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 Proportionality: The evil that will be brought about by the action is not out of proportion to the good being aimed at.

o d u c e.
A violation that satisfies all of the provisions of the DDE counts as an indirect violation and is thus not prohibited by NLT.
r
d o n o t rep
C. KANTIAN MORAL THEORY
l u s e only,
P e rsona 2 0 - 0 8 -18
20principle, the categorical imperative:
Humanity formulation of Kant’s fundamental

H An action is right if and only if (and because) the action treats persons (including oneself) as ends in themselves and
not merely as a means.
Universal Law formulation

UL
p r o d u ce.
An action is right if and only if one can both (a) consistently conceive of everyone adopting and acting on the general

, d o ot re
policy (that is, the maxim) of one’s action, and also (b) consistently will that everyone act on that maxim.
n
s e onl y
a l u
D.
Person
RIGHTS-BASED MORAL THEORY
0 2 0 -0 8-18
2
As the name suggests, a rights-based moral theory takes the notion of moral rights as basic and defines or characterizes the
rightness or wrongness of actions in terms of moral rights.

R An action is right if and only if (and because) in performing it either (a) one does not violate the fundamental moral
rights of others, or (b) in cases in which it is not possible to respect all such rights because they are in conflict, one’s
action is among the best ways to protect the most important rights in the case at hand.
r o d u c e.
n o
Typical moral rights taken as fundamental include the Jeffersonian rights to life, various p and the freedom to pursue
t reliberties,
only, d o
one’s own happiness.
l u s e
P e r sona 2 0 - 0 8 -18
E. ETHICS OF PRIMA FACIE DUTY 20
This sort of moral theory features a plurality of principles of prima facie duty. To reach an all-things-considered moral verdict
in cases in which two or more principles apply and favor conflicting actions, one must use moral judgment to figure out which
duty is most stringent.

F. SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY p r o d u ce.

, d o n ot re
s e onl y
BASIC IDEA:
a l u
son right if and only
Peis rmorally 0 2 0 - 0 8-18it is permitted by a set of moral principles that hypothetical
SC An action 2 if (and because)
agents would agree to under conditions that are ideal for choosing moral principles (the precise characteristics of the
hypothetical agents and ideal conditions to be spelled out.)
RAWLS’S TWO PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE:

In the context of developing a theory of social justice governing social and political institutions, John Rawls proposed two

d u ce.
basic principles of justice that he argued would be chosen by agents (under certain specified conditions) who are deciding on
p r o
basic principles for mutual governance.
, d o n ot re
u s e oisntolyhave an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible
The principle of greatest equal liberty: Each person
l
a 8-18
Person
with a similar liberty for others.
0 2 0 -0
2 are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to
The difference principle: Social and economic inequalities
be to everyone’s advantage and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.
 ro e.
duc
no
CONTENTS
t r e p
n l y, d o
a l u seo
Perso n
0 2 0 - 0 8-18
2
Quick Guide to Moral Theories inside front and back covers
Preface
User’s Guide

1. A MORAL THEORY PRIMER

1. What Is a Moral Theory?
p ro d u ce.
2. Eight Essential Moral Theories
, d o n ot re
A. Consequentialism
s e onl y
a l u
P e rson
B. Natural Law Theory
0 2 0 - 0 8-18
C. Kantian Moral Theory 2
D. Rights-Based Moral Theory
E. Ethics of Prima Facie Duty
F. Social Contract Theory
G. Virtue Ethics
H. Care Ethics
3. Coping with Many Moral Theories

e p r o d uce.
2. MORAL THEORY SELECTIONS
l y, d o not r
l u s onAre You)
eNeither
erso n a
MARK TIMMONS / Why I Am Not a Moral Relativist (and
- 0 8 -18
J. S. MILL / Utilitarianism
P
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS / Treatise on Law 20 2 0
IMMANUEL KANT / The Moral Law
JOHN LOCKE / Natural Rights
W. D. ROSS / What Makes Right Actions Right?
JOHN RAWLS / A Theory of Justice
ARISTOTLE / Virtue and Character
STEPHANIE COLLINS / Care Ethics: The Four Key Claims

Additional Resources
ro d u c e.
d o n o t rep
3. SEX
l u s e only,
IMMANUELe Kr
a to the Body in Regard
so/ OfnDuties - 0 8 8 Impulse
-1Sexual
P ANT
20
LINA PAPADAKI / Sexual Objectification
2 0 to the

JOHN CORVINO / What’s Wrong with Homosexuality?

JOAN MCGREGOR / What Is the Harm of Rape?
ROBIN WEST / The Harms of Consensual Sex

Cases for Analysis

Additional Resources
4. FREEDOM OF SPEECH
e p r o d uce.
J. S. MILL / On Liberty
l y, d o not r
LOUISE RICHARDSON-SELF / Woman-Hating:e
u s On o n Sexism, and Hate Speech
n a l Misogyny,
o and Expressive Harm
rsCodes 8 -18
P
ANDREW ALTMAN / Speeche 2 0 - 0
0 of the American Mind
GREG LUKIANOFF AND JONATHAN HAIDT / The 2 Coddling

Cases for Analysis

Additional Resources

5. DRUGS AND ADDICTION

MICHAEL HUEMER / America’s Unjust Drug War
PETER DE MARNEFFE / Decriminalize, Don’t Legalize
p r o d u ce.
DANIEL SHAPIRO / Addiction and Drug Policy
, d o n ot re
Cases for Analysis
l u se only
a -18
Additional Resources Person 20 2 0 - 0 8
6. SEXISM AND RACISM
ANNE E. CUDD AND LESLIE E. JONES / Sexism
J. L. A. GARCIA / The Heart of Racism
TOMMIE SHELBY / Is Racism in the “Heart”?
ELIZABETH ANDERSON / The Future of Racial Integration
DANIEL KELLY AND ERICA ROEDDER / Racial Cognition and the Ethics of Implicit Bias

p ro d u ce.
ot re
Cases for Analysis
, d o n
Additional Resources
l u se only
son a 8-18
7. THE ETHICSPOFeIrMMIGRATION 2 0 2 0 - 0
STEPHEN MACEDO / The Moral Dilemma of U.S. Immigration Policy: Open Borders versus Social Justice?
JOSEPH H. CARENS / Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective
CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN / Immigration and Freedom of Association
SARAH FINE / Freedom of Association Is Not the Answer

Cases for Analysis

uce.
Additional Resources

e p ro d
8. EUTHANASIA AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
l y, d o not r
a l u s e on
Peand n
o Die
rsLetting
JAMES RACHELS / Active and Passive Euthanasia
2 0 - 0 8 -18
PHILIPPA FOOT / Killing
DANIEL CALLAHAN / A Case Against Euthanasia
20
MICHAEL B. GILL / A Moral Defense of Oregon’s Physician-Assisted Suicide Law
DAVID VELLEMAN / Against the Right to Die

Cases for Analysis

Additional Resources

9. ABORTION

e p r o d uce.
ot r
 n o t r e prod
, do 8
PATRICK LEE AND ROBERT P. GEORGE / The Wrong of Abortion

e o n l y
al us 2020-08-1
ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE / Virtue Theory and Abortion

P e r s o
DON MARQUIS / Why Abortion Is Immoral n
JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON / A Defense of Abortion
MARGARET OLIVIA LITTLE / The Moral Complexities of Abortion

Cases for Analysis

Additional Resources

10. CLONING AND GENETIC ENHANCEMENT

LEON R. KASS / Preventing Brave New World
ro d u c e.
GREGORY E. PENCE / Will Cloning Harm People?
d o n o t rep
u s e
MICHAEL J. SANDEL / The Case Against nly,
oPerfection
r son / Isa l 8 -18
P e
FRANCES M. K AMM
0 - 0
There a Problem with Enhancement?
PETER SINGER / Parental Choice and2 2
0 Improvement
Human

Cases for Analysis

Additional Resources

11. THE DEATH PENALTY

STEPHEN NATHANSON / An Eye for an Eye?
ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG / A Defense of the Death Penalty
p ro d u ce.
JEFFREY H. REIMAN / Civilization, Safety, and Deterrence
THADDEUS METZ / African Values and Capital Punishment, do no
t re
l u s e only
Cases for Analysis
erson a - 0 8-18
P
Additional Resources 2 0 2 0
12. WAR, TERRORISM, and Torture
THOMAS NAGEL / War and Massacre
MICHAEL WALZER / Terrorism: A Critique of Excuses
ANDREW VALLS / Can Terrorism Be Justified?
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ / Should the Ticking Bomb Terrorist Be Tortured?
MARCIA BARON / The Ticking Bomb Hypothetical
p r o d u ce.
, d o n ot re
only
Cases for Analysis

a l u se
Additional Resources
Person 0 2 0 - 0 8-18
13. ECONOMIC JUSTICE
2
GARRETT HARDIN / Lifeboat Ethics
PETER SINGER / The Life You Can Save
JOHN ARTHUR / World Hunger and Moral Obligation
THOMAS POGGE / World Poverty and Human Rights
ELIZABETH ASHFORD / Severe Poverty as an Unjust Emergency

