What Is Music? Is There a Definitive Answer?

Author(s): JONATHAN MCKEOWN-GREEN

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , FALL 2014, Vol. 72, No. 4 (FALL
2014), pp. 393-403
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics

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 JONATHAN MCKEOWN-GREEN

What Is Music? Is There a Definitive Answer?

ABSTRACT

Philosophers frequently defend definitions by appealing to intuitions and contemporary folk classificatory
methodological concerns that undermine some of these defenses. Focusing on Andrew Kania's recent definition
argue that the way in which it has been developed leads to problems, and I show that a number of other definit
to philosophers of art (and others) run into similar problems.

Philosophers often develop and defend definitions

such definition tells us, at best , what we currently
of kinds of things by enlisting intuitionstakeabout
to be music, and this information proves to
haveand
what it takes for something to be of the kind little practical value. Section V examines
appealing to empirical facts about society'swhat happens if the assumption is suspended. It
classi-
explores alternative approaches to the business of
ficatory practices. They consider the implications
of these data and posit necessary and sufficient
defining things, but, for these, a defense reliant
conditions for kind membership that they support
on intuitions and classificatory practices is insuffi-
by reflecting on the evidence as a whole. Andrew
cient. Consequently, definitions like Kania's must
Kania employs this strategy to advance his pre-be defended differently or rejected.
either
ferred definition of music.1 I evaluate that defi-
nition and highlight methodological dangers that
threaten projects of this sort, arguing that I.defini-
KANIA'S DEFINITION
tions like his cannot be successfully defended in
this way. Exclusive appeals to intuitions and clas-
Kania defines music as: "(1) any event intention-
sificatory practices only work if the natureally
of the
produced or organized (2) to be heard, and
(3) either (a) to have some basic musical fea-
thing being defined is determined by our concep-
tion of it, that is, by the way we construe ture,
it- thesuch as pitch or rhythm, or (b) to be lis-
features we take it to have in virtue of being theto for such features."2 He thinks many
tened
thing it is. Even if this condition is met, hurdles
avant-garde works flout (3a). His examples are
remain for Kania and others. "John Cage's Williams Mix (1952)- a tape com-
Section I presents Kania's account. He defines position painstakingly spliced together out of a
music in terms of intentions to manifest partic-variety of sound sources, without regard to their
ular sonic properties or to promote experiences basic musical features- [and] Yoko Ono's Toilet
characterized by reference to those properties.Piece/Unknown (1971)- an unedited recording of
Sections II to IV introduce difficulties for this a flushing toilet."3 Yet these are music, if they sat-
proposal as well as for an earlier one by Jerroldisfy (3b): "one can listen to sounds under a par-
Levinson to which Kania is responding and, in- ticular concept without the sounds actually falling
deed, for any definition of music that foregrounds
under that concept. Thus we can admit as mu-
sic sounds intended to be listened to for basic
sonic or experiential properties. Assuming that it
is an analysis of the folk conception of music, any
musical features that everyone is aware they do
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72:4 Fall 2014
© 2014 The American Society for Aesthetics

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394 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

what anybody intended, by bearing in mind that

not possess."4 (3b), though, is violated by melodic
in other works Zorn references grunge and that he
or rhythmic events- like the practicing of scales
to improve dexterity- that are not intended to writes uncontroversially tonal and rhythmic mu-
be listened to for such features but that Kania sic for conventional forces. Kania is right to think
takes to be music. Hence, his third condition that
is a some works lacking all basic musical features
can and perhaps should be appreciated against a
disjunction: "Condition (3a) should capture most
music across history and the globe, while (3b)
conventional musical tradition and that many of
these can reasonably be counted among the music.
should capture the remaining modernist and post-
But plausibly, in his eagerness to admit some but
modern musical experiments, such as Ono's Toilet
Piece/Unknown and Cage's Williams Mix."5 not too much arrhythmic, unpitched, contempo-
Basic musical features are crucial for determin- rary, or otherwise outlying material, Kania fastens
ing what counts as music, on Kania's view. His on an arbitrary criterion.
list is open-ended, but they are clearly features Other alleged counterexamples have been top-
from which there has been only comparatively re- ics of lively debate. Kania excludes electronic,
cent or sporadic departure in the traditions wherestochastic, and noise composition that violates (3).
Western commentators normally think music oc-He writes:
curs. Music that lacks, and is not intended to
have, such features qualifies derivatively by being [T]here are works of sonic art that will not count as
heard against a background that frames listening music according to my definition. These are works such
in terms of them. as Toilet Piece/Unknown that lack basic musical features

Considering potential counterexamples may
help to elucidate Kania's definition. Morse code
is not music, but Kania cannot easily exclude it
without defining rhythm in a way that also ex-
cludes some metrically irregular music.6 Some-
body who intentionally produces or organizes
but (unlike Toilet Piece/Unknown) are not intended to
be listened to for such features. (It could be argued that
Williams Mix is in fact such a piece.) This is an advantage
of the definition I have suggested, since there does seem
to be just such a division in contemporary art practice
between music and sound art.7

sound for artistic purposes might not intend it to

have, or be listened to for, basic musical features It is indeed widely accepted that a lot of mate-
but may nonetheless produce something tuneful. rial can be helpfully called sound art.8 Yet in-
(Imagine a bank of pipes arranged to face the fluential people think some events lacking basic
wind, broadcasting pleasant tones. Imagine that musical features are both sound art and music.

