REVIEW ARTICLE

Not created equal: Institutional constraints

and the democratic peace
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Matthew S. Dabrosa and Mark W. Petersenb

a
Assistant Professor of Political Science, Western Connecticut State University, 181 White Street,
Danbury, CT, USA.
E-mail: dabrosm@wcsu.edu
b
Assistant Professor of Political Science, Bethany College, Bethany, West Virginia, USA.
E-mail: mpetersen@bethanywv.edu
Abstract | A prominent explanation for the democratic peace is that democracies are by institutional
design less likely to go to war than autocracies. In this review essay of the institutional constraints
literature, we draw on research in comparative politics and other disciplines to suggest there is more
intra-regime variation than generally accounted for by standard theories, encouraging scholars to
revisit how constraints have been conceptualized. The prowess some democrats display in
circumventing constitutional restrictions or shaping public opinion, and the ability of certain groups
to limit autocrats’ actions, may have a significant impact on executive power in war, and we suggest
that exploring these potential sources of variation in future research will lead to a more nuanced
understanding of the relationship between regime type and interstate conflict.
International Politics Reviews (2013) 1, 27–36. doi:10.1057/ipr.2013.5
Keywords: institutional constraints; democratic peace; regime type

Introduction draw on research in comparative politics, economics and

It has become axiomatic that democracies initiate military
conflicts against each other less frequently than auto-
cracies. Several explanations have been offered for this
empirical regularity, ranging from ideas about the pacific
effects of dyadic interactions between democracies to the
notion that domestic democratic norms restrain aggressive
international behavior. Another possibility that has gained
prominence in recent years is that institutional constraints
make it difficult for democratic leaders to mobilize their
countries’ resources for war, relative to autocrats.
In this review essay, we evaluate the institutional con-
straints literature, focusing on how well it captures the
within-regime dynamics of executive constraint in war. We
communications to suggest there is a greater degree of
intra-regime variation than accounted for by standard the-
ories, encouraging scholars to revisit how constraints have
been conceptualized. In no way does our review call the
overarching premise of this research program into ques-
tion, as the evidence that institutional constraints limit
democrats’ ability to wage war is overwhelming. Instead,
we are suggesting how much these constraints matter likely
transcends the democracy–autocracy continuum, and we
propose that exploring this possibility in future research
will lead to the development of a more nuanced under-
standing of the relationship between regime type and war.
Given the shakeup of many longstanding autocracies by

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 Dabros and Petersen
the disparate Arab Spring movement, how institutions
matter across democratic, hybrid and autocratic regimes
has seldom been more salient in world politics. This is
especially true, given the risk of war posed by emerging
democracies (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002, 2007, 2009).
Institutional Constraints: Theoretical Rationale
The central theoretical premise in the literature is that a
leader’s ability to wage war is conditioned by domestic
political structures. Leaders have a high level of control
over military affairs in non-democracies that place few
restrictions on executive actions, and leaders have com-
paratively less authority in democracies with electoral
competition, universal suffrage, multiple power centers
(for example, legislatures, viable party systems) and other
constraints on executive power. The basis for this idea is
found in Kant’s (1795/1932) famous essay on Perpetual
Peace, and its modern version began to take shape in the
now seminal pieces by Small and Singer (1976) and
Rummel (1979, 1983). A large number of books and arti-
cles have since addressed this proposition (for example,
Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Bueno de Mesquita and
Lalman, 1992; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Fearon, 1994;
Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Bueno de
Mesquita et al, 1999; Lai and Slater, 2006; Mansfield and
Snyder, 2007), and though these authors each offer a
unique take on the basic theory, their ideas are similar in
many respects. In this section, we describe standard the-
ories of institutional constraints, although the reader should
be aware that nuances among scholars have been omitted.
Many theories start by making assumptions typical of
rationally based understandings of political behavior, spe-
cifically that executives are utility maximizers whose pri-
mary objective other than retaining office is determining
public policy (see especially Bueno de Mesquita and
Siverson, 1995; Bueno de Mesquita et al, 1999). Their
ability to reach this goal is subject to a vector of institu-
tional constraints, which defines how much authority they
have over public policy. Within the foreign policy context,
there are a number of potential factors that might limit their
ability to mobilize resources for war, but four have stood
out within the literature: the ability of elites to overthrow
the executive, the level of electoral competition, the fre-
quency of elections and the amount of power wielded by
other political institutions.
The effects these factors have on executive war initia-
tion depend on whether a country is autocratic or demo-
cratic. Certain combinations of constraints allow leaders to
initiate conflict with minimal fear their power will be chal-
lenged, whereas other combinations prevent them from
acting militarily without consulting other political actors.