Cases for Analysis

e p ro d uce.
Additional Resources
l y, d o not r
l u se on
a
Person 18
 Pers
14. THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS
0 2 0 -0 8-18
2
PETER SINGER / All Animals Are Equal
CARL COHEN / Do Animals Have Rights?
PETER CARRUTHERS / Against the Moral Standing of Animals
ALASTAIR NORCROSS / Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases

Cases for Analysis

Additional Resources
e p ro d uce.
l y, d o not r
15. THE ENVIRONMENT, CONSUMPTION, AND Co
u s e n
LIMATE C HANGE
a l
rsoornPenguins: The Case02 -18
8Pollution
P/ePeople
WILLIAM F. BAXTER
2
for0 - 0
Optimal
ALDO LEOPOLD / The Land Ethic
THOMAS E. HILL JR. / Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving the Natural Environment
STEPHEN M. GARDINER / A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics, and the Problem of Moral
Corruption
WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG / It’s Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations
MARION HOURDEQUIN / Climate, Collective Action, and Individual Ethical Obligations

Cases for Analysis

Additional Resources
Appendix
Glossary
 p ro d u ce.
, d n ot re
PoREFACE
l u s e only
a 8-18
Person 2 0 2 0 - 0

The guiding aim of this anthology is to connect various disputed moral issues with moral theory in order to help students better
understand the nature of these disputes. The issues featured in this book include questions about the morality of various forms
of sexual behavior; freedom of speech and censorship; drugs and addiction; sexism and racism; immigration; euthanasia and
physician-assisted suicide; the ethical treatment of animals; abortion; cloning and genetic enhancement; the death penalty; war,

e p ro d uce.
terrorism, and torture; economic justice; and ethical questions that relate to consumption, climate change, and the environment
in general.
, d o n ot r
e onl y
The connection between moral disputes over such issues and moral theory is that opposing moral viewpoints on some topics
s
a l u
Person 0 2 0 - 8-18
are very often grounded in one or another moral theory. Thus, to understand an author’s arguments for her or his favored
0
2
position, one must be able to recognize the author’s deepest moral assumptions, which are reflected in the moral theory from
which the author proceeds in reasoning about particular moral issues.
In editing this anthology, I have attempted to help readers connect moral issues with theory in the following ways:

A moral theory primer. One way to connect issues and theory is to have students read compact summaries of the various
moral theories—summaries that convey just enough detail about a moral theory to aid understanding without
overwhelming the reader. This is what I have tried to do in the first chapter, “A Moral Theory Primer,” in which I first

uce.
explain what a moral theory is all about—its main concepts and guiding aims—and then proceed to present eight types of
e p ro d
not r
moral theory that are essential for understanding moral disputes over the sorts of issues featured in this book. In the brief
l y, d o
introduction and “User’s Guide” immediately following this preface, I explain how one might integrate the moral theory
primer into a moral problems course.
a l u s e on
Perso n
2 0 - 0 8 -18
20
Addressing moral relativism. For this edition I have included an essay of my own that critically discusses moral
relativism. In teaching ethics courses at a college or university level, I often encounter students who express skepticism
about the philosophical study of disputed moral issues because they think it’s “all relative to one’s culture” or “how one
feels.” My hope is that this relatively short discussion of moral relativism, which leads off chapter 2, will convince
students that the sort of “anything goes” moral relativism is just false (or at least highly dubious).
Chapter introductions. In addition to the primer, I have also written introductions to each chapter that go over certain
conceptual, historical, and theoretical issues that students must have in beginning their study of moral issues. These

p ro d u ce.
introductions include remarks about how the moral theories presented in the primer relate to the arguments of the authors
whose writings are featured in the chapter.
, d o n ot re
l u s only
Selection summaries. Again, in order to aid one’s understanding of the articles, each selection is preceded by a short
e
a 8-18
Person
summary of the article. Immediately after the summary I have, where relevant, included a cue to readers that indicates the
2 0 2 0 - 0
relevant part of the moral theory primer that will aid in understanding the article in question.
Reading and discussion questions. Following each selection, I have included a set of reading and discussion questions.
The reading questions are meant to prompt students’ understanding of each selection’s content, whereas the discussion
questions are meant to help stimulate critical thought about the issues and arguments in the selections.
Each chapter includes case studies, mostly based on actual events. These are meant to stimulate further discussion of the
moral issues featured in the chapter.
Quick guide to moral theories. I have also included a “Quick Guide to Moral Theories,” which lists the various principles

p ro d u ce.
featured in each of the eight theories featured in the primer. This is for readers who need a brief reminder of the key
elements of one or more of the featured moral theories.
, d o n ot re
s e l
onthat y
s o n a l u
In addition, this anthology includes the following features many will find useful:
P e r
18
 Pe
8 -18
Glossary. For ease of reference, I have included a glossary of important terms that are defined in the moral theory primer
2020-0
and in the chapter introductions. Each term in the glossary appears in boldface type when it is first introduced in the text.
The glossary entry for each term specifies the chapter and section in which the term is first introduced.
Additional resources. Finally, at the end of each chapter, I have included a short list of resources, broken down into Web
resources, authored books and articles, and edited collections. These resources are recommended to those who wish to
explore a topic in more detail.

p r o d u ce.
As mentioned earlier, the following “User’s Guide” makes a few suggestions about integrating the study of moral theory and
moral issues.
, d o n ot re
l u s e only
a 8-18
Person
New to the Fifth Edition
2 0 2 0 - 0
Here is a summary of the changes I’ve made in this edition—seventeen new essays in all that reflect suggestions I received for
improving on the fourth edition.

Each chapter now features two case studies, taken from recent events in the news, together with questions that prompt
readers to consider the cases in light of the chapter’s readings. These cases were researched and prepared by Robert
Wallace. (Robert also updated the online material for this edition.)
I’ve added an essay of my own to the second chapter, “Why I Am Not a Moral Relativist (and Neither Are You).” The title

e p ro d uce.
speaks for itself and I hope it adequately addresses the perceived need to have something that explains what moral

d o not r
relativism is, what it isn’t, and why I suspect most all students do not accept moral relativism.
l y,
l u s
Also new to chapter 2, “Moral Theory on
e Selections,” is an essay by Stephanie Collins that explains the key ideas featured in
goralong
care ethics. Toe n a
so with Collins’s essay, I’ve 0
- 8 8 on care ethics to chapter 1, “Moral Theory Primer.”
-1a section
P 2 0 added
20on sex (formerly “Sexual Morality”). The new sections include an excerpt from
I’ve almost completely redone the chapter
Kant’s Lectures on Ethics in which he defends a conservative sexual ethic. This is followed by Lina Papadaki’s “Sexual
Objectification.” Her essay employs the Kantian idea that it is wrong to treat others merely as means to one’s own ends in
developing a conception of sexual objectification. Joan McGregor’s article “What Is the Harm of Rape?” also appeals to
Kantian ideas in addressing the question her title raises. Finally, I’ve included Robin West’s well-known article on the
harms of consensual sex.

p ro d ce.
I’ve replaced the chapter “Pornography, Hate Speech, and Censorship” with a chapter just on free speech. Here again, all
u
ot re
of the selections except the one by Andrew Altman are new to this edition. The chapter begins with a selection from J. S.
, d o n
only
Mill’s On Liberty in which he defends freedom of speech and expression. Also new are articles by Louise Richardson-

a l u s e
Self, “Woman Hating: On Misogyny, Sexism, and Hate Speech,” and “The Coddling of the American Mind” by Greg
Person 2 0 -0 8-18
Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt. This latter essay is critical of the so-called free zone movement on some college and
0
university campuses. 2
The chapter on drugs and addiction now includes “America’s Unjust Drug War” by Michael Huemer.
In the chapter “Sexism and Racism” (formerly “Sexism, Racism, and Reparations”), I’ve now included Elizabeth
Anderson’s “The Future of Racial Integration” and an article by Daniel Kelly and Erica Roedder, “Racial Cognition and
the Ethics of Implicit Bias.”
The chapter on abortion now includes Margaret Olivia Little’s “The Moral Complexities of Abortion,” which discusses
the unique relationship between a pregnant woman and the fetus.
p ro d u ce.
o n ot re
New to the chapter on the death penalty is Thaddeus Metz’s “African Values and Capital Punishment” in which he
, d
l u s e only
addresses the morality of the death penalty by appealing to a distinctive conception of dignity grounded in a conception of
a 8-18
Person
community.
2 0 2 0 - 0
The chapter “War, Terrorism, and Torture” now includes the classic by Thomas Nagel, “War and Massacre.”
Thomas Pogge’s “Poverty and World Hunger” is included in chapter 13, “Economic Justice.”
Finally, Marion Hourdequin’s “Climate, Collective Action, and Individual Moral Obligation” responds to the selection by
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong in the chapter on the environment, consumption, and climate change.