by chance the sound produced when air blows
through them is an arresting, hummable melody.)
(3) is violated here, but some might think music
happens. The solitary drummer wearing earplugs
while practicing rudiments violates (2), since he
Andy Hamilton, recounting a telephone conversa-
tion with Philip Samartzis, says: "Though happy to
call himself a sound-artist, [Samartzis] is ambiva-
lent about dividing avant-garde musical explo-
ration from sound-art. He concedes that he thinks

or she does not intend that anything be heard. Yet in musical terms."9 Karlheinz Stockhausen wrote
one might think he or she makes music, if one that "nowadays any noise is musical material."10
agrees with Kania that pianists practicing scales Edgard Varèse said: "When I was . . . giving con-
do. The sole relevant difference is that the drum- certs of modern music, I got sick of the stupid
mer endeavors to render the material unheard. phrase 'Interesting, but is it music?' After all, what
Arguably, some avant-garde works that Kania is music but organized sound- all music! So, I said
would happily call music actually flout (3b): it is that my music was organized sound and that I
not obvious that they all were, or are, intended to was not a musician, but a worker in frequencies
and intensities."11 Sympathizers with these stand-
be listened to for basic musical features. The inten-
tions of many creators who depart from, but some-points may propose counterexamples to Kania's
how still belong to, a tradition centered on basic definition: events that they take to be music, ei-
musical features are surely indeterminate on this ther on the basis of their own reflection, or be-
matter, and others may have intentions that are cause they recognize that the community has so
contrary to the one Kania ascribes to them. Ap- decided, even though the events lack all basic mu-
sical features and are not intended to be listened
preciating and classifying John Zorn's challeng-
ing game pieces might be facilitated, no matterto for such features.

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McKeown-Green What Is Music? 395

I delay assessing counterexamples until Section banks store and lend money. Some are about pro-
IV, but they raise a methodological issue thatceduresis involving a thing, such as its connection
worth remarking on now. I am not sure what re- with an institution or its creator: banks are accred-
sources Kania would rally in response to them.ited If by governments. Some intuitions are criterial:
he brandishes intuitions, his opponents can too. part of what makes something a bank is that it
If he appeals to institutional practice, as he does lends money. Others are evidentiary: a rainbow
when dividing music from sound art, his oppo- is the kind of thing that we identify by observing
nents can insist that the practice is equivocal. Ifcolors,
he whether or not those colors help to make
prioritizes some data over others, seeking reflec- something a rainbow.
tive equilibrium, on what grounds does he decideMany factors influence the development, main-
which data to prioritize? It is unclear what ad- tenance, and updating of classificatory intuitions.
ditional evidence Kania would adduce to defend Different people generalize differently from sim-
his definition. This becomes important in the final ilar exemplars- of music, mental states, or moral
section. rectitude- depending on, inter alia , which heuris-
Intuitions and classificatory practices formtics they adopt for recognizing new instances, what
Kania's evidence base. These bear on what peo- authority figures say, which aspects of culture they
ple take music to be. Since Kania is proposingthink a are universal, which states of affairs they
definition of music, he can only be fully vindicatedtake to be unchanging, their capacity for imag-
by these data if the nature of music is settled by ining alternative pasts and futures, their meta-
our conception of music. I assume throughout the physical proclivities, and how reflective they are.
next three sections that it is. But I argue that what
One informant may intuit that music always has a
counts as music according to our folk conceptiontune is or a beat. Another suspects that nothing con-
so controversial and dependent on historical acci- strains the principles of organization or the sonic
dent that we must doubt the extensional adequacy elements that can generate music. One may judge
and usefulness of Kania's definition, assuming itthatis bananas are well qualified to be fruit because
taken to specify our conception of music. Section of their constitution or function and that tomatoes
II examines how intuitions and social norms con- only just qualify or are clearly on the border be-
stitute folk conceptions. Section III, a case study,tween fruit and nonfruit. Another may regard the
investigates our folk conception of jazz, prefigur- status of tomatoes as unclear or indeterminate. A
ing the worries raised subsequently for Kania'sthird may distinguish a botanical from a culinary
definition of music. Section IV raises those wor- kind of fruit. No one need be intransigent; they
ries: when construed as specifications of our folkjust have different starting points.
conception, Kania's definition and others that ap- Agents' intuitions and any reflecting they do
peal to sonic and experiential properties or inten- fuel the furnace that emits communal classifica-
tions to produce them are controversial and not tory practices. Such practices are subject to norms
future-proof. This severely constrains their useful-that likewise address various features of objects-
ness. Section V considers ways of defining musicperceptual, functional, and so on, and they too
(and other things) that are not hostage to folk may distinguish central cases from vague, contro-
conceptions. versial, or hybrid cases. The norms constitute folk
conceptions of kinds of things. These manifest psy-
chologically among community members as dispo-
II. INTUITIONS AND NORMS
sitions to lump roughly the same things together,
perhaps for roughly the same reasons.
Hunches, gut feelings, and sober judgmentsWhen
aboutunfamiliar objects surface or fresh in-
which pegs fit which holes fix on various features
sights are gained, communally sanctioned tax-
of the items they concern. Some of these intuitions , often sorely tested. Is heavy wa-
onomies are
as we shall call them, are about what something is Is unauthorized downloading theft?
ter water?
made of: cottage pie contains mince and Such questions prompt decisions about which
potato.
Some are about how we perceive things- always, cases to include under existing cat-
unfamiliar
typically, or ideally: rainbows present as egories.
bands of
There may be tentativeness, disagree-
specific colors in a specific order, arched ment,
acrossor
the
indifference about marginal cases and
sky. Some are about what something does arbitrariness
or is for: in the ways practices accommodate

