Development Policy Review - 2018 - Chopra - Accounting For Success and Failure in Policy Implementation The Role of

Received: March 2018
|
Accepted: September 2018
DOI: 10.1111/dpr.12404
ARTICLE
Accounting for success and failure in policy

implementation: The role of commitment in India’s
MGNREGA
Deepta Chopra
Institute for Development Studies,

Brighton, UK
Abstract
Commitment or political will is often notable by its absence.
Correspondence While lack of commitment is a key factor in policy failure,
Deepta Chopra
Email: d.chopra@ids.ac.uk it has been challenging to identify and operationalize how
commitment can shape successful implementation. This
Funding information
article applies Brinkerhoff’s (2000) framework of expres-
Effective States in Development (ESID),
DFID sions of commitment to explain how commitment of policy
elites shape policy implementation processes. Evidence
for five characteristics of commitment traces these expres-
sions from two types of policy elites — politicians and
bureaucrats. Primary data from four Indian states were
used—Chhatisgarh, Assam, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh—to
examine the case of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Act (MGNREGA). The data were collected
through interviews with state‐level elites, supplemented by
secondary data on the political economy of these states. In
explaining how successes and failures of the MGNREGA
are attributable to the commitment of these actors, the ar-
ticle considers the politics of policy implementation. It ar-
gues that commitment is critical at the sub‐national level in
India, and explains the different outcomes of MGNREGA
in the four states. The article considers how to strengthen
policy implementation, and demonstrates that this can be
done through capitalizing on positive feedback loops be-
tween different strands of commitment, as well as between
© The Authors 2018. Development Policy Review © 2018 Overseas Development Institute
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790 CHOPRA
commitment of administrative elites and political party

leaders. The paper concludes that commitment and capac-
ity feed off each other, improving implementation of social
policies.
KEYWORDS
commitment, India, MGNREGA, policy implementation, political will
1 | IN T RO D U C T ION
Most studies of policy implementation examine mechanisms and processes, debate whether
these are top‐down or bottom‐up, and identify barriers, obstacles and learning in these pro-
cesses (Hjern & Hull, 1983; Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980). This literature has recently started
privileging political economy explanations which examine actors involved in implementation,
and their interests in shaping policy implementation and initiating policy reform. There is a
spirited discussion documenting the failure of well‐intentioned policies (Corbridge, Williams,
Srivastava, & Veron, 2005; Fernandez, 2012; Kohli, 1987; Fernandez, 2012). In the Indian
context, there seems to be substantial sub‐national variation in implementation of the same
policy (Bajpai & Sachs, 1999), but an understanding of reasons behind policy failure or success
remains underexplored.
One plausible explanation pertains to the “interests” of political elites that shape implementation
of policy, but there is scant literature on how these can be conceptualized, seen and assessed. What
are the expressions of these interests and motivations? And how do they shape policy implementation
and outcomes in different ways? This article frames “interests and motivations” as the political will
that policy actors bring to policy processes, thereby shaping both the implementation and outcomes
of policy by examining and assessing the commitment of political elites involved in decision‐making
and implementation of policies, namely politicians and bureaucrats.
The case of India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA)
is ideal for examining the commitment of political elites as a strong factor behind success and fail-
ure. State‐level variations in MGNREGA’s outcomes provide such examples of the same policy,
which are important to explore from a political perspective. Further, understanding supply‐side
reasons behind variations in implementation and outcomes is interesting since although the Act is
supposed to be demand‐based, in practice, MGNREGA remains largely driven by state and local
actors (Chopra, 2016) free to shape their implementation processes and pathways. It therefore be-
comes critical to examine differences in commitment of state‐level political elites, and how these
help shape variation at the state level in MGNREGA’s performance.1
This article argues that the commitment of state‐level political elites, notably politicians and bu-
reaucrats involved in the Act’s implementation, is critical in accounting for variations in outcomes of
the MGNREGA across states. It employs comparative case studies, analysing qualitative data from
four states: two where MGNREGA has been a success (Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Chhattisgarh), and
1
While there is considerable variation in performance within states, and some explanations for that (Roy, 2015), the focus
here on state‐level variation is because (a) that state‐level action influences implementation at sub‐state and local levels; and
(b) there are some factors at the state level that seem to be more important than local‐level factors cumulatively in influencing
overall implementation outcomes at the state level. This article is largely based on an earlier work (Chopra, 2015).
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two where it has not (Bihar and Assam).2 “Success” is understood as high proportions of person‐days
generated in each state from the number of rural poor.3 This is an important indicator given that job
creation is the overriding objective of MGNREGA; and it controls for variations introduced as a result
of different demands across states, assuming that demand is highest in poor households.4
This comparative approach allows an exploration of factors at the state level, thereby operation-
alizing “commitment” from a political perspective. The literature has usually focused on a technical
analysis of problems, but this article privileges ways in which commitment of political elites shapes
success and failure, and so provides valuable insights into political factors behind outcomes, clarifying
and tracing the role of commitment.
After a brief methodological note (including the rationale for selection of the four states), this
article assesses how commitment is conceptualized in the literature on policy processes. It then op-
erationalizes this with data from the four states, providing nuanced analysis of the characteristics of
commitment. It concludes with some critical observations on the role of commitment in delivering
MGNREGA, operationalizing the concept of political will or commitment for understanding policy
implementation and outcomes.
1.1 | Methodology
This article is based on fieldwork carried out between July 2012 and September 2014 for a larger
project which identified eight of 18 major states (selected for geographical variation, socio‐economic
characteristics and access to state‐level officials). It presents analysis from four states,5 chosen for
three main reasons. First, they allow comparisons of implementation and outcome levels. Second, this
enables us to explore reasons for differing outcomes even in states with similar political regimes. For
example, Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Assam were both Congress Party‐ruled, yet their implementation
of MGNREGA differed drastically. Finally, the selection of these four states eliminates the role of
political dynamics between central and state governments in determining varied implementation.
While AP’s performance might be high because the political party in power was the same as central
government (MGNREGA was a flagship programme of the central ruling alliance), the same dynamic
does not hold for Assam. Similarly, one would expect performance in both Chhatisgarh and Bihar to
be low, being ruled by opposition parties, yet Chhattisgarh’s performance is high.
2
These rankings are similar to rankings provided by other scholars on these states, also reflecting the accuracy of the indicator
of “success” defined in this article. Maiorano (2014) and Mukherji and Jha (2017) present AP as a high‐performing state,
while Dutta et al. (2014) show rationing of work and other problems that impede MGNREGA’s implementation in Bihar.
While Chhatisgarh has been lauded for its good implementation through national awards (Staff Reporter, 2018), Assam is
considered to be one of the lowest‐performing states regarding MGNREGA (Singh, 2012).
3
Other popular indicators of “success” in MGNREGA have included the proportion of households completing 100 days of
work; and the level of delays in wage payments. Interestingly, the use of either of these two indicators generates similar
rankings of states. A possibly good indicator of performance or “success” of MGNREGA, especially from the perspective of
the workers, could be the ease with which demand for employment was met—however, this indicator is difficult to assess, as
demand is not easily captured. Data generated under the comprehensive MIS system of MGNREGA show very little
difference between the amount of work demanded and the amount generated—primarily because of negative sanctions such
as unemployment allowance that prevent correct figures from being entered into the MIS.
4
In this way, the denominator takes into the “demand‐side” of MGNREGA work, while the numerator captures the total
provision of MGNREGA work in the state.
5
While this means that the exact ranking of the four states on the various indicators of commitment needs to be seen as being
valid only within a certain timeframe, this article’s contribution is in operationalizing the framework of commitment for
understanding policy implementation through similar data.
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These four states also rule out demand‐side factors like awareness, alternative job prospects and
migration, in seeking explanations for varied performance, with similar levels of awareness (Chaarlas
& Velmurugan, 2012) and lack of development and alternative jobs in rural areas (Dutta, 2009).
Therefore, similarities in demand for MGNREGA work exist across India, so inter‐state variation
in performance needs to be examined in relation to supply‐side factors. These factors include the
capacity of state‐level elites to implement MGNREGA. In order to separate the contribution of that
capacity and commitment success, this article examines states with varying capacities despite similar
performance. AP is a high‐capacity state implementing MGNREGA very well, while Chhattisgarh,
arguably a low‐capacity state, has also been successful. Bihar and Assam represent states with lower
capacity and low performance (Matthew & Moore, 2011; Pankaj, 2008; Pankaj et al., 2013).
Desk‐based literature reviews and statistical analysis were conducted for an overall picture of
the states’ political economy and performance in MGNREGA. Fieldwork included visits to state
departments of rural development involved in implementation, some district‐ and block‐level of-
fices and some field sites. Primary data were collected through interviews with state‐level bureau-
crats and other personnel (at least four officials in each state) responsible for MGNREGA. These
interviews were often unstructured and conducted in formal meetings or informal discussions and
repeated interactions during fieldwork. Furthermore, interviews and meetings were conducted with
at least two district‐ and/or block‐level officials in each state; interactions with frontline staff and
workers at selected work sites helped build a picture of overall state‐wide implementation dynamics
and processes.
Rural development ministers of state were also interviewed, the single most influential politicians
with respect to MGNREGA: this is in line with the thinking that “powerful politicians matter enor-
mously” for policy implementation (Melo, Ng’ethe, & Manor, 2012, p. 2). I also interacted repeatedly
with some ministers through emails, phone calls and meetings. While I tried to interview the Chief
Minister in each state, this was only possible in Assam. For the other states, I depended on secondary
literature and other interviewees’ accounts of Chief Ministers’ interest in MGNREGA. Interactions
with civil society activists varied by state, as did meetings with state institutes providing training to
state officials on MGNREGA. I also met senior bureaucrats from the Ministry of Rural Development
in Delhi in formal interviews or during more general discussions on progress of the research and spe-
cific findings/questions emerging from state‐level pictures.
All interviews and meetings were noted, some recorded with permission from the respondents, and
all anonymized, transcribed and analysed in an appropriate coding framework. While there were few
interviewees in each state (between four and eight across the state, and six at the centre), I could build
an overall picture of state‐wide commitment of political elites through my interactions and review of
secondary literature for each state, since I interviewed the key players in each case. Accordingly, this
article makes no claims regarding sub‐state variation in political commitment, nor nationwide claims
regarding MGNREGA based on this data.
2 | IM P L E ME N T ING P O L IC Y: THE ROLE