In particular, the absence of institutionalized forms of
popular control in non-democracies means autocrats are
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more easily able to wage war than democrats. Other poli-
tical and economic elites are the only actors who poten-
tially possess the resources and authority to challenge their
policies, but by securing elite support leaders are able to
acquire broad authority over military affairs.
Autocrats obtain elite approval in a relatively simple
manner: by using their authority over government expen-
ditures to provide private goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al,
1999), perhaps in the form of lucrative business contracts,
jobs, tax breaks or government subsidies. Providing these
goods not only increases the likelihood executives will be
supported in their war efforts, but also reduces the prob-
ability that elites will remove them from office in the event
of military defeat. However, as Maoz and Russett (1993)
observe, ‘once the support of [these] key legitimizing
groups is secured, the government can launch its policy
with little regard to public opinion or for due political pro-
cess’ (p.626). Wars can be initiated quickly, so long as
elites – the main constraint on executive power – have
given their consent.
Democratic executives must overcome a more varied set
of constraints in their pursuit of military action. This does
not mean that elites can no longer pressure leaders, only
that the factors that limit executive power have multiplied.
Electoral competition is perhaps the most obvious con-
straint in democracies (Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Reiter
and Tillman, 2002), and as citizens exercise the ultimate
sanction over politicians – removal from office – execu-
tives must convince them that their policies are the right
policies. This is particularly true in instances of military
conflict, where citizens bear the largest burdens (for exam-
ple, as soldiers). Leaders must persuade them that war is
the correct policy choice, either made necessary by cir-
cumstance or as one that promises to provide long-term
benefits. This is a difficult decision for citizens to make,
and they are often reluctant to accept that military conflict
is unavoidable. Incumbents who spurn popular preferences
on military matters and plow ahead with hawkish policies
run the considerable risk of electoral defeat, especially
when political opponents are proposing more pacific
action.
The idea that democratic executives are susceptible to
electoral competition gives rise to a related constraint on
executive power, namely, that the timing of elections affect
the likelihood they will pursue military conflict (Stoll,
1984; Gaubatz, 1991; Miller, 1995; Smith, 1996; Leblang
and Chan, 2003). Unlike autocrats, whose positions are
never challenged by the electoral process, democrats must
be particularly careful of going to war immediately before
an election (Gaubatz, 1991). Executives know that initiat-
ing conflict at the same time the public is deciding whether
to retain them in office will not bode well politically if the
decision proves unpopular; hence, they expend consider-
able effort avoiding war under these circumstances. Once
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the election cycle has been successfully weathered, how-
ever, incumbents have leeway to order military strikes,
knowing that there is time to justify their actions before the
next election. Nevertheless, even at this stage, that next
election looms in democrats’ minds, forcing them to weigh
more carefully than autocrats the costs and benefits of
interstate conflict.
The dispersion of power within and between branches
of government imposes a third noticeable limitation on
executive power in democratic systems (Morgan and
Campbell, 1991; Kaarbo, 1996; Clark, 2000; Ireland and
Gartner, 2001; Reiter and Tillman, 2002; Palmer et al,
2004). With respect to the distribution of authority across
institutions, at least in presidential systems, the fact that
each branch of government is responsible for different
aspects of statecraft creates constitutional and practical
limitations on the power of a single individual. In particular,
executives are often required to obtain the approval of
other political officials before proceeding with military
activities (see, especially, Morgan and Campbell, 1991). The
president of the United States might be commander-in-chief
of the armed forces, for example, but the decision to raise
an army and declare war theoretically rests with Congress;
further powers were delegated to the legislature with the
passage of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, again in
theory. Congressional authority in military matters, especially
as it pertains to financing, may encourage the president
to listen to and at times negotiate with House and Senate
leaders. This negotiation process might find the president
attempting non-military solutions or agreeing to limit the
scope, means and duration of the dispute.
In parliamentary systems, the frequent necessity of coa-
lition governments and the corresponding diffusion of
power across several political parties with seats in the leg-
islature likewise checks executive authority. Plans for
military action must be vetted through many competing
interests, any one of whom may have incentives to prevent
hostilities. A key member of a coalition government known
for its pacific nature may refuse to support military action,
for example, and its threats to withdraw from the governing
alliance may compel its partners to rethink their foreign
policy positions.
The ability of minor parties to check executive power
declines markedly in two-party states, of course, but
opposition parties retain some authority. Opposition parties
provide alternatives to the status quo, and a majority of
parliamentary systems allow them to force elections when
they believe the party in power no longer retains the con-
fidence of the population. Realizing that opposition leaders
represent an ever-present threat to their power, parliamen-
tary leaders ensure that they have broad-based political and
popular support before initiating hostilities.
