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Comparing Political Regimes across Indian States: A Preliminary Essay

Author(s): John Harriss


Source: Economic and Political Weekly , Nov. 27 - Dec. 3, 1999, Vol. 34, No. 48 (Nov. 27 -
Dec. 3, 1999), pp. 3367-3377
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4408661

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SPECIAL ARTICLES

Comparing Political Regimes across Indian States


A Preliminary Essay
John Harriss

This article makes a strong case for differentiating the political systems of different states in India on
the basis of the balance of caste/class power and the nature of party organisation within those states. Such
differences can then be shown to influence the policy formulation and performances of these states, especially
with regard to decentralisation of power to lower caste/class groups and alleviation of poverty.
IT has been suggested - for example, by Approaching the ideal of democracy,
context. Others have disagreed. V S Vyas
Atul Kohli (1987) - that India constitutes and P Bhargava, for example, summing therefore, depends upon the differentiation
a 'laboratory' for comparative political up the findings of comparative studiesof
ofthe realm of politics from overall systems
public intervention and rural poverty
analysis. The fact that the country has a of inequality in a society - so that collective
decisions are not made by particular
alleviation in nine states, say emphatically
number of states with quite diverse politics,
but within the framework of Indian individuals or groups of people because
that "success in poverty alleviation efforts
federalism, creates conditions for 'con-
was not significantly affected ... [at least]
of the power derived from their economic
trolled experiments'. But these apparent
by the professed political ideology of the or social status [Rueschmayer et al 1992
opportunities have not been taken up very 41ff]. In practice democratic forms of
ruling parties in the different states" (1995:
2572). The debate which is inherent government,
much. There are important bodies of work in involving the accountability
by individual scholars on the politics of different statements is more signi-
these of the executive to an assembly of repre-
particular states - one thinks officantthe than it once was because of the sentatives elected through free, open
sustained research by Zoya Hasan increased
and elections,
salience of state-level politics in in the context of freedom of
the context of India's economic reforms.
Paul Brass on Uttar Pradesh, that of James expression and association, can never
Manor on Karnataka, of Jayant LeleThe and
greater financial autonomy of the states eliminate altogether the significance of
latterly, of Thomas Blom Hansen on these entail "is likely to combinedifferences of wealth, power and status in
which
Maharashtra, and of Ghanshyam Shah with
on increased regulatory autonomy ...society. Hence, the Marxists have generally
making the state level a more importantrejected such representative democracy as
Gujarat. It is also striking that some states
have not been the subjects of such political
con- arena, and therefore, more in needa sham, concealing the exercise of power
sistent research. And exercises in com- of study" [Jenkins 1996: 198]. The effortby the dominant class. The view expressed
parative politics have been rather thin of
on developing a comparative analysis of by Rueschmayer and his co-authors is that
the ground. Efforts were made in collabo-
state politics seems worthwhile, therefore.the ideal of democracy is approached more
rative exercises on the politics of various or less closely according to the balance of
DEFINING REGIME DIFFERENCES
states orchestrated by Myron Weiner class power in a society, and the nature
(1968), by Iqbal Narain (1967 and 1976)The term 'regime' is used widely butof the state system. The development of
and then by John Wood (1984). The latter quite loosely in political science. It is quitecapitalism is, in some ways, actually con-
includes an interesting comparative essayoften applied to a particular government,ducive to approaching the democratic ideal
by Roderick Church which is referred as to in 'the Telugu Desam regime in Andhrabecause it weakens the power of landlords
Pradesh'; but as frequently it is appliedand strengthens subordinate classes,
later in this article. Then Kohli published
the results of his research on the effec- to such broad distinctions as that between shifting them from the relatively un-
tiveness of different party regimes indemocratic and authoritarian forms of rule. favourable environment of peasant agri-
Karnataka (that of the Congress underClearly, in a discussion of Indian states,culture in which, as Marx argued in The
Devaraj Urs), in UP (the Janata coalition)operating within the framework of federalEighteenth Brumaire, they are 'like
and in West Bengal (the Left Front), indemocracy laid down in the Constitutionpotatoes in a sack' - divided from each
relation to poverty reduction, in his bookof India, the latter distinction does notother, lacking a sense of a collective
The State and Poverty in India (1987). Butapply. We may be concerned, however,interest, and given their identity by the
with differences in the democratic
the most ambitious comparative project so more self-conscious classes which make
far has been that of Francine Frankel and functioning of different states, and describe
up the rest of society. The democratic ideal
M S A Rao, who brought together work these in terms of 'regime types'. is approached more closely, too, if the
by a group of scholars within a framework 'Democracy' is taken to mean: 'govern-
state-system (the organisation of the state)
is relatively autonomous in relation to
which focused on the problematic of 'the ment by the people; the form of government
decline of dominance' (1989, 1990). The in which sovereign power resides society.
in the But there is narrow gap between
exercise which I have undertaken draws people and is exercised either directly by
the Scylla, of a state-system dominated by
heavily upon, and aims to extend the workthem [participatory democracy] particular
or by interests within society, such as
of Frankel and Rao. officers elected by them [representative
those of landlords, or of industrial capital,
Kohli concluded from his comparative democracy]'. Clearly, this is a statement
or of finance capital, and the Charybdis,
study that differences between the political of a state-system which is absolutely
of an ideal, for it evades the real problems
regimes of different states do makeofa collective action, which arise from the
autonomous and able to exercise dic-
significant difference, specifically to the
fact that the goals held by individualstatorship over society, over-riding the
('the
people') rarely coincide absolutely.
adoption of pro-poor policies in the Indian interests and aspirations of 'the people'.