O F CO M M ITME N T
Following pioneering work on policy implementation processes by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973),
conceptual strides have been made with a political economy approach (Mcloughlin & Batley, 2012)
that privileges politics (Leftwich & Wheeler, 2011). The role of actors and institutions in addressing
constraints, choosing allocation and provision of resources, and defining relationships of accountabil-
ity, has also been considered (OECD, 2008; Scoones & Keeley, 2000). This conforms with the policy
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reform literature, which explains policy change by different configurations of institutions, actors and
interests (Grindle, 2005), as well as changes in political junctures and social contracts between state
and citizens (Chopra, 2014; Hickey, 2006) and the roles of public action and citizen pressure (Chopra,
2011a, 2011b; Coelho, Pozzoni, & Cifuentes, 2011). These perspectives essentially view implemen-
tation and reform as a political undertaking, with actors, networks, strategies and existing structures
accorded importance in affecting them (Grindle, 2005; Scoones & Keeley, 2000). Incentives are ac-
knowledged to play a significant role (Collier, 2007)—and derive from various sources—the actors’
power base, ideology, knowledge, capacity to implement policies, and perceptions regarding political
feedback (Amsen, DiCaprio, & Robinson, 2011). Incentives are also determined by questions of mo-
tivation and political choices (Booth, 2011).
“Political will” appears in many studies of policy implementation and reform, primarily with regard
to its absence. Most literature explaining policy failure will include “lack of political commitment”
(Jordon, 1999), yet fails to clarify how commitment is identified, or the processes which lead to the
failure of implementation. This lack of clarity is echoed even when political will or commitment may
explain success: for example, Ghana’s or Ethiopia’s basic education reforms (Mcloughlin & Batley,
2012). Instead, literature explaining success privileges factors like regime type, political competition
and specific events such as elections (Birner & Resnick, 2010), and the incentives for political returns
(Mcloughlin & Batley, 2012).
Despite Matland’s (1995) argument that various paradigms of ambiguity and conflict arising in
policy implementation require committed political solutions for smooth implementation, the role of
commitment in success is nearly invisible, leading to technocratic solutions.6 An exception is the work
of Melo et al. (2012), who study how politicians’ strategies and power positively influence poverty‐re-
duction agendas.
Clearly, there is a gap in understanding what commitment is, and how it can shape successful
policy implementation. This article seeks to fill both gaps. First, it aims to understand the character-
istics of “political commitment,” and to identify these in policy implementation processes by both
administrative and political elites. Second, it examines cases of success and failure to understand the
role of “political commitment” through its presence or absence in shaping policy implementation and
outcomes.
Political commitment is a concept easier to trace when absent, but hard to define otherwise. Some
perceive the presence of institutional structures that enables practical responses to implementation
challenges as commitment (Putzel, 2004), while others identify it in how governments allocate bud-
gets to ensure policy outcomes (Nattrass, 2008). Indeed, political commitment has been called the
“slipperiest concept in the policy lexicon” (Hammergren, 1998, p. 12). Literature identifying sources
of commitment outlines aspects like political incentives or imperatives, personal interest and inter-
national pressure (Booth, 2011; Holmes, 2011). Less work has been done on conceptualizing com-
mitment to explain how its presence can be seen or understood. One notable exception is Brinkerhoff
(2000), who examines commitment to policy reform for anti‐corruption measures. Te Lintelo et al.
(2012) operationalize commitment around three themes—legal frameworks, policies and programmes,
and government expenditures to construct a Hunger and Nutrition Reduction Commitment Index
6
Successful implementation of policy also depends on the capacity of the state to implement it (Fukuyama, 2013; Levy &
Kpundeh (Eds.), 2004; Stewart, Hedge, & Lester, 2008; Vom Hau, 2012). But “capacity development is fundamentally an
endogenous process that engages not just the abilities and skills, but the motivation, support, and aspirations of people…in
other words, the ownership and political will” (Brinkerhoff, 2007, pp. 111–112). It is therefore difficult to separate capacity
from commitment.
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(HANCI) for 21 developing countries. However, this work does not examine the processes through
which commitment shapes the implementation of policies—as this article seeks to do.
Commitment is defined as actors’ willingness and intent to take actions to achieve a set of ob-
jectives, and to sustain these over time (Brinkerhoff, 1996, 2000). Building on Brinkerhoff (2000),
commitment comprises action and intention. Action is relatively visible, intention harder to identify
or measure (te Lintelo et al., 2012). Brinkerhoff (2000) proposes a framework for understanding com-
mitment with five main characteristics. Applied to policy implementation, these are:
· locus of initiative for policy implementation efforts

