotes should arm himself163

The stratiotes should first arm his lower legs, then his thighs, after that
he may wear the klibanion or a mail coat, and a surcoat. Afterwards the
double-edged sword should be placed about the shoulders, then the bow
 Translation 53
and quiver case. Next he should put his helmet on and in addition arm the
lower arm and the wrists.

38  Armament of the infantry according to the Romans164

1 Let the armament of the Roman infantry formations be the following:
the shields of the so-called heavy infantry should be square as near as
possible to six spans, with a narrow ending at the bottom, or triangular,
but able to cover almost the height of a man, like the square ones, or
even circular of three and a half spans.165
2 The shields of each division, namely the middle one, the right one, the
left one, and the others, should have identical colour and insignia.
3 Their spears should be of ten cubits or at least eight, having points of
one and a half spans.166 The menavlia,167 however, should not be made
from hewn wood, but from fresh oak or cherry trees, or from the so-
called artzikidon or from another tree of that sort.168
4 In addition, they should wear lorikia,169 or even klibania, of iron or
horn. If these are not available, they must have kabadia170 made of cot-
ton and coarse silk, reaching to the knees. The sleeves [should] reach
the elbows, and have openings around there, in order for the arms to
go through them. The sleeves should be attached to the back of the
shoulders with loops.
5 They should be girded with parameria, namely double-edged swords,
which measure four spans including the hilt.171 They should also have
cheiropsella, which are also called manikellia,172 as well as podopsella
or chalkotouba,173 along with helmets that fully cover [the face],174
which have plumes at the top. The same plumes should also be on the
lorikia and the klibania, on top of the shoulders.175
6 On the other hand, the armament of the so-called medium infantry176
should be made lighter. For their shields should be round, of approxi-
mately three spans, or oblong of four spans. Their spears should be
of eight cubits and their akontia or riptaria177 as near as possible to a
fathom and a third; that is to say each should be no longer than twelve
spans, including the point.
7 [They should wear] mail armour,178 namely lorikia and klibania,
both either made of iron or of horn, [and] if these are not available,
very thick kabadia of cotton and coarse silk, as we said above. In
addition, [they should bear] parameria and helmets which do not
cover the face.
8 The manner in which the equipment of the so-called light [infantry]
should be made is the following: they should hang bows and quiver
54 Translation
cases, which can each fit thirty or forty arrows, from their shoulders.179
They should also each have two bow-strings and small wooden tubes
with small arrows and small bows. Some call these kinds of small
arrows menas.180
9 These missiles [are] useful during the battle, since they are discharged
from the bows at a great distance and, because they are invisible to the
enemy due to their small size, they thus kill very suddenly. Besides,
these missiles [are] also useful because they are unusable by the enemy
due to ignorance.
10 The light infantry should also bear javelins and very small round
shields as well as parameria or battle-axes which are carried in leather
sheaths. Some of them should also have slings, no smaller than six
spans.181
11 Their tunics should not cover their feet, but should reach to their
knees, and their shoes should be moderately hobnailed, because these
are particularly helpful during the march.182
12 In addition, each dekarchia of these infantry tagmata should also have
a wagon183 which carries a hand-mill, an axe, a hatchet, two picks and
two shovels, a goat-hair mat and a basket, as well as an adze and other
[tools] of that sort. Besides, a battle-axe, a scythe, and iron caltrops
which are attached to wire by iron nails, in order to be easily thrown
and in turn easily collected. Each wagon should also have extra bows
and arrows,184 hardtack and flour, and all the other [things] which are
necessary and have been omitted by us.185

39  Armament of the cavalry according to the same186

1 The cavalry should be armed in this manner: the shields of the kata-
phraktoi should be oblong of approximately four and a half spans, the
lances should be of eight cubits, having small pennons and points of
one span and more.187 The armour should be mail and fully covering,
reaching to the ankles and fastened with thongs and rings, or klibania
made of iron or horn,188 or even long tunics189 made of cotton and raw
silk having openings at the elbows, as we said somewhere above. In
addition, they should also wear surcoats190 which have plumes or tas-
sels at the shoulders.
2 Double-edged swords, which are of approximately four spans exclud-
ing the hilt, should be hung from their shoulders. The smallest should
be four spans including the hilt.191 The kataphraktoi should be girded
with other, single-edged, swords which are of the same size as the dou-
ble-edged ones, and are in fact called parameria. They should cover
their arms with cheiropsella and their legs in turn with the so-called
 Translation 55
podopsella, which [are] either iron or wooden or even from processed
ox hides.
3 In their saddles192 they should all have maces or iron maces,193 and in
addition, two or three saddle-bags containing hardtack or flour, as we
have said with more detail, in chapter 20.194 On their heads they should
likewise have polished iron helmets that cover [the face] fully and
which have plumes on top.
4 They should also bear quivers, each capable of carrying thirty to forty
arrows. The arrows should each be of nine palms and no smaller. The
bows should be much reduced in strength, of sixteen palms, or fifteen
at the least, including their cases.195
5 In their quiver-belts, each should also have files, awls, large knives,
glue, and other necessary [things] of that sort.
6 Their horses should definitely be covered with face-, breast- and flank-
protection of either lorikia or klibania, and these should be woven
together of either iron or horn.196
7 The lancers should be armed almost with the same armament as the
kataphraktoi, but lighter than them and less covered in armour. In
addition, their horses should be unarmoured, in order both to charge
and retreat promptly. And so much for the lancers.
8 From among the so-called light cavalry, the javelin-men should each
have two or three javelins of approximately twelve spans and also an
eight-cubits lance, and a rectangular shield as near as possible to four
spans, or a round one of three spans, and a helmet, which does not
cover [the face] entirely.
9 The horse-archers should have quivers and bows reduced in strength,
as we said above, for the greatest efficiency and accuracy. They should
also have parameria and helmets which do not cover the face. Further-
more, they should have saddle-bags and some of the necessary items
hung from their quiver waist belts, in the same manner as we said in
our discussion of the kataphraktoi.

40  The difference between the prokoursatores and koursatores. And

in addition, that after a withdrawal, our raiders must not be
complacent because they have arrived at the borders of their own
territory.
1 In fact, the prokoursatores and the koursatores are almost the same,
because they both consist of the so-called light [cavalry]. Their differ-
ence, however, is that the defensores are fewer among the prokoursa-
tores and not a great deal better. Because the prokoursatores fight very
56 Translation
closely to the other two tagmata,197 their hope for assistance comes
from thence and less from the defensores.
2 On the other hand, [there] are more of the defensores among the kour-
satores and they are better by far. Because the koursatores ravage hos-
tile territory, and depart a great distance from their army, the hope for
their safety depends entirely on the defensores.
3 The prokoursatores are separated from the other tagmata at a distance
of approximately two miles or maximum of three, because that [is] as
safe as possible. The koursatores, however, advance nearly six or as
many as seven miles beyond their force, but sometimes more or less,
which certainly seldom happens because it is risky. Nevertheless, it is
possible to reduce or increase the distance, depending of course on the
location and the size of the tagmata.
4 For this reason then, as far as the prokoursatores are concerned, the
force is divided into three: the prokoursatores will comprise two-
thirds and the defensores one-third. However, in the case of the kour-
satores,198 [it is] conversely one-third of koursatores and two-thirds of
defensores.
5 Rarely will half [of the force] consist of prokoursatores, and the other
half of defensores, unless perhaps there is complete uncertainty or if
the enemy is clearly very weak. Because as we said above, those who
spend time in hostile [territory] must be more careful, and that [is]
even more so for those who entirely spend their time plundering and
ravaging it. For I believe that those who divide two-thirds into kour-
satores and one-third into defensores, claiming either that the enemy
is weak or that no enemy army is currently present, do so out of a
desire for gain; not for the aforementioned reasons and not after a long
acquaintance with strategy.
6 For it [is] possible for the enemy army to arrive out of the blue, when
nobody expects it, and to score a victory with ease. The right-minded,
therefore, think that it is better to keep as safe as possible everywhere.
After the raid, the withdrawing army must not be in a careless state
of mind, and especially when it arrives at its own borders. Because, at
that time, it is customary for the enemy to attack, seeing that the raid-
ers completely neglect the proper precautions due to their victory and
that they heedlessly release their horses for grazing, as well as occupy
themselves with camp matters.199
7 Therefore, as I said, one must guard against the enemy’s attacks par-
ticularly on the following occasions: during the march and likewise
while in camp, by night and by day, and especially when the army is
occupied with setting up the encampment, as I have said. Consequently,
 Translation 57
the general should not dismount from his horse, and nor should his
army dare to break ranks before the establishment of the encampment
is completed, and before the watchmen, whom the Romans call viglai,
occupy their own places. For once the encampment is completed, the
expectation of an attack is reduced, since the encampment has been
secured with the steadfastness of the stakes, exactly as a palisaded
camp, and passage is made difficult by the tents being placed next to
one another.

41  The names of the military manoeuvres200

1 Turning to the spear, turning to the shield, marching by the front,
marching by the horn, epagoge, paragoge, metabole, epistrophe,
anastrophe, antiperispasis, exallagmos, hyperphalangisis, hyperk-
erosis, stoichein, zygoun, diplasiasmos, entaxis, hypotaxis, protaxis,
parekbole, systole.201
2 The movement of each man to the right is called turning to the spear,
and to the left, is called turning to the shield. Marching by the front
[is] when the formation advances and keeps its regular length, and
by the horn, when the formation, in the midst of very narrow places,
has the right division leading the way, then the middle, and finally
the left. For as we said, the outermost flank of each formation is
called the horn.
3 Epagoge [is] when the formation has the lochagoi, or first-fighters,
and the file-closers in accordance with their regular position. <Para-
goge, when . . . >202
4 Metabole turns the soldier right around and epistrophe turns the whole
tagma around as a single man. Anastrophe [is] to restore the whole
tagma to its previous state. Antiperispasis [is] when an unexpected
manoeuvre takes place, so that the enemy is deceived into yielding
in the sector where he is fighting and prevailing. Exallagmos [is]
when the first-fighters become file-closers and the file-closers become
first-fighters.
5 Hyperphlangisis [is] when the formation’s front is extended beyond
the enemy’s on both sides and hyperkerosis when it extends beyond
only on one side.
6 To ‘draw up in file’203 [is] for those who stand in the tagma by depth or
file to be in a straight row from one another, namely the lochagoi, then
the men in the centre, and then the file-closers. To ‘draw up in rank’204
[is] for those who stand horizontally to be in a straight line (because
the horizontal line of the tagmata is called rank).
58 Translation
7 Diplasiasmos [is] when the two lochoi become one and this is done
either vertically or horizontally. Entaxis [is] when the lightly armed
[men] are haphazardly positioned with the heavily armed one next to
another. Hypotaxis [is] when the lightly armed are placed individu-
ally behind the heavily armed. Protaxis, [is] when the lightly armed
are drawn up in front of the heavily armed. Parekbole205 [is] when
the front of the formation extends further in length and systole the
opposite.

42  The shapes of the formation206

1 Plaisia, isopleuros, plagia, orthia, loxe, amphistomos, antistomos.
The formation which consists of four sides, except not equilaterally,
but in the form of an oblong, is called plaisia. Isopleuros [is] the for-
mation which has the tagmata equilaterally on four sides, which is
also called a square.
2 Plagia [is] the formation that has a rather extensive front compared to
its depth and it forms an oblong square, which is very serviceable as
an array. Orthia [is] the formation that has an extensive depth com-
pared to its length, which is only serviceable in defiles. Loxe is the
formation which fights only by one flank at a time, slightly concealing
the other.
3 The amphistomos formation is different from the antistomos because
the first, which fights with the appearance of a rectangular column
shape, maintains battle on both flanks, while the second fights in a
rectangular horizontal shape and also maintains battle on both sides,
except not from the flanks but from the front and the rear.

43  Concerning the depth or thickness and the length of

the infantry as well as cavalry units, and also how much space
the infantryman and the cavalryman occupy in formation.
In addition, about the horizontal and vertical intervals
between the units and also regarding the bowshot.
1 The maximum depth of the infantry units is no more than sixteen
ranks and at least seven.207 For a depth beyond sixteen is useless, since
the javelin-men, archers, and slingers are hindered by the multitude of
men standing in front of them. However, a depth less than seven [is]
useless in another way, because sometimes the enemy attacks from the
front and the back simultaneously, and since the formation becomes
double-faced, it ends up as a result being captured by the enemy as it
lacks significant depth.
 Translation 59
2 So if the infantry forces amount to twelve thousand and beyond, then
the units should be made from sixteen ranks each. But if the army is
smaller, it is possible to reduce them to seven deep. So much for the
depth or density of the infantry units. The length of the infantry units
is imprecise though, because it is possible sometimes to stretch or to
contract them, according to the size of the army. To [my] thinking at
least, the most convenient length for the units is three hundred men
and a minimum of two hundred.
3 The maximum depth of the cavalry units consists of ten ranks, the
smaller depth of five, and of four at the least. Because a cavalry for-
mation which lacks depth is useless at the time of battle since it is
penetrated by the enemy, suffers encirclement, and easily succumbs to
destruction. It [is], however, extremely useful for taking prisoners and
ravaging the country very quickly.
4 So if the cavalry army amounts to ten thousand men, then the units
should be made of ten ranks each, but if the army is smaller, of five
or at least four ranks each. This is especially effective and useful as
regards the array. For the horse-archer who stands behind five men
will be compelled to shoot at a high angle due to those who stand in
front of him. Therefore, the result is for the arrows to be shot ineffec-
tively. Besides, the infantryman can easily push the man who stands
in front of him to battle, but not the cavalryman. Each of these will be
discussed in more detail in chapter 46.208
5 The depth or density then of the cavalry formation will be in this man-
ner. The length, however, is once more imprecise here, for it will be in
accordance with the size of the army. So, in this case as well a length
of three hundred, and two hundred men at the least, seems the most
convenient. So much for the length and depth of both the infantry and
cavalry units.
6 It is said that both the infantryman and the cavalryman occupy a hori-
zontal space in formation: of a fathom during the march, namely four
cubits; half a fathom if battle is expected, namely three feet; a third of
a fathom during the engagement itself, namely two feet, which is also
called synaspismos.209
7 Therefore, only in the so-called tortoise formation, which the ver-
nacular calls ‘locking of shields’,210 each of the infantrymen occupies
a quarter of a fathom, namely a cubit. A suitable space for both the
cavalryman and the infantryman is half a fathom. The infantryman,
however, occupies a vertical space of a fathom, in order to loose slings
and hurl javelins.211
60 Translation
8 The horizontal intervals between each of the units in the infantry
formations are no more than six fathoms [each]. For in this case, an
interval which allows eighteen cavalrymen to pass through seems suf-
ficient. As regards the horizontal intervals of the cavalry formations
in particular, [they are] imprecise, so an interval of thirteen fathoms
seems convenient in this case as well. Keep in mind that, as shall be
discussed in chapter 46, it is only in the second line that it is possible
to make horizontal intervals of up to half a bowshot.212
9 The vertical intervals as regards the units: during the march, each
unit will stand one or two bowshots away from each other, and some-
times more or less. In the time of battle, however, the intervals will
commonly be up to one bowshot. In rare cases though, the intervals
between the cavalry formations will be smaller than that, and much
smaller between the infantry formations. In the case of a composite
army, whenever the infantry encloses the cavalry in the middle of
a drawn up formation, the intervals will be a great deal smaller, as
will be discussed in more detail in chapter 47 concerning the com-
posite army and its infantry units. Because then, the vertical intervals
between the infantry units are no more than twenty-eight fathoms.213
10 However, the so-called prokoursatores and their defensores (they may
be those who march ahead of the units in times of battle and provoke
the enemy to an engagement) will stand off from the other units at
approximately two miles or a maximum of three, because further than
that [is] not safe. Likewise, the rear guards will stand two bowshots
away from the baggage train, so that the men of the baggage train may
not be struck down by arrows from behind if the enemy strikes against
the rear guard.
11 The right measure for the bowshot should be approximately 156 fath-
oms and as close as possible to 170 or at the most 180 of the so-called
simple fathoms.214

44  What should be done before a battle and, in addition, that

prisoners of war should be trusted more than deserters
1 Above all, the general and his army must be cleansed from sins before
the battle. In fact, one day before the battle, a prayer and the so-called
fervent supplication must be carried out by the priests for the sake of
our army’s salvation. So, when the appointed and decisive day comes
and the divine worship is conducted, everybody must participate in the
most immaculate and live-giving rituals. First, the banners [must] be
 Translation 61
blessed by the priests, and so in this manner, they [must] be entrusted
by the tourmarchai to the banner guards. In this way, after God is gra-
cious and well disposed towards us, He will also in every kind of way
commit Himself to victory.215
2 Without a doubt, the day of battle should not be proclaimed too many
days in advance to all the soldiers, except perhaps to those who are
picked among the officers. So that should battle at some point occur
suddenly in the intervening period and not wait for the appointed day,
victory does not side with the enemy, since due to the proclamation the
soldiers might act negligently as regards guarding the camp and other
military duties.216
3 In addition, spies should always be sent into the enemy’s camp some
days in advance so that they can provide accurate information about
the enemy numbers and armament and, especially on the very day
of battle, to know whether an allied force is attached to them or has
otherwise provided them with the necessities of battle. For if this is
the case, the general can then draw up his army safely and as well as
possible. The spies should be dispatched at dawn, due to the afore-
mentioned reasons.217
4 Keep in mind that at this time the sentries, as the Greeks call them,218
or the so-called viglai in the Roman language,219 should also be dis-
patched to a distance of approximately two or three miles from the
camp, separated into four groups of two or three men. Thus the general
can be accurately informed by them whether the enemy is conducting
ruses in nearby places, either by the so-called ambuscades or some-
times by causing rivers to flood, or whether the surrounding area has
become otherwise hostile and unsuitable for battle. Besides, [watches
should also be set] so that those who defect to the enemy from our
camp, usually before battle, may be punished as traitors after running
into the aforementioned sentries.220
5 Next, after the general has assembled the army by files, units, and
lines, he [must] encourage and rouse the men for battle, announcing to
them the rewards and honours given by the emperor and the wage on
behalf of the nation, as well as everything else he knows that incites
the soldiers to courage and bravery.221
6 It seems most advantageous and safe for the whole army to draw up
brothers by the side of brothers, friends by the side of friends, and to
mix the closest fellows with those who feel the same. For however
much a kinsman may be in danger, he who comes to his aid must
appear as willing to endanger himself to the same degree. In turn, he
who received the aid would be disgraced to abandon his benefactor
62 Translation
in the midst of danger, unless he willingly returned the favour he has
received for their defence.222
7 And besides the aforementioned, the general must also be careful
of this, namely not easily to believe the words of defectors, because
every defector is suspect. Therefore, those who have been captured by
assaults are to be more easily believed, since it appears that they give
unprepared responses to our questioning and that they do not lie as
much.223
8 In addition to the aforementioned, the general must order each cavalry-
man in the time of battle to have hardtack for two or three days in their
so-called saddle-bags. For sometimes the enemy retreats and runs to
some kind of stronghold. If the general realises that this is profitable,
and that the capture of that particular fort is easy in two or three days
at the most, he must pursue them. Because the capture of the enemy
will follow if the besieged have a lack of necessary provisions, but
the besiegers have sufficient [supplies]. If this does not happen, the
general has to impose an ignoble treaty on the enemy and to make
arrangements for them to retreat in their own land in disgrace.224

45  Infantry formations according to the Romans and about the

stationing and arrangement of each
1 As we have already discussed, the differences between the Roman and
foreign formations [are] many. The general will know which of the
two he must choose in the time of battle, because he will array his own
forces against [the enemy] not as he wishes, but in accordance with
the enemy formations. The formations, therefore, that are usually used
in times of battle and training,225 on particular account of which the
Romans conquer if they fight with God on their side, should be these
and no others.
2 When the infantry army consists of 24,<100> men, four thousand
will become prokoursatores, [divided] into four tagmata, all lightly
armed. Five hundred will be rear guards, [divided] into one tagma,
from whom a quarter,226 namely 125 men, will be shield bearers,227
and the other 375 light infantry. Another fifty will become defensores
of the general’s banners, who are also called banner guards, [organ-
ised] into one tagma only. All [should be] bold and well equipped,
and those who carry the banners at the very time of battle even more
so.228
3 The remaining 19,550 are divided into four major tagmata, each as
close as possible to 4,888 men. Again from every tagma, ten men are
 Translation 63
removed as banner guards for the commander of each of the afore-
mentioned tagmata. Two are removed as messengers: these would be
the men who convey the orders of the commanders to the soldiers in
time of battle. Moreover, ten are removed as auxiliaries, also called
kribantes: these would be the unarmed men who always follow behind
the tagma at a distance of forty fathoms, carry the wounded from the
battle on their horses, and transport them to the doctors through the
intervals between the units.229
4 Therefore, whenever twenty-two men from each tagma are removed
for the aforementioned reasons, in each of their units, 4,866 men
remain. From them a quarter, namely 1,216 men, are light infantry
and the other 3,650 shield bearers. For each tagma must not consist
solely of shield bearers, it should be mixed with light infantry instead,
so that it can shoot at the enemy from a distance.
5 As a result, this infantry formation is divided into ten tagmata; four
are the major ones, namely the right, the left, the middle right, and the
middle left. We said that each of these has 4,886 men, namely 19,464
in total. A quarter of them, namely 4,866 [men], [are] light infantry
and the other 14,598 shield bearers.
6 The minor tagmata [are] six: four of the prokoursatores, each of a
thousand [men], namely four thousand in total, all light infantry; one
[tagma] of five hundred rear guards,230 a quarter of whom, namely
125 [men], [are] shield bearers and the other 375 light infantry;
one [tagma] of fifty defensores of the general’s banners, all heavy
infantry.
7 In total 24,100 [men], from whom the 5,621 [are] light infantry and
the other 18,454 shield bearers. And so much for the division of the
tagmata.
8 Their array now is as follows: ahead of everyone are the prokoursa-
tores, namely the four tagmata of light infantry. They either march in
a straight line and with an equal front, like the array of the shield bear-
ers, or they also draw up in a triangular shape. After they have released
their missiles, they retire on both sides of the shield-bearing tagmata,
and so they hand over the battle to them. During this march of the
prokoursatores, shield bearers must be mixed with the light infantry,
especially on the outer sides [of the units], on account of the release of
missiles.231
9 After them [come] the equal-numbered tagmata of the shield bear-
ers. Between these shield-bearing tagmata, in fact in the most central
interval, the tagma of the defensores of the general’s banners should be
drawn up together with the trumpeters. The general also stands there,
64 Translation
[his tagma] having an equal front with the others. Next [comes] the
baggage train, and then behind everybody else follow the rear guards.
10 Because the aforementioned infantry tagmata do not often attack in
ranks and files, but irregularly, and sometimes they extend to great
length, or on the other hand sometimes contract in a mass,232 conduct-
ing ambushes against the enemy in one body; we must, therefore,
discuss the length and depth or the files of the most notable tagmata
and also the stationing and arrangement of their officers. For the book
should be thorough if it is ordered in this manner.
11 In this case then, the depth or thickness of each tagma, which is also
called kontoubernion in the Roman language, comprises sixteen ranks,
and each rank approximately 304 men.
12 The first rank will consist of dekarchoi, having the ekatontarchoi stand
in the middle of one hundred [men], and the pentekontarchoi on both
sides, close to the flanks. As we said, the dekarchoi will be drawn up
first of all and on this account they will be called file-leaders and first-
fighters. In addition, [they are] also [called] lochagoi, namely when
the tagma comprises sixteen ranks because, as we already said, a corps
of sixteen men is called a lochos.
13 The so-called epistatai will be drawn up second, after the dekarchoi.
The pentarchoi will stand in the middle of the depth or of the files of
the tagma. The so-called tetrarchoi, who are also called file-closers,
[will fill] the last rank.
14 Above all, it is needful to know this as well, that there will be no con-
fusion whatsoever when the tagma has a depth of ten ranks. Because
every dekarchia will consist of ten men, and the pentarchia and the
tetrachia likewise [of five and four men], and as I said, the dekarchos
will stand in the first rank, the pentarchos in the middle, and the tetrar-
chos in the very last one.
15 Similarly, when the tagma comprises sixteen ranks, the same officers
again stand in the same manner. Once more, the dekarchos stands first
and is called file-leader, first-fighter, but also lochagos, since he is the
leader of sixteen men (because lochos, as we have said many times,
is the name for a corps of sixteen men). The pentarchos stands in the
middle of the file, not fifth after the dekarchos, but seventh. And so
the same applies to the tetrarchos, because he will not be tenth, but
sixteenth, since the tetrarchos is always the file-closer.
16 The first rank, namely that which comprises the dekarchoi, the second,
of the so-called epistatai, and the third as well as the fourth, should of
necessity consist of shield bearers. In turn, the last rank, which com-
prises the tetrachoi, and the one before it, and up to four ranks, must
 Translation 65
also have shield bearers. All the other ranks in between will consist of
archers, slingers, and javelin-men, mixed in with shield bearers.
17 For the file of the tagma must have the means to be double-faced.
Because if the enemy attacks both from the front and from the rear, the
pentarchos will become file-closer. The tetrarchos, with the men under
his command, will separate from the others at a distance of approxi-
mately 120 fathoms, and so he will also become first-fighter and file-
leader so as to turn towards the enemy who is attacking from the rear.
On this occasion then, the tacticians call the unit double-arrayed233 or
double-faced, since it can sustain battle on both sides.
18 This is why the tetrarchos should leave behind a spacious interval in
between, namely, so that our men, who fight on the other side, may
not be shot from behind by the missiles released by the enemy. The
horizontal intervals of these tagmata must each be about six fathoms.
19 The intervals are necessary in all formations. Because having released
all their missiles, the prokoursatores retire without disorder in the sec-
ond line through the aforementioned intervals. Furthermore, through
these intervals, the wounded are safely carried by the so-called auxil-
iaries and delivered to the doctors, and by crossing the same intervals,
the messengers convey the orders and the commands of the officers
to those who are drawn up in the back. For in the time of battle it is
unsafe for those who are in need of assistance to go round the units.
20 And so much for how the men are arrayed in the tagma. The com-
manders of each tagma now stand in the middle together with their
banners and their guards and also with the trumpeters. The general
himself, as has been said, stands in the most central interval of the
units, together with those attached to him. On account of this, the
general is also called the navel or mouth of the formation. This will
become clearer from the diagram.234
21 The rear guards [will be placed] behind the tagmata, at a distance
of a bowshot. The tagmata must each keep a distance of a bowshot
between one another for this reason: so that the missiles which are
released by the enemy may not harm those who stand behind, but so
that they may fall in the empty space in between.
22 If the army amounts to 10,100 [men] the same array will follow, even
if the army should consist of more than twenty-four thousand [men]
and up to six thousand.235 For even if the formation has fewer tagmata,
the same array is once more preserved.
23 Now in [an army] of 10,100 men, the formation is divided into eight
tagmata, from which the major ones, namely the three of the shield
bearers, have 6,484 men,236 each of 2,162.237 From these 6,484, a
66 Translation
quarter, namely 1,620, [will be] light infantry and the other 4,866
shield bearers. Each of these three tagmata consists of sixteen ranks
and each rank of 216 men.238
24 The minor tagmata [are] five: three of the prokoursatores, having three
thousand [men], each of one thousand, all light infantry; one tagma of
the rear guards, five hundred [strong], of whom a quarter, namely 125,
[will be] shield bearers, and the other 375 light [infantry]; one tagma
of the defensores of the general’s banners exclusively of five hundred
heavy infantry.
25 To reckon this infantry formation to a total of ten thousand < and one
hundred > [men], the sixty-four [men] are also included,239 namely
those who are detached for the needs of the three major shield-bearing
tagmata, as stated above.240 From all these, 4,745 [are] light infantry
and the other 5,281 shield bearers.
26 If the infantry formation amounts up to six thousand [men], the same
array will follow, as has been said.241 However, in this case, the array
changes due to the shortage [of men]. For in [an army of] 5,900, the for-
mation will only be divided into seven tagmata, from which the major
two, namely of the shield bearers, each have 1,500 [men]. From them,
a quarter, 750, [will be] light [infantry], 375 [men] in each [tagma],
and the other 2,250 shield bearers, 1,125 [men] in each [tagma]. Each
of these tagmata has ten ranks242 and each rank 150 men.
27 The minor tagmata [are]: three of the prokoursatores 2,400 [strong],
each tagma of eight hundred [men], all light infantry; one tagma of
four hundred rear guards, a quarter of whom, one hundred [men],
[will be] shield bearers and the other three hundred light [infantry];
one tagma of the defensores of the general’s banners, of fifty heavy
infantry.
28 To reckon this third infantry formation to a total of 5,900 [men], as we
have already said, the forty-four men who are detached for the needs
of the two shield-bearing tagmata are also included. From these 5,900,
2,600 [are] shield bearers, and the other 3,250 light [infantry].
29 In [an army] of 3,116 [men], the tagmata will likewise be seven. From
these, the major [ones are] two, namely the tagmata of the shield bear-
ers of 1,400 men, 700 each. From these, a quarter, 350 men, [will be]
light [infantry], 175 in each tagma, and the other 1,050 shield bearers,
525 in each tagma. Each of these tagmata comprises seven ranks and
each rank a hundred [men].
30 The minor tagmata [are] five: three of the prokoursatores having 1,200
[men], four hundred in each [tagma], all light [infantry]; one [tagma]
of four hundred rear guards, a quarter of whom, one hundred men [will
 Translation 67
be] shield bearers and the other three hundred light [infantry]; one of
the defensores of the general’s banners of fifty men, all heavy infantry.
31 To reckon this formation to a total of 3,116 [men], as has been said
many times, the sixty-six men who are detached for the necessary
needs of the shield-bearing tagmata are also included. Of these [3,116
men], 1,650 [will be] light infantry and the other 1,466 shield bearers.
32 Whenever the enemy attacks the Roman army with great force and
prevails, the formation must become dense to such an extent as to
be impossible for anyone to turn about and move from one spot to
another. Because each [man] occupies a space of no more than a cubit,
the formation is, therefore, called ‘locking of shields’.243
33 The Romans usually make this formation round but also square.
Sometimes it has more length than depth and sometimes the opposite.
Those who stand at the front put forward the man-height shields which
some call thyreoi, and turning their faces towards the enemy, they fight
boldly without breaking the close order at all. If they are on the move,
they conduct the march slowly and in step. Each of those in the middle
covers the heads of those who are standing by him by quickly rais-
ing his shield high, and so everybody remains unharmed, since due to
the density [of the formation], the missiles and stones released by the
enemy do no harm. Consequently, this formation was called the tor-
toise by the tacticians, because it has so much density as for someone
to easily stand in file and not fall, and for the very large stones which
are thrown to roll upon the shields and to fall onto the ground without
any result at all.

