Geopolitical Codes - Geopolitics

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Mapping the Dynamism of the United States' Geopolitical Code: The

Geography of the State of the Union Speeches, 1988-2008
Colin Flint a; Michael Adduci a; Michael Chen a; Sang-Hyun Chi a
a
Department of Geography, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, USA
Online publication date: 11 November 2009
To cite this Article Flint, Colin, Adduci, Michael, Chen, Michael and Chi, Sang-Hyun(2009) 'Mapping the Dynamism of
the United States' Geopolitical Code: The Geography of the State of the Union Speeches, 1988-2008', Geopolitics, 14: 4,
604 — 629
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Geopolitics, 14:604–629, 2009
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DOI: 10.1080/14650040802693929
Mapping the Dynamism of the United States’

Geopolitics, Vol. 14, No. 3, June 2009: pp. 1–36
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Geopolitics
Geopolitical Code: The Geography of the State

of the Union Speeches, 1988–2008
COLIN FLINT, MICHAEL ADDUCI,

Geography
Colin Flint etofal.
the State of the Union Speeches
MICHAEL CHEN, and SANG-HYUN CHI

Department of Geography, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, USA
The changing geographical foci of the geopolitical code of the

Downloaded By: [Flint, Colin] At: 16:26 13 November 2009
United States are examined by a content analysis of the presidential

State of the Union Speeches between 1988 and 2008, the last year
of President Reagan’s term through the presidency of George W. Bush.
The State of the Union speeches are interpreted as geopolitical
discourse within a structural setting, using seven foreign-policy
paradigms as an organising framework. The empirical findings
illustrate an increase over time in the number of regions and
countries mentioned in the speeches. Also, notable differences
between administrations in terms of their advocacy of globalist or
regionalist policies and emphasis upon allies or adversaries are
found.
INTRODUCTION
The contemporary analysis of geopolitics has been able to take a critical

perspective through the identification of geopolitics as practice and repre-
sentation.1 The classical geopolitical theories of the end of the nineteenth
and beginning of the twentieth century proclaimed objective scientific analysis
of global dynamics.2 However, they were far from objective views, but were
limited depictions of world history and geography used to support particular
policy prescriptions for specific states.3 The theories were representations
created to inform and justify particular state practices. The textual analysis
evoked by the perspective of critical geopolitics has focused upon
Address correspondence to Colin Flint, Department of Geography, University of Illinois,

Urbana, IL 61801, USA. E-mail: flint@uiuc.edu
604
Geography of the State of the Union Speeches 605
representations of historical and contemporary elites to unpack the

underlying power relations, as well as the common sense assumptions
evident in popular culture that uphold them.4
A critique of the critical geopolitics literature is its weak understanding
and usage of discourse.5 Discourse is more than the text or speech under
analysis, but the layers of previous statements, each power-laden and linked
to previous layers, which current utterances rely upon and maintain. The
result is that the autonomy of the geopolitical agent, such as a president and
his speechmakers, is constrained by previous layers of discourse.6 In writing
and making a speech a president is a multiple subject and the content of his
discourse must be understood as one achieving multiple goals for multiple
audiences under multiple constraints. Hence, a single text should not be
interpreted as a snapshot in time but the product of previous geopolitical
actions by multiple geopolitical actors. In the case of the State of the Union
speeches other actors to consider include previous speeches, and the
actions of other countries. It is for this reason that there is benefit in

interpreting the content of a sequence of State of the Union speeches within
a context of global events, and as a sequence of representations.
In this analysis we explore the connections between geopolitical
representation and global context through the analysis of United States
presidential State of the Union speeches from 1988 to 2008. The State of the
Union is an annual act of political theatre that demands the president claim
that the United States is “strong” or “healthy”, subtle reference to an organic
understanding of the state. Political allies are flattered and a recent historical
development of the television age is the use of guests (such as soldiers recently
returned from war, or teachers who have won awards) to help score political
points. The State of the Union is an act of geopolitics. It is an event that main-
tains the US political system and the banal understanding of the nation-state,
and places the president at the centre of the foreign policy agenda.7
On the other hand, the speeches are geopolitical acts to create and
disseminate geopolitical representations. The speeches are used to portray
the United States as a benevolent political power, to identify particular
threats or dangers, and classify regions and countries in colourful terms that
imply particular necessary, if not inevitable, actions. The identification of
the “axis of evil” by President George W. Bush in the 2002 State of the Union
speech is a prominent example. Earlier examples include President Reagan’s
1983 vision that “the future belongs not to governments and ideologies which
oppress their peoples, but to democratic systems of self-government which
encourage individual initiative and guarantee personal freedom” and President
Clinton’s 1997 goal “to prepare America for the 21st century, we must master
the forces of change in the world and keep American leadership strong and
sure for an uncharted time.” The geopolitical act of the speech is used to
convey representations that justify past and future acts and representations
by the United States.
606 Colin Flint et al.
State of the Union speeches were analysed by political geographers

almost twenty years ago in a study that covered the years 1946–1987.8 This
previous analysis by O’Loughlin and Grant built upon Alan Henrikson’s
pioneering article on the ‘mental maps’ of US diplomats, a precursor to
discourse analyses of geopolitical representations.9 O’Loughlin and Grant
took a broad quantitative and analytical approach, rather than Henrikson’s
narrative essay. Their methodology was similar to our own, a content
analysis of the speeches with a focus upon their regional foci and the
proportion of each speech devoted to foreign policy. O’Loughlin and
Grant’s findings are of interest to facilitate comparison with our own, and
see changes between the two periods, 1946–1987 and 1988–2008. Briefly,
the proportion of the speeches directed towards foreign policy was
usually between 25% and 35%, though there were some extremes.10 There
was a slight but steady increase in the focus upon particular regions,
rather than broad global references, but no clear pattern or trend in
regional emphases.11 The general conclusions were that the Cold War
drove most of the geographic references, and the role of regional powers
was evident, though mention of South America was largely absent in the
speeches.12 Interestingly, they explain the absence of a regional pattern
through the “idiosyncratic” predilections of the presidents.13 We acknowl-
edge the role of individual perspectives and agendas in the speeches, but
also consider the constraints of global geopolitical dynamics. O’Loughlin
and Grant claimed that at the time of their analysis no other geographic
study of the State of the Union speeches had been undertaken. To the
best of our knowledge, no follow-up analysis other than our own has
been conducted since.
The State of the Union speech is not performed in a geopolitical
vacuum. The representations adopted in the speech are a reflection of the
need to respond to the practices, and to some degree representations, of
other countries. The practices of other states, sometimes themselves
reactions to the acts of the United States, provide the context in which the
foreign policy initiatives mentioned in the State of the Union speech, and
how they are represented, are formulated. In addition, domestic influ-
ences of changing political ideology, political party competition, and the
influence of the military also play a part in defining the content of the
speeches.14 The representations in the speech reflect on the role of
multiple existing discourses and, consequently, the president as multiple
subject.15
The presidential State of the Union speeches is a geopolitical act that
may be analysed to explore the geopolitical foci of the United States. It is a
combination of practice and representation within a broader context of
global geopolitical events and dynamics. Moreover, its annual occurrence
means that it can be analysed over time to identify broad trends in US
geopolitical imperatives.
STATE OF THE UNION SPEECHES WITHIN US