· degree of analytical rigour applied to understanding the context and causes of implementation
failure
· mobilization of constituencies of stakeholders in support of policy implementation
· application of credible sanctions in support of implementation objectives
· continuity of effort in implementing policy.
While some of these characteristics may seem sensible bureaucratic practices, and therefore more symp-
tomatic of the administration’s commitment, in practice these are closely linked to the commitment of
elites. Relationships between the political and administrative elites are complex, characterized variously
by “convergences, compromises and clashes” (Maiorano, 2014, p. 97), each reflecting varying levels of
autonomy of the state from vested interest groups.7 For certain issues, the commitment of both elites con-
verges to reinforce, and provide the space and support for increased administrative commitment to im-
proving policy implementation and outcomes. Political commitment and vision at the very top (of the AP
Chief Minister) provided “necessary autonomy, authority, and resources to implement the [MGNREGA]
scheme, sometimes against the wishes of the state’s political class” (Maiorano, 2014, p. 102). Mukherji
and Jha (2017) have also documented how a committed bureaucracy was insulated against powerful farm-
ers by the political commitment of the AP Chief Minister—this synergy of bureaucratic conviction and
political will was largely responsible for the success of MGNREGA here, because the bureaucracy had
specific ideas and innovations that it could put into place, protecting the MGNREGA from its opponents:
from the top to the local level (personal communications with AP bureaucrats; Mukherji & Jha, 2017),
thereby ensuring effective implementation.
This reflects the importance of an autonomous and committed state bureaucracy for success, yet
highlights that autonomy is only possible with the support of senior political figures, who are able to
protect the bureaucracy from powerful vested interest groups. Conversely, therefore, the commitment
of administrative elites can be displaced and made ineffectual by lack of interest and commitment
both of the top‐level political elites and local political elites, if these were unable to successfully lobby
to further their interests. In other words, a positive relationship between administrative and political
commitment (at least at senior levels) is essential for success—a hypothesis that I examine in relation
to the four states.
Just as the complex design of MGNREGA relies largely on the bureaucratic machinery, it also
posits a new form of social contract between states and rural citizens (Chopra, 2014). Administrative
commitment and showcasing of outcomes can, in certain situations, fuel politicians’ commitment to
7
In the case of MGNREGA, vested interest groups included two major factions: large landowning farmers who needed
labourers at cheap rates, and who were opposed to the MGNREGA as it was driving up wage rates; and contractors, who had
been cut out of the Act’s provisions. Local caste politics and patron–client relationships were also prominent, similar to other
welfare programmes in India, but an exploration of these or the workings of the powerful groups against MGNREGA fall
outside the purview of this article (see Mukherji & Jha, 2017 for the AP experience on this).
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the Act, strengthened by actual or perceived political feedback. Mukherji and Jha (2017) explain this
dynamic in AP, through the belief of the Chief Minister as to electoral dividends from MGNREGA’s
success—an aspiration duly realized in his subsequent re‐election (Elliott, 2011). Political feedback
can sustain, intensify or even undermine leaders’ political will (Melo et al., 2012), although there is
seldom a link between political feedback and responsive implementation. Theories of distributive
politics include both an accountability framework, where distribution patterns are linked to perceived
electoral gains, and a responsiveness framework outlining policy responsiveness to the electorate.8
I now apply and extend Brinkerhoff’s (2000) framework to policy implementation, using data from
India’s largest social security programme to provide evidence for commitment as an important factor
in MGNREGA’s implementation failure or success.
3 | ID E N T IF Y ING CO MMIT MENT AND ITS ROLE IN

S H A P ING IM PL E ME N TAT ION
MGNREGA combines a range of actors at different levels, all involved in a complex system of imple-
mentation, with three main processes—funding, planning of worksites and work by beneficiaries—
each involving various staff and departments. As shaped by implementation officials at state level,
outcomes depend on the intentions and commitment of state elites. This section analyses qualitative
interview material from the four states to understand the different characteristics of commitment, and
how these shape MGNREGA’s success or failure.
3.1 | Locus of initiative

Brinkerhoff (2000) argues that with greater initiative of actors spearheading reform processes, the
greater the political will for the reform. The extent to which sub‐national actors take initiatives relat-
ing to MGNREGA indicates their willingness to adapt systems to improve it, leading to successful
outcomes. This can be done by establishing rules and regulations9 issuing state‐level guidelines and
cross‐questioning to clarify rules.
Interviews with state‐level administrative elites in Assam revealed that the Act’s implementation
depended on central government orders—passed on to the district level without any changes by the state
bureaucracy. With no state‐level guidelines and orders, the locus of initiative in the state came mainly
from central‐level bureaucrats. A contrasting example was that of AP—where state government or-
ders, circulars and memos, primarily from bureaucrats leading the Department of Rural Development
(DRD), were numerous and responsive to requirements arising during MGNREGA’s implementation.
Interestingly, central government orders were also cascaded through the state to district and block lev-
els but modified according to the state’s field realities before being conveyed. Another unique feature
of AP was the decentralization of initiatives and decision‐making: “Programme implementation is in
[programme director]’s hand so long as they follow the guidelines” (personal communication, Andhra
Pradesh, November 18, 2012).
Bihar and Chhattisgarh fell in the middle of the scale, with state orders and initiatives increasing
rapidly from 2010, attributable to particular bureaucrats at the helm of the state DRD who were
8
See Golden and Min (2013) for an extensive review of relevant literature in this field. However, this discussion falls outside
the purview of this article.
9
For the MGNREGA, both the centre and the state can formulate regulations.
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“very committed to the functioning of the MGNREGA” (personal communication, Delhi, November
20, 2012). In Chhattisgarh, the state gave flexibility to the districts, since building ownership of
MGNREGA among frontline functionaries was critical (personal communication, Chhattishgarh,
February 3, 2013), thus countering the problem of “imported or imposed initiative [that] confronts
the perennial problem of needing to build commitment and ownership” (Brinkerhoff, 2000, p. 4).
Chhattisgarh officials also conveyed their solutions to the centre: “We discuss about overcoming
shortcomings. If they need any inputs we provide them” (personal communication, Chhattishgarh,
February 3, 2013).
This characteristic of commitment has a significant impact on whether the state is successful—
states that take more initiatives will find innovative solutions to problems arising during implementa-
tion. Initiatives taken by state‐level actors can reduce delays in finding workable solutions and convey
good practices to the central level. There is potentially a reverse dynamic if there are too many orders,
which prevents lower‐level officials from adapting and embedding previous orders before they are
moved to new systems. While it may be important to consider the impact of this “eternal boiling,”
whether this improves or hinders implementation depends on two contrasting scenarios: the first is of
systems fine‐tuned through specific and timely orders seeking to solve problems—this would improve
implementation and lead to successful outcomes. The second would entail hindering implementation,
when initiatives are taken too quickly, overhauling entire systems, and thereby causing disruption
rather than allowing embedding and learning from previous initiatives.
A prerequisite for taking initiative at the state level is that central government allows states to
work flexibly. With centrally sponsored schemes in India, such as MGNREGA, there seemed a gen-
eral move towards centralization and mandated systems, despite states seeking increased autonomy
(Mollinga, 2008). Flexibility can increase ownership of implementation of MGNREGA among state‐
level functionaries, thus becoming a source of greater commitment.
3.2 | Degree of analytical rigour

