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1
Chapter 7
INTENTIONAL TORTS
Harm to the Person [7-1] False Light
Battery [7-1a] Defenses
Assault [7-1b] Misuse of Legal Procedure [7-2c]
False Imprisonment [7-1c] Harm to Property [7-3]
Infliction of Emotional Distress [7-1d] Real Property [7-3a]
Harm to Right of Dignity [7-2] Trespass
Defamation [7-2a] Nuisance
Elements of Defamation Personal Property [7-3b]
Defenses to Defamation Trespass
Invasion of Privacy [7-2b] Conversion
Appropriation Harm to Economic Interests [7-4]
Intrusion Interference with Contractual Relations [7-4a]
Public Disclosure of Private Facts Disparagement [7-4b]
Fraudulent Misrepresentation [7-4c]
Cases in This Chapter

Philip Morris USA v. Williams Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc. v. Buck
Ferrell v. Mikula White v. Samsung Electronics
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co.
Chapter Outcomes
After reading and studying this chapter, the student should be able to:
• Identify and describe the torts that protect against intentional harm to personal rights.
• Explain the application of the various privileges to defamation suits and how they are affected by
whether the plaintiff is (a) a public figure, (b) a public official, or (c) a private person.
• Describe and distinguish the four torts comprising invasion of privacy.
• Identify and describe the torts that protect against harm to property.
• Distinguish among interference with contractual relations, disparagement, and fraudulent
misrepresentation.
TEACHING NOTES
The law of torts has three principle objectives: (1) to compensate persons who sustain harm or loss from
another’s tortious conduct, (2) to place the cost of compensation on those parties who should bear it, and (3) to
prevent future harm and losses. Compensatory damages compensate the plaintiff for his injury. Punitive
damages punish or make an example of the wrongdoer, in cases where the defendant’s conduct was intentional
and outrageous, showing malice or a fraudulent or evil motive.
© 2017 Cengage Learning®. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part,
except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website or
school-approved learning management system for classroom use.
CHAPTER 7 INTENTIONAL TORTS 2
CASE
Philip Morris USA v. Williams
Supreme Court of the United States, 2007
549 U.S. 346, 127 S.Ct. 1057, 166 L.Ed.2d 940
FACTS This lawsuit arises out of the death of Jesse Williams, a heavy cigarette smoker. Williams' widow
represents his estate in this state lawsuit for negligence and deceit against Philip Morris, the manufacturer
of Marlboro, the brand that Williams smoked. A jury found that Williams' death was caused by smoking;
that Williams smoked in significant part because he thought it was safe to do so; and that Philip Morris
knowingly and falsely led him to believe that this was so. The jury found that both Philip Morris and
Williams were negligent and that Philip Morris had engaged in deceit. In respect to deceit, it awarded
compensatory damages of about $821,000 along with $79.5 million in punitive damages.
The trial judge subsequently found the $79.5 million punitive damages award “excessive” and reduced
it to $32 million. Both sides appealed. The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected Philip Morris' arguments and
restored the $79.5 million jury award. Subsequently, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected Philip Morris'
arguments that the trial court should have instructed the jury that it could not punish Philip Morris for injury
to persons not before the court and that the roughly 100:1 ratio of the $79.5 million punitive damages
award to the compensatory damages amount was “grossly excessive.”
The U.S. Supreme Court granted Philip Morris certiorari on its claims that (1) Oregon had
unconstitutionally permitted it to be punished for harming nonparty victims; and (2) Oregon had in effect
disregarded “the constitutional requirement that punitive damages be reasonably related to the plaintiff's
harm.”
DECISION The Oregon Supreme Court's judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded.
OPINION Breyer J. This Court has long made clear that “punitive damages may properly be imposed to
further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.” [Citations.]
At the same time, we have emphasized the need to avoid an arbitrary determination of an award’s
amount. Unless a State insists upon proper standards that will cabin the jury’s discretionary authority, its
punitive damages system may deprive a defendant of “fair notice … of the severity of the penalty that a
State may impose,” [citation]; it may threaten “arbitrary punishments,” i.e., punishments that reflect not an
“application of law” but “a decisionmaker’s caprice,” [citation]; and, where the amounts are sufficiently
large, it may impose one State’s (or one jury’s) “policy choice,” say as to the conditions under which (or
even whether) certain products can be sold, upon “neighboring States” with different public policies,
[citation].
For these and similar reasons, this Court has found that the Constitution imposes certain limits, in
respect both to procedures for awarding punitive damages and to amounts forbidden as “grossly
excessive.” [Citation] (requiring judicial review of the size of punitive awards); [citation] (review must be de
novo); [citation] (excessiveness decision depends upon the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct,
whether the award bears a reasonable relationship to the actual and potential harm caused by the
defendant to the plaintiff, and the difference between the award and sanctions “authorized or imposed in
comparable cases”); [citation] (excessiveness more likely where ratio exceeds single digits). Because we
shall not decide whether the award here at issue is “grossly excessive,” we need now only consider the
Constitution’s procedural limitations.
In our view, the Constitution’s Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to
punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom they directly represent, i.e.,
injury that it inflicts upon those who are, essentially, strangers to the litigation.
***
*** [W]e can find no authority supporting the use of punitive damages awards for the purpose of
punishing a defendant for harming others. We have said that it may be appropriate to consider the
reasonableness of a punitive damages award in light of the potential harm the defendant’s conduct could
have caused. But we have made clear that the potential harm at issue was harm potentially caused the