FOREIGN-POLICY PARADIGMS
The end of the Cold War geopolitical world order was marked by the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the re-emergence of independent states in
Central and East Europe, and the very questioning of the role of NATO, and
the meaning of ‘Europe.’ The changing global context required a full-scale
reassessment of US foreign policy imperatives. In such a situation, the
established content of the foreign policy of the United States was open for
renegotiation like no other period since George Kennan’s long telegram and
NSC-68 had established the practices and language of containment and
global presence, the twin stanchions of the US Cold War practice and
rhetoric. Of course, the specific form of actions and language was contested
and changed from administration to administration, as O’Loughlin and
Grant’s analysis showed. However, the depiction of the Soviet Union as the
main protagonist, equating national defence to stopping the spread of

Communism, were the essence of the Cold War language and individual
presidential actions and words were structured by this context.
In the wake of the Cold War geopolitical order there was debate and
uncertainty regarding the appropriate strategic stance the United States
should take. This debate was interpreted by O’Loughlin as political
contestation to adopt a new foreign-policy paradigm, defined as
a general world perspective that is moulded by the relative importance

and variety of American domestic interests vis-à-vis with the state of
international relations and the international political economy. Paradigms
tend to be associated with specific presidential administrations and
become personalised by the global visions that each holder of the presi-
dential office brings to power. ‘Mental maps’ are strongly influenced by
early personal experiences, while others are changed by unexpected
global shifts. More than anything else, paradigms offer a fairly abstract
blueprint for dealing with international relations and determining the
extent and level of US engagement with the world outside its borders.16
The lengthy quote is necessary to illuminate the relevant points of

O’Loughlin’s approach to our analysis. First, there is an interaction between
the president as a subject (with a particular world view, experiences,
beliefs, and agenda) and events in the world that will be interpreted and
represented in particular ways for political ends. Second, these world views
are often relatively stable over presidential administrations. Third, the
paradigms are abstract and are seen as general frameworks within which
the specifics of geopolitical codes are constructed.17
The seven paradigms were defined by O’Loughlin as follows. 1) ‘Noblesse
oblige,’ or the US as benevolent and obligated world leader, leading to
expectations of a global presence. 2) ‘US first,’ or an anti-internationalist

sentiment, leading to expectations of limited concern with foreign countries.
Though politicians from both the right and left of the political spectrum
have, at times, voiced this paradigm it is not associated with any of the
presidential administrations we analysed. 3) The ‘declinist’ paradigm
acknowledges that the US has slipped from its dominant or hegemonic
position and must share tasks with allies. Within this paradigm the regional
focus of US foreign is expected to change over time as certain alliances are
made in light of new situations. 4) The ‘contingent’ paradigm treats each
situation on its own merits and hence no pattern is expected. 5) Writing in
1999, O’Loughlin deemed the ‘eagle triumphant’ paradigm as “hardly credi-
ble or sustainable” without the Soviet Union as clear archenemy.18 With its
call for a militaristic foreign policy, it advocated the use of military strength
to attain foreign policy goals. However, this paradigm returned with a
vengeance under the presidency of George W. Bush and the imposition of
the Global War on Terror. 6) The ‘regionalist’ paradigm classified Europe,

the Middle East, and North-East Asia as regions of particular importance and
focus for US foreign policy. 7) The ‘world powers’ paradigm was a feature
of the Cold War, pitting the US as leader of a Western alliance fighting the
Soviet Union and China. This paradigm has returned recently in two
different guises. The first being Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” and the
second the renewed antagonism with a re-assertive Russia.19 The ‘world
powers’ paradigm leads to expectations similar to the ‘regionalist’ view as
the same key regions are identified as battlegrounds, or shatterbelts,20
between competing blocs.
The broad foreign policy orientation of the paradigms is translated into
immediate imperatives and actions, called geopolitical codes, which define
the specific acts of the United States. Geopolitical codes are comprised of
five calculations:21
a. Identifying current and potential allies

b. Identifying current and potential enemies
c. Defining the means of maintaining current allies and fostering new ones
d. Defining the means of facing existing and emerging enemies
e. Representing the practices in a–d to domestic and global audiences.22
This seemingly simple framework is in fact the basis for the complexity of
global geopolitics. The calculations are dynamic and entail constant recon-
sideration by the foreign policy elites of states: Hence, the expectation of
changing regional patterns in the focus of presidential State of the Union
speeches. Furthermore, the construction of a geopolitical code is the
product of changing relations between states and other geopolitical actors.
Hence, the specifics of the codes are partially the result of the actions of
other actors.
The uncertain negotiation between global events, the specificity of

geopolitical codes or actions, and the way the world is seen and
represented by the president can be illustrated, to some degree, by the
mapping of references made in the State of the Union address and the interpre-
tation of the pattern by the use of the paradigms. O’Loughlin has identified
most of the presidential administrations we analyse with one or more of the
paradigms, with the necessary caveat that the complexity and dynamism of the
paradigms, codes, and world events produces imprecision.23 However, the
adoption of the paradigms as an interpretative framework allows some means
of discussing whether the rhetoric of particular administrations displayed:
• a pattern that would be expected if foreign policy was forged within a

particular paradigm,
• the degree to which the rhetoric of an administration was conflicted, or
displayed the content of a number of paradigms, and
• whether changes in paradigm through consecutive administrations
resulted in dramatic shifts in the pattern of geographic references made

by the president.
More specifically, Table 1 summarises expected patterns for each of the