Finally, this fifth edition features an updated Instructor’s Manual and Testbank on CD and a companion website for both
students and instructors that I describe in more detail in the “User’s Guide” following this preface.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Robert Miller, my editor at Oxford University Press, for encouraging me to do a new edition of this anthology, and
to associate editor Alyssa Palazzo for her expert advice on this edition.

Dedication
Finally, I wish to dedicate this fifth edition of Disputed Moral Issues to Betsy Timmons for her generous research assistance in
helping to update many of the chapter introductions and for her cheerful encouragement during my work on this edition.
Mark Timmons
Tucson, AZ
 p ro d u ce.
Ud o n
SER’S re
oGtUIDE
e only ,
a l u s
Person 0 2 0 - 0 8-18
2
In what follows, I suggest how instructors might approach teaching a course that is primarily focused on particular moral
disputes but also integrates moral theory into the teaching of those disputes. Following this discussion is a description of the
various resources for both students and instructors that come with this book.
As mentioned in the preface, a central aim of this anthology is to connect a range of contemporary disputed moral issues to

o d uce.
moral theory. Much of the philosophical literature on the morality of abortion, homosexuality, hate speech, cloning, and the
e p r
, d o n ot r
death penalty approaches these and other issues from the perspective of some moral theory. As I will explain more fully in the

e onl y
next chapter, a moral theory purports to answer general moral questions about the nature of the right and the good. So one way
s
a l u
Person 0 2 0 - 8-18
in which philosophers tackle disputed moral issues is by appealing to a moral theory—appealing, that is, to a general
0
2
conception of the right and the good in examining some particular moral issue.
But this presents a challenge for students who are trying to understand and think about the moral controversies featured in
this book and presents an associated challenge for instructors. Because of the important role that moral theory plays in the
writings of both professional philosophers and nonphilosophers who write about contemporary moral issues, a full
understanding of most of the readings in this book requires that one have a basic grasp of the various moral theories to which
authors appeal in their writings. Some authors take the time to briefly explain whatever moral theory they are using in
approaching some moral issue, but many do not—they assume a basic acquaintance with moral theory. And this means that a

o d uce.
student not previously acquainted with moral theory is often at a disadvantage in trying to understand the position and
e p r
l y , d not r
arguments of an author. The associated challenge for an instructor is to teach just enough moral theory to aid students’
o
eo
understanding in a course devoted primarily to disputed moral issues.
u s n
r s o n a l 8 18 I have written an introductory overview
-First,
P e
In this anthology, I try to address this challenge in a number of
- 0
related ways.
2 0
20 what a moral theory is all about and then present the basic
of moral theory, “A Moral Theory Primer,” in which I first explain
elements of eight types of moral theory that are featured throughout the readings in this book. These theories include the
following:

Consequentialism (including utilitarianism)

Natural law theory (including the doctrine of double effect)
Kantian moral theory (including Kant’s Humanity and Universal Law formulations of the categorical imperative—Kant’s
fundamental moral principle)
p ro d u ce.
o n ot re
Rights-based moral theory (including an explanation of “rights-focused” approaches to moral problems that are very
, d
l u s e only
common but importantly distinct from a genuinely rights-based theory)

P e rsoduty
Ethics of prima facie na(including W. D. Ross’s
0 - 0
classic 8 and the more recent version defended by Robert Audi)
8-1version
Social contract theory (featuring John2 0 2
Rawls’s influential contract theory of justice)
Virtue ethics (including an explanation of the concepts of virtue and vice)
Care ethics (associated with feminist approaches to ethics)
The moral theory primer, then, is meant to get readers up to basic speed on eight essential moral theories, with an eye on their
application to disputed moral issues.
Many users of the book report to me that many of their students come in to an ethics course thinking that moral relativism is

p ro d u ce.
true. I find that students who think they are moral relativists really aren’t. So, now included in the second chapter “Moral

d o n ot re
Theory Selections” is an essay I wrote for this volume. It explains what moral relativism is, reasons to reject it, and why it is
,
s e onl y
a l u
common to mistakenly suppose that this moral theory is (or must be) true.

Person
18
 Pe
8 -18
The moral theory primer can be read straight through. But let me make a suggestion about how it might be used in a course
2020-0
devoted mainly to contemporary moral problems—a suggestion that incorporates additional ways in which I have tried to
address the previously mentioned challenge. (What I am about to say reflects my own approach to teaching a contemporary
moral problems course.)
The basic idea is to incorporate select readings from the moral theory primer as one proceeds to work through the readings
in the chapters that follow. The motto here is: Teach moral theory as needed in working through the readings. I have written

p r o d ce.
the primer so that the segments on each of the eight types of moral theory are largely self-standing; they can be consulted as
u
ot re
needed in learning about and teaching moral issues. I find that teaching moral theory as needed helps students to better digest
, d o n
only
and understand the somewhat abstract nature of a moral theory by immediately relating it to some concrete moral issue. And,
l u s e
of course, their coming to understand moral theory helps them more fully understand the readings.
a
Personthe teaching of2theory -18
Let me further suggest a way of implementing
020on-0an8as-needed approach.
Getting started. Read the introduction and section 1 of the moral theory primer in which I provide a brief overview of
what a moral theory is all about. That will be enough to get readers started. Some instructors may wish to begin with the
self-standing “Why I Am Not a Moral Relativist (and Neither Are You).” Otherwise, it can be worked into a course
whenever it becomes appropriate to address questions about moral relativism.
Moving ahead to the moral issues. Then I recommend proceeding to one of the chapters on a disputed moral issue—they
can be taught in any order.

e p ro d uce.
Chapter introductions. Read the chapter introduction on the selected topic; it will explain basic concepts relevant to the

l y, d o not r
topic. Each of these chapters ends with a subsection titled “Theory Meets Practice,” in which I briefly relate the moral

l u s e on
theories that are used in that chapter’s readings to the topic of the chapter.
a
Cues for theP n
erso use of the moral20 0 -08-Then 18proceed to work through the readings in the selected chapter.
integrated
2
theory primer.
Each reading begins with a brief summary of the article and, in those cases in which an author is appealing to, or relying
on, some moral theory, the summaries are followed by a recommended reading, which cues readers to go back (if needed)
to the relevant sections of the moral theory primer where the theory in question is presented. This is how I incorporate the
teaching of various moral theories into the course as needed.
Let me add that not every reading appeals to one or another moral theory. Some articles are mainly concerned with
conveying an understanding of some disputed concept like “sexism” or “racism.” And in a few other cases, the readings

p ro d ce.
do not clearly proceed from some moral theory. So, not every article summary includes a recommendation to consult the
u
ot re
moral theory primer. But most of the reading selections do connect directly with one or more of the moral theories
explained in the primer.
y,
lmaked o n
l u s e on
r s o n a
Quick reference guide to moral theories. In order to
0 18front of the book. Once one has read the relevant
it easy to review the fundamental principles of each of the
8at-the
Pea “Quick Guide to Moral
theories, I have placed
2 0 2 0 -
Theories”
sections of the moral theory primer, this guide may be consulted to refresh one’s memory of the basics.

Again, the preceding steps reflect how I like to proceed. Users are invited to find ways that best fit their own style of teaching.

Resources for Students and Instructors

The fifth edition is supported by robust companion websites for both students and instructors.

p ro d u ce.
ot re
Instructor Resources:
, d o n
Sample syllabi
l u s e only
erson a - 0 8-18
Chapter goals and summaries
P
Lecture notes in PowerPoint format
2 0 2 0
A Testbank that includes essay, multiple-choice, true/false, and fill-in-the-blank questions
Learning Management System (LMS) cartridges are available in formats compatible with any LMS in use at your college
or university and include the Instructor’s Manual and Computerized Testbank and student resources from the companion
website
Student Resources:

Self-quizzes, which include multiple-choice, true/false, and fill-in-the-blank questions

Helpful Web links
Suggested readings and media (articles, films, etc.)