plaintiff. [Citation] (“We have been reluctant to identify concrete constitutional limits on the ratio between
harm, or potential harm, to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award”) ***
*** Evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff
also posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public, and so was particularly reprehensible—
although counsel may argue in a particular case that conduct resulting in no harm to others nonetheless
posed a grave risk to the public, or the converse. Yet for the reasons given above, a jury may not go
further than this and use a punitive damages verdict to punish a defendant directly on account of harms it
is alleged to have visited on nonparties.
*** We therefore conclude that the Due Process Clause requires States to provide assurance that
juries are not asking the wrong question, i.e., seeking, not simply to determine reprehensibility, but also to
punish for harm caused strangers.
***
The instruction that Philip Morris said the trial court should have given distinguishes between using
harm to others as part of the “reasonable relationship” equation (which it would allow) and using it directly
as a basis for punishment. The instruction asked the trial court to tell the jury that “you may consider the
extent of harm suffered by others in determining what [the] reasonable relationship is” between Philip
Morris’ punishable misconduct and harm caused to Jesse Williams, “[but] you are not to punish the
defendant for the impact of its alleged misconduct on other persons, who may bring lawsuits of their own
in which other juries can resolve their claims.…” [Citation.] And as the Oregon Supreme Court explicitly
recognized, Philip Morris argued that the Constitution “prohibits the state, acting through a civil jury, from
using punitive damages to punish a defendant for harm to nonparties.” [Citation.]
***
As the preceding discussion makes clear, we believe that the Oregon Supreme Court applied the
wrong constitutional standard when considering Philip Morris’ appeal. We remand this case so that the
Oregon Supreme Court can apply the standard we have set forth. Because the application of this standard
may lead to the need for a new trial, or a change in the level of the punitive damages award, we shall not
consider whether the award is constitutionally “grossly excessive.”
INTERPRETATION In most states, a jury may award punitive damages if a defendant's tortious conduct is
intentional and outrageous, but the amount of damages must not be grossly excessive and may not
punish the defendant for harm caused to parties other than the plaintiff.
ETHICAL QUESTION Is it ethical to impose punishment in a civil case without the protections provided to
defendants in a criminal proceeding? Explain.
CRITICAL THINKING QUESTION Can juries be adequately instructed to make the distinction required by
the U.S. Supreme Court? Explain.
Tort law is primarily common law, and, as we mentioned in Chapter 1, the Restatements, prepared by the
American Law Institute, present many important areas of the common law, including torts. You will recall that
although they are not law in themselves, the Restatements are highly persuasive in the courts. Since then, the
Restatement has served as a vital force in shaping the law of torts. Between 1965 and 1978, the institute adopted
and promulgated a second edition of the Restatement of Torts, which revised and superseded the First
Restatement. This text will refer to the second Restatement simply as the Restatement.
In 1996, the American Law Institute approved the development of a new Restatement Third, Torts: Liability for
Physical and Emotional Harm, which addresses the general or basic elements of the tort action for liability for
accidental personal injury and property damage but does not cover liability for economic loss. The final work is
published in two volumes. Volume 1 was published in 2009 and covers liability for negligence causing physical
harm, duty, strict liability, factual cause, and scope of liability (traditionally called proximate cause). Volume 2
covers affirmative duties, emotional harm, landowner liability, and liability of actors who retain independent
contractors. Volume 2 was approved and published in 2011.
Because this new Restatement applies to nonintentional torts, it will be covered extensively in the next chapter
and it will be cited as the “Third Restatement.” A few of its provisions, however, do apply to intentional torts
and will be included in this chapter. Comment c to Section 5 of the Third Restatement provides that the Second
Restatement remains largely authoritative in explaining the details of specific intentional torts and their related
defenses. The ALI, however, has begun work on the Restatement Third, Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons,
which is the latest installment of the ALI’s ongoing revision of the Restatement Second of Torts. This new
project will complete the work focusing on recovery for physical and emotional harm to persons.
The Institute’s Restatement Third, Torts: Economic Torts and Related Wrongs will update coverage on torts that
involve economic loss or pecuniary harm not resulting from physical harm or physical contact to a person or
property. The project will update coverage of economic torts in Restatement Second, Torts and address some
topics not covered in prior Restatements. The Institute began this project in 2004 and after several years of
inactivity the project was resumed in 2010. Tentative Draft No. 1 (Chapter 1, Unintentional Infliction of
Economic Loss, Sections 1-5) was approved in 2012; Tentative Draft No. 2 (Chapter 1, Unintentional Infliction
of Economic Loss, Sections 6-8, and Chapter 2, Liability in Tort for Fraud, Sections 9-15) was approved in
2014.
As used in tort law, intent means that the defendant desired to bring about the actual consequences of his
physical action or that he believes those consequences are substantially certain.
*** Chapter Outcome ***

Identify and define the torts that protect against intentional harm to personal rights.
7-1 HARM TO THE PERSON

7-1a Battery
Consists of intentional infliction of harmful or offensive bodily contact. Such contact does not necessarily have
to be with the person’s body; it may be touching the individual’s clothing or some object that is being held.
7-1b Assault
Is essentially the intentional creation of a mental impression that an offensive or harmful bodily contact is about
to occur. The intended victim must be aware of the imminent danger.
7-1c False Imprisonment