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396 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

unprecedented phenomena. These need not un- eaten as the first meal of the day (as in: we serve
dermine a classificatory practice's coherence or all-day breakfast). So the fact that we use the same
utility. An indignant carnivore can argue with a word to describe two things does not always mean
waiter about whether some vegetarian dish is a that our intuitions incline us to regard them as
cottage pie without anybody doubting that rules kind-mates satisfying a single conception of some-
govern what counts as one. Whales are classed as thing. Meanwhile, 'nice' once meant fastidious,
mammals, though they might not have been. This but seldom does nowadays. So the fact that a new
precisifies the criteria for being a mammal along case comes to fall arbitrarily within the extension
one trajectory rather than another, but those cri- of an old word might signal an old folk conception
teria are still consistent and handy. giving way to a new one rather than a single
Nevertheless, extensive uncertainty or dis- conception updating. Yet, conceptual disorder
agreement about how to classify marginal cases cannot always be thus described. Intuitions and
may imply a lack of consensus about why even classificatory tendencies often harbor evidence
central cases clump together. And where there is that the folk (however untidily) regard multiple
much arbitrariness in the way categories stretch to conceptual norms, diachronically and synchron-
subsume new cases, maybe loud voices, rather than ically, as bearing on the same notion. When
coherent, serviceable rules, are calling the shots. diversity of opinion (as with the vegetarian cot-
One-off uses of old words to cover new, marginal tage pie) is routinely interpreted as disagreement,
instances sometimes penetrate public discourse when an institution (like the American Society
and affect the way the folk classify those instances for Aesthetics) coordinates activity across a wide
thereafter. Bloggers, broadcasters, lobbyists, leg- spectrum, when there is conceptual conservatism,
islators, arbiters of fashion, and pundits dispro- or when a term subsumes sundry cases without
portionately influence updating of classificatory checking out as ambiguous, we have (defeasible)
norms in new circumstances, perhaps because of evidence of a single conception. Both 'jazz' and
their public profile rather than because their views 'music,' for instance, tick all of these boxes.
are uncommonly well-informed. Hence, the as- Analysts of folk conceptions gather intuitions
sortment of cases satisfying a folk conception can and postulate societal norms to explain verdicts
become hard to subsume under a single principle. on particular cases. Some data may be discarded
(This is one story about why our conception of and some prioritized in the hunt for a coherent
sport, for example, invites a family-resemblance- principle that summarizes and perhaps explains
style analysis.) all, or most, verdicts. If the items falling uncon-
The prospect of unprincipled conceptions is in- troversially under a folk conception differ greatly
creased by the prevalence of conceptual conser- in their constitution or perceptual properties, ei-
vatism. This ensures that if something counts as ther at a time or over time, they might still turn
a clear instance of a concept at some time, it out to perform, or be meant to perform, the same
counts as an instance of that concept at all sub- function. Banks and letterboxes are like this; their
sequent times, regardless of how far the concept functions unify our conceptions of them. Alterna-
gets warped to cover new cases. ("Greensleeves" tively, all the items falling under some conception
will always count as music, no matter what new- may turn out to be mandated in similar ways by
fangled stuff does or does not.) Where there is similar institutions. Legal rights and duties might
conceptual conservatism, extending a folk concep- be like this. If all else fails, a conception that ap-
tion to cover new cases is like building new rooms plies to new things in an apparently ad hoc manner
on a house. When the loudest voices are not the might evolve in a recursively describable fashion:
most reasonable, there is no guarantee that the new instances are always causally connected with
resulting structure conforms to a plan.12 slightly older ones in the same way, even if they
Unmoderated conceptual drift sometimes end up differing markedly from very early ones.13
signals that, despite appearances, multiple folk Sometimes, though, the analyst might reason-
conceptions are in play, simultaneously or in ably conjecture that no principle at all subsumes
succession. Close attention to language may the things picked out by a particular folk concep-
reveal this. 'Breakfast' currently has at least two tion. Given the way practices evolve, this is not
meanings: first meal of the day (as in: I haven't surprising. In the next section, I illustrate this situ-
had breakfast yet) and the kinds of food typically ation by documenting the haphazard evolution of