paradigms. The paradigms were associated, where appropriate, with the
presidential administrations that we analysed. As O’Loughlin notes, the Clinton
administration morphed from one paradigm to another. Also, President George
H. W. Bush, confronted with the ongoing collapse of the Cold War geopo-
litical world order, displayed rhetoric attributable to more than one
paradigm. Also, there is crossover in the language of some of the paradigms
and in the expected manifestations of related geopolitical codes. For
example, the world of regions and anti-imperialist paradigms are similar in
that the key regions are significant because of their geographic location
within superpower competition.
However, the paradigms are still useful in that they classify the
dynamism of political representations across presidential administrations,
TABLE 1 Seven Foreign Policy Paradigms
Paradigm Presidential administration Global pattern Specific regions
Noblesse Oblige Bush Senior; Clinton first term Globalist None expected
US first None Regionalist None expected
Declinist Clinton second term Regionalist None expected
Contingency Clinton first term Regionalist None expected
Eagle triumphant Bush Senior Globalist None expected
World of Regions Bush Senior Regionalist Europe, Middle East
and North-East Asia
Anti-imperialism Bush Senior and Junior Regionalist Europe, Middle East
and North-East Asia
and within some, and can lead to expectations in the pattern of geographic
foci within the speeches of particular presidencies. They also provide
expectations of globalist or regionalist tendencies in particular administrations.
Finally, where the regionalist and anti-imperialist paradigms come into play
we would expect to see emphasis upon the three key regions. In addition
to these empirical expectations the use of paradigms, and especially their
intra-administration changes, is a bridge between the macro-theoretical
understandings of the interactions between discourse and practice, and
events and representations, and the specificities of the empirical findings. In
other words, paradigms are a combination of world views, changing
geopolitical contexts and the representational and material strategies of the
commander-in-chief.
METHODOLOGY
The analysis covers the period 1988–2008; the last year of Ronald Reagan’s
presidency, and the administrations of George H. W. Bush, William Clinton,
and George W. Bush. We began with the State of the Union speech of 1988
for two reasons: It provides a continuation from the O’Loughlin and Grant
study that concluded with 1987, and it provides a benchmark year of a
presidency firmly attached to the Cold War geopolitical code before the
subsequent years of dynamism that we focus upon.24 The texts of the
speeches were downloaded from the website of The American Presidency
project housed at University of California Santa Barbara between August
2007 and March 2008.25
The texts were coded for word content. To ensure accuracy and consis-
tency the project began by coding speeches analysed and discussed in detail
by O’Loughlin and Grant.26 When the two researchers responsible for coding
gained the same results as O’Loughlin and Grant and each other the initial
coding of the 1988 speeches began. Three speeches were chosen at random
and the researchers coded them individually. The same results were obtained
by both researchers giving a high level of confidence that coding bias had
been eliminated through this process of defining and learning coding proto-
cols. One researcher coded speeches given in odd years (1991, 1993, etc.)
and the other even years. The coding for all years was then checked by a
third researcher to ensure consistency and accuracy. The State of the Union
speech has been a venue for a statesman t o talk about inter-state politics. In
the speeches analysed, the presence of non-government organisations was
marginal, but not completely absent. For example, George W. Bush mentioned
NGOs with regard to AIDS programmes. However, seeing as such references
were still choices by the president to represent either a country’s geopolitical
importance or US engagement with that country they were coded no
differently to other country specific references.
The content of the speeches was analysed in order to construct the

following variables: the number of words dedicated to matters of foreign
policy; the number of words dedicated to foreign policy in general, or as a
global engagement, without reference to a particular country or region; the
number of words dedicated to foreign policy in general but with specific
reference to a particular country or region; the number of words that make
reference to threats or enemies; the number of words that make reference
to allies or positive engagements with other countries or regions; the num-
ber of words making specific reference to a particular country.
These counts were used to create the following ratios or proportions:
the proportion of the speech dedicated to foreign policy; the ratio of
proportion of the foreign policy component of the speech addressing threats
and enemies to the proportion addressing allies and positive engagement;
and the ratio of the proportion of the foreign policy component of the
speech addressing specific regions and countries to the proportion addressing
foreign policy in general. The proportions and ratios were calculated and
graphed using an Excel spreadsheet, the word counts for each country were
mapped using Arc/GIS software.
THE CHANGING TONE OF US GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSE
The first questions posed focused upon the degree of emphasis placed
upon foreign policy in the State of the Union speeches. Each year the
president and his speechwriters make a strategic political decision regarding
the specific content of the speech, and the political capital that may be gained
from this scripted and prominent event. There is no formula regarding the
speeches’ content, and so the amount of time spent on foreign policy is a
matter of choice, especially as conventional wisdom rests on the assumption
that the US electorate has little interest in international affairs.27
Compared to subsequent aspects of the speeches we analysed it is hard
to discern a clear pattern in the relative emphasis upon foreign policy,
measured by the percentage of words of each speech devoted to foreign
policy (Figure 1). The variation from year to year is greater than across
Presidential terms, though there is some evidence that there is a trend of
increasing foreign policy emphasis. This is particularly the case if President
George H. W. Bush’s single year emphasis on the first Gulf War is discounted.
There is also a suggestion of the increased attention to foreign issues paid by
President Clinton across his terms. In the case of George W. Bush the immediate
impact of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 is clear, but so is the
subsequent reassertion of domestic concerns until the need to acknowledge
and address the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. In summary, there
seems to be no connection between the emphasis upon foreign policy in a
particular speech and the amount of foreign policy focus in previous
Percentage
35
Foreign Policy / Total Words
30
25
20
612
15
10
Years
0
Reagan_1988 Bush_1990 Bush_1992 Clinton_1994 Clinton_1996 Clinton_1998 Clinton_2000 Bush_2002 Bush_2004 Bush_2006 Bush_2008
FIGURE 1 Percentage of words dedicated to foreign policy for all speeches.

speeches. For this one measure, the ability of a President to create their
own discourse does not appear constrained by previous speeches.
The annual pattern evident in Figure 1 would also suggest that events
drive the content of the speeches rather than the aims and agency of the
administrations. However, certain choices in foreign policy are evident
when the geographic foci of the different terms are analysed. A broad
difference in the definition of a geopolitical code is the contrast between a
globalist and regionalist perspective. The former reflects a geopolitical code
that sees all parts of the globe as equally important and does not discern
between regional contexts. The regionalist approach specifies particular
parts of the globe as more important, as either threats or allies, to the US. In
other words, the US geopolitical code is targeted towards particular regions at
particular times. This distinction was measured by creating the percentage of
all words regarding foreign policy that made reference to a specific region
of the world (Figure 2).
The broad pattern in the data can be summarised as “like father like
son.” The two Bush administrations made much more reference to specific
regions. On the other hand, the speeches made by President Clinton made
much greater reference to an undifferentiated foreign policy. These patterns
are of interest given the rhetoric of the different presidents in question.
President George H. W. Bush faced the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
related geopolitical transition. The term “New World Order” that he used to
describe the emergent geopolitical situation implied a global perspective
and a leading role for the United States. However, the language used in his
State of the Union speeches remained centred upon particular parts of the
world. President George H. W. Bush believed the New World Order
required geopolitical rhetoric that focused upon particular regions. The role
of the first Gulf War is relevant in explaining this language: a very territorial
battle over borders, sovereignty, and access to resources was seen as a
vehicle for the US to assert its geopolitical authority and re-shape the world
in a renewed bout of ‘Eagle triumphant’ authority. However, the basis was
conflict and cooperation in particular regions and with particular countries.
These results support analyses of the performative nature of geopolitics, in
which global projects such as the “New World Order” are grounded and
framed within descriptions of particular countries.28 In other words, the
grand geopolitical scheme of President George H. W. Bush required the
mention of specific countries rather than an abstract reference to the globe
or international politics.
The same general pattern can be seen during the two terms of President
George W. Bush. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were the
catalyst for a foreign policy agenda that was also about constructing a new
world.29 The rhetoric of the Global War on Terror portrayed the increasingly
militaristic foreign policy of the US as a project of democratisation and
development, a combination of ‘Noblesse oblige’ and ‘Eagle triumphant’
Ratio of Words Specific Region / Foreign Policy Total Ratio