Is the intentional interference with a person’s freedom of movement by unlawful confinement. The person must
be aware of the confinement or harmed by it. Mere obstruction of someone’s freedom of movement is
insufficient so long as there is a reasonable, alternative exit available.
7-1d Infliction of Emotional Distress

Consists of outrageous conduct that falls well beyond the bounds of decency and which causes the person to
suffer severe mental and emotional harm. Many courts allow recovery even if no physical injury occurs.
The Third Restatement provides a more detailed definition: “A person acts recklessly in engaging in conduct if:
(a) the person knows of the risk of harm created by the conduct or knows facts that make the risk obvious to
another in the person’s situation, and (b) the precaution that would eliminate or reduce the risk involves burdens
that are so slight relative to the magnitude of the risk as to render the person’s failure to adopt the precaution a
demonstration of the person’s indifference to the risk.”
CASE
Ferrell v. Mikula
Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2008
295 Ga.App. 326, 672 S.E.2d 7; reconsideration denied, 2008; certiorari denied 2009
FACTS On Friday night, August 6, 2006, eighteen-year-old Racquel Ferrell and thirteen-year-old Kristie
Ferrell went to Ruby Tuesday. After they ate and paid their bill, the girls left the restaurant, got into their
car, and drove out of the parking lot. As they entered the highway, Racquel noticed a black truck following
her very closely with its headlights on high. A marked police car by the side of the road pulled onto the
highway between the girls' car and the following truck and pulled the car over. The officer pulled Racquel
out of the car, placed her in handcuffs, and put her in the back seat of his patrol car. Another officer
removed Kristie from the car, placed her in handcuffs, and put her in the back of another patrol car.
All of the police officers gathered to talk to the driver of the truck that had been following the Ferrells,
who turned out to be a uniformed off-duty police officer working as a security guard for Ruby Tuesday.
The officer who arrested Racquel returned to the patrol car where she was being held and told her if she
had not paid her Ruby Tuesday bill, she was going to jail. She protested, and the officer conferred again
with the other officers, then returned to the car and said, “It was a mistake.” He explained that the
manager at the restaurant had sent the off-duty officer after them because he said the girls had not paid
their bill, but they did not fit the description of the two people who had walked out without paying. The
officers removed the handcuffs from Racquel and Kristie and returned them to their car. After asking for
Racquel's driver's license and obtaining information about both girls, the officer told them they were free to
go.
Christian Mikula had been an assistant manager for about a month, and was the only manager at
Ruby Tuesday that night. One of the servers, Robert, reported that his customers at Table 24 had a
complaint, so Mikula talked to the couple and told them he would “take care of the food item in question.
The customers were a man and a woman in their late twenties to early thirties. Mikula left the table to
discuss the matter with Robert, after which server Aaron told Mikula that the patrons at Table 24 had left
without paying. Mikula looked at the table, confirmed they had not left any money for the bill, and went out
the main entrance. He saw a car pulling out of the parking lot, and said to the off-duty officer, “Hey, I think
they just left without paying.” The officer said, “Who, them?” Mikula said, “I think so,” and the officer got up
and went to his vehicle.
Mikula knew the officer was going to follow the people in the car and would stop them, but did not ask
the officer if he had seen who got into the car. He did not give the officer a description of the people at
Table 24, and did not know the race, age, gender, or number of people in the car being followed. He did
not know if there were people in any of the other cars in the parking lot. He did not ask any other people in
the restaurant if they had seen the people at Table 24 leave the building, which had two exits. He did not
know how long the people had been gone before Aaron told him they left, or whether another customer
had picked up money from Table 24. He could have tried to obtain more information to determine whether
the people in the car he pointed out were the people who had been sitting at Table 24, but did not do so.
Racquel Ferrell and the parents of Kristie Ferrell sued Ruby Tuesday, Inc. and its manager, Christian
Mikula, for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment on all counts. The Ferrells appealed.
DECISION Summary judgment on the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is affirmed;
summary judgment on the claim for false imprisonment is reversed.
OPINION Barnes, C. J. In this case, the Ferrells were detained without a warrant, and thus have a claim
for false imprisonment *** . [Citation.] “False imprisonment is the unlawful detention of the person of
another, for any length of time, whereby such person is deprived of his personal liberty.” [Citation.] “The
only essential elements of the action being the detention and its unlawfulness, malice and the want of
probable cause need not be shown.” [Citations.]
The evidence in this case clearly establishes that the Ferrells were detained. Although “‘imprisonment’
was originally intended to have meant stone walls and iron bars, … under modern tort law an individual
may be imprisoned when his movements are restrained in the open street, or in a traveling automobile.”
[Citation.] Ruby Tuesday does not argue otherwise, but instead argues that the evidence established
sufficient probable cause and the plaintiffs failed to establish that Mikula acted with malice. But malice is
not an element of false imprisonment, *** . Further, *** the mere existence of probable cause standing
alone has no real defensive bearing on the issue of liability [for false imprisonment]. [Citation.]
***
Arresting or procuring the arrest of a person without a warrant constitutes a tort, “unless he can justify
under some of the exceptions in which arrest and imprisonment without a warrant are permitted by law,
[citations]”. Generally, one “who causes or directs the arrest of another by an officer without a warrant may
be held liable for false imprisonment, in the absence of justification, and the burden of proving that such
imprisonment lies within an exception rests upon the person … causing the imprisonment.” [Citations.] ***
Accordingly, as the Ferrells have established an unlawful detention, the next issue to consider is
whether Mikula “caused” the arrest. Whether a party is potentially liable for false imprisonment by “directly
or indirectly urg[ing] a law enforcement official to begin criminal proceedings” or is not liable because he
“merely relates facts to an official who then makes an independent decision to arrest” is a factual question
for the jury. [Citation.] The party need not expressly request an arrest, but may be liable if his conduct and
acts “procured and directed the arrest.” [Citation.]
***
Here, Mikula told the officer that the car leaving the parking lot contained people who left without
paying for their food, although he did not know or try to ascertain who was in the car. He also knew the
officer was going to detain the people in the car and could have tried to stop him, but made no attempt to
do so. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs’
false imprisonment claim.
***
The Ferrells also contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants on
their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The elements of a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress are: (1) intentional or reckless conduct; (2) that is extreme and outrageous;
(3) a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) severe
emotional distress. [Citation.] Further,
[l]iability for this tort has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is
one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse
his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, “Outrageous!”
[Citation.]
In this case, the action upon which the Ferrells base their emotional distress claim is being stopped by
the police, placed in handcuffs, and held in a patrol car for a short period of time before being released.
While this incident was unfortunate, the question raised by the evidence was whether the restaurant
manager’s actions were negligent, not whether he acted maliciously or his conduct was extreme,
atrocious, or utterly intolerable. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on the Ferrells’ claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
INTERPRETATION False imprisonment is the unlawful detention of the person of another, for any length
of time, whereby such person is deprived of his personal liberty unless there is a legally recognized
justification. Liability is imposed under the tort of infliction of emotional distress for intentional or reckless
conduct that is extreme and outrageous and that causes severe emotional distress.
CRITICAL THINKING QUESTION Do you agree that the manager's conduct was negligent at most and
thus not reckless?
7-2 HARM TO RIGHT OF DIGNITY