Economic and Political Weekly November 27, 1999 3367

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This is where 'civil society' enters the are these: are there appreciable differencesand ideological coherence - which Kohli
equation: the more developed is the sphere between states in terms of the balance of also highlighted - enter in here.
of private, voluntary association, of civil class power, and the extent of political 'Measuring' regime differences is
society, the wider is the-gap between the participation of historically subordinated,obviously difficult, both conceptually and
Scylla and the Charybdis, and the greater lower classes? What is the nature of this practically (given what is in some instances,
the space for democracy, for it implies that 'participation', ideologically and organis- in regard to India, the paucity of data, and
different interests are organised within ationally, and what are the relationships in others data inconsistencies). We can
society, and able (at least to a significant of the lower classes with other classes?
obtain some qualitative information on
degree) to hold the organisations in the Note that it has often been argued that
the characteristics of different state regimes
state-system accountable [derived from Indian politics are characterised by from the political science literature and
Rueschmayer et al 1992]. 'political accommodationism', referring
from political commentaries (for example,
In the light of this discussion it would to the way in which dominant elites build
Manor's commentary on the new support
seem perfectly sensible to compare Indian coalitions of political support amongst
base built by Devaraj Urs between 1972
states as democratic regimes. Although sections of dependent groups by means and of 1980 in Karnataka).3 It is also of value
the majority of the labour force across thea strategy of selective inclusion.1 to trace changes in the composition of
country remains agricultural, there are Tackling these questions in the Indian state legislatures and of state governments
important regional differences and case requires study of evidence on class (and the backgrounds of chief ministers,
differences between states in terms of the too) in terms of caste and occupation (not
structures and theirrelationships with caste/
organisation of agriculture, the level of ethnicity and historical structures of of course that these translate at all directly
development of capitalism, and of agrarian dominance (defined, following Frankel into policy and policy practice, but still,
class structures. There are differences and Rao as: 'the exercise of authority shiftsin like that which took place in the
between states in terms of the extent of society by groups who achieved socio- 1970s when agriculturalists started to be
industrial development, and hence in the economic superiority and claimed represented much more strongly, are
development of both the industrial legitimacy for their commands in terms of significant). It is possible to take quite
bourgeoisie and the working class. These superior ritual status').2 'Class formation' systematic account of the frequency of
differences may then be reflected, in turn,is always and everywhere a problematic changes of government and to derive from
in variations in the nature and the extent concept. The relationships between this indicators of regime stability, which
of political mobilisation, and of 'objective' differences between groups of can be supplemented from the descriptive
organisation in civil society, both of which
people, in terms of their roles and relations literature. Generally my approach has been
are likely to be very significantly within productive systems, and the to try to develop a framework worked out
subjective categories in terms of which by Roderick Church in a comparative
influenced, in the Indian context, by caste
people experience and understand these discussion of state politics (in UP, Bihar,
and other ethnic identities. These political
differences may exercise a significant roles and relations - between 'class-in- West Bengal, Kerala, Karnataka,
itself' and 'class-for-itself - have always
influence on the functioning of the various Maharashtra and Gujarat) written in 1984.
(state-level) 'state systems'. This is one
to be treated contextually and historically.
At this time, Church argued, there was
level of comparison, therefore, which we In the Indian case this means studying athe
'crisis of participation' amongst lower
might describe as 'structural'. Another relationships
is between class and caste.castes/classes.
We This was in the context of
that of 'regime' in the sense, rather, of a fourfold distinction between caste
know that there is no neat mapping between
'government'. This is the sense employed'class' and 'caste', but there are strong
categories:
by Atul Kohli when he writes: broad correspondences, for example The 'upper'castes, the 'high castes' or the
Variations in regional distributive 'twice-born' are the brahmans, kshatriyas
between land ownership and caste position.
and banias. They have long dominated
We also know that in many instances class
outcomes ... are a function of the regime
society and politics as landlords in the
relationships are experienced as relations
controlling political power. Regime type,
in turn - at least in the case of India - countryside and as businessmen and
between castes [see Harriss 1994]. Some-
times potential or actual class political
closely reflects the nature of the ruling professionals in the city. [Note the
political party. The ideology, organisation connection that is made throughout the
mobilisation is cross-cut by caste relations,
discussion between caste status and class
and class alliances underlying a party-
and vice-versa - and sometimes not. In
dominated regime are then of considerable positions.]
practice we have to study the class/caste
consequence for the redistributive bases of different regimes in order toThe 'middle' castes are the principal
performance of that regime (1987: 10) farming castes (jats, yadavs and kurmis in
address the critical question of 'the balance
In his book, of course, he goes on to of class power'. the north, for example; Marathas in
Maharashtra, and so on). According to
compare the performance of different Further analysis entails examining
caste tradition they are Sudras, the term
party-dominated regimes in three Indian political organisation, including the
for all those below the twice-born and
states. formation of different types of association
above the untouchables, but they have a
For the purposes of this paper, weand
maythe ideology, organisation and class
special status and importance because of
seek to distinguish regime differences
alliances underlying different party- their numbers and land. Typically they are
across states at both the structural level
dominated regimes/governments. What are kisans (farmers or [rich]/middle peasants.
and that of 'party-dominated government',
the stated objectives of different regimes?
[It is usually the case that the locally
searching in the first place for evidenceHow do they seek to win support, 'dominant castes' - dominant by virtue of
on the nature and extent of political ideologically and organisationally? What their control over land and labour, which
mobilisation and of organisation in bothare the alliances on which they depend? are still commonly the basis of local
civil and political society. In the light ofWhat are the relationships between 'local political power - are from these 'middle'
the preceding short discussion of demo- power' and state-level politics? Questionscastes].
cratic political systems critical questionsconcerning leadership and organisationalAt the bottom of the traditional status

3368 Economic and Political Weekly November 27, 1999

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hierarchy are the 'scheduled' castes, the TABLE 1: TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL REGIMES IN DIFFERENT STATES, EARLY 1980S
ex-untouchables, who now have special
Category Characteristics States
constitutional protection and privileges.
They are primarily agricultural labourers. A Upper caste/class-dominated Bihar, Uttar Pradesh
The 'lower' castes form an economic and Congress regimes + [Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan]
social stratum which is sandwiched
between the middle castes above them and B Lower castes/classes recruited into Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra [?:JH]
Congress regimes + [Andhra Pradesh?]
the Scheduled Castes below. It is composed
of marginal farmers, sharecroppers and C Lower castes/classes strongly represented Kerala, West Bengal
landless labourers from low status in non-Congress regimes + [Tamil Nadu]
agricultural castes together with traditional
service and artisan castes - barbers, D Competition between Congress and a Punjab
'middle' caste regional party (excluding
boatmen, blacksmiths, carpenters, grain-
lower castes/classes?)
parchers, oil-pressers, and so on. The
proportion of people in this stratum varies Notes:
from region to region, but it is usually 1 The evidence supporting Church's classification is found in the papers in Wood (ed) (1984).
about a third of the population.4 Because 2 I have added other states (+ [...]), which Church did not consider, in the light mainly of evidence
individual castes are usually small and found in the relevant chapters in Frankel and Rao's two-volume work on state politics:
widely dispersed, as well as poor, the Orissa, described in detail by Mohanty (1990) as still dominated by brahmans and karans (scribes,
comparable with kayasthas in northern India).
lower castes find it difficult to develop a
Rajasthan, dominated by rajputs, as indeed it remains to the present (see the article by Jenkins 1998
common sense of identity or to assert which shows how even the jats in the state, an important 'middle' caste, in Church's terms, have
much political power on their own. (These) been kept out of power).
lower castes are the last stratum to be
Madhya Pradesh is not included in Frankel and Rao's volumes, perhaps because, as Christophe
brought into politics ... [Church 1984:
Jaffrelot has noted recently, traditional dominance by princes and upper castes was still not in
230-31 ;emphasis mine]. decline in that state at the time at which Frankel-Rao and their co-authors were writing, in the mid-
1980s - indeed it hardly is today [Jaffrelot 1998: 40].
Church went on to argue that by the
Andhra Pradesh is perhaps more clearly placed in category B than Maharashtra. Andhra politics
1960s ''the only people systematicallywere still dominated mainly by reddys, and in some of the coastal districts by kammas, in a way
excluded from a share of political which was comparable with Maratha dominance in Maharashtra. But, Ram Reddy notes, "The
representation and policy benefits were
Congress Party [in Andhra] under the direction of Indira Gandhi [and her satrap, P V Narasimha
the castes below the middle castes and Rao, as chief minister] succeeded to a substantial extent in weakening the hold of the rich peasantry
above the Scheduled Castes" and that as over the 'vote banks' provided by the poor peasants and landless [this is analysed in detail in the
ethnographic account of Marguerite Robinson (1988)]", so that when Indira Gandhi was defeated
people from these groups sought a larger
nationwide in 1977 after the period of emergency rule, "in Andhra Pradesh the Janata Party could
share in state power, they encountered not make a dent in.her hold over the poorer sections. The backward castes and the harijans
resistance or attempts at co-optation on continued to identify Mrs Gandhi with the poor, while the dominant agricultural castes aligned
the part of dominant groups (from the themselves with the Janata. The Congress victory, with the support of the weaker sections,
indicated an increasing social polarisation both along caste and class lines" [Reddy in Frankel and
upper and middle castes): "This is evident
Rao 1989:284].
in new levels of violence and corruption,
Tamil Nadu: Here the Congress lost control in 1967, ceding power to the Dravida Munnetra
in populist appeals to the 'poor', in calls
Karzagham, a regional party which propagated Tamil cultural nationalism, and which was
for law and order, in the emergence of successful in mobilising lower castes against Tamil Nadu's relatively fragmented dominant castes.
regionalism, in struggles over reservations
Punjab: While each of these major states presents a distinctive political history, Punjab arguably
for the 'backward classes', and in the constitutes a case apart which cannot be incorporated into the three main categories which have
efforts of political parties to recruitbeen distinguished. The structure of dominance around brahmans/kshstriyas which prevailed over
most of India was not strongly developed here, because of the importance of Sikhism. Punjab was
representatives from lower castes" [this
also strongly affected by social reform movements with anti-brahmanical overtones, in the later
and the previous quotation, Church 1984:
19th/early 20th centuries. So it has not been a state with an 'upper caste/class dominated Congress
231]. This powerful statement has proven
regime'. Moder Punjab politics are fundamentally influenced by the relations of Sikhs, who are
remarkably accurate, and it applies topredominant in rural parts of the state, and Hindus who, although they only make up a little more
Indian politics in the 1990s, as well as tothan a third of the whole population, are numerically dominant in urban areas. Politics have been
the 1980s. dominated since independence by competition between a strong Sikh-based regional party, the
The lower castes have mobilised, or Akali Dal, and Congress, both of them subject to intense factionalism, with the communist parties
and Hindu nationalist Jan Sangh/BJP also playing significant roles. It is said that "Elite (Sikh) Jat
have been mobilised politically in several
dominance under the hegemony of successful landowners is one important dimension of the Akali
different ways: (i) as 'poor people', held Dal" [P Wallace in Frankel and Rao 1990: 456]. In terms of Church's definitions it can be described
to have interests in common with scheduled as a 'middle' caste dominated party. Some poorer Sikhs, including Sikh artisans, and certainly the
castes and tribes; (ii) through status appeals, Sikh Scheduled Castes (who make up close to 30 per cent of the population), have generally been
when a hard-pressed upper caste group inclined to support the Congress, which has also been supported by some of the town-based
Hindus, others of whom have supported the Jan Sangh/BJP. The communist parties have won
seeks to recruit their support (as happened
support from "marginal (Sikh) farmers rather than landless labourers" [P Wallace in Frankel and
in the kshatriya movement in Guj arat, when
Rao 1990: 446]. The Akali Dal has usually had to pursue a strategy of accommodation with Hindus
rajput kshatriya were prepared to concede in order to secure and hbld office, and has commonly entered into alliance with the Jan Sangh/BJP
'kshatriya' status to hitherto low-ranking (as indeed it has done at the national level within the loose coalitions which have kept the BJP in
kolis in order to increase their political office in central government after the 1998 general election). The effect has been to exclude those
clout), or when it is sought to establish who would be referred to in terms of the schema proposed here as 'lower castes/classes' from
links between middle and lower castes as significant political participation; and it is thought that the movement led by Bhindranwale, which
fellow members of the 'backward classes' ;5 brought civil war to the state in the 1980s, appealed to poor Sikhs as well as to educated
unemployed youth.
(iii) by emphasising the regional 3 Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir and Assam, amongst the major states, are not
community (through appeals, forexample, considered here.
to 'We Telugus' or 'We Bengalis'). Such Source: Church (1984).