The analytical rigour towards policy implementation can be seen from (a) prior preparation by im-
plementing agencies, including establishing adequate and appropriate systems that support imple-
mentation; and (b) steps to understand the causes of implementation failure and responses (problem
identification and solving). Prior preparation and establishing an appropriate system would signal
high levels of commitment and lead to success, while actions that are insufficient to address problems
would demonstrate shallow commitment to implementation and explain failure.
Preparing to implement the Act: The extent of prior preparation seemed very low in Bihar. “We
had no idea how complex MGNREGA as an Act was…systems were not there…somewhere people
involved in implementation are finding it difficult to understand all of it” (personal communication,
Bihar, January 30, 2013). This was compounded by the scale of the scheme, enlarged by the state
government without adequate preparation.10 This was the opposite for AP: “Our team decided that let
us not implement without thinking through, without looking at the dynamics and without talking to
other stakeholders…a core team…was formed to think through the design, issues and problems of the
scheme” (personal communication, Andhra Pradesh, November 20, 2012). A similar focus on imple-
mentation was also given by Chhattisgarh, where “everybody from CM and us…started putting their
immediate attention to this from the start” (personal communication, Chhattishgarh, February 3,
10
With a phased implementation strategy, the central government chose 23 out of 28 districts of Bihar to implement the
MGNREGA in 2006. However, the Bihar government also launched the MGNREGA in the remaining five districts with their
own funds until these were covered under the central government funds from 2007 onwards.
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2013). Indeed AP’s in‐depth preparation began in April 2005, prior to MGNREGA’s enactment in
September, with a team of state‐level bureaucrats “working tirelessly…to create an enabling architec-
ture” for implementation (Mukherji & Jha, 2017, p. 5).
By contrast, Bihar was beset by lack of preparation and what several respondents called “systemic
problems.” Inadequate systems were often mentioned to explain failures and challenges in implemen-
tation of MGNREGA. However, this “systemic” shortcoming was not explained—“we are still not
sure as to what the actual problem is…we are trying to see what…works but as of now we do not have
the complete picture” (personal communication, Bihar, January 30, 2013). Lack of change in Bihar at
the systemic level is in sharp contrast to Chhattisgarh where, with prior preparation, systems were de-
veloped, and regularly adapted to cater to the demands placed upon the state systems by MGNREGA’s
complex implementation mechanisms. There was no evidence of any preparatory work in Assam,
where the Act came as a central directive.
Problem solving: There was a high degree of active problem solving in Bihar. During visits to
the State Secretariat and districts, instances of high‐level bureaucrats interacting with district‐ and
block‐level functionaries in person and through video conferencing were observed. Unsurprisingly,
these districts were the best performing in Bihar, revealing a growing commitment from state bureau-
crats. The same mechanisms of problem solving and interactions between different levels of state
functionaries were also observed in Chhattisgarh and AP, but not in Assam, where almost no problem
solving was observed or deduced from interviews with several functionaries involved in MGNREGA’s
implementation.
Greater analytical rigour promoted state‐wide success in four ways—first, taking stock of existing
field challenges and installing systems to address them. Then, with adequate preparation and changes
in administrative structure, the state machinery was better placed to take on the complex implemen-
tation of the Act in providing benefits to the rural poor. Third, potential problems were foreseen and
dealt with quickly and efficiently. Finally, greater analytical rigour gave states a deeper understanding
of the mechanisms of implementation, and the ability to answer to central government regarding
decisions.
3.3 | Mobilization of support