7-2a Defamation
Consists of either an oral or written false communication that causes injury to a living person’s reputation (or the
reputation of a corporation, partnership or other business entity). Unless a statute provides otherwise, no action
may be brought for defamation of a deceased person.
Elements of Defamation — The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove the falsity of the statement. The
communication must be published, which means it must be communicated to a third party. Oral
communications are referred to as slander; written as libel. Truth is a complete defense to defamation.
CASE
Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc. v. Buck
Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourteenth District, 1984
678 S.W.2d 612; certiorari denied, 472 U.S. 1009, 105 S.Ct. 2704, 86 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985)
FACTS On June 1, 1976, Larry W. Buck, an established salesman in the insurance business, began
working for Frank B. Hall & Co. In the course of the ensuing months, Buck brought several major accounts
to Hall and produced substantial commission income for the firm. In October 1976, Mendel Kaliff, then
president of Frank B. Hall & Co. of Texas, informed Buck that his salary and benefits were being reduced
because of his failure to generate sufficient income for the firm. On March 31, 1977, Kaliff and Lester
Eckert, Hall's office manager, fired Buck. Buck was unable to procure subsequent employment with
another insurance firm. He hired an investigator, Lloyd Barber, to discover the true reasons for his
dismissal and for his inability to find other employment.
Barber contacted Kaliff, Eckert, and Virginia Hilley, a Hall employee, and told them he was an
investigator and was seeking information about Buck's employment with the firm. Barber conducted tape-
recorded interviews with the three in September and October of 1977. Kaliff accused Buck of being
disruptive, untrustworthy, paranoid, hostile, untruthful, and of padding his expense account. Eckert
referred to Buck as “a zero” and a “classical sociopath” who was ruthless, irrational, and disliked by other
employees. Hilley stated that Buck could have been charged with theft for certain materials he brought
with him from his former employer to Hall. Buck sued Hall for damages for defamation and was awarded
over $1.9 million by a jury—$605,000 for actual damages and $1,300,000 for punitive damages. Hall then
brought this appeal.
DECISION Judgment for Buck affirmed.
OPINION Junell, J. Any act wherein the defamatory matter is intentionally or negligently communicated to
a third person is a publication. In the case of slander, the act is usually the speaking of the words.
Restatement (Second) Torts § 577 comment a (1977). There is ample support in the record to show that
these individuals intentionally communicated disparaging remarks to a third person. The jury was
instructed that “Publication means to communicate defamatory words to some third person in such a way
that he understands the words to be defamatory. A statement is not published if it was unauthorized,
invited or procured by Buck and if Buck knew in advance the contents of the invited communication.” In
response to special issues, the jury found that the slanderous statements were made and published to
Barber.
***
A defamer cannot escape liability by showing that, although he desired to defame the plaintiff, he did
not desire to defame him to the person to whom he in fact intentionally published the defamatory
communication. The publication is complete although the publisher is mistaken as to the identity of the
person to whom the publication is made. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577 comment l (1977).
Likewise, communication to an agent of the person defamed is a publication, unless the communication is
invited by the person defamed or his agent. Restatement § 577 comment e. We have already determined
that the evidence is sufficient to show that Buck did not know what Kaliff, Eckert or Hilley would say and
that he did not procure the defamatory statements to create a lawsuit. Thus, the fact that Barber may have
been acting at Buck’s request is not fatal to Buck’s cause of action. There is absolutely no proof that
Barber induced Kaliff, Eckert or Hilley to make any of the defamatory comments.
***
When an ambiguity exists, a fact issue is presented. The court, by submission of proper fact issues,
should let the jury render its verdict on whether the statements were fairly susceptible to the construction
placed thereon by the plaintiff. [Citation.] Here, the jury found (1) Eckert made a statement calculated to
convey that Buck had been terminated because of serious misconduct; (2) the statement was slanderous
or libelous; (3) the statement was made with malice; (4) the statement was published; and (5) damage
directly resulted from the statement. The jury also found the statements were not substantially true. The
jury thus determined that these statements, which were capable of a defamatory meaning, were
understood as such by Barber.
***
We hold that the evidence supports the award of actual damages and the amount awarded is not
manifestly unjust. Furthermore, in responding to the issue on exemplary damages, the jury was instructed
that exemplary damages must be based on a finding that Hall “acted with ill will, bad intent, malice or
gross disregard to the rights of Buck.” Although there is no fixed ratio between exemplary and actual
damages, exemplary damages must be reasonably apportioned to the actual damages sustained.
[Citation.] Because of the actual damages [$605,000] and the abundant evidence of malice, we hold that
the award of punitive damages [$1,300,000] was not unreasonable. ***
INTERPRETATION The key elements of defamation are that the statements made are false, injure the
plaintiff's reputation, and are published.
ETHICAL QUESTION Did Hall's employees act ethically? Did Buck act ethically in hiring an investigator to
obtain the information? Explain.
CRITICAL THINKING QUESTION How should a company respond to inquiries for information about
former or current employees? Explain.