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McKeown-Green What Is Music? 397

our conception of jazz. Then, in Section IV, I argueNevertheless, suppose that I successfully char-
that some of the lessons we learn about jazz applyacterize our current folk conception of jazz in
terms of experiential and sonic properties and in-
to music. Specifically, I argue that if there is any
tentions to manifest them: I accurately distinguish
unity and practical utility to be found in our con-
jazz, nonjazz, and penumbra. My definition would
ception of music, we will only find it by examining
exploit classificatory facts not available to a de-
features- perhaps functional, institutional, or re-
cursively describable ones- other than the sonic, finer circa 1920. 1, in turn, lack access to data about
experiential, and intentional features that Kania future stylistic innovations and the unforeseeable
invokes in his definition. tendencies of our heirs to dub or disqualify them.
Like one from 1920, my definition would not be
III. CLOSE ENOUGH FOR JAZZ
future proof Mine would only specify the extent
to which an item counts as jazz now. It might be
Bebop, swing, and Dixieland count as jazz. Rock interesting, but arguably no other
sociologically
'n' roll does not. Most Broadway songs do not,
benefits accrue.
though jazzers routinely improvise on them. Therefour purposes for which a definition of
Consider
are areas of doubt, disagreement, and indiffer-
a kind of thing might be consulted. Not every defi-
ence. Some Third Stream music might be border-
nition whatsoever need meet all four expectations,
andwhether
line jazz, or maybe people disagree about there are other rewards that definitions can
some of it is borderline or most of it is hybrid.
deliver, but, I suggest, quadruple failure strongly
Disputes rage about whether Miles Davis stopped
indicates a dearth of practical applications.
playing jazz and whether Kenny G started. First, one might want a definition to illuminate
We are hard-pressed for criteria distinguish-
the shared nature of the kind-mates. We expect
ing even central cases of jazz from most nonjazz.
this from a definition of a natural kind. Maybe jazz
Much canonical jazz does not emphasizelacks improvi-
a shared nature. Anyway, a successful char-
sation; much country and folk music does. Peopleof our current conception like the one
acterization
who enjoy central cases of jazz from onewe subgenre
envisage supplies none. It yields a procedure
are not especially likely to enjoy jazz from other
for generating the current extension of our con-
subgenres. Such disunity is easily explained histor-
ception, but the folk treat jazz as a persisting kind,
and we cannot
ically. For example: influential swing soloists in- trust our definition to foretell its
vented bebop; their experiments influencedfortunes.
swing
performance style; since swing was jazz, it Second,
was nat- one might want a definition to state cri-
ural to authorize bebop. Rock 'n' roll, despite shar-
teria used in practice to identify whether (or the
ing many features with swing, had roots in rhythm
extent to which) something is of the kind. A good
and blues and country. By covering some styles
definition of a mother-in-law obliges: you identify
more than others, DownBeat and other mothers-in-law
jazz jour- by identifying spouses' mothers.
nals steered readers toward those styles. Our envisaged specification of our conception of
No rigorous constraints govern the evolution
jazz will not yield identificatory criteria. These are
of the criteria for identifying instances likely
of jazz.
to No
include a network of defeasible heuristics
Academie de Jazz arbitrates. Nor doesassociated
jazz, like
with subgenres, central cases, and indi-
atoms and mammals, play a well-defined causal
vidual careers: "This is jazz because it's hard bop;
role in some theory about the world's workings.
that's jazz because of the breathy sax solos; those
Thus, the story of jazz could easily have are
gonejazzdif-
because Monk wrote them." Heuristics
ferently. The beboppers might have left vary
jazz critics
from person to person, even for central cases
behind, attracting new listeners. Bebop might
where then
there is no disagreement about whether
not have been regarded as jazz. Fledgling rock
there 'n'
is jazz.
roll might have occupied more space in Third, Down- one might want a definition to isolate the
Beat. Nothing in the previous practicecriteria
signaledimplicit in decisions about which marginal
that certain styles, and not others, would count
or novel things are of the kind. We expect this from
as jazz later. Nor is it likely that actuala legal
jazz his-
definition of malice aforethought. We do
tory reflects a more principled, strategic,
notelegant,
find it here. Jazz evolves desultorily, and some
or otherwise defensible program than allofcounter-
the relevant decisions are in the future, where
factual ones. the definition cannot reach.

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398 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

Finally, one might want a novice to efficiently
learn which things belong to the kind by apply-
ing the definition. This works for mothers-in-law.14
But, for a start, our specification of our concep-
tion of jazz will probably be a complicated clus-
ter definition or an opaque lengthy disjunction.
Expect hedge clauses, reflecting doubt, disagree-
ment, and indifference. Also, since it is confined
to what currently counts as jazz, the definition
in this way. What matters for what follows is that,
because of border skirmishes and especially fu-
ture uncertainties, we cannot usefully define our
conception of jazz solely in terms of sonic or ex-
periential properties or intentions like those that
Kania invokes in his definition of music.
IV. MOTLEY MUSIC