Reform is bound to attract criticism and resistance, therefore the mobilization of support becomes
crucial (Brinkerhoff, 2000). Greater willingness and ability of actors to identify and mobilize support
for policy implies greater commitment. This indicator also encompasses the extent of efforts to gar-
ner support—numerous effective efforts reflect higher commitment, while few or ineffective efforts
reflect lower political will.
In mobilizing support, the implementation team needs to develop what Brinkerhoff (2000, p. 4)
calls “a credible vision of success and a strategy that is participative and incorporates the interests of
important stakeholders.” There are political and administrative actors involved in the MGNREGA at
the central, state, district, block and village level. Examples include Sarpanches (heads of Panchayati
Raj Institutions at village level), Project Officers (PO), Junior Engineers, District Project co‐ordina-
tors (DPC), the Principal Secretary and State Ministers of rural development.
None of the four states had support from all the stakeholders mentioned above. In AP, the State
Chief Minister and senior bureaucrats from the DRD were very supportive of the Act. In fact, the then
Chief Minister overcame stiff resistance even from within his own party and with Members of the
Legislative Assembly, to ensure that the Act was implemented in a corruption‐free manner, with in-
stitutionalized social audits (Maiorano, 2014, p. 96). However, the AP model completely bypasses the
PRIs (Maiorano, Das, & Masiero 2018). The AP government has done little to garner support for the
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Act from Sarpanches, opting instead for a more centralized and administration‐led model. However,
even within the administration, there is little support for the DRD (which is in charge of the implemen-
tation of MGNREGA) from the Department of Panchayati Raj (PR), which causes problems in AP:
The PR and RD [rural development] department are two different teams—there is no con-
nection between them. The money lies with RD department and staff with PR. Principal
Secretary RD cannot do anything beyond writing to Principal Secretary PR to tell them
about a deviation and request action but the PR Ministry will say that we need to do our
own enquiry. Power lies with one and funds with other
(personal communication, Andhra Pradesh, November 18, 2012).
The DRD has established regular meetings with the PR department staff, which is important in solving
co‐ordination problems and garnering support from the PRI system. However, holding staff to account
remains a problem. This shows that AP is taking action to counter resistance, even if not very effectively.
The State Ministers of rural development for both Bihar and Chhattisgarh are largely supportive
of the Act, however implementation depends heavily on the interest shown by senior bureaucrats. In
Chhatisgarh, support extends beyond the DRD to other senior ministers and the Secretary of State in
charge of finances, as well as the Chief Minister (personal communication, Chhattishgarh, February 4,
2013). In Bihar the DRD seems to have done little to gain the support of other senior ministers, (even
the Chief Minister remains wary of the Act, seeing it in fact as a blot on his “zero corruption” stance
in the state (personal communication, Bihar, January 30, 2013)).
In Assam, there is a lack of support from critical state actors. While the State Minister and some
officials were interested in the Act, this was not supported by the necessary action to elicit support
from the stakeholders of MGNREGA, even from within the government. Senior officials knew little
about the Act and showed no interest in its actual implementation.
In addition to state actors, support from civil society actors and local power holders is critical for
success. In Bihar, the use of organizations such as the Mahadalit Sangha is a positive effort. But while
these organizations work closely with the DRD to spread awareness about the Act, civil society repre-
sentatives expressed reservations about the state taking their concerns into account and the resulting
mutual distrust (personal communication, Bihar, January 30, 2013). This is echoed in Assam, where
relations between state and civil society are strained. In AP, measures have been taken to mobilize
labourers through federations, including the AP–NGO alliance, which “ensures better quality work”
(personal communication, Andhra Pradesh, December 24, 2013); but there is a long way to go to en-
sure civil society support.
While support of civil society actors develops, AP steers clear of any mobilization of support from
local power holders such as the Sarpanches, basing implementation on preferred “Field Assistants,”
who are accountable to the state administration (Maiorano, 2014). In Bihar and Chhattisgarh,
Panchayats are the main implementing body. From my interviews and discussions with state officials,
it was clear that while there was recognition in both Bihar and Chhatisgarh that implementation was
open to elite capture by Sarpanches, only Chhattisgarh had taken steps to get these power holders on
board. In fact, the support of elected representatives through the PRIs is a hallmark of the Chhattisgarh
initiative—“everything is decided at the gram panchayat level. We have done a lot of work for empow-
ering the PRIs” (personal communication, Chhattisgarh, February 4, 2013).
Another powerful stakeholder mobilizing against MGNREGA implementation, is the large farm-
ers’ lobby.11 In AP, such lobbies are critical in limiting the provision of work through MGNREGA
11
These are farmers with large land holdings who are dependent on landless labourers as cheap labour.
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(Jakimow, 2014; Maiorano, Das, & Masiero 2018), similar to the picture across rural India—as evi-
denced by their opposition to the Act from its very conception (Chopra, 2010; Singh, 2012). However,
it seems that the government does too little to convert this opposition into support (no evidence of
dialogue with farmers’ associations was found in any of the states), except for altering the MGNREGA
calendar (in all states) to ensure that the work provided was only in the rainy season (when demand for
labourers was low).
The above discussion has shown the differences in mobilizing support both across and within states
among different stakeholders, which plays out in implementation and outcomes of MGNREGA. Lack
of inter‐departmental co‐ordination and support could undermine implementation, especially without
support from political leaders. On the other hand, lack of civil society support to state bureaucrats
implementing the Act would reduce the accountability of the state government, promote the possibil-
ity of elite capture at the local level, and therefore decrease the legitimacy of the state government to
implement the Act in a meaningful manner—thereby leading to failure.
3.4 | Application of credible incentives and sanctions

In garnering support from implementing actors, both positive and negative sanctions can play a role.
This also indicates whether reformers are open to identify incentives and apply sanctions to “restruc-
ture principal–agent relationships” (Brinkerhoff, 2000, p. 5). Sanctions can motivate actors imple-
menting policy. Political will can be said to be higher if credible sanctions are effectively applied,
which can directly lead to successful outcomes.
MGNREGA has a built‐in mechanism of sanctions through the social audit process (with state‐
specific models). How social audits are conducted, and actions following these audits, affect compli-
ance. Motivations for implementation can be accorded to positive recognition and promotion, or to
negative sanctions like fines, suspensions and transfers. In AP, there is a large number of regular social
audits, institutionalized through the formation of an independent society (SSAAT), nested within the
state DRD. So considerable support for these social audits comes from the political elite, which the
establishment of SSAAT reflects. However, follow‐up on social audits in applying sanctions (e.g.
fines, transfers and prosecution) is low (Afridi & Iversen, 2013). Senior officials in AP cited the tussle
between the bureaucratic and political elites in the application of sanctions—with the State Minister
and other politicians stepping in to request leniency, or individuals being posted to specific state loca-
tions. While there is a mechanism for sanctions in AP, it may not be applied credibly enough to change
principal–agent relationships or rehabilitate institutions through prosecution, transfers and recovery
of pilfered amounts.
In Assam, there are no regular social audits, and hardly any instances of sanctions were found.
While there are plans to set up a Directorate of Social Audit (in all states, through a central order),
social audits are conducted by gram panchayat secretaries, and “they do not highlight problem areas…
it is a mere formality” (personal communication, Assam, December 3, 2012).
Interestingly, the positions of AP and Assam are reversed in the case of incentives. In Assam:
“Government system…do not reward excellent performance…we have started scheme to incentivize
best performers…” (personal communication, Assam, December 3, 2012). The view that incentives
are critical is echoed by the political elites, who approved the scheme’s creation. In contrast, AP actors
do not feel that positive behaviour requires incentives: “it is their job, you don’t give rewards for doing
your job” (personal communication, Andhra Pradesh, November 18, 2012). Similarly, in Chhattisgarh,
negative sanctions seem to be prioritized: “Government runs by fear and not motivation…in many
Panchayats no works were being undertaken…but it is not like this now. I monitor…and stop sala-
ries—if you don’t work, you don’t get salary” (personal communication, Chhattisgarh, February 4,
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800 CHOPRA
2013). This view was also approved by the political elite, who put a “lack of corruption” down to
better implementation (personal communication, Chhattisgarh, February 4, 2013).
Bihar and Chhattisgarh had no systems for social audit, but intensive monitoring is used as a deter-
rent for inaction: “We have a strong team that monitors the MIS [Monitoring Information System]…
monthly meetings with additional DPCs at the headquarters…weekly video conference with group
of DPCs. DPCs similarly call the POs at their level…” (personal communication, Bihar, January 30,
2013). Promotion or recognition did not play a role in what was considered to be important for moti-
vation. Instead, job satisfaction and inspiration from the work of senior colleagues were deemed to be
motivating factors. “You get satisfaction by helping people. You want people to get benefit. Money is
given by central government…you also get motivation from others who are doing a good job” (per-
sonal communication, Chhattisgarh, February 2, 2013).
High commitment backed up by effective and credible sanctions can motivate implementing actors
to do their job properly, leading to success. However, there is an important distinction between sanc-
tions that motivate actors to implement programmes, albeit imperfectly, and sanctions that promote
inaction or prevent implementation because of fear, as Chopra (2016) has shown.
3.5 | Continuity of effort