Explain the application of the various privileges to defamation suits and how they are affected
by whether the plaintiff is (a) a public figure, (b) a public official, or (c) a private person.
Defenses to Defamation — A privilege is a legal defense to what would otherwise be defamation; it provides
immunity from liability when the defamation furthers a societal interest of greater importance than the injury
caused by it. Three kinds of privilege apply to defamation:
Absolute privilege protects the defendant regardless of motive or intent. It has been confined to those few
situations where public policy clearly favors complete freedom of speech and includes: (1) statements made by
participants regarding a judicial proceeding; (2) statements made by members of Congress on the floor of
Congress and by members of state and local legislative bodies; (3) statements made by certain executive officers
while performing their governmental duty; and (4) statements made between spouses when they are alone.
Conditional privilege depends on the proper use of the privilege. A person has a conditional privilege to
publish defamatory matter to protect his own legitimate interests. It also extends to cases where the publisher
and the recipient have a common interest, as with letters of reference. It can be forfeited by improper use.
Constitutional privilege arises from the First Amendment to the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of
speech and freedom of the press. This extends to the right to comment about public officials or public figures so
long as it is done without malice. A private individual bringing a defamation suit need not prove malice as
negligence is sufficient.
Congress enacted Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) granting immunity to
Internet service providers (ISPs) from liability for defamation when publishing information originating from a
third party. Because Section 230 of the CDA grants immunity only to ISPs, there is the possibility that
employers will be held liable for some online defamatory statements made by an employee.

Describe and distinguish the four torts comprising invasion of privacy.
7-2b Invasion of Privacy