In short, standard theories of institutional constraints
predict that elite threats to executive dominance, the
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Not created equal
existence and timing of electoral competition and the
influence of other governing institutions will generate two
types of executive behavior in conflict situations, one each
for autocrats and democrats. Autocrats in countries without
electoral competition or a meaningful division of powers
will cater to elite demands in the form of private goods, and
their corresponding latitude in military matters will be
high. Democratic leaders required to share power and
compete in regular, free and fair elections must consider
how the public and other institutions will respond to war
initiation, generally finding that their authority over these
matters is limited. Wars launched without due considera-
tion for these political actors never occur in democracies,
or at least only rarely, because executives who act uni-
laterally are removed from office or otherwise restrained.
Institutional Constraints: The Empirical Evidence
There is a large body of empirical evidence to support these
theories of institutional constraints, as well as the larger
democratic peace proposition (Chan, 1984; Benoit, 1996;
Cederman and Rao, 2001; for reviews of specific find-
ings, see Ray, 1995; Chan, 1997; Maoz, 1998).1 These
findings are generally robust regardless of the time period
under investigation, sample composition or research
method, and they remain strong even when control vari-
ables that might mitigate the impact of institutional con-
straints (for example, major power status or shared borders
with non-democracies; Reiter and Tillman, 2002) are
included in the analysis. For example, in their examination
of 37 democratic countries between 1919 and 1992, Reiter
and Tillman (2002) determined that war initiation varied
inversely with electoral competition, and Prins and Sprecher
(1999) found that the separation of powers limited executive
authority in their study of Western Parliamentary democ-
racies between 1946 and 1989; these results are consistent
with those of Ireland and Gartner (2001; 18 countries
between 1917 and 1990), Leblang and Chan (2003; 24
interstate conflicts between 1946 and 2000) and Elman
(2000; case studies between 1800 and the late 1900s).
The literature has not yet reached consensus on how
strongly these mechanisms constrain executive power in
war. Whereas Ireland and Gartner (2001) suggest that coa-
lition and majority governments participate in conflicts in
similar amounts, with minority governments participating
the least, Prins and Sprecher (1999) find coalitions partake
in one and a half times more interstate disputes than single-
party governments (p.282). Leblang and Chan (2003), on
the other hand, find no real conflict differences between
types of democratic government. They argue, too, that the
timing of the election has no bearing on whether democrats
will enter a conflict, although Gaubatz (1991) provides
evidence to the contrary that executives are significantly
less likely to start military disputes immediately before
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 Dabros and Petersen
national elections. For Leblang and Chan (2003), the key
mechanism is proportional representation, which reduces
the likelihood of war more than any other constraint in their
study. Note, however, that even though these studies dis-
agree about which mechanisms are most salient, they con-
cur that some combination of constraints genuinely restrain
a democrat’s ability to wage war.
Rethinking Institutional Constraints
There is clear evidence of a systematic relationship
between institutional constraints and executive authority in
war. Nevertheless, work done in comparative politics,
economics and communications raises questions about
how institutional constraints have been conceptualized by
the institutional constraints literature, particularly as it per-
tains to how strongly leaders in each regime type are
restrained. First, the comparative literature on hybrid
regimes highlights the strong possibility that limitations on
autocratic power are much greater than commonly
acknowledged. Electoral competition and the separation of
powers might not play the same role in autocracies and
hybrid regimes as they do in consolidated democracies, but
where they exist, they encourage rulers to consider other
actors’ preferences before moving ahead with personal
agendas; non-democratic mechanisms of restraint might
also limit the range of actions autocrats can take. Second,
research into the principal-agent problem indicates that the
institutional constraints literature may in some respects
overestimate the level of constraint placed on executive
power. The existence of principal-agent problems in
democracies implies that executives might have wide lati-
tude to craft public policy, even in war, depending on the
context and despite the nominal presence of institutiona-
lized restraints. By raising these issues, we are not imply-
ing that the institutional constraints literature is incorrect;
rather, we contend institutions matter in democratic and
autocratic regimes in ways that have yet to be emphasized
fully by the existing literature. More remains to be said
about how democrats might have less constraints and
autocrats more constraints than is widely recognized.