9
Specific Region / Foreign Policy Total RATIO
614
4
0 Years
Reagan_1988 Bush_1990 Bush_1992 Clinton_1994 Clinton_1996 Clinton_1998 Clinton_2000 Bush_2002 Bush_2004 Bush_2006 Bush_2008
FIGURE 2 Ratio of words pertaining to a specific region: total words dedicated to foreign policy.
paradigms. Though the agenda was globalist it was grounded in reference

to specific countries that dominated the State of the Union speeches in
President George W. Bush’s two terms. One reason for this was the
reactionary nature of the US geopolitical code post-2001. The geopolitical
code was driven by responses to the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks, first
Afghanistan and then, controversially, Iraq. The portrayal of the US geo-
political code as a ‘Noblesse oblige’ project to reconstruct global politics
through the justification and practice of the Global War on Terror was
grounded in specific parts of the world. However, the final two speeches
indicate a more globalist rhetoric in conjunction with greater relative
emphasis upon foreign policy.
The contrast with the State of the Union speeches made by President
Clinton is clear (Figure 2). In this period the speeches made significantly
less reference to particular areas of the world. The subsequent mapping of
the geographic references in all the speeches shows that President Clinton
spoke about regions and countries that were not addressed by Presidents
Reagan and George H. W. Bush. However, the analysis suggests that the
preference was to frame foreign policy in globalist terms. One explanation
for this difference between President Clinton’s speeches and those that
preceded and followed them is the difference between an idealist and
realist approach. As the endgame of the First Gulf War and the content of
the Powell Doctrine make clear, President George H. W. Bush advocated a
circumscribed foreign policy. President George W. Bush viewed the world
as a realist arena of friends and foes, as evident in the much quoted “with us
or against us” speech. Such a world view required the actual identification of
countries that required geopolitical engagement. Partially, the foreign policy
philosophy of President Clinton was based upon a perception of the United
States as a force for global peace, the Noblesse oblige paradigm, which
required focus on particular conflicts, such as Northern Ireland and Israel-
Palestine amongst others, but was wrapped in an ideal of peace through
US-led global institutions.
The relative emphasis upon globalist or regionalist rhetoric across the
presidential terms does not necessarily translate into less mention of spe-
cific countries by President Clinton.30 What it does mean is that the men-
tion of specific regions and countries by President Clinton was framed
within globalist rhetoric, while both the presidents Bush eschewed such
language and focused upon the countries in question. Though such a pat-
tern does contradict expectations given the global reach of the “New
World Order” and the “Global War on Terror”, it does suggest that the
geopolitical practices during these two administrations had to be justified
by the construction of the perceived threat posed by particular countries:
Hence, the tentative conclusion of the underlying role of a realist perspec-
tive in the two Bush administrations. Furthermore, the change from
regionalist to globalist messages between administrations suggests that
presidents have some freedom in choosing the tone of their rhetoric, even
if they are reacting to events. The return to a more globalist tone in the
speeches of 2007 and 2008 is suggestive of a recalculation of the realist
perspective that dominated the first three-quarters of the G. W. Bush pres-
idency. Further evidence of this trend is presented later and indicates that
presidents have some flexibility in altering their discourse despite previ-
ous statements and acts.
THE CHANGING GEOGRAPHY OF US GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSE
The geographic pattern of President Ronald Reagan’s last speech is a rele-

vant starting point (Figure 3). It marks the end of the Cold War geopolitical
world order, but is surprisingly parochial. The vast majority of the world is
not mentioned specifically, and the focus is upon Central America. The only
country mentioned outside this neighbouring region is the Soviet Union.

The representation of the Cold War at the end of President Reagan’s presi-
dency was a local battle within a global war. A similar pattern existed for
Reagan’s speeches between 1981 and 1987, though countries in Africa, the
Middle East and Asia were also mentioned.31 The geography of President
Reagan’s speech may be used as a benchmark for the following speeches.
The changing global geopolitical context that emerged with the end of the
Cold War is expected to require new and evolving US geopolitical codes.
FIGURE 3 Map: Ronald Reagan 1988.

FIGURE 4 Map: George H. W. Bush 1989–1992.
Hence, we should expect to see different geographies of geopolitical refer-

ence in the next two decades.
President George H. W. Bush’s four years in office retained the
Central American focus seen in 1988 with the addition of Puerto Rico
(Figure 4). The Soviet Union is also a presence. But in addition is a, as
we shall see, rare mention of Central Europe (Germany and Poland) plus
the emergence of the Middle East, a region that remained important up
to 2008. China also appears during this period, and remained an impor-
tant element of the State of the Union speeches. The geographic details
of the United States’ emerging geopolitical code begin to be defined in
this period. Challenges to US authority in the Middle East required that
the president discuss them in his most visible annual speech. In addi-
tion, the growing power and role of China merited its inclusion in the
speeches. A constant theme of the analysis is evident in President
George H. W. Bush’s term, the absence of Western Europe and South
America. Perhaps these regions of the world were, in this period,
assumed to be within the geographic realm of US allies and influence,
and hence their absence is a banal statement of authority. It is the poten-
tial challenges to the US and emergent powers that President Bush
thought necessary to mention.
The change in presidency from the Republican White House of
President Bush senior to the Democratic Presidency of William Clinton
marked, as we have seen, a switch from regionalist to globalist rhetoric.
In parallel, President Clinton mentioned many more countries in the
FIGURE 5 Map: William Clinton 1993–1996.
world, but framed within a globalist language. In a similar pattern to the