Consists of four separate torts: (a) appropriation of a person’s name or likeness; (b) unreasonable intrusion on
the seclusion of another; (c) unreasonable public disclosure of private facts; and (d) unreasonable publicity that
places another in false light in the public eye.
Appropriation — of someone’s name or likeness for personal benefit is not permitted. Individuals have a right
to exclusive use of their own name and identity for pecuniary gain. Also called right of publicity.
CASE
White v. Samsung Electronics
U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 1992
971 F.2d 1395; cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951, 113 S.Ct. 2443, 124 L.Ed.2d 660 (1993)
FACTS Plaintiff, Vanna White, is the hostess of Wheel of Fortune, one of the most popular game shows in
television history. Samsung Electronics and David Deutsch Associates ran an advertisement for
videocassette recorders that depicted a robot dressed in a wig, gown, and jewelry chosen to resemble
White's hair and dress. The robot was posed in a stance, for which White is famous, next to a game
board, which is instantly recognizable as the Wheel of Fortune game show set. The caption of the ad read:
“Longest-running game show. 2012 AD.” Defendants referred to the ad as the “Vanna White” ad. White
neither consented to the ads, nor was she paid for them. White sued Samsung and Deutsch under the
California common law right of publicity. The district court granted summary judgment against White on
this claim.
DECISION Judgment reversed.
OPINION Goodwin, J. White argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to
defendants on White’s common law right of publicity claim. In Eastwood v. Superior Court, [citation], the
California court of appeal stated that the common law right of publicity cause of action “may be pleaded by
alleging (1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness
to defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent, and (4) resulting injury.”
[Citation.] The district court dismissed White’s claim for failure to satisfy Eastwood’s second prong,
reasoning that defendants had not appropriated White’s “name or likeness” with their robot ad. We agree
that the robot ad did not make use of White’s name or likeness. However, the common law right of
publicity is not so confined.
The Eastwood court did not hold that the right of publicity cause of action could be pleaded only by
alleging an appropriation of name or likeness. Eastwood involved an unauthorized use of photographs of
Clint Eastwood and of his name. Accordingly, the Eastwood court had no occasion to consider the extent
beyond the use of name or likeness to which the right of publicity reaches. That court held only that the
right of publicity cause of action “may be” pleaded by alleging, inter alia, appropriation of name or likeness,
not that the action may be pleaded only in those terms.
The “name or likeness” formulation referred to in Eastwood originated not as an element of the right of
publicity cause of action, but as a description of the types of cases in which the cause of action had been
recognized. The source of this formulation is Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal.L.Rev. 383, 401–07 (1960), one of
the earliest and most enduring articulations of the common law right of publicity cause of action. In looking
at the case law to that point, Prosser recognized that right of publicity cases involved one of two basic
factual scenarios: name appropriation, and picture or other likeness appropriation. [Citation.]
Even though Prosser focused on appropriations of name or likeness in discussing the right of
publicity, he noted that “[i]t is not impossible that there might be appropriation of the plaintiff’s identity, as
by impersonation, without use of either his name of his likeness, and that this would be an invasion of his
right of privacy.” [Citation.] At the time Prosser wrote, he noted however, that “[n]o such case appears to
have arisen.” [Citation.]
Since Prosser’s early formulation, the case law has borne out his insight that the right of publicity is
not limited to the appropriation of name or likeness. In Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
[citation], the defendant had used a photograph of the plaintiff’s race car in a television commercial.
Although the plaintiff appeared driving the car in the photograph, his features were not visible. Even
though the defendant had not appropriated the plaintiff’s name or likeness, this court held that plaintiff’s
California right of publicity claim should reach the jury.
In Midler, this court held that, even though the defendants had not used Midler’s name or likeness,
Midler had stated a claim for violation of her California common law right of publicity because “the
defendants *** for their own profit in selling their product did appropriate part of her identity” by using a
Midler sound-alike. [Citation.]
In Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., [citation], the defendant had marketed portable
toilets under the brand name “Here’s Johnny”—Johnny Carson’s signature “Tonight Show” introduction—
without Carson’s permission. The district court had dismissed Carson’s Michigan common law right of
publicity claim because the defendants had not used Carson’s “name or likeness.” [Citation.] In reversing
the district court, the sixth circuit found “the district court’s conception of the right of publicity *** too
narrow” and held that the right was implicated because the defendant had appropriated Carson’s identity
by using, inter alia, the phrase “Here’s Johnny.” [Citation.]
These cases teach not only that the common law right of publicity reaches means of appropriation
other than name or likeness, but that the specific means of appropriation are relevant only for determining
whether the defendant has in fact appropriated the plaintiff’s identity. The right of publicity does not require
that appropriations of identity be accomplished through particular means to be actionable. It is noteworthy
that the Midler and Carson defendants not only avoided using the plaintiff’s name or likeness, but they
also avoided appropriating the celebrity’s voice, signature, and photograph. The photograph in
Motschenbacher did include the plaintiff, but because the plaintiff was not visible the driver could have
been an actor or dummy and the analysis in the case would have been the same.
Although the defendants in these cases avoided the most obvious means of appropriating the
plaintiffs’ identities, each of their actions directly implicated the commercial interests which the right of
publicity is designed to protect. As the Carson court explained:
[t]he right of publicity has developed to protect the commercial interest of celebrities in their
identities. The theory of the right is that a celebrity’s identity can be valuable in the promotion of
products, and the celebrity has an interest that may be protected from the unauthorized
commercial exploitation of that identity *** If the celebrity’s identity is commercially exploited,
there has been an invasion of his right whether or not his “name or likeness” is used.
[Citation.] It is not important how the defendant has appropriated the plaintiff’s identity, but whether the
defendant has done so. Motschenbacher, Midler, and Car-son teach the impossibility of treating the right
of publicity as guarding only against a laundry list of specific means of appropriating identity. A rule which
says that the right of publicity can be infringed only through the use of nine different methods of
appropriating identity merely challenges the clever advertising strategist to come up with the tenth.
Indeed, if we treated the means of appropriation as dispositive in our analysis of the right of publicity,
we would not only weaken the right but effectively eviscerate it. The right would fail to protect those
plaintiffs most in need of its protection. Advertisers use celebrities to promote their products. The more
popular the celebrity, the greater the number of people who recognize her, and the greater the visibility for
the product. The identities of the most popular celebrities are not only the most attractive for advertisers,
but also the easiest to evoke without resorting to obvious means such as name, likeness, or voice.
Consider a hypothetical advertisement which depicts a mechanical robot with male features, an
African-American complexion, and a bald head. The robot is wearing black high-top Air Jordan basketball
sneakers, and a red basketball uniform with black trim, baggy shorts, and the number 23 (though not
revealing “Bulls” or “Jordan” lettering). The ad depicts the robot dunking a basketball one-handed, stiff-
armed, legs extended like open scissors, and tongue hanging out. Now envision that this ad is run on
television during professional basketball games. Considered individually, the robot’s physical attributes, its
dress, and its stance tells us little. Taken together, they lead to the only conclusion that any sports viewer
who has registered a discernible pulse in the past five years would reach: the ad is about Michael Jordan.
Viewed separately, the individual aspects of the advertisement in the present case say little. Viewed
together, they leave little doubt about the celebrity the ad is meant to depict. The female shaped robot is
wearing a long gown, blond wig, and large jewelry. Vanna White dresses exactly like this at times, but so
do many other women. The robot is in the process of turning a block letter on a game-board. Vanna White
dresses like this while turning letters on a game-board but perhaps similarly attired Scrabble-playing
women do this as well. The robot is standing on what looks to be the Wheel of Fortune game show set.
Vanna White dresses like this, turns letters, and does this on the Wheel of Fortune game show. She is the
only one. Indeed, defendants themselves referred to their ad as the “Vanna White” ad. We are not
surprised.
Television and other media create marketable celebrity identity value. Considerable energy and
ingenuity are expended by those who have achieved celebrity value to exploit it for profit. The law protects
the celebrity’s sole right to exploit this value whether the celebrity has achieved her fame out of rare ability,
dumb luck, or a combination thereof. We decline Samsung and Deutsch’s invitation to permit the
evisceration of the common law right of publicity through means as facile as those in this case. Because
White has alleged facts showing that Samsung and Deutsch had appropriated her identity, the district
court erred by rejecting, on summary judgment, White’s common law right of publicity claim.
INTERPRETATION The tort of appropriation protects a person's exclusive right to exploit the value of her
identity.
CRITICAL THINKING QUESTION What are the interests protected by this tort?
Intrusion — concerns the unreasonable and highly offensive interference with a person’s solitude or seclusion.
It applies to places and events or occurrences where the individual has a heightened right of privacy on which
the wrongdoer intrudes, such as unauthorized entry into home or eavesdropping on a private conversation.
Information contained in public records is not covered.
Public Disclosure of Private Facts — applies where private, but true, facts about another are publicized.
“Publicized” means the private facts must be communicated to the public at large, whereas publication is
communication to even a single third party.
False Light — involves publicity that creates an untruthful public impression. There must be either knowledge
of the untruthfulness or a reckless disregard of the truth. Again, publicity and not merely publication is required.
Defenses — absolute, conditional, and constitutional privilege apply to the publication of any matter that is an
invasion of privacy to the same extent as they do to defamation.
7-2c Misuse of Legal Procedure