Economic and Political Weekly November 27, 1999 3369

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of a 'risky business' with potentially very
attempts, however, to unite the lower castes Weiner studied local Congress organis-
with those above them are inherently high returns. Though many of the early ation in the 1960s, reported that he could
problematical because of real differences legislators were extraordinarily principled find little active 'organisation' to speak
in economic interests. The lower castes and personally austere, not all were, and of, at all. The same is true of other political
may be won by populist appeals (as Indira the prospect that the Congress would form parties, as well [see for example, Manor's
Gandhi sought to) "but they can also ministries
be in 1937, under the Government comments on the Janata Dal in Karataka;
drawn to more radical alternatives, as well
of India Act, had already brought in many Manor 1998]. Interventions by central
as to the regional parties. The net effect new members, attracted by the possibilities government in state-level politics, which
is to make political coalitions more fluid of government patronage. The Congress have increased in frequency as part of
and to add a new element of uncertainty party machine which exercised largely these developments, have also contributed
to party politics" [Church 1984: 233].unchallenged authority, both at the centre significantly to political instability.
Around the early-middle 1980s, Church and in the states, for the first 30 years of The outstandingly successful political
independent India, was always oiled by parties of the last quarter-century have
argued, the patterns of politics in different
states could be understood in terms the patronage - the exchange of offices, jobs been the CPI(M) in West Bengal and
extent and mode of political participation and access to public resources for the Kerala, the Jan Sangh/BJP in parts of
mobilisation of electoral support, or 'the north India, Shiv Sena in Maharashtra,
of the lower castes: "First, there are those
states in which lower castes have achieved loaves and the fishes of offices and jobs', and the DMK/ADMK in Tamil Nadu.
positions of power in the legislature andas Ashok Mehta memorably put it - rather These parties, while they have certainly
government and where governmentpolicythan an organisation dependent upon active not always been above the games of patro-
to some extent addresses the concerns ofcadres. It is by these means that 'political nage and corruption,6 do have organisation
the poor(my emphasis; JH). These includeaccommodationism', referred to earlier - and (less so, latterly, in the case of the
West Bengal, Gujarat, Karnataka, Keralaselective inclusion, designed to build DMK/ADMK) coherent ideology (crude
and (perhaps to a lesser extent) Maha-coalitions of support - has been made to though this may seem to outsiders to be,
rashtra. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar remain work. But increasingly, through the history in the case of Shiv Sena especially). An
states where the lower castes have made
of independent India, political office has important influence, therefore, upon
little progress. Second, among states been
in sought in order to derive rents in regime differences at state level is the
which the lower castes have made the various forms. extent to which states have been governed
One of the concomitants of these general by these parties. The DMK/ADMK in
most progress, there are those in which the
Congress has taken the initiativefeatures in of the Indian political system is Tamil Nadu, Shiv Sena in Maharashtra,
recruiting the lower castes and bringing that there is competition for 'the spoils of and the Telugu Desam in Andhra Pradesh,
change" (1984: 236-37). Thus Church office'. Large majorities are often not aare - in the Indian context - relatively
proposed a typology of political regimes guarantee of a stable and secure govern- 'strong' parties, with frankly regional
in different states, in the early 1980s (see ment, because it is then more difficult foragendas and organisations. But in practice
Table 1). those in power to satisfy the aspirations the CPI(M) in West Bengal and Kerala,
Before proceeding to extend this frame- of all their supporters. There is a built-inand the BJP in the north Indian states in
work to take account of political develop- tendency towards factionalism - com-which it is most strong, where it has
ments in the last 15 years, it is important petition between groups led by particularestablished distinctive regional versions
to take account of other factors which individuals who are in pursuit of personalof the overall ideology of hindutva [see
make for differences between political gain and personal differences, rather than for the BJP in Maharashtra, Hansan 1996,
regimes: ideology, leadership, organisation being divided from each other ideo- 1998; Rajasthan, Jenkins 1998], function
and stability (all aspects of the institu- logically. Ideology, indeed, counts for like regional parties, as has the Janata Dal
tionalisation of politics). In the Indian rather little in this political system. And in Karnataka and Orissa. It is significant
case, all of these are affected by certain there is no major state which has not - and refers back to the initial discussion
general (national) tendencies of politics experienced periods of instability as a resultabove, distinguishing between regimes in
and governance. Firstly, although much of factional in-fighting in ruling parties.terms of the extent and mode of parti-
policy analysis seems to operate with the Changes of government, in this context,cipation by lower castes/classes - that as
implicit assumptions that the Indian state(s) most emphatically, often mean nothingPartha Chatterjee has put it: "The more
corresponds with the model of rational- more than a reshuffling of personnel, and the processes of democracy have deepened
legal authority, and that it is engaged have in absolutely no ideological or policyin India, the more has its centre of gravity
rational problem-solving in the common implications. moved downwards ... (and that) ... Today,
interest, the reality is of course veryAnother aspect of the spoils is that there are numerous groups that are able
political parties are but weakly institu-
different. It is a notorious fact that political to make their demands heard in the demo-
life in India has become increasingly tionalised (they are not dependent upon cratic arena ...". But there are differences,
criminalised and is in thrall to those whom active cadres but rather on the prospect still, in these respects, between states.
Chatterjee describes as "self-seeking and or the actuality of the distribution of spoils). A few words more on idea of the
unprincipled political speculators", for This is a problem which has grown pro- 'accommodationism' in Indian politics [the
whom "politics is ... a business, like gressively worse, as many commentators following has been stimulated by Jenkins
speculating in share markets ... a risky have remarked, since Indira Gandhi, in 1996]. This can be viewed eitherpositively
business where you can go bust all of a pursuing her struggle for ascendancy over or negatively, or - perhaps more sensibly
sudden, but where you can also make a the old leadership of the Congress Party - as having positive as well as negative
fortune if things go all right" (1997[ 1991 ]: in the late 1960s and 1970s, rather sys- aspects. From a radical perspective 'accom-
213-14). Though the extent of outright tematically broke up the old Congress modation' means at best fudge and
criminality has steadily increased, Indian machine. Atul Kohli (1996), revisiting in tokenism, if not deliberate manipulation
politics has always had the characteristics the 1980s places in which the late Myron to head-off pressure for the thorough-going