For more information, please visit OUP’s Ancillary Resource Center: https://oup-arc.com/.
 ro duc e.
r ep
o n ly, d o not
al u s e
Person 2 0 -0 8 -18
20
DISPUTED MORAL ISSUES
p r o d u ce.
, d o n ot re
l u se only
a -18
Person 20 2 0 - 0 8

ro d u c e.
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 n o t r e prod
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e r s o n al us 2020-08
P
1 A Moral Theory Primer
ro duc e.
not r e p
o n l y, do
r so n a l use 8 -18
Pe 20 2 0 -0
On November 1, 2014, twenty-nine-year old Brittany Maynard committed suicide by ingesting a lethal dose of medication
prescribed by a physician. In January of that year, she was diagnosed with stage 4 brain cancer, and in April she was told she
had six months to live. Because California, her state of residence, did not at that time permit physician-assisted suicide, she
moved to Oregon where “aid-in-dying” laws permit physicians to assist patients in committing suicide. According to one
source, “Maynard captivated online audiences and reignited the right-to-die debate after she announced in a viral video that she
would take her own life rather than die a painful death her brain tumor was predicted to soon cause.”1 According to Oregon
state law, Maynard and her physician did nothing illegal. However a moral question remains: did Maynard do anything morally
wrong in taking her own life?
Disputes over moral issues are a fact of our social lives. Most of us are familiar with such disputes—for example, over the

p r o d u ce.
death penalty, the ethical treatment of animals, human cloning, or abortion. The same sort of moral question raised about the

d o n ot re
actions of Maynard can be raised about these and other moral issues. Thinking critically about such moral issues is where
,
philosophy becomes especially important.
l u s e only
A philosophical approach e tormoral a seeks answers to-questions
sonissues 0 8 -18about issues of moral concern. Given the contested
P 2 0
0 to be able to defend one’s position with reasons. If we examine
2needs
nature of such practices as cloning and abortion, one
how philosophers go about providing reasons for the moral positions they take on certain issues, we find that they often appeal
to a moral theory. For example, in arguing for a particular position on the topic of euthanasia, philosophers often make their
case by applying a moral theory to the practice of euthanasia. Applying moral theory to practical issues is one way in which
reasoning in ethics proceeds, and is the method featured in this book.
But what is a moral theory? What are its guiding aims? What moral theories are there? How is a moral theory used in
reasoning about disputed moral issues? These are the main questions of concern in this moral theory primer.

1. WHAT IS A MORAL THEORY?

p ro d u ce.
o n e
othet rright
According to philosopher John Rawls, “The two main concepts of ethics
o n ly, d
are those of and the good.… The structure of
an ethical theory is, then, largely determined by n a s e
u and connects these-1two
lit defines 8 basic notions.”2
In explaining what a moral theoryP is,e
r s o how
8
0 main concepts.
0-two
202these
then, we begin by clarifying

The Main Concepts: The Right and the Good

In ethics, the terms “right” and “wrong” are used primarily to evaluate the morality of actions. In this chapter, we are mainly
concerned with moral theories that address the nature of right and wrong action (or right action, for short). Here, talk of right
action in contrast to wrong action involves using the term “right” to refer to actions that aren’t wrong. Used in this sense, to
describe an action as “right” is to say that it is “all right” (not wrong) to perform. This leaves open the question of whether the
act, in addition to being all right, is an action that we morally ought to perform—that is, an obligation or duty. But we
sometimes find “right” being used narrowly to refer to actions that are “the” morally right action for one to perform. When so

duc e.
used, it refers to actions that are morally required or obligatory (one’s obligation or duty). Actions that are all right to perform
ro
not r e p
(right in the sense of merely being not wrong) and that are also not one’s moral obligation to perform—actions that are all right

n l y, do
to perform and all right not to perform—are morally optional. So, we have three basic categories of moral evaluation into
o
r so n a l use 8 -18
which an action may fall: an action may be morally obligatory (one’s obligation or duty); morally optional; or morally wrong
(Figure 1.1). Pe 20 2 0 -0
 e p r o d uce.
ot r
FIGURE 1-1 Basic Categories of Right Conduct

l y , d o n
a l u s e onprimarily
Again, in ethics, the terms “good” and “bad” are used in assessing the value of persons (their character) as well as

P e r
experiences, things, and states ofs o n
affairs. Philosophers
0 8
distinguish
0 - 18 a thing having intrinsic value (that is, being
-between
intrinsically good or bad) and a thing having extrinsic20 2
value (that is, being extrinsically good or bad). Something has intrinsic
value when its value depends on features that are inherent to it, whereas something is extrinsically good when its goodness is a
matter of how it is related to something else that is intrinsically good. For instance, some philosophers maintain that happiness
is intrinsically good—its goodness depends on the inherent nature of happiness—and that things like money and power, while
not intrinsically good, are nevertheless extrinsically good because they can be used to bring about or contribute to happiness.
Philosophical accounts of value are concerned with the nature of intrinsic value. And here we can recognize three basic value
categories: the intrinsically good, the intrinsically bad (also referred to as the intrinsically evil), and the intrinsically value-
neutral—that is, the category of all those things that are neither intrinsically good nor bad (though they may have extrinsic
value).3

uce.
A moral theory, then, is a theory about the nature of the right and the good and about the proper method for making correct
e p r o d
not r
or justified moral decisions. Accordingly, here are some of the main questions that a moral theory attempts to answer:
1. What makes an action right or wrong—what best explains whynright l y, d o
a l u s e owhy intrinsically good
acts are right and wrong acts are wrong?
2. What makes something good or bad—what
P e r s o n best explains
0 - 0 8 - 18 things are intrinsically good (or best
explains why intrinsically bad things are intrinsically bad)?20 2
3. What is the proper method for reasoning our way to correct or justified moral conclusions about the rightness and
wrongness of actions and the goodness and badness of persons, and other items of moral evaluation?
In order to understand more fully what a moral theory is and how it attempts to answer these questions, let us relate what has
just been said to the two main aims of moral theory.

Two Main Aims of a Moral Theory

Corresponding to the first two questions about the nature of the right and the good is what we may call the theoretical aim of a

ce.
moral theory:

t r e p rodu
o n l y,d o no
The theoretical aim of a moral theory is to discover those underlying features of actions, persons, and other items of moral
evaluation that make them right or wrong, good or bad, and thus explain why such items have the moral properties they
al us e
P e r s o n
2 0 -0 8 -18
have. Features of this sort serve as moral criteria of the right and the good.
20 in ethics is the basis for the practical aim of a moral theory:
Our third main question about proper methodology
The practical aim of a moral theory is to offer practical guidance for how we might arrive at correct or justified moral
verdicts about matters of moral concern—verdicts which we can then use to help guide choice.
Given these aims, we can evaluate a moral theory by seeing how well it satisfies them. (We will return to the issue of
evaluating moral theories in section 3.) We can gain a clearer understanding of these aims by considering the role that
principles typically play in moral theories.

The Role of Moral Principles

ce.
eprodu
 t r e p roduc
l y, d no
In attempting to satisfy the theoretical and the practical aims of moral theory, philosophers typically propose moral principles
o
se o n
—general moral statements that specify conditions under which an action is right (or wrong) and something is intrinsically
u
o n a l 8-18
Pers
good (or bad). Principles that state conditions for an action’s being right (or wrong) are principles of right conduct, and those
2 0 2 0 - 0
that specify conditions under which something has intrinsic value are principles of value. Here is an example of a principle of
right conduct (where “right” is being used in its broad sense to mean “not wrong”):