46  Cavalry formations according to the same and about the

arrangement and stationing of each244
1 So much for how the Romans draw up and divide the infantry army.
Now, the so-called complex cavalry formation according to the
Romans would be as follows.
2 From a cavalry army consisting of 18,570 men, a thousand will
become prokoursatores in one tagma. Of them a quarter, 250 men,
will become lancers and the other 750 horse-archers. Five hundred
will become their defensores, in one tagma as well. So, as we already
said, the prokoursatores mostly attack the enemy irregularly, due to
the ever-frequent charges, retreats, and returns conducted by them.
The defensores do not [act] in the same manner, but they follow the
prokoursatores in an orderly manner and in files, with steadfastness.
68 Translation
3 Now each tagma of the defensores has a depth or thickness of five
ranks or horizontal lines and each rank a hundred men. The first and
second rank, and in turn the fourth and fifth, should necessarily consist
of lancers. However, the third and middle rank should have horse-
archers, for the reason that we discussed in the [chapter] concerning
the depth or files of the formations. And so much for how the defen-
sores will be immediately after the prokoursatores.
4 Behind them [comes] the so-called vanguard,245 [divided] into three
tagmata, each of 1,500 [men], so as for the vanguard to have 4,500
men. From them, a quarter, namely 1,125 men, [will be] light [cav-
alry], with 375 in each [tagma], and the other 3,375 <lancers . . . >,246
two tagmata of them, namely the right and the left. The depth [will be]
of ten ranks or horizontal lines and each rank [will have] 150 [men].
The first rank then, namely of the dekarchoi and the second, third, and
in turn the fourth, as well as the eighth, ninth, and tenth, namely of
the tetrarchoi, must consist of lancers together with kataphraktoi. The
other three ranks, that is the fifth, namely of the pentarchoi, the sixth,
and the seventh, will consist of horse-archers. And so much for how
the depth will be. Now, the length, as we said, will comprise 150 men
and fifty fathoms.
5 Evidently, the ekatontarchos will stand in the middle of the length.
The pentekontarchoi will stand on both sides, close to the outermost
flanks of the tagmata. The dekarchoi will stand successively between
the ekatontarchos and the pentekontarchoi, filling the first rank or hor-
izontal line. On this account the dekarchoi are also called file-leaders
and first-fighters. Likewise, the epistatai will fill the second rank, just
as we discussed in the infantry formations. The pentarchoi now [will
fill] the middle rank and the tetrarchoi the tenth and last one. On this
account they are also called file-closers. We have discussed them in
more detail in chapter 17.247
6 The so-called triangular array stands in the middle of the aforemen-
tioned two tagmata, consisting of twelve ranks or horizontal lines.248
The first rank has 122 [men] and the twelfth and last one 116,249
because the ranks right after the first and until the twelfth project from
one another by four men. Therefore, this triangular array will not com-
prise 1,500 men as the other two, namely those which [are] on both its
sides, but 1,504, a quarter of whom, 376 [men], will be light [cavalry]
and the other 1,128 kataphraktoi and lancers, two from the right and
likewise two from the left.250
7 The first rank then, the second, the third, and the fourth, and in turn
the ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth, will necessarily comprise
 Translation 69
exclusively kataphraktoi and the other four ranks horse-archers
together with lancers.
8 This triangular array will not have an equal front with the two units on
both its sides, but will project to such an extent that its last and twelfth
rank will be aligned with the first rank of the other two [tagmata].
9 Now, after the prokoursatores discharge their arrows against the
enemy, as is customary, and after they retire behind the formation
of the vanguard through the intervals between its units, the triangu-
lar will immediately advance against the enemy with an undoubt-
edly irresistible charge.251 If the triangular routs the enemy, the
other two tagmata will follow as defensores252 without breaking
ranks. If the triangular is already exhausted from the struggle, the
other two tagmata will join it, having the so-called second line253
following right behind. The matter of the second line will be dis-
cussed shortly after.
10 On the right side of the vanguard, after a sufficient interval from the
tagma of its outmost flank, stands the tagma of the so-called out-flank-
ers of two hundred men. From them, a quarter, namely fifty [men], [will
be] lancers and the other 150 light [cavalry]. They are drawn up so as
always to encircle the enemy formation during the battle, since they
conduct their charge from the spear-side, namely from the right side.
They precede right from the beginning and widen a little, just like the
letter upsilon [Υ]. They and the flank-guards complete the vanguard.254
11 For the tagma of the so-called flank-guards stands on the left side
of the vanguard, also composed of two hundred men. From them, a
quarter, namely fifty [men], [will be] lancers and the other 150 light
[cavalry]. They are arrayed so as to guard against the constant encir-
clements conducted by the enemy and to fight against them, as they
initially conduct their charge from the shield-side, which is from the
left. Since they also precede and widen a little like the out-flankers,
they are to be seen preparing their formation in the aforementioned
shape.255
12 The vanguard is also accompanied, at a sufficient interval, by another
two tagmata, each having a hundred men. A quarter of them, namely
fifty men [will be] lancers, twenty-five in each [tagma], and the other
150 [will be] light [cavalry], seventy-five [men] in each [tagma].
These units are those which lie in ambush in strategic positions before
the engagement and unexpectedly attack the enemy from the front,
from the rear, or from the flanks.256
13 These concealed tagmata are especially useful when the enemy turns
to flight, because the general must leave these tagmata in strategic
70 Translation
positions and together with the remaining army he must then pursue
the enemy. Sometimes the general will gain great assistance from the
ambuscades whenever the enemy feigns retreat and suddenly turns
about against the pursuers, causing the pursuit to be reversed. For when
the concealed [men] suddenly appear and attack the pursuing enemy,
they will either cause them to flee or they will restrain their advancing
momentum. And so much for how the vanguard will be.257
14 Behind the vanguard, at a distance of two bowshots, the so-called sec-
ond line follows, consisting of four tagmata of six thousand men. Of
them, a quarter, 1,500 [men], [will be] light [cavalry], with 375 in each
[tagma], and the other 4,500 lancers, 1,125 men in each [tagma], so as
for each tagma to have 1,500 light [cavalry] and lancers in total.
15 The depth of every tagma has ten horizontal lines or ranks and each
rank from 150 [men], so as for the length of each rank to be fifty
fathoms. The first rank then, the second, third, fourth and in turn the
eighth, ninth, and tenth, namely of the file-closers, must be composed
of lancers. The other three ranks in between, namely the fifth, sixth,
and seventh, will consist of horse-archers.
16 The horizontal intervals of these four tagmata from one another may
each be [half a bowshot].258 The second line has much larger intervals
between the tagmata than the others on account of this: because when-
ever the vanguard is worn out by the enemy, it must not scatter in dis-
order by breaking its ranks, but after it retires without trouble through
these intervals, it should thus halt, and together with the second line
it must oppose the enemy again. However, if the vanguard puts the
enemy to flight on its own, it should conduct the pursuit in good order,
as we already said.
17 Therefore, for the sake of greater security, the general, who stands at
the middle interval of the second line, must consider dispatching the
third line, which stands behind and which is called the saka by some,
for pursuit through the aforementioned intervals of the second line.
He, however, must take care to follow behind with the two aforemen-
tioned tagmata of the second line, in an orderly manner and in battle
array. But more on this later.259
18 In the aforementioned three intervals of the second line, three tagmata
are drawn up, in order to fill the space of the intervals and so to prevent
the formation from having such large openings. These will consist of
six hundred men, that is to say each part of the intervals has two hun-
dred [men]. From them, a quarter, namely 150 out of six hundred [will
be] lancers, with fifty [men] in each [interval], and the other 450 light
[cavalry], with 150 in each [interval]. These tagmata will draw up in
 Translation 71
the intervals, not by having an equal front like the other four major
tagmata of the second line, but [their] first rank will be aligned with
the last rear ranks of the major tagmata. So much for the second line
then, which is second after the vanguard.
19 The saka, the third and last line, draws up at a distance of a bowshot,
following the second line. It happens to be the same as the vanguard
in everything, concerning numbers, array, and all the rest. It will only
differ in this, namely that if there is a large number of kataphraktoi,
the middle tagma will in this case become triangular, but if there is
not, the middle one will be the same as [the tagmata] on both sides.
20 Now after the third line, the baggage train draws up together with the
three tagmata of the so-called rear guards of six hundred men, two
hundred in each [tagma]. From them, a quarter, namely 150 [will be]
lancers, with fifty in each [tagma], and the other 450 light [cavalry],
with 150 in each [tagma].
21 Therefore, the tagmata of the so-called complex cavalry formation
will be twenty-three in total,260 of which ten will be the major ones:
three of the vanguard, four of the second line, and three of the third
line. The minor ones will be thirteen: one of prokoursatores, one of
defensores, one of out-flankers, one of flank-guards, two concealed,
one of banner guards, three at the intervals of the second line, and
three of rear guards.
22 To reckon this complex cavalry formation to a total of twenty-three
tagmata, as I said, and to 18,570 men, those who are dispatched for
the various needs of the ten major tagmata are also included, as has
been discussed in chapter 45 concerning the infantry formations. From
the 18,570 [men], 6,150 will be light [cavalry] and the other 12,356
kataphraktoi and lancers.
23 The vertical and horizontal intervals of the tagmata from one another
and also the rest of their arrangement and stationing may be the fol-
lowing: the prokoursatores precede all the other tagmata, at a dis-
tance of approximately two or three miles at most, for this is as safe
as possible. After them, at a distance of about four bowshots, [come]
their defensores. Then, at a distance of approximately two or three
miles, [comes] the vanguard in three tagmata, as has been said. They
have as companions on both sides the out-flankers from the right and
the flank-guards from the left, and at an even further distance from
them on the flanks, the so-called concealed tagmata, another two [in
number].
24 Next, at a distance of two bowshots, follows the so-called second line,
in four tagmata (where the general [stands] with the banner guards
72 Translation
and the trumpeters, that is to say in the most central interval). This
line has in its intervals the aforementioned three tagmata. Afterwards,
at a distance of a bowshot, follows the third line in three tagmata, as
I said, after the fashion of the vanguard. After it, at distance of another
bowshot, follows the baggage train and after everyone else follows the
three tagmata of the rear guards at a distance of approximately two
bowshots.
25 The horizontal intervals between the tagmata in each of the three lines
should be the same in the case of the vanguard and the third line,
namely thirteen fathoms each, because this seems convenient for the
cavalry formations. Nevertheless, as regards the four tagmata of the
second line, they should each be half a bowshot. A more detailed dis-
cussion of these has been given in chapter 43.
26 In [an army] of 6,770 [men], the tagmata [will] likewise [be] twenty-
three, ten of which [will be] major in this case: three of the vanguard,
from which the two [will consist of] five ranks or lines and each rank
of a hundred [men], so these two tagmata comprise five hundred
men. From them a quarter, namely 125, [will be] lightly cavalry and
the other 375 lancers. One [tagma] of the triangular [formation] of
504 [men],261 a quarter of whom, 126, [will be] light [cavalry] and
the other 378 kataphraktoi and lancers. This triangular formation
has twelve ranks or horizontal lines, the first of twenty men and the
twelfth of sixty-four. To reckon the total of the vanguard, it equals
1,504 [men], a quarter of whom, 376, [will be] light [cavalry], 125
in each [tagma], and the other 1128 kataphraktoi and lancers, 375 in
each [tagma]. <Four tagmata of the second line . . . >, each of these
four tagmata has five ranks and every rank one hundred [men]. The
three [tagmata] of the third line [will be] in the same manner as the
vanguard.262
27 As we said, the major tagmata [are] ten, and the minor ones thirteen:
one of 334 prokoursatores, a quarter of whom, eighty-four [men, will
be] lancers and the other 250 light [cavalry]; one of 166 defensores,
a quarter of whom, forty-three [men, will be] light [cavalry] and the
other 123 lancers; one of one hundred out-flankers, of whom a quar-
ter, twenty-five [men, will be] lancers and seventy-five light [cavalry];
one of flank-guards, in the same manner as the out-flankers; two of
one hundred concealed men, a quarter of whom, twenty-five, [will be]
lancers and the other seventy-five light [cavalry]; one of the banner
guards of fifty kataphraktoi;263 three [tagmata] in the intervals of the
second line, each of one hundred [men], a quarter of whom, twenty-
five, [will be] lancers and the other seventy-five light [cavalry]; three
 Translation 73
[tagmata] of the rear guards, in the same manner as these in the inter-
vals of the second line. All three [are] identical.
28 To reckon this second cavalry formation to a total of twenty-three tag-
mata, as we said, and 6,770 men, of whom the 2,015 [will be] light
cavalry and the other 4,763 kataphraktoi and lancers, the 220 [men]
are also included, namely those who are dispatched for the needs of
the ten major tagmata, as indicated above. We already said that the
array and the intervals of the tagmata from one another [will be] after
the fashion of the first cavalry formation.
29 So, as I said, if the cavalry formation amounts to the aforementioned
6,770 men, the same array will be followed; namely, if the formation
consists of more than 18,570 [men] or fewer, up to 6,770 men, as
I said. In this case however, the array changes due to the shortage [of
men]. Therefore, in [an army] of three thousand [men], the formation
will only be divided into fifteen tagmata, from which, three [will be]
the major ones: one of the vanguard, which should be the triangular,
the first rank or horizontal line consisting of [ten]264 and the twelfth of
fifty-four [men]; one of the second line, this second tagma here has
five ranks, so that each line may comprise <seventy-four> [men], a
quarter of whom, ninety-three [men, will be] light [cavalry] and the
other 279 kataphraktoi and lancers; one of the third line, in the same
manner as the tagma in the second.
30 As it has been said, these three are the major units. The minor, how-
ever, are twelve: one [tagma] of 200 prokoursatores, a quarter of
whom, fifty [men, will be] lancers and the other 150 light [cavalry];
one of one hundred defensores, a quarter of whom, twenty-five [men,
will be] light [cavalry] and the other seventy-five lancers; one tagma
on the right side of the vanguard, namely of the out-flankers of 150
men, a quarter of whom, thirty-seven [men, will be] lancers and the
other 113 light [cavalry]; one on the left of the vanguard, namely of
the flank-guards, in the same manner as the out-flankers; two con-
cealed tagmata, each with fifty [men], a quarter of which has thirteen
lancers, and thirty-seven light [cavalry], that is to say for each of them;
one of the banner guards of fifty kataphraktoi; one on the right flank of
the second line of 200 [men], a quarter of whom, fifty, [will be] light
[cavalry] and the other 150 lancers; one on the left flank of the same
line, in the same manner as the right; one on the right and one on the
left flank of the third line, in the same manner as those in the second;
one [tagma] of the rear guards of one hundred [men], half of them,
fifty, [will be light cavalry] and the other fifty lancers. These [are]
twelve in total.
74 Translation
31 To reckon this third cavalry formation as a total of fifteen tagmata,
as we said, and three thousand men, of whom 1,860 [will be] light
[cavalry] and the other 1,140 kataphraktoi and lancers, the two hun-
dred men who are despatched for the needs of the tagmata are also
included. The array and the intervals of the tagmata from one another
[will be] as we discussed in the aforementioned cavalry formations.
32 In [an army] which [is] in every way very small (this may be an army
of a thousand men), the array is completely different due to the short-
age [of men]. For in this case, the formation is only divided into nine
tagmata, from which five [will be] the major ones: one may be the
vanguard of two hundred [men], of whom sixty-seven may be kata-
phraktoi and the other 133 lancers; three of the second line, from
which the middle [may have] 250 [men], of whom eighty-four [may
be] kataphraktoi and the other 166 lancers; the right [may have] a
hundred men, sixty-seven of whom, [may be] lancers and other thirty-
three light [cavalry]; the left [may be] in the same manner as the right;
one of prokoursatores of 166 [men], all light [cavalry].
33 These five are the major [units], as has been said. The minor, however,
are four: one of defensores, eighty-four [strong] all lancers; two of the
concealed [tagmata], with twenty-five [men] in each, lancers and light
cavalry together; one of the rear guard of fifty [men], thirty-four lanc-
ers and sixteen light [cavalry].
34 To calculate this smallest cavalry formation, it equals a total of nine
tagmata, as we have said, and a thousand men, of whom 266 [will
be] light cavalry and the other 734 kataphraktoi and lancers. In addi-
tion, twelve men from the kataphraktoi, the best and boldest of them
all, will become banner guards, six in each banner. The array and the
intervals of the tagmata from one another [will be] in the fashion of
the other cavalry formations we discussed. In this case, the general,
together with the banners and the trumpeters, stands in the most cen-
tral part of the tagmata in the second line. And so much for the discus-
sion of the Roman cavalry formations.
  Marginal note: It must be known from the ancient military treatises
that the left [division] always enjoys greater preference than the right
one. As a result, the commander of the left [division] should be more
distinguished than the right. In the defiles, the commander of the left
[division] precedes, then the commander of the middle and third the
commander of the right. However, the [commander of] the right is
preferred for assaults against the enemy. Since the right [tagmata] are
more agile than the left, they take the lead during the movement of
units, when the need is for them to pass through a narrow opening. In
 Translation 75
the case when the left division has been put first, it crosses obliquely
in front of the right division. But the right division, being more agile,
quickly returns to the previous array, something which can be seen
taking place, both in corps and tagmata.265

47  Compound military formations according to the same, in which

the infantry is always the majority
1 If the army happens to be compound, namely of both infantry and
cavalry, the Romans draw up their formations in a different way,
undoubtedly dissimilar to the aforementioned fashion of the infantry
and cavalry formations.
2 The compound army now should be composed of 26,184 men. From
them, 19,414 should be infantry, in fifteen tagmata, from which twelve
should be the major [units], with 1,500 [men] in each. From the 1,500
men then, a quarter, that is to say 375, should be light infantry and the
other 1,125 shield bearers, so as for the total of men in these twelve
tagmata to be eighteen thousand, a quarter of whom, 4,500, should be
light [infantry] and the other 13,500 shield bearers.
3 Each tagma has ten ranks and each rank 150 men. The aforementioned
twelve tagmata in this compound army are always drawn up in an
equilateral shape, either in a square266 or even in a horizontal rectangle
and rarely, when the army passes through defiles, in a vertical rectan-
gle. We will discuss all these.
4 Let us first discuss the equilateral square formation, how many men
must be in each tagma, and in turn how many of them must be shield
bearers and likewise light [infantry], as we already said. The array
and placement of the light and shield-bearing infantry and of their
officers has been sufficiently discussed in chapter 45, where we went
through the first infantry formation in detail. The intervals of these
tagmata from one another [are] as discussed in chapter 43, because the
horizontal and vertical intervals of the infantry units in the composite
army are expounded in detail there. What remains to be discussed is
how the infantry formation of a compound army should be drawn up
in an equilateral shape.
5 Three tagmata will be drawn up in the front [of the square] in a row,
having intervals between one other. In turn, three tagmata will be
drawn up in the last and final post, which some are accustomed to call
the tail. They also draw up in a row and have the same intervals. In
addition, three tagmata will be drawn up on the right side and another
three on the left. They both happen to be in a straight vertical line and
76 Translation
behind the outermost tagmata. They each stand at vertical intervals
of approximately twenty-eight fathoms from one another, as has been
discussed in chapter 43. There will therefore be twelve infantry tag-
mata in this compound formation, eight of which will be major [units],
and their intervals will be of the same number.
6 The perimeter of this equilateral square is 648 fathoms, with 162 on
each side. For as we have said, there are three tagmata in the front,
each having a length of 150 men. This indicates that these three tag-
mata will have a length of 150 fathoms because, as has been said in
chapter 4<3>, in all the tagmata during the battle, three men are cal-
culated for a fathom. However, since there are two intervals between
them, another twelve fathoms will be added, because we said that the
horizontal intervals of the infantry units [are] no more than six fath-
oms each. As a result, the front side reckons a total of 162 fathoms, as
we have already indicated. The rear side will be in the same manner.
7 The right and the left side will also each consist of 162 fathoms, but in
another manner and not after the fashion of the aforementioned two,
namely the front and the rear side. Because in this case each [side] has
a depth of five tagmata,267 a space of fifty fathoms will be occupied
here, ten fathoms for each tagma. For it has been said that the tagma
has a depth of ten men, and likewise we said in chapter 43 that each
man occupies a space of a fathom in the depth or file of the tagma.
Since there are also four intervals in these aforementioned five tag-
mata, consequently another 112 fathoms may be added, twenty-eight
fathoms in each interval.
8 Because in the composite army the vertical intervals [of the men]
in the infantry units also comprise a fathom,268 the perimeter of the
square, as we said, is 648 fathoms. The empty unoccupied space inside
may be 428. The two sides, the front one and the rear one, comprise
sixty-two fathoms each, including the intervals. The remaining two,
the right and the left, each consist of 142.269 This will become clearer
from the diagram.
9 In the horizontal rectangle, however, there will be four tagmata in a
row in the front, and four likewise in the so-called tail, while another
two will be on the right side and likewise two on the left side.
10 The two sides of the front and of the rear consist of 436 fathoms, each
of 218. The right and the left consist of 248 fathoms, each of 124.
Therefore, the perimeter of this rectangle should be 684 fathoms. The
empty unoccupied space inside of it should be 444 fathoms, the two
sides, the front and the rear, each consisting of 118, and the remaining
two, namely the right and the left, of 104 each.
 Translation 77
11 In the vertical rectangle there will be <four> tagmata in the front and
likewise <four> in the tail, having their length as a depth, <and two>
others will be on the right side and likewise on the left.
12 The two sides, at the front and the rear, as well as at the right and the
left, may in the same manner be 628 fathoms, each composed of 314.
As a result, the perimeter of this vertical rectangle may be <1256 fath-
oms>.270 Its unoccupied empty space inside will receive the cavalry
and the baggage train.
13 This vertical rectangular formation is not always serviceable, but only
in defiles as we have said. Therefore, it has horizontal and likewise
vertical intervals between the tagmata of sixteen fathoms, for this may
be the right measure for a stone-shot. Due to this fact, it has a smaller
perimeter and an empty unoccupied space inside. And so much for
how the twelve major tagmata are drawn up in a composite army.
14 Since this formation also has three minor tagmata, it is necessary to
discuss them as well. So, there is one tagma of the banner guards of
the general’s banners of fifty heavy infantry and one tagma of those
who [stand] in the eight major intervals of eight hundred men, all light
[infantry].
15 These eight hundred will be drawn up in the aforementioned intervals,
in order to fill the space between the tagmata. They will not, however,
have the same front as the others but they will be drawn up towards the
inside, aligning with the last rank of the tagmata, so as to always keep
an eye on those who want to break in through the intervals.
16 The third tagma is of the so-called menavlatoi, comprising three hun-
dred shield bearers. The menavlatoi are first set in the intervals of the
front side. But when the enemy approaches at a distance of a bowshot,
they pass through these intervals in front of the tagmata and draw up
at a distance of approximately thirty or forty fathoms, either having
an equal front or in a triangular shape, as has been said in chapter
<46>.271 Their task is courageously to pierce the horses of the enemy
kataphraktoi with their menavlia.
17 And so much for the array of the infantry, consisting of 19,414 men,
as has been said. The men of the twelve major tagmata, [are] eighteen
thousand,272 of whom 4,500 [are] light [infantry] and the other 13,500
shield bearers. The men of the three minor tagmata [are] 1,414, of
whom 484 [are] shield bearers and the other 930 light [infantry]. As
we have said many times, the 264 men who are detached for the needs
of the twelve major tagmata are also included.
18 Therefore, this first infantry formation in the composite army is reck-
oned at a total of 19,414 [men], from whom, 5,564 [are] light [infan-
try] and the other <1>3,850 shield bearers. The cavalry, namely 6,770
78 Translation
men, stand inside the aforementioned twelve infantry tagmata without
changing their array at all, but drawing up in the very same manner as
discussed in chapter 46 on cavalry formations.
19 The cavalrymen begin the battle first, exiting through the major inter-
vals of the aforementioned infantry tagmata on the flanks. When they
have put the enemy to flight, they vigorously pursue them, having
the infantry units following behind, but when they are repulsed, they
return again towards the infantry. They either pass through the inter-
vals and stand inside the infantry units, that is to say in the empty
space where they previously stood, or they stand outside, close to the
outermost flanks of the infantry tagmata, and so, being on both sides
as we said, they fight together with the infantry array.
20 If the enemy force is larger, then it is safer, according to Polybius and
Aelian,273 for this compound formation to have only eight intervals
and the corners of the square to be attached together. On the other
hand, if the enemy force is smaller, it is appropriate for it to be arrayed
with ten or twelve intervals. Whenever the cavalry army is numerous,
it is cramped and not able easily to stand inside the empty space of the
infantry tagmata, due to its size. In these circumstances, the general
must remove one rank from each tagma inside the square and attach it
to the outside part of the square.
21 And so much for how the first infantry and cavalry array will be in a
composite army, comprising in total, as we have said, 24,184 men, of
whom 19,414 will be infantry, of whom in turn, 13,850 will be shield
bearers and the other 5,564 light [infantry]. As mentioned many times,
the 6,770 will be cavalry, from whom 2,015 [men] will be light [cav-
alry] and the other 4,763 kataphraktoi and lancers, as we said in the
[chapter] on the second cavalry formation.
22 In [an army] of 9,274 infantry and 3,244274 cavalry the same array
follows, because in this case there will also be fifteen infantry tag-
mata. Twelve of these will be the major ones, each [having] seven
horizontal lines or ranks. Each rank [will have] a hundred men, so
as for every tagma to have seven hundred men, a quarter of whom,
namely 175, will be light [infantry] and the other 525 shield bear-
ers. Therefore, the aforementioned twelve tagmata are reckoned to a
total of 8,400 [men], a quarter of whom, 2,100, [will be] light [infan-
try] and the other 6,300 heavy infantry and shield bearers. The minor
three tagmata, as discussed, [are]: one of defensores of the general’s
banners, of fifty [men], all heavy infantry; one of menavlatoi, two
hundred [strong]; one of those who stand at the intervals of the tag-
mata, 360 [strong], each of forty-five [men], all light [infantry].
 Translation 79
23 So, for this second composite formation to be reckoned to a total of
12,528 [men] of whom 9,274 [will be] infantry and of these in turn
2,724 light [infantry], the 264 [men], namely those who are detached for
the needs of the twelve major tagmata, are also included, as mentioned
many times. The other 6,550 [will be] heavy infantry and shield bearers,
including the menavlatoi. And so much for the infantry. The 3,244275
cavalrymen stand inside these infantry tagmata, as I have already said.
24 If the compound army consists of 9,220 [men], the 6,452 infantry and
the other 2,768 cavalry, the same battle array will apply. For in this
case, the infantry will be divided into fifteen tagmata of which twelve
will be major, each having seven ranks and each rank sixty-eight men,
so as for every tagma to have 476 men, a quarter of whom, as close as
possible to 119 [men], will be light [infantry] and the other 358 shield
bearers. All the twelve tagmata in total will have 5,736 [men], a quar-
ter of whom, 1,428 [men], will be light [infantry] and the other 4,274
shield bearers. The three minor tagmata [will be]: one of defensores of
the general’s banners, of fifty heavy infantry; one of menavlatoi, 142
[strong]; one of those [who stand] at the intervals, of 288 [men], all
light [infantry].
25 So, for this third infantry formation of a composite army to be reck-
oned to a total of 6,452 [men], of whom 1,976 [will be] light [infantry],
the 264 [men], that is to say those who are detached for the needs of
the twelve major tagmata are also included, as indicated many times.
The other 4,476 [will be] heavy infantry together with shield bearers.
The cavalry, namely 2,768 [men], stands inside the aforementioned
infantry tagmata, maintaining the same array as we discussed in the
fourth cavalry formation.
26 Therefore, this third composite formation should comprise 9,220 men
in total, of whom 6,452 may be infantry and the other 2,768 cavalry.
The intervals and the rest of the array [will be] the same as discussed
in the case of the first composite formation.
27 So then, if the composite army consists of up to 9,220 men, the same
battle array applies. In this case, however, the array changes due to the
shortage [of men]. For if the composite army consists of 3,116 infantry
and a thousand cavalry, the infantry will be drawn up as we discussed
in [the chapter] regarding the third infantry formation. The cavalry will
follow at a distance of half a bowshot, not in the rear, but close to the
outmost flanks of the infantry tagmata, which are also called horns
(because the flank of the formation is called a horn).
28 The cavalry will draw up in four tagmata as follows: two on the right
and likewise two on the left. Therefore, there are five hundred cavalry
80 Translation
on both flanks, [divided] into two tagmata as we said. One-third, 166
men, will be prokoursatores and the other 334 defensores. In this case,
the tagma of the defensores has four ranks and each rank eighty-three
[men]. The cavalry must be drawn up close to the outmost flanks of the
infantry tagmata for the following reason.
29 Since the infantry army is small, it is extremely likely that it will be
encircled on account of its shortage [of men]. The cavalry will eas-
ily guard against the enemy encirclements, and if the time calls for
it, it will encircle the enemy for they are horsemen and they conduct
charges from an advantageous position, just as we discussed for the
out-flankers and the flank-guards in chapter 46 on cavalry formations.
30 In this case then, the cavalry prokoursatores begin the battle, followed
by the infantry tagmata bearing their slings. If they are repulsed, they
retreat to their previous position and they fight together with their
defensores and the infantry tagmata.
31 If there is a composite army in which the cavalry is <the majority>
and the infantry fewer, the cavalry will occupy the middle part of the
formation. The infantry will draw up close to the outmost flanks of
these tagmata, not behind the cavalry, as we said a little earlier when
the cavalry was fewer than the infantry, but they will precede all the
cavalry tagmata, except for the cavalry prokoursatores. Because in
general, the infantry always precedes the cavalry tagmata in both the
foreign and Roman formations.

48  Concerning night battle276

1 The tacticians divide the whole army into only three divisions on
the occasion of a night battle. They set two of them on both sides
of the enemy camp, with many bugles, trumpets, and copper drums
because in this manner the approaching army gives the impression to
the enemy that it [is] many times larger. The third [division], however,
is ordered to advance directly against the enemy with much boldness
and courage.
2 One should strike against the enemy camp from only three sides, and
not encircle it, but leave the escape route towards enemy territory
unhindered and without posting guards, so that the enemy should not
fight too boldly out of despair, if they did not at any time have a place
to flee to.
3 During a night battle, trumpets or bugles should not be sounded at
all when the army is about to begin the move nor during the march.
 Translation 81
A signal or a clash of shields277 or something else of that sort should
replace their function. Once the army stands as close to the enemy
camp as possible, that is when the bugles, trumpets, and copper drums
are needed.
4 The general should give a signal for everyone to remember so that
they can recognise one another at night, and to avoid slaying each
other accidentally.278 The signal should not always be the same, nor
should it be announced many days in advance, but very close to the
time of battle so that if it were revealed to the enemy by spies or defec-
tors it would not bring them salvation.
5 At the time of the attack, it is most advantageous to deceive the enemy
through some men who know their language. Because when they hear
them call out, the enemy come forward to speak to them as if they
were of their own race and they are easily overpowered.279
6 The best time for a night battle is two or at most three hours before
dawn and when the night is full of stars or the moon is full. For in this
way, the army will conduct the nocturnal assault in light without harm
to itself. Besides, having the moon shining on their backs, the soldiers
will seem fearsome and [seem to have] bigger bodies to the enemy. In
fact, when the Roman general < . . . > did this, he prevailed by force.280
7 Throughout the course of night battle, combat is always conducted
hand to hand. The masses of the so-called lightly armed [infantry],
namely the archers and the slingers, [are] useless here, because every-
one is fighting in the melee. Above all, it must be known that night bat-
tles were invented for times of weakness or shortage in the army. For
if the army is fit for fighting, it [is] insulting and totally unworthy to
win in such a way, and undoubtedly even more so for the general to be
defeated after the engagement, should he prove to be unsuccessful.281

49  Concerning the march of the composite army over level and

rough terrain. In addition, that the army should be prevented
from marching across cultivated places.282
1 If an encounter is expected in a period of approximately five or six
days, the general should always conduct marches in good order,
whether he traverses friendly or hostile territory. For if the soldiers
are accustomed to march in good order, each will gradually recognise
their own lochoi in times of battle and they will learn to obey their
officers, as well as to recognise their commands. And so everybody
82 Translation
will be ready for the sudden assaults which sometimes occur during
the march.
2 First of all then, if there is no danger while marching, the surveyors
and those who are responsible must select and occupy a site for the
camp one day in advance, as well as allocate to each tagma a sufficient
spot and take note of pasturage for horses and for the abundance of
water.
3 In addition, in impassable or overgrown locations, the general should
send the infantry on ahead in order to prepare and level the road as far
as possible, because this [is] absolutely vital for the presence of a very
large army.283
4 The general, together with the banners and all the rest of his entourage
should precede everyone during the march because, just by being seen,
he becomes the promoter of as great a discipline as possible for all the
officers and soldiers. In the same manner, each of the tourmarchai,
droungarioi, and kometes and all the other officers should precede
their own unit.284 However, the general should act in the aforemen-
tioned manner, as I have said, [only] if there is no danger. On the other
hand, if he leads the army through a territory where an enemy attack
is expected, he should send scouts ahead of the army at a distance of
approximately twelve miles. Each scout party should not have more
than two men. Then behind them at a distance of two or even three
bowshots another two should be posted, then another [two] and so on,
all of them in pairs, extending as far as the camp, so as for the general
to learn easily from them what has taken place during the march.
5 Especially in defiles and at major river crossings, each officer must
wait until the force under his command has traversed safely. The same
thing should be observed on land which is arable and under cultiva-
tion, whether the army traverses through its own territory or through an
allied one. For it is absolutely vital never to lead the army through such
territory. If there is an urgent need though, the officers themselves must
halt in the aforementioned land and must not retire from there until the
force under their command has passed through.
6 Then [each] officer must hand over the lands unharmed to the officer
behind him and in this manner then, he must carry on with the march.
For in this way, it follows that the array is not broken and the farmers
will enjoy [the fruits of] their hard work.
7 The hunting of wild beasts should always be forbidden during the
march and especially if battle is expected, because hunting is only
essential to soldiers in times of peace. These matters will be discussed
in more detail in chapter 56.285
 Translation 83
8 Now if the general invades the enemy territory through defiles, he should
normally not depart before he has secured himself with an infantry force
and before the infantry has occupied the strategic positions at the defiles,
as we also said in chapter 33.286 If the army [consists] only of cavalry,
we command that such passages be avoided in every possible way and
especially during the summer season due to the density of the vegeta-
tion, unless the situation is desperate.287
9 If it comes to this, since everybody should dismount from their horses,
the latter should be mingled with the baggage train and not kept nearby.
[This is] so that, if some kind of fear or confusion were to occur and
the horses were there, the majority would not break ranks by each
trying to mount the horses. If the width of the defile were one or even
two miles at the most, the cavalrymen, after organising the infantry
formation, [should] pass through the dangerous and impassable places
in this manner.288
10 In the defiles and places where the attack of the enemy is expected, the
infantry is drawn up as follows: if perhaps the width of the aforemen-
tioned defiles is more or less moderate, no more than about fifteen fath-
oms, the baggage train precedes in the middle with a leisurely marching
step. All the tagmata of the heavy infantry accompany it on both sides,
conducting the march vertically and in a column, not at their front but
on their flanks, having the length as depth and the depth as length. The
first-fighters, or dekarchoi, do not stand on the front side but on the
outer side, towards the side of the attacking enemy.289
11 All the light infantry are divided into four [tagmata]. The first is
detached as prokoursatores. It always marches ahead of the baggage
train and the whole army, at such a distance as for the sound of the
trumpet or the bugle to be heard quite clearly. It also investigates sus-
picious places and, as far as possible, restores the roads and leads the
way. Then the second becomes the rear guard of all the tagmata, fol-
lowing the baggage train and the wagons at a distance of a stone-shot,
while the remaining two accompany the tagmata of the heavy infantry
for the sake of greater security.290
12 And so much for how the army, together with the baggage train or the
spoils, will pass through defiles, if the defiles have a moderate width,
namely up to fifteen fathoms, as we said. Now in the case of the very
narrowest of places, the tagma of the prokoursatores marches ahead
once again, then [come] the remaining two light infantry tagmata,
after them the heavy infantry together with the general at the same
place, then the baggage train, after that the wagons, then those who
84 Translation
are posted as rear guards, mixed with some of the cavalry, and right
behind them a few infantry.291
13 In times of battle and likewise of march, everyone must know the com-
mands of their officers exactly and must begin if the bugle sounds or
on the other hand halt [at the sound of] the trumpet. The soldiers must
be trained in these beforehand during drill, and not at the very moment
of battle. In this case, the vertical intervals of the tagmata from one
another should be no more than a stone-shot, which may be approxi-
mately sixteen fathoms, apart from the interval between the prokoursa-
tores, for we said that they march ahead of the rest of the tagmata as far
as the sound of the bugle or trumpet [can be heard].292

50  What the general must do after victory and regarding the

distribution of booty. In addition, those who die in battle are
worthy of burial and prisoners of war should not be slain (and
never the most honourable of them) while the fighting is still in
progress.293
1 When the general prevails against the enemy with the help of God, puts
them to flight by force, captures their lands, and becomes fearless, he
must first of all remit the thanks due to our Lord and God Jesus Christ
and he must fulfil eagerly and without any sort of delay what was prom-
ised during or after the war to the Lord Christ himself or to any of his
followers and others among his servants.294
2 Next, it is likewise fit for the general to give benefits to those who
acted bravely during the battle, promoting some to a higher rank or
giving money or land grants to others. However, it is suitable to punish
and take revenge on those who proved to be the very worst. For when
brave men expect awards and honours but cowards the exact opposite,
that is when the general must eagerly oppose the enemy.
3 The general should not only honour brave men individually, but also
by droungoi and tourmai and by the other divisions, because in this
way he will render the soldiers more daring and more eager for battle.
The general then should show favour to the distinguished men with
banquets and breakfasts, some [given] by himself and others by their
commanding officers.295 For undoubtedly, it [is] unfair for the hunts-
men to entice the hounds with the blood and the organs of the prey but
to leave unrewarded the great spirit of those who suffer on behalf of
our own people and for the unblemished faith of the Christians.
4 The distribution of spoils should be made equally among those who
engage in fighting: likewise among those who are on guard behind
them or among those who guard the baggage train. They should be
 Translation 85
given both to the lower [ranks] and to the higher,296 because this is the
law for the whole army. The general should not receive a portion from
Our Majesty’s grant more than the old tenth or the present sixth,297
and neither should he, or any of the tourmarchai, receive more than
the military portion for the sake of personal profit, because for each of
them the increase in salary and the plentiful grants which are given to
them on each [occasion] by our God-crowned Majesty are enough.298
5 In addition, the general should not allow even a single person in the
army to pilfer and conceal anything from the common spoils, but he
should restore whatever was stolen to the sum by sending forward
some of the most trusted men and diligently occupying the roads and
the trails.
6 The captive soldiers and those of the enemy who were seized and
[are] otherwise honourable should not be included in the spoils but
they should be excluded from the sum, either for the sake of being
exchanged, for concluding a truce or for whatever Our Majesty wishes
[to do with them].299 To be sure, when the cost involvement is shared
in common, in this case everyone and above all the general and the
officers as well as the taxiarchoi under his command, must keep their
hands off the aforementioned spoils completely, until the amounts
intended for the common needs are covered from this [allocation].300
7 Thought must be taken, in any possible way, for those who die dur-
ing the battle and they must be deemed worthy of burial and of every
other kind of care, without alleging time, fear, or place as an excuse;
because on that account, the greatest encouragement and eagerness
towards danger springs up amongst the living.301
8 In addition, the prisoners should not be slain while the war is still
on. For whenever victory sides with the enemy, it is possible to
rescue our own prisoners through an exchange with them. How-
ever, if the enemy neither consents to this nor welcomes peace, then
the general must take care of the most worthy of the prisoners and
never execute them, but he must surrender the remaining vulgar and
coarse mob to famine and sword, taking revenge on the enemy in a
fair way and bringing grief and fear upon them.302