3370 Economic and Political Weekly November 27, 1999

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structural changes which are necessary for placidity and civility of Rajasthan politics Mohanty argues that "a brahman-karan
the empowerment of poor, exploited and will be rocked by the 'power-drive' of the middle class dominates society and politics
oppressed people. But accommodation can agricultural castes, while bound to arrive, in contemporary Orissa" (1990: 321); and
also be considered positively, as part of is difficult to predict" (1990: 53). It has that "The failure of caste associations or
a gradual process of change which may still not come. Jaffrelot's work on politics opposition parties to pave the way for the
lead to greater equity and inhibit violence, in Madhya Pradesh (1998), similarly, autonomous politicisation of the lower
in a context in which radical change is shows the continuing pre-eminence of castes ... facilitated the continuation of
politically infeasible (this is more or less brahmans, rajputs and banias in both the upper caste control over major political
what the authors of Redistribution With BJP and the Congress in that state, though parties" [Mohanty in Frankel and Rao
Growth argued in the 1970s, of course). it seems that part of the reason for the 1990]. The numerical strength of scheduled
The standard works on the political success of Congress in retaining office in castes and tribes in the population of the
economy of India, those of Pranab Bardhan the state is that the party, under Digvijay state "could not be exploited by the left
(1984) and of Francine Frankel (1978), Singh's leadership, has been successful in parties ... conservative elements could
converge around the view that political incorporating some from the lower castes, manage to receive their [the SCs'/STs']
accommodation has frustrated the projects and members of the scheduled tribes (who political support ... (and) despite their
both of rapid economic growth and of make up one-fifth of the state's population). visible presence in the state and the
human development in India, and Paul This is the context, too, of some progressive
legislature they have not emerged as an
Brass, in his survey of Indian politics, measures in education and local self-
independent political force" [Misra 1989:
argues that "'accommodative politics' have 254]. Left-wing parties have never won
government in the recent past. Previously
failed and cannot succeed in the face of the Congress in MP had a long historymuch of support outside small pockets. The
growing class antagonisms in the most outstanding political leader from
factionalism, and the longest single period
countryside and the increasing dominance in office of any CM, before Digvijay Singh,
Orissa has been the late Biju Patnaik, who
of India's 'proprietary classes"' (1990: was that of Arjun Singh (between 1980 maintained a political following in oppo-
246). This last assessment seems to have and 1985). The most significant changes sition to Congress for over two decades,
been falsified by events in the decade of party regime in these two states widening are the social base of electoral
since it was written, but it will be argued those which have taken place in the 1990s.
politics and mobilising the rising 'agrarian
here that there are significant differences (2) Orissa: Orissa has features in middle class', as Mohanty describes it,
between states in the extent to which ac- common with these two states. It too was including notably khandayats, numerically
commodative politics still work, and in partially constituted by former princely the largest single caste group, and who
their modalities.7 states, and like MP it has a high proportionshould probably be considered as 'middle'
We are now in a position to attempt to of scheduled tribes within its population.caste [in terms of Church's definitions;
extend and develop the framework first The princes of Orissa seem to have been and see Mitra 1982]. Biju Patnaik led the
worked out by Church (see Table 2). less successful in retaining political power,Janata Dal government of Orissa after
A (ii): States where upper caste/class but the right wing parties, initially1990, before losing office again to
dominance has persisted - (1) MP and Swatantra - to which some of the princes Congress in 1995. The politics of Orissa
Rajasthan: These are both constituted gravitated and which took part in a coalitionhave had an unusually strong personal
largely by former princely states and in government after 1967 - and later the Janelement, and party contests have been
both some of the former rulers have Sangh/BJP, have long been influential. governed by intra-elite competition.
remained politically powerful. They are
states, too, in which right wing parties - TABLE 2: TYPOLOGY OF INDIAN STATE REGIMES
Swatantra in the 1960s, and the Jan Sangh,
Category Characteristics States
later BJP - have traditional base. The Jan
Sangh shared office in Madhya Pradesh,A(i) States in which upper caste/class d
briefly, as early as 1967, establishing a Congress has remained strong in the con
system [ 'traditional dominance' rather th
pattern of two-party competition at an
accommodation vis-a-vis lower classes]
early stage; and the party led the Janata
government in Rajasthan after 1977. The A(ii) States in which upper caste/class do
BJP took office in both states in 1990, and challenged by middle castes/classes, an
retained it in 1993 (after a period of collapsed in the context of fractured and u
president's rule, following the demolition competition [both 'dominance' and the po
have broken down]
of the Babri masjid at Ayodhya in 1992)
in Rajasthan (until 1998, when the party
B States with middle caste/class dominated
lost) though not in Madhya Pradesh (where has been effectively challenged but has
the party lost again to Congress in 1998). fairly stable and mainly two-party co
Neither state has offered much opportunity accommodation vis-a-vis lower class in
for left-wing political parties or their work effectively, most effectively in M
least effectively in Gujarat]
ideologies. Political leadership in
Rajasthan was divided between brahmans,
C States in which lower castes/classes ar
rajputs, and jats, and the state assemblies in political regimes where the Congress
dominated by these three groups, and the arly stage West Bengalc
scheduled castes, Jenkins has shown how
Notes: a: These five states are classified as '
the BJP has been a vehicle for extending
b: AP and Karnataka are 'middle income s
rajput dominance (1998). Narain and 'high income states'.
Mathur remarked that "The day when the c: These three states are 'middle income st