P An action is right if and only if (and because) it would, if performed, likely bring about at least as much overall
happiness as would any available alternative action.4
This principle, understood as a moral criterion of right action, purports to reveal the underlying nature of right action—what
makes a right action right. According to P, facts about how much overall happiness an action would bring about were it to be
performed are what determine whether it is morally right. Although P addresses the rightness of actions, it has implications for
wrongness as well. From P, together with the claim that if an action is not morally right (in the broad sense of the term) then it
is morally wrong, we may infer the following:

p r o d u ce.
P*
, d o n ot re
An action is wrong if and only if (and because) it would, if performed, likely not bring about at least as much overall
happiness as would some available alternative action.
s e onl y
a l u
n wrongness can be derived 8
-1principles
r osimply
Since, as we have just seen, principles aboutsmoral
Pewrong, 0 2 0 - 0 8from of rightness, I shall, in explaining
a moral theory’s account of right and 2
formulate a theory’s principles (there may be more than one) for right
action.
In addition to serving as moral criteria, principles like P are typically intended to provide some practical guidance for
coming to correct or justified moral verdicts about particular issues, thus addressing the practical aim of moral theory. The idea
is that if P is a correct moral principle, then we should be able to use it to guide our moral deliberations in coming to correct
conclusions about the rightness of actions, thus serving as a basis for moral decision making. In reasoning our way to moral
conclusions about what to do, P has us focus on the consequences of actions and instructs us to consider in particular how
much overall happiness actions would likely bring about.
To sum up, a moral theory can be understood as setting forth moral principles of right conduct and value that are supposed to

p ro d ce.
explain what makes an action or other object of evaluation right or wrong, good or bad (thus satisfying the theoretical aim), as
u
not re
well as principles that can be used to guide moral thought in arriving at correct or justified decisions about what to do (thus
satisfying the practical aim).
e o n l y, do
ofe
The StructureP
al us
sonTheory
arMoral -0 8-18
2 0 2 0
What Rawls calls the “structure” of a moral theory is a matter of how a theory connects the right to the good. As we shall see,
some theories take the concept of the good to be more basic than the concept of the right and thus define the rightness of
actions in terms of considerations of intrinsic goodness. These value-based moral theories include versions of
consequentialism, natural law theory, and virtue ethics. However, some moral theories do not define rightness in terms of
goodness. These are duty-based moral theories—theories that take the concept of duty to be basic and so define the rightness
of actions independently of considerations of goodness. These theories are often called “deontological” moral theories (from
deon, the Greek term for duty). The moral theory of Immanuel Kant and theories inspired by Kant (Kantian moral theories) are
arguably deontological.5 In addition, the ethics of prima facie duty contains deontological elements, as we shall see later in
section 2.

p r o d u ce.
Brief Summary
, d o n ot re
s e onl y
a ofu
l
rson 8-18
Let us briefly sum up a few basic elements moral theory:
P e 0 2 0 - 0
2 featured in moral theory are the concepts of the right (and wrong)
Main concepts of moral theory. The two main concepts
and the good (and bad).
Two aims of moral theory. A moral theory can be understood as having two central aims: the theoretical, and the practical.
The theoretical aim is to explain the underlying nature of the right and the good—specifying those features of actions or
other items of evaluation that make an action right or wrong, good or bad. We call such features “moral criteria.” The
 practical aim is to offer practical guidance for how we might arrive at correct or justified moral verdicts about matters of
moral concern.
The role of moral principles. A moral theory is typically composed of moral principles (sometimes a single, fundamental

p ro d ce.
principle) that serve as criteria of the right and the good (thus satisfying the theoretical aim) and are also intended to be
u
ot re
useful in guiding moral thinking toward correct or justified conclusions about some moral issue (which satisfies the
, d o n
nly how a moral theory connects the concepts of the right
practical aim).
l u s e oconcern
a (intrinsic value) more
The structure of a moral theory. Considerations of
rsothengood
structure
0 8 -18than the right and define the right in terms
Pemake
and the good. Value-based theories
2 0 -
20 of considerations of value.
basic
of the good. Duty-based theories define the right independently

In the next section, we briefly examine eight moral theories that play a large role in philosophical discussions of disputed
moral issues. We then investigate questions that are likely to occur to readers: Why is the study of moral theories helpful in
thinking about disputed moral issues when there is no one moral theory that is accepted by all those who study moral theory?
How can appealing to moral theory really help in trying to think productively about moral issues?

2. EIGHT ESSENTIAL MORAL THEORIES

ro duc e.
e p
Eight types of moral theory are prominently represented in our readings: consequentialism, natural law theory, Kantian moral
not r
o n l y, do
theory, rights-based moral theory, the ethics of prima facie duty, social contract theory, virtue ethics, and care ethics. The

r so n a l use
following overview of these theories will provide background for understanding our readings.
8 -18
P e 20 2 0 -0
A. Consequentialism
In thinking about moral issues, one obvious thing to do is to consider the consequences or effects of various actions on matters
that are of concern to us. Consequentialism (C) is a type of moral theory according to which consequences of actions are all
that matter in determining the rightness and wrongness of actions. Its guiding idea is this:

C Right action is to be understood entirely in terms of the overall intrinsic value of the consequences of the action
compared to the overall intrinsic value of the consequences associated with alternative actions an agent might perform
instead. An action is right if and only if (and because) its consequences would be at least as good as the consequences
of any alternative action that the agent might instead perform.

p r o d u ce.
Five important ideas are packed into C—ideas that are present in the varieties of consequentialist moral theory presented next.
Let us unpack them.
, d o n ot re
s e ly theory: it characterizes right action in terms of intrinsic value.
onmoral
l u
sonathe idea of alternative
First, consequentialist moral theory is a value-based
8 to an agent: in circumstances calling for a moral
-1open
Perinvolves 2 0 - 0 8
Second, this sort of theory
20 actions
choice, an agent is confronted by a range of alternative actions, any one of which she might choose to perform.
Third, consequentialism is a comparative theory of right action: the rightness (or wrongness) of an action depends on how
much intrinsic value it would likely produce (if performed) compared to how much intrinsic value alternative actions
would likely produce (if performed).
Fourth, the consequentialist account of right action is a maximizing conception: we are to perform that action, from among
the alternatives, whose consequences will have at least as much overall value as any other.
Fifth, consequentialism is a strongly impartialist moral theory in the sense that the rightness or wrongness of an action is
made to depend on the values of the consequences for everyone who is affected by the action, where everyone affected
counts equally. (This fifth point will become clearer when we consider particular versions of consequentialism.)

p ro d u ce.
, d o ot re
Consequentialism, we have noted, is a general type of moral theory. We can distinguish four main species of
n
l u s only
consequentialism. Let us explore these four species further, beginning with the most common: utilitarianism.
e
a 8-18
Utilitarianism Person 2 0 2 0 - 0
Utilitarianism was originally developed and defended by Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and later refined by John Stuart Mill
(1806–1873).6 Their basic idea is that it is human welfare or happiness that alone is intrinsically valuable and that the rightness
or wrongness of actions depends entirely on how they affect human welfare or happiness. As a consequentialist theory,
utilitarianism requires that one maximize welfare where the welfare of all individuals who will be affected by some action
counts. We can sharpen our characterization of this theory by introducing the technical term “utility,” which refers to the net
value of the consequences of actions. The net value of an act’s consequences refers to how much overall welfare or happiness
would likely result from an action, taking into account both the short-term and long-term effects of the action on the welfare of
all who will be affected. The basic idea is that an action’s rightness or wrongness depends both on how much happiness (if

odu ce.
any) it would likely produce for each individual affected were it to be performed, as well as how much unhappiness (if any) it
p r
o no t r e
would likely produce for each affected person were it to be performed. For each alternative action, then, we can consider the
o n l y,d
net balance of overall happiness versus unhappiness associated with that action. Call this overall net value the utility of an
e
s o n al us -18
action. We can now formulate a generic statement of the basic utilitarian principle—the principle of utility:
e r -0 8
U
P 2 0
20because) it would (if performed) likely produce at least as high a utility (net
An action is right if and only if (and
overall balance of happiness versus unhappiness) as would any other alternative action one might perform instead.7
Notice that the utility of an action might be negative. That is, all things considered, an action may produce a net balance of
unhappiness over happiness were it to be performed. Moreover, since U (like all versions of C) is comparative, it may turn out
that the right action is the one that would likely bring about the least amount of overall negative utility. This would be where
all of one’s options have a negative utility.
As formulated, U leaves open questions about the nature of happiness and unhappiness about which there are different
philosophical theories.8 Bentham and (apparently) Mill held that happiness is entirely constituted by experiences of pleasure

uce.
and unhappiness by experiences of displeasure or pain. And so their theory of intrinsic value is called value hedonism: only
e p ro d
not r
states of pleasure have positive intrinsic value and only states of pain have intrinsic negative value; anything else of value is of

y, d o
mere extrinsic value. For the value hedonist, any positive value that knowledge may have is extrinsic: it is only of positive
l
l u s e on
value when it contributes to bringing about what has intrinsic value, namely pleasure (or the alleviation of pain). It should be
a
Perso n 0 - 0 8 -18
noted that a value hedonist need not (and should not) take an excessively narrow view of pleasure and pain; the hedonist can
2
20
follow Bentham and Mill in holding that in addition to such bodily pleasures of the sort one gets from eating delicious food or
having a massage, there are aesthetic and intellectual pleasures such as appreciating a beautifully written poem. Moreover, the
value hedonist will recognize not only pleasures of the sort just mentioned, but also pleasures as when one plays a game or is
involved in some creative activity. So value hedonism can recognize a broad range of pleasurable experiences that have
positive intrinsic value and a broad range of painful experiences that have negative intrinsic value.
If we now combine the principle of utility (U) with value hedonism, we obtain hedonistic utilitarianism (HU):
HU An action is right if and only if (and because) it would likely produce (if performed) at least as high a net balance of
pleasure (or less pain) as would any other alternative action one might do instead.