Brinkerhoff (2000) posited that ongoing effort and resources in support of policy reform signify
greater political will. This is held to be especially important for successful outcomes, which require
adequate monitoring, and adequate human and financial resources to ensure continuity of initiatives
and actions.
The centre requires state governments to fulfil certain conditions (MIS formats kept up to date
and making timely labour budgets) before MGNREGA money is released. The Act also provides for
6% of the state’s MGNREGA budget as administrative costs, used to pay salaries to personnel in-
volved in implementation, and bear more costs, such as training and administrative expenses. Central
government officials acknowledge that the financial flow to all states is irregular because they had
been unable to maintain the MIS as required: “If…you cannot keep the system up to date then you
face problem in release of funds and that impacts overall implementation” (personal communication,
Delhi, November 21, 2012).
For states such as AP, this resource constraint is less of a problem; the state can tide over short‐term
deficits. However, for states like Bihar, Chhattisgarh and Assam, this becomes an uphill task; com-
pletion of MIS requires technical, physical and infrastructural capacity that these states lack. AP was
also the only state that had built up stable financial systems and was seeking to minimize delays in
payments to workers. In Bihar and Chhattisgarh, initial steps had been taken to build regular financial
systems, but Assam was found to be lacking in even these initial steps.
In AP, there was high continuity among personnel at the state level, and also adequate hando-
vers, so that lessons from each predecessor were retained, strengthening the implementation of
MGNREGA rather than reinventing the wheel. Bihar and Chhattisgarh were interesting examples of
how continuity was being maintained at state level through innovations like hiring external consul-
tants (from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank) for certain
tasks. Irregularity of personnel was high in Assam, with staff frequently being transferred even at the
level of the state government. This inhibited the development of good systems and suggested the po-
litical machinery was not committed to implementing MGNREGA. For both Bihar and Chhattisgarh,
an ongoing challenge remained the lack of continuity, with massive turnover of frontline staff who
were mainly on short‐term contracts, including those involved in updating MIS and financial records,
data‐entry operators and technical staff. Conversations with frontline workers revealed the extent of
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801
their dissatisfaction with their terms and conditions of service, including being on low‐paid contracts
with no job security.
Even when states were able to retain staff, the sheer pressure of work on other government pro-
grammes sometimes poses a challenge for the continuity of effort on MGNREGA, especially for
district‐ and block‐level officials. In the three states other than AP, no officials were exclusively in-
volved in implementation of MGNREGA. The problem was acute in the case of Assam, where “two
departments—PR and RD are under me…each one is implementing 3‐4 schemes. MGNREGA is only
one of them” (personal communication, Assam, December 16, 2012).
Adequate monitoring is critical in ensuring continuity of effort and sanctions. In AP, for exam-
ple, intensive monitoring through social audits and the MIS system to track progress of MGNREGA
across districts, blocks and each worksite ensures that the provisions of the MGNREGA are upheld.
The complexity and usefulness of AP’s home‐grown IT‐based monitoring for top‐level state officials
to enhance implementation indicates a strong commitment. In sharp contrast, I found no instances of
monitoring through the MIS system or social audits in the other states. Personal interactions of the
state‐level bureaucrats with lower‐level bureaucrats was seen in Bihar and Chhatisgarh, but even this
was absent in Assam.
It is important to note that what is monitored also shows what the officials are committed to,
and what they do not consider important. In the central NREGAsoft (MIS) system, as well as in all
four states (including AP, which has a well‐functioning MIS system that is more detailed than the
central system), a significant aspect not being monitored is the number of worksite crèches (Chopra,
forthcoming), and field visits in all four states found no adequate crèche facility. Another aspect not
monitored is the involvement of PRIs. As explained before, AP does not involve PRIs in implementa-
tion (Maiorano, 2014). These two examples show that adequate monitoring of certain aspects depict
a continuity of effort towards the operationalization of these aspects, boosting implementation and
ensuring success in these areas. Conversely, what is not monitored is poorly implemented.
What is implemented and monitored also depends on the elements of the Act to which the political
and administrative elite are committed. In AP, my interviews found that the politicians’ main interest was
providing work for the rural poor (also documented by Mukherji & Jha (2017)), while the bureaucracy’s
main interest was timely wage payment—and these aspects formed the basis for most innovations being
undertaken at the time of my fieldwork (such as refining the payment system through the transaction soft-
ware developed by Tata Consultancy Services). In Chhattisgarh, the State Minister expressed a concern
over assets along with provision of jobs. Awareness creation was seen by political and administrative
elites as an essential component for success, and this led to a major awareness‐creation drive with murals,
road milestones and a range of other informative material being developed and disseminated.
MGNREGA is process oriented, and its complexity requires a range of frontline and senior per-
sonnel for its effective functioning. This becomes especially critical as it becomes more MIS‐centred,
requiring technical and support staff to update and maintain the MIS system at all levels. High staff
turnover and blockages in disbursements can hamper implementation by wasting capacity‐building
efforts and reducing the implementing agencies’ ability to implement the Act—thereby contributing
to failure. In India, political elites at both state and local level are critical in ensuring continuity of
personnel, and therefore interference through transfers and postings of officials impedes good admin-
istrative practices.
3.6 | Administrative sensibilities and political commitment

Given the above discussion, it is clear that aspects such as locus of initiative, degree of analytical
rigour and continuity of effort primarily indicate high levels of bureaucratic commitment and are
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T A B L E 1 Ranking of States on Commitment Dimensions
Characteristic Factors leading to

of commitment “success” Chhattisgarh Assam Andhra Pradesh Bihar
Locus of High degree of State bureaucrats taking Only orders from centre were The number and quality Initiatives taken by the
Initiative initiative of state increasing number of initia- followed. Low levels of of innovations was very state were person depend-
bureaucrats tives since 2010. High levels autonomy and ineffective high. While sub‐state ent, while sub‐state
High levels of au- of autonomy, and increasing support from one politician. functionaries had low lev- functionaries were not
tonomy to sub‐state support given by political The state gave no feedback els of autonomy, the state given much autonomy.
functionaries elites, as well as increasing to the centre. had very high support for Some support from politi-
feedback to the centre. initiatives from political cal elites, but the state's
Support for initiatives
elites, and consistently success was hampered by
by political elites
provided feedback to the lack of full support. The
Effective and useful centre. state gave no feedback to
feedback to centre the centre.
Degree of Good initial prepara- The state had taken extensive There had been minimal The state had taken exten- While prior preparation
Analytical tion and changes in steps for preparation, and was preparation in the state for sive steps for prepara- had been minimal, the
rigour structure effective in problem solving, MGNREGA, and the state's tion, and was effective state had systems for
Effective problem with high levels of support for machinery was not geared in problem solving, with problem solving, with
solving changes from political elites. for problem solving. high levels of support for some support from politi-
changes from political cal elites.
Support from political
elites.
elites for changes,
problem solving, etc.
(Continues)
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T A B L E 1 (Continued)

Mobilization of Supportive staff of The state scored highly on all The state was characterized While the DRD staff were Support to implementation
support DRD aspects of this, with most by low levels of support highly supportive of the by the DRD was variable.
Support from other stakeholders heavily involved from all stakeholders; ef- Act, the state lacked sup- The state did not make
departments in the implementation pro- forts to garner support were port from other depart- efforts to mobilize support
cesses. The state also made negligible. ments (notably the PRI from other departments
Support of state's
significant attempts to involve department). The state had and civil society; while it
political elites
local power holders (PRIs) in only just started making was still open to capture
Support by civil implementation. links with civil society but and co‐option at the local
society had excluded local power levels.
Support of local power holders (PRIs) entirely
holders from implementation.
Application Credible and effective Some social audits had been There were no social Extensive system of state‐ Some social audits were
of credible social audits conducted in the state. The audits conducted in the run social audits was in conducted. The state
sanctions Recognition of positive state was doing well in state. Neither positive nor place, but follow‐up and lacked mechanisms for
actions recognizing positive actions negative sanctions had been action were weak. The positive or negative
and motivating staff through applied. state recognized positive sanctions.
Adequate and effective
actions of senior leaders, but actions through promo-
negative sanctions
lacked any negative sanctions. tions, while negative
sanctions were being
developed.
(Continues)