51  The general must cautiously pursue during enemy retreats and

he should leave behind some lochoi in strategic [positions], in
order to withdraw safely. Furthermore, he who turns about often
during a retreat is asking for battle.
1 Just as we suspect the enemy, their withdrawals should likewise always
be viewed with suspicion and pursuits should not be led recklessly
86 Translation
and carelessly. Rather, the locations all around should be carefully
inspected: from where and through what sort of passage is the enemy
leading the army and in turn whether they have calculated whether
they should conduct their withdrawal through the same or another
passage.303
2 The pursuer, therefore, must leave a sufficient force in the narrow
mountain passes and in the so-called defiles, in order to withdraw
safely.
3 In addition, however, the soldier who is experienced in tactics must
also know the following, that he who regularly turns about while flee-
ing is reckoned as more daring, and if he is ordered to engage with
someone in battle, he is absolutely thirsty for a fight.304

52  What the general should do if the enemy attacks his own

territory
1 If the enemy force is equal or greater, the general must not fight those
who occupy our land openly in a pitched battle but during the invasion
he must not oppose [them] at all. However, he must always lurk in
strategic locations, occupying the secure ones in advance, setting on
fire and destroying necessities.305
2 Now, if the enemy is retreating and by this time has reached their own
borders, and if they are already encamped, then it may be advanta-
geous to attack furiously. For the enemy will neglect the proper pre-
cautions, when they are entirely occupied with matters of booty and
also because everybody is weary from the march and likewise encum-
bered. That is especially true if they are already near to their borders,
as we said, because they will be more negligent since they clearly have
more opportunities to save themselves.306
3 In fact, since those who are in foreign [territory] always fight more
daringly and more recklessly due to desperation, the very best time for
attacking, as I have said in chapter 40, is when the army is occupied
with fixing the camp and when everybody may release the horses for
pasturage.307

53  What the general should do under siege308

1 If the general suspects that he will be besieged by the enemy, he should
above all gather food which will be sufficient for a lengthy siege. If
food supplies are not sufficiently abundant, he should send the sick,
elderly, and the women and children to a safe and fortified location
in advance of the enemy assault. Before that, he must pay serious
attention to suspicious people. Afterwards, he should assign the most
 Translation 87
trusted men to the city gates. He should not always have the same men
guarding the same location, but if possible every single day, or every
two or three days at the most, he should rotate them due to [the dan-
ger of] treason. Especially during stormy, moonless, or even festive
nights, he should render the watches as safe as possible, because this
is usually the time for ruses.
2 Of course he should deploy his force on the more assailable [parts] of
the wall, but he should have another one with him in order to provide
aid easily to the section which is hard-pressed. In addition, through
rotation, [he must] relieve those who fight by night with those who
fight by day, so that the soldiers will not be exhausted due to the short-
age of men and compelled to abandon some of the sections of the
city’s watch easily.309
3 Once the siege has already begun, the besieged should not fight out-
side of the walls, even if they happen to be greater in numbers and
braver; unless perhaps the situation is desperate and it is impossible for
those who stand on the walls to repel the approaching siege engines.
In addition, missiles should not be loosed against the enemy too early,
because if they prove to be useless and ineffective it breeds contempt
in the mind of the enemy.310
4 He should also cut down the trees which are near to the city walls and
remove every kind of obstacle, so that the enemy may neither hide in
them, nor feed on the fruits of the trees, if they are short of food. There
should be men in charge of the distribution of grain and of all kinds
of food which are in the city, and the same applies to water as well. If
there is not an abundance of water or reservoirs in the city, drinking
water may be enclosed in some kind of container or in cisterns because
when the siege is prolonged for a great length of time, water must be
secured and measured as much as possible so that it may not be easily
snatched away by the strongest people.311
5 The general should only counter the siege engines which are brought
against the walls by the enemy in the following ways. Against stones
released from the catapults and trebuchets,312 he should hang heavy
mats or newly stripped-off buffalo hides from the battlements on the
outer side of the wall in order to cover them easily, or timbers attached
together like a textile (the Romans call them pontila).313 Against the
blows of the battering-ram, [he should use] very thick pikes and sacks
full of chaff or sand.314
6 Against the so-called tortoises he should build beams, which have
very sharp iron points at their ends, because when they are stuck into
the tortoises, they easily overturn them.315 Against the aforementioned
tortoises, both boiling pitch and lead should also be used,316 or fire or
88 Translation
even very heavy stones, raised up and immediately cast down by siege
engines.317
7 Against the ladders which are brought up to the walls or even against
those who dare to approach carelessly, mill stones [must be used],
which are tied with ropes to every battlement as well as very heavy
timbers which are also tied across the battlements. Furthermore, pitch,
oil and fenugreek, all boiling, [should] be poured on the aforemen-
tioned ladders.318
8 The so-called strepta, namely those which mechanically shoot the
liquid fire, which is also called ‘bright’ by common people, and the
so-called hand-siphons,319 the very thing which Our Majesty pres-
ently invented, get the better of the wooden towers320 that are brought
towards the walls with rolling cylinders that the tacticians call mosy-
nas.321 In addition, any sort of material which is piled in the interven-
ing space and set on fire shortly after [destroys them]. The towers,
which stand opposite them, also [get the better of them] with stones,
bricks, or wood.322
9 Against the tunnels [dug] by the enemy, copper shafts must be sunk
into the suspected locations, or shields of the same material or troughs
must be placed upon them, because in this way the tunnels will become
evident due to the sound of the tools. A very deep trench should be dug
in front of the walls as well, because in this way the enemy who is dig-
ging the tunnels will be clearly spotted. The general must also counter-
mine and when he meets [the enemy tunnel], he must immediately
fill a cask with felt or feathers and set it on fire. After he has securely
stopped the mouth [of the cask] with copper, which has been perfo-
rated after the manner of a sieve, he must turn it towards the enemy.
After he has then bored through the bottom of the cask, he must con-
tinuously produce gusts, by means of a machine, in the same way as
blacksmiths. On account of this the enemy will forget about digging
and will very easily flee due to the fierce smoke from the felt.323
10 In addition, if there is a very great need, an attack should be made
unexpectedly against the siege engines through the postern gates that
most people are unaware of, or the enemy should be opposed in some
other way, that is to say as force demands and as need requires.

54  What the general will do when besieging the enemy

1 The general who mounts a siege must first secure the camp in
every possible way, which in chapter 22 Our Majesty ordered to be
 Translation 89
established standing off from the city at a distance of approximately
two miles or at least eight stades. For the preparations of the besiegers
always seem more formidable to the enemy when they are observed
from afar. Besides, in this manner, the part of the army whose turn is to
rest will not be unduly stressed when fighting takes place. The bravest
of the soldiers, however, should be posted as near as possible to the
city in order to prevent unexpected enemy attacks, especially around
dinnertime.324
2 The army should be divided into allagia and each division must detach
its own sub-division, so that they do not easily become exhausted from
the siege by all fighting at once. Having the largest part of the army
with him, the general ought to launch assaults continuously in relays,
by night as well as by day, and especially during the night, when the
attacks seem a great deal more intimidating to the besieged. Besides,
since the enemy has no time to relax due to the continuous assaults,
overpowered by exertion and lack of sleep, they will on that account
easily surrender the city and themselves.325
3 During a siege, it [is] best to apply every kind of contrivance simulta-
neously. Therefore, the archers and the javelin-men should shoot their
missiles like hail against those who guard the battlements, the rams
should strike at the walls, and likewise those who are in the tortoises
should undermine the foundations.326
4 Ladders should also be employed, placed on vertical wooden beams
and driven towards the walls on wheels. Moreover, the men on the
wooden siege-towers should shoot from the higher ground after they
likewise approach the walls with rolling cylinders. Both the rams and
the wooden siege-towers should be enclosed all around with newly
stripped-off buffalo hides. The tortoises should be smeared all over
with clay on top and sponges completely soaked with vinegar should
be placed on their exterior.327 For when vinegar is used, it prevents the
combustion of fire, especially of the so-called liquid [fire], and also
quenches molten lead, pitch, or boiling oil as quickly as possible, more
than water [can].328
5 The general should command all the archers, javelin-men, and stone-
throwers to shoot fire at the enemy buildings by releasing missiles or
stones when they detect a very strong wind.329
6 Consequently, when hearts are shaken330 with fear and the enemy gives
up all hope due to the aforementioned stratagems, they will at some
point either surrender the city and themselves, or they will be forced
to abandon the battlements. When the city is actually captured by right
90 Translation
of conquest, the general should announce in the language of the enemy
to the whole army through the use of messengers that none of the
citizens who are unarmed are to be slain, unless some were armed
with something or carried a sword. For if the enemy hears such an
announcement, everyone will abandon their weapons and will shame-
fully choose slavery and so, once the city becomes empty of armed
men, it may be captured without danger.331

55  How a fort located near the enemy borders should be built

quickly without a pitched battle
1 At the beginning, the general himself must reconnoitre the surround-
ing area and choose the most naturally fortified position where it is
possible to enclose a space from all sides preferably with dry stones,
bricks, or wood, in twelve days at the most.332 Next, having prepared
sufficiently what is necessary, especially the heavy infantry, he [must]
deceive the enemy with the dispatch of another force, as if he had it
in mind to build a fort elsewhere. However, the general unexpectedly
remains in the aforementioned position and so he [must] begin with
the construction as follows: first he [must] place a sufficient watch
(the Romans call them viglai) in the strategic locations. Then on the
same day, he [must] dig a trench and immediately occupy it with the
infantry. And having thus made a start with the construction, he should
immediately erect a tower or another kind of enclosure immediately,
on account of [the danger of] sudden assaults. Next he [must] build the
remaining enclosure in the manner that we said, with dry stones, and if
they [are] not [available], with bricks, or with wood, if there is no lack
of forests.333
2 If there is no water in the fort he must, in the meantime, construct a
wooden cistern, securing the framework with bitumen and pitch. Its
length should be approximately twenty feet and the width ten. The
depth should be equivalent to the width, or in accordance with the
size of the army. There should be a small wooden container, so that
the water which remains motionless does not smell. The wooden con-
tainer receives the running water and when it is full, it is immediately
emptied into the aforementioned wooden cistern. Pouring in vinegar
is also useful if the water starts to smell and river pebbles thrown into
such water also dissipate the odour.334
3 If the general learns that the enemy is advancing against him while
the fort is being completed, he should slowly retreat from that place,
together with the cavalry after he has first left a sufficient garrison in
 Translation 91
the fort. He should be far enough away so as not obviously to provoke
the enemy to a pitched battle due to his proximity, but not so remote as
not to be able to aid those who are in danger easily and to be unable to
observe everything during a siege.335
4 The best time for the construction of such forts should be the months of
Panemos, Loos, and Gorpiaios, which the Romans call July, August,
and September. Since the pasturage is dry and easily burned at that
time, the enemy cavalry will suffer from that and will abandon the
siege very quickly. When the siege is lifted, the general should then
build the fort with materials from the countryside and he should obtain
for it a large number of siege artillery and weapons, an abundance
of food, and all the other things, in proportion to the time and the
resources available.336

56  The army should be trained by chasing and hunting wild beasts,

but only in times of peace, and how the military hunt should take
place337
1 Diligence in hunting produces much benefit to the soldiers and to
their horses. Not only do their bodies become stronger and healthier
in every way through training, but they also become more experienced
and better at paying attention to tactics, since these military hunts take
place neither at random nor irregularly, but with as much discipline
and military order as possible.
2 This battle order is useful both when the army begins the march and
in turn when it withdraws after the war. It also imitates the formations
of the Scyths and the Persians. Therefore, as we said, the soldiers must
diligently become involved, in wintertime or otherwise in times of
peace. However, when the expectation of battle is present, it [is] bet-
ter to abstain from them, so that the soldiers and their horses should
not prove to be inefficient in the time of battle by completely wearing
[themselves] out too early by putting all their force into the effort of
military exercises and races.
3 The general should ascertain, through the use of scouts, the location
of the spot and the prey which is present there a day in advance. After-
wards, approximately two hours before daybreak, he should order the
whole army to equip itself with the so-called light arms, which may be
bows, swords, and spears. The scouts should precede the whole army,
some far away in the spot itself to spy on the prey again, and the others
more closely, so as to guide the army. When the army is already close
to the prey it should then be drawn up at a distance of approximately
92 Translation
four miles and not closer, so that the beasts do not run off before they
are encircled, having sensed the attack of the army from a gust of the
wind.
4 The formation should be divided into the right, left, and centre [divi-
sions]. On both sides the flank-guards should be present. The length of
this formation in flat and level places should be approximately eight
miles. Nevertheless, for the formation neither to be too closely packed,
so as for the soldiers to crush in upon each other, nor yet too loose for
the beasts to be able escape through the intervals, every 1,125 cavalry-
men should occupy one mile, so as for three men to occupy a space of
two fathoms.
5 Therefore, the front of the formation or the length will be nine thou-
sand men and its depth or thickness in accordance with the size of the
army. Sometimes it comprises two, three, and four ranks, but in the
rougher and impassable [places] it comprises at least six or seven. The
first rank of the formation, if possible, should consist of horse-archers
only but if not, then it should also have lancers mixed with them. The
second rank and all the rest should be composed of shield-bearing
lancers.
6 The army then advances in one of the aforementioned ways, having
an equal front on every side and allowing no one to abandon his place,
even if perhaps it is impassable, or to shoot prematurely and rashly
with the bow. If some beast moves, the only one who shoots is he who
stands closest to the animal, without daring to break ranks or to give
chase. For nobody advances ahead of the formation, except perhaps
the general and the tourmarchai, who have the messengers accompa-
nying [them] as usual.
7 When the army is as close as possible to a distance of approxi-
mately two miles, the tagmata of the flanks, which are also called
the horns, immediately receive the order to advance. And so, at
first the formation becomes crescent and then, with the aforemen-
tioned flanks joining one another, it becomes a ring. Whenever
the prey is thrown into confusion before the flanks manage to join
one another, in this case the flank-guards must immediately fill
the empty space and enclose the beasts which are about to escape
by dashing in from both sides. When the formation has already
become a ring, the ranks of soldiers must become a little denser,
so as always to make the enclosed space smaller and for the ani-
mals to be seized easily so that they do not produce trouble for
the soldiers by scattering to and fro in disorder as far as the camp.
 Translation 93
8 When the enclosed space successfully becomes very small, the gen-
eral must array the lancers in front of the archers, after he has ordered
all the lancers to dismount from their horses. The lancers put forward
their shields in a row, forming the so-called shield-wall, so that the
young of the encircled beasts should not easily pass through between
the legs of the horses. The general should allow the most worthy of
the officers and those who know how to shoot accurately to kill the
beasts with swords and bows. When night begins to fall, then the gen-
eral should order the shield bearers to seize the rest of the animals by
hand by further reducing the space in between and setting the shields
to overlap with one another.
9 Even if [the catch] is not substantial, he should distribute it equally to
everyone because the custom of hunting is as follows: to make every-
body companions equally in the toils, and likewise in the catch. If the
prey is very insignificant, the general should hold a lottery and give it to
the tagma which draws the lot. Above all it is right to reward the scouts,
if they have perhaps proved to be dedicated and keen during the hunt.

57  How the soldiers may easily be prevented from falling ill from
sun and fatigue
1 In the spring and summer and especially in the autumn, the soldiers
must not eat just twice but many times a day and in small amounts,
because this is better for digestion. It is also useful for them to boil rue
and wild marshmallow, to mix its broth with wine which has already
started to taste like vinegar and to drink it between meals, once or
twice at most, or to mix milk with wine and water and to drink it
before the meal. The so-called squill-flavoured wine [is] also useful
before the meal, and the vinegar of squills after the meal, but only in
the spring, summer, or autumn, as we said.338
2 Oven-baked bread [is] useful. It is moulded thin and plain then, after
it has been baked, it is dried in the sun for a short time. Wine is also
beneficial, especially that which is made in marshy lands. Since the
water in these areas is unhygienic, however, the soldiers must boil it
up over fire first, until a tenth vanishes. They cool the rest and then
they must drink it in this manner.339

58  How the soldiers may become immune to poisonous drugs

For the soldiers to become truly immune to poisonous drugs, each must be
given, on an empty stomach, twenty leaves of rue, two nuts, and two dried
94 Translation
figs. If the above drugs prove to be completely inactive and ineffective,
the following is applied: after the soldiers have put dry rue, peppercorn, a
Lemnian stamped clay tablet,340 figs, and nuts all together in equal portions
and after they have ground them down to the size of a walnut or a mouse,
each [must] consume this before or after the meal.341

59  How the soldiers are easily infected with plague by

the enemy through food
1 Sometimes the army gets infected with plague by the enemy if some-
body has enclosed a tree-frog or a toad and a viper together in a ves-
sel. After he has sealed the lid with clay, so that their breath has no
way out whatsoever, the beasts are killed by one another. Then, after
he has ground their remains into thin pieces, he puts them into water
and boils them. Then, after he has prepared flour-meal and loaves of
bread with the same water, he makes the enemy eat them. For in this
case, the disease does not only infect those who eat the loaves, but also
those who live alongside them.342
2 If our soldiers are informed by defectors about these loaves and they
would not want to eat them, the enemy gives them to prisoners of
our own race and at once sets them free. Those who have been freed
immediately seek refuge to the camp of their kin and they spread the
disease to everyone, just by living alongside them. Of course, the men
who poison these loaves consist entirely of the prisoners, because as
they say, he who prepares them becomes infected just by touching
them.
3 We compiled this book judging that these [stratagems] and others of
the kind should be recorded not in order to be used by us against the
enemy (for I believe that they are unworthy even to be mentioned in
a Christian context), but so that our generals may be able to guard
against them by knowing exactly the cunning plans of the enemy
concerning food and drink, especially when they encamp in hostile
territory.

60  How the soldiers are overpowered by the enemy with wine343

After the enemy has quenched quicklime with wine, he inserts into it
monkshood, boxwood, or hemlock, and the whole army pretends to sit at
tables as if they were about to eat and drink. At the very moment when the
Roman tagmata become visible, they pretend that they are taking flight
and they abandon the tables. When the Romans arrive after a while, they
 Translation 95
find the feast without men, and not knowing about the ruse, they eat and
drink their fill and thereby endanger themselves.

61  How [our soldiers are overpowered] with water344

The enemy chops up and thoroughly grinds river pufferfishes345 or the
so-called regular serpent until they become very thin. Then he boils up
them with water, so that all the fat vanishes, and he throws them into the
water from which our army drinks. They say that those who drink [from
it] become immediately swollen. The myrtle spurge, called tithymallis, is
also deadly if it is thrown into water which has no outflow. Water in tanks
will become largely useless when manure and stones, fish lard, or sea
purple-fish, which some people also call conch, are thrown into it.

62  How drinking wine makes those who consume it sleepy for two
or three days, and how they wake up346
When somebody thoroughly grinds and smooths two litra of Theban
poppy juice, myrrh, one part of lettuce seed, one part of henbane juice
and two parts of mandrake juice, then pours them into wine, he will make
those who drink it sleepy for two or three days. On the other hand, when
somebody puts vinegar in their noses, he will cause them to recover.

63  How trees become desiccated347

Every kind of tree, apart from the apple-tree, becomes desiccated if some-
body inserts the sting of the stingray into its roots. Some say that the rind
of beans placed into the tree roots also dries them up.

64  How the land becomes unsuitable for agriculture as the season

approaches348
Cultivated fields become unsuitable for agriculture, for as long as the sea-
son lasts, if somebody sows them with hellebore or salt and then ploughs
them up again. This is what Alexander did when fighting the Paionians.349

65  How horses are easily turned to flight350

Horses are easily turned to flight if some of the so-called light infantry, after
standing behind the shield-bearing cavalry and bearing hand-pipes which
have spurge-juice, spray it into the nostrils of the horses. Alternatively, if
some of the aforementioned light infantry were to fall furiously upon the
96 Translation
enemy cavalry with burning torches, the entirety of the cavalry will be turned
to flight at the very moment of impact.

66  How horses are killed or made ill from drinking351

The seed of white hellebore kills horses if it is drunk. The sap of ivy and the
juice of storax also harm them, as does, to lesser degree, the smoke of burning
woollen cloths.

67  How a horse will suddenly collapse and then recover352

The horse will suddenly collapse if somebody sprinkles the bile of a sea-
turtle into its nostrils. It will be revived again if somebody puts saffron and
wine in its mouth and nostrils,353 after he has mixed them in equal portions.

68  < How galloping horses will be halted >354

* When the ankle of the right forefoot of a wolf is cast in front of a four-
horse chariot, it stops the horses. Well, if it stops four horses, [it would
work] much better on those that are in formation. We will give these ankles
then to a few slingers, in order to shoot them <into> the enemy formation.
Each ankle will not harm only one horse, but all those which happen to
run over it. *355

69  < How horses will not neigh >356

* To prevent the horses from neighing – Some horses neigh when they are
making a threat, others when they catch the smell of a female. Whenever
we mount an ambush, it [is] useful for them to be silent in order to remain
undetected. In fact, Aristomenes the Messenian noticed that the Spartans
were lying in an ambush when their horses neighed, since he was mounted
on a mare. On another occasion, he set up the ambush securely when he
placed mares in the ambuscade.357 The Parthians, in fact, keep the horses
they lead <into> battle silent in the following manner: they tie the base
of the tail tightly with a strong string. The horse then, being in pain due
to the constriction of the bond, does not make a sound, even if he sees
mares. *358

70  < How the so-called liquid fire may be put out and how it might
not burn wood or walls when it is cast upon them >359
* How we can put out fire – If the enemy sets alight to the wall or some-
thing of that sort with artificial fire, we will put it out by pouring vinegar
[on it]. However, if you know beforehand what things are likely to be
 Translation 97
burned, you should coat their surface with vinegar and the fire will not
touch them.*360

71  < How severe bleeding from a wound may be stopped >361

* [How to make] a few horses look like many – If you want to give the
impression that the horses [are] numerous, after you have gathered mules
and donkeys in the camp, you should mount on them men equipped with
cavalry armament and draw them up into cavalry units. However, in the
front rank of each division, you should post real horses. The enemy sees
the latter and regards those at the back as horses. *362

72  < How wounded skin may be closed up without stitches >363

73  < How both horses and mules may not become infected by
pestilential disease >364

74  < How enemy weapons may be burned without fire >365

* The automatically ignited fire is produced as follows: put equal portions
of native sulphur, rock salt, ashes, cedar-tree, and pyrite stone in a black
mortar, when the sun is at its peak. Mix together with black mulberry sap
and free-flowing Zakynthian liquid asphalt, each in equal [portions]. You
should grind it until it becomes sooty coloured. Then you should add the
smallest amount of quicklime to the asphalt. However, as the sun is at
its peak, you ought to pound it with diligence and to protect your face
entirely. *366 Then, it should be sealed in a copper vessel, so as for it never
to see the rays of the sun. The wagons of the enemy should be coated while
it is still night. All will be suddenly burned, when the sun shines on them
moderately.

75  Coating of poisonous arrows367

1 The Turks, Persians, and some of the Scythian races coat their arrows
with the so-called archery coating and they easily kill animals, which
are harmed by it. However, when I was looking for it and I was not
able to find it, one of the most esteemed doctors gave me another drug
of equal strength. It is as follows.
2 After somebody has put water and an herb along with its branches, the
so-called spurge which is also called copper [plant], in an empty ves-
sel, he should boil it up until all the juice is left in the water. Then, after
98 Translation
he has taken out the branches of the herb, he should put in another fresh
herb and do this two or three times until the water becomes thick like
honey and thus, he should coat the arrows. Furthermore, the venom of
the asp, of the viper, and of the salamander has the same capabilities,
so they say.

RECOMMENDATIONS ABOUT GENERALSHIP FROM THE

DEEDS AND STRATAGEMS OF ANCIENT MEN, ROMAN,
GREEK, AND OTHERS, IN TWENTY-EIGHT CHAPTERS368

76  How written messages may be sent secretly369

1 Caesar wrote a message about something he wanted370 on paper and
rolled it up with wax like a torch. After he gave it to one of his spies,
he sent it to his colleague who had previously revolted, offering to
him, by means of this message, an amnesty for his transgressions. And
so, he immediately won over his colleague.371
2 Sulla took a pig’s urinary bladder and after he had inflated it greatly, he
tied it up until it dried out, and wrote on it a message about something
<he wanted>372 with encaustic ink. Then, after he had unfastened and
folded it together, he inserted it in an oil jar. Then, he inflated it again
and having filled the jar with oil, he gave it to one of his most trusted
men and sent it to . . . ,373 ordering [the man] to tell him to break the
jar open privately. The recipient acted accordingly and when he read
the message, he admired Sulla’s contrivance and replied in the same
way.374
3 Somebody else placed a paper under a horse’s blanket.
4 After Harpagus had ripped open a rabbit, he removed none of its
entrails, but he securely concealed a message in them instead. Then,
after he had skilfully stitched up the rabbit, he gave it to his most loyal
servant. Telling him to carry hunting-nets, he sent the servant to the
Persian king Cyrus in the guise of a hunter. He ordered him to speak
privately to Cyrus, so that the latter would rip the rabbit open when
nobody was looking.375
5 The same man, having written on a tin leaf, inserted it into the soles
of a pair of sandals and very skilfully sewed up the soles, by cover-
ing them with leather. He gave the sandals to his closest servant and
ordered him to wear them. Harpagus sent the servant to the person
 Translation 99
he wanted, giving him another message [to hold] openly, which con-
tained the opposite of what he was intending to explain [on the tin
leaf].376
6 Somebody else inserted a piece of paper into a wooden staff after he
had carved it.
7 Pseudagoras wrote messages on a linen textile, then he patched it
underneath with a shrunken and torn cloth. He sent one of his most
loyal slaves to the camp, ordering him to wear the cloth, and since he
was thought by the enemy to be a beggar, the servant delivered the
messages to whom he was ordered without danger.377
8 Someone else sent [a message] by rolling a piece of paper with wax in
a wine cooler.
9 The same man carved a stone and inserted a piece of paper into it, skil-
fully filling the opening with wax and asphalt and smearing the stone
with manure and clay to make it look insignificant. He gave the stone
to his most loyal slave and sent him to the enemy camp.378
10 Somebody else inserted a piece of paper into an iron mace.
11 Onias sent a message without trouble with the help of a woman after
he wrote on the tiniest piece of paper and placed it under her braid.379
12 The same man communicated with his soldiers in this way after he had
skilfully tied a small piece of paper to a horse’s tail.380
13 Choerilus wrote on a tiny paper and inserted it into a reed tube of such
a size that it easily fitted into a man’s mouth and caused no hindrance
whatsoever to speech. After he had protected the tube as far as he
could with wax in order to prevent the paper from being damaged by
moisture, he inserted it into the mouth of a slave and sent him to the
camp.381
14 Someone else bought sheep meat as it were together with the so-called
windpipe and concealed a piece of paper in it, thus escaping the notice
of the sentries.

77  The enemy should be deceived through deserters and

consequently enemy deserters should be treated with caution
1 While Merops was besieging the city of Babylon and was unable to
capture it by storm, he made a feigned truce. After he had chosen three
hundred of his best men, he offered them as slaves to the governors of
the city. Merops departed from the city as if he were withdrawing to
his own land, concealing the army in the nearby thickets. Then, around
midnight, after the three hundred had mounted the city walls, they let
100 Translation
Merops in together with his whole army without trouble, by summon-
ing him with signal-fires and throwing the gates wide open.382
2 While the same man was investing a Syrian city for a long time with
no results, he lifted the siege, pretending that he made a truce with the
emperor in Rome and announcing that he would send envoys with gifts
shortly.383 Therefore, he concealed two hundred heavily armed men in
an equal number of wooden baskets, loading them onto one hundred
camels. He commanded the aforementioned envoys to camp in front of
the walls of the city, which had been under siege shortly before, and to
cajole its commander with every kind of reasoning and luxurious gifts to
receive into the city the presents that were being sent to the emperor, in
order to keep them safe. Afterwards Merops himself approached with his
army and, at any rate, when this happened he became the master of the
city because the heavily armed soldiers in the baskets emerged at around
midnight and joyfully let Merops in together with all his army by light-
ing huge signal-fires on the towers and smashing the gates without any
trouble.384
3 While Cyrus was besieging Babylon and was unable to capture it by
force, he had his satrap Zopyrus severely beaten, cut his ears off and
shaved him, then compelled him to pretend he was seeking refuge in
the city. When the Babylonians saw him, they felt compassion for his
misfortune, deemed him worthy of suitable care, and entrusted the city
to him. Zopyrus immediately surrendered Babylon to Cyrus and when
the latter entered the city, he burst into tears and said, ‘Today I would
not even like to have thirty Babylons, for I am unable to help Zopyrus,
even though I see him suffering in such a way on my behalf’.385
4 When the Carthaginians learned that the Romans had a large army
in Sicily, they convinced some of their own men to pretend that they
were deserting to the enemy with promises to surrender the island
of Lipara, which is close to Carthage. Convinced by their words, the
Romans made an expedition to Lipara and the Carthaginians, falling
upon the few who were left behind, prevailed completely.386
5 After Antiochus rebelled against his brother Seleucus, he escaped to
Mesopotamia and the latter sent some men to pursue him. When they
encountered him on the road they attacked and chased him but were
unable to kill him. Therefore, after Antiochus had recalled his own
men from the flight, he clad them in black and sent them to look for
him, as if he had fallen in battle. The enemy, believing the soldiers,
also scattered in order to locate the corpse. Antiochus immediately
attacked [them] and overcame them by force.387
 Translation 101
78  In the most urgent matters, the general is the first one
obliged to act in person
1 When Iphicrates saw that his army was discontented because of the
winter and hesitant regarding the upcoming battle, he wrapped himself
in the cheapest and thinnest rags of all, which [were] unsuitable for
winter. Consequently, the soldiers were ashamed and after they had
marched to battle eagerly, they won the day.388
2 When Alexander was besieging Tyre, he was the first to fill a basket
with earth and throw it into the ditch [of the city] after he had realised
that his army was wholly reluctant to fill the ditch up. And so, once the
soldiers were filled with eagerness and worked together, they easily
captured the city.389

79  The general must be patient and able to bear hardship

1 During one summer, Alexander became thirsty while he was leading
the army through a waterless area. When a small portion of water was
offered to him, he looked around at the soldiers who were with him
and, realising that they were all demoralised due to thirst, he refused
the drink and said, ‘If I drink, all the others will faint’. And so, after
he had completed the march with his soldiers, he captured Darius with
his wife, children, and the royal baggage without any difficulty.390
2 Alexander scolded some men who were amazed to read Darius’s din-
ner [menu], telling them that [it was] unprofitable to read such things
in camp, so that the soldiers would not incline to prodigality.391
3 Philip relieved a general of command because he bathed in hot water,
saying: ‘You seem to me to be ignorant of the Macedonians, among
whom not even a woman in labour bathes in hot water’.392
4 The same man once relieved all the officers of their commands when
a female flute player came into the camp.393
5 While Archidamus, the king of the Spartans was leading the army
through narrow and waterless areas, it became discontented and made
an outcry against him. When he had attacked the enemy unexpectedly
and was victorious, he inquired of each person about the time at which
the victory occurred. Some men answered that it was from the very
beginning of the engagement, others in the midst of the battle, and
still others around the end. Archidamus replied, ‘Not at all, rather [it
was] when we were marching through the narrow and waterless areas,
because victory attaches itself to soldiers mostly through hardships’.394
102 Translation
6 When Mucius the Roman volunteered to kill the king of the Etruscans,
he wore Etruscan attire and moved around the enemy camp reconnoi-
tring each and every thing. After he had been unmasked as a spy, he
was arrested, brought before the king, and sentenced to place his right
hand into the watch-fire of the camp. While Mucius was undergoing
the punishment, he stood confident and full of resolve, talking to the
Etruscans. When the king not surprisingly marvelled at this, Mucius
said, ‘Do not be amazed, for three hundred [men] with the same endur-
ance as mine are moving around your camp seeking to kill you’. When
the king heard these words, he immediately became frightened and
concluded a treaty with the Romans.395
7 In the summer, the Roman consul Gaius ordered the whole army to be
armed and ready for battle. Thereupon his son, with a contemptuous
disposition towards his father’s orders, abandoned the ranks and went
down to the river in order to water his horse. When Gaius saw that, he
condemned his son to death, saying that it is better to mourn a son than
any number of Roman troops.396
8 On one occasion, when Caesar’s army suffered from hunger, he pro-
duced loaves of bread from herbs and attentively served them to his
soldiers. When Pompey the Great found these loaves, he concealed
them, saying: ‘Our troops would surely be fearful of battle if they
were to learn from the enemy’s deeds that he [is] capable of such
endurance’.397

80  The enemy’s benevolence must always be treated with caution

1 At the same time that Cassander was laying siege to the city of
Salamis, he also defeated the Athenians at sea in a naval battle, and
released those whom he had captured without ransom. When the peo-
ple of Salamis learned this, they surrendered the city to Cassander.398
2 When the Roman consul Scipio was fighting the Iberians and became
master of a city of theirs, he declined when the citizens offered him
a maiden of unrivalled beauty as a gift. However, he searched for the
maiden’s father and when he found him, he graciously granted her to
him together with a very large amount of money, saying ‘I also give
these to the maiden’. In addition, he assigned the best-behaved guards
to the daughters of other nobles, commanding them to provide for the
girls’ needs abundantly and above all to ensure their chastity. This
prompted the rest of the Iberian cities to join the Romans.399
3 When Antiochus was besieging Cypsella, a renowned Thracian city,
he rendered the people of the city glad to surrender it to him by
 Translation 103
deeming those who defected to him worthy of every kind of amenity
and offering them weapons, money, and horses, as well as very beauti-
ful garments.400
4 Camillus, the Roman general, was fighting against the Falerians when
a teacher surrendered to him the children whom he was responsible for
educating. Camillus had put the teacher in chains and then he deliv-
ered him to the children saying that ‘Now you have received him in
fetters, present him to your fathers, in order to be punished as a trai-
tor’. When this became known to the children’s fathers, it resulted in
the death of the teacher and the surrender of the city to Camillus.401
5 While Pompey was besieging a very renowned Asian city, he ordered
all the suburbs to be mercilessly ravaged, but the two more salubrious
[ones] to be spared as if he was doing the besieged a favour. When the
people of the city noticed this, they fearlessly exposed themselves in
these [two] places by frequently going out of the city. Pompey suddenly
attacked them, seized them all, and through them he captured the city.
He was admired for this stratagem.402