former president, South America is absent, as is Western Europe. One
exception is President Clinton’s trumpeted involvement in the Northern
Ireland peace process (Figure 5), an expectation of the Noblesse oblige
paradigm.
The new geographic foci displayed in President Clinton’s first term
marked a significant change, however. Canada and Mexico’s participa-
tion in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) meant that
the emphasis upon immediate neighbours became a matter of trade
rather than the identification of geopolitical threats in Central America.
The most dramatic difference from his predecessor lies in the increased
discussion of East Asia. Japan and North Korea were mentioned in addi-
tion to China. Also, and for the first time, African countries were men-
tioned (Somalia and South Africa), while the geopolitical ramifications of
the collapse of the Soviet Union required mention of Belorussia and Rus-
sia. As O’Loughlin noted, Clinton’s presidency was marked by a switch
from paradigm to paradigm. The patterns in the speeches confirm this
statement with signs of Noblesse oblige and contingency paradigms. The
need for NAFTA, or economic security with immediate neighbours,
could also be interpreted as a sign of the declinist paradigm and the
need to formalise alliances.
Arguably the most important difference between President G. H. W.
Bush’s administration and President Clinton’s first term is the disappear-
ance of the Middle East. The first Gulf War had been the basis for
President Bush’s call for a New World Order, a rhetorical device for a new
post–Cold War geopolitical code. However, President Bush’s new idea
had not become embedded as a geopolitical code within the foreign pol-
icy apparatus of the state, and hence the new Clinton administration
believed it could focus upon other areas. This changing pattern may be
interpreted as a move away from the world of regions paradigm, and pos-
sibly the anti-imperialism paradigm.
However, such a movement was partial. The most notable feature of
President Clinton’s second term in office is the increase in the number of
Asian countries mentioned in the State of the Union speeches (Figure 6).
South Korea appears in addition to all the East Asian countries mentioned
in the first term’s speeches. The geographic reach of the speeches
expanded to include South Asia (India and Pakistan) as well as Indonesia.
Furthermore, Iraq reappeared but now with the addition of its neighbour
Iran. The result is a striking image of Asian focus stretching from Japan,
through India and China, to Iraq. The geopolitical focus of a New World
Order, initiated by President George H. W. Bush with a war in Iraq regard-
ing the sovereignty of Kuwait, had quickly changed to the necessity to
address the dynamics of growth and competition in South and East Asia.
However, the perceived need to engage Iraq persisted in the State of the
Union speeches. Hence, the combination of contingency, world of regions
(with a lesser emphasis on the Middle East), and anti-imperialism para-
digms are evident.
FIGURE 6 Map: William Clinton 1997–2000.

The other geographic aspects of President Clinton’s second-term

speeches displayed consistency with previous terms. Mexico, but not
Canada, was still worthy of a mention, and, in the immediate geopoliti-
cal vicinity, more Caribbean countries were included. President Clinton
maintained a conversation with the US public regarding Africa, a rare
feature of post–Second World War speeches. Again, Western Europe,
with the exception of Northern Ireland, and South America were absent.
Finally, Russia, the constant feature in all the speeches, was mentioned.
The rhetoric may have claimed that the Cold War geopolitical code had
changed, and there were certainly dramatic changes in practice as well
as the content of the State of the Union speeches, but the former Cold
War adversary remained a key entry in the dynamic US geopolitical
code.
The final two maps describe the geographic foci in the State of the
Union speeches of President George W. Bush’s two terms. The changes
from President Clinton’s terms are more expansive coverage of the Middle
East, and the introduction of Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly, the impact of the
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the US’s responses define this
pattern. The new found concentration on terrorism in the geopolitical code
is also evident in the mention of Libya and Somalia.
In comparison with President Clinton’s State of the Union speeches,
President Bush displayed a lack of interest in South Asia (Figure 7).
Perhaps this may be interpreted as a geopolitical opportunity cost of the
FIGURE 7 Map: George W. Bush 2001–2004.

Global War on Terror. However, despite President George W. Bush’s

redefinition of the US geopolitical code in the name of fighting terrorism,
certain countries retained their presence in the speeches. The East Asian
focus introduced by President Clinton was still there, with the inclusion of
the discussion of the Philippines. Russia remained an ever present. Fur-
thermore, despite much geopolitical rhetoric and practice in the wake of
the terrorist attacks of 2001 regarding coalition building to fight what was
defined as a global terrorist threat, the likely allies in Western Europe and
South America were not mentioned explicitly. Even in a time of geopoliti-
cal crisis, a redefinition of the US geopolitical code, and the mobilisation
of the military and the language used to justify war erstwhile allies were
not deemed worthy of acknowledgment. Perhaps, the linkages between
Western Europe and South America are so taken-for-granted they are
believed to be part of the American public’s geopolitical imagination
whatever the circumstances.
However, the picture in President George W. Bush’s second term is

dramatically different (Figure 8). For the only time in the period we analy-
sed every continent was mentioned in the speeches of a single term. Great
Britain and Spain, both victims of terrorist attacks by Muslim fundamental-
ists, added a Western European focus to the speeches. Egypt, Sudan,
Morocco, and Zimbabwe resulted in the consideration of African countries
in the north and south of the continent. South Asia, introduced by President
Clinton, is back on the map too, with the addition of Thailand and Myanmar.
FIGURE 8 Map: George W. Bush 2005–2008.

The East Asian countries retained their inclusion. As did Russia, though
Belorussia returned and Ukraine was mentioned for the first time. South
America made a rare appearance through Columbia and Venezuela. The
dramatic increase in the geographic scope of President Bush’s speeches is
consistent with the Eagle triumphant paradigm, but with a touch of contin-
gency too. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 generated a
response that produced a global presence. However, such a presence
reinforces the US’s commitment to the key regions identified in the world
of regions paradigm. Moreover, the presence of Russia, and the emer-
gence of China, means that the legacy of the anti-imperialism paradigm
remained.
The geopolitical code introduced by President George W. Bush in the
wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 was as ambitious as it
was controversial.32 It envisaged a global threat to “civilisation” that had to
be met through the twin and, sometimes, combined processes of military
intervention and democratisation. It was as bold and global a vision as the