might misleadingly reveal transitory, adventitious

orderliness. Our newcomer can do much better. Not every folk conception is as unruly as ja
If he were quite interested in discovering jazz,
but our conception of music is unruly enough
he should learn some history. That will acclima-
warrant skepticism about the utility of definit
tize him to what counts as jazz and when. It will
like Kania's. As with jazz, there is doubt, disagr
ment, and indifference about what counts as m
demonstrate why some kinds of drift occur but not
others. If he is only mildly interested, he should
sic and how borderline or hybrid various ca
are. Much that is routinely treated as music
sample canonical instances so that he realizes what
people mean when they allude to jazz. Suppose the elite, Western artworld or by metallers is
that, instead, another newcomer learns my hypo- parently not music to the public's ears (excep
movies). As noted in Section I, some of it is n
thetical specification of what our conception cur-
music according to Kania's definition, though
rently licenses. Then she learns only some of what
she ought to know, together with arbitrary factswould be included by many sonic revolutiona
peculiar to the period on which the definition re-
who regard themselves and are often regarde
ports. Had she known enough history or central music makers. Securing broad agreement ab
what counts as music is unlikely when comm
cases to match her curiosity, my definition would
have been superfluous. tators differ not merely over where to draw
Perhaps a serviceable, accurate, future-proof boundaries but over what makes something m
characterization of our folk conception that re-sic. Nor can one say uncontroversially that th
spects the fuzziness of the boundaries is re- are just different conceptions of music in pl
coverable from our intuitions and classificatorysome might insist that there is one core not
trends, but surely it would invoke properties other
that fragments around the edges.
than sonic and experiential ones. It might be aMoreover, as with jazz, institutional decisio
recursive-historical definition that details how an about what is music and what is not seem no more
event gets to be jazz if it is suitably related to priorcoherent or inevitable than some alternative histo-
jazz. A successful definition of this kind would plotries. Just as bebop might not have been regarded as
a pattern through the evolution of our conception,jazz, material by Cage and Varèse could easily not
revealing either deep stability in that conceptionhave been regarded as music. Much of it eschews
or a network of different, but related, conceptionsthe tonal, rhythmic, and timbrai resources of their
that change and cross-fertilize in ways that can benative tradition, and they celebrated this discon-
explained systematically. Alternative characteri- tinuity. However, they took their work to signal
zations would say that an event gets to be jazz justan expansion and liberalization of that tradition
when or to the extent that it performs a particular and influenced many, including musicians working
function in our cognitive or social lives or is ac-primarily in more established styles. Maybe that
cepted as jazz by a relevant institution. Because ofhelps to explain why their work is often regarded
the unruliness and consequent unpredictability ofas music. Furthermore, just as rock 'n' roll might
jazz's development, I doubt that any definer could have been regarded as jazz, foley- the addition
reliably discern a recursively describable histor- of sound effects to a film after shooting- might
ical pattern or diachronically stable function. have counted as music. The foley artist's inventive
Perhaps an institutional definition would fare bet- manipulation of assorted objects and the resulting
ter, but such definitions are subject to well-knownplay of sound are akin to much twentieth-century
difficulties, and I will not speculate here about thepercussion work. However, foley did not emerge
prospects of characterizing our conception of jazz from that tradition and differed sufficiently from

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McKeown-Green What Is Music ? 399

mainstream music to be distinguished from it in to diligently reflect on music as it was and could
studio postproduction. Maybe that helps to ex- be might have pictured a future in which such
plain why it is not regarded as music. In short, items were regarded as music. But even if this
the sequence of decisions of the communities in prevented him or her from discarding the pos-
which a conception of music is used to classify sibility that those items should count as music,
things could easily have gone differently but justcategorically including them would mean riskily
as coherently. predicting, beyond the mandate of prevailing in-
All of this controversy and haphazardness is tuitions and practices and perhaps contrary to the
definer's own intuitions, that the criteria for de-
bad news for definitions of music in terms of expe-
riential and sonic properties and agents' intentionslineating music would follow a particular path.
to generate them when those definitions are de- So even if Kania's definition accurately captures
fended by appeals to current intuitions about what the folk's conception of music at the beginning of
counts as music together with past and present the twenty-first century, his anticipator's success
institutional classificatory facts. There are poten-in describing that same conception is lucky, not
prescient.
tially two flavors of bad news. The first is boundary
controversies. In the previous section, we imag- If Kania has aspirations beyond his time, he
ined a hypothetical characterization of our con- faces the same plight: he cannot be expected to
ception of jazz in terms of sonic and perceptual rule in everything that might count as music 180
properties and related intentions that took bound-years hence. By then, there might be a tradition
ary disputes to be just that. Perhaps a characteri-
of performing, in front of an audience, works that
zation of our conception of music in similar termsresemble Western concert music, except that they
could do likewise, but Kania's does not. As we are not intended to be heard. When they are per-
have seen, it passes confident verdicts on some formed, by dropping feathers onto cushions or
cases about which the folk are noncommittal or blowing ultrasonic whistles, aficionados appreci-
ambivalent, categorically excluding some avant- ate the performers' skill, the intricacy of the mo-
garde offerings that sonic revolutionaries regard tivic development (revealed by the details of their
actions), the nuanced effect of the recital on ca-
as music and including others that most people, in-
cluding many music lovers, exclude. This prevents nine spectators, or the play of sounds (clicking
that particular definition from being extension- keys, furtive breaths) attendant on the realiza-
ally adequate. The other bad news item was fatal tion of the inaudible content. Such works violate
even to our hypothetical definition of jazz, and Kania's
I second condition and perhaps also his
think the sort of definition of music we are dis- third. But, given that some present-day commen-
tators believe in silent music, we can coherently
cussing cannot avoid it either. Any such definition
can only aspire to specifying what currently getsenvisage futures in which these works are re-
counted as music. Given conceptual conservatism, garded as music. Equally, given present-day un-
we can expect it to include among the music mostease about whether there can be silent music, we
if not all of what clearly counted as music in for-
can envisage futures in which they do not.
mer times. However, if the definition accurately Another scenario reinforces the point. One
hundred eighty years hence, deaf people might
identifies criteria that always will track what gets
counted as music, this is a fluke. routinely make and appreciate music, taking ad-
To see why, suppose Kania's definition was an- vantage of sophisticated enhancements of current
ticipated 180 years ago by a columnist in Robert technology that enables them to monitor vibra-
Schumann's Neue Zeitschrift für Musik. Only for- tions tactually. Suppose this mode of perception
tuitously could this visionary produce a definition
turns out not to be a form of hearing: it is pro-
of music in terms of its real or intended sonic cessed very differently from the way auditory sig-
or experiential properties, whose extension nals
in- are processed. If this is part of our future,
cludes Ono's Toilet Piece/Unknown. There were there will one day be music that violates condition
insufficient clues in the musical landscape of mid-
(2): it will not be intended that it be heard; yet we
nineteenth-century Europe to motivate the inclu-
can also envisage futures from which this scenario
is absent.
sion of any material that lacks all basic musical
features. A columnist who was musically, philo- So even if Kania is right about what gets
sophically, and anthropologically capable enough
counted as music now, he cannot, except flukily,