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T A B L E 1 (Continued)

Continuity of Continued personnel There was high continuity of Neither at state nor at sub‐ High continuity and While personnel at the state
effort at state and sub‐state personnel at the state level, state levels did personnel handovers in state‐level level had been transferred,
levels but needed to be improved at remain in post for long. The personnel was a hallmark. continuity at state level
Strong and consistent the sub‐state level. The state state's financial systems also Sub‐state team continu- was maintained through
financial systems had continuous and strong left a lot to be desired. ity was low but being external consultants. The
financial systems. improved. The state had state's financial systems
strong and continuous were being improved,
financial systems. albeit slowly.
Assessment of commitment Chhattisgarh Assam Andhra Pradesh Bihar
Overall Very high Very Low High Medium
bureaucratic commitment
Overall commitment from political elites Very high Ineffective support—Low High and very effective Medium
support
Assessment of overall commitment and High levels of commitment, Low levels of administrative High levels of commitment, Evidence of improving ad-
therefore overall success and failure with administrative and and political commitment with administrative and ministrative commitment
political elite commitment led to ineffective implemen- political elite commitment but the state was facing
in a virtuous circle led to tation in the state—a failure in a virtuous circle. This difficulties in generating
the state being a success in state. led to the state being a support from political
MGNREGA outcomes. success in MGNREGA elites, hence progress
outcomes. was slow (but increasing
potential).
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805
essential for success. From the perspectives of the bureaucrats, however, these practices depend on a
good level of commitment from the political elites, to insulate them from opposition by vested interest
groups (Mukherji & Jha, 2017). In fact, different political visions are linked to bureaucratic sensibili-
ties and good practices. For example, a strong vision of the CM for AP for MGNREGA (to generate
jobs for the rural poor so that they remember him in a positive light and vote for his party) comple-
mented the high commitment of senior officials and allowed them the autonomy to make innovations
and find solutions for effective implementation. In both AP and Chhattisgarh, bureaucrats spoke about
the high level of support the bureaucracy enjoyed from the political elites:
[politicians] looked at getting a good mileage out of a good implementation. [Senior

bureaucrat] … explained how this will help the political class. The then CM felt that it
will create a positive image for him as people will go door to door to collect information
and hence, spread information in the process…this is a good example of political and
bureaucratic collaboration
(personal communication, Andhra Pradesh, November 18, 2012).
In Chhattisgarh, a senior political leader also acknowledged the positive relationship between the polit-
ical and administrative elite, explaining that “if the Minister takes interest in the scheme, then the officers
also take interest in its proper functioning” (personal communication, Chhattisgarh, February 4, 2013).
Plus, implementation and monitoring of specific parts of the MGNREGA and therefore its success, de-
pends on this synergy of support and commitment that insulates the programme from vested interests.
Interestingly, this virtuous cycle of committed elites leading to committed bureaucrats did not
play out in Assam. Despite leadership expressed by the Minister of Rural Development, bureaucrats
showed no initiative in implementing MGNREGA, leading to failure. This could be because the
DRD and its Minister were not as powerful as other departments and ministers; in addition, the Chief
Minister had no interest in the Act. This resembled the attitude of the Bihar political elites towards
MGNREGA – but an increasing number of state‐level initiatives also reflected committed bureaucrats
who were trying to overcome this limitation and work with politicians to gain their support.
The above discussion shows that commitment of bureaucrats is critical to kickstart effective imple-
mentation, yet good administration can only be sustained with the commitment of the political elites.
This is critical in the implementation of a policy such as MGNREGA, that strikes at the interests of
powerful groups such as farmers and contractors and seeks to challenge patron–client relationships
bound by caste and class politics. In this context, it becomes crucial for senior leaders to provide au-
tonomy and support to bureaucrats, thereby insulating the programme from vested interests (Mukherji
& Jha, 2017). And while high levels of commitment from politicians boost bureaucratic commitment
(as in Chhattisgarh and AP), this positive link relies on politicians being well placed in state politics,
or if support comes from the top. But even in the absence of commitment from the political elite, some
sensible bureaucratic practices can be upheld through good levels of administrative commitment, as
in Bihar.
3.7 | In summary
The above discussion has highlighted five characteristics of commitment, providing examples from
the four states on how these can be identified. As summarized in Table 1, the two successful states
have high commitment, and the two low performing states have low commitment. Further, Assam
shows very low commitment of state actors with no positive indicators, while Bihar has low com-
mitment overall, but aspects, such as a growing degree of analytical rigour and intense monitoring
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806 CHOPRA
by senior officials, are positive. Chhattisgarh has high commitment from both its administrative and
political leadership, which has helped the state to turn around a situation of low capacity. While AP
also scores well on the commitment indicators, it is clearly a high‐capacity state and therefore does not
have to contend with the same downward pull on its implementation processes as Chhattisgarh does.
4 | O P ER AT IO NA L IZ ING CO MM ITM ENT: CHALLENGES