Truman Doctrine and, if the rhetoric was followed by practice, demanded
political or military intervention across the globe. Such a process is evi-
dent in the geographic references included in the second term speeches of
President George W. Bush. The coverage is the most global in this analy-
sis, and is matched only by the epic coverage of President Carter.33 The
rhetoric and practice of the Global War on Terror was evident in the
perceived need to mention all continents and numerous countries
between 2005 and 2008; a reflection of perceived dangers (from insurgents in
Iraq to anti-democracy movements in the former Soviet Union), the need to
address the geopolitical actions of other countries (such as Russia, China, and
North Korea), and the related need to justify the US’s actions and plans to the
public. Not surprisingly, President George W. Bush’s speeches are four of
five with the highest ratio of foreign policy words to total words in the
period of study.
In summary, the pattern of geographic references from 1988 to 2008
mark a shift in the US geopolitical code with the end of the Cold War and
the beginning of the Global war on Terror. However, the legacy of the Cold
War is clear as the Soviet Union/Russia is the one country mentioned in all
the terms studied. The unwinding of Cold War geopolitical codes, on both
sides of the conflict, required continual reevaluation of the geopolitical
situation by the United States. The initial attempt to define a new geopoliti-
cal code, President George H. W. Bush’s “New World Order”, was in some
way prescient but also potentially ephemeral. The First Gulf War was the
first act in that plan, but the idea of initiating the construction of a new
geopolitical world order by geopolitical involvement in the Middle East was not
maintained in the subsequent Clinton administrations. Of course, it came back
with a vengeance post-2001. But in between, President Clinton’s terms saw
increased attention paid to East and South Asia. The geopolitical project of the
New World Order became not a political project defined or led by the US but
an overt conflict, the Global War on Terror (GWOT) that was more reactive
than creative. Furthermore, and in conjunction with this loss of control as geo-
political codes were being redefined across the globe in the wake of the Cold
War, the geography of the US’s geopolitical engagement became broader as all
parts of the world were engaged in one manner or another.
In combination, the decline of the Cold War geopolitical code, which at
least rhetorically was a global encounter, led to greater engagement across
the globe. It is also interesting to note the gaps and silences in these
speeches. Even in a period when geopolitical codes are dynamic some
allies, Western Europe and the Monroe Doctrine region of South America,
were considered secure enough to not be mentioned, even in terms of a
nod to their presumed loyalty. Also, in practice the GWOT saw much
greater US involvement in the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet
Union. This expansion of the US’s global presence remained off the main-
stream agenda of geopolitical representation.
THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE SPEECHES
The regionalism of the two Bush presidencies, compared to the relative

globalism of the Clinton administrations was, to some degree, matched by
the greater stress placed upon foreign policy in their speeches. However,
the expansion of the geographic extent of countries mentioned is more of a
linear trend across the Bush, Clinton, and then Bush administrations.
Perhaps this is a reflection of global geopolitical imperatives, or circum-
stances created by the geopolitical codes of other countries rather than the
initiative of the US. If this is the case it is a reasonable surmise that the US
perceived itself to be faced with greater threats over time, and embraced the
Eagle triumphant paradigm.
However, this is not the picture that emerges from this analysis. The
ratio of the mention of countries as allies rather than adversaries for each
speech from 1988 to 2008 shows more of a cyclical pattern (Figure 9).
President Clinton’s speeches were marked by a greater stress upon allies but
were sandwiched between a marked emphasis on adversaries in the
previous and subsequent administrations. These results are open to a
number of interpretations. On the one hand, they could be a reflection of
events somewhat outside the control of a sitting president: the occurrences
of the invasion of Kuwait or the terrorist attacks of 2001 that required the
definition of adversaries. On the other hand, the emphasis is an indication
of the tone that a president may choose to give to his geopolitical code.
President Clinton was a commander-in-chief who gave his blessing to a
number of military actions (the bombing of Serbia and cruise missile attacks
upon Sudan, for example).
Percentage Allies versus Adversaries: Percent Comparison
100%
90% Adversaries
Allies
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Reagan_1988 Bush_1991 Clinton_1994 Clinton_1997 Clinton_2000 Bush_2003 Bush_2006
Year
FIGURE 9 Allies vs. adversaries percentage comparison.
However, the overall picture President Clinton was able to paint was of
a world of states that the US could work with to address global problems.
The world was one of potential allies, a geopolitical relationship that could
be cemented by US involvement. On the other hand, the emphasis upon
adversaries mobilises different reasons for a global US geopolitical code and
different means of enacting it. The world is constructed as a hostile place
requiring a militarised US response. Certainly, the activities and rhetoric of
al-Qaeda have facilitated, arguably justified, such rhetoric and practice, but
the almost total focus upon adversaries in President George W. Bush’s
speeches is a deliberate choice of rhetoric that is aimed to justify an increas-
ingly militarised foreign policy.34 This interpretation is supported by the rise
in the emphasis given to allies in the final two speeches. Coupled with a
more globalist tone this trend can be seen as a possible recalculation of the
geopolitical code in the light of the foreign policy difficulties facing the US;
a revaluation of the realist escapades of the previous years.
The stark contrast between the tone of the speeches across administrations
suggests the role of agency in how the geopolitical code of the US is justi-
fied to the public. Using a story of global reconciliation under US leadership
versus the militarised defence of a (Western) civilisation under attack portrays
a very different world, though both President Clinton’s and President George
W. Bush’s administrations were marked by engagement across the globe.
The global reach of the US was a common factor, but one was represented as
a fear-driven response to an adversarial world rather than an idealist globalist

project. Perhaps this rhetoric reached its apex in George W. Bush’s administra-
tion but has been, to some degree, tempered in recognition of its limitations.
DISCUSSION
Three general trends can be discerned from the analysis of the speeches: an
increase in reference to adversaries; an increase in the number of countries
mentioned; and an increase in the geographic scope of the foreign policy
references. There was a clear rise in the geographic scope of the speeches,
especially the inclusion of all regions of Asia, and a concomitant increase in
the number of countries mentioned. From the confined regional foci of
Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush, the American public was
introduced to a broad spectrum of countries, regions, and foreign policy

issues through the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations.
Without going into detail on the issues related to each country, which
is beyond the scope of this paper, the geographic pattern is related to a
diverse and increasing set of issues. The Cold War pattern evident on
President Reagan’s final speech was simple and constrained: Soviet Union
as “home” of a perceived Communist threat and its manifestation in the US’s
self-proclaimed “backyard.” Over the period of this analysis many new
issues and related geographical foci arose: nuclear proliferation (Iran and
North Korea), democratisation (Ukraine and Belorussia), terrorism in allied
countries (Spain and the United Kingdom), military intervention and
consequent insurgency (Iraq and Afghanistan), regional security dynamics
(Japan and China), “failed states” (Somalia and Sudan), maintaining trade
superiority (Canada and Mexico), coping with new, if at times recalcitrant,
allies (Libya and Russia), and the generation of new allies in a new conflict
(Pakistan and India).
Despite this increased geographic and topical geopolitical context,
there is no evidence to suggest an increase in the amount of time spent
discussing foreign policy across the span of the analysis. Though particular
events (the first Gulf War and the invasion of Afghanistan, for example)
created annual spikes, there was no trend that would suggest a perceived
need by presidents to demote the traditional emphasis on domestic projects
in the State of the Union speeches. It is taken for granted in US politics that
the public has little interest in foreign policy and that politicians gain little
capital by droning on about foreign shores. The analysis provides some
support for the conclusion that even as the US’s geopolitical code was
dramatically altered in the name of the GWOT, and more countries and
regions of the world were mentioned, presidents did not change the overall
weight given to foreign policy. In other words, as the geopolitical context
got broader and more complex, more countries and issues were addressed
but apparently in shorter sound bites. More was discussed, but simply.
The final trend to be discussed is the relative emphasis given to allies
and adversaries. The results are open to two interpretations. The first is the
relative explanatory power of agency, or more simply the manner in which
different presidents elected to frame their language. President Clinton used
language that reflected allies and friendship while the two Bush administra-
tions were more prone, in some years almost totally, to choose phrasing
that emphasised hostility and threat. However, the same pattern can be
interpreted as a function of geopolitical contexts related to increased
challenge to US power. President George H. W. Bush was in office at a time
of uncertainty as the Cold War geopolitical code, in existence for more than
forty years, became redundant. President George W. Bush faced a clear
manifestation of the challenge al-Qaeda posed to US geopolitical authority
and constructed an energetic (to put it mildly) response. The Cold War
geopolitical code was created from the Yalta conference. Though it