Undifferentiated autocrats and the homogeneity of
regimes
Similar to all rational choice perspectives on politics, stan-
dard theories of institutional constraints make homogeniz-
ing assumptions about the units being observed. This is to
say that leaders of military juntas are expected to behave
very similarly in war as rulers of one-party governments,
who are themselves presumed to act similarly to hereditary
monarchs. In early conceptualizations of the theory, this
same principle was supposed to hold true with respect to
democracies (see Elman, 2000). However, as discussed
above, a growing number of researchers have argued that
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this assumption is incorrect in a major way: institutional
variations that exist within democracies might prompt
executives in different types of democratic systems to
behave differently toward war (Morgan and Campbell,
1991; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995a, b, 2002; Elman,
2000; Ireland and Gartner, 2001; Reiter and Tillman,
2002; Leblang and Chan, 2003).
Nevertheless, the prevailing notion of authoritarian
regimes continues to be that meaningful constraints on
executive power are largely nonexistent. Maoz and Russett
captured the sentiments of a majority of democratic peace
researchers when, in their seminal 1993 article, they wrote
that interstate conflict can most often be explained by ‘the
lack of structural constraints on the mobilization and esca-
lation process of (non-democracies)’ and the tendency of
autocracies to ‘operate under relatively few structural con-
straints’ (p.626). Few scholars then or since have ques-
tioned Maoz and Russett on this point, and indeed much of
the existing scholarship is based on the idea that autocrats
are at most weakly constrained by elites within their own
country, the possibility of mass uprising aside. Thus,
although the literature on how specific democratic pro-
cesses affect the likelihood of war is growing, the possibi-
lity that a similar situation exists in autocracies has
received little scholarly attention.
Ongoing research in comparative politics has none-
theless demonstrated that qualitative, intra-regime varia-
tions occur, especially among countries in transition from
autocracy to democracy – an observation that has spawned
a plethora of articles devoted to ‘hybrid regimes’, which
are defined as governments that manifest authoritarian as
well as democratic characteristics (Schmitter and Karl,
1991; Karl, 1995; Collier and Levitsky, 1997; Diamond,
2002; Levitsky and Way, 2002; Schedler, 2002; Van de
Walle, 2002; Case, 2005; Klick, 2005; Wintrobe, 2007;
Hellwig and Samuels, 2008; Diamond, 2008). As Schmitter
and Karl (1991) state, ‘There are many types of democracy,
and their diverse practices produce a similarly varied set of
effects. The specific form democracy takes is contingent
upon a country’s socioeconomic conditions as well as its
entrenched state structures and policy practices’ (p.76). This
is certainly true of non-democracies as well (see, for exam-
ple, Geddes, 1999), and the varying institutional processes
that exist in different types of non-democracies might
prompt executives to respond to similar situations in con-
trasting ways. What is more, as Carothers (2002) observes,
there should be no implicit expectation that these ‘hybrid
regimes’ are making their way from autocracy to democracy;
rather, it is merely important to note that they are mixing
elements of both regime types and therefore their institutions
are important and relevant in unique ways.
A very small body of research focuses on how different
types of autocrats might respond to potential international
disputes, acknowledging that some executives might be
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more limited in foreign affairs than others (Peceny et al,
2002; Butler and Peceny, 2003; Peceny and Butler, 2004;
Weeks, 2008). Nearly all of these articles concentrate on
how varying sizes of the ‘selectorate’ (see, for example,
Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003) in personalist dictatorships,
one-party states and military dictatorships might induce
executives to behave differently in war. The limited
research available suggests that one-party governments are
the least conflict-prone of the three because a larger number
of political actors hold power in these regimes (see espe-
cially Peceny and Butler, 2004). These authors have made
significant improvements in our understanding of the
domestic processes that exist in authoritarian countries, but
they leave room for further exploration into which, when
and how domestic actors might exert their influence. This is
to say that a greater degree of attention needs to be given to
the specific ways that authority is restrained in autocratic
regimes.
One obvious constraint on executive power in an auto-
cracy is the elites. The constraining effects of elite groups
has been acknowledged by nearly all proponents of the
institutional argument as the key mechanism of executive
control, of course, but rarely does their influence receive
much additional consideration. In fact, superficial com-
ments to the contrary, elite interests are infrequently treated
as noteworthy restraints on executive power. All dictators
have to do is buy them off with private goods in order for
their ultimate control over the war-making process to be
assured, according to much of the literature.