e p ro uce.
One need not accept hedonism as a theory of value in order to be a utilitarian. In fact, many contemporary utilitarians reject
d
not r
value hedonism and accept some other conception of happiness or welfare. But, again, what makes a theory a version of
l y, d o
e on
utilitarianism is that the theory accepts the basic consequentialist claim, C, together with the idea that it is human happiness
a l u s
-18
(also referred to as well-being) that has intrinsic value and is to be promoted in what we do.
Perso n 0 - 0 8
Perfectionist Consequentialism
20 2
But a consequentialist need not be a utilitarian. She might hold that there are items having intrinsic value other than happiness
that are important in determining the rightness or wrongness of action. To illustrate, I have chosen what is called perfectionist
consequentialism—a species of the generic view that accepts a perfectionist theory of value.9 According to a value
perfectionist, it is states of human perfection, including knowledge and achievement, that have intrinsic value.10 One might
come to have a great deal of knowledge and achievement in one’s life, yet not be happy. So a perfectionist theory of the good is
not the same as a happiness theory of the good. We might formulate the basic principle of perfectionist consequentialism as
follows:

e pr o d uce.
ot r
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
To seeke their deaths that sought to dash his drift,
Of whome the chief the queene’s allies hee thought,
That bent therto with mounts of mischief fraught,
Hee knew their liues would bee so sore his let,
That in their deaths his onely help hee set.

12.

And I, most cursed caytife that I was,

Seeing the state vnstedfast how it stoode,
His chiefe complice to bring the same to passe,
Unhappy wretch consented to their blood:
Yea kings and peeres that swim in worldly good,
In seeking bloud the end aduert you playne,
And see if bloud ey aske not bloud agayne.

13.

Consider Cyrus in your cruell thought,

A makelesse[1582] prince in riches, and in might,
And weigh in mynd the bloudy deeds hee wrought,
In sheading which hee set his whole delight:
But see the guerdon lotted to this wight,
Hee, whose huge powre no man might ouerthrowe,
Tomyris queene with greate dispite hath slowe.

14.

His head dismembred from his mangled corps,

Her selfe shee cast into a vessell fraught
With clottered bloud of them that felt her force,
And with these words a iust reward shee taught:
“Drinke now thy fill of thy desired draught:”
Loe, marke the fine that did this prince befall:
Marke not this one, but marke the end of all.

15.
Behold Cambises, and his fatall day,
Where murder’s mischiefe, mirour like, is left,
While hee his brother Mergus cast to slay,
A dreadfull thing, his wits were him bereft:
A sword hee caught, wherewith hee perced eft
His body gored, which hee of life benooms:
So iust is God in all his dreadfull dooms.

16.

O, bloudy Brutus, rightly didst thou rue,

And thou, O[1583] Cassius, iustly came thy fall,
That with the sword, wherewith thou Cæsar slue,
Murdredst thyselfe, and reft thy life withall:
A miroir let him bee vnto you all
That murdrers bee, of murder to your meede:
For murder cryes[1584] out vengeaunce on your seede.

17.

Loe, Bessus, hee that armde with murdrer’s[1585] knife,

And traytrous[1586] heart agaynst his royall king,
With bloudy hands bereft his maister’s life,
Aduert the fine his foule offence did bring:
And lothing murder as most lothly thing,
Behold in him the iust deserued fall
That euer hath, and shall betyde them all.

18.

What booted him his false vsurped raygne?

Wherto by murder hee did so ascend,
When like a wretch, led in an yron chayne,
He was presented, by his chiefest frend,
Unto the foes of him whom hee had slayne:
That euen they should venge[1587] so foule a gilt,
That rather sought to haue his bloud yspilt.
 19.

Take heede ye princes and ye prelates all

Of this outrage, which though it sleepe a while
And not disclosde, as it doth seeld befall,
Yet God, that suffreth[1588] silence to beguile
Such gilts, wherewith both earth and ayre ye file,
At last discryes them to your fowle deface,
You see th’examples[1589] set before your face.

20.

And deeply graue within your stony harts,

The drery dewle that mighty Macedo,
With teares vnfoulded, wrapt in deadly smarts,
When hee the death of Clitus sorrowed so,
Whom erst hee murdred[1590] with the deadly blowe
Raught in his rage vpon his frend so deare,
For which beholde, loe, how his panges appeare.

21.

The launsed speare hee wrythes out of the wound,

From which the purple bloud spins in[1591] his face:
His heynous gilt when hee returned found,
Hee throwes himselfe vpon the corps, alas,
And in his armes how oft doth hee imbrace
His murdred frend? and kissing him, in vayne
Forth flowe the fluds of salt repentant rayne.

22.

His frends amazde at such a murder done,

In fearefull flocks begin to shrinke away,
And hee therat, with heapes of grief fordone,
Hateth him selfe, wishing his later day:
Now hee likewise perceiued in lyke stay,
 As is the wylde beast in the desert bred,
Both dreading others and him selfe a dred.

23.

Hee calles for death, and loathing lenger[1592] lyfe,

Bent to his bane, refuseth kindely foode:
And plungd in depth of death and dolour’s strife,
Had queld him selfe, had not his frends withstoode:
Loe, hee that thus hath shed the guiltles bloud,
Though hee were king and kesar ouer all,
Yet chose hee death to guerdon death withall.

24.

This prince whose peere was neuer vnder sunne,

Whose glistening fame the earth did ouerglyde,
Which with his power welny the world had wonne,
His bloudy handes himselfe could not abyde,
But fully[1593] bent with famine to haue dyed,
The worthy prince deemed in his regarde,
That death for death could bee but iust rewarde.

25.

Yet wee, that were so drowned in the depth

Of deepe desire, to drinke the guiltlesse bloud,
Like to the wolfe, with greedy lookes that lepth
Into the snare, to feede on deadly foode,
So wee delighted in the state wee stoode,
Blinded so far in all our blinded trayne,
That blinde wee sawe not our destruction playne.

26.

Wee spared none whose life could ought forlet

Our wicked purpose to his passe to come:
Fowre worthy knights wee headed at Pomfret
Guiltlesse, God wote, withouten law or dome:
My heart euen bleedes to tell you all and some,
And how lord Hastings, when hee feared least,
Dispiteously was murdred and opprest.

27.

These rockes vpraught, that threatned most our wrecke,

Wee seemde to saile much surer in the streame:
And fortune faring as shee were at becke
Layde in our lap the rule of all the realme:
The nephues strait deposde were by the eame:
And wee aduaunst to that wee bought full deare,
Hee crowned king, and I his chiefest peare.

28.

Thus hauing wonne our long desired pray,

To make him king that hee might make mee chiefe,
Downe throwe wee straith his seely nephues tway,
From princes pompe, to woefull prisoners life:
In hope that nowe stint was all furder strife:
Sith hee was king, and I chiefe stroke did beare,
Who ioyed but wee, yet who more cause to feare?

29.

The guiltles bloud which wee vniustly shed,

The royall babes deuested from theyr throne,
And wee like traytours raigning in theyr sted,
These heauy burdens passed[1594] vs vpon,
Tormenting vs so by our selues alone,
Much like the felon that pursude by night,
Starts at ech bush, as his foe were in sight.

30.

Now doubting state, now dreading losse of life,

In feare of wracke at euery blast of winde,
Now start in dreames through dread of murdrer’s[1595]
knife,
As though euen then reuengement were assynde:
With restles thought so is the guilty minde
Turmoyld, and neuer feeleth ease or stay,
But liues in feare of that which followes aye.

31.

Well gaue that judge his dome vpon the death

Of Titus Clelius[1596] that in bed was slayne:
Whan euery wight the cruell murder layeth
To his two sonnes that in his chamber layen,
The judge, that by the proofe perceiueth playne,
That they were found fast sleeping in theyr bed,
Hath deemde them guiltles of this bloud yshed.

32.