restricted the geographical reach of the US, despite its global pretensions, it
was the basis for the geopolitical understandings underpinning the US’s
Cold War geopolitical code. President George H. W. Bush’s reference to
adversaries as the Cold War geopolitical world order unraveled before his
eyes and the explosion of challenges to US geopolitical authority most
clearly faced by President George W. Bush both explain the trends in the
ratio of reference to allies and adversaries and situates these trends in global
geopolitical dynamics.
It is important to stress that all the trends in the data can be interpreted
as evidence of the agency of individual presidents and their speechwriters
or a reflection of the contextual geopolitical imperatives related to growing
challenge to US authority. The analysis conducted is not sophisticated
enough to determine causality: It cannot adjudicate between the relative
importance of the choices made by individual presidents or the strictures of
a geopolitical context Nonetheless, a narrative can be constructed to
counter the emphases of historians and biographers promoting personal
and ideological differences between successive presidencies. At the very
least the analysis forces one to consider whether the individual proclivities
of presidents are tempered to a large degree by broader contextual
changes.
CONCLUSION
Some clear conclusions may be drawn from the empirical component of this
paper. The geographic component of the geopolitical code of the US has
changed dramatically in the past twenty years. The Cold War pattern of a
focus on the Soviet Union and select allies became redundant and in turn
the geographic scope of the US’s concerns came to encompass every

continent, especially Asia. The regionalist and adversarial tone of the
speeches in the two Bush Presidencies stood in stark contrast to the globalist
and more positive phrasing of President Clinton.
The trend of increasing geographic scope of the State of the Union
speeches is consistent with the end of the dominance of the world of
regions and anti-imperialism paradigms, on the one hand, and the emergence
of a new range of challenges on the other. The inclusion of North America in
the speeches is a probable reflection of fears of economic insecurity and the
related promotion of NAFTA. The re-emergence of the Middle East as a
region of focus is a reflection of new forms of conflict in a traditional region
of concern. At the same time, China’s rising global presence and the
increasing geopolitical significance of South Asia, coupled with renewed
geopolitical tensions with Russia, promoted representation of US interests
across all regions of Asia. The Global War on Terror was not the sole reason
for the increasingly global scope of US foreign policy representations within

the State of the Union speeches.
What is less clear is how to interpret these results. Most of the findings
support the expectations generated from the structuralist theories, such as
the world-systems approach, that believe the US is a declining hegemonic
power facing an increase in the number and form of challenges to its
authority.35 However, the analysis does not allow us to make claims of
causality from structural imperatives. An alternative interpretation is that
presidents are powerful geopolitical actors who are able to shape geopolitical
rhetoric and practice to meet their goals. The differences between adminis-
trations could be interpreted as a result of individual agency.
It is likely that a middle-ground interpretation is the most useful and
accurate. Both of the Bush presidencies were defined by exogenous events,
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the terrorist attacks of September 2001. Their
geopolitical codes and the associated rhetoric evolved within these
contexts; they were agents but within a dynamic context. Furthermore, the
context was a broad systemic scale change from the established codes of
the Cold War to a wide array of new geopolitical actors challenging the
geopolitical authority of the US in different ways. The geopolitical context
and US geopolitical code were mutually constitutive, and the content of the
speeches simultaneously reflected broad structural changes and affected
their outcome.
The State of the Union speech is a combination of discourse and
practice, an example of the inadequacy of seeing the two as binary.36 Not
only is the practice of giving the speech a dissemination of a particular
discourse, the content must be made to make sense within an existing set of
discourses. Furthermore, though the content of the speech may change as
the geopolitical code changes, overarching discourses must be retained.
Though a quantitative analysis such as this one is unable to cover the
nuances of the representations, it holds an advantage to more tightly

focused analyses of geopolitical rhetoric. It is able to provide views of
broad geopolitical change that encompass the strictures of geopolitical con-
text and the ability of geopolitical agents to construct their own rhetoric. For
example, the discourse of the US as benevolent world leader rather than
self-interested hegemonic power must be retained within the sequence of
speeches in order to maintain the rhetorical legitimacy of US power. The
practice of President Clinton was indeed different from that of President
George W. Bush, but they were both following an overarching discourse of
the legitimacy of US global reach and intervention in their idiomatic ways.
The foreign policy paradigms adopted were all representations of a taken-
for-granted belief in the necessity and good of global US intervention. The US
first paradigm is not part of the presidential representational toolkit. The State of
the Union speeches also illustrate the duality of discourse and practice in a dif-
ferent way, the practices of military intervention or constructing free trade poli-
cies requires constant discursive legitimatising. The State of the Union speech
is theatre, but it facilitates actual theatres of war too.
NOTES
1. G. Ó Tuathail and J. Agnew, ‘Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in