81  Especially in times of engagement cowards must not be mingled

together with the rest of the troops and how these men are
recognised
1 When Epaminondas suspected that some men of the army were afraid
of the approaching battle, he ordered those who were feeling weak
because of illness not to march out but to remain in the tents in order to
rest. In this manner, when the cowards retired on the pretext of illness,
he drew up with those who were more courageous and easily defeated
the enemy.403
2 While Iphicrates was drawing up the army for battle, he noticed that
many men were delaying the engagement. He ordered those who had
forgotten or lost a piece of equipment to go back and to look for it dili-
gently and, when they found it, to catch up with [the rest of the army]
with all haste. Iphicrates did not wait for their arrival, but hastening
into battle with the rest [of the troops], he fought and prevailed.404
3 Agathocles was intending to sail against Carthage when he noticed that
many had misgivings about the voyage due to cowardice. Agathocles
allowed them to abandon the ships and killed all those who hastened
to disembark. After he had praised the rest for their steadfastness, he
made the voyage with them. He vigorously prevailed and destroyed
the cities of the Carthaginians by burning his ships, rendering his sol-
diers braver in this manner due to desperation.405
104 Translation
82  How friends are tested
1 Dionysius proposed to test the most loyal of his officers, since he
wanted to assault a coastal city unexpectedly. When he had given to
each a blank paper fastened with seals,406 he ordered them to keep the
seals closed, but to break them when the voyage was about to begin
and to sail where the message indicated. Before the army started
to embark on the ships, Dionysius ordered each of them to present
the papers. He praised and honoured those whom he found with
unbroken seals but punished as traitors those who had tampered with
theirs.407
2 Alcibiades covered up the statue of a man in a dark room and then sum-
moned his friends one by one. Presenting the aforementioned statue as
a corpse, he claimed that he had murdered it, and was expecting each
one of them to assist him in its clandestine burial. So he categorised
as most loyal those whom he perceived to be sympathetic and coop-
erative, whereas those who had a disposition other than that which he
considered appropriate, he got rid of, regarding them as useless.408

83  Concerning both our own and the enemy spies

1 When he sent spies into the enemy camp, Pompey ordered them not to
travel together constantly and not to speak to any of the soldiers at all
so that they would not give false reports by sharing one mind.409
2 When Chares suspected that some of the enemy had infiltrated the
camp as spies, he securely closed the gates of the palisaded encamp-
ment at once and ordered each man to seize the one who stood next
to him and to learn exactly his name and to which unit and group-tent
he belonged.410 Once he had detected the spies in this manner, he pun-
ished them appropriately.411

84  One should fight at the right time and not at random

and the time which is [suitable] for battle
1 Whenever Timotheus had men unfit for battle as a majority in his
army, he always encountered the enemy quickly. For once the cowards
had immediately retreated upon first contact, he fought [only] with the
most courageous.412
2 Lycurgus always advised his associates not to campaign frequently
against the enemy. He said, ‘So that finding them prepared for battle,
you shall not fall into great trouble sometime’.413
 Translation 105
3 If Antigonus had a more powerful force he used to give battle in a
leisurely fashion, believing that in this manner he terrified the enemy.
But if he had the weaker force, he gave battle hastily, commenting that
the sight rather than hand-to-hand combat always makes the enemy
more fearful.414
4 If Iphicrates faced an untrained force in pitched battle, he used to join
combat in a more leisurely fashion and not immediately. However, if
he had the untrained force, he used frequently to hasten the engage-
ment, adding that ‘The untrained are not steadfast’.415
5 When Marius, the Roman general, was fighting the more northerly
barbarian tribes, he used to give battle mostly at the height of summer
and especially at high noon. He used to say that ‘Because the enemy
is unaccustomed to the heat, he is weaker in fighting’. But when he
faced the more southerly tribes, he used to do the opposite, citing the
aforementioned reason in this case as well.416

85  It [is] most advantageous to make the enemy

suspicious of his allies
1 When the Ionians, who are now called Thrakesians, became allies of
the Persian king Xerxes, Themistocles ordered his own soldiers to
spread out during the night and write on the doors and the walls of the
houses where the Ionians lived: ‘Ionian men! You campaign against
your fathers; you are not doing the right thing’. When this happened,
Xerxes immediately suspected the Ionians and dismissed them.417
2 When two thousand [men] from the Athenian army defected to the
Spartans, I think, Themistocles, the Athenian general, entrusted a secret
message to one of his close friends and commanded him to deliver it
to the leaders of the defectors, since he knew that he would surely
fall into the hands of the Spartans who were guarding the roads. The
message contained the following ‘Neither forget our common plans,
nor neglect the predetermined time, when you see that the anticipated
force we have sent has arrived’. When this took place, since the Spar-
tans suspected the defectors, they immediately tried to arrest them.
When the defectors fled to save themselves and earnestly begged to
join the Athenians again, their request was not granted.418

86  The army is greatly moved to bravery and courage by

the general’s words and devotion
1 Seeing his soldiers in flight, Caesar dismounted from his horse and
said, ‘Comrades! Are you not ashamed to flee, abandoning me into the
106 Translation
hands of the enemy?’ Since the deserters were shamed by these words,
they suddenly turned about and prevailed.419
2 While the Persians were fighting the Medes, they were put to flight,
fleeing with reckless haste. Therefore, the deserters’ mothers came out
of the city, advanced to greet them and, pulling up their dresses, they
said ‘The most worthless of all men! Where are you fleeing? Do you
want to re-enter the womb from which each of you came?’ They say
that since the deserters were shamed by these words, they all turned
about at once and immediately fell heavily upon the enemy, gloriously
redeeming themselves for their defeat.420
3 Cyrus faced the Medes three times and was shamefully defeated three
times. When he conducted an engagement for a fourth time, and once
more saw his [men] fleeing and hastening to enter into the city, he
assembled their wives together with their children and commanded
them to come out of the city and confront the enemy. When the desert-
ers learned this, each of them felt pity for their families and after they
had turned about they immediately won the battle.421
4 When Sulla, the Roman general, saw his soldiers fleeing at
Orchomenus, he rode his horse in the direction of the enemy, and said
‘Romans! It is honourable for me to die here on behalf of my country,
but to those who ask where you abandoned Sulla, remember to say at
Orchomenus’. These words filled the soldiers with anger and, charg-
ing against the enemy en masse, they were victorious.422
5 When the Gallic king Brennus noticed that his soldiers were hesitating,
after he had chosen those with shorter and weaker bodies from among
his Roman prisoners, he dressed them in filthy and torn clothes. Bring-
ing them out, he placed them next to his own finest equipped men and
said ‘Comrades! Since we are such large men, it [is] not honourable to
be troubled by such homunculi’. Those who were previously hesitant
took heart at these words, courageously engaged the Romans and pre-
vailed over them.423
6 When Scipio saw a soldier boasting that he had a fine shield, he said
‘Comrade! Since you are a Roman, it is honourable to trust in your
right hand and not in the left’.424
7 The same man used to call his soldiers ‘comrades’, rendering them
more willing for the struggles through the equalising pretext of this
title.425
8 When Epaminondas realised that the battle was a stalemate, he asked
the front-rankers of his army to grant him just one pace [forward].
When this happened, he prevailed over the enemy.426
 Translation 107
87  How the general could give the impression that his
army is numerous, if he has a small one
1 Since he had a small number of cavalry, Agesilaus placed all his caval-
rymen at the front of his formation. Behind them, after he had disarmed
the infantry, he mounted them with cavalry equipment on donkeys and
mules. He terrified Aeropus with this stratagem and compelled him to
consent to an ignoble treaty.427
2 When Iphicrates was intending to make a night attack due to the small-
ness of his army, he ordered the trumpeters to disperse around the
enemy camp and to blow their trumpets at the right time. Thus the
enemy were scattered in a disorderly fashion so as to respond to the
calls of the trumpeters. When Iphicrates noticed that the number of
men [who remained] in the camp was now reduced, he attacked them
and against all odds emerged victorious.428
3 When the same man had a larger army, he used to order each pair of
soldiers to possess one bed in camp, but when he had an inferior force
he used to order each soldier to make two beds. Since he changed
camps frequently, he kept on deceiving the enemy.429
4 While Perdiccas was approaching Ptolemy with a powerful army at
Memphis, Ptolemy assembled herds of cattle and asses. After he had
tied branches and every kind of firewood material to the tail of each
animal, he eagerly marched with his army against the enemy, and the
herds of cattle and asses followed behind at a suitable distance. Since
an immense amount of dust was raised by the trailed firewood, Per-
diccas judged this army to be very large and was shaken by fear. He
immediately turned to flight, so both Perdiccas and the whole army
under his command perished dishonourably.430
5 While Eumenes’s army was wintering, the enemy marched against him
en masse. After he had dispersed the majority of his soldiers into the
nearby mountains, he ordered each to light a great number of watch-
fires scattered around different places. He commanded them to light the
fire as was customary in the camp, taller when the night began, smaller
around midnight, and in every way tiny around daybreak. When the
enemy noticed this above them and concluded that Eumenes had assem-
bled the army, they withdrew without risking battle.431
6 While the Scythians were at war against the Triballi, they ordered the
horse herdsmen to follow at a distance with their herds of horses and
hasten towards the battle at the very time that they saw that the engage-
ment was about to begin. Since this gave the Triballi the impression of
a [Scythian] allied force, it turned them to flight.432
108 Translation
7 Tyrrenius’s coastal city was vigorously besieged by the enemy, and
since he only had one warship, he assembled all the fishing boats
and placed a trumpeter in each of them. During a moonless night, he
approached the city at a suitable distance. When all the trumpeters
simultaneously produced a sharp and piercing sound, the enemy with-
drew, since they thought that a great fleet was sailing against them.433

88  And likewise in turn how the general could give the impression of
a small army if he has a large one
1 Fighting against the Gauls, Caesar established a very narrow encamp-
ment and ordered that fewer camp fires than necessary be lit. At the
same time, he took the larger and more powerful part of his army and
encamped in a strategic place. Since the enemy had become contemp-
tuous of Caesar due to the smallness [of his army], they surrounded
his camp and, with great confidence, captured and thoroughly plun-
dered it. When Caesar appeared with his army, he utterly defeated the
Gauls.434
2 Since Onias’s fleet was very large, the enemy hesitated. As they did
not dare to engage in a naval battle, Onias ordered his officers to hoist
only half their sails. After he provoked the enemy to an engagement in
this manner, he was victorious.435

89  In time of war the army is assisted by fire and wind

1 While Nicias was fighting against Syracuse, he was pinned down in
the trench. Therefore, when the Syracusans occupied the buildings in
front of the trench, Nicias set them on fire. Since the battle was in this
way relatively prolonged, his comrades came to his aid and succeeded
in rescuing him from that place.436
2 While Alcibiades was at war with the Argives, he noticed that the
wind was blowing towards the enemy. Since there was a considerable
stretch of dry woodland between the two camps, he set fire to it at the
moment of battle and defeated the enemy.437
3 While Iphicrates was at war against the Thracians, he set fire to a
very large amount of dry wood, after it had been piled up between
the two camps. Therefore, when the smoke was produced, as is to be
expected, due to its thickness it made the night seem almost moon-
less. Iphicrates abandoned all the baggage in the camp and bivou-
acked together with his army in a nearby thicket. When dawn came,
the Thracians immediately rushed to pillage the camp, interpreting
 Translation 109
Iphicrates’s escape as a retreat. Since he found them scattered and
entirely occupied with the spoils, he won a great victory, sparing no
one.438
4 Hannibal was fighting against the Romans at Cannae. Since the earth
[there] is sandy, he ploughed up the land between the two camps
throughout the night. He kept an eye precisely on the hour during
which in the summertime the wind used to blow as if predetermined.
At this time then, he engaged the Romans in all haste. Hannibal utterly
destroyed the Roman army, since the wind obstructed their view with
the raised dust, not allowing them to open their eyes at all.439

90  It [is] always advantageous to divert the enemy

1 The Spartans were besieging Athens. Therefore, after they had pre-
pared a fleet, the Athenians sent it against the coastal cities of the
Spartans. Once the Spartans became aware of this, the siege was
immediately lifted.440
2 When Demosthenes sailed to Pylos, he pretended to be undertaking
an assault on the citadel. After the citizens went over to that place [to
defend it], Demosthenes easily captured the city below, quickly arriv-
ing with a few ships.441
3 While at war with Methone, Philip had nearly captured it when the
Macedonians, who were entering the city, began to waver since they
were suffering badly from the enemy who stood on the walls. Philip
placed ladders on other sections of the city [wall] and commanded his
soldiers to ascend them. Since the citizens were distracted and ran to
counter Philip, Methone was safely captured.442

91  How the general could make his army vigilant at night

1 Alcibiades was besieged in Athens by the Spartans and since he sus-
pected treason one night, he gave the following orders to those man-
ning the walls: ‘I will light torches443 three times in the course of the
night. Whoever among you does not reply to me in the same way will
be condemned to death for failing to guard his homeland’. And so the
guards remained vigilant all night long waiting for the signal.444
2 Clearchus was raiding in Thrace and since he was always appre-
hensive of an enemy night attack, he ordered everyone to bear arms
throughout the night and to sleep like that, as if the enemy might attack
them at any moment. One moonless night, Clearchus marched out to
a sufficient distance from the camp and then returned to it, giving his
110 Translation
soldiers the impression of an enemy. In any case, when the Thracians
did attack the camp one night, the Athenian army proved ready for a
night battle and remained unscathed.445

92  In addition, how one could safely defeat the enemy through sleep
deprivation
When Epaminondas, the Theban general, intended to conduct an invasion
of Spartan territory, he allowed his army to rest, since he had learned that
Ionion had been occupied in advance by the Spartans and that the passage to
Sparta was impossible for the entire force. However, he conducted assaults
throughout the night by sending in a moderate number of men in relays.
Since the Spartans who were guarding the narrow passages were exhausted
throughout the whole previous night, they unwisely went to sleep the follow-
ing morning. Epaminondas suddenly attacked them while they were sleep-
ing and, forcing his way through, he safely captured the narrow passes.446

93  One should hide one’s own misfortunes while in camp

Since Agesilaus’s men were stricken with cowardice at the time of the
upcoming battle, he sent out and collected secretly the abandoned shields
of those who had fled and of those who had retreated to the camp at night,
so that the owners would not instil cowardice into the rest when they were
asked about the shields, were they to be seen throughout the camp.447

94  How cavalry will easily be defeated by infantry

1 Since the enemy were mounted, while Iphicrates only led an infantry
force, he drew up his formation eight deep. He ordered everyone, after
lowering their shields, each to dig a pit with their swords. Afterwards
he ordered them to advance slightly in front of the ditch and then to
wait for the battle [to begin] in this manner. When the engagement
commenced, Iphicrates ordered them to retreat as if they were flee-
ing, after putting up little resistance. When this happened, Iphicrates
prevailed over the enemy because the horsemen unexpectedly fell into
the ditches. They were thrown off their horses and had their throats
mercilessly cut by the infantry, who suddenly turned about.448
2 While the enemy were approaching the Phocians with a cavalry force,
the latter filled the ditch in front of the city with clay pots, threw a
small amount of earth on top, and in this manner then they defeated
the horsemen. For when the horsemen charged against the city walls
 Translation 111
with great boldness, they immediately fell down along with their
horses after the clay pots were broken.449
3 When the Thebans learned that Philip was approaching them with a
cavalry force, and after they had flooded the ground in front of the city
at night, they drew up in battle order at the break of dawn, provok-
ing the Macedonians to fight. Therefore, when the engagement com-
menced, the Thebans feigned retreat and the horsemen were easily
captured together with their horses, since they immediately pursued
[them] and fell into the marshy ground.450

95  The enemy is also overpowered by false reports,

feigned actions, and similar signals
1 One summertime, the enemy was approaching Alexander while he
was marching with the army along a river. He ordered everyone to
refrain from tasting the water, claiming that it was poisoned, so that
the Macedonians would not break their [marching] formation. After
the enemy’s retreat from that place, however, while everybody else
hesitated to drink the water due to his claim, he was the first to taste it
and he was admired for his ruse.451
2 When Autophrates intended to penetrate into Pisidian territory, he
made an assault and when he was repelled, he immediately retreated
a distance of twelve miles, as he knew that the narrow passes were
diligently occupied by the enemy. Since the Pisidians considered
the retreat as a withdrawal, they also departed when the night came,
neglecting their guard duty. Therefore, after Autophrates had found
the narrow passes totally unguarded and had crossed from there with
all his army, he made an incursion into Pisidia and thoroughly raided
it with impunity. He returned a conqueror by another route.452
3 While Cyrus was ravaging the country of the Massagetae, he left the
less effective part of the army behind together with the baggage train,
furnishing them with tables filled with every kind of food, a great
amount of wine, and other delicacies, whereas he withdrew with the
men who were most in fighting shape. When the Massagetae learned
of this in the morning, they invaded the camp, since they thought that
Cyrus had fled due to cowardice. After they had plundered the camp,
the Massagetae went to eat, since they found the tables filled with
every kind of good things, as mentioned. Cyrus then suddenly fell
upon them and killed them all.453
4 Since Merops was besieged in the city of Antigonea and was short
of supplies, he filled two of the largest silos with sand at night, and
112 Translation
sprinkled grain on top. When the enemy envoys arrived, he received
them and placing them next to the mouth of the silo, he said ‘Do not
be deceived into thinking that we have a shortage of supplies, because
as you see, we have food which can last for a very long time. In any
case, if it seems good [to you], make a truce and withdraw peacefully’.
When the envoys saw that, they immediately proceeded with the truce
and most readily lifted the siege.454
5 While Tyrrenius was besieged in Iberia, he made a wooden basket and
inserting a dead cockerel in it, he also shut himself in the basket. He
ordered his men to dress in black and transport him to his country, as if
he were dead. When the enemy heard that Tyrrenius was dead, for this
reason they did not pursue the ship, since they believed the rumour.
They had already learned from spies that the coffin was full of foul
smells, that all the relatives were clad in black and that the city was in
great distress on account of Tyrrenius. Consequently, the enemy inten-
sified the siege by establishing their encampment very close to the city
walls and surrounding it with a strong palisade. Tyrrenius, however,
reached his country safe and sound and when the time permitted, he
assembled all his forces, appeared [before] the enemy, and prevailed
over them.455
6 When a corpse was being conveyed from the city, Chares dressed in
female funeral clothes and mingled himself with the mourners. Going
out in this manner then, he escaped the notice of the besiegers.456
7 Demetrius escaped from a siege hiding in a cart which transported
fodder out of the city.457
8 While Chilon was confined in jail, since his wife used to visit him
whenever she desired, he dressed in her clothes, gave his own clothes
to her, and ordered her to wait in the prison. After he deceived the
guards with the female clothing, Chilon escaped and safely reached
his country. When he had assembled his army and a significant [num-
ber of] mercenaries, he unexpectedly assaulted the enemy city in
which he used to be confined and conquered it.458
9 While Merops was immured in prison, he pretended to be sick by put-
ting chalk and water in his mouth, then spitting it out. He was thought
[likely to] die shortly. Since the guards became negligent because of
this, he succeeded in escaping from there without any difficulty.459
10 When the same man was besieged, he cut his hair very short, put on
poor and dirty clothes, and took a halter in his hands, as if he had
lost his master’s horse. He walked around the enemy encampment,
spying out everything and, in this manner, he reached the middle of
the palisaded camp. When he had gained the support of a very large
 Translation 113
[force] of allies, he mixed them with his own army and suddenly
attacked. He easily defeated the enemy, since he terrified them by
surprise.460
11 When Memnon was campaigning against the Cyzicenes, he equipped
his army with Macedonian arms and armour, since he had learned that
they were waiting for Chalcis the Macedonian as an allied [force], and
in this way he captured the city.461
12 The Spartan king, Cleomenes, was fighting against the Argives when
he realised that they were following his lead. While he was prepar-
ing for battle, they were preparing for battle. When he used to go to
dinner, they also did the same. On one occasion, however, he ordered
everyone to arm themselves and to attack the enemy camp, whenever
they received the dinner signal. Therefore, when the signal was given,
as was customary, the Argives immediately went to dinner. After he
had found them unarmed and occupied with the dinner, Cleomenes
killed them to a man.462
13 While Alexander was fighting against Darius, he ordered the Macedo-
nians to fall to their knees and rub the ground with their hands when
they approached the enemy, but then to advance against the foe with
courage and great impetuosity when the trumpet sounded sharply and
piercingly. When this took place, the Persians thought that the Mac-
edonians, stricken by cowardice and fear, were bowing to their king
Darius. Consequently, the Persians lowered their vigour and manli-
ness, while at the same time their hearts were shaken by the unex-
pected nature of the enemy onslaught, and understandably they turned
to flight.463
14 When Pammenes intended to make a night attack due to the small size
of his army, he sent spies to the enemy camp. After he had learned
through the spies the night password that the enemy used with each
other, he attacked during the middle of the night and prevailed over
them, since they could not recognise their own [troops] from the
enemy.464
15 When Megas noticed the manner in which the enemy fire signals were
lit in times of peace and of war, he easily scored a victory after he lit
friendly fire signals and deceived the enemy through them.465
16 At dawn, Telesinicus provided his men with breakfast, then after he
had embarked them on ships, he sailed to Methone. Thereafter, he
allowed most of the day to pass, preparing for an engagement. After
giving the signal for breakfast, he anchored in port, pretending to have
breakfast. When the enemy did the same, Telesinicus immediately
114 Translation
appeared in full force, terrorised [them] with the suddenness [of his
attack], and prevailed over everyone.466
17 Darius was fighting the Sacae. Now since they were divided into
three divisions, after he had attacked and defeated one of them, Dar-
ius equipped his soldiers with the arms and armour of the fallen and
ordered [these men] to mount the enemy horses, to carry the enemy
banners, and in this manner to go forward against the other divisions,
advancing slowly and in step. Since he deceived the Sacae with this
[ruse], Darius annihilated them.467

96  The general should make sworn agreements as safe as possible

1 The Campanians swore to surrender half of all their weapons to their
besiegers. And so, when the siege was lifted, they rendered them use-
less for the enemy by cutting each one in half.468
2 Onias dug a pit, placed [planks of] wood over it and covered them on
top with earth. He performed oaths there, swearing to preserve invi-
olate what had been agreed as long as this very ground maintained
its shape, after pointing with his hand towards the place at which he
performed the oaths. Accordingly, after a while, when the wood was
removed and the pit reappeared, Onias attacked the enemy.469
3 Dercylidas swore to send Meidias back into the city again with a very
large force of bodyguards if he came out of it. Since Meidias trusted
his words, he came out of the city and while he was conversing with
Dercylidas, he was seized by him. When Dercylidas threatened to kill
him unless he surrendered the city, Meidias immediately threw wide
the gates, since his heart was shaken with fear. Dercylidas ordered him
to lead the way clad in royal attire, while he followed him with the
army. Having captured the city in this manner then, Dercylidas used
earnestly to contend that he had kept his oath.470

97  Concerning traitors
1 When Iphicrates, the Athenian general, learned that some people in
Chios were favourable to the Spartan [interests], he resolved to find
them. The next day he ordered his men to dress in Spartan armour and
in this guise to attack the city of the Chians. When the Spartan support-
ers saw this, they joyfully hurried out to the harbour. After Iphicrates
had arrested them for treason, he sent them to Athens in fetters.471
 Translation 115
2 Seeing most of the cavalrymen in his camp defecting to the enemy,
Abradatas convinced his infantry that he had sent the horsemen as
fake defectors to the enemy camp. And so, filled with courage, the
soldiers fought eagerly and put the enemy to flight.472
3 Arsames had his army already prepared [for battle], when he heard
that the commander of the bodyguard [planned] to defect to the enemy
with three hundred of the most valiant [men]. He immediately relieved
him of his command and promoting one of his most loyal [men] to
commander [of the bodyguard], he ordered him to feign a defection
with three hundred men and to attack the enemy from the rear when
the battle was in full swing. When this happened, Arsames won a most
decisive and excellent victory.473

98  The enemy should always be slain mercilessly during a pitched

battle, but those who are in full flight should be pressed upon
more lightly, especially in narrow and rough places
1 Lycurgus always ordered his soldiers to kill enemy troops merci-
lessly during a pitched [battle], so as to compel them to flight, but to
attack those who were already in flight to a lesser degree. He said, ‘So
that the enemy may turn to flight most easily, after they have learned
from their own experience that it [is] better to flee than to stay in
formation’.474
2 Agesilaus used to command his soldiers always to give passage to
enemies who had already turned tail and were in full flight.475
3 Iphicrates used to command his men to pursue the enemy whenever
they turned to flight, but not to be eager to surround them in narrow
passes or rivers and thereby to block their way. He said, ‘In order for
the enemy not to be compelled to fight desperately’. The same man
used to order [them] not to approach the walls during sieges either to
any great extent.476

99  How one could retreat safely and without danger

1 Since Iphicrates wanted to escape the notice of the opposing army
which was lying nearby, he gave the impression of a camp to the
enemy. After he had cut the branches of the trees which stood through-
out the camp, he hung shields and helmets from them and placed
spears upright next to the shields. At night, Iphicrates conducted his
retreat with his entire army.477
116 Translation
2 Fighting against Agesilaus, Chabrias intended to conceal his retreat
due to the small size of his army. He ordered his soldiers to light a very
large number of camp fires and after he abandoned the baggage as well
as the spoils, he conducted his retreat with the army by night.478
3 With the enemy pursuing him in the narrow passes, Merops com-
manded the axe men of his infantry diligently to cut down the trees
which were close to the roads. After the infantry made a pile of dry
wood, Merops immediately ordered them diligently to set this alight
so as to make a very large fire. And thus Merops safely conducted his
retreat.479
4 When Hannibal was cut off in the narrowest passes guarded by the
Romans, after he had gathered herds of cattle and tied lamps to the
horns of each animal, he commanded [some men] to lead them in front
of the army. The Romans readily turned to flight, since it was night
and they were terrified because of that. So, Hannibal passed through
without danger.480
5 When Onias intended to take flight and was concerned about pursuit,
he placed the horseshoes’ nail holes on the hooves backwards, and
thus he conducted his retreat without danger.481

100  Moderate punishments should be inflicted on disobedient

soldiers
1 Caesar did not use to punish all the disobedient soldiers, but either
only the officers or those who were in some way superior to the others
and who were liable to blame for instigating the offence. For he used
to say that sympathy [is] the patron of a manly spirit.482
2 Augustus used to remove the belts of soldiers who had moderately
disobeyed, making them stand without a belt all day long, or to dress
them up in female clothes. However, he used to punish those who
were most responsible implacably.483
3 When Hamilcar arrested those who had killed his brother, he stepped
on the neck of each, but after a while he released them saying, ‘I have
taken sufficient revenge for my brother’s murder, for I do not repay
evil with evil’.484

101  How one could preserve himself from danger when returning

from a raid, if the enemy attacks him in the narrow passes
1 Since Agesilaus ravaged many of the cities in Asia, he consequently
acquired a considerable amount of booty. When he heard that the
enemy were laying an ambush for him in the narrow passes, he had all
 Translation 117
the prisoners that he had assembled and stripped of all their clothing.
He then placed them in front of his army. When the enemy learned
this, they immediately ceased hostilities.485
2 After Onias had assembled all the prisoners and placed them in front
of his army, he stormed the enemy city and conquered it.486

102  The general must fight more boldly on occasions when not

fighting presents evident danger
1 After Lacon drew up his shield bearers at the front, he placed his
Scythian mercenaries behind them with orders to kill without mercy
those who dared to turn to flight. And so, Lacon emerged victorious,
since the shield bearers at the front fought bravely.487
2 When a great crisis lay ahead, since Iphicrates was about to fight
against larger [forces], he dug a very large trench behind his forma-
tion. Consequently, the soldiers abandoned any thoughts of escaping.
As a result, they prevailed over the enemy since they attacked them
more boldly.488
3 Seeing that Macedonians were very fearful during the Persian expe-
dition, Alexander rendered his men bolder through desperation by
destroying the bridges over the largest rivers after his army had crossed
them.489
Notes

Introduction
1 A new translation and a detailed studied of MS is forthcoming by Philip Rance under
the title The Roman Art of War in Late Antiquity: The Strategikon of the Emperor Mau-
rice, to be published by Routledge.
2 For the Arab-Byzantine frontier and warfare see among others: Dagron and Mihăescu
1986: 139–287; Haldon 1999; Haldon 2013: ii. 373–93; Haldon 2014: 312–18; Haldon
and Kennedy 1980; Stouraitis 2009: 54–169; Decker 2013: 137–43; Whittow 1996:
175–81; Lilie 1976: 287–360; McMahon 2016: 22–33; Asa Eger 2011; Asa Eger 2014;
Kennedy 2001: 105–7; Bonner 1996; Cheynet 2001.
3 Shepard 2001: 20, 34–40; Luttwak 2009: 409–18.
4 Theophanes Continuatus 1838: 415–16; Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 1967a:
206–7; Vasiliev 1935–68: ii. 258–61, 264–5; Bikhazi 1981: 366–7, 414.
5 Canard 1951: 383; Bikhazi 1981: 410–14.
6 Theophanes Continuatus 1838: 416–17, 432; Canard 1951: 735–7, 748–53; Vasiliev
1935–68: ii. 268–70; Bikhazi 1981: 429.
7 Shepard 2001: 34; Bikhazi 1981: 787, 843, 854–6; Canard 1951: 762.
8 For the character of Byzantine offensive and expansion, see Shepard 2001: 19–40;
Holmes 2002: 83–104; Garrood 2013: 20–34.
9 Treadgold 1984: 75–98.
10 Skylitzes 1973: 101; Skylitzes 2010: 102; Genesios 1978: 69–70; Genesios 1998: 86.
11 Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 2012: 702.
12 Theophanes Continuatus 1838: 3–4.
13 For the debate on the dating of the work, see Dennis 1985: 2–4; Zuckerman 1990: 216;
Cosentino 2000: 262–80; Rance 2007: 719–37; Baldwin 1988: 290–3; Haldon 2014:
18–20.
14 Shepard 2001: 37–8; McGeer 1992: 228; McGeer 1995a: 262, 272–5, 283–5; Haldon
1999: 217–20; Decker 2013: 152–6.
15 Haase 1847: 17.
16 Vári 1927: 266; Dain 1938: 6–8; McGeer 1995a: 184; Dain and Foucault 1967: 357.
17 Kolias 1993: 24–6.
18 Haldon 2014: 66–8.
19 Vieillefond 1932: xlvi–xlvii.
20 Chatzelis (in progress).
21 Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 142
22 Krumbacher 1897: 637
23 Vári 1927: 241–3, 265–70.
24 Chatzelis (in progress).
25 Dain 1938: 8; Dain 1939: 12–31, 70–1; Dain and Foucault 1967: 350–1, 353; Mecella
2009: 100–1, 107–13; Haldon 2014: 66–8.
120 Notes
26 The complicated issue of the sources of the ST is discussed in more detail in Chatzelis
(in progress).
27 Jackson 1998: 91–3, 101; Jackson 2003: 137–9; Tsagas 1993: 13–19.
28 Dain 1939: 12; Dain and Foucault 1967: 338; Mecella 2009: 107.
29 Bianconi 2008: 372, n. 104; Bianconi 2011: 125, n. 40; Peréz-Martín 2008: 431–58.
30 For the military laws, see: Korzenszky 1931: 155–63 and for the hymns: Pertusi 1948:
145–68.
31 McCabe 2007: 33–5.
32 Dain and Foucault 1967: 338; Fryde 1996: ii. 424, 612.
33 Dain 1939: 11–12, n.1.
34 The second title appears before ST: 76.1.
35 ST: 45.20, 47.8.
36 Bandini 1764–70: iii. 148–9.
37 Köchly 1854: i. 30–1 and elsewhere; Dain 1938: 9.
38 Migne 1863: 669–1094.
39 Melber 1887: 507–40; Dain 1938: 9.
40 See, for example, Vári 1917–22: i. 49 (ST: 38.1, 38.5), 118 (ST: 38.8), 119 (ST: 38.11),
121 (ST: 38.12), 124–5 (ST: 31), 128–9 (ST: 40.1), 130 (ST: 40.2), 131 (ST: 40.3), 212
(ST: 22), 213 (ST: 49.2), 216 (ST: 49.4), 218 (ST: 49.5), 225–6 (ST: 49.6), 236 (ST:
44.6), 243 (ST: 49.6), 245 (ST: 23.4), 263 (ST: 49.7), 266 (ST: 49.8), 282 (ST: 22.1),
285 (ST: 22.4), 287 (ST: 22.10), 290–1 (ST: 22.7), 293–4 (ST: 22.8), 297 (ST: 22.9), ii.
43 (ST: 20.3), 55 (ST: 20.1), 109–10 (ST: 44.3, 45.4), 112 (ST: 15), 126 (ST: 44.1).
41 Vieillefond 1932: xlvi–xlvii, 67–74.
42 Dain and Foucault 1967: 317–92.
43 Dain 1939: 34–6; Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 1004–73.