Intuitively, however, it is difficult to accept the idea that
providing private goods is always enough to convince
elites to cede influence over the incumbent, especially in
matters of war, or that a leader will be able to glean the
amount of goods required to secure their assent. It is an
understatement that war is a serious matter for all those
involved, and even elites who might bear no direct invol-
vement in the fighting have to consider whether the poten-
tial benefits of war outweigh the financial and political
risks. We might expect elite groups to impose constraints
on the executive when they conclude that war is unneces-
sary or unworthy of the risks, even when private goods are
being offered. Particularly if these elites are military or
political officials whose support is crucial, the chances that
they will successfully restrain autocratic prerogatives may
be large. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine that the provi-
sion of private goods tends to persuade elites to overlook
military defeat and retain the executive. Young men and
women have died, assets have been wasted, the country’s
standing in international affairs has been damaged and the
leader has failed to prove himself/herself militarily. Con-
sidering the implications these circumstances might have
on the country, a larger number of goods than are available
may be needed for elites to absolve the leader of policy
failures. Incumbents likely recognize this possibility exists,
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Not created equal
and those who proceed militarily may find themselves
stripped of power.
Systematic empirical research is needed to evaluate
these statements, but at least one historical example – the
downfall of the USSR’s Nikita Khrushchev – provides
anecdotal evidence for some of these points. For much of
his reign, Khrushchev exercised substantial authority
within the Soviet Union, some opposition to his rule not-
withstanding (McClellan, 1998; MacKenzie and Curran,
2002; Dziewanowski, 2003). In mid-1962, in what is now
known as the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev ordered
ballistic missiles to be installed in Cuba. This and other
directives made during the subsequent crisis with the Uni-
ted States were unilateral decisions, ordered by the incum-
bent without the knowledge or approval of influential
political and military elites (Dziewanowski, 2003, pp.319–
321). Although elites were unable (or unwilling) to prevent
Khrushchev from bringing the USSR to the brink of war at
the time, his bungling of the situation led them to assert
their influence not long after. Citing ‘wild schemes; half-
baked conclusions and hasty decisions and actions
divorced from reality; bragging and bluster; attraction to
rule by fiat’ and other qualities unbecoming of a leader, the
party elites removed Khrushchev from power in October,
1964 (Pravda, quoted in Dziewanowski, 2003, pp.327–
328). Khrushchev presumably proved unable to assuage
elite anger through private goods, and even though other
factors were present, there is little doubt his end-run around
elite preferences during the Cuban Missile Crisis was a
major reason for his political demise.
In addition to elite opposition, leaders from hybrid
regimes often face constraints similar to those that exist in
consolidated democracies. Although these constraints do
not have the same force as they do in established democ-
racies, they are institutions ‘through which opposition for-
ces may periodically challenge, weaken, and occasionally
even defeat autocratic incumbents’ (Levitsky and Way,
2002, p.54). As Levitsky and Way (2002) point out, free
and regular elections are commonly held in non-democ-
racies, and though they may not be entirely fair or untain-
ted, their outcomes are sometimes in doubt. As in
consolidated democracies, it stands to reason the prob-
ability an incumbent will suffer electoral defeat is heigh-
tened when war is on the horizon. The population
recognizes that it will bear the brunt of interstate conflict
and may be more willing to vote for opposition candidates
under these circumstances, especially if such individuals
are promoting anti-war platforms. As autocrats often want
to retain the pretense of legitimacy by winning elections,
they might therefore pursue more peaceful policies. Lea-
ders bent on pursuing hawkish agendas can, of course,
bypass public opinion by rigging the election, but this car-
ries substantial risks. Incumbents who ‘win’ elections
despite intense opposition may quickly succumb to popular
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pressure and be forced from office, as the political uphea-
vals that occurred in Peru, Mexico and elsewhere during
the late 1900s and early 2000s illustrate.
Levitsky and Way (2002) also observe that though in
hybrid regimes the legislature’s purpose may be to rubber
stamp executive decisions, ‘they occasionally become
focal points of opposition activity’, especially as multiple
political parties are often represented in the chamber
(p.56). Although legislators may not have the legal
authority to prevent an autocrat from imposing a preferred
policy, they may be able to reveal its weaknesses, offer
alternatives or encourage the public to protest its passage.
Hence, in the prelude to war especially, they may be will-
ing to speak out against the conflict, pass resolutions con-
demning aggressive action or otherwise emphasize that war
is not their preferred choice. Faced with such political
hostility, executives may be more cautious in foreign
affairs, including when pursuing policies that might lead to
interstate conflict.
In summary, the ability of elite groups and other poli-
tical institutions to restrain executive power suggests, in
theory at least, that autocrats must overcome larger num-
bers of political constraints in their pursuit of interstate war
than has heretofore been explored in the literature.
Depending on the circumstances, executives may be unable
to muster the political support needed to initiate hostilities,
and, even when they are able to, enough time may have
passed for peaceful solutions to emerge. Scholars wishing
to increase the power of their models will likely find by
taking into account these finer differences among similar-
type regimes, they can provide more detailed explanations
of how, when and why institutions matter.