American Foreign Policy’, Political Geography 11 (1992) pp. 190–204; K. Dodds and D. Atkinson
(eds.), Geopolitical Traditions (London: Routledge 2000); P. Kelly, ‘A critique of Critical Geopolitics’,
Geopolitics 11 (2006) pp. 24–53; G. Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics (London: Routledge 1996); G. Ó
Tuathail and S. Dalby (eds.), Rethinking Geopolitics (London: Routledge 1998).
2. J. Agnew, Geopolitics (London: Routledge 2003) .
3. Dodds and Atkinson (note 1); L. Hepple, ‘The Revival of Geopolitics’, Political Geography
Quarterly, Supplement Issue 5 (1986) pp. S21–S36; L. Hepple, ‘Metaphor, Geopolitical Discourse and the
Military in South America’, in T. Barnes and J. Duncan (eds.), Writing Worlds (London: Routledge 1992)
pp. 136–54.
4. S. Dalby, ‘Critical Geopolitics: Discourse, Difference and Dissent’, Environment and Planning
D: Society and Space 9 (1991) pp. 261–283; K. Dodds, ‘Steve Bell’s Eye: Cartoons, Geopolitics and the
Visualization of the ‘War on Terror’, Security Dialogue 38 (2007) pp. 157–177; J. Dittmer, ‘The Geograph-
ical Pivot of (the End of) History: Evangelical Geopolitical Imaginations and Audience Interpretation of
Left Behind’, Political Geography 27/3 (March 2008) pp. 280–300; Ó Tuathail (note 1); J. P. Sharp, Condensing
the Cold War: Reader’s Digest and American Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2000); M.
Power and A. Crampton (eds.), Cinema and Popular Geo-politics (London: Routledge 2007).
5. M. Müller, ‘Reconsidering the Concept of Discourse for the Field of Critical Geopolitics:
Towards Discourse as Language and Practice’, Political Geography 27/3 (March 2008) pp. 322–338.
6. Ibid.
7. M. Billig, Banal Nationalism (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 1995).
8. J. O’Loughlin and R. Grant, ‘The Political Geography of Presidential Speeches, 1946–8’,
Annals, Association of American Geographers 80 (1990) pp. 504–530.
9. A. Henrikson, ‘The Geographical ‘Mental Maps’ of American Foreign Policy Makers’, Interna-
tional Political Science Review 1 (1980) pp. 495–530.
10. O’Loughlin and Grant (note 8) p. 509.
11. Ibid., p. 510.
12. Ibid., p. 522.
13. Ibid., p. 525.
14. D. Halberstram, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House 1969).
15. Müller (note 5).
16. J. O’Loughlin, ‘Ordering the “Crush Zone”: Geopolitical Games in Post-Cold War Eastern
Europe’, in N. Kliot and D. Newman (eds.), Geopolitics at the End of the Twentieth Century (London and
Portland, OR: Frank Cass 2000) pp. 34–56.
17. Ibid., p. 37.
18. Ibid., p. 42.
19. S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of a World Order (New York:
Simon and Schuster 1996).
20. S. Cohen, Geography and Politics in a World Divided, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University
Press 1973).
21. C. Flint, Introduction to Geopolitics (London: Routledge 2006) p. 55.
22. Ibid., p. 56.
23. O’Loughlin (note 16) p. 37.
24. O’Loughlin and Grant (note 8).
25. J. T. Woolley and G. Peters, The American Presidency Project [online]. Santa Barbara, CA:
University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database), available at <http://www.presidency
.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=76301>.
27. For a review of the literature on this topic see J. H. Aldrich, C. Gelpi, P. Feaver, J. Reifler, and
K. T. Sharp, ‘Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection’, Annual Review of Political Science 9 (2006)
pp. 477–502.
28. L. Bialasiewicz, D. Campbell, S. Elden, S. Graham, A. Jeffrey, and A. J. Williams, ‘Performing
Security: The Imaginative Geographies of Current US Strategy’, Political Geography 26 (2007) pp. 405–422.
29. C. Flint and G.-W. Falah, ‘How the United States Justified its War on Terrorism: Prime Morality
and the Construction of a “Just War”’, Third World Quarterly 25 (2004) pp. 1379–1399.
30. Bialasiewicz et al. (note 28).
31. O’Loughlin and Grant (note 8) p. 520.
32. D. Gregory, The Colonial Present (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell 2004); D. Harvey, The New Impe-
rialism (New York: Oxford University Press 2005); N. Smith, The Endgame of Globalization (New York:
Routledge 2004).
34. A. Bacevich, The New American Militarism (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005); D. Cowen,
‘Fighting for “Freedom”: The End of Conscription in the United States and the Neoliberal Project of
Citizenship’, Citizenship Studies 10/2 (2006) pp. 167–183; C. Enloe, Globalization & Militarism: Feminists
Make the Link (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 2007); D. Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping
Peace with America’s Military (New York: W.W. Norton 1994); S. Roberts, A. Secor, and M. Sparke,
‘Neoliberal Geopolitics’, Antipode 35/5 (2003) pp. 886–897.
35. I. Wallerstein, The Decline of American Power (New York: W.W. Norton 2003).
36. Müller (note 5).

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Mapping the Dynamism of the United States’

Geopolitical Code: The Geography of the State

COLIN FLINT, MICHAEL ADDUCI,

MICHAEL CHEN, and SANG-HYUN CHI

The changing geographical foci of the geopolitical code of the

United States are examined by a content analysis of the presidential

The contemporary analysis of geopolitics has been able to take a critical

Address correspondence to Colin Flint, Department of Geography, University of Illinois,

representations of historical and contemporary elites to unpack the

actions of other countries. It is for this reason that there is benefit in

State of the Union speeches were analysed by political geographers

STATE OF THE UNION SPEECHES WITHIN US

main protagonist, equating national defence to stopping the spread of

a general world perspective that is moulded by the relative importance

The lengthy quote is necessary to illuminate the relevant points of

expectations of a global presence. 2) ‘US first,’ or an anti-internationalist

the Global War on Terror. 6) The ‘regionalist’ paradigm classified Europe,

a. Identifying current and potential allies

The uncertain negotiation between global events, the specificity of

• a pattern that would be expected if foreign policy was forged within a

resulted in dramatic shifts in the pattern of geographic references made

More specifically, Table 1 summarises expected patterns for each of the

TABLE 1 Seven Foreign Policy Paradigms

Paradigm Presidential administration Global pattern Specific regions

The content of the speeches was analysed in order to construct the

THE CHANGING TONE OF US GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSE

Foreign Policy / Total Words

FIGURE 1 Percentage of words dedicated to foreign policy for all speeches.

Ratio of Words Specific Region / Foreign Policy Total Ratio

Specific Region / Foreign Policy Total RATIO

paradigms. Though the agenda was globalist it was grounded in reference

THE CHANGING GEOGRAPHY OF US GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSE

The geographic pattern of President Ronald Reagan’s last speech is a rele-

country mentioned outside this neighbouring region is the Soviet Union.

FIGURE 3 Map: Ronald Reagan 1988.

FIGURE 4 Map: George H. W. Bush 1989–1992.

Hence, we should expect to see different geographies of geopolitical refer-

FIGURE 5 Map: William Clinton 1993–1996.

world, but framed within a globalist language. In a similar pattern to the

FIGURE 6 Map: William Clinton 1997–2000.

The other geographic aspects of President Clinton’s second-term

FIGURE 7 Map: George W. Bush 2001–2004.

Global War on Terror. However, despite President George W. Bush’s

However, the picture in President George W. Bush’s second term is

FIGURE 8 Map: George W. Bush 2005–2008.

intervention and democratisation. It was as bold and global a vision as the

stream agenda of geopolitical representation.

THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE SPEECHES

The regionalism of the two Bush presidencies, compared to the relative

Percentage Allies versus Adversaries: Percent Comparison

FIGURE 9 Allies vs. adversaries percentage comparison.

a fear-driven response to an adversarial world rather than an idealist globalist

introduced to a broad spectrum of countries, regions, and foreign policy

geopolitical code was created from the Yalta conference. Though it

the geographic scope of the US’s concerns came to encompass every

for the increasingly global scope of US foreign policy representations within

nuances of the representations, it holds an advantage to more tightly