Hee thought it could not bee, that they which brake

The lawes of God and man in such outrage,
Could so forthwith themselues to sleepe betake:
He rather thought the horrour, and the rage
Of such an heynous guilt, could neuer swage,
Nor neuer suffer them to sleepe, or rest,
Or dreadles breath one breth out of theyr brest.

33.

So gnawes the griefe of conscience euermore,

And in the heart it is so deepe ygraue,[1597]
That they may neyther sleepe nor rest therefore,
Ne thinke one thought but on the dread they haue:
Still to the death foretossed with the waue
Of restles woe, in terrour and despeyre,
They leade a life continually in feare.
 34.

Like to the dere that stricken with the dart,

Withdrawes himselfe into some secret place,
And feeling greene the wound about his hart,
Startles[1598] with pangs tyll hee fall on the grasse,
And, in great feare, lies gasping there a space,
Forth braying sighes, as though ech pang had brought
The present death, which hee doth dread so oft:

35.

So wee, deepe wounded with the bloudy thought,

And gnawing worme that greu’d[1599] our conscience so,
Neuer tooke ease, but as our heart out brought[1600]
The strayned[1601] sighes in witnes of our woe,
Such restles cares our fault did well beknowe:
Wherewith, of our deserued fall, the feares
In euery place rang death within our eares.

36.

And as ill grayne is neuer well ykept,

So fared it by vs within a while:
That which so long with such vnrest wee reapt,
In dread and daunger by all wit and wile,
Loe, see the fine, when once it felt the whele
Of slipper fortune, stay it mought no stowne,
The wheele whurles vp, but strayt it whurleth downe.

37.

For hauing rule and riches in our hand,

Who durst gaynesay the thing that wee averd?
Will was wisedome, our lust for law did stand,
In sort so straunge, that who was not afeard,
When hee the sounde but of king Richard heard?
 So hatefull waxt the hearing of his name,
That you may deeme the residue of[1602] the same.

38.

But what auaylde the terrour and the feare,

Wherwith he kept his lieges vnder awe?
It rather wan him hatred euery where,
And fayned faces forc’d by feare of lawe:
That but, while fortune doth with fauour blawe,
Flatter through feare: for in theyr heart lurkes aye
A secret hate that hopeth for a daye.

39.

Recordeth Dionisius the king

That with his rigour so his realme opprest,
As that hee thought by cruell feare to bring
His subiects vnder, as him liked best:
But, loe, the dread wherewith him selfe was strest,
And you shall see the fine of forced feare,
Most miroir like, in this prowd prince appeare.

40.

All were his head with crowne of gold ysprad,

And in his hand the royall scepter set:
And hee with princely purple richly clad,
Yet was his heart with wretched cares orefret:
And inwardly with deadly feare beset,
Of those whom hee by rigour kept in awe,
And sore opprest with might of tyraunt’s lawe.

41.

Agaynst whose feare no heapes of gold and glie,

No strength of gard, nor all his hyred powre,
Ne prowde high towres, that preaced to the skie,
His cruell heart of safty could assure:
But dreading them whom hee should deeme most sure,
Him selfe his beard with burning brand would ceare,
Of death deseru’d so vexed him the feare.

42.

This might suffice to represent the fine

Of tyraunt’s force, theyr feares, and theyr vnrest:
But heare this one, although my heart repine
To let the sounde once sinke within my brest:
Of fell Phereus, that, aboue the rest,
Such lothsome cruelty on his people wrought,
As, oh, alas, I tremble with the thought.

43.

Some hee encased in the coates of beares,

Among wilde beastes deuoured so to bee:
And some, for pray vnto the hunter’s speares,
Like sauage beasts withouten ruth to dye:
Sometime, to encrease[1603] his horrible cruelty,
The quicke with face to face engraued hee,
Ech other’s death that ech mought liuing see.

44.

Loe, what more cruell horrour mought bee founde

To purchase feare, if feare could stay his raigne?
It booted not, it rather strake the wounde
Of feare in him, to feare the like agayne:
And so he did full oft, and not in vayne,
As in his life his cares could witnesse well,
But most of all his wretched end doth tell.

45.

His owne deare wife, whom as his life hee loued,

Hee durst not trust, nor proche vnto her bed,
But causing first his slaue with naked sworde
To goe before, himselfe with trembling dread,
Strayt foloweth fast, and whurling in his head
His rolling eyne, he searched[1604] heare and there
The deepe daunger that hee so sore did feare.

46.

For not in vayne it ran still in his brest,

Some wretched hap should hale him to his end,
And therefore alway by his pillow prest
Had hee a sworde, and with that sworde he wende,
In vayne, God wot, all perils to defende:
For, loe, his wife, foreyrking[1605] of his raigne,
Sleping in bed this cruell wretch hath slaine.

47.

What should I more now seeke to say in this,

Or one iote farder linger forth my tale?
With cruell Nero, or with Phalaris,
Caligula, Domitian, and all
The cruell rout? or of theyr wretched fall?
I can no more, but in my name aduert
All earthly powres beware of tyraunt’s hart.

48.

And as our state endured but a throwe,

So, best in vs, the stay of such a state
May best appeare to hang on ouerthrowe,
And better teach tyraunts deserued hate,
Then any tyraunt’s death tofore or late:
So cruell seemde this Richard third to mee,
That, loe, my selfe now loathde[1606] his cruelty.
 49.

For when, alas, I saw the tyraunt king

Content not only from his nephues twayne
To riue world’s blisse, but also all world’s being,
Sauns earthly gylt ycausing both be slayne,
My heart agrisde[1607] that such a wretch should raigne,
Whose bloudy brest so saluagde[1608] out of kinde,
That Phalaris had nere[1609] so bloudy[1610] a minde.

50.

Ne[1611] could I brooke him once within my brest,

But with the thought my teeth would gnash withall:
For though I erst were his by sworne behest,
Yet when I saw mischiefe on mischiefe fall,
So deepe in bloud, to murder prince and all,
Ay then, thought I, alas, and welaway,[1612]
And to my selfe thus mourning would I say:

51.

If neyther loue, kinred, ne[1613] knot of bloud,

His owne allegaunce to his prince of due,
Nor yet the state of trust, wherein hee stoode,
The world’s defame, nor nought could forme[1614] him
true,
Those gyltles babes, could they not make him rue?
Nor could theyr youth, nor innocence withall
Moue him from reauing them, theyr life, and all?

52.

Alas, it could not moue him any iote,

Ne[1615] make him once to rue, or wet his eye,
Stird him no more then that that stirreth not:
But as the rocke, or stone, that will not plye,
So was his heart made hard with[1616] cruelty,
To murder them: alas, I weepe in thought,
To thinke on that which this fell wretch hath wrought.

53.

That now, when hee had done the thing hee sought,
And as he would, complisht and compast all,
And saw and knew the treason hee had wrought
To God and man, to slay his prince and all,
Then seemde hee first to doubt and drede vs all,
And mee in chiefe, whose death all meanes hee might,
He sought to worke by malice and by might.

54.

Such heapes of harms vpharbard in his brest,

With enuious hart my honour to deface,
And knowing hee, that I, which wotted best
His wretched dryfts, and all his wretched case,[1617]
If euer sprang within mee sparke of grace,
Must nedes abhorre him and his hatefull race:
Now more and more can cast mee out of grace.

55.

Which sodayne chaunge, when I, by secret chaunce

Had well perceiude, by proofe of enuious frowne,
And saw the lot that did mee to aduaunce
Him to a king, that sought to cast mee downe,
To late it was to linger any stowne,
Sith present choise lay cast before myne eye:
To worke his death, or, I my selfe to dye.

56.

And as the knight in field among his foes,

Beset with swords, must slay or there bee slayne:
So I, alas, lapt in a thousand woes,
Beholding death on euery syde so playne,
I rather chose by some sly secret trayne
To worke his death, and I to liue therby,
Then hee to liue, and I of force to dye.

57.

Which heauy choyse so hastened mee to chose,

That I in part agrieude at his disdayne,
In part to wreake the dolefull death of those
Two tender babes, his sely[1618] nephewes twayne,
By him, alas, commaunded to be slayne,
With paynted chere humbly before his face,
Strayght tooke my leaue, and roade to Brecknocke
place.

58.

And there as close and couert as I might,

My purposde practise to his passe to bring,
In secret drifts I lingrede day and night,
All how I might depose this cruell king,
That seemde to all so much desyrde a thing,
As therto trusting I emprisde the same:
But to much trusting brought mee to my bane.

59.