Economic and Political Weekly November 27, 1999 3371

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Latterly the Congress and Patnaik's population); the patidars of Gujarat especially,
(about successful industrialists, who
following (which has passed substantially 12 per cent); the lingayats and vokkaligas
have pursued effective strategies of ac-
to his son Navin, now leader of the Biju of Karnataka (who together constitute commodation
30 of the lower caste/classe
Janata Dal, which is in alliance with the per cent or so of the population); and the
interests, assisted in this by the fact that
BJP) have competed for power, operating marathas in Maharashtra (30 per cent though
or those described as 'backward
from the same social base, and, "Mono- so of the population of the state). The jatmake up about 50 per cent of the
castes'
polising the competitive arena they (have) Sikhs, similarly, constitute more thanpopulation
20 in the districts of Andhra
pre-empted alternative popular forces from per cent of the population of Punjab. Pradesh,
Upper they are also unevenly distributed
acquiring political significance" [Mohanty castes (brahmins, banias and kshatriyas)
and divided into a large number of small
in Frankel and Rao 1990]. It is unlikely, have been significant in the politicsgroups.
of all "In its actual functioning, the
here, that changes of party-regime are of four states, but more so in Gujarat, practice
where of political accommodation took
any great significance for policy or its on an ad hoc and expedient character in
brahmins and banias generally dominated
implementation. response to the various claims raised by
the ruling Congress Party up to and through
A (ii): States where upper caste/class the 1960s [Wood 1984]. In all these states,
competing social groups. Radical politics
dominance has been effectively challenged the dominant 'middle' castes (and the [in a state in which communists were
upper
- (1) Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are the core castes) have been challenged by lower initially powerful - it was thought likely
states of the 'Hindi heartland', where the castes, or they have accommodatedthat lower
the CPI would form the first govern-
upper castes are much more numerous. ment of
caste aspirations, but the political grip of the state after its formation in
The Congress Party in both states was the 'middle' castes has remained strong,
1956] were thereby avoided and amelio-
dominated by members of these upper though perhaps in varying degrees.rative
They measures pursued" [this and the
castes. About UP, Zoya Hasan writes, are also states in which the BJP now has following quotations from Reddy in
"from the outset the ruling party restricted a significant presence, which is important Frankel and Rao 1989: 265]. The politics
the access of lower castes to positions in in relation to the concerns of this analysisof patronage (in which "The underlying
government, and successive Congress especially because of the way in which the assumption was that every aspirant to
regimes were dominated by upper castes- party has mobilised support which cross-power had his price ...", p 265) gave way,
classes. Upper caste domination provided cuts middle classes and some groups ofas a result of the policies adopted in the
the framework of political bonding in a low caste/class people, though not in a 1970s under the inspiration of Indira
fragmented society" (1998: 19). But way which promises to deliver very much Gandhi to a populist strategy, which
'middle' caste, in our terms, 'Other Back- to the latter. The strength of the BJP iscontinued to win her and her party support
ward Classes' (OBCs) have become evident in Gujarat, where it came to powerin the state even in the aftermath of the
politically powerful in both states; the in 1995 and has been in office, though notemergency (as noted above). But by the
Congress party has very substantially without internal convulsions, for much ofend of the 1970s resentments built up
the time since then, and in Maharashtra,amongst higher caste groups because of
destroyed itself, after ruling each state for
most of the time from independence where up it also held office, in alliance withwhat was perceived as the tilt towards
to 1989/1990, and no longer has muchShiv of Sena, from 1995 until October 1999.scheduled castes and "the rural poor
The BJP's electoral strength in both Andhrathemselves became divided along caste
an electoral base; and politics in each state
is fragmented, and bitterly contested Pradesh, where it won 18 per cent of thelines. Finally, the break-down in client-
between formations which derive from the vote and 4/42 seats in the 1998 generalpatron relations at the local level resulted
Lok Dal, in which OBCs are strong, the election, but has virtually no presence inin the failure of political communication
BJP, to which the upper castes have
the state assembly, and in Kamataka, whereand created a void which went unfilled in
gravitated but which seeks, as elsewhere,
it won 27 per cent of the vote in 1998 andthe absence of any new grass roots party
became the second largest party in theorganisation" (p 285). Youth, educated
to win support from lower castes as well,
and dalit-based parties (notably the state assembly in 1994, albeit with a much middle classes, members of 'lower' castes
smaller share of the vote than the Congress, and Kamma industrialists alike went in
Bahujan Samaj Party, one of whose leaders,
Mayawati, became the first scheduled caste
is much less secure. Manor argues that the search of an alternative to Congress. Then
woman to hold the chief ministershipprospects
of of the BJP in Kamataka stillin the early 1980s Indira Gandhi's frequent
a major state, in a brief tenure in UP depend
in rather on the self-destruction ofinterventions in Andhra politics, and a
1995). The rule of law has broken down the Congress and the Janata Dal than on rapid succession of ineffectual chief
to a greater extent in Bihar than elsewhere
its own efforts, and that the BJP's organis-ministers, built up resentments which were
in India, but the home minister of India ation "has always been far less strong andsuccessfully exploited by the film star
went on record in the Lok Sabha in March extensive in Karnataka than its counterpartsN T Rama Rao, who established a new
1997 to state that UP is moving towards in northern and western India" (1998: 194).political party, the Telugu Desam Party
'anarchy, chaos and destruction'. These judgments were confirmed during(TDP), and - stepping into the political
B: States with 'middle' caste/class
the 1999 Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha vacuum created by the decline of the
dominated regimes: There are of course Congress, and the 'void' at local level -
elections in the state. The BJP is also likely
many differences between these states.
to remain a minor force, in Manor's view, won office in the state in 1983 [see also
But they are alike in having powerful
in Andhra Pradesh, though the performance Kohli 1988, and Vakil 1990, who confirm
'middle' castes/classes - numerically
of the party in the 1998 general election the analysis given by Ram Reddy]. One
significant, locally dominant castes, but that it has finally arrived incharismatic
showed the leader (NTR) effectively
whose dominance extends over widestate.
areas, replaced another (Indira Gandhi), but later
and which have generally exercised was
(1) Andhra Pradesh: The politics of this a national leader while the former
pervasive political influence: the reddys
state has continued to be dominated by regional: "It was (NTR's) charisma that
and kammas of Andhra Pradesh (who'forward
make caste' reddys and kammas, majordominated the electoral scene, rendering
up, together, about 20 per cent oflandholders
the and in the case of the kammasmost of the organised political parties