Is comprised of three torts, each of which protects an individual from being subjected to unjustifiable litigation:
Malicious Prosecution — bringing a criminal proceeding without probable cause, for an improper purpose,
resulting in a finding of not guilty.
Wrongful Civil Proceedings — like malicious prosecution, except in a civil suit.
Abuse of Process — use of legal proceedings for purposes other than their intended purposes, even if there is
probable cause.

Identify and describe the torts that protect against harm to property.
7-3 HARM TO PROPERTY

7-3a Real Property
Real property is land and anything attached to it, such as buildings, trees, and minerals. The possessor of land
has the right to its exclusive use and quiet enjoyment.
Trespass — A person is liable for trespass to real property if he intentionally (1) enters or remains on land in
the possession of another; (2) causes a thing or a third person to do so; or (3) fails to remove from the land a
thing that he is under a duty to remove. Liability exists even though no actual damage occurs. Mistake is no
defense. A trespass may be committed on, beneath, or above the surface of the land.
Nuisance — A nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the use and private enjoyment of land. Nuisance
does not require interference with another’s right to exclusive possession of land. It imposes liability for
significant and unreasonable harm to another’s use or enjoyment of land such as by the emission of unpleasant
odors, smoke, dust, gas, or pollutants.
7-3b Personal Property

Personal property is any type of property other than an interest in land; protected interests include the retention
of possession of the property, the physical condition and usability at the present time, and the property’s
availability for use in the future.
Trespass — Trespass to personal property consists of the intentional dispossession or unauthorized use of the
personal property of another. For trespass, the owner recovers damages for the actual harm to the property or
for loss of possession.
Conversion — Conversion is the intentional exercise of dominion or control over another’s personal property
that so seriously interferes with the other’s right of control as to justly require the payment of full value for the
property. All conversions are trespasses, but not all trespasses are conversion.
7-4 HARM TO ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Economic interests include a person’s existing and prospective contractual relations, business reputation, name
and likeness, and freedom from deception.

Distinguish among interference with contractual relations, disparagement, and fraudulent
misrepresentation.
7-4a Interference with Contractual Relations