For while I now had fortune at my becke,

Mistrusting I no earthly thing at all,
Unwares, alas, least looking for a checke,
Shee mated mee in tourning of a ball:
When least I fearde, then nerest was my fall,
And when whole hoasts were prest to stroy my foen,
Shee chaungde her cheare, and left mee post alone.

60.
I had vpraysde a mighty band of men,
And marched forth in order of array,
Leading my power amid the forest Dene,
Agaynst the[1619] tyrant banner to display:
But, loe, my souldiers cowardly[1620] shranke away:
For such is fortune when shee list to frowne,
Who seemes most sure, him soonest whurls shee
downe.

61.

O, let no prince, put trust in commontie,

Nor hope in fayth of giddy people’s mynde,
But let all noble men take heede by mee,
That by the proofe to well the payne do fynde:
Loe, where is truth or trust? or what could bynde
The vayne people, but they will swerue and swaye,
As chaunce brings chaunge, to driue and draw that
way.

62.

Rome, thou that once aduaunced vp so hye,

Thy stay, patron, and flowre of excellence,
Hast now throwne him to depth of miserie,
Exiled him that was thy whole defence,
Ne comptest[1621] it not an horrible offence,
To reuen him of honour and of fame,
That wan it thee when thou hadst lost the same.

63.

Behold Camillus, hee that first reuiued

The state of Rome, that dying hee did fynde,
Of his owne state is now, alas, depriued,
Banisht by them whom hee did thus det-bynde:
That cruell folke, vnthankfull and vnkinde,
 Declared well their false vnconstancie,[1622]
And fortune eke her mutabilitie.

64.

And thou Scipio, a miroir mayst thou bee

To all nobles, that they learne not to late,
How they once trust th’vnstable[1623] commontie:
Thou that recuredst[1624] the torne dismembred state,
Euen when the conquerour was at the gate,
Art now exilde, as though thou not deserued
To rest in her, whom thou hadst so preserued.

65.

Ingratfull Rome, hast shewde thy crueltie

On him, by whom thou lyuest yet in fame,
But not thy deede, nor his desert shall die,
But his owne words shall witnes ay the same:
For, loe, his graue doth thee most iustly blame,
And with disdayne in marble sayes to thee:
Vnkind countrey, my bones shalt thou not see.

66.

What more vnworthy then this his exile?

More iust then this the wofull playnt hee wrote?
Or who could shew a playner proofe the while,
Of most false fayth, then they that thus forgot
His great deserts? that so deserued not:
His cindres yet, loe, doth hee them deny
That him denyde amongst them for to dye.

67.

Milciades, O happy hadst thou bee,[1625]

And well rewarded of thy countrey men,
If in the fielde when thou hadst forst to flye,
By thy prowes, three hundred thousand men,
Content they had beene to exile thee then:
And not to cast thee in depth of prison, so
Laden with gyues, to end thy life in woe.

68.

Alas, how hard and steely hearts had they,

That, not contented there to haue thee dye,
With fettred gyues in prison where thou lay,
Increast so farre in hatefull crueltye,
That buriall to thy corps, they eke denye:
Ne wil they graunt the same till thy sonne haue
Put on thy gyues, to purchase thee a graue.

69.

Loe, Hanniball, as long as fixed fate,

And brittle fortune had ordayned so,
Who, euermore, aduaunst his country state
Then thou, that liu’dst[1626] for her and for no moe?
But when the stormy waues began to growe,
Without respect of thy deserts erewhile,
Art by thy[1627] countrey throwne into exile.

70.

Unfrendly fortune, shall I thee now blame?

Or shall I fault the fates that so ordayne?
Or art thou Ioue the causer of the same?
Or cruelty her selfe, doth shee constrayne?
Or on whom els, alas, shall I complayne?
O trustlesse world, I can accusen none,
But fickle fayth of commontie alone.

71.
The Polipus nor the Chameleon straunge,
That tourne themselues to euery hewe they see,
Are not so full of vayne and fickle chaunge,
As is this false vnstedfast commontye:
Loe, I, alas, with myne aduersitye
Haue tryde it true, for they are fled and gone,
And of an hoast there is not left mee one.

72.

That I, alas, in this calamitie

Alone was left, and to my selfe mought[1628] playne
This treason, and this wretched cowardye,
And eake with tears beweepen and complayne
My hatefull hap, still loking to bee slayne:
Wandring in woe, and to the gods[1629] on hye
Cleaping for vengeaunce of this treacherye.

73.

And as the turtle that hath lost her make,[1630]

Whom griping sorrowe doth so sore attaint,
With dolefull voice and sound that[1631] shee doth make,
Mourning her losse, fills all the groue with plaint:
So I, alas, forsaken, and forfaynt,
With restlesse foote the wood rome vp and downe,
Which of my dole all shiuering doth resowne.

74.

And being thus, alone, and all forsake,

Amid the thicke, forwandred in despayre,
As one dismayde, ne wist what way to take,
Untill at last gan to my mynd repayre,
A man of myne, calde Humfrey Banastaire:
Wherwith mee feeling much recomforted,
In hope of succour, to his house I fled.
 75.

Who being one whom erst I had vp brought

Euen from his youth, and lou’d[1632] and liked best,
To gentry state auaunciug him from nought,
And had in secret trust, aboue the rest
Of speciall trust, now, being thus distrest,
Full secretly to him I mee conueyde,
Not doubting there but I should fynd some ayde.

76.

But out, alas, on cruell trecherie,

When that this caytife once an inkling hard,
How that king Richard had proclaimde, that hee
Which mee descryde should haue for his rewarde
A thousand pounds, and farther bee prefarde,
His truth so turnde to treason, all distaynde,
That fayth quite fled, and I by trust was traynde.

77.

For by this wretch I being straite betrayed

To one Ihon Mitton, shiriffe of Shropshire then,
All sodaynly was taken, and conuayed
To Salisburie, with rout of harnest men,
Unto king Richard there, encamped then
Fast by the cittie with a mighty host:
Withouten dome where head and life I lost.

78.

And with these wordes, as if the axe euen there

Dismembred had his head and corps aparte,
Dead fell hee downe: and wee in woefull feare
Stoode mazed when hee would to lyfe reuert:
But deadly griefs still grew about his hart,
That still hee lay, sometime reuiude with payne,
 And with a sigh becomming dead agayne.

79.

Midnight was come, when euery[1633] vitall thing

With sweete sound sleepe, their weary lyms did rest,
The beasts were still, the little byrds that sing,
Now sweetely slept, besides their mother’s brest,
The olde and all were shrowded in their nest:
The waters calme, the cruell seas did cease,
The woods, the fieldes, and all thinges held their
peace.

80.

The golden stars were whyrld amyd their race,

And on the earth did laugh with twinkling light,
When each thing nestled in his resting place,
Forgat daye’s payne with pleasure of the night:
The hare had not the greedy hounds in sight,
The fearefull dere of death stoode not in doubt,
The partridge drept not of the falcon’s foote.

81.

The ougly beare now minded not the stake,

Nor how the cruell mastiues doe him teare,
The stag lay still vnroused from the brake,
The fomy boare fearde not the hunter’s speare:
All thing was still in desert, bush, and breare:
With quiet heart now from their trauayles ceast,
Soundly they slept in midst of all their rest.

82.

When Buckingham, amid his playnt opprest,

With surging sorrowes and with pinching paynes
In sort thus sowned,[1634] and with a sigh, hee ceast
To tellen forth the trechery and the traynes
Of Banastaire: which him so sore distraynes,
That from a sigh hee falls into a sounde,
And from a sound ly’th[1635] raging on the ground.

83.

So twiching were the pangs that hee assayed,

And hee so sore with ruthfull[1636] rage distraught,
To thinke vppon the wretch that him betrayed,
Whom erst hee made a gentleman of naught,
That more and more agreued with this[1637] thought,
Hee stormes out sighes, and with redoubled sore,
Stroke with the furies, rageth more and more.

84.

Who so hath seene the bull chased with darts,

And with deepe wounds foregalde and gored so,
Tyll hee, oppressed with the deadly smarts,
Fall in a rage, and run vpon his foe,
Let him, I say, behold the raging woe
Of Buckingham, that in these gripes of griefe,
Rageth gaynst him that hath betrayde his lyfe.

85.

With bloud red iyen hee stareth here and there,

Frothing at mouth, with face as pale as cloute:
When, loe, my lyms were trembling all for feare,
And I amazde stoode still in dread and doubt,
While I mought see him throwe his arms about:
And gaynst the ground him selfe plunge with such
force,
As if the life forthwith should leaue the corps.

86.