Democrats and the principal-agent problem
The idea from economics that agents will seek ways to
undermine their principals has been extended to a host of
political relationships (Weingast, 1984; Kalt and Zupan,
1990; Songer et al, 1994). Much research focuses on the
implications of this behavior, as well as how citizen-
principals can craft mechanisms that alert them to when
political agents are acting self-interestedly. That principal-
agent problems occur in executive handling of foreign and
domestic affairs has been recognized by numerous scho-
lars, but the idea has yet to be fully integrated into the dis-
cussion of institutional constraints and the likelihood of
war. This section focuses on how principal-agent effects
manifest themselves in democracies and perhaps afford
executives broader authority in war than is captured by
theories of institutional constraints.
A major way that principal-agent problems arise in any
country – democratic or autocratic – is in the flow of
information received by citizens (Keefer and Khemani,
2003, 2004). As these authors point out, there are many
barriers that preclude the population from receiving reliable
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information about incumbent actions, especially in less-
developed democracies. Few television and radio stations,
low levels of newspaper circulation, high illiteracy rates
and extensive mass apathy toward politics all limit the
information available to a country’s population. This
makes it difficult in the aggregate for citizens to uncover
the details of domestic and foreign policies or judge how
well their executive is behaving. Even when this informa-
tion is ostensibly available, citizens must be able to obtain
and process the material if they are to make informed
judgments about executive performance – for instance, by
purchasing and reading a newspaper. In cases of foreign
policy crises, citizens must also have enough information
to reach a decision on its severity and the necessity of
military action.
These observations suggest that executives consider
citizen knowledge levels before establishing public policy.
Research into redistributive politics, for instance, demon-
strates that incumbents provide more public goods in high-
information societies rather than low, presumably because
they worry politically conscious citizens will equate low
levels of goods with poor executive performance (Besley
and Burgess, 2002; Adsera et al, 2003; Stromberg, 2004).
A similar decision-making calculus is likely at work in the
foreign policy arena, with democrats in low-information
societies less constrained in military affairs than those
whose citizens are more aware of politics. Specifically,
executives gauge how much information the population
has about foreign events and decide based on this assess-
ment whether and how to proceed with military action.
Citizens receive less consideration when information is
hard to come by than when it is widely distributed. In the
case of low-information democracies, leaders know that
citizens are mainly ignorant of foreign events and they are
able to use this fact to exercise independent control over
military affairs. When information is freely available and
citizens are more knowledgeable about foreign events, on
the other hand, incumbents have to be especially careful
about when and how they choose to launch interstate dis-
putes. They must take time to discuss the nature of the
conflict, the pitfalls of peaceful alternatives and the justifi-
cation for war, lest their disregard for public opinion
imperil their electoral prospects.
To be clear, we are not implying that leaders are some-
how able to hide interstate disputes from the population, in
high- or low-information societies. Instead, what this
argument suggests is that the types of actions executives
can take, and how quickly, varies according to the level of
information citizens have about a given issue. Democratic
executives likely behave differently depending on how
well informed the public is of foreign affairs. The less
information the population has, the faster and more
frequently incumbents can initiate military action; the
more informed, the longer the waiting period. Even in
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high-information societies, however, mass ignorance of
certain events at a minimum allows executives to give
quick approval to quasi-military operations. In the United
States, for instance, most citizens were likely unaware of
clandestine CIA forays into Pakistan, Western Europe and
elsewhere in search of suspected terrorists, at least until the
information found its way into the mainstream media. By
that time, however, several missions had already been
undertaken.
Executives consider not only the amount of material
available to citizens, but also their control over the dis-
semination of foreign policy and military information. A
leading theory of media politics suggests that journalistic
coverage of foreign affairs is ‘indexed’ to those in power:
the more power these actors have over a given policy sphere,
the greater the attention their perspective receives from the
media (Hallin, 1986; Bennett, 1990; Zaller and Chiu, 1996;
Livingstone and Bennett, 2003; Bennett et al, 2006; Bennett
et al, 2007). In foreign policy matters such as war, execu-
tives – not legislators or other officeholders – dominate
media coverage because they are the ones who receive the
latest intelligence briefings and have direct responsibility for
overseeing interstate disputes, who can provide reporters
with the most salient information on military matters and
who can blacklist journalists who portray them unflatter-
ingly (see especially Bennett et al, 2007). Opposition view-
points never receive much attention according to indexing
theory – in some instances being harshly stifled – and, ulti-
mately, the public perceives the conflict almost exclusively
through the lens of the executive office.