3372 Economic and Political Weekly November 27, 1999

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irrelevant" (p 286). The TDP offered 'to charismatic leader, Chandrababu Naidu,
Shah and Wood have noted, that there was
restore the dignity of the Telugu people'. is under threat as the scheme has been cut
also a discrepancy between political power
The policies it proposed were frankly down in response to the World and Banksocial dominance in the state. The
populist (notably promising rice at Rs 2 conditionality. In sum, continuity in the
economy was dominated by brahmans,
per kilo), and attempted to accommodate dominance of 'middle' caste/class banias and patidars, but political power
youth, women and the 'lower' castes/ was held
interests, but the populist programmes of mainly by rajput and koli
classes - indicating "the continuity in the TDP may represent a significantkshatriyas,
shift and Wood remarked, in-
political style". Indeed the interim budget within the regime. sightfully, that "The haves, possessing
passed by the TDP immediately after it (2) Gujarat: The more complex caste-
social and economic power but excluded
came to power shifted from irrigation and class structure of this state has madefrom
for access to political power in the
power development, which received an politics which are even more Byzantine
Congress-I, appear to have nowhere to
increased outlay of only 6 per cent, to than is usual in India. Ghanshyam Shah
turn except to hopelessly weak and divided
social and community services, on which comments, "the social situation in Gujarat
opposition parties, or to lawless behaviour"
trfe outlay was increased by 30 per cent is not quite clear. Caste as a social
(1984: 221). He anticipated the violence
[see Pai 1996]. The continuities in the andnot
organisation ... is crumbling, though turbulent conflict which have
leadership of the dominant 'middle' castes/ disappearing. At the same time caste
characterised Gujarat's politics in the
classes is shown in studies of the com- sentiments prevail in the intra-class con-But the 'haves' did find a party to
1980s.
position of the state assembly and of theflicts among the poor farmers, agricultural
turn to by the end of the decade, in the
labourers and industrial workers [in
state cabinet (though it is true that kammas this
BJP. According to Shah's account of it
were more strongly represented under therelatively highly industrialised state with first the Jan Sangh and then the
(1998),
TDP - NTR was himself a kamma), andparticularly extensive commercial BJPagri-
have pursued a long-run strategy of
the representation of members of theculture] as well as the rich peasants and support in Gujarat, seeking to
building
business class. While different classes
'lower' castes/classes in local government incorporate dalits (scheduled castes) and
has been only gradual. Ram Reddy sums cutting across caste boundaries are being
OBCs (lower castes in our terminology)
up: "While the parties in power changed, formed, class consciousness as such is yet
under upper caste leadership. "The party
the stability of the polity continued. The to develop. This situation works in favour
has put the dalit, tribal and OBC members
success of a party seemed to lie in buildingof the upper classes of the dominant castes
in the forefront in various campaigns"
a strong and charismatic personality on the in perpetuating their hold over society" (1998: 257), fielding significant numbers
one hand and carrying out populist policies (1990: 111). The state does not fit so of OBC candidates in state assembly
on the other, capable of appealing to aclearly into the category of 'a middle caste
elections, whilst at the same time contriving
broad spectrum of disadvantaged groups.dominated regime' as do Andhra, never actively to support job reservations
[No new party organisation could be built Karnataka and Maharashtra, because for them. And in 1991 as many as 63 per
to substitute horizontal mobilisation of members of the upper castes - brahmans cent, still, of the state and district level
the poor for vertical patron client networks and especially banias, as well as patidars leaders were from upper castes (brahmans,
...(which)... contributed to excessive - a classic 'middle' caste in Church's banias) and the patidars. After the BJP
dependence on a single charismatic leader terms, exercising local dominance in parts
took power in the state in 1995 it was
and increasing centralisation of power; of the state, and 'kshatriyas' - who include
rapidly split by a conflict between leaders
p287]. As the politics of accommodationboth rajputs and some kolis, the most which seemed to reflect traditional rivalry
appeared to break down because of its own numerous caste group of the state between patidars and rajputs-cum-kolis.
social contradictions [not all groups or (accounting for around a quarter of Shankarsinh
the Vaghela, himself a rajput but
aspirants to powercan possibly be satisfied] population), who include large numbers
with a base amongst kolis, broke away to
another party emerged with a new of small and marginal farmers, form
and the Rashtriya Janata Party, ruled for
charismatic leader and more expansiveagricultural labourers, and can be defined a time with Congress support and "tried
populist policies" (p 291). Sure enough as 'lower' caste, have all vied for power.
with some success to emerge as a leader
NTR's TDP, though it retained office in As Wood argued (1984) the Congress-I of the OBCs in Gujarat" [Shah: in Franke
land Rao 1998: 265]. But in the state
1985 after a badly bungled attempt by the was successful in the 1980s in establishing
Congress government at the centre toa power base by deploying the so-called elections in 1998 the polarisation on caste
remove him, lost in the state in 1989 to 'KHAM' strategy which was presentedlines by which Vaghela anticipated did not
the Congress, even though by this stage its own advocates in the party as a occurway and the BJP won widespread support
Rajiv Gandhi's charisma had worn rather of 'uplifting' disadvantaged members inofa comprehensive victory (Vaghela
thin. The Congress government in the state society. 'KHAM' refers to 'kshatriya' subsequently merged the RJP with Con-
was then defeated in turn in 1994 by the including lower caste kolis, harijan gress, arguing - curiously for one so
TDP, which was able to highlight the issue (scheduled castes - around 7 per cent of
recently a leader of the BJP - that his party
of the distributional effects of the fiscal the population), 'Adivasis' (scheduled
had no ideological differences with
reforms which were by then being imple- tribes - around 18 per cent), and Muslims
Congress). The current chief minister,
mented in the country. The issue of sub- (another 8 per cent or more). Thus it Keshubhai
was Patel, is now perceived, how-
sidised rice was centrally important. Thethat Church defined Gujarat as a state in as favouring patidars at the cost of
ever,
cheap rice scheme had been effectively which lower castes/classes had been 'lower' castes, and there are reports of
run by the TDP before 1989, and the recruited into Congress regimes, though trouble in the ruling party for this reason
record of the Congress in running it was it was already clear that the 'KHAM' (Frontline, June 18, 1999).
perceived as poor, not least because the strategy had exacerbated divisions withinIn sum, there is little evidence to suggest
price had been increased from Rs 2 toeach of its constituent groups, with the that lower castes/classes have won much
Rs 3.50 per kilo. Now the future of theworse-off amongst them being excluded political ground in Gujarat, and the current
TDP, under a new and somewhat from benefits. But it did mean, as both ascendancy of the BJP is founded on 'the

Economic and Political Weekly November 27, 1999 3373

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upper classes of the dominant castes'. But His view was that as a result of these organisational setting ... it has an
regime shifts occurred in the later 1970s incompatible
events in the early 1980s, it was no longer leadership structure
and 1980s in the period of the 'KHAM' possible for any single social force to
emanating mainly from discrete and pre-
strategy and again in the mid-1990s with dominate Karnataka politics, and he
existing political backgrounds [The
the assumption of power by the BJP, and (correctly, as it has turned out) foresaw
recurrent conflicts between the top leaders
the realignment of economic and political that politics in Karnataka might become of the Janata Party, later Janata Dal in
power. increasingly unstable. Karataka - Hegde, Bommai and Deve
(3) Karataka: The politics of Karataka The local dominance of lingayats and
Gowda, a brahman, a lingayat and a
has been described by Manor as a state vokkaligas may have persisted - this vokkaliga,
is respectively, - bear out this
with a conservative social order, in which quite clearly shown by Ray and Kumpatla's
point]. The Janata Party has no ideological
"the disparities in wealth, status andpower analysis of the social backgrounds of zilla
commitment to the poor; its ideology can
have not been so severe as to undermine be spelled out only in terms of some
parishad presidents in the mid- 1980s, under
the comparative cohesiveness of society" the Janata government of the state (1987)
generalities like democracy and de-
(1989: 323). Later, he argues that this - but they were no longer dominant, Manor
centralisation. The hold of the dominant
'cohesion' "rooted in small peasant pro-maintained, as they had been at supra-
landowning castes in the party is enormous.
prietorship" (p 331), has been dominated local levels. He considered that "The Its policies and programmes are not
by lingayats and vokkaligas. Congress problem of the Hegde government [after therefore intended to imperil the entren-
administrations led by vokkaligas and 1983] was not that they favoured locally ched interests of the propertied classes as
lingayats in the 1950s and 1960s are said dominant groups but that they risked a whole ..." [Ray and Kumpatla 1987:
to have carried out 'modest reforms', spreading their resources too thinly1830]. by Manor, and Kohli, in the light of
offering modest concessions to poorer distributing largesse to nearly every their commentaries on the Urs' govern-
groups [though it is possible that Manor sizeable group in the state" (1989: 357). ment, might well argue that this is precisely
has latterly over-emphasised the effec-Srinivas and Pannini had been even more the point: these were regimes which were
tiveness of the land reforms of 1961, as positive about the character of the Hegde able to pursue modestly progressive
well as those carried out in the times of government, suggesting that it had agendas because - pursuing the politics
the Urs administration in the 1970s: see "restored the bias that Urs gave to rural of accommodation they took a pragmatic
Damle 1989]. But by the late 1960s theuplift and poverty eradication" (1984:73). attitude towards propertied classes. But it
solidarity of 'lingayat raj' was being Ray and Kumpatla, however, found that has yet to be demonstrated that they
undermined by frustrations over access to in local government the representation of achieved lasting benefits for poorer people
patronage. This assisted Devaraj Urs' riselingayats and vokkaligas was greater under in Karnataka (and, it would seem, from
to power, which involved mobilisation of Hegde than it had been in Urs' time and the studies of Minhas-Jain-Tendulkar
lower caste/class groups in the 1970s. Butheld that because the Janata government (1987) and Datt-Ravallion (1998), that
Urs' regime, described as 'progressive' by had neither the will nor the capacity to they did not). The 1994 elections to the
Manor (1980) and after him by Kohli, challenge local power holders "the newly state assembly in which lingayats and
lacked organisational foundations and did created powerful [panchayati raj] system vokkaligas won, respectively, 29 and 24
not endure. Neither does it seem - in the of democratic decentralisation is unlikely per cent of the seats, show the persistence
light of subsequentevents -that Urs sowed to create substantial gains for the rural of their influence (see also Harold Gould's
the seeds of radical change in Karnataka poor" (1987: 1825), a finding which is analysis ( 1997) of the Janata Dal electoral
society in the way in which M N Srinivas broadly substantiated by Manor's own later strategy in the general elections in the state
and M N Pannini suggested when they work on panchayati raj in Karnataka, with in 1996, which confirms the point.
wrote, "He succeeded in making the poorer Richard Crook. Crook and Manor argue In sum, it is not clear that 'middle' caste/
sections realise that in a democracy not that decentralisation in Karnataka has class dominance has been shaken in
only should the government work for the improved political participation andKarnataka, or that lower castes/classes have
welfare of the poor but also that it should government performance, but, they say exercised some voice in the way that they
be run by them" (1984: 73). The Congress- "Even (this) the most successful of ourhave in Andhra and in Gujarat. It is possible
I was restored to power in 1980, under the cases showed little evidence of having that both the Urs and the Janata Party/
leadership of Gundu Rao, who proceeded been particularly responsive to 'vulnerable Janata Dal regimes have been more 'pro-
to govern with such bungling ineptitude groups', the poor or the marginalised" poor' than others, but it has yet to be
(Manor saves his most cutting language (1998: 301). In Karnataka there was no shown that - if this was so - they have
for Gundu Rao) as to alienate "a vast array mechanism or political process forhad much effect.
of important social groups" who then, in checking the exercise of local power, such (4) Maharashtra: Jayant Lele, who has
January 1983 "astonished India by rejecting as might be supplied, they imply - a lawritten extensively on Maharashtra
a Congress government for the first time". Kohli - by dominance in the political politics, says of the marathas that "In no
According to Manor "Because so many system of a leftist party. We should notother state do we find an ideologically
alienated groups had turned to the then "expect democratic decentralisation guided and economically differentiated
opposition, the Janata government which in India to assist in poverty alleviationcaste cluster of this size" (1990: 180); and
took power in 1983 contained repre- over the short to medium term, unless theRobert Jenkins sums up Lele's views on
sentatives of nearly every important social centralised system is dominated by a leftistthe politics of the state as follows: "the
force in the state. Despite ill-informed and party" [Crook and Manor 1998: 77]. TheMaratha caste cluster has constructed a
quite unsubstantiated cliches in sections Urs regime, and subsequently the Janata/system of elite-pluralist hegemony, which
of the Indian press, lingayats and Janata Dal failed (pace Srinivas and subsumes many unprivileged members of
vokkaligas have not succeeded in domi- Pannini) to bring about radical change in that caste cluster as well as other dis-
nating that government" [this and the Karnataka politics: "Hegde, like Urs, heads advantaged castes, and has cut short a
preceding quotations Manor 1989: 356]. a party which has a loose ideological and 'coalition of the disadvantaged' ... this