Translation
1 The attribution to Leo VI and the date are no longer considered to be authentic. For a
discussion of the date and authorship of the work, see the Introduction, pp. 5–7.
2 For 1.3, see Onasander 1928: 374–5 (1.1); LT: 16–17 (2.1).
3 The Christian faith pervaded the whole of Byzantine life and warfare was no excep-
tion. Victory in battle depended on the will and judgement of God so it was incumbent
on the general to try to earn God’s favour through his moral character, actions, and
prayer. See Stouraitis 2009: 189–376; Stouraitis 2012: 227–64; McGuckin 2011–12:
40–4; Strässle 2004: 120–9; Haldon 1999: 13–33; Kolia-Dermitzaki 2012: 121–31;
Kolia-Dermitzaki 1991; Nelson 2011–12: 162–92.
4 For the first part of 1.7, see Onasander 1928: 374–5 (1.2); LT: 16–17 (2.2–3).
5 For the middle part of 1.7, see Basil I 2009: 126–9 (1.11).
6 For the final part of 1.7, see John Stobaeus 1884–1912: i. 493 (3.17.17), quoting Aris-
tippus of Cyrene, a Greek philosopher of the fifth century BCE, and Anonymous 2007:
i. 278, ii. 655 (CP. 3.453).
7 For 1.8, see Onasander 1928: 376–7 (1.5); LT: 16–17 (2.5).
8 For 1.9, see Onasander 1928: 376–7 (1.4); LT: 16–17 (2.4); MS: 270 (8.1.4); Maurice
1984: 79.
9 For the first part of 1.10, see Basil I 2009: 238–41 (1.65); Anonymous 2007: i. 351, ii.
765 (CP. 4B.3).
10 For 1.10 as a whole see MS: 270, 290 (8.1.6, 8.2.67); Maurice 1984: 80, 88; LT: 568–9,
580–1 (20.92, 131).
11 For the first part of 1.11, see Isocrates 1928b: 30–1 (1.43); John Stobaeus 1884–1912:
ii. 334–5 (4.10.29).
12 For 1.12, see Onasander 1928: 436–9 (13.1–2); MS: 296 (8.2.90); Maurice 1984: 91.
13 For 1.13, see Onasander 1928: 376–7 (1.7); MS: 270 (8.1.7); Maurice 1984: 80; LT:
18–19, 540–1 (2.7, 20.11).
 Notes 121
14 For 1.14, see John Stobaeus 1884–1912: i. 9 (3.1.18); Anonymous 2007: i. 366, ii. 785
(CP. 6.66); MS: 292 (8.2.71); Maurice 1984: 88; LT: 554–5, 582–3 (20.49, 134).
15 For 1.15, see MS: 292, 302–4 (8.2.77, 9.1.5–18); Maurice 1984: 89, 93; LT: 578–9
(20.124).
16 For 1.16–18, see MS: 304 (9.1.20–3); Maurice 1984: 93; LT: 394–7 (17.5–7).
17 Reading ἐτρέψαντο instead of ἐπετρέψαντο in Dain 1938: 22. See L, f. 75v.
18 For 1.19, see Onasander 1928: 376–7 (1.6); MS: 288 (8.2.51); Maurice 1984: 87; LT:
18–19 (2.6).
19 For 1.21, see Onasander 1928: 388–9 (3.1); MS: 282 (8.2.23); Maurice 1984: 85; LT:
38–43 (3.1, 5, 9).
20 For 1.22, see Onasander 1928: 388–9 (3.2).
21 For 1.23, see Onasander 1928: 388–9 (3.3); LT: 48–51 (4.5).
22 Solomon, king of Israel (c. 970–c. 931 BCE) was renowned for his wisdom. Samson
in the Bible and Hercules in Greek mythology both possessed superhuman strength.
Cyrus the Great, king of Persia (c. 559–530 BCE), and Alexander the Great (356–323
BCE), king of Macedon from 336 BCE, were both renowned military leaders. The
Roman general and dictator, Gaius Julius Caesar (100–44 BCE), had an unshakeable
belief in his own destiny and fortune.
23 For 1.24, see Onasander 1928: 376–7 (1.8); MS: 290 (8.2.57); Maurice 1984: 88; LT:
18–19 (2.8). No such law as the one described here existed in the Roman Republic.
24 For 1.26, see Onasander 1928: 484–5 (34.1–2); LT: 382–3, 604–5 (16.3, 20.191).
25 For 1.27–8, see Onasander 1928: 390–1 (4.1–2).
26 For this passage, see Isocrates 1928a: 52–3 (2.24).
27 For 1.29, see Onasander 1928: 434–5 (11.6); LT: 390–1 (16.17).
28 For 1.30, see Onasander 1928: 380–1 (1.13); MS: 292 (8.2.74); Maurice 1984: 89; LT:
20–1, 574–5 (2.12, 20.110).
29 For 1.31, see Onasander 1928: 380–1 (1.14–16); LT: 574–5 (2.12). While this pas-
sage originally derives from Onasander, it applies equally well to the Byzantines. The
ninth-century Syrianos Magistros, who was also an author of a military manual, wrote
a treatise specifically devoted to military speeches; see Syrianos Magistros 2010. Sur-
viving examples of Byzantine military speeches more or less follow the recommenda-
tions of Syrianos and reflect imperial ideology as well as themes from the Bible and
ecclesiastical texts. See, for example, Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 1990: 124–5
(C.466–73); Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 1908: 75–85; Constantine VII Porphy-
rogennetos 1967b: 393–404; Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 2003: 117–20, 127–
34. For further discussion, see Haldon 1990: 242–3; Haldon 2014: 267–8; McGeer
2003: 111–38; Hoffmann 2007: 105–39; Stouraitis 2012: 238–64; Markopoulos 2012:
47–56; Karapli 2010.
30 For 1.32, see Onasander 1928: 376–7 (1.9); LT: 18–19 (2.9).
31 For 1.33, see Onasander 1928: 376–9 (1.10–11); LT: 18–21 (2.9–10).
32 For 1.34, see Onasander 1928: 378–9 (1.12); LT: 20–1 (2.11).
33 For 1.35, see Onasander 1928: 380–1 (1.17); LT: 22–3 (2.13).
34 For 1.36, see Onasander 1928: 382–3 (1.19); LT: 22–3 (2.14).
35 For 1.37, see Onasander 1928: 382–3 (1.20); LT: 22–3 (2.14).
36 For 1.38, see MS: 284 (8.2.35); Maurice 1984: 86; LT: 28–9, 568–71 (2.19, 20.93).
37 For chapter 2, see LT: 196–9, 610–13 (11.9, 20.209).
38 The derivation of this chapter on land measurements has prompted some debate. Dain
1938: 9 and Geiger 1992: 31–43 believe that it derives from the sixth-century architect,
Julian of Ascalon, but their theory has not been universally accepted. Diller 1950: 22–5
argues that it was copied from two texts to which the author of the ST made his own
additions. The first was the Geometrica (Heron of Alexandria 1903: iv. 182–201 (4)).
The second was the Peri Metron (Anonymous 1946: 158–9), a text which was inter-
polated into the manuscript tradition of Aelian Tacticus sometime before the eleventh
century. Saliou (Julian of Ascalon 1996: 21–7) agrees that this paragraph is a later
122 Notes
interpolation in the manuscript tradition and therefore omitted it from the main text of
her edition of Julian of Ascalon’s Treatise of Construction and Design. For Byzantine
measurements generally, see Schilbach 1970.
39 The Greek words here are πόδες, ὄργυιαι, and πήχεις respectively.
40 The Greek word here is δάκτυλος.
41 The Greek word here is παλαστή or παλαιστή.
42 The Greek word here is βῆμα.
43 The Greek word here is σπιθαμή.
44 The Greek word here is ἂκαινα.
45 In practice, a stade (or stadion) could be anything between 175 and 200 metres.
46 The Greek word for ‘mile’ here is μίλιον, of which the standard measure was eight and
a third stades. The reference is to Strabo 1917–33: iii. 292–3 (7.7.4) but that to Erato-
sthenes of Cyrene (c.285–194 BCE) cannot be traced. See Geiger 1992: 39–40.
47 The Greek word here is παρασάγγης. According to Xenophon 1998: 157–8 (2.2.6),
536 parasangs was the equivalent of 16,050 stades, so that one parasang equalled thirty
stades. See Strabo 1917–33: v. 286–7 (11.11.5) although he does not cite Posidonius of
Apamea (c.135–c.50 BCE) as the author of the ST claims.
48 For 4.1, see Onasander 1928: 480–1 (33.1); MS: 242 (7.1B.8–10); Maurice 1984: 69;
LT: 291–2, 346–7 (14.3, 14.99).
49 For 4.2, see Onasander 1928: 480–3 (33.2–3).
50 For 5.1, see Onasander 1928: 508–9 (42.2); MS: 268 (8.1.1); Maurice 1984: 79.
51 For 6, see Onasander 1928: 426–7 (10.9.24).
52 For 7.1, see MS: 270 (8.1.10); Maurice 1984: 80; LT: 541–3 (20.13). Constantine VII
Porphyrogennetos 1990: 86–7 (B.74–9) reports that one of the duties of the imperial
representative in Constantinople when the emperor was away was to reassure the citi-
zens in the event of false rumours being disseminated and to punish those who spread
them.
53 For 7.2, see MS: 228 (7.A.13–19); Maurice 1984: 64. Constantine VII Porphyrogen-
netos 1990: 82–5 (B.1–33) provided an extensive list of tasks that should be completed
before a campaign began. These included inquiring about routes, terrain, enemy forces,
fortresses, enemy garrisons, distances between fortresses, and possible enemy rein-
forcements. Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 2012: 657, 678 included among the
preparations for the expeditions to Crete in 911 and 949, a calculation of the distance
to the island from Constantinople and the despatch of spies to surrounding enemy ter-
ritories to report on how ready for battle the Arabs there were.
54 For 8.1, see MS: 270 (8.1.9); Maurice 1984: 80; LT: 540–1 (20.12).
55 The author specifically advises the use of μανδάτορες (literally ‘messengers’) for this
task. See 35.13 below.
56 The Greek words here are μέρη and μοίρας.
57 For 9.1, see MS: 102, 232–4 (1.9.1–9, 7.A.4); Maurice 1984: 20, 66; LT: 278–9 (13.4);
Haldon 2014: 271.
58 To avoid such problems, the Byzantine army had regulated routes and base camps
(apletka) for the army to meet up, depending on the location of the impending cam-
paign. See Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 1990: 80–1, 88–9 (A; B.97–100); Hal-
don 2014: 224–5; Huxley 1975: 87–93.
59 For 9.2, see MS: 280 (8.2.15); Maurice 1984: 84; LT: 108–9, 154–7 (7.6, 9.3–6).
60 For 9.3, see MS: 280 (8.2.14); Maurice 1984: 84; LT: 42–3 (3.9).
61 For 10.1, see Onasander 1928: 474–5 (32.1).
62 For 10.2, see Onasander 1928: 474–5 (32.2).
63 For 10.3, see Onasander 1928: 474–7 (32.3).
64 For 10.4, see Onasander 1928: 476–7 (32.5).
65 For 11.1, see Onasander 1928: 400–1 (6.11); MS: 338 (10.1.23–9); Maurice 1984:
106–7.
66 For 11.2, see Onasander 1928: 400–3 (6.12); MS: 314 (9.3.40–5); Maurice 1984: 97;
LT: 160–3, 404–5 (9.22–3, 17.34).
 Notes 123
67 For 11.3, see Onasander 1928: 402–3 (6.13).
68 For 11.4, see Onasander 1928: 524–5 (42.9.23).
69 For 11.5, see Onasander 1928: 502–3 (39.2.4); LT: 368–9 (15.37).
70 For 11.6, see Onasander 1928: 504–5 (40.1); LT: 350–1 (15.2).
71 12.1–5 derive from Onasander 1928: 496–7 (38.1.1–5). See also LT: 364–7 (15.31,
34).
72 13.1–2 derive from Onasander 1928: 498–9 (38.2.7–8). See also LT: 364–5 (15.30).
73 For 14.2, see MS: 250 (7.11B.1–9); Maurice 1984: 72; LT: 298–301 (14.15).
74 For 14.3, see MS: 250 (7.11B.10–17); Maurice 1984: 72–3.
75 For 14.4, see MS: 280, 294 (8.2.16–17, 80); Maurice 1984: 84, 89 LT: 558–9, 568–9
(20.62, 89).
76 For 14.5, see MS: 274 (8.1.31); Maurice 1984: 82.
77 For 15.1, see MS: 234, (7.A.6, 8.1.15); Maurice 1984: 66, 80; LT: 280–1, 542–3 (13.6,
20.18).
78 For 15.2, see MS: 242 (7.A.15); Maurice 1984: 69; LT: 266–7 (12.90).
79 For 16.1, see MS: 284 (8.2.36); Maurice 1984: 86; Onasander 1928: 493–5 (37.1).
80 For 16.2–3, see MS: 276, 284 (8.1.37, 8.2.36); Maurice 1984: 82, 86; LT: 388–9,
550–1, 570–1 (16.15, 20.39, 97); Onasander 1928: 494–5 (37.2–3).
81 For 17.1, see MS: 268 (8.1.2); Maurice 1984: 79.
82 The idea that the commander of the army should show a fatherly concern to his sol-
diers was also applied to the emperor and it is a theme that is found in Constantine VII
Porphyrogennetos 1990: 122–3 (C.451–4).
83 For 17.2, see MS: 268–70 (8.1.3); Maurice 1984: 79.
84 Syntelestai (literally ‘contributors’) usually denotes taxpayers who shared the fiscal
expenses of the poorer stratiotai in order to help them fulfil their military obligations.
The word was also employed in the general sense of people belonging to the empire,
i.e. imperial subjects. See: LT: 148–9, 538–9, 510–11, 518–19 (8.10, 20.5, 19.18, 39);
MS: 270 (8.1.3); Maurice 1984: 79; Lemerle 1979: 121–2; Górecki 2009: 147–52;
McGeer 2000: 27; Haldon 2014: 140–1.
85 For 18.2, see MS: 280 (8.2.18); Maurice 1984: 84.
86 For 19.2, see MS: 278 (8.1.44); Maurice 1984: 83; LT: 552–5 (20.45).
87 The Greek word here is βύκινα, curved types of trumpet made of animal horns, wood
with leather coating, ivory, and metal, whose more developed forms were probably
similar in shape to the modern trombone. These instruments had no finger-holes and
only produced sound through the vibration of the lips. See Maliaras 2001: 100–4;
Haldon 2014: 180–1.
88 For 20.1, see MS: 136–8 (2.17); Maurice 1984: 33; LT: 246–7 (12.53).
89 For 20.2, see MS: 140–2 (2.20); Maurice 1984: 34. On banners generally, see Haldon
2014: 192.
90 The banners and pennons of soldiers and lower officers seem to have been plain. The
heads and the streamers of the banners were coloured in accordance with the division
to which each belonged. At least some of the banners were surmounted by a cross.
These battle colours are to be contrasted with parade and imperial banners which were
very elaborate. Some were coloured gold or had golden stripes on them and captured
enemy banners and pennons were also included in imperial ceremonies. See Con-
stantine VII Porphyrogennetos 2012: 576–7, 615; Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos
1990: 142–3 (C.742–7). For a more detailed discussion, see: Dennis 1982: 51–9; Hal-
don 1990: 270–4; Haldon 2014: 192; Babuin 2001: 5–59.
91 For 20.3, see MS: 130 (2.10); Maurice 1984: 30; LT: 240–1, 264–5 (12.40–1, 81).
92 For 20.4, see MS: 134 (2.14); Maurice 1984: 32; LT: 244–5, 264–5 (12.48, 82).
93 For 20.5, see MS: 260–2 (7.16B.25–37); Maurice 1984: 76–7; LT: 266–7 (12.87–8).
The late tenth-century Anonymous 1985: 276–9 (9) suggests that the signals of the
trumpets were regulated. He describes three different calls. The first, at dawn, signi-
fied that the soldiers should begin their preparation for departure. The second meant
that the tents should be taken down and the pack animals be loaded, while the officers
124 Notes
of the scouts, flank-guards, and rear guards were to receive orders and leave the camp
first. The third call signified that the whole army should leave the camp. For a discus-
sion, see Haldon 2014: 255–6.
94 See also the measures for camp patrols in Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 1990:
120–3 (C.420–39).
95 For 21.1, see Onasander 1928: 416–17 (10.4.10–11); MS: 330 (9.5.68–74); Maurice
1984: 104; LT: 306–7, 426–7 (14.30, 17.82–3)
96 Similar measures are recorded in Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 1990: 130–1
(C.573–9).
97 For 21.3, see Onasander 1928: 418–19 (10.10.12).
98 For 21.4, see MS: 330 (9.5.83–7); Maurice 1984: 104. The cross-reference here is
inaccurate, as the author has not given any relevant information in any earlier passage.
99 For 22.1–12, see MS: 472–80 (12.22B); Maurice 1984: 158–62.
100 For 22.1–2, see Onasander 1928: 404–9 (8–9); LT: 196–7, 208–9 (11.3, 31). For a
further discussion, see Haldon 2014: 240–2.
101 For 22.3, see LT: 208–9 (11.30, 33).
102 The author of the ST prefers the classical word stauroma (σταύρωμα) here instead of
the more contemporary stabaron (στάβαρον), which seems to be of Slavic origin. See
Haldon 2014: 243–4.
103 For 22.4, see LT: 196–201, (11.8, 13).
104 An inaccurate cross-reference, as the author has not given any relevant information in
an earlier passage.
105 The Greek word here is tribolos. The use of caltrops was widespread already from
late antiquity; in the period of the ST they were regularly used both by Byzantines and
Arabs. See Tsurtsumia 2011b: 415–21; Haldon 2014: 181. Constantine VII Porphy-
rogennetos 2012: 660, 673 lists caltrops that were to be gathered for the 911 and 949
expeditions against Crete.
106 Apart from citations below, see also Anonymous 1985: 262–3 (2.21–3) and AB: 976
(76), where similar pits are also mentioned. For tradition and reality in the ninth-cen-
tury Apparatus Bellicus see Zuckerman 1994: 359–89. For a discussion of horse break-
ers and connections with the Roman period and the West, see Haldon 2014: 287–8.
107 For 22.5, see MS: 198 (4.3.53–6); Maurice 1984: 54; PS: 90–1 (29.25–8).
108 For 22.6, see PS: 90–1 (29.27–30); OT: 166–9 (55).
109 The ST follows the advice of earlier manuals here: the cavalry tents are arrayed at a
distance so as not to be shot by arrows in case of an enemy assault. See Haldon 2014:
248–51.
110 For 22.7, see LT: 200–1 (11.14, 16).
111 For 22.8, see LT: 200–3 (11.15, 17–18). In the ST the taxiarchos is an unofficial rank.
Here the term simply denotes an officer who commands a taxis, which is a unit of
either infantry or cavalry. It should not be confused with the official rank of taxiar-
chos, which in the second half of the tenth century designated the commander of a
taxiarchia, which was specifically an infantry unit, usually of a thousand men. For
taxiarchos in the sense given in the ST, see PS: 48–9 (15.64–6). For the later taxi-
archos, see Nikephoros II Phokas 1995: 16–17 (1.75–89); Anonymous 1985: 246–7
(1.11–16); Anonymous 1972: 273; Oikonomides 1972: 335–6; McGeer 1988: 135–
45; McGeer 1995a: 265–72; Kühn 1991: 273–8; Haldon 1999: 218.
112 The Greek word for ‘litany’ here is ἐκτενῆ. For this and other litanies, see ODB: ii.
1234; Haldon 2014: 253. We know that priests accompanied the Byzantine army and
Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 1990: 106–7 (C.183–4, 196) lists liturgical books
of the church and a small chapel to be included in the items for an imperial campaign.
Other religious services included prayers and litanies before the battle, one of which,
an akolouthia, survives from the late ninth or early tenth century. See Pertusi 1948:
145–68; Dennis 1993: 107–17.
113 For 22.9, see LT: 202–3 (11.19–20).
114 For 22.10, see MS: 240 (7.1.13); Maurice 1984: 68; LT: 198–9 (11.10–11).
 Notes 125
115 For 23.1–8, see MS: 208, 214, 458–68 (5.1, 5, 12.20B.); Maurice 1984: 58, 60, 152–5;
LT: 186–93 (10).
116 For 23.2, see MS: 322 (9.4.10–18); Maurice 1984: 100–1; PS: 60–1 (18.31–8).
117 For 23.3, see MS: 322 (9.4.10–20); Maurice 1984: 100–1.
118 For 23.5, see MS: 324–6 (9.4.51–9); Maurice 1984: 101–2; LT: 174–5 (9.49–50).
119 For 23.6, see MS: 326 (9.4.59–64); Maurice 1984: 102.
120 For 24.1–5, see PS: 118–21 (40).
121 Dain 1938: 48 adds another τάξιν (‘formation’) here, but that does not seem to be necessary.
122 For 24.3, see LT: 320–1 (14.49).
123 25.1–3 derive from PS: 122–5 (42); MS: 282, 328 (8.2.26, 9.5.51–2); Maurice 1984:
85, 103; LT: 566–7 (20.84).
124 26.1–3 derive from PS: 124–7 (43).
125 During the first Punic War (264–241 BCE), the Roman general Marcus Atilius Regu-
lus, having been captured by the Carthaginians at Tunis, was set free on condition
that he would go to Rome to negotiate peace. Regulus allegedly urged the Romans
to reject peace but he then honourably returned to Carthage to comply with the terms
of his release. The Carthaginians thereupon tortured him to death and he became a
legendary figure of Roman honour, loyalty, and endurance. See Sempronius Tuditanus
2013: ii. 343 (F8).
126 For 27.1, see PS: 120–1 (41).
127 The Greek word here is κοπῶν.
128 For 27.2, see LT: 432–5 (17.92).
129 For 28, see Aelian Tacticus 2012: 12–15 (2).
130 The Greek words here are ὁπλίτας, πελταστάς, and ψιλούς, respectively.
131 For 29.1, see MS: 218 (6.1); Maurice 1984: 61; LT: 438–9 (18.6). On prokoursatores,
defensores and saka, see Haldon 2014: 155–6, 158, 222–3.
132 For 29.2, see MS: 218–20 (6.2–3); Maurice 1984: 62; LT: 438–41 (18.8).
133 See Kaegi 1964: 96–108 and Haldon 2014: 340–3.
134 For 29.3, see MS: 220 (6.3); Maurice 1984: 62; LT: 438–41 (18.9).
135 Philip II (382–336 BCE), king of Macedon from 359 BCE, and his son and succes-
sor, Alexander the Great, are discussed in the work of the Roman tactician Aelian (fl.
120 CE) and the Greek historian, Lucius Flavius Arrian (c.86–c.160 CE). In the ninth
and tenth centuries, interest in the writings of Arrian and Aelian Tacticus revived and
the Byzantines were particularly keen to know how these authorities discussed the
formation and equipment of the infantry. Syrianos Magistros, Leo VI, the ST, and
Nikephoros II Phokas all included relevant material in their treatises, while sometime
in the tenth century the manuscript tradition of Aelian was updated and some extra
chapters were interpolated in it, among which was one describing a hollow square
formation. See Dain 1946: 156–8; McGeer 1995a: 182, 187; 1992: 219–29; Rance
1994: 49–79; Haldon 2014: 209–11.
136 The klibanion was a lamellar type of armour. The Byzantines probably adopted and
developed it from the Khazars. This type of armour is frequently depicted in Byz-
antine and Georgian iconography, and some scholars have attempted to determine
the different types of klibania. See Haldon 1975: 16–28; Kolias 1988: 45–50; Daw-
son 1998: 38–50; Dawson 2001–2: 89–95; Tsamakda 2002: 308, 396; Parani 2003:
105–10; Grotowski 2010: 155–61, 137–51; Tsurtsumia 2011a: 65–99; Dawson 2013:
69–90; Haldon 2014: 175–6, 187.
137 The Greek word paramerion is composed of παρά and μηρός meaning ‘close to’ or
‘next to the thigh’, which is very appropriate given that this type of sword was sus-
pended from the belt. See 38.5 on the equipment of the Romans for more information.
138 For 30.2–4, see Aelian Tacticus 2012: 12–13 (2); LT: 98–101 (6.30–3). On manikellia,
see Haldon 2014: 186–7.
139 For 31.1–3, see Aelian Tacticus 2012: 14–15 (2); LT: 96–9 (6.27–8).
140 For 32.1–5, see Asclepiodotus 1928: 256–7 (2.7); Aelian Tacticus 2012: 26–7 (8); LT:
64–7, 338–41 (4.58–63, 14.86–8).
126 Notes
141 24,576 is the actual total.
142 For 34.1, see LT: 338–41 (14.86–9).
143 On these ranks, see Haldon 2014: 91–7. For the merarchai in particular, see Haldon
2014: 147–8 and for the komes, see Haldon 2014: 149–51. Evidence from the Book of
Ceremonies and the Kletorologion of Philotheos suggests that in the first half of the
tenth century the droungarioi and the kometes commanded a similar number of men,
so from around the middle of the century their ranks and importance become identical
and the fused term droungarokometes appeared. See Constantine VII Porphyrogen-
netos 2012: 656; Philotheos 1972: 109, 157; Haldon 2000: 324–8. Cf. Constantine VII
Porphyrogennetos 2012: 663, 667; Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 1990: 134–5
(C.653–5); Haldon 1990: 256–8; Kühn 1991: 51–2; Treadgold 1992: 127–30.
144 The Greek word here is βανδοφόροι. See Haldon 2014: 153.
145 The Greek word here is μανδάτωρες. See Haldon 2014: 155.
146 The Greek words here are δαιπότατοί and κρίβαντες (σκρίβαντες), which both mean
‘auxiliaries’. See MS: 126–8 (2.9); Maurice 1984: 29–30; LT: 52–3 (4.17); Haldon
2014: 154–5.
147 The Greek word for ‘surveyors’ here is μίνσωρες, followed by the variant μινσουράτωρες,
which means the same thing. For 35.1, see LT: 50–1 (4.6–7); Haldon 2014: 156.
148 For 35.2, see LT: 50–1, (4.8–9). The term tourmarches seems to have first appeared
in the sixth or seventh century. From the middle of the tenth century it slowly disap-
pears from the Byzantine sources and it is last heard of in the middle of the elev-
enth. Although the ST mentions that the tourmarches commanded from three to nine
thousand men, these numbers were a generalisation and theory varied greatly from
practice. According to the testimony of the De Administrando and the Book of Cer-
emonies, a tourma actually numbered around one thousand men and sometimes fewer.
See Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 1967a: 236–7 (50.92–105); Constantine VII
Porphyrogennetos 2012: 651–6; Haldon 2014: 135–7; Haldon 2000: 305–22. Cf.
Treadgold 1992: 78–145.
149 The Greek word here is φλάμουλον.
150 For 35.4, see LT: 58–61 (4.43). The term bandon most probably has a Gothic origin.
In MS the term only referred to cavalry, but from LT onwards it also applied to the
infantry. The ST follows LT: 60–1 (4.47) that a bandon should consist of two to four
hundred for the infantry, but for the cavalry bandon it gives the lower number of
fifty men which is not found in older treatises. For the bandon see also Haldon 2014:
143–4. For the term allagion in the tenth century, see Pertusi 1956: 92–5; Guilland
1967: i. 524–5; Haldon 1984: 275; Haldon 2014: 96.
151 Dain 1938: 56 reads τριακοσίων υˊ which gives 300–400. However, the fact that the
number three hundred is written out full could imply the sense of three hundred and
more. L, f. 86r allows υˊ to be replaced with νˊ, which denotes the number 350 in accord-
ance with the author’s guidelines above. These imperial allagia were most probably full-
time elite soldiers of the tagmata and are contrasted with the regular allagia composed
of part-time soldiers of the themata. They might have been constituted regular tagmata
or provincial tagmata which were stationed in some provinces. The imperial allagion of
Thrakesion could have belonged to the peratika tagmata which were stationed in Asia
Minor, but close to the capital. For regional peratika and regular tagmata, see Ahrweiler
1960: 25–33, 55–9; Guilland 1967: i. 428–30; Oikonomides 1972: 329–35; Haldon
1984: 234; Haldon 1999: 84; Haldon 2000: 332; Kühn 1991: 69, 123–4, 251–9. Apart
from the ST, the only surviving reference we have to full-time troops in Charsianon
comes from the eleventh century. Maybe the allagion of Charsianon here was constituted
for the needs of a particular campaign in the way that some Armenians were recruited
for an expedition to Crete. See Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 2012: 652, 657, 666;
Ahrweiler 1960: 34–5; Kühn 1991: 265; Haldon 1984: 219–20; Haldon 2000: 333.
152 For 35.6, see LT: 52–3 (4.13).
153 Cf. Haldon 2014: 162.
154 Literally meaning ‘tail-leader’, commonly referred to as ‘file-closer’.
 Notes 127
155 Kontoubernion denoted the smallest independent tactical unit in the Byzantine army
which fought as a file. See ST 35.12; 45.11; LT: 46–7 (4.40). Other military treatises
record that soldiers were assigned to a κοντουβέρνιον with their friends and kinsmen
and that they marched and camped together. See, for example, LT: 58–9 (4.2); Nike-
phoros II Phokas 1995: 12, 38 (1.11, 3.74); Ouranos 1995: 88, 116 (56.16, 60.86);
Haldon 2014: 145.
156 For 35.13, see LT: 42–3 (4.18–19).
157 For the term touldon see Dain 1950: 161–9.
158 For 35.16, see LT: 54–5 (4.27–8).
159 For the size of the horses and their dietary requirements, see Haldon 2014: 235–6,
325–7.
160 For 35.17, see MS: 132 (2.12); Maurice 1984: 31; LT: 54–5 (4.24). On minsouratores,
see Haldon 2014: 156.
161 36.1–2 derive from LT: 46–7 (4.1).
162 The Greek word here is ἑταῖροι, which denotes the members of the soldiers’ house-
holds who were left behind to cultivate the land in their absence. See Lemerle 1979:
139–42; Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 264–9; Kolias 2007: 323–5; Haldon 2014: 142–
3, 281–3.
163 For 37, see PS: 84–7 (27.15–22).
164 For 38.1–12, see MS: 420–4 (12.B.4–6); Maurice 1984: 139–40; LT: 90–5 (6.21–3).
165 A shield of six spans would indeed be almost as tall as the man who held it. Depend-
ing on which type of span being used here, the shield would be 140cm, 117cm. or
94cm high. The 140cm version must have been rather unwieldy but ST is not the
only source to record such enormous shields. The ninth-century PS 52–3 (16.5–9)
speaks of shields of 160cm, while the tenth-century Nikephoros II Phokas 1995:
14–15 (1.3.28–9) and the eleventh-century Ouranos 1995: 90–1 (56.3.32) record the
same measurements as the ST. Such shields seem to have also been employed by the
Fatimids and probably by the Slavs. See Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 1967a:
78–9 (15); MS 374 (11.4.45); Maurice 1984: 121. For measurements, see Haldon
2014: 195–7; Dawson 2007: 1–6; Schilbach 1970: 16–22. The triangular kite-shield is
generally connected with Western European warfare and it could have been brought
back from Italy by Byzantine troops. The earliest surviving Byzantine pictorial depic-
tion seems to be the London Psalter dating from around 1066, see: Haldon 2014: 71;
Grotowski 2010: 210–36; Kolias 1988: 103–7; Kalavrezou-Maxeiner 1985: 99, 101.
Some shields were used for ceremonial purposes and were thus gilded and adorned
with precious stones. See Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 2012: 640; Parani 2013:
147–8; Grotowski 2010: 250–4; Grotowski 2007: 93, 102–3, 112–14.
166 A spear of eight cubits would have probably been 3.7m long and one of ten cubits
4.7m. These measurements do not seem implausible, as they are in accordance with
earlier manuals. LT: 74–5 (5.2), for example, speaks of spears of eight cubits long
which its author calls small, and his information correlates with the length of some
pikes known from the West. See Dawson 2007: 7–10; Haldon 2014: 194–5; Kolias
1988: 191–202; Grotowski 2010: 232–6; Parani 2003: 139–40. According to Con-
stantine VII Porphyrogennetos 2012: 640, silver-gilt spears were used in ceremonies.
For their role in ceremonies and their symbolism, see Parani 2013: 145–8; Grotowski
2010: 323–6; Grotowski 2007: 94–102–6. For ceremonies and triumphs in general,
see McCormick 1986.
167 The word menavlion (or menavlon) first appears in the LT to describe a javelin but in
the ST and all the other manuals of the later tenth century, it denotes a sturdy spear
used for thrusting. The menavlia seem to have been made differently from ordinary
spears since the author of the ST stresses here that they should not be made with
‘hewn’ wood. An eleventh-century depiction of St. Merkourios portrays his spear with
regular-length cuts all over its shaft which makes it look as if it had been made from
sections of wood joined together. See Haldon 1975: 33; Haldon 2014: 202–3; McGeer
1986: 53–8; Kolias 1988: 192–5; Anastasiadis 1994: 1–10; Dawson 2007: 7–8 and
128 Notes
Grotowski 2010: 320–3. Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 2012: 669 lists a hundred
menavlia for the 949 expedition to Crete.
168 For 38.3, see LT: 74–5 (5.2). The artzikidon is an unknown type of a tree and this is the
earliest known use of this word. See Sullivan 2010: 155 and for a possible explanation
of the term McGeer 1995a: 64–5.
169 The term lorikia has not yet been definitely identified as it could refer either to mail or
scale armour. See: Haldon 1975: 18–24; Haldon 1999: 130–4; Haldon 2002: 68–70;
Haldon 2014: 185–6; Kolias 1980: 27–35; 1988: 37–41; McGeer 1995a: 215; Dawson
1998: 46–7; 2002: 86; Grotowski 2010: 155–61; Dawson 2013: 34–7.
170 On these tunics, see Kolias 1988: 55–8; Parani 2003: 117–18; Grotowski 2010: 166–70.
171 The paramerion has stirred a debate as to what kind of sword it denotes. Some have
argued in favour of a single-edged weapon either in a form of a sabre or a pallash and
others suggested that it was no different to a regular sword or dagger save for the fact
that it was girded onto waist belts. As the ST (39.2) shows, the term paramerion was
generally applied to any type of sword, either double or single edged, which was slung
from a waist belt. Ceremonial parameria also existed and we know from Constan-
tine VII Porphyrogennetos 1990: 142–3 (C.751–2) that emperors wore them on cam-
paigns. See also Haldon 1975: 31; McGeer 1995b: 63, 71; Kolias 1988: 137–8; Parani
2003: 131–3. For iconography and archaeological evidence, see Haldon 2014: 173–5;
Grotowski 2010: 357–60, 388. Golden parameria were also used on ceremonies and
the way they were held had significant symbolic elements. See Parani 2013: 148–56;
Nelson 2011–12: 176–7, 189; Grotowski 2010: 360–7; Grotowski 2007: 93–4, 103,
109–10.
172 These were arm guards made of iron, wood, or leather. See: Kolias 1988: 65–70;
Grotowski 2010: 170–4; Haldon 2014: 186–7.
173 As the author specifies in 39.2, podopsella and chalkotouba were greaves which could
be made of iron, wood, or bison hide and were designed to protect the legs. They
are usually depicted as cylindrical in the iconography of the tenth and eleventh cen-
tury, although other types also appear. See Haldon 1975: 36–7; Kalavrezou-Maxeiner
1985: 99–100, 103–4; Kolias 1988: 70–4; Tsamakda 2002: fig. 467; Parani 2003:
121–2; Grotowski 2010: 187–90; Haldon 2014: 176–7.
174 Helmets that covered the entire head are not found in Byzantine iconography. It seems
that there were different ways for the helmet to provide a complete covering. Constan-
tine VII Porphyrogennetos 2012: 669 informs us that for the expedition to Crete in
949, ten of the helmets were autoprosopa, that is to say they had a mask. Nikephoros
II Phokas 1995: 36–7 (3.34–7) and Ouranos 1995: 114–15 (60.43–7) speak of double
or triple layers of zaba, which is more commonly interpreted as mail that was attached
to the helmet. LT: 76–7 (3.5) speaks of both mail and quilted fabric as well as leather
neck pieces which, if required, could be made to cover whole face of the soldier.
Some scholars, however, have rejected the possibility that mail was regularly used
in such a way and favour lamellar or textile coverings instead. See: Haldon 1975:
37–8; Kolias 1988: 65–7, 79–80; McGeer 1995a: 70; Parani 2003: 123; Grotowski
2010: 155–61. Depictions of neck pieces in Byzantine iconography seem to suggest
that mail, textile, leather, or lamellar were all in use. The tenth-century ivory panel of
Joshua depicts neck pieces that could have been lamellar or leather. See Goldschmidt
and Weitzmann 1930–4: i. 13–16, 24 and fig. 1, pl.1. The tenth- or eleventh-century
Jesus of Navi in Greece depicts a textile neck piece, on which see Chatzidakis 1997:
16. The Madrid Skylitzes manuscript has some neck pieces painted in a grey-blue
colour which clearly suggests metal, although most of them seem to be either lamellar,
textile, or leather: See Tsamakda 2002: 309 and figs. 19, 54. 60. For further discussion
and archaeological evidence, see Haldon 2014: 176.
175 A tenth- or eleventh-century Byzantine casket depicts a cavalryman wearing a helmet
with a plume on top, see Goldschmidt and Weitzmann 1930–14: i. 11, 13–14, 17–18,
 Notes 129
27–8, fig.12a–e, pl. vi. On the plumes attached to the shoulder-pieces of the armour
which is depicted in the Digenis Akrites dish, dated to the twelfth or thirteenth cen-
tury, see Grotowski 2010: fig. 57. For further discussion and some archaeological
evidence see Haldon 2014: 197; Kolias 1988: 62–3.
176 The Greek word here is πελταστῶν.
177 I.e. javelins. See Kolias 1988: 186–7; Parani 2003: 139–40; Grotowski 2010: 318–20.
178 The Greek term here is θώρακες ἁλυσιδωτοί
179 The standard type of bow must have remained the composite reflex bow, which was
adopted by the Romans in the fifth and sixth centuries. Their model was the steppe-
nomad bows which were constructed of wood, horn, and sinew, but the Book of Cer-
emonies speaks in addition of Roman bows which could have been a new type. The
bow-cases seems to have been almost similar to the ones known to have been used
by Turkic and nomadic peoples. See Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 2012: 669;
Haldon 2000: 271; Haldon 2014: 169–70; Coulston 1985: 220–366; Amatuccio 1996:
30–1; Kolias 1988: 214–19; Grotowski 2010: 369–75; Parani 2003: 141–2. It remains
open to question how seriously to take the statement in LT: 84–5 (6.5) that archery
was in decline among the Romans and Leo the Deacon’s evidence that the bows were
drawn only to the chest in his day (Leo the Deacon 1828: 50–1; Leo the Deacon
2005: 100). In Byzantine iconography of the ninth to the eleventh century, archers are
depicted drawing both to the chest, as well as the more challenging draw to the ear.
See PS: 128–9 (44); with Kolias 1988: pl. VI.1; XVI.2; Tsamakda 2002: fig. 5, 65, 67,
381. For this debate, see Haldon 1999: 215; Haldon 2014: 160–2.
180 Menas (μένας) is an ambiguous term, only encountered in the ST. Dennis 1981: 1–5
argues that the author meant to copy μύας or μύιας, i.e. ‘mice’ or ‘flies’, since a para-
phrase of MS also used this term in the same context and it also appears in LT: 526–7
(19: 345) and Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 2012: 670. Along with Haldon 1970:
155–7, Dennis proposed that the small wooden tubes (solenaria) described here were
crossbows and therefore that the ‘mice-flies’ were their missiles while Nishimura
1988: 422–35, Kolias 1988: 241–4, and Pétrin 1992: 271–6 argued in favour of an
arrow-guide, which was placed in front of the bow to shoot smaller arrows to a greater
distance.
181 For a discussion of these slings (sphendone/sphendobola), see Haldon 2014: 197;
Kolias 1988: 254–7; Decker 2013: 121–2.
182 For 38.8–11, see LT: 92–3 (6.22); MS: 422 (12.B.5); Maurice 1984: 139. For a dis-
cussion of footwear, see Haldon 2014: 199; Kolias 1988: 72–3; Grotowski 2010:
191–203.
183 LT and the ST may refer to wagons but later treatises such as Constantine VII Porphy-
rogennetos 1990: 116–19 (C.332–70) and Nikephoros II Phokas 1995: 20–1 (1.137–
9) suggest that pack animals such as mules and horses were the norm. For similar
discussion and logistics, see Haldon 2014: 200, 233–6; Haldon 1999: 158–66; Haldon
et al. 2011: 209–35.
184 Arrows were of course used in great numbers and sometimes at least they were pro-
vided by the state. Nikephoros II Phokas 1995: 20–1 (1.137–8) speaks of imperial
arrows, while Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 2012: 957 informs us that prior to
the 911 expedition to Crete, the strategos of Thessaloniki had the duty of providing
200,000 arrows. See also Haldon 2014: 192–3.
185 For 38.12, see LT: 94–5 (6.23); MS: 422–4 (12.B.6); Maurice 1984: 139–40. Similar
items also appear in Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 1990: 134–7 (C.653–9).
186 For 39.1–9, see LT: 82–91 (6.1–18).
187 This would make the cavalry spear smaller than the infantry one. The fact that liter-
ary sources speak of very long cavalry lances (e.g. Leo the Deacon 1828: 143; Leo
the Deacon 2005: 188) has led some scholars to wonder about the proportions of
infantry and cavalry spears. They also argued that depictions of military saints and
130 Notes
other figures in manuscripts support the claim that cavalry spears were indeed longer
than those of the infantry. For a discussion see Grotowski 2010: 327–8; Parani 2003:
139–40; Dawson 2007: 7–8; Haldon 2014: 194–5. In the ST the lance is the primary
weapon of the kataphraktoi, whereas in Nikephoros II Phokas 1995: 36–7 (3.53–65)
and Ouranos 1995: 114–17 (60.66–76) its use is only recommended for some cav-
alrymen in the flanks of the wedge formation. The manuals do not describe the way
in which the spear was used during the charge. Kolias argued in favour of spear-
ramming techniques in the Byzantine army, something which is also supported by
iconography. One example is the Madrid Skylitzes, which was decorated by both
Western and Byzantine painters. Miniatures by Western artists show the Byzantine
cavalry charging with long spears holding them under their arms. This is also the case
with a cavalryman depicted on a tenth- or eleventh-century Byzantine ivory casket.
However, the Byzantine painters of the Madrid Skylitzes depict spears as being held
at the flanks of the horse near the rider’s hip, or grasped near the horse’s neck. See
Goldschmidt and Weitzmann 1930–4: i. 11, 13–14, 17–18, 27–8, fig.12a–e, pl. vi; Tsa-
makda 2002: figs. 74, 128, 282–4; Kolias 1988: 207–8; Nicolle 1980: 11–12; Haldon
2014: 349–50; McGeer 1995a: 213.
188 It is possible that apart from mail coats reaching to the knees, there were other lamel-
lar or scale coats. While the latter are not usually depicted in Byzantine iconography,
we do have some examples coming from the Madrid Skylitzes manuscript (e.g. 108r,
108v, 109r, 126r, 135v, 136v, 140v), which belong both to Byzantine and Western
painters, while similar examples are found in Georgian iconography. See Kolias 1988:
46; Tsamakda 2002: 308, 396; Parani 2003: 108; Tsurtsumia 2011a: 74–5.
189 The term ἐπιλωρίκια is used here, which usually denotes a padded surcoat made of
cotton and coarse silk. While their role was mainly designed to protect against mis-
siles, they could also prove helpful as a protection from the heat, so that the sun would
not make direct contact with the metal part of the armour. In addition, according to
MS: 80 (1.2.50–8); Maurice 1984: 13, similar coverings helped to conceal troops on
the march as it prevented reflections. Nikephoros II Phokas 1986: 52–3 (8.4) advised
against white epilorikia so as not be easily spotted by the enemy. These epilorikia
seem to be absent from iconography, but from textual evidence we know that some
were blue or green while those used for parades and ceremonies were red, crimson,
purple, or gold, and richly decorated with precious stones, crosses, and lions. See
Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 1990: 142–3, 148–9 (C.748–51, 837–8); Anony-
mous 1998: 346–7 (1461–5); Nikephoros II Phokas 1995: 34–5 (3.31–3); Ouranos
1995: 114–15 (60.41–3); Kolias 1988: 58–61; Parani 2003: 118–21; Grotowski 2010:
177–9; Haldon 2014: 188.
190 The Greek word here is ἐπανωκλίβανα, literally meaning something worn above the
klibanion; they were the same as the epilorikia above.
191 This straight double-edged sword was called the spathion. The smallest version of the
two given here would have measured around 93.5cm, while the larger version would
have added 12–18cm for the hilt, making 112cm. The suspension of the sword from
a shoulder strap is frequently depicted in frescoes and ivory panels of military saints,
some of which date to the tenth and eleventh centuries. This way of carrying the sword
had strong links with Roman antiquity and also served for ceremonial purposes. See
Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 2012: 134; Dawson 2007: 6; Kolias 1988: 136–47;
Haldon 2014: 171; Grotowski 2010: 342–57; Parani 2003: 130–1.
192 From iconography and literary sources, it seems that the Byzantine saddle was made
like those of the Avars and Khazars. Compared to the Roman saddles they seem to
have been higher and broader. See Haldon 2014: 189; Grotowski 2010: 383–6.
193 The mace gradually evolved from a secondary weapon used only by some of the
infantry in LT: 94–5, 126–7 (6.23, 7.41) to the basic heavy cavalry weapon of the
Byzantines in Nikephoros II Phokas 1995: 36–7 (3.53–65). The ST appears to be
the middle point of this evolution as the spear and bow remain the primary weapon
 Notes 131
of the heavy cavalry, but now maces appear as a secondary one to be carried by all
kataphraktoi. Maces seem to have been of various kinds. Literary sources speak
of three-, four-, and six-cornered iron maces, some of which were long and oth-
ers shorter, to be either thrown or used at close quarters. Iconography portrays all
kinds along with knobbed maces. The literary and iconographic evidence is cor-
roborated by archaeology. For some literary accounts, see Leo the Deacon 1828:
144–5; 2005: 189; Skylitzes 1973: 126; Skylitzes 2010: 126. For iconography see
the miniatures of the Madrid Skylitzes and the Digenis Akrites dish in Tsamakda
2002: figs. 208. 406, 413, 420, 429, 482; Grotowski 2010: fig. 57. For a more
detailed discussion, see: Kolias 1988: 178–84; Dennis 1997: 168; Grotowski 2010:
367–9; Parani 2003: 138.
194 An inaccurate cross-reference, as the author has not given any relevant information in
chapter 20. For the diet of the Byzantine soldier, see Kolias 1984: 193–200; Haldon
2014: 201–2.
195 The cavalry bow was smaller so as to make it easier to draw and to increase accuracy.
It is estimated that it could have produced about half the force of the regular bow. See
McGeer 1995a: 68; Bivar 1972: 283; McLeod 1965: 1–14.
196 In addition to the information of the ST, horse armour could have also been made
of leather or bison hides, which seems to be the only kind depicted in the surviv-
ing iconography. See Nikephoros II Phokas 1995: 36–7 (3.37–46); Ouranos 1995:
(60.47–58); Tsamakda 2002: 71, fig. 60; Grotowski 2010: 395–7; Haldon 2014: 188–
9. Theophanes Confessor 1883: 318 (AM 6118); Theophanes Confessor 1997: 449
reports that Dorkon, the horse of emperor Herakleios (610–41 CE), was not harmed
by spear and sword blows thanks to its leather armour. Al-Mutanabbī, an Arab poet
who records Sayf al-Dawla’s victory in the battle of al-Hadath (954 CE), seems to
agree that the Byzantines used long horse armour since he records that their horses
appeared as if they had no legs, see Vasiliev 1935–68: ii.i. 333.
197 Most probably referring to the two cavalry tagmata that accompany the kataphraktoi
in the first line, see below 46.4,6.
198 Dain 1938: 63 reads προκουράτωρσιν (prokoursatores) here, but the second line from
the top of L, f. 88r, as well as the context, makes it clear that the koursatores are meant
here.
199 For 40.6, see MS: 274 (8.1.32); Maurice 1984: 82.
200 41.1–7 derive from Aelian Tacticus 2012: 64–71, 78–9, 82–7 (23–5, 28, 30–1); Ascle-
piodotus 1928: 272–5, 293–313 (6, 10). See also PS: 74–9, 94–7 (22–4.10, 31).
201 These terms are explained by the author below.
202 The author fails to define paragoge, which is when the phalanx marches with the flank
leading. See Aelian Tacticus 2012: 98–9 (36).
203 The Greek term here is stoichein (στοιχεῖν).
204 The Greek term here is zygoun (ζυγοῦν).
205 Reading παρεκβολή instead of παρεμβολή as in Dain 1938: 65. See L, f. 88v for the
correct reading.
206 For 42.1–3, see Aelian Tacticus 2012: 80–1, 100–3 (29, 37–8); PS: 94–7 (31).
207 For a discussion of the depth of sixteen men, see Haldon 2014: 209–10.
208 For 43.4, see MS: 122 (2.6.4–15); Maurice 1984: 27–8; LT: 232–5 (12.30–1).
209 I.e. ‘in Coalition’ or ‘fighting in close order’.
210 The Greek word for ‘locking of shields’ here is σύσκουτον. Its predecessor seems to
be the Roman fulcum. See Rance 2004b: 265–326; Haldon 2014: 211–12.
211 For 43.6–7, see Asclepiodotus 1928: 266–9 (4.1, 3); Aelian Tacticus 2012: 34–5 (11).
212 For 43.8, see MS: 132 (2.13.10–11); Maurice 1984: 31.
213 For 43.9, see MS: 132 (2.13.10–18); Maurice 1984: 31.
214 This would mean that an average bowshot measured around 330m. See McLeod
1965: 1–14; Schilbach 1970: 42; Haldon 2014: 208–9; McGeer 1995a: 68.
215 For 44.1, see MS: 232 (7.A.1); Maurice 1984: 65; LT: 290–1 (14.1).
132 Notes
216 For 44.2, see MS: 292 (8.2.72); Maurice 1984: 88–9.
217 For 44.3, see MS: 232 (7.A.3); Maurice 1984: 65–6.
218 The Greek word here is skopoi (σκοποί).
219 For the terms used for guards, watches, and scouts, see Haldon 2014: 242–3.
220 For 44.4, see MS: 256 (7.13B); Maurice 1984: 74–5; LT: 304–5 (14.25).
221 For 44.5, see MS: 232–4 (7.A.4); Maurice 1984: 66 and 9.1 above.
222 For 44.6, see Onasander 1928: 464–5 (24); LT: 58–9 (4.41).
223 For 44.7, see MS: 276, 312–14 (8.1.36, 9.3.21–31); Maurice 1984: 82, 97; LT: 404–5,
550–1 (17.32, 20.38).
224 For 44.8, see MS: 236–8 (7.10A); Maurice 1984: 67; LT: 270–1 (12.100).
225 Reading γινόμεναι instead of γινομέναις as in Dain 1938: 71. See L, f. 90r for the cor-
rect reading.
226 See MS: 118, 260 (2.3, 7.16B); Maurice 1984: 26, 76–7, where the proportion of light
to heavier troops in general is a third.
227 Most probably referring to medium infantry or heavy and medium infantry together.
228 For 45.2, see LT: 68–71 (4.67–74), where a similar formation is described.
229 For 45.3, see MS: 264 (7.17B.17–28); Maurice 1984: 77–8; LT: 236–9 (12.37).
230 Dain 1938: 72 adds χίλιοι in front of the five hundred, thus giving the number of 1,500
men, but this does not agree with the total below.
231 For 45.8, see LT: 324–7 (14.59–60).
232 The Greek word here is δρουγγιστί. It derives from the Latin drungus, which in turn
was most probably of Gallic origin, meaning ‘tribe’ or ‘band’. By the tenth century it
denoted a mass of men, operating irregularly rather than in a tactical battle line. See
Rance 2004a: 101–20; Haldon 2014: 145–6. A similar passage appears in LT as well
and seems to reflect a contemporary problem that the Byzantine themata were used
to fighting irregularly and could not always participate effectively in more complex
tactical roles, see Haldon 2014: 289.
233 The Greek word here is διφαλαγγίαν
234 None of the diagrams were copied into L.
235 The text wrongly states 10,100. This was probably a mistake of the copyist, as the
number six thousand appears in 45.26 below.
236 Dain 1938: 75 mistakenly reads 4,486 men here. L, f. 91v preserves the correct figure
of 6,484.
237 In fact 6,486 men are needed here to give a total of 2,162 when divided by three.
238 Probably another mistake on the part of the copyist since 216 x 16 is 3456. Perhaps
the original text gave instructions for the units to be ten deep since 216 multiplied by
10 gives 2160, a number close to the correct number of men in each unit.
239 The above numbers already give a total of 10,484 men.
240 An inaccurate cross-reference, as the author has not provided us with any relevant
information elsewhere.
241 The figure of 6,000 here corresponds with the information given in 45.22 and its
footnote above, if it is accepted that the text there originally preserved the number of
6,000 instead of 10,100.
242 The text incorrectly states one hundred ranks here.
243 The Greek word here is syskouton (σύσκουτον).
244 For 46, see LT: 226–31, 488–501 (12.19–23, 18.136–49) on cavalry formation.
245 The Greek phrase here is πρόμαχος παράταξις, i.e. the first line.
246 Probably the words σύν κατάφρακτοι (‘and kataphraktoi’) should be added here as in
46.22, 26, 29, since the numbers given in 46.5–6 suggest that.
247 An inaccurate cross-reference, since the author has not given any relevant information
in that chapter.
248 LT instructed the middle unit of the vanguard to consist of elite cavalrymen. Probably
the Byzantine wedge, which first appears in the ST, is a gradual evolution of LT, see
Haldon 2014: 337–8 and Chatzelis (in progress).
 Notes 133
249 The numbers here are incorrect. A formation of 1,500 men is possible if the first line
had 103 men and the last 147.
250 The remark at the end of this section that the kataphraktoi and lancers should stand
δυσὶ μὲν ἐκ δεξιῶν, δυσὶ δ’ ὡσαύτως ἐξ εὐωνύμων (‘two from the right and likewise
two from the left’) seems like a clarification. It would fit better in the first sentence
of the section where the author stipulates that each rank should project by four men.
Alternatively, the author might have intended to demonstrate that the kataphraktoi
and lancers should be drawn at the flanks, to enclose and to protect the horse-archers.
251 Nikephoros II Phokas 1995: 46–7 (4.125–32) advised that some of the prokoursatores
to be dispatched to the flanks of the wedge formation so as to repel enemy attempts to
attack the kataphraktoi or to disrupt their charge. See also McGeer 1995a: 303–7.
252 I.e. as defenders.
253 The Greek phrase here is βοηθόν παράταξιν, an auxiliary formation.
254 For 46.10, see MS: 184–6 (3.14); Maurice 1984: 49–50.
255 For 46.11, see MS: 182 (3.13); Maurice 1984: 49.
256 For 46.12, see LT: 230–1 (12.25).
257 For 46.13, see MS: 120–2 (2.5); Maurice 1984: 27; LT: 230–1 (12.26).
258 The copyist wrote ‘six bowshots’ here but not only is this number unusually large, but
it is also contradicted by information given in 43.8 and 46.25. Presumably that is a
mistake and it is corrected here.
259 For 46.17, see LT: 246–7 (12.52).
260 The array of this cavalry formation is a development of the one found in LT: 227–31
(12–20–5). The main difference is that the ST adds a new third battle line and that
the middle unit of the vanguard and the third line now consisted of kataphraktoi who
drew up in the wedge, rather than of regular cavalry. Nikephoros II Phokas 1995:
38–43 (4.1–75) followed the array of the ST closely but omitted the two concealed
units and the small units that were posted in the intervals of the second line. For the
cavalry formation in the Praecepta Militaria, see McGeer 1995a: 280–9.
261 Nikephoros II Phokas 1995: 34–5 (4.1–17) based his wedge formation on that of
the ST. He also drew up his heavy cavalry in a wedge comprising 504 men with
minor changes. For information on the innovation of the ST and how its tactics were
employed and developed in the Praecepta Militaria, see Chatzelis (in progress);
McGeer 1995a: 286–9.
262 For 46.26, see LT: 230–1 (12.24) for the formation of a medium cavalry army.
263 The text states here that the banner guards should be ἐξ ὁπλιτῶν καταφράκτων, which
literally means ‘from armoured heavy infantry’. It seems improbable, however, that
in a cavalry army, the banner guards would have been on foot. In the other passages
the author uses the term καταφράκτοι rather than ὁπλῖται (hoplites), and so it seems
reasonable to conclude that heavy cavalry banner guards are meant here. In most
military manuals such as the ST, PS, LT, and De Re Militari (Anonymous 1985), the
word hoplites is used specifically to denote a heavy infantryman but there are occa-
sions when the word is used in a more general sense of any armoured soldier, whether
mounted or on foot. Apart from the example above, see also Anonymous 1985: 312–13
(25.12–13), where hoplites with horses are mentioned, and ST 105 (55.1) were the
author refers to ὁπλίτας πεζούς, explicitly stating that these heavily armoured men
should be infantry.
264 Dain 1938: 84 adds ‘thirty-two’ here but if the pattern of adding four men in each line
is followed, the first line should have ten men for the last to have fifty-four.
265 This marginal note is found in the lower left and bottom margin of L, f. 94v.
266 The square formation is also discussed by earlier manuals but only for use in emergen-
cies. See for instance MS: 252 (7.11B.42–5); Maurice 1984: 73; LT: 300–3 (14.20);
McGeer 1995a: 259–60; Haldon 1999: 219; Haldon 2014: 279.
267 The author counts five tagmata in each flanks of square because he also includes the
two out of the three previously mentioned tagmata in the front and in the back of the
134 Notes
square. This square formation is unique in that it draws up the units of the flanks by
ranks and not by files, as is the case in later manuals such as Nikephoros II Phokas
1995: 14–19 (1.39–119); Ouranos 1995: 110–11 (59.1–26); Anonymous 1992. The
measurements and occupied space given by the author and the fact that he does not
use the phrase ‘having their length as a depth’ as in ST 47.11 would both suggest this.
Most probably, one of copyists of L designed this formation in the lower right margin
of L, f. 95r. For square formations in Arab armies, see Haldon 2014: 359–60.
268 In his division of the text, Dain included this sentence in the previous paragraph. This,
however, disturbs the flow and meaning of the text. The punctuation mark after the
word διαλείμματα should rather be interpreted as a comma, and not as a full stop. See
the middle section of L, f. 95r.
269 This however gives a total of 432.
270 Dain 1938: 88 adds 1,256 fathoms here but this number does not agree with the state-
ment in 47.13 below that this formation has a smaller perimeter than the other two
above. Nevertheless, even with that addition, the instructions here remain problematic
since even if each side were 314 fathoms, it would suggest that the front would consist
of 157, which is only five fathoms less than the regular square formation, making it
ineffective in narrow passes and defiles. Perhaps the formation had a total of 612 fath-
oms, with 88 at the back and front and 248 on the right and the left sides, if we count
ten fathoms per unit in the front and rear side plus sixteen fathoms for each interval,
and fifty fathoms for each unit in the right and left side plus sixteen fathoms for each
interval. The discrepancy could simply be the result of a scribal error.
271 This specialised unit of the menavlatoi is recorded for the first time in the ST. Nike-
phoros II Phokas made much greater use of them in his manual, the Praecepta Mili-
taria, where the menavlatoi are four times more numerous: 1,200 men as compared
to the 300 of the ST. There, instead of repelling the enemy cavalry from a position
isolated from the friendly infantry units, they are specifically advised not to march out
of the infantry square, but to remain attached to it. See Nikephoros II Phokas 1995:
16–19 (1.75–106); McGeer 1988: 136–45; McGeer 1995a: 373–5.
272 Dain 1938: 89 wrongly reads ᾱ ̗κ (10,020) instead of ᾱ ̗η (18,000). See L, f. 96r for the
correct text.
273 The reference to Polybius here cannot be traced but could perhaps refer to a lost work
on tactics produced by him. See Polybius 1922–7: iv. 52–3 (9.20.4) and Vári 1927:
266. Eric McGeer has suggested that the reference to Aelian Tacticus can be identi-
fied, if it is assumed that the author is referring to the interpolated Syntaxis armatorum
quadrata, which appears under the name of Aelian but which was in fact written at
some point in the tenth century CE. McGeer considers that the Syntaxis and the ST
present an identical square and he has argued that the Syntaxis was produced before
the ST. Consequently the Syntaxis could have been used by the author of the ST as
a source. See McGeer 1995a: 257–72; McGeer 1992: 226–7; Dain 1946: 156–60.
However, this conclusion is open to question as the square of the Syntaxis is closer to
the more evolved and crystallised version presented by Nikephoros II Phokas in his
manual. It is therefore likely that the Syntaxis was compiled after the ST. A possible
resolution to this problem is being developed in Chatzelis (in progress).
274 Dain 1938: 91 reads ̗γσνδˊ (3254), but L, f. 96v preserves the number ̗γσμδˊ (3244).
275 Dain 1938: 91 reads ̗δσνδˊ (4254) but L, f. 96v preserves the correct number of ̗γσμδˊ
(3244).
276 For 48.1–7, see MS: 274, 306–10 (8.1.25, 9.2); Maurice 1984: 81, 94–6; LT: 398–401
(17.14–19).
277 MS: 308–9 (9.2.36–8); Maurice 1984: 95 offers alternative signals such as a whistle or
a command. The striking of a shield seems also to have been a standard signal. Liud-
prand of Cremona 1998: 137 (5.22); 2007: 186 reports that some armed men struck a
shield when they intended to murder Constantine VII.
278 The word σύσσημον (syssemon) is mostly used for a visual signal or sign. The limited
visibility during the night, however, would have made such signals effective only at
 Notes 135
a fairly short distance. Consequently, the word may be interpreted here as referring
passwords, much like the ones that were used for watches or patrols. Constantine VII
Porphyrogennetos 1990: 120–1 (C.425–7) gives some examples of such passwords,
such as ‘the Saviour’, ‘the Virgin Mary’, ‘the Arch-General’, ‘Arch-Angel Michael’,
and ‘one of the holy martyrs and stratelatai’, the latter most probably referring to St.
Theodore Stratelates, the military saint. See also Haldon 1990: 240–1. For the military
saints St. Theodore and St. Theodore Stratelates, see Haldon 2016. For Byzantine
military saints, see White 2013; Walter 2003.
279 For 48.5, see PS: 117–19 (39.39–43).
280 This episode could refer to the Roman general, Pompey the Great (108–48 BCE),
who, during the third Mithridatic War of 75–63 BCE, made a night attack against the
camp of Mithridates VI, king of Pontus (120–63 BCE). As the Romans had the moon
at their backs, their shadows became enormous. Not being able to estimate the correct
distance, Mithridates’s men launched their missiles prematurely and missed their tar-
gets. The Romans then charged and overran the enemy camp. See Plutarch 1914–26:
v. 200–1 (Life of Pompey 32.6–7).
281 For 48.7, see LT: 398–9 (17.14).
282 For 49.1–7, see MS: 102–6 (1.9); Maurice 1984: 20–2; LT: 156–61, 164–5 (9.6–11,
15–20, 29).
283 For 49.3, see MS: 322 (9.4.10–13); Maurice 1984: 100–1.
284 Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 1990: 88–91 (B.107–21) gives a similar order of
march in friendly territory.
285 For 49.5–7, see LT: 158–61 (9.15–20).
286 An inaccurate cross-reference, perhaps a mistake of the copyist who might have
intended to refer to 23.1–8, where similar information can be located.
287 For 49.8, see Onasander 1928: 402–5 (7.1); MS: 322 (9.4.1–15); Maurice 1984: 100–
1; LT: 162–5, 170–1 (9.27, 43).
288 For 49.9, see MS: 324 (9.4.39–45); Maurice 1984: 101; LT: 170–3, (9.43, 47).
289 For 49.10, see MS: 316–18 (9.3.87–91); Maurice 1984: 99; LT: 166–9 (9.37).
290 For 49.11, see MS: 460–2 (12.20B.30–52); Maurice 1984: 153–4.
291 For 49.12, see MS: 458–60 (12.20B.12–29); Maurice 1984: 152–3; LT: 178–9 (9.58).
292 For 49.13, see MS: 438–40 (12.16B.1–6); Maurice 1984: 145.
293 For 50.1–3, see LT: 382–5 (16.2–5).
294 This was the case even if the battle was conducted against Christians or rebel Byzantines,
since any war that was against the emperor and his lawful subjects was justified and laud-
able. A good example of this outlook can be observed during the triumph of Emperor John
Tzimiskes (969–76 CE) in Constantinople, after his victory against the Rus in 971 CE.
Supposedly the crowd demanded that John should ride at the head of the procession in
a chariot. Instead, he placed an icon of the Virgin Mary in the chariot and, underneath it,
the crowns and royal garments of the defeated enemy. John himself followed just behind
the chariot on his horse in a symbolic recognition that the Virgin, not the emperor, was
responsible for the victory. See Leo the Deacon 1828: 158; Leo the Deacon 2005: 200–1;
Skylitzes 1973: 310; Skylitzes 2010: 293–4; McCormick 1986: 170–4.
295 Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 1990: 88–9 (B.91–4) speaks of the emperor hold-
ing two to three such communal tables every day. See also ST: 5.2.
296 Dain 1938: 99 adds the word νόμον after κατά τόν to give the meaning ‘according to
the law’. However, this addition seems unnecessary since the phrase ‘the law for all
the army’ (παντί στρατῷ νόμος) appears at the end of the sentence. It is unlikely that
the author would refer to the dictates of the law twice in the same sentence. Instead it
seems more probable to assume that τόν is just the definite article of μικρόν so that,
along with κατά, the text has the meaning of ‘to the less important ones’.
297 LT (see below) speaks of a fifth rather than of a sixth. For more discussion, see Dain
1950–1: 347–52; Haldon 2014: 436–7.
298 For 50.4, see Leo III and Constantine V 1983: 244–5 (18); Procheiros Nomos in Zepos
and Zepos 1931: ii. 227 (40); LT: 604–5 (20.192). The author of the ST copied the
136 Notes
‘increase in salary’ from the Procheiros Nomos but added ‘the plentiful grants which
are given to them on each [occasion] by our God-crowned Majesty’. Despite the fact
that the first phrase is copied, it could have still have applied to the author’s period.
Comparing the information provided by Ibn Khurdādhbih, the Book of Ceremonies,
and Liudprand of Cremona regarding the payment of officers, Warren Treadgold
argued that salaries seem to have been reduced at some point during the reign of Leo
VI, and then restored to their original level. See Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos
2012: 696–7; Liudprand of Cremona 1998: 149–50 (6.10); Liudprand of Cremona
2007: 200–2; Treadgold 1992: 91–2. Byzantine chronicles speak of an increase in
expenditures and donatives in general in the reign of Romanos I and Constantine
VII: see Theophanes Continuatus 1838: 417–18, 429–30, 446–52; Symeon Magis-
tros 2006: 330–2 (136.57–9); Skylitzes 1973: 225, 231; Skylitzes 2010: 217, 221–3.
Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 1990: 111–12, 126–9 (C.261–5, 501–11, 536–47)
speaks of donatives given to soldiers, officers, and the strategoi. Some were given
as gold and silver coins and others in the form of luxurious clothing decorated with
imperial symbols.
299 These prisoners could have been captured soldiers, officers, or relatives of enemy
generals and high-ranking officials. They were useful for exercising diplomatic pres-
sure to the enemy but also for exchanging for Byzantine prisoners, a regular occur-
rence during the yearly raids and hostilities. The exchange of prisoners is frequently
mentioned both by Byzantine and Arab sources and was usually conducted by high-
ranking officials on both sides. See Theophanes Continuatus 1838: 443; Vasiliev
1935–68: ii. 254, 282, 316; Canard 1951: 757–9; Patoura 1994: 88–90, 94–7, 111–24;
Kolia-Dermitzaki 2000: 583–620; Khouri 1983; Haldon 2014: 301. Prisoners could
also be ransomed and, the more important the prisoner, the higher the amount that
was expected to be paid for their release. For example, after the Arab capture of Thes-
saloniki in 904 CE, only those who held important posts or had promised money to
pay for themselves or their relatives were held for ransom while the vast majority of
captured Byzantines were probably sold at the slave market: see Kaminiates 2000:
96–101 (58–9). Another example is found in 924 CE, when the city of Oria, situated
to the east of Tarentum, was captured by the Arabs. According to the Arab sources, six
thousand Byzantines were killed and ten thousand taken prisoner. Among them was
the governor, who managed to ransom himself and the city. Constantine Phokas, son
of the domestic of the scholai Bardas Phokas, was captured at the battle of Marash
in 953 CE. According to Arab sources, Constantine became ill and died during his
captivity, despite the fact that Sayf al-Dawla did everything in his power to cure him.
Skylitzes states though that Sayf tried to convert Constantine to Islam and finally
poisoned him. That seems highly unlikely, considering that Bardas proposed to give
800,000 dinars and three thousand prisoners in exchange for his son. See Vasiliev
1935–68: ii. 255, 350–1; cf. Skylitzes 1973: 241; Skylitzes 2010: 232–3.
300 For 50.6, see Poinalios Stratiotikos Nomos in Zepos and Zepos 1931: ii. 88 (48.2); LT:
384–7 (16.9).
301 For 50.7, see Onasander 1928: 490–1 (36); LT: 306–7, 386–7 (14.31, 16.11).
302 For 50.8, see LT: 384–7 (16.9). Prisoners of war were automatically reduced to the
status of slaves, through right of conquest, and the right to enslave, sell, or kill them
was regarded as something entirely natural. The author of the ST: 23.5, 19.1 has
already stated that in case of emergencies the prisoners were to be slain without com-
punction, so as to terrorise the enemy and enable all men to fight since there would
then be no need to guard the captives. Prisoners were thus regularly put to sword,
sometimes when a desperate situation required it, sometimes for retaliation, or some-
times to undermine the morale of the enemy. For instance, Liudprand of Cremona
reports that after the victory of the Byzantines against the Rus in 941 CE, all the
prisoners were beheaded on the orders of Emperor Romanos I, although the fact that
 Notes 137
the Rus had committed numerous atrocities may have something to do with it. See
Liudprand of Cremona 1998: 132 (5.15); Liudprand of Cremona 2007: 180–1; Sky-
litzes 1973: 229–30; Skylitzes 2010: 221–2; Theophanes Continuatus 1838: 423–6;
Symeon Magistros 2006: 335–7 (136.71–5). Nikephoros II advised that captives be
killed in order to move more quickly and Basil I (867–886) certainly did this on one
occasion. See Nikephoros II Phokas 1986: 74–5 (11.21–3); Constantine VII Porphy-
rogennetos 2011: 174–7; Skylitzes 1973: 142–3; Skylitzes 2010: 139–40; Ramaḍān
2009: 155–94; Chrysos 1997: 204–6; Letsios 1992: 213–27. The practice was by no
means restricted to the Byzantines. When Sayf al-Dawla was returning from a raid in
950 CE, he was ambushed in a pass by a Byzantine army. When he realised the gravity
of the situation, he killed all 400 Byzantine prisoners that he held. See Vasiliev 1935–
68: ii. 345; Skylitzes 1973: 242; Skylitzes 2010: 234. Despite the fact that nobles
and officials had a better chance of remaining unharmed in captivity, they were by
no means immune to acts of retaliation. For instance, during the hostilities in South
Italy in 929–34 CE, Tedald, who was margrave of King Hugh of Italy (924–47 CE),
mutilated the genitals of the Byzantine aristocrats who had been taken prisoner. Bar-
das Phokas, wanting to avenge for the death of his son Constantine, decided to kill all
the relatives of Sayf al-Dawla who were in his custody. See Liudprand of Cremona
1998: 101 (4.9); Liudprand of Cremona 2007: 145–6; Skylitzes 1973: 241; Skylitzes
2010: 232–3.
303 For 51.1, see MS: 274, 342 (8.1.32, 10.2.23–9); Maurice 1984: 82, 108.
304 A feigned retreat like this was employed by the Magyars at the battle of the Lech in
910 CE. See Liudprand of Cremona 1998: 36–7 (2.4–5); Liudprand of Cremona 2007:
76–7; Haldon 2014: 277.
305 For 52.1, see MS: 340 (10.2.1–7); Maurice 1984: 107; LT: 416–17 (17.59). This was
the standard way to deal with invaders for centuries. See Nikephoros II Phokas 1986;
Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 139–287; Haldon 1999: 39–41; Haldon 2014: 312–18;
Haldon and Kennedy 1980; Stouraitis 2009: 47–169; Decker 2013: 137–43; Whittow
1996: 175–81; Lilie 1976: 339–60; McMahon 2016: 22–33; Asa Eger 2014.
306 For 52.2, see MS: 340 (10.2.8–14); Maurice 1984: 108; LT: 416–17 (17.60).
307 For 52.3, see MS: 278 (8.1.44); Maurice 1984: 83.
308 This chapter, especially 53.1–7, is largely the same as MS: 342–6 (10.3); Maurice
1984: 108–10 and LT: 368–75 (15.41–7, 49, 51–2). To a great extent, the treatment of
siege warfare in the ST is typical of other general military manuals. On the contrary,
a great deal of detail is found in other manuals which were specifically dedicated
to this subject. Apart from the OT, see the PP where siege engines are discussed in
greater detail. For Byzantine siege warfare and its practice in general, see Haldon
1999: 183–9; Haldon 2014: 294–7; McGeer 1995b: 123–9; Sullivan 1997: 179–200;
Decker 2013: 158–61; Petersen 2013: 115–43.
309 For 53.2, see MS: 344 (10.3.28–30); Maurice 1984: 109; OT: 172–3 (67).
310 For 53.3, see LT: 374–5 (15.51).
311 For 53.4, see MS: 346 (10.3.51–3); Maurice 1984: 110; LT: 374–5 (15.52); OT: 158–9
(25); see also OT: 174–5 (71).
312 The ST refers to the employment of πετροβόλων ὀργανων and ἑλεπόλεων. The second
term also had a more general meaning that referred to any type of siege-engine and
it is clear here that some kind of stone-throwing machine is meant. Scholars have
interpreted this second machine as trebuchet and argued that it perhaps had a greater
range than the first one. For further discussion, see Sullivan 2000: 239; Dennis 1998:
99–115; Haldon 1999: 188–98; Haldon 2000: 273–5; Chevedden 2000: 71–116. For a
study of siege warfare terminology, see Makrypoulias 2013: 31–44.
313 On these, see Haldon 2014: 264–5.
314 For 53.5, see MS: 344 (10.3.9–13); Maurice 1984: 109; PS: 40–3 (13.72–82,115–20);
OT: 210–11 (176).
138 Notes
315 Tortoises were wooden sheds usually employed to cover those who were trying to
reach the walls and undermine them or were using a ram to attack a gate. Tortoises,
ram-tortoises, sledge-hammers, and pickaxes for undermining purposes were included
in Constantine VII’s inventory for the 949 expedition against Crete and various types
of tortoises are mentioned in the PP. See Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 2012:
670; PP: 28–9, 44–51 (2.1–5, 13–15); Haldon 2014: 303–4 and Sullivan 2000: 159,
182–90 and fig. 1–2, 4, 6, for eleventh-century illustrations of tortoises from Vati-
canus graecus 1605.
316 Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 2012: 671, 673, includes pitch and lead among the
items with which the army was provisioned prior to the 949 CE expedition against
Crete.
317 For 53.6, see PS: 40–1 (13.61–71); OT: 172–5 (68); LT: 370–1 (15.43).
318 For 53.7, see LT: 372–3 (15.46).
319 It is open to debate whether the strepta was a new and different device from the hand-
siphons, whether it was the same device, or whether it was a particular part of the same
device. The ST seems to treat the strepta as a different device from the hand-siphons.
Although the strepta appears in the PP: 98–9 (49.20–5), accepting the new dating of the
ST would mean that the latter is the first manual to mention this device. This seems to be
supported by the fact that the author felt the need to describe the function of the strepta
to his readers. For more discussion and for the claim in LT that hand-siphons were
recently devised, see Sullivan 2000: 161–2, 231; Haldon 2006: 290–7; Haldon 2014:
412–14. For a representation of such devices in the eleventh-century Vaticanus graecus
1605, see Sullivan 2000: fig. 22. For the dating of the PP (most probably c.950), see
Schneider 1908–12: ii. 84–5; Dain 1953: 77–8; Sullivan 2000: 4, 15–21, 248.
320 Wooden siege-towers mounted on cylinders or wheels were regularly employed both
by the Byzantines and their enemies. Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 2012: 670
includes a wooden siege tower among the equipment gathered for the expedition to
Crete in 949. The PP: 28–9 (2.6) also mentions a wooden siege tower and the Vati-
canus graecus 1605 preserves a relevant illustration, see Sullivan 2000: 160, fig. 15;
Haldon 2014: 304–6.
321 The author of the ST uses the antiquarian term mosynas (μόσυνας) here. The only
other author of a military treatise to have used this term is the fourth-century BCE
Aeneas the Tactician 1928: 180–1 (33.3). Strabo 1917–33: v. 400–1 (12.3.18) com-
ments that the word mosynas was rather archaic already in his time. For the employ-
ment of rare terms by the author of the ST, see also Sullivan 2010: 155.
322 For 53.8, see LT: 528–9 (19.64); OT: 188–9 (113).
323 For 53.9, see H: 497 (56.7); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 989; Polybius 1922–7: v.
340–3 (21.28.7–17); PS: 38–9 (13.34–43); OT: 212–15 (185–95). For mining and
counter mining, see also Haldon 2014: 299–300.
324 For 54.1, see MS: 316, 336–8 (9.3.77–81, 10.1.4–7, 38–42); Maurice 1984: 98, 106–7;
LT: 352–3, 360–1 (15.4, 23).
325 For 54.2, see MS: 338–40 (10.1.32–8, 44–8); Maurice 1984: 107; LT: 352–3, 354–7
(15.5, 15–16); PP: 34–7 (4).
326 For 54.3, see LT: 362–3 (15.27).
327 Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 2012: 673 lists sponges to be provided for the
siege engines prepared for the 949 expedition to Crete.
328 For 54.4, see LT: 362–3 (15.27); PP: 42–51, 82–5, and 99 (11, 13, 15, 39, 49).
329 For 54.5, see MS: 340 (10.1.49–51); Maurice 1984: 107; LT: 362–3 (15.26). For fire
arrows see Haldon 2014: 298.
330 Reading κατασεισθέντας instead of κατασεισθέντες as in Dain 1938: 104. See L, f.
100v, bottom line.
331 For 54.6, see LT: 358–61 (15.21).
 Notes 139
332 For the relevance of this passage to the Arab-Byzantine frontier see Haldon 2014:
307–8.
333 For 55.1, see MS: 346–8 (10.4.1–22); Maurice 1984: 110; LT: 376–7 (15.56–7).
334 For 55.2, see MS: 348–50 (10.4.41–62); Maurice 1984: 111–12; LT: 378–81 (15.63–4).
335 For 55.3, see MS: 348 (10.4.23–34); Maurice 1984: 111; LT: 376–7 (15.58).
336 For 55.4, see MS: 348 (10.4.34–40); Maurice 1984: 111; LT: 378–9 (15. 62).
337 For 56.1–9, see MS: 490–500 (12.4); Maurice 1984: 165–9.
338 For 57.1, see AB: 952–3 (40). The AB most probably dates to the ninth century and
mainly draws on the Cesti of Julius Africanus (160–240 CE) and the PS: see Vieille-
fond 1932: xxxvi–xliii; Vieillefond 1970: 5–70; Mecella 2009: 87–98; Wallraff et al.
2012: xlviii–lii. For tradition and originality in the AB, see Zuckerman 1994: 359–
89. Squill (σκίλλα in Greek) is a type of plant (urginea maritima) used as medicine.
A recipe for vinegar made from squill is found in Anonymous 1895: 230 (8.42); Dalby
2011: 183.
339 It was common in antiquity for wine to be consumed mixed with water so it is sug-
gested here that the water should be boiled first in order to sterilise it.
340 Earth from the island of Lemnos was famous as a medicine throughout antiquity and
the Middle Ages. It was believed that it could generally protect from poison and snake
bites as well as possessing numerous other properties. See Hall and Photos-Jones
2008: 1034–49.
341 For 58.1, see AB: 953 (41).
342 For 59.1–2, see AB: 916–17 (2).
343 For 60, see AB: 918 (3).
344 For 61, see AB: 917–18 (2).
345 Dain 1938: 111 reads φύρσεις, the plural form of φύρσις, which means ‘mixing’, but
that does not make sense in this context. It is possible that the original word here was
φύσας, a type of river fish, for that also appears in the relevant passages of AB: 917 (2)
and Ouranos’s Taktika (91–3), as edited in Mecella 2009: 120.
346 For 62, see AB: 949 (32).
347 For 63, see AB: 950 (33).
348 For 64, see AB: 950 (34).
349 Alexander the Great campaigned against the Paionians, who inhabited northern Mac-
edonia, in 353 BCE, before he embarked on his campaign against the Persians. Arrian,
the main source for Alexander’s campaigns, does not record this particular event,
however.
350 For 65, see AB: 951 (36).
351 For 66, see AB: 928 (14).
352 For 67, see AB: 928 (14).
353 Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos 1990: 102–3 (C.132–3) mentions that the komes of
the stables was to prepare wine and vinegar for a campaign, most probably to be used
for the treatment of horses.
354 For 68, see AB: 951 (35).
355 The text from chapter 68 to chapter 74 did not originally appear in the manuscript
which the copyists of L used. As one of them informs us in the lower right and bottom
margin of f. 103r, they tried to fill some of these chapters by themselves, probably
from another lost source. As regards chapter 68, the copyist supplied this text in the
top margin of f.104r. See Dain 1938: 113–15n; Vieillefond 1932: lii–liv; Dain 1939:
12–14, 28–31; Dain and Foucault 1967: 353; Mecella 2009: 107–8.
356 For 69, see AB: 923–4 (9).
357 Aristomenes led the Messenians in their revolts against the Spartans, in the second half
of the seventh century BCE, according to Pausanias 1918–35: ii. 246–303 (4.14–24).
The stratagem of the horses is not found there, however.
140 Notes
358 The copyist supplied this passage in the bottom margin of L, f. 103v but placed it in
chapter 70.
359 For 70, see AB: 952 (39).
360 The copyist supplied this passage in the bottom margin of L, f. 102v but placed it in
chapter 69.
361 For the title of 71, which bears no resemblance to the content of the chapter, see AB:
953 (43).
362 The traceable source for this passage is AB: 951 (37). The copyist supplied it in the
bottom margin of L, f. 104r and placed it in chapter 71 but it does not correspond with
any title found in the original table of contents.
363 For the title of 72, see AB: 953 (42). The copyist did not supply us with a text in this
case.
364 For the title of 73, see AB: 954 (44). The copyist did not supply us with a text in this
case.
365 For 74, see AB: 954 (45).
366 The copyist supplied this passage in the bottom margin of L, f. 103r but placed it in
chapter 68. The rest of the text after this footnote is found in the main text of L, since
it was preserved in the manuscript that the scribe had copied from.
367 For 75.1–2, see AB: 951–2 (38).
368 What follows originally derives from the Stratagems of Polyaenus. The version in the
ST, however, preserves a new witness to the tradition of the text. The stratagems here
do not come directly from the original version of Polyaenus nor from the two known
abbreviations: the Hypothesis (H) and Stratagemata Ambrosiana, which is preserved
in manuscript B. 199 Sup., held in the Ambrosiana Library in Milan. For H see Dain
1937: 73–86; Dain and Foucault 1967: 337; Schindler 1973: 205–16; Krentz and
Wheeler 1994: i. xx–xxi. For the Stratagemata Ambrosiana see Anonymous 1949;
Dain and Foucault 1967: 364–5; Mazzucchi 1978. Leo VI also included stratagems of
Polyaenus in LT: 535–619 (20.1–221); Haldon 2014: 418–42. Once more, however,
the version of the ST is different from that of LT and there is no direct connection
between the two works. It has been argued that the author of the ST copied this section
from a now lost treatise, the Corpus Perditum, which among other works included
some of the Stratagems of Polyaenus. See Dain 1939; Dain and Foucault 1967: 353;
Krentz and Wheeler 1994: i. xxi–xiii; Mecella 2009: 107–13. The Stratagems of Poly-
aenus became very popular in the tenth century. Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos
1990: 106–7 (C. 196–9) instructed that a copy of Polyaenus should be taken on cam-
paign along with other books.
369 Dain 1938: 9 argued that this chapter derives from a lost work, known as the De epis-
tolis secreto mittendis, which was solely dedicated to the subject of secret correspond-
ence. He argues that it incorporated elements from Philo of Byzantium and Aeneas the
Tactician and that traces of it can be found in a number of later lost and extant works.
See also Dain and Foucault 1967: 339 and Krentz and Wheeler 1994: xxii.
370 Dain 1938: 116 omits the word ‘wanted’ (ἠβούλετο), despite the fact that it appears in
L, f. 103v. It is included in Melber 1887: 509.
371 Julius Caesar had a reputation for sending secret messages in code, substituting the
original letter with that which came fourth before it in the alphabet, the so-called Cae-
sar’s cipher. See Suetonius 1914: i. 108–9 (Life of Julius Caesar 56.6–7) and Aulus
Gellius 1927: iii. 232–5 (17.9.1–5).
372 Dain 1938: 116 adds only ἂν here, Melber 1887: 509 adds ἂν ἠβούλετο.
373 The recipient is not given.
374 For 76.2, see Aeneas the Tactician 1928: 160–1 (31.10–13). Lucius Cornelius Sulla
(c.138–78 BCE) was a Roman general and dictator but this particular incident seems
to be absent from the historical narratives.
375 Harpagus was a noble of the Median empire who communicated with Cyrus the Great
of Persia in this way because he wanted to take revenge on his own king. See Herodo-
tus 1920–5: i. 160–3 (1.123).
 Notes 141
376 For 76.5, see Aeneas the Tactician 1928: 156–7 (31.4–5). This incident cannot be
traced in the historical record.
377 This person and incident are only recorded in the ST and cannot be traced in any extant
source.
378 This incident cannot be traced in the historical record.
379 This anecdote may refer to the Jewish high priest Onias IV who left Syria for Egypt
in around 160 BCE, where he settled with his people and owed military service to
the kings of Egypt. The ST is the only testimony, however, to connect him with this
stratagem and this Onias may simply be a fictional character. See also Meulder 2003:
460.
380 This incident cannot be traced in the historical record.
381 This probably refers to Choerilus, a poet and encomiast from Iasus who lived around
the end of the fourth century BCE. This event itself does not seem to be recorded in
any historical narrative, but if it ever occurred, it possibly took place in the context
of Alexander the Great’s campaign against the Persians, in which Choerilus allegedly
participated.
382 According to tradition, Merops was king either of the Meropians, a people who inhab-
ited the island of Cos, or of the Ethiopians, and he is often found in connection to other
mythological figures such as Aeneas or Pandareus. Meulder 2003: 448–58 argues that
the Merops referred to here was actually Shapur I, Sasanian king of Persia (240–70
CE) and that this anecdote in fact refers to the capture of Hatra in around 241 CE,
since similar stratagems are recorded in Persian sources. The same trick is attributed
by Procopius of Caesarea 1914–28: ii. 12–17 (3.2.14–26) to the Gothic leader Alaric
when he captured Rome in 410 CE.
383 The word used here is ‘Καίσαρα’ which could also refer to Julius Caesar, but ‘emperor’
has been preferred in this translation due to the obscurity of the anecdote.
384 Meulder 2003: 448–51, proposed that this stratagem refers to the capture of Antioch
by Shapur I in around 253–6 CE.
385 For 77.3, see H: 481 (41.5); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 957. According to Herodo-
tus 1920–5: ii. 184–195 (3.152–60), it was not Cyrus who played this trick but Darius
I, king of Persia (522–486 BCE).
386 For 77.4, see H: 480 (41.3); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 955. This incident took
place in 260 BCE during the First Punic War. See Polybius 1922–7: i. 62–5 (1.21).
The Byzantines also used fake deserters to plant disinformation. See Shepard 1985:
275.
387 For 77.5, see H: 440–1 (9.2); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 875–7. This anecdote
refers to the events of 240–239 BCE when Antiochus Hierax managed to defeat his
brother, Seleucus II Callinicus, during their struggle for the control of the Seleucid
Empire. The historical narratives, however, do not seem to record this particular ruse.
388 For 78.1, see H: 432 (1); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 859. Iphicrates (fl. 390–356
BCE), mostly fought as a mercenary commander and apart from his victories he is
also credited for creating a new type of medium infantry, the Iphicratian peltasts.
While many ancient authors refer to Iphicrates, most of his stratagems only appear in
later military treatises.
389 For 78.2, see H: 432 (1); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 859. The siege of Tyre took
place in 332 BCE, as part of Alexander the Great’s Persian campaign. The incident
with the bucket, however, does not seem to be recorded in the historical narratives.
390 For 79.1, see H: 432 (1); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 859. This incident took place in
330 BCE when Alexander captured Darius III, king of Persia (336–330 BCE) and his
family. It is also attested in Plutarch 1914–26: vii. 348–51 (Life of Alexander 42.3–6)
and Arrian 1929–33: ii. 178–1 (6.26.1–3).
391 For 79.2, see H: 433 (3.5); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 861. This anecdote appears in
a slightly different form in Polyaenus 1887: 181–4 (4.3.32); Polyaenus 1994: i. 361–7,
where it is recorded that it was Alexander himself who found the menu belonging to
Darius III and that unlike everybody else he was contemptuous rather than amazed.
142 Notes
392 For 79.3, see H: 433 (3.3); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 861 and Polyaenus 1887:
159 (4.2.1); Polyaenus 1994: i. 317. The latter states that the disgraced general was
Docimus of Taras, of whom nothing else is known.
393 For 79.4, see H: 433 (3.4); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 861 and Polyaenus 1887: 159–
60 (4.2.3); Polyaenus 1994: i. 317–19, who records that Aeropus and Damasippus were
the commanders of the Macedonian army visited by the flautist. This anecdote is not
recorded in the historical narratives and nothing further is known of these two generals.
394 For 79.5, see H: 432–3 (3.1); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 859–61. This commander
was Archidamus III, king of the Spartans (359–338 BCE). Polyaenus 1887: 47–8
(1.41.5); Polyaenus 1994: i. 93–5 states that this incident took place during a night
march against the city of Caryae in 367 BCE but Xenophon 1918–21: ii. 246–7
(7.1.28) only reports that the city was taken by storm.
395 For 79.6, see H: 433 (3.6); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 861. Gaius Mucius Scaevola
volunteered to assassinate Lars Porsenna, King of the Etruscans, during his attack
on Rome in 504 BCE. The legend is also recorded by Dionysius of Halicarnassus
1937–50: iii. 80–7 (5.28–30).
396 For 79.7, see H: 433 (3.7); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 861. The identity of this
consul has not been traced.
397 For 79.8, see H: 444 (3.9); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 863. This incident allegedly
took place in 48 BCE before the battle of Dyrrachium during the civil war between
Julius Caesar and Pompey the Great. See Suetonius 1914: i. 118–19 (Life of Julius
Caesar 68.2).
398 For 80.1, see H: 435 (4.6); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 865. Cassander was a Mac-
edonian general who later became king of Macedon (305–297 BCE). The campaign
against Athens and Salamis took place in 318 BCE but this particular anecdote about
the release of prisoners does not seem to be recorded in the historical narratives.
399 For 80.2, see H: 436 (4.13); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 867. Publius Cornelius
Scipio Africanus (236–183 BCE), Roman consul and general, campaigned in Spain
during the Second Punic War and in 210 BCE captured the city of Carthago Nova
which was where this incident took place. See Livy 1919–59: vii. 190–5 (26.50).
400 For 80.3, see H: 435 (4.7); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 865. This anecdote most
probably refers to Antiochus II Theos, ruler of the Seleucid empire (281–261 BCE).
Polyaenus 1887: 215–16 (4.16); Polyaenus 1994: i. 429–31 reports that it was the
Thracians Teres and Domichetes that defected to Antiochus, but nothing else seems to
be known either about the event or these men.
401 For 80.4, see H: 436 (4.12); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 867. Marcus Furius Camil-
lus (c.446–365 BCE), Roman censor, consular tribune and dictator, was taking part
in hostilities against the Etruscan city of Veii and its allies the Falerians in 406–394
BCE. See Plutarch 1914–26: ii. 116–21 (Life of Camillus 10).
402 For 80.5, see H: 441 (9.3); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii, 877 and Polyaenus 1887: 266
(5.33.3); Polyaenus 1994: i. 531, who attribute this stratagem not to Pompey the Great
but to Pompiscus, an Arcadian about whom nothing else is known.
403 For 81.1, see H: 436 (5.1); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 867. This anecdote about
Epaminondas (d. 362 BCE), Theban general and leader of the Boeotian League,
remains untraced, but something similar is recorded by Pausanias 1918–35: iv. 228–9
(9.13.8), who reports that Epaminondas allowed some men, mainly Thespians, to
leave the camp before the battle of Leuctra in 371 BCE so that they did not dishearten
the rest of the troops during the battle.
404 For 81.2, see H: 436–7 (5.2); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 867–9. This is one of many
anecdotes originally found in the work of Polyaenus which cannot be traced in any
extant historical source. Polyaenus may well have used sources which belonged to an
oral tradition or have treated his written sources more freely and from memory, with
a view only to getting the main idea across rather than to recording a historical event
accurately. See Pretzler 2010: 85–107 and Wheeler 2010: 38–9.
 Notes 143
405 For 81.3, see H: 437 (5.3); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 869. Agathocles, ruler of
Syracuse (316–228 BCE), mounted this expedition against Carthage in 310 BCE. See
Diodorus of Sicily 1933–67: x. 155–91 (20.5–18).
406 Dain 1938: 124 incorrectly reads σφαγῖσιν instead of σφραγῖσιν here. See Melber
1887: 518 and L, f. 107r.
407 For 82.1, see H: 437 (6.2); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 869. Most probably this anec-
dote refers to Dionysius I, ruler of Syracuse (405–367 BCE) who waged wars against
the Carthaginians and the Greek city-states of southern Italy. Polyaenus 1887: 245
(5.10.2); Polyaenus 1994: i. 489 and Diodorus of Sicily 1933–67: vi. 164–5 (14.55.1),
however, reverse the roles and attribute the trick to the Carthaginian general Himilco
(d. 366 BCE), who was said to have employed it during his Sicilian expedition against
Dionysius in about 406 BCE. Frontinus 1925: 20–1 (1.2.6) credits the Roman general
Marius with using sealed letters in this way.
408 For 82.2, see H: 437 (6.1); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 869. Alcibiades (451–404
BCE), Athenian general and politician, who was active in the Peloponnesian War
(431–434 BCE).
409 For 83.1, see H: 438 (7.3); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 871 and Polyaenus 1887:
266–7 (5.33.6); Polyaenus 1994: i. 531–3, who attribute this anecdote to Pompiscus
the Arcadian rather than to Pompey the Great.
410 The Greek word for ‘group-tent’ is κοντουβέρνιον.
411 For 83.2, see H: 438 (7.1); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 871. Chares (fl. 367–332
BCE), Athenian general, fought many wars against the Macedonians in Thrace and
Northern Greece and was present at the battle of Chaeronea in 337 BCE.
412 For 84.1, see H: 445 (13.5); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 885. Timotheus (d. 354
BCE), Athenian general, campaigned in Corfu and Chalkidiki and participated in the
so-called Social Wars of 357–355 BCE.
413 For 84.2, see H: 444 (13.1); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 883. Lycurgus is more or
less a legendary figure whose reforms, which seem to have taken place at some point
between the eleventh and eighth centuries BCE, created the Spartan Constitution.
Plutarch 1914–26: i. 242–5 (Life of Lycurgus 13.5), confirms that this was one of
Lycurgus’s laws.
414 For 84.3, see H: 445 (13.7); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 885. This story most prob-
ably refers to Antigonus I Monophthalamus (382–301 BCE), one of the generals of
Alexander the Great and king of Asia Minor and Syria from 306.
415 For 84.4, see H: 444 (13.4); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 883. This incident cannot
be traced in the historical record.
416 For 84.5, see H: 445 (13.9); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 885. Gaius Marius (157–86
BCE), a Roman general and statesman, who halted the advance of the Cimbri into
Italy in 102 BCE. Plutarch 1914–26: ix. 534–7 (Life of Marius 26.3–5) records that
Marius took advantage of the heat to repel the Cimbri, who were accustomed to a
much colder climate.
417 For 85.1, see H: 439 (8.1); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 873. A slightly different ver-
sion of this anecdote about Xerxes, king of Persia (486–465 BCE), and Themistocles
(c.525–459 BCE), Athenian statesman, is found in Herodotus 1920–5: iv. 20–3 (8.22).
418 For 85.2, see H: 483 (44.1); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 961 and Polyaenus 1887:
138 (3.9.57); Polyaenus 1994 i. 275. According to the latter, it was Iphicrates, rather
than Themistocles, who employed this stratagem.
419 For 86.1, see H: 450 (14.29); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 895. This incident took place
in 45 BCE at the battle of Munda when Julius Caesar was fighting against Pompey’s
son, Gnaeus Pompeius, in Spain. The anecdote is preserved with some variations by
other sources. See, for example, Plutarch 1914–26: vii. 570–3 (Life of Caesar 56.1–2).
420 For 86.2, see H: 449 (14.24); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 893. This event took place
when Cyrus the Great was leading the Persian Revolt against the Medes in 559–552
BCE and is also recorded in Plutarch 1931a: iii. 490–3 (5).
144 Notes
421 For 86.3, see H: 449 (14.21); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 893. Like the story above,
this incident seems to be set during the Persian revolt against the Medes. The classical
Greek sources present Cyrus’s victory over the Medes almost as a single event but
Babylonian records and other sources seem to agree that it was a long and difficult
struggle, thus making this anecdote credible. For a discussion, see Briant 2002: 31–3.
422 For 86.4, see H: 449–50 (14.25); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 893–5. The battle of
Orchomenus was fought in 85 BCE as part of the First Mithridatic War, where the
Romans prevailed under the command of Sulla. This anecdote is also recorded by
Plutarch 1914–26: iv. 394–5 (Life of Sulla 21.2).
423 For 86.5, see H: 449 (14.22); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 893 and Polyaenus 1887:
345 (7.35.1); Polyaenus 1994: i. 689. The latter apparently places this anecdote in the
context of the invasion of Greece and Macedonia by a Gallic chieftain called Bren-
nus in 279 BCE, since he reports that the prisoners were Greek rather than Roman. H
does not specify the origin of the prisoners. Since the author of the ST reports that the
prisoners displayed were Romans, this Brennus is probably to be identified with the
Gallic chieftain who attacked Rome around 390 BCE.
424 For 86.6, see H: 450 (14.28); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 895. This Scipio is Scipio
Africanus the Younger (185–129 BCE), rather than his more famous adopted father,
Scipio Africanus the elder. The anecdote is also found in Plutarch 1931b: iii. 194–5
(201.18) and Claudius Aelianus 1974: 122 (11.9.20–4); Claudius Aelianus 1997:
158–9.
425 For 86.7, see H: 450 (14.30); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 895. Julius Caesar is also
credited with calling his men ‘comrades’ in ST, 86.1, as are other Romans elsewhere.
See, for instance, Cassius Dio 1914–27: ix. 40–3 (72.24–6).
426 For 86.8, see H: 446 (14.4); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 887 and Polyaenus 1887: 78
(2.3.2); Polyaenus 1994: i. 155. The latter records that this incident took place during
the Theban Epaminondas’s victory over the Spartans at the battle of Leuctra in 371
BCE but it does not appear in the historical narratives.
427 For 87.1, see H: 451 (15.2); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 897. Agesilaus II (400–359
BCE), king of Sparta, had requested a passage through Macedonia from Aeropus II,
king of Macedon (399–393 BCE), and probably resorted to this ruse when it was
denied. See Plutarch 1931c: iii. 262–3 (211.43); Plutarch 1914–26: v. 42–3 (Life of
Agesilaus 16).
428 For 87.2, see H: 451 (15.4); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 897. This incident cannot
be traced in the historical record.
429 For 87.3, see H: 451 (15.3); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 897. This incident cannot
be traced in the historical record.
430 For 87.4, see H: 452 (15.6); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 899. Perdiccas (365–c.320
BCE), one of the generals of Alexander the Great, attacked Ptolemy I Soter (c.367–
283 BCE) at Memphis in 321 BCE, but his army was destroyed as he was trying to
cross the Nile. The historical narratives, however, do not report the anecdote given
here and attribute the defeat solely to the incompetence of Perdiccas. See for example
Diodorus of Sicily 1933–67: ix. 106–9 (18.34–5).
431 For 87.5, see H: 451–2 (15.5); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 897–9. This incident took
place in 317 BCE when the Macedonian general Eumenes (c.362–317 BCE) was at
war with Antigonus I. The story is also preserved by Plutarch 1914–26: viii. 124–7
(Life of Eumenes 15.3–7), while Diodorus of Sicily 1933–67: ix. 295–305 (19.24–7)
gives a slightly different account.
432 For 87.6, see H: 452 (15.8); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 899. The Scythians were
nomads who probably originated from the area of Northern Caucasus. They were
trained to fight in horseback with bows and lances and must have started their migra-
tion in the Balkans around the middle of the sixth century. The Triballi were a clan of
Thracian or Illyrian origin who inhabited the lands around the river Danube.
 Notes 145
433 For 87.7, see H: 452 (15.7); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 899 and Polyaenus 1887:
260–1 (5.23); Polyaenus 1994: i. 519–21. The latter gives the name of the leader of
the defence as Tynnichus and that of his city as ‘Theudosia’. The name of neither
Tynnichus nor Tyrrenius can be linked with any known military figure but the city can
be recognised as Theodosia in the Crimea, which is described by Strabo 1917–33: iii.
236–9 (7.4.4).
434 For 88.1, see H: 453 (16.2); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 901. This anecdote is con-
nected with Julius Caesar’s conquest of Gaul in 58–50 BCE.
435 For 88.2, see H: 453, 500, and 502 (16.1, 57.9, 18); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 901,
995, 997. The ST is the only source to have credited Onias with this stratagem. In H
the anecdote is not connected with any particular figure while Polyaenus 1887: 148
(3.11.3); Polyaenus 1994: i. 295 attributes something similar to the Athenian general,
Chabrias (d. 357).
436 For 89.1, see H: 458 (22.1); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 911. Nicias (c.470–413
BCE), Athenian general and statesman, was one of the leaders of the Sicilian Expedi-
tion of 415–413 BCE during the Peloponnesian war. The protracted siege of Syracuse
is context for this anecdote. See Thucydides 1919–23: iii. 368–71 (6.102) and Plu-
tarch 1914–26: iii. 268–71 (Life of Nicias 18.1–3).
437 For 89.2, see H: 459 (22.2); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 912 and Polyaenus 1887: 45
(1.40.7); Polyaenus 1994: i. 89 but they have Alcibiades employing this tactic against
a different foe from the Argives mentioned here: the former reports that it was against
the Syracusans and the latter that it was against the Athenians on Sicily. The story is
not found in the historical narratives.
438 For 89.3, see H: 466 (31.3); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 927. This anecdote could
have taken place when Iphicrates was involved into a Thracian civil war in 387 BCE
to assist Seuthes to recover the throne of the Odrysian kingdom.
439 For 89.4, see H: 459 (23); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 913. Hannibal (247–c.183
BCE), Carthaginian general, inflicted a fourth consecutive defeat on the Romans at
the battle of Cannae in 216 BCE during the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE). This
incident of the wind is also recorded by Livy 1919–59: v. 350–3 (22.46).
440 For 90.1, see H: 459 (24.1); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 913. This passage could
refer to the campaign of 430 BCE during the Peloponnesian war. The Spartans rav-
aged Attica and, rather than sally forth from their walls and attack the Spartans on
land, the Athenians sent a fleet to attack the cities of Peloponnese which were allied
to Sparta, forcing the Spartans to withdraw from Attica. See Thucydides 1919–23:
i. 356–9 (2.55–6).
441 For 90.2, see H: 464 (29.4); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 923. This incident took
place during the Peloponnesian war, when the Athenian general Demosthenes led an
expedition against Pylos in 425 BCE. For this anecdote, see Thucydides 1919–23:
ii. 212–85 (4.3–41), who gives a slightly different and more complicated version of
events.
442 For 90.3, see H: 494 (54.12); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 983 and Polyaenus 1887:
164 (4.2.18); Polyaenus 1994: i. 327. The latter states that these events took place
at Pharcedon, a city in Thessaly, during Philip II of Macedon’s intervention in the
area around 352 BCE, rather than at Methone in the Peloponnese. Diodorus of Sicily
1933–67: vii. 330–7 (16.34–5) does not give any detailed information about the cap-
ture of these cities.
443 Dain 1938: 131 and Melber 1887: 527 read πυρούς (wheat) here which makes little sense
in this context. Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 1074 have incorrectly interpreted the word
as deriving from πῦρ and give the translation ‘I shall light a fire’. However, the top line of
L, f. 111r clarifies the matter, since the word πυρσούς (‘torches’) clearly appears there.
444 For 91.1, see H: 460 (25.1); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 915. This incident cannot
be traced in the historical record.
146 Notes
445 For 91.2, see H: 441–2 (10.1); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 877–9. Clearchus was a
Spartan general who later became a mercenary captain and fought against the Thra-
cians in the service of the Persian prince, Cyrus (d. 401 BCE). It is possible that this
stratagem took place on this occasion, if we assume that ‘Athenians’ is a general term
for Greek mercenaries. Polyaenus 1887: 74–5 (2.2.6); Polyaenus 1994: i. 147–9 does
not refer to Athenians, which makes more sense.
446 For 92, see H: 460 (25.2); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 915. This anecdote is pre-
served with few differences in Diodorus of Sicily 1933–67: vii. 140–3 (15.68).
447 For 93, see H: 472 (34.2); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 939. This incident took place
in 370–369 BCE when Epaminondas invaded the Peloponnese. The anecdote is also
reported by Plutarch 1914–26: v. 90–1 (Life of Agesilaus 32.7).
448 For 94.1, see H: 476 (37.3); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 947. The H and Polyae-
nus 1887: 76–7 (2.2.9); Polyaenus 1994: i. 151–3 both record that it was Clearchus
who employed this stratagem. Either way nothing similar is found in the historical
narratives.
449 For 94.2, see H: 476 (37.5); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 947. This incident took place
in 480 BCE after the battle of Thermopylae, when the Thessalians invaded the terri-
tory of Phocians. The anecdote is also found in Herodotus 1920–5: iv. 28–9 (8.28).
450 This anecdote cannot be traced in the historical narratives. If it ever took place it must
have happened sometime before or during the battle of Chaeronea in 338 BCE, prob-
ably in front of the town of Chaeronea.
451 For 95.1, see H: 465 (30.2); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 925. This incident cannot
be traced in the historical record.
452 For 95.2, see H: 469 (31.15); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 933. This probably refers
to Autophradates (fl. 390–330 BCE), satrap of Lydia, but the context of the anecdote
is unclear since the historical narratives do not mention it.
453 For 95.3, see H: 470 (31.18); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 935. This anecdote is
also preserved in Herodotus 1920–5: i. 260–7 (1.207–11), according to whom it was
Croesus, king of Lydia (561–546 BCE), who advised King Cyrus of Persia to follow
this course of action. Cyrus agreed, annihilated the Massagetae, and captured their
leader.
454 For 95.4, see H: 498 (56.11); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 991 and Polyaenus 1887:
346–7 (7.36); Polyaenus 1994: i. 691–3. While the ST uses the legendary figure of
Merops here, H presents these events as anonymous advice and Polyaenus attributes
a very similar stratagem to the legendary or fictional figure of Mygdonius. The oldest
testimony to this anecdote comes from Diogenes Laertius 1925: i. 84–7 (Life of Bias
1.5.82–4), where he records that Bias of Priene, one of the seven wise men of Greece,
employed the same stratagem when his city was besieged by Alyattes, king of Lydia
(600–561 BCE), sometime around 570 BCE. This story could also refer to Shapur
I of Persia since Antigonea was the name of a city in Syria as well as in Epirus. See
Meulder 2003: 460–1.
455 The story of Tyrrenius and his escape can neither be traced nor put into any histori-
cal context. However, Bohemond (1058–1111 CE), Norman lord of Taranto and later
prince of Antioch, is recorded as having employed this stratagem to escape from Anti-
och in 1106 in Anna Komnene 2001: 356–8 (11.12); Anna Komnene 2009: 329–30;
Albu 2000: 157–68.
456 For 95.6, see H: 491 (52.3); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 977 and Polyaenus 1887:
117 (3.7.3); Polyaenus 1994: i. 233, where this stratagem is attributed to Lachares, a
confidant of King Cassander of Macedon, rather than to Chares and Polyaenus records
that Lachares employed this stratagem to flee from the town of Sestus. The episode
might therefore be connected to the capture of Sestus in 353–352 BCE by Chares,
but there is no record either of such an escape or of Lachares being present. See, for
instance, Diodorus of Sicily 1933–67: vii. 330–3 (16.34).
 Notes 147
457 For 95.7, see H: 491 (52.4); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 977. Demetrius of Pha-
lerum (c.350–c.283 BCE), orator and scholar, was appointed ruler of Athens by King
Cassander of Macedon in 317 BCE, but ten years later he was forced to abandon the
city after it was captured by the Macedonian general, Demetrius Poliorketes. Noth-
ing relevant can be found in the historical narratives regarding this stratagem and the
fact that Polyaenus 1887: 155–6 (3.15); Polyaenus 1994: i. 309–11 records that it was
from the king of the Thracians that Demetrius escaped in this way makes the anecdote
even more improbable.
458 For 95.8, see H: 491–2 (52.7); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 977. This story prob-
ably refers to Chilon, a candidate for the Spartan throne, who in 219 BCE led a failed
coup, but the sources do not record anything about him escaping captivity, only that
he left Sparta and reached Achaea. Elsewhere, the participants of this anecdote are
given as inhabitants of Lesbos and Lemnos who were forced to abandon their islands
by the Pelasgi and then fled to Sparta. When they were imprisoned by the suspicious
Spartans, their wives visited them, exchanged clothes, and allowed their husbands
to escape. See Herodotus 1920–5: ii. 344–7 (4.145–6) and Polyaenus 1887: 355–4,
397–8 (7.49, 8.34); Polyaenus 1994: i. 707–9, 793–5 for a similar stratagem.
459 For 95.9, see H: 491 (52.5); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 977 where the stratagem
is presented anonymously rather than attributed to the fictional Merops. Polyaenus
1887: 310 (6.54); Polyaenus 1994: i. 619 attributes it to Amphiretus of Acanthus, of
whom nothing further is known.
460 Frontinus 1925: 16–19 (1.2.1) records that in the Second Punic War, Scipio Africanus
sent some of his officers disguised as a slaves to spy in the enemy camp together with
legates who were to negotiate a truce. The centurions let loose a horse and by pretend-
ing that they were trying to catch it, they were able to reconnoitre the enemy camp.
A similar account is provided by Livy 1919–59: viii. 376–9 (30.4.1–5).
461 For 95.11, see H 462 (28.3); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 919 and Polyaenus 1887:
273–4 (5.44.5); Polyaenus 1994: i. 545–7 who both also report how Memnon of
Rhodes (fl. 350 BCE) used this stratagem when he attacked Cyzicus in 335/4 BCE,
but claim that it only almost succeeded rather than delivering the complete victory
reported here. Diodorus of Sicily 1933–67: viii. 136–7 (17.7.8) supports H and Poly-
aenus, although he gives no details of the attack.
462 For 95.12, see H: 457 (20.1); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 909. Cleomenes I, king of
Sparta (c.520–c.490 BCE), fought against the city of Argos in around 494 BCE and,
according to Herodotus 1920–5: iii. 226–9 (6.77–8), he won by using this stratagem.
463 For 95.13, see H: 454–5 (18.5); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 903–5. This incident
cannot be traced in the historical record.
464 For 95.14, see H: 457 (20.2); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 909. Pammenes of Thebes
(fl. 360–370 BCE) was a close associate of Epaminondas and, after the death of the
latter in 362 BCE, he became a leading figure of the Boeotian League. However, this
particular stratagem cannot be traced in the historical narratives.
465 For 95.15, see H: 458 (21.1); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 911 and Polyaenus 1887:
101 (2.28.2); Polyaenus 1994: i. 201 who report that the name of the man was actually
Magas, a member of the Ptolemaic dynasty. Polyaenus adds that Magas employed this
stratagem after he captured Paraetonium in Egypt. It is not clear when this stratagem
took place, as it is absent from the historical narratives.
466 For 95.16, see H: 468 (31.10); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 931 and Polyaenus 1887:
264–5 (5.32.1); Polyaenus 1994: i. 527–9. The latter informs us that Telesinicus was
from Corinth and that this incident took place near the harbour of Syracuse, rather
than at Methone, and that the enemy was the Athenians, so the historical context may
have been the Sicilian Expedition of 415–413 BCE. This stratagem cannot be traced
in the historical narratives and nothing else is known about Telesinicus apart from the
information that is presented here.
148 Notes
467 For 95.17, see H: 462–3 (28.5); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 919–21. King Darius
I of Persia campaigned against Scythian tribes around 520 BCE and again in 513
BCE. The second campaign is recorded in detail by Herodotus 1920–5: ii. 284–345
(4.83–143), but the stratagem, if it ever happened, could have taken place in the first
campaign, which is not well recorded by Greek sources.
468 For 96.1, see H: 478 (39.5); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 951. Campania in south-
ern Italy was colonised by Greeks from Euboea around the eighth century BCE. The
historical context of this anecdote seems to be unclear, though it may be connected
with attacks by the Samnites, who were on hostile terms with Rome until Campania
became part of the Roman Republic around the fourth century BCE.
469 For 96.2, see H: 478 (39.7); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 951, which presents the
anecdote anonymously, and Polyaenus 1887: 345 (7.34); Polyaenus 1994: i. 689, who
attributes it to Aryandes, the satrap of Egypt under the Persian king Darius I. The
historical context of this stratagem by the possibly fictional Onias cannot be traced
but Herodotus 1920–5: ii. 402–5 (4.201) reports that one of Darius’s officers named
Amasis employed this ruse against the city of Barce.
470 For 96.3, see H: 477 (39.2); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 949. The Spartan general,
Dercylidas, was involved into a campaign against the Persians in around 399 BCE
when he laid siege to Scepsis, a city on the coast of Asia Minor. Meidias, the satrap
of Scepsis, asked to come to terms with Dercylidas in order to become an ally of
the Spartans. Dercylidas managed to capture Scepsis, Gergis, and other cities in this
way. See Xenophon 1918–21: i. 188–95 (3.1.20–4, 2.1), where a similar narrative is
provided.
471 For 97.1, see H: 478–9 (40.2); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 951–3. Although this
anecdote does not seem to be recorded in the historical narratives, its historical con-
text could have been the Athenian Social War of 357–355 BCE when Chios, Cos,
Rhodes, and Byzantium revolted against Athens.
472 For 97.2, see H: 479 (40.4); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 953 and Polyaenus 1887:
336 (7.21.7); Polyaenus 1994: i. 671. While the ST here uses Abradatas, who was
an imaginary figure found in Xenophon 1914: ii. 4–5 (5.1.2–3ff), H and Polyaenus
attribute the stratagem to Datames (fl. 362 BCE), a Carian by birth who became satrap
in the area of southern Cappadocia. According to Cornelius Nepos 1929: 152–7 (Life
of Datames 6), he employed this ruse against the Pisidians.
473 For 97.3, see H: 483 (44.2); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 961. This story may refer
either to Arsames (fl. 522–521 BCE), the father of the future Persian king Darius I, or
to another Arsames who was a satrap of Egypt in the fifth century BCE. See Sekunda
2011: 53–5.
474 For 98.1, see H: 484 (45.1); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 963. Plutarch 1914–26:
i. 276–7 (Life of Lycurgus 22.5) explains that the Spartans regarded it as ignoble to
pursue men who turned to flight and that this practice was useful as well since their
enemies came to know about it and thus often chose to flee rather than to fight.
475 For 98.2, see H: 484 (45.2); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 963 and Polyaenus 1887:
61–2 (2.1.5); Polyaenus 1994: i. 121–3. The latter explains that Agesilaus gave this
command in order not to fight against desperate men. See also Xenophon 1918–21: i.
302–3 (4.3.20), where Agesilaus did not attack the enemy who had taken refuge in the
temple of Athena, although the mere fact that they were in a temple might also have
played a significant role.
476 For 98.3, see H: 484 (45.3); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 963. See Xenophon
1918–21: ii. 224–5 (6.51–2), where Iphicrates is criticised for leaving a major pass
unguarded and thus allowing the Boeotians to escape.
477 For 99.1, see H: 485 (46.4); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 965. This incident cannot
be traced in the historical record.
 Notes 149
478 For 99.2, see H: 485–6 (46.6); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 965–7 and Polyaenus
1887: 149 (3.11.6); Polyaenus 1994: i. 297. This incident could have taken place
during the Corinthian War around 391 BCE since Polyaenus reports that Chabrias
raided Sellasia in the Peloponnese at that time. Cornelius Nepos 1929: 130–3 (Life of
Chabrias 1) gives a detailed account of the hostilities between Chabrias and Agesilaus
under the date 378 BCE but, in spite of a reference to Chabrias’s flight, he does not
record this stratagem.
479 For 99.3, see H: 484 (46.1); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 963 and Polyaenus 1887:
40 (1.38.5); Polyaenus 1994: i. 79. While the legendary figure of Merops is used here,
H does not credit anyone in particular with this stratagem and Polyaenus attributes it
to the Spartan general, Brasidas (fl. 424–422 BCE). This incident is not reported by
Thucydides, but it could have taken place during Brasidas’s retreat while fighting for
Perdiccas, king of Macedon. See Thucydides 1919–23: ii. 422–35 (4.124–8).
480 For 99.4, see H: 486 (46.10); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 967. This incident took
place in 217 BCE when the Roman general Quintus Fabius Maximus (c.280–203
BCE) managed to cut off Hannibal’s army and trap it in a narrow pass. The ruse is also
recorded by Appian 1912–13: i. 324–7 (Hannibalic War 14–15).
481 The stratagem only appears in the ST and the mysterious figure of Onias makes its his-
torical context rather unclear. It is possible that it was devised either by a lost source or
by our author, perhaps to provide something more relevant to his time. See Dain 1938:
140 and Krentz and Wheeler 1994: xxii–xxiii.
482 For 100.1, see H: 492 (53.1); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 979. For examples of mod-
erate punishments, see Appian 1912–13: iii. 314–17 (Civil Wars 2.47) and Suetonius
1914: i. 120–1 (Life of Julius Caesar 69), where Caesar punished only the ringleaders
after the mutiny of the ninth legion at Placentia in 49 BCE.
483 For 100.2, see H: 492 (53.3); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 979. According to Sueto-
nius 1914: i. 182–3 (Life of Augustus 24.2), Gaius Octavius (63 BCE–14 CE), who
as Augustus was the first Roman emperor from 27 BCE, punished disobedient sol-
diers by making them remove their military belts and carry heavy objects. Suetonius
does not refer to female attire but there are other references to this, such as in Zosi-
mus 1971–89: ii.i. 11–12 (3.3.4–5), where in 357 CE Emperor Julian (361–3 CE) is
reported to have punished the horsemen who fled at the battle of Strasbourg in this
way.
484 For 100.3, see H: 432 (2); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 859. When mercenary troops
in Carthaginian service mutinied in 240–238 BCE, the Carthaginian general Hamilcar
Barca (c.275–228 BCE), succeeded in suppressing the revolt and seizing its leaders.
H and Polyaenus 1887: 247–8 (5.11); Polyaenus 1994: i. 493–5 wrongly report that
it was another Carthaginian leader, Gescon, who showed mercy to murderers, but he
was in fact among the generals who were killed by the rebels. Furthermore they also
state that Gescon was the brother of Hamilcar, which does not seem to have been the
case. Nor were all the ringleaders pardoned. One of them was crucified by Hamilcar
and another was tortured to death in Carthage, although there is no information that
Hamilcar was personally responsible for this second execution. See Diodorus of Sic-
ily 1933–67: xi. 148–9 (25.5) and Polybius 1922–7: i. 234–59 (1.80–8).
485 For 101.1, see H: 481 (42.2); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 957. This incident prob-
ably took place around 396–400 BCE, when Agesilaus was campaigning against the
Persians in Asia Minor.
486 For 101.2, see Polyaenus 1887: 71–2, 139 (2.1.30, 3.9.62); Polyaenus 1994: i. 141–3,
277, where something similar is attributed to Iphicrates and Agesilaus. This stratagem
does not seem to be recorded in any other source.
487 For 102.1, see H: 448 (14.19); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 891. The correct name
here is Leucon (389–349 BCE), king of Bosporus, whose realm included Crimea and
150 Notes
parts of modern Russia, as recorded in H and Polyaenus 1887: 289–90 (6.9.4); Poly-
aenus 1994: 577.
488 For 102.2, see H: 447 (14.9); Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ii. 889. This incident cannot
be traced in the historical record.
489 The ST seems to be the only source to record this incident.
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Index
Dates are CE unless otherwise stated
Abbasid caliphate 2
Abradatas, imaginary figure 115, 148n472
Achelous, battle (917) 2
Aelian Tacticus, Greek writer on tactics 1,
7, 47, 78, 121n38, 125n135, 134n273
Aeneas, mythical figure 141n382
Aeneas the Tactician, Greek writer on
tactics 1, 140n369
Aeropus II, king of Macedon (399–393
BCE) 107, 142n393, 144n427
Africanus, Julius Sextus, Roman historian
139n338
Agathocles, ruler of Syracuse (316–228
BCE) 103, 143n405
Agesilaus II, king of Sparta (400–359
BCE) 107, 110, 115 – 16, 144n427,
148n475, 149n478, 149nn485 – 6
Alaric, Gothic leader 141n382
Alcibiades, Athenian general 104, 108 – 9,
143n408, 145n437
Alexander, Byzantine emperor (912–13)
1, 7
Alexander the Great, king of Macedon
(336–323 BCE) 25, 47, 95, 101, 111,
113, 117, 121n22, 125n135, 139n349,
141n381, 141n389, 141n391
Al-Hadath 2 – 3; battle (954) 131n196
allagion (corps) 51, 89, 126n151
allies 33 – 4
Al-Muqtadir, Abbasid caliph (908–32) 2
Al-Mutanabbī, Arab poet 131n196
Alyattes, king of Lydia (600–561 BCE)
146n454
Amasis, Persian officer 148n469
ambushes 43 – 4, 70
Amphiretus of Acanthus 147n459
amphistomos (formation) 58
anastrophe (manoeuvre) 57
Antigonea 111, 146n454
Antigonus I Monophthalmus, king of Asia
Minor and Syria (306–301 BCE) 105,
143n414, 144n431
Antioch 141n384
Antiochus II Theos, Seleucid king (281–
261 BCE) 102 – 3, 142n400
Antiochus Hierax, Hellenistic general 100,
141n387
antiperispasis (manoeuvre) 57
antistomos (formation) 58
Arabs 2, 43, 136n299
archers 65, 89
Archidamus III, king of Sparta (359–338
BCE) 101, 142n394
Argos, Argives 108, 113, 147n462
Aristippus of Cyrene, Greek philosopher
120n6
Aristomenes, Messenian leader 96,
139n357
Armenia, Armenians 126n151
armour 47 – 8, 52 – 5
Arrian, Lucius Flavius, Greek historian
125n135, 139n349
arrows see bows and arrows
Arsames, Persian noble 115, 148n473
Aryandes, satrap of Egypt 148n469
Asclepiodotus, Greek writer on tactics 1
Asia Minor 2 – 3, 116, 126n151
Athens, Athenians 102, 105, 109 – 10, 114,
145n440, 148n471
Augustus, Roman emperor (27 BCE–14
CE) 116, 149n483
Autophrates, satrap of Lydia 111, 146n452
auxiliaries see kribantes
Avars 130n192
axes 54
Babylon 99 – 100
baggage train see touldon
166 Index
Bandini, Angelo-Maria 10
bandon (corps) 50 – 1, 126n150
banner guards 62 – 3, 65, 71, 74, 133n263
banners 36 – 7, 60 – 1, 74, 123n90
Barce 148n469
Basil I, Byzantine emperor (867–86) 1
Bianconi, Daniele 8
Bias of Priene, Greek philosopher 146n454
Bohemond, prince of Antioch 146n455
booty 41, 43, 84 – 5
bows and arrows 54 – 5, 97 – 8, 129n179,
129n184, 138n329
Brasidas, Spartan general 149n479
Brennus, king of the Gauls 106, 144n423
Bulgaria, Bulgars 2
burial of the dead 85
Byzantine empire, Byzantium 1 – 2;
literature and education 3 – 5
Byzantium (city) 148n471
Caesar, Gaius Julius, Roman dictator 25,
98, 102, 105 – 6, 108, 116, 121n22,
140n371, 141n383, 142n397, 143n419,
144n425, 145n434, 149n482
Caltrops 39, 124n105
Camillus, Marcus Furius, Roman dictator
103, 142n401
Campania, Campanians 114, 148n468
Cannae, battle (216 BCE) 109, 145n439
Carthage, Carthaginians 100, 103,
125n125, 149n484
Carthago Nova 142n399
Caryae 142n394
Cassander, king of Macedon (305–297
BCE) 102, 142n398, 146n456, 147n457
catapults 87
cavalry 46, 110 – 11; arms and armour 48,
54 – 5; formation 49, 59 – 60, 67 – 74,
78 – 80; as guards 37 – 8, 56 – 7
Chabrias, Athenian general 116, 145n435,
149n478
Chaeronea, battle (337 BCE) 143n411,
146n450
Chalcis, Macedonian general 113
chalktouba (armour) 47, 53, 128n173
Chares, Athenian general 104, 112,
143n411, 146n456
cheiropsella (armour) 54
Chilon, claimant to Spartan throne 112,
147n458
Chios 114, 148n471
Choerilus of Iasus, Greek poet 99,
141n381
Cimbri 143n416
civilians 32, 86, 90
Clearchus, Spartan general 109, 146n445,
146n448
Cleomenes, king of Sparta (c.590–c.490
BCE) 113, 147n462
Constantine VII, Byzantine emperor
(913–59) 1 – 4, 134n277; and ST 6 – 9
Constantinople 1, 135n294; intellectual
activity 3 – 4
Corfu 8, 143n412
Corinthian War 149n478
Corpus Perditum 7, 140n368
Crete, Cretan, expedition (911) 129n184;
expedition (949) 3, 122n53, 126n151,
128 – 9n167, 128n174, 138n315
Croesus, king of Lydia (561–546 BCE)
146n453
Cypsella 102
Cyrus, Persian prince 146n445
Cyrus the Great, king of Persia (c.559–530
BCE) 25, 98, 100, 106, 111, 121n22,
140n375, 141n385, 143n420, 144n421,
146n453
Cyzicus, Cyzicenes 113, 147n461
Dagron, Gilbert 6
Dain, Alphonse 10 – 11
Damasippus, Macedonian general 142n393
Darius I, king of Persia (522–486 BCE)
114, 141n385, 148n467, 148n469
Darius III, king of Persia (336–330 BCE)
101, 113, 141n390, 141n391
Datames, satrap of Cappadocia 148n472
defeats 33 – 4
defectors see deserters
defensores 46 – 7, 52, 56, 60, 62 – 3, 66 – 9,
71 – 4
defiles 41 – 3, 83, 86, 116 – 17
dekarchos (rank) 50 – 1, 64, 68
Demetrius of Phalerum, governor of
Athens (317–307 BCE) 112, 147n457
Demetrius Poliorketes, Macedonian
general 147n457
Demosthenes, Athenian general 109,
145n441
Dercylidas, Spartan general 114, 148n470
deserters 45 – 6, 60 – 2, 94, 99 – 100,
141n386
Dionysius I, ruler of Syracuse (405–367
BCE) 104, 143n407
diplasiasmos (manoeuvre) 57 – 8
disease 39, 93 – 4