Incumbents are able to use their control over press cov-
erage of foreign affairs to shape public opinion and to
understand international disputes. This appears to be a
time-honored tradition in autocracies as well as democ-
racies, including in such consolidated democracies as the
United States. Following the destruction of the US warship
Maine on 15 February 1898, for instance, warmongers in
the McKinley administration either allowed or encouraged
journalists to affix blame for the accident on Spain, even
though the ship’s captain expressly cautioned against such
attribution. Commented Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Theodore Roosevelt, the destruction was ‘an act of dirty
treachery on the part of the Spaniards’, later saying ‘we
will have this war for the freedom of Cuba …’ (as cited in
Tindall and Shi, 2004, pp.760–761). Although Roosevelt
had no direct evidence that the Spanish were responsible
for the sinking, these and other comments gave citizens
what turned out to be the mistaken impression that the
United States had fallen victim to a sneak attack by a for-
eign nation. Hence, when war came, it was with the support
of a large segment of the population.
Half a century later, in a situation similar to the
destruction of the Maine, the US executive branch was
again able to use its control of the media to affect the
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS REVIEWS IPR |
© 2013 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved
Not created equal
public’s understanding of international events. In a tele-
vised speech given in early August 1964, President John-
son advised citizens that the North Vietnamese had
launched an unprovoked attack on two US naval vessels
sailing in the Gulf of Tonkin. There was again no con-
clusive evidence that an attacked had commenced, but as in
the case of the Maine, the executive failed to mention these
ambiguities. Instead, Johnson used a potential attack on US
troops to rally initial support for what became the Vietnam
War, with the ensuing Gulf of Tonkin Resolution accord-
ing him wide powers in dealing with North Vietnamese
‘aggression’ (Tindall and Shi, 2004, pp.1122–1123).
Although public support for the war was ephemeral at best,
the fact remains that a skewed presentation of events was
what allowed the conflict to escalate.
Perhaps the most well-known example of a US pre-
sident using his control of the news to ‘sell’ war in recent
memory is the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. As docu-
mented by Bennett et al (2007), the Bush Administration’s
media blitz began in mid-September 2002. For the next
several months, administration officials wove a grim tale
about the dire consequences that would befall the United
States should it fail to challenge Saddam Hussein’s pursuit
of weapons of mass destruction. Said Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld, ‘Imagine a September 11 with weapons of mass
destruction. It’s not 3000, it’s tens of thousands of innocent
men, women, and children’ and Secretary of State Rice,
‘We don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud’
(as quoted in Bennett et al, 2007, p.19). The public now
realizes the evidence provided in support of these state-
ments was incomplete, patently false or disputed by intel-
ligence experts, but at the time it was presented to the
American people as fact by trusted political figures who
knew differently. Whether this evidence was concocted to
justify an interstate conflict many years in the making, as
some commentators have suggested (Bennett et al, 2007),
or the unintended consequence of policy failures that
inexplicably emerged from an administration’s earnest
desire to protect its citizens is a matter for historians to
decide. However, whatever the reason, the information
used to rally public support for the invasion is another
illustration of how an executive can successfully circum-
vent key constraints on his power.
Within the context of the institutional constraints litera-
ture, an obvious objection to indexing theory is that even if
the executive is somehow able to mislead the public by
controlling the media, political opponents will nevertheless
find ways to meaningfully challenge hawkish policies and
prevent the country from moving toward war. Perhaps
legislation will be introduced in the legislature prohibiting
military action or maybe political allies will withdraw their
support; there is a long list of possibilities. However, as
Bennett et al (2007) point out, history again indicates that
these possibilities do not always materialize or are swiftly
VOLUME 1 SEPTEMBER 2013 33
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 Dabros and Petersen
quashed by the incumbent. Recall that of the relatively few
officials who rallied against US military action in Iraq,
most were quickly and severely punished by the adminis-
tration. Once Senator Ted Kennedy claimed that the Bush
administration had skewed intelligence on Iraq, he was
‘quickly dismissed by the Republican rapid-response net-
works as a traitorous liberal throwback’ (Bennett et al,
2007, p.18); Senator Richard Durbin was ridiculed by the
administration’s allies and forced to apologize after com-
paring the tragedy of Abu Ghraib with the Nazis torture
machine; and CIA operative Valerie Plame’s identity was
compromised soon after her husband, Ambassador Joseph
Wilson, criticized the administration’s justification for war.
The message was obvious: public opposition to the Iraq
War on the part of political officials would not be tolerated
by the Bush administration. By responding in these and
similar ways, executives are able to silence in practice
those officials whose power is equivalent to them in theory
(Bennett et al, 2007).