3374 Economic and Political Weekly November 27, 1999

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system is flexible enough to respond to in 1995, though its social character was
none of them has 'middle' castes extending
most challenges of change" (1996: 210, changed in other ways. Maratha strength
local dominance over wide areas, as is the
note 12). Dalits have been more con- was maintained - but the kinds ofmarathas
case with the marathas, the reddys or the
tinuously organised in Maharashtra than who won were different from those who lingayats and vokkaligas. In all the three
has been the case elsewhere in India, and had held seats in previous assemblies. The
states there are strong indications of higher
in consequence perhaps there has been Maratha Maha Sangh (a caste association)levels of political mobilisation and
more 'generous' accommodation of elites allied with the Shiv Sena, but successful
participation by 'lower' castes/classes than
from the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes maratha candidates who won on the Shiv is true elsewhere. Papers in Wood (1984)
and Muslims than elsewhere, so that "They Sena ticket were young and had little or substantiate this case for Kerala and West
have developed a vested interest in the no support from Maharashtra's co- Bengal, where it is due to the activities
maintenance of the system. Lele says operatives or other institutions: "They are of a left-of-centre party, the CPI(M) which
elsewhere, "Ambedkar's project' of low those disgruntled elements who are not has combined coherent leadership,
caste- emancipation 'is on the buffers'... absorbed in the local power structure by pragmatism towards the propertied classes,
(while) ... Those from the Other Backward the clannish marathas of the Congress" and ideological and organisational
Classes .. have also realised that without [Vora 1996: 173; points confirmed in commitment which has successfully
control over land or trade, without a caste Banerjee's analysis (1997) of the success challenged local landed power-holders. In
cluster ideology equivalent to that of the of the BJP-Shiv Sena in the 1996 general both states there has been more significant
Marathas or Mahars [the most numerous election]. The BJP's 64 MLAs "reflected effort made at asset redistribution through
Scheduled Caste] and without spatialthe party's systematic strategy of trans- agrarian reform than elsewhere. Kerala,
concentrations, mobilising against Maratha forming its upper-caste image" [Hansen however, has a more developed civil society
hegemony or the Congress system cannot 1998: 147]. Only 10 were brahmins and and more political competition, whereas
yield a lasting alternate system of rewards"24 came from the maratha-kunbi caste the CPI(M) in West Bengal has become
[Lele 1990:188]. The Maharashtra govern-cluster. rather a monolithic machine. Echeverri-
ment was unable to provide satisfactory A commentator argues that in India'sGent acknowledges "The party's relative
information to the Mandal Commission most urbanised and industrialised state success in dislodging traditional landed
about the status of the 'OBCs' in the state, "the rural-based Congress is becoming elites ...". But he argues that "democratic
but there was also unlike Gujarat, little in irrelevant" [Vora 1996: 172], but the same competition is essential in maintaining
the way of 'anti-reservation' outbursts inwritergoes on to suggest that crucial factorsparty commitment and discipline over the
Maharashtra in the 1980s. The state's in the elections were first, the Congresslongerrun" and he fears that "The declining
widely celebrated employment guarantee in-fighting, which meant that there werecompetitiveness of politics in West Bengal
scheme (EGS)- the state's most important large numbers of rebel Congress can-suggests that there may be a reduction in
anti-poverty programme, has played a
didates, and second, the party's loss ofresponsiveness to the rural poor"
significant part in 'the system', too: "Largesupport amongst Muslims (following the[Echeverri-Grant 1993: 168-169]. None-
part of the funds for the EGS is provided violence against Muslims in the Bombay theless the work of Richard Crook shows
riots of 1992-1993). Here, as elsewhere,that amongst all the instances of de-
by the prosperous urban sector of the state...
(the) politically powerful rural elite in thethe self-destruction of the Congress hascentralisation which he has been able to
state succeeded in extracting finance from played a significant, if not vital, part inidentify and to study from across the world,
the urban sector for the GS in order to the get BJP's rise. It is certainly still too early
West Bengal's has been most successful.
benefits from the assets created in the ruralto write off the Congress as a politicalHe concludes his comparative study by
areas [whilst also managing potential force in Maharashtra (though it has been arguing that "It is highly significant that
resistance: JH]" [Mahendra Dev 1995: further damaged by the recent split betweenthe most successful cases [like West
2674]. Sharad Pawar and Sonia Gandhi). But Bengal] were the ones where central
Another outcome of the system was that meanwhile there has been a change ofgovernment not only had an ideological
Congress rule proved most durable, party-regime for the first time in Maha- commitment to pro-poor policies, but was
amongst all the major states, in Maha- rashtra. The significance of this has yetprepared to engage actively with local
rashtra, and until 1995 the party was only to become apparent. On one level the BJP-politics ... to challenge local elite resistance
out of power there for two years (and even Shiv Sena seems to accommodate differentif necessary and to ensure implementation
then, the government which ruled between class interests very effectively, though inof policies". (Where central governments
1978 and 1980, in the aftermath of the a different way from that which workedhad not confronted local elites, the results
emergency, included those who had been under the old Maharashtrian Congressof decentralisation in relation to the poor
and who were to be again leaders of the system in Maharashtra. The implicationswere universally poor.)
Congress-I). The 1995 state assembly in the longer run of local challenge to In Tamil Nadu the participation of lower
elections saw the first serious challenge Maratha dominance may be profound. But castes/classes has rather been articulated
to both Congress and the Maratha domi- in terms of policy, at least in the short run,by a local, regional party which at one time
nance. The BJP-Shiv Sena alliance won there has not been great deal of change.propagated cultural nationalism, and which
29.1 per cent of the vote and 64 and 73C: States in which lower castes/classes has had charismatic leaders who have
seats respectively against the Congress have been more strongly represented:successfully appealed to lower castes/
Kerala, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal are
'80 (and 30.9 percent of the vote), bringing classes through populist programmes.
about the first change of party regime. Forstates which stand out because their caste/Cross-class political alliances have been
the first time in its history, the state had
class structures have historically been quiteestablished by fairly well-institutionalised
a real non-Congress government, and one fragmented. In none of them was upperpolitical parties. Politics is quite clearly
not dominated by marathas coming from caste dominance as strongly entrenched asnot upper caste/class-dominated as in (say)
in the north (though brahmans had MP, or middle caste/class-dominated as
rural areas. The caste composition of the
Vidhan Sabha did not change very much positions of importance in all of them);in (e g) Maharashtra, but the DMK/