Docimus of Taras, Macedonian general
142n392
doctors 26, 50, 52, 63, 65
Domichetes, defector 142n400
Dorkon, imperial horse 131n196
droungarios (rank) 37, 50, 82, 126n143
droungarokometes (rank) 126n143
Dyrrachium, battle (48 BCE) 142n397
Edessa 3
ekatokontarchos (rank) 25, 37, 40, 50 – 1,
64, 68
encampment 23, 37 – 41, 56 – 7
entaxis (manoeuvre) 57 – 8
envoys 23, 45
epagoge (manoeuvre) 57
Epaminondas, Theban general 103, 106,
110, 142n403, 144n426, 146n447,
147n464
epistates (rank) 51, 64, 68
epistrophe (manoeuvre) 57
Eratosthenes of Cyrene, Greek geographer
27, 122n46
Etruria, Etruscans 102
Euclid, Greek mathematician 4
Eumenes, Macedonian general 107,
144n431
exallagmos (manoeuvre) 57
Falerians 103, 142n401
feigned retreats 70
Florence 8
formation 46 – 8, 51 – 2; infantry 48 – 9,
62 – 7; cavalry 49, 67 – 74, 133n260;
compound 49–50, 75–80; hunting 92;
shape 58 – 60
forts 90 – 1
Foucault, Jules-Albert de 10
Gaius, Roman consul 102
Gaul, Gauls 106, 108
general 63, 65, 84 – 5, 101 – 2; qualities
21 – 30, 120n3; advice to 31 – 46, 85 – 90
Gescon, Carthaginian general 149n484
Goths, Gothic 126n150
Greek fire see hand-siphons; liquid fire
Greek language 3 – 4
Greeks (ancient) 47 – 50
Gregoras, Nikephoros, Byzantine historian 8
guards see viglai
Haase, Friedrich 5
Haldon, John 6
Index 167
Hamdanid dynasty 3
Hamilcar Barca, Carthaginian general 116,
149n484
handbooks see taktika
hand-siphons 88, 138n319
Hannibal, Carthaginian general 109, 116,
145n439, 149n480
Harpagus, Median rebel 98 – 9, 140n375
Hatra 141n382
hekatontarch see ekatokontarchos
Helena Lekapena, Byzantine empress 2
helmets 47, 53, 55, 128nn174 – 5
Herakleios, Byzantine emperor (610–41)
131n196
Hercules, Greek hero 25, 121n22
Heron of Alexandria, Greek mathematician
121n38
Himilco, Carthaginian general 143n407
Hippiatrica 6, 9
Homer, Greek poet 4
horse-archers 46, 48 – 9, 55, 67 – 9
horses 95 – 6, 129n183; armour 55,
131n196
Hugh, king of Italy (924–47) 136, 137n302
hunting 82, 91 – 3
hyperkerosis (manoeuvre) 57
hyperphalangisis (manoeuvre) 57
hypotaxis (manoeuvre) 57 – 8
Hypothesis 7, 140n368
Iberia see Spain
infantry 110 – 11; arms and armour 53 – 4;
formation 48 – 9, 58 – 60, 62 – 7, 75 – 7
Ionians 105
Ionion 110
Iphicrates, Greek mercenary commander
101, 103, 105, 107 – 10, 114 – 15, 117,
141n388, 143n418, 145n438, 148n476,
149n486
Isocrates, Athenian rhetorician 7
isopleuros (formation) 58
javelin-men 46, 48 – 9, 55, 65, 89
javelins 54
John I Tzimiskes, Byzantine emperor
(969–76) 135n294
Julian, Roman emperor (361–3) 149n483
Julian of Ascalon, Greek architect 121n38
kabadia (armour) 53, 128n169
kataphraktoi (heavy cavalry) 5 – 6, 46,
54 – 5, 68 – 9, 71 – 4, 77 – 8, 130 – 1n193,
133nn250 – 1
168 Index
kentarchos see ekatontarchos
Khazars 125n136, 130n192
klibania (armour) 47 – 8, 52 – 5, 125n136,
130n190
Köchly, Hermann 10
Kolias, Taxiarchis 6
komes (rank) 37, 40, 50, 82, 126n143
kontoubernion (file) 51, 64, 127n155
Kourkouas, John, Byzantine general 2 – 3
koursatores 52, 55 – 6
Krateros, Byzantine scribe 8
kribantes (auxiliaries) 50, 52, 63, 65
Krumbacher, Karl 7
Lachares, Athenian statesman 146n456
Lacon see Leucon
lancers 46, 55, 67 – 74, 133n250
Lars Porsena, king of the Etruscans 102,
142n395
Laskaris, Janus, Byzantine scholar 8
Laurenziana Library 8, 10
Lekapenos family 1 – 2
Lemnos, Lemnian 147n457; earth 94,
139n340
Leo VI, Byzantine emperor (886–912) 1;
Taktika 4; and ST 6 – 7, 13, 21, 120n1
Lesbos 147n458
Leucon, king of Bosporus (389–349 BCE)
117, 149n487
Leuctra, battle (371 BCE) 142n403,
144n426
Lipara 100
liquid fire 96 – 7
litany 41, 124n112
lochagos (rank) 25, 50 – 1, 64
lorikia (armour) 53, 55, 128n169
loxe (formation) 58
Lucian, Greek rhetorician 4
Lycurgus, Spartan statesman 104, 115,
143n413
Macedon, Macedonians 2, 47 – 50, 101,
111, 113, 117
Macedonian dynasty 1, 7
Macedonian renaissance 3, 5
maces 55, 130n193
Magas, Ptolemaic general 113, 147n465
Magnaura Palace 3
manikellia (armour) 47, 53, 125n138
manoeuvres 57 – 8
manuals see taktika
Marash 2 – 3; battle (953) 136n299
marches 81 – 4
Marius, Gaius, Roman general 105,
143n416
Massagetae 111, 146n453
Maurice, Byzantine emperor (582–602) 1
Maximus, Quintus Fabius, Roman general
149n480
Media, Medes 106, 143n420, 144n421
Medici, Lorenzo de’, Florentine
statesman 8
Megas see Magas
Meidias, satrap of Scepsis 114, 148n470
Melber, Johannes 10 – 11
Melitene 2 – 3
Memnon of Rhodes, Greek general 113,
147n461
Memphis, battle (321 BCE) 107, 144n430
menas (arrows) 54, 129n180
menavlatoi (medium infantry) 5 – 6, 77 – 9,
134n271
menavlia (spears) 53, 77, 127n167
merarches see tourmarches
Merkourios, saint 127n167
Merops, fictional king 99 – 100, 111 – 13,
116, 141n382, 147n459, 149n479
messages, messengers 98 – 9, 122n55,
140n371
Messenia, Messenians 96, 139n357
metabole (manoeuvre) 57
Methone 109, 113, 145n442, 147n466
Migne, Jacques-Paul 10
minsouratores (surveyors) 50, 52,
126n147, 127n160
Mithridates VI, king of Pontus (120–63
BCE) 135n280
mosynas 88, 138n321
Munda, battle (45 BCE) 143n419
Mygdonius, legendary figure 146n454
Nicias, Athenian general 108, 145n436
night attacks 23, 80 – 1, 135n280
Nikephoros II Phokas, Byzantine emperor
(963–9) 4, 6, 125n135, 134n271,
134n273, 136 – 7n302
Onasander, Greek writer on tactics 1, 5, 7,
121n29
Onias, imaginary figure 99, 108, 114,
116 – 17, 141n379, 145n435, 148n469,
149n481
Onias IV, Jewish high priest 141n379
Orchomenus, battle (85 BCE) 106,
144n422
Oria 136n299
orthia (formation) 58
Paionia, Paionians 95, 139n349
Pammenes, Theban general 113, 147n464