AN D LE S S O N S
This article set out to operationalize the concept of commitment for policy implementation, using
MGNREGA as a case study. In applying Brinkerhoff’s (2000) criteria of commitment to policy imple-
mentation, the article fills an important gap in this literature by clarifying how the workings of these
characteristics variously shaped MGNREGA implementation and outcomes.
The article adds to Brinkerhoff’s framework by disentangling sensible bureaucratic practices that
reflect greater administrative or bureaucratic commitment, from political vision that reflects commit-
ment of the political elite. It has shown how any one of these two forms of commitment can boost
the other. Where there is strong political commitment this translates into bureaucratic commitment
as long as the relevant politicians have enough clout in the state. This article has also highlighted the
variety of methods senior politicians use to ensure that their “political will” prevails. In line with Melo
et al. (2012), these include: (a) persuading others to share their beliefs and interests—for example in
Chhatisgarh, Bihar and AP; (b) creating incentives and disincentives such that others are persuaded
to pursue the same goal—such as in AP; and (c) countering opposition through political strategies—
such as in AP. Conversely, strong bureaucratic commitment can sometimes lead to higher political
commitment, but this is tougher to accomplish and requires greater engagement of the administrative
elite with the political elite.
The article also provides evidence for links between various characteristics of commitment, ex-
emplifying that low ratings in one or two characteristics do not imply “a complete absence of po-
litical will” (Brinkerhoff, 2000) and therefore do not necessarily lead to failure. Initiatives taken
by Chhattisgarh to implement MGNREGA are negligible compared to AP, yet the state comes out
strongly in all other characteristics. The level of initiative state governments can take also depends on
policy design and the central government’s stance towards flexibility. Policy suggestions to increase
flexibility can provide space for innovation and boost commitment. Interlinkages within each of the
six characteristics is also critical, as each sub‐category may play out differently even within a state.
For example, while AP has mobilized support within the government and the DRD, support from civil
society actors and PRIs is low. Yet, AP comes out as a successful state.
It is important to delineate how state‐level commitment interacts with capacity to implement pol-
icy. Clearly, states with greater administrative, financial and organizational capacity and territorial
reach, stable political systems and good relational capacity are better at ensuring appropriate imple-
mentation and successful outcomes. Yet, whether higher capacity translates into success is often a
function of commitment. States having greater capacity along with high levels of political commit-
ment will probably be more successful than those with high capacity but little political commitment.
Importantly, this article has also shown that in cases where capacity is low, high commitment can help
to overcome capacity constraints and achieve success, as in the case of Chhattisgarh.
This article has also identified some important sources of commitment—electoral feedback, fear of
sanctions, job satisfaction and inspiration of other colleagues, etc. More research is needed to system-
atically examine how actors are motivated or demotivated—which is beyond the purview of this arti-
cle. However, a few important lessons have been exemplified here. First, examining how commitment
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807
can be built and maintained helps inform capacity‐building programmes and provide directions for
strengthening implementation. Second, exploiting the interlinkages between different strands of com-
mitment and capitalizing on positive elements may hold the key to boosting success, especially in
states with low implementation. For example, in Bihar there is strong support within the state DRD
for implementing this Act. This has translated into more effective problem‐solving initiatives—which
enable the state bureaucrats to implement MGNREGA more effectively. This, in turn, may generate
confidence in the Ministry’s political leadership—creating a virtuous cycle of increased commitment
and better implementation as depicted in Figure 1. Third, there are positive feedback loops between
the commitment of administrative elites and of political leaders—all enhanced through the links to
perceptions about state capacity and will, and perceptions of political feedback, that play a critical role
in sustaining and intensifying leaders’ political will.
A particular aspect of MGNREGA is its rights‐based essence, which implies it is demand driven.
Therefore, any improvement in commitment to improving implementation processes—such as streamlining
the payment system to reduce delays in wage payments (as AP has done) or involving civil society actors
in awareness generation (as exemplified in Chhattisgarh), will boost demand for work. This is what could
kickstart the process of creating demand that the state will commit to meeting—requiring greater capacity
to implement programme provisions. This is the final and perhaps most important pathway through which
greater commitment can lead to successful outcomes for demand‐based policies such as MGNREGA.
Its dynamic nature presents a challenge for operationalizing commitment for policy implementa-
tion. Brinkerhoff (2000) also recognizes that political will is likely to change, especially in the face
of changing circumstances. The aspect of a changing mix of actors is especially relevant given the
often person‐centric nature of institutions and departments involved in policy implementation. An
additional methodological challenge relates to the differences in the extent of recall in interviews,
especially when discussing successes as opposed to failures.
In conclusion, the article has shown that various elements of commitment combine with aspects
such as capacity and external environmental situations to shape the implementation and outcomes
improved public
increased
percpetions of
commitment of
the state's
administrative /
capacity and
political elites in
will for
one arena
implementation
increased
commitment of
Increased
political/
implementation
administrative
and outcomes
elites in other
arenas
better systems;
streamlined
processes; can
boost demand
for policy
provisions
F I G U R E 1 A Virtuous Cycle of Increased Commitment and Better Implementation [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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808 CHOPRA
of public policy. It has argued that commitment can be measured and seen through a range of in-
dicators, and its characteristics shape policy implementation processes and outcomes in significant
ways. Importantly, commitment and capacity can feed off each other to ensure success. Tracing the
expressions of commitment, this article gives primacy to the political factors behind success and fail-
ure of policy implementation. It is especially critical to see how commitment of administrative and
political elites interact and lead to success. Though a focus on commitment accords importance to
understanding the supply‐side factors for implementation, commitment can boost demand (although
the capturing of this demand is in itself political), and therefore demand is not “exogenous” to capacity
and commitment. This understanding of the workings of commitment for determining policy success
can be applied to understanding and strengthening the implementation of other policies, not only in
India, but also in the international context. This article has generated lessons for both high‐ and low‐
capacity states to enter into a positive cycle of greater commitment, greater capacity, better demand
and therefore improved implementation processes and successful outcomes of rights‐based social
policies such as MGNREGA.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I gratefully acknowledge the Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre, a DFID‐
funded research programme consortium, for financial support which allowed the fieldwork and
writing of this article. An earlier version of the article appeared as a 2015 working paper published
by the Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID) at The University of
Manchester, titled “Political commitment in India’s social policy implementation: Shaping the per-
formance of MGNREGA.” I am especially indebted to Professor Kunal Sen and Dr Anuradha Joshi
for their comments on an earlier draft of this article which helped to improve it, and to the anonymous
peer reviewers for their insightful feedback.
R E F E R E NC E S
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How to cite this article: Chopra D. Accounting for success and failure in policy
implementation: The role of commitment in India’s MGNREGA. Dev Policy Rev.
2019;37:789–811. https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12404

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Accounting for success and failure in policy

Institute for Development Studies,

Dev Policy Rev. 2019;37:789–811. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/dpr | 789

commitment of administrative elites and political party

2 | IM P L E ME N T ING P O L IC Y: THE ROLE

· locus of initiative for policy implementation efforts

3 | ID E N T IF Y ING CO MMIT MENT AND ITS ROLE IN

3.1 | Locus of initiative

3.2 | Degree of analytical rigour

3.3 | Mobilization of support

3.4 | Application of credible incentives and sanctions

3.5 | Continuity of effort

3.6 | Administrative sensibilities and political commitment

T A B L E 1 Ranking of States on Commitment Dimensions

Characteristic Factors leading to

Characteristic Factors leading to

Characteristic Factors leading to

[politicians] looked at getting a good mileage out of a good implementation. [Senior

4 | O P ER AT IO NA L IZ ING CO MM ITM ENT: CHALLENGES

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Development Policy Review - 2018 - Chopra - Accounting For Success and Failure in Policy Implementation The Role of

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Development Policy Review - 2018 - Chopra - Accounting For Success and Failure in Policy Implementation The Role of

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Available Formats

Received: March 2018

Accounting for success and failure in policy

Institute for Development Studies,

Dev Policy Rev. 2019;37:789–811. ﻿ wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/dpr | 789

commitment of administrative elites and political party

2 | IM P L E ME N T ING P O L IC Y: THE ROLE

· locus of initiative for policy implementation efforts

3 | ID E N T IF Y ING CO MMIT MENT AND ITS ROLE IN

3.1 | Locus of initiative

3.2 | Degree of analytical rigour

3.3 | Mobilization of support

3.4 | Application of credible incentives and sanctions

3.5 | Continuity of effort

3.6 | Administrative sensibilities and political commitment

T A B L E 1 Ranking of States on Commitment Dimensions

Characteristic Factors leading to

Characteristic Factors leading to

Characteristic Factors leading to

[politicians] looked at getting a good mileage out of a good implementation. [Senior

4 | O P ER AT IO NA L IZ ING CO MM ITM ENT: CHALLENGES

You might also like

Dev Policy Rev. 2019;37:789–811. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/dpr | 789