Economic and Political Weekly November 27, 1999 3375

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AIADMK regime does have a petit institutionalised party system thaninstitutions,
does and requires that they should be
identified
Karnataka, where the party system is by a commission appointed by the
bourgeois rather than working class
character. Kohli' s observations on Madurai president. When the V P Singh government
increasingly fragmented - though it is still
decided in 1990, to adopt the recommendations
suggest that the ADMK became dominated by the locally powerful middle
of the second such Backward Classes
deradicalised, failed to build institutionalcastes/classes. Unsurprisingly Crook found
Commission there was violent protest from
roots (beyond the MGR fan clubs), andthat decentralisation in Karnataka was members
less of upper castes, especially across
failed to deliver on its anti-centre, anti-effective in relation to poverty alleviation
northern India. The extraordinary sensitivit
brahman and pro-poor goals, which than in West Bengal given that the surrounding 'Mandal' (the name of the
central
chairman of the second commission, which
"slowly brought to the fore a ruler elected(state) government made no attempt to
came to be applied generally to the recom
primarily by virtue of his personal appeal"challenge local power. There has been
mendations of the report) is in part a reflectio
(1990:182). Similarly, Washbrooks viewsmore party competition in Gujarat than in increasing political strength of some o
of the
"the AIADMK regime was one of bread Maharashtra which may have made thefor
'OBCs' ('other backward classes'), and
(or rice) and circuses (or movies) and inrather greater responsiveness to themay also have contributed to its development.
poor
One reason for favouring the use of Church's
broad political terms, might be conceived(eg through the PDS). Where stable,
distinction between 'middle' and 'lower' castes,
as a form of Bonapartist or Caesarian relatively well-institutionalised parties
rather than - as if often the case in
political
democracy. Classically, the bourgeoisie,compete for their votes, the political system
commentary in and on India - using only the
or the elite of wealth, withdrew from a is likely to be more responsive to thecategory
needs of 'OBCs', is precisely that the latter
formal position of control over the stateand interests of poorer people, and are
more
quite clearly differentiated in the way that
apparatus and the constitutional political effective in bringing about povertyChurch suggests.
6 A fortiori during the period in which Jayalalitha,
process. Not only was their direct controlreduction.
leader of the ADMK, was chief minister of
no longer necessary for the purposes of Notes Tamil Nadu after 1991.
capital accumulation but their attempt to 7 Jenkins' argument, developed in the context of
exercise it ... provoked resistance and [This paper was written in connection with a a discussion about 'the politics of protecting
instability. Formal control was transferredcollaborative project on 'Political Systems and the poor', in the process of economic reform
to [I would ratherput it, 'was assumed by'] Poverty', directed by Mick Moore (of the Institute in Maharashtra, is an interesting one. He
of Development Studies, Sussex) and James Putzel suggests "that both the rich and politicians
a cadre of professional political managers
(of the LSE) for the governance department of alike, though clearly diverting to themselves
who on the basis of a populist ideology,the UK department for international development.
a good deal of the resources meant for the poor,
mollified resistance by turing what wasI am grateful to Mick and James for their have something togain from preserving a system
left of the state into a welfare agency andencouragement of my work.] of social welfare which has allowed them to
by stirring up feelings of patriotism and control the flow of resources and thereby to
1 Frankel's masterly analysis of India's political
atavism" [Washbrook in Frankel and Rao shore up their waning traditional authority ..
economy 1947-77 shows how accommodation
1989: 258]. there may be life left yet in the corpse of
worked and what its effects were [Frankel
political accommodationism" (1996: 200).And
In conclusion, therefore, there does seem 1978].
no bad thing, either, for the poor of Maharashtra,
to be a strong case for differentiating2 In the two-volume work Dominance and State
he seems to suggest, stand their best chance
between the political systems of different Power in Modern India (1989, 1990) edited
of gaining some protection from the effects of
states in terms of the balance of caste/class by Frankel and Rao, various authors analyse
economic liberalisation. There are political
the relations of dominance, in this sense, and
power, and the nature of theirparty systems, pressures in India, in his view, which will tend
'state power' ('the exertion of secular authority
and it may be expected that these dif- by individuals appointed or elected to offices to create the conditions for the type of coalition
ferences can be shown to influence the envisaged by Joan Nelson between 'some;
of the state, who claim legitimacy under the
among the poor' and those in middling income
policy process and the performance of the law'). A central theme of the work as a wholedeciles.
states. For example, in the group of states concerns the decline of 'dominance', associated
with brahmanism.
where middle castes/classes have been References
3 There is a lot of variation in terms of the
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This reflects the continuing power of groups should be the subjects of positive Karnataka: Myth of Success', EPW, August
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lead to what has been described as
Article 340 of the Indian Constitution refers Some Indian States Done Better Than Others
'responsive wage deceleration', ortothe
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for preferential treatment in access to publicEcheverri-Gent, J (1995): The State and the Poor:
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3376 Economic and Political Weekly November 27, 1999

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Machine', EPW, 32, 37, September 13. Shah, G (1998): 'The BJP's Riddle in Gujarat... "KHAM" Strategy ,and Congress (I)
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Harriss, J (1994): 'Between Economism and Post- QUEST FOR A JUST WORLD ORDER
Modernism: Reflections on the Study of
Agrarian Change in India' in D Booth (ed)
Essays in honour of K Raman Pillai
Rethinking Social Development, Longman, Edited by: B. Mohanan & P. S. Nair
London.
Hasan Z (1998): Quest for Power: Oppositional
The 22 articles in this book touch upon the world economic order, the
Movlements and Post-Congress Politics in
UP, OUP, Delhi. world political order, the global security arrangements, the prospects of
Jaffrelot, C (1998): 'The Sangh Parivar ..', in T universal Human Rights, the world environment order and the challenges
Hansen and C Jaffrelot (eds), The BJP and
before world governance through the UN system. In all these articles the
the Compulsions of Politics in India, OUP,
Delhi. perspective is that of the developing world and more particularly countries
Jenkins, R (1996): 'The Politics of Protecting the in the Asian region. The picture of the world that emerges on reading
Poor During Adjustment ...', in U Thakkar
and M Kulkarni (eds), Politics in Maharashtra,
the articles is neither satisfactory nor just. It is not alarming either. It
Himalaya Publishing House, Bombay. reflects the QUEST, a quest that is partly inchoate, mostly inarticulate
- (1998): 'Rajput Hindutva, Caste Politics, and some times contentious. To-be able to know the dimensions to the
Regional Identity and Hindu Nationalism in
quest, one has to read the entire book and reflect on issues it raises. Well
Contemporary Rajasthan' in T Hansen and C
Jaffrelot (eds), The BJP and the Compulsions there is no limit to the quest and the more you get to know about it, the
of Politics in India, OUP, Delhi. more you realise how little you know. But even to know what you know,
Kohli, A (1987): The State and Poverty in India,
CUP, Cambridge.
you need to read this book.
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28,10.
Member Law Commission of India
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