Pandareus, mythical figure 141n382
Paraetonium 147n465
paragoge (manoeuvre) 57, 131n202
parameria (swords) 47, 53 – 4, 125n137,
128n171
parekbole (manoeuvre) 57 – 8
Parthia, Parthians 96
Pelasgi 147n458
Peloponnesian War 143n408, 145n436,
145nn440 – 1
pentarchos (rank) 50 – 1, 64 – 5, 68
pentekontarchos (rank) 25, 37, 51, 64, 68
Perdiccas, Macedonian general 107, 144n430
Perdiccas II, king of Macedon
(c.448–c.413 BCE) 149n479
Peri Metron 121n38
Persia, Persians 43, 91, 97, 106, 113, 117
Peter, khan of the Bulgars (927–69) 2
Pharcedon 145n442
Philip II, king of Macedon (382–336 BCE)
47, 101, 109, 111, 125n135, 145n442
Philo of Byzantium, Greek engineer
140n369
Philotheos, Byzantine author of
Kletorologion 4, 126n143
Phocis, Phocians 110, 146n449
Phokas, Bardas, Byzantine general
136n299, 136 – 7n302
Phokas, Constantine 136n299, 136 – 7n302
Pisidia, Pisidians 111, 148n472
plagia (formation) 58
plaisia (formation) 58
Plato, Athenian philosopher 4
podopsella (armour) 53, 55, 128n173
poison 93 – 5, 97 – 8
Polyaenus, Greek writer on tactics 1, 7, 10,
140n368, 142n404
Polybius, Greek historian 78, 134n273
Pompeius, Gnaeus, Roman general
143n419
Pompey the Great, Roman general 102 – 4,
135n280, 142n397, 142n402, 143n409
Pompiscus the Arcadian, Greek general
142n402, 143n409
Posidonius of Apamea, Greek philosopher
122n47
priests 60 – 1
prisoners of war 43, 60, 62, 84 – 5, 94,
136n299, 136 – 7n302
prokoursatores 43, 46 – 7, 52, 55 – 6, 60,
62 – 3, 65 – 9, 71 – 4
protaxis (manoeuvre) 57 – 8
Pseudagoras, fictional figure 99
Ptolemy I Soter, king of Egypt (305–283
BCE) 107, 144n430
Index 169
Punic Wars 125n125, 141n386, 142n399,
145n439, 147n460
punishments 34 – 5, 116, 149n482
pursuit of the enemy 85 – 6
Pylos, battle (425 BCE) 109, 145n441
Rance, Philip 119n1
rear guards 64 – 5, 72
Regulus, Marcus Atilius, Roman general
45, 125n125
retreats 115 – 16
Romanos I Lekapenos, Byzantine emperor
(920–44) 1 – 3, 7, 136n298, 136 – 7n302
Rome, Romans (ancient) 100, 102 – 3, 106,
109, 116; sack of (410) 141n382
rumours 29, 122n52
Rus, Russians 135n294, 136n302, 136–7n302
Sacae 114
saddles 130n192
saka (formation) 46, 70 – 1
Salamis 102, 142n398
salaries 85, 136 – 7n298
Samnites 148n468
Samosata 2 – 3
Samson, Old Testament hero 25, 121n22
sarissai (spears) 47
Sayf ad-Dawla, Hamdanid emir (945–67)
3, 131n196, 136n299, 136 – 7n302
Scaevola, Gaius Mucius, Roman hero 102,
142n395
Scipio, Africanus, Publius Cornelius,
Roman general 102, 142n399, 144n424,
147n460
Scipio Africanus the Younger, Roman
general 106, 144n424
Scyths, Scythian 91, 97, 107, 117,
144n430, 148n467
Seleucus II Callinicus, Hellenistic king
100, 141n387
Sestus 146n456
Seuthes, king of the Odrysians 145n438
Shapur I, king of Persia (240–70)
141n382, 141n384, 146n454
shield bearers 63 – 7, 75, 78
shields 47 – 8, 53 – 4, 127n165
Sicily, Sicilian 100
siege engines 87 – 8, 137n312
sieges 30 – 3, 86 – 91
siege towers 89, 138n320
signals 81, 134n277, 135n278
slingers, slings 65, 129n181
Social Wars 143n412, 148n471
Solomon, king of Israel (c.970–c.931
BCE) 25, 121n22
170 Index
Spain, Spanish 102, 112, 142n399
Sparta, Spartans 96, 101, 105, 109 – 10,
114, 139n357, 143n413, 145n440,
147n458, 148n474
spears 47 – 8, 53, 127n166, 129n187
spies 40, 44 – 5, 61, 98, 104
stoichein (manoeuvre) 57
Strabo, Greek geographer 27
Strasbourg, battle (357) 149n483
stratiotai 5, 52 – 3, 123n84
strepta 88, 138n319
Sulla, Lucius Cornelius, Roman dictator
98, 106, 140n374, 144n422
surveyors see minsouratores
swords 47 – 8, 52 – 4, 130n191
Sylloge Tacticorum 4 – 5; date and author
5 – 7; manuscripts and editions 8 – 11
Symeon, khan of the Bulgars
(893–927) 2
synaspismos (formation) 59
syntelestai 35, 123n84
Syracuse 108, 145n436, 147n466
Syrianos Magistros, Byzantine writer on
tactics 4, 121n29
systole (manoeuvre) 57 – 8
Tactica Perdita 7
tagmata 5, 50 – 2, 75 – 7, 126n151
tagmatarches 51; see also taxiarchos
taktika (handbooks) 1, 4 – 5, 10
Tarsus 3
taxiarchos (rank) 40, 51, 85, 124n111
taxis (formation) 51, 124n111
Tedald, margrave 136 – 7n302
Telesinicus, Corinthian general 113,
147n466
Teres, defector 142n400
tetrarchos (rank) 50 – 1, 64 – 5
Thebes, Thebans 111
themata 5, 126n151, 132n232
Themistocles, Athenian statesman 105,
143nn417 – 18
Theodore, saint 135n278
Theodosia 145n433
Theodosioupolis 2 – 3
Thermopylae, battle (480 BCE) 146n449
Thessaloniki 136n299
Thrace, Thracians 2, 102, 108 – 10
thyreoi (shields) 47, 67
Timotheus, Athenian general 104, 143n411
tortoise (formation) 59, 67
tortoise (siege engine) 87, 89, 138n315
touldon (baggage train) 41 – 3, 52, 64,
71 – 2, 77, 83 – 4, 127n157
tourmarches (rank) 37, 40, 50, 82, 85,
126n143, 126n148
traitors 33, 45 – 6, 114 – 15
trebuchets 87, 137n312
Triballi 107, 144n432
truces 34 – 5
trumpets, trumpeters 36, 50, 63, 65, 72, 74,
80 – 1, 84, 123n87, 123n93
Turks 43, 97
Tynnichus, Greek general 145n433
Tyre 101, 141n389
Tyrennius, Greek general 108, 112,
145n433, 146n455
Vári, Rudolph 10
Veii 142n401
Vieillefond, Jean-René 10
viglai (guards) 57, 61, 90
Virgin Mary 135n294
water supply 87, 90, 95, 139n339
Wheeler, Everett 11
Wölfflin, Eduard 10 – 11
Xenophon, Greek historian 28
Xerxes, king of Persia (486–465 BCE)
105, 143n417
Zopyrus, Persian satrap 100
zygoun (manoeuvre) 57