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400 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

predict what else will get counted as music in the four potential benefits of definitions from our jazz
future. Maybe posterity will require additional dis- discussion. Definitions of music of the kind under
juncts in condition (3) and a retraction of (2). scrutiny satisfy none of them.
An earlier definition to which Kania is respond- First, a specification of our current folk con-
ing shares his difficulties. Jerrold Levinson de- ception, couched in terms of sonic and experien-
fines music as "sounds temporally organized by tial features and related intentions, cannot illumi-
a person for the purpose of enriching or intensify- nate the shared nature of all that counts as music.
ing experience through active engagement (e.g., Like jazz, the folk regard music as a kind with a
listening, dancing, performing) with the sounds future. Whatever the definition says, we cannot
regarded primarily, or in significant measure as know what counts as music in the future. (Kania's
sounds."15 Like Kania, Levinson has difficulties proposal also represents boundaries as more set-
negotiating the boundaries of our conception: he tled than they are.) So we cannot even confirm
gleefully excludes Muzak, but surely many peo- extensional adequacy.
ple, even on reflection, think Muzak is music and Second, this sort of definition does not state
Kania cheerfully includes it.16 In the imagined fu- the criteria used in practice to identify whether
tures of the previous paragraph, the music will not something counts as music. In central cases, peo-
be captured by Levinson's definition. ple might fasten on Kania's basic musical fea-
Perhaps there are analyses of our conception tures: "This, I can sing"; "That's got rhythm."18
of music that do not rule unsafely on marginal or Further out, other desiderata often hold sway.
future cases. A theorist in any period, reflecting For you, Penderecki's Threnody to the Victims of
on our intuitions and classificatory norms, might Hiroshima is music because he prescribes a string
propose a historical-recursive, functional, or pro- orchestra. For me, it is music because it sounds like
cedural analysis. This is still risky, given the de- something I studied for a music exam. A specifi-
finer's ignorance about the future.17 Still, for all cation of an aggregated folk conception will not
I have argued, such definitions might accurately be this idiosyncratic.
and nonflukily inform us about a temporally sta- Third, a definition like Kania's, construed as an-
ble folk conception of music (with fuzzy edges) alyzing a current folk conception, will not isolate
that is manifested differently at different times the criteria implicit in decisions about which novel
or about conceptions that succeed one another in stuff counts as music. As with jazz, some of these
accordance with a pattern. They would do so with- are decisions about the future.
out being as specific as Kania's proposal is about Finally, a beginner would not efficiently learn
the causal, experiential, and contextual features what counts as music by encountering this sort of
in virtue of which we regard something as music, distillation of what we currently take to qualify.
at a given time, but, as we have seen, proposals It would provide, at best, a potentially misleading
like his are sensitive to the indeterminacies and snapshot of a turbulent, evolving practice. And,
transformations of societal norms. as with jazz, an interest in the issue of what
Boundary disputes and expiry dates are not au- gets regarded as music should cue a history
tomatically slights on a definition. Yes, our crite- lesson.
ria for identifying music are awkwardly controver-
sial at the margins, and they evolve, but puzzling
concepts that play a role in classifying items need V. FACING THE FOLK VERSUS FACING THE MUSIC
not be fully determinate or stable to be worth un-
derstanding, and a partial understanding could be The pitfalls outlined above presumably aff
better than nothing. However, our discussion of definitions of many kinds that are defende
jazz illustrated how our conception of something large part by appeals to intuitions and past
can be at the mercy of haphazard development to present classificatory decisions about what
such an extent that the question of what currently the kind. I have drawn particular attention
counts as falling under it is of mainly sociological analyses of our conceptions of jazz and of m
import. This cap may or may not fit our concep- that make claims about actual or intended sonic
tion of music, but it does if that conception can be or experiential properties. However, we can ex-
analyzed only in terms of the kinds of features to pect similar allegations of extensional inadequacy
which Kania alludes in his definition. Recall the and lack of utility to dog any characterization