The public’s inability to be assured of a leader’s true
preferences for war is a third way that the principal-agent
relationship can affect executive behavior. It reasons poli-
ticians take office with preset dispositions about whether
and how wars should be fought. The decision to go to war
is often politically motivated, to be sure, but it is also
influenced by their beliefs about the nature of their posi-
tion, what their responsibilities for protecting their citizens
entail and the utility of fighting in general. Some executives
are willing to accept that military action is a useful and
justified policy choice based on these ideological princi-
ples, whereas others maintain that war is an abhorrent pol-
icy used only as a last resort.
These beliefs affect both incumbents’ policy positions
and how they behave during interstate disputes. There is an
extensive literature on the US Congress, which examines
whether leaders maintain their ideological dispositions
while in office. The consensus is that ideological ‘shirking’
does not occur. Legislators vote in a manner consistent
with their stated ideological position throughout their
careers, even in the final term when electoral threats are
nonexistent (Lott, 1987; Vanbeek, 1991; Lott and Davis,
1992; Kau and Rubin, 1993; Bender and Lott, 1996).
These articles provide some evidence that politicians take
personal preferences into account as they make decisions,
not always basing their behavior on how the public will
respond. As it pertains to interstate war, therefore, we can
expect ideology to impact whether an executive favors
military action, even in the presence of electoral competi-
tion, the division of powers and other institutional con-
straints. An incumbent who is by nature more favorable to
war may pursue aggressive policies more quickly and with
less provocation than a pacifist, even though the constraints
are similar for both. Whereas those with less inclination
toward conflict might be satisfied with allowing electoral
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34 SEPTEMBER 2013 VOLUME 1
© 2013 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved
competition and other institutions limit their actions, hawks
will take the steps necessary (such as those described
above) to overcome opposition to their foreign policy
preferences.
In summary, the nature of the principal-agent relation-
ship may mean that democrats are less constrained than
theories of institutional constraints typically allow. Speci-
fically, research in economics and communications sug-
gests executives are able to use citizen ignorance and
control over the media to their advantage as they make
decisions regarding war. Leaders first consider their perso-
nal preferences toward executive power and war, assess
whether other political officials have the authority to chal-
lenge the favored position, judge how well citizens are able
to evaluate performances and evaluate how risky opportu-
nistic behavior would be to their careers. Decisions about
war are then made accordingly. There are certainly intra-
regime differences in the opportunities an executive has to
exploit information barriers, as well as personal willingness
to engage in self-interested behavior. Personal preferences
and information effects are both meaningful factors in an
executive’s decision-making calculus; hence, even in the
presence of a host of hypothetical constraints on executive
power, the principal-agent relationship may grant the
executive expansive authority to initiate and manage inter-
national military disputes.
Conclusion
Research indicates that executives take domestic threats to
political power seriously as they evaluate the benefits of
starting wars, with democrats more restrained on these
issues than autocrats. However, the point we are making in
this review essay is that democratic and autocratic regimes
are not homogenous. On the contrary, work done in com-
parative politics and other disciplines shows that regimes
are dynamic, with governing structures that vary greatly
from one country to the next. Democrats are restrained by
electoral competition and the division of political powers,
to be sure, but citizen ignorance and executive control over
the media may nevertheless grant them expansive authority
over war. Autocrats may not have to subject themselves to
regular national elections or share authority with other
institutions, but elite preferences, quasi-electoral competi-
tion and the ability of legislators and political parties to
protest aggressive military rhetoric might reduce the num-
ber of policy opportunities available to incumbents.
The implications of this review are twofold. First, in a
research program that is built upon the notion that regime
type matters, variation within them must be taken ser-
iously. It is not enough to note that liberal democracies do
not fight each other and call it a day. If this were the case, it
would not matter if the democratic peace was produced
rationally, institutionally, culturally or otherwise. Clearly,
www.palgrave-journals.com/ipr

it does matter, because policies are predicated on certain
sets of beliefs. Wilsonian idealism, for instance, might
work if all that matters is democracy. However, if parti-
cular institutions matter, if consensus matters, then recog-
nizing empirical patterns presented by regime type is
insufficient.
Second, the above is especially true with respect to
recent additions to the club of democratized nations. Egypt,
for instance, having overthrown its longstanding autocratic
leader, might now work toward democracy, might remain
as a hybrid regime moving toward democracy (or in stasis)
or may slide back into autocratic rule. However, to
claim that Egypt would behave neatly based on a strict
categorical definition of its regime type is far less likely
than its foreign policy would be constrained, effectively or
not, by its new institutions. The same is true for the bevy of
states that follow in its wake.
Each country is different, and, even though there are
commonalities among them, variations in the nature, qual-
ity and quantity of institutionalized constraints might allow
executives in similar-type regimes to behave dissimilarly.
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