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McKeown-Green What Is Music? 401

and
of a folk conception that rules unequivocally onare not constrained by our conceptions of
things.20 Chomskian I-languages are posited to
contentious cases or only reliably tells us the story
so far about an undisciplined bundle of evolving explain certain phenomena that are informally
features. described as linguistic: chiefly, deep similarities
Kania might insist that his definition is not a among
re- syntactic descriptions of diverse languages
port of what the community takes music to be: andhe the rapidity of children's language acqui-
has a different take on how to define music. Ifsition.so, For this role, perhaps I-languages need
he may need to consider which sorts of evidence not accord with the everyday conception of a
should be used to support his definition, andlanguage.
this
will depend on what kind of thing he takes music What is music? Is it like jazz in that its nature
to be. is plausibly exhausted by our conception of it?
Proposed definitions that are answerable only Is it like a rainbow, on Jackson's story, in that
to intuitions and community norms should beits nature is at least partly determined by fac-
re-
garded primarily as attempts to unpack our tors con-beyond our conception of it but constrained
ceptions of things. If it is adequate, a definitionby of
that conception? Is it like I-language is some-
a rainbow supported by such data reveals whattimes we taken to be in that it could turn out rather
take rainbows to be. It only reveals what a rain- different from any current folk category- a the-
bow is if the nature of rainbows is settled by oretical
our posit that helps to explain widespread
conception of them. Knowledge and games may phenomena?21
be like this, and jazz almost certainly is. Plausibly, Consider definitional endeavors that seek to
defining them amounts to specifying what we vindicate
take our intuitions about possible cases
them to be. Rainbows are not like this. To discoverand our past and present classificatory practices.
what a rainbow is or to define rainbows, one must How they fare turns on how the nature of the
do physical science. Even so, Frank Jackson argues definiendum- music, say- relates to our concep-
that to know which physical science matters here, tion. If music is like jazz, its nature is plausibly
we must know what we take rainbows to be.19 We determined entirely by our conception of it, and
must know which situations count for us as ones then, as detailed above, care is needed to avoid
with rainbows, which do not, which are borderline,
defining music in ways that make contentious (in-
and which are contested. Only thus equipped can cluding future) cases seem uncontentious. To pro-
we discover which kind of thing or which phe- duce a more promising account of our conception,
nomenon typically occurs in the rainbow-laden and, hence, of music, one should probably inves-
situations (and perhaps with an attenuated profiletigate the conditions that determine the evolution
in the penumbra), playing the rainbow role in our of our shifting classificatory practices. A recur-
lives. Only something like that can be a rainbow sive, functional, or procedural account might illu-
because wondering about rainbows is wondering minate these. Perhaps Kania's definition of music,
about things that we can identify and distinguishunderstood as an attempt to characterize music
from other things. If Jackson is right, conceptual by characterizing our conception of it, should be
revised in this direction.
analysis, the specification of the criteria that con-
stitute our conception of a thing or kind of thing, If instead, music is like a rainbow and
illuminates not only stuff like jazz, whose nature Jackson
is is right, one must explore our concep-
determined solely by our conception of it, but also tion in order to target the aspect of reality we
things like rainbows, whose natures are settled ataim to describe. Conceptual untidiness might not
least partly by facts distinct from our conceptions be fatal here, since the definition is not a restate-
of them. ment of our conception. Our conception merely
It is controversial whether every phenomenon constrains our search so that it pinpoints features
whose nature is scientifically or philosophically
of the world that are typically present when we
interesting must be investigated in the light claim there is music and typically absent when
of conceptual conclusions. Some have argued we claim there is not. To find out what those are,
that when Noam Chomsky theorizes about I- expect to import other evidence, perhaps about
languages and when Ruth Millikan explores rep- commonalities in neural responses to audible
stimuli, evolutionary functions of music-related
resentational states, they are simply inquiring sci-
entifically into the nature of objective realitybehavior, cross-cultural social norms associated

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402 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

with music, material heard in music venues, or cur- JONATHAN MCKEOWN-GREEN

ricula delivered under the heading 'music' (rather Philosophy Department

than, say, 'physics' or 'sculpture'). We can also University of Auckland
expect this evidence to be gathered and tested Auckland 1142, New Zealand
rigorously against scientific standards. Maybe we
internet: j .mckeown-green@auckland.ac.nz
will eventually rule that music is best defined in
terms of Kania's basic musical features as all and
only the events meeting conditions (1), (2), and 1 . Andrew Kania, "Definition," in The Routledge Com
panion to Philosophy and Music , eds. Theodore Gracyk an
(3a). This hypothesis might cover all the cases
Andrew Kania (London and New York: Routledge, 2011)
that the folk regard as paradigmatic. Of course,
pp. 1-13. See also Andrew Kania, "Music," The Routledg
it departs from important tenets of our folk con-Companion to Aesthetics , 3rd edition, eds. Berys Gaut an
Dominic Mclver Lopes (London and New York: Routledge
ception, but it might be called for by an objective
2013), pp. 639-648, especially p. 640, and "Silent Music," Th
assessment of which kinds of stuff truly belong
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68 (2010): 343-353
together and hence of which natural aspect of 2. Kania, "Definition," p. 12.
the world is tracked (imperfectly) by our musical 3. Kania, "Definition," p. 9.
thought, talk, and behavior.22 If Kania's definition 4. Kania, "Silent Music," p. 348.
is supposed to conform to this picture, according5. Kania, "Definition," p. 11.
6. See Stephen Davies, "On Defining Music," The
to which our conception of music is a reference
Monist 95 (2012): 535-555, at p. 538.
point for the investigation of the nature of music, 7. Kania, "Definition," p. 12.
he owes us an account of the kind of evidence that 8. See Andy Hamilton, Aesthetics and Music (New
must supplement data about our folk conception York: Continuum, 2007), chap. 2. Like Kania, Hamilton dis-
in order to vindicate the definition. tinguishes music from sound art. He postulates a conceptu
difference between them, due to music's reliance on "tone
Finally, if music is like I-language, on the view Hamilton's view is not one of my targets: he is not propos
entertained above, our intuitions and communal ing a definition of music in terms of necessary and sufficien
norms need not constrain our definition at all, conditions; also, his argument is not especially beholden to
since we are not interested in what people are try- intuitions or existing institutional rulings.
9. Hamilton, Aesthetics and Music , p. 62.
ing to fix on when they enter into thought or talk 10. Karlheinz Stockhausen, Stockhausen on Music:
about music. We simply want to understand the Lectures and Interviews , ed. Robin Maconie (London and
world around us in its own terms. Again, this raises New York: Marion Boyars, 1989), p. 109.
the possibility of a revisionary definition: music 11. Alfred L. Copley, "Edgard Varèse on Music and
Art: A Conversation between Varèse and Alcopley," in
might be characterized as a scientific posit that
Leonardo 1 (1968): 187-195, at p. 194.
helps to explain many interesting phenomena, like 12. Conceptual conservatism may not always have been
cross-culturally similar responses to small ratio in- active in our conception of jazz: arguably, Al Jolson should
tervals. In that case, music is whatever plays that no longer be called a jazz singer.
explanatory role rather than something whose na- 13. Jerrold Levinson, "Defining Art Historically,"
British Journal of Aesthetics 19 (1979): 232-250 offers a re-
ture is determined by our folk conception of it. cursive definition of art.
Again, some things that some folk call music might 14. And rugues: a good detinition is complex, but a
turn out not to be.23 If Kania's definition is sup- neophyte who masters it knows what fugues are.
posed to fit this mold, according to which music 15. Jerrold Levinson, "The Concept of Music," in Mu-
sic, Art , and Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aes-
is independent of our folk conception, he should
thetics (Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 267-278, at
not only explain what sort of theoretical role mu- p. 273.
sic is meant to play and what kinds of evidence 16. See Levinson, "The Concept of Music," p. 274, and
are required to determine what realizes it but also Kania, "Definition," p. 10.
eschew the sorts of evidence relied upon in his 17. In "On Defining Music," Davies is gloomy about the
defense thus far. prospects for functional and recursive definitions of music.
18. Kania, "Definition," pp. 7-8.
Maybe none of these three options captures the 19. Rainbows succinctly illustrate Jackson's methodol-
relationship between the folk conception and the ogy, though he himself does not mention them. See Frank
nature of music. Maybe more methodological re- Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Concep-
tual Analysis (Oxford University Press, 1998).
flection on this relationship is needed. But I hope
20. Justine Kingsbury and Jonathan McKeown-Green
to have shown that Kania and others who mount
argue that this is how we should understand Chomsky's
similar campaigns must find new ways to argue for and Millikan's projects, but that Jackson's view accom-
their definitions.24 modates rainbows and much more. See their "Jackson's

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McKeown-Green What Is Music? 403

mental
Armchair: The Only Chair in module
Town," in (see
ConcIs
"Modularity
and Philosophical Naturalism , eds. of Music
David BraP
and Robert Nola (MIT Press,
[2003]: 2009), pp.
688-691) and 159-
tha
an interesting
21 . Even on this construal, class: mus
which things are
still be determined, at least in
pothesis part, include
might by facts e
intentions, responses, or purposes.
perimental findings abou
22. The sociohistorical program
to audible for charac
signals.
sic sketched by Davies 24.
inThanks to Stephen
"On Defining Mus
Horn, Justine Kingsbur
of this "rainbow" type.
23. One might, for Pettigrove,
instance, argue
Aness that w
Webst
editors
ditory signals with basic of this
musical journal
features infoa

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