An improper interference aimed at inducing a party to a contract not to perform. Liability requires that a person
act with the purpose of interfering with another’s contract and with the knowledge that interference is
substantially certain to occur as a result of her actions.
CASE
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co.
Court of Appeals of Texas, First District, 1987
729 S.W.2d 768; cert. denied, 485 U.S. 994, 108 S.Ct. 1305, 99 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)
FACTS Pennzoil negotiated with Gordon Getty and the J. Paul Getty Museum over the purchase by
Pennzoil of all the Getty Oil stock held by each. Gordon Getty, who was also a director of Getty Oil, held
about 40.2 percent of the outstanding shares of Getty Oil. The Museum held 11.8 percent. On January 2,
a Memorandum of Agreement was drafted, setting forth the terms reached by Pennzoil, Gordon Getty,
and the Museum. After increasing the offering price to $110 per share plus a $5 “stub” or bonus, the board
of directors of Getty Oil voted on January 3 to accept the Pennzoil deal. Accordingly, on January 4 both
Getty Oil and Pennzoil issued press releases, announcing an agreement in principle on the terms of the
Memorandum of Agreement but at the higher price.
Having learned of the impending sale of Getty Oil stock to Pennzoil, Texaco hurriedly called several
in-house meetings, and hired an investment banker as well, to determine a feasible price range for
acquiring Getty Oil. On January 5, Texaco decided on $125 per share and authorized its officers to take
any steps necessary to conclude a deal. Texaco met first with a lawyer for the Museum, then with Gordon
Getty. Texaco stressed to Getty that if he hesitated in selling his shares, he might be “locked out” in a
minority position. On January 6, the Getty Oil board of directors voted to withdraw from the Pennzoil deal
and unanimously voted to accept the $125-per-share Texaco offer. Pennzoil sued and won an award of
$7.53 billion in compensatory damages and $3 billion in punitive damages based on tortious interference
with a contract. Texaco appealed.
DECISION Judgment of trial court affirmed.
OPINION Warren, J. New York law requires knowledge by a defendant of the existence of contractual
rights as an element of the tort of inducing a breach of that contract. [Citation.] However, the defendant
need not have full knowledge of all the detailed terms of the contract. [Citations.]
The element of knowledge by the defendant is a question of fact, and proof may be predicated on
circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] Since there was no direct evidence of Texaco’s knowledge of a
contract in this case, the question is whether there was legally and factually sufficient circumstantial
evidence from which the trier of fact reasonably could have inferred knowledge.
***
We find that an inference could arise that Texaco had some knowledge of Pennzoil’s agreement with
the Getty entities, given the evidence of Texaco’s detailed studies of the Pennzoil plan, its knowledge that
some members of the Getty board were not happy with Pennzoil’s price, and its subsequent formulation of
strategy to “stop the [Pennzoil] train” ***
***
A necessary element of the plaintiff’s cause of action is a showing that the defendant took an active
part in persuading a party to a contract to breach it. [Citation.] Merely entering into a contract with a party
with the knowledge of that party’s contractual obligations to someone else is not the same as inducing a
breach. [Citation.] It is necessary that there be some act of interference or of persuading a party to breach,
for example by offering better terms or other incentives, for tort liability to arise. [Citations.] The issue of
whether a defendant affirmatively took steps to induce the breach of an existing contract is a question of
fact for the jury. [Citation.]
***
The evidence discussed above on Texaco’s calculated formulation and implementation of its ideal
strategy to acquire Getty is also inconsistent with its contention that it was merely the passive target of
Getty’s aggressive solicitation campaign and did nothing more than to accept terms that Getty Oil and the
Museum had proposed. The evidence showed that Texaco knew it had to act quickly, and that it had “24
hours” to “stop the train.” Texaco’s strategy was to approach the Museum first, through its “key person”
Lipton, to obtain the Museum’s shares, and then to “talk to Gordon.” It knew that the Trust instrument
permitted Gordon Getty to sell the Trust shares only to avoid a loss, and it knew of the trustee’s fear of
being left in a powerless minority ownership position at Getty Oil. Texaco notes indicated a deliberate
strategy to “create concern that he will take a loss;” “if there’s a tender offer and Gordon doesn’t tender,
then he could wind up with paper”; and “pressure.” This evidence contradicts the contention that Texaco
passively accepted a deal proposed by the other parties.
INTERPRETATION The tort of interference with contractual relations protects a party to a contract from a
third party who intentionally and improperly induces the other contracting party not to perform the contract.
ETHICAL QUESTION Did Getty or Texaco act unethically? Explain.
CRITICAL THINKING QUESTION Does the protection afforded by this tort conflict with society's interest
in free competition? Explain.
7-4b Disparagement
Involves intentional or reckless publication of false facts which injure a person’s economic or monetary
interests. Absolute, conditional, and constitutional privilege apply to the same extent to disparagement as they
do to defamation.
7-4c Fraudulent Misrepresentation

The intentional misrepresentation of a material fact; imposes liability for the monetary loss caused by a
justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation.
NOTE: Concept Review: Intentional Torts lists the interests protected by each tort.
ETHICAL DILEMMA DISCUSSION

“What May One Do to Attract Clients From a Previous Employer?”
Legal Background
The present conduct could give rise to an action for the tortious interference with contractual relations. This tort
has been recognized at common law in many states and was highly publicized in Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.,
729 S.W.2d 768 (1987). See also Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin, and Creskoff v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d
1175 (1978) in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the sending of letters by attorneys to former
clients in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility amounted to tortious interference with contractual
relations.
Tortious interference is defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts as “One who intentionally and improperly
interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by
inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for
the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform the contract.” Section
767 of the Restatement (Second) defines “improper conduct” based on the facts and circumstances including the
nature of the actor’s conduct, the actor’s motives, the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct
interferes, the interest sought to be advanced by the actor, the social interest in protecting freedom of action by
the actor, the contractual interests of the other, the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the
interference, and the relations between the parties.
Social Policy and Ethical Considerations

1. Most would agree that Jones should not go along with the proposed mailing. The mailing involves the use
of confidential client files of a former employer and may violate the state’s Code of Ethics on self-
recommendation.
2. Jones could discuss the matter with a disinterested attorney to discuss the legal ramifications and to review
the applicable Code of Ethics. As a matter of public policy, increased continuing education requirements
for attorneys with particular emphasis on ethics and effective enforcement of disciplinary actions could be
helpful in deterring this type of conduct.
3. The competing social interests include the freedom of competition balanced against the importance of
privacy and fundamental notions of fair-play.
4. If the parties involved were accountants, the public at large and all users of financial statements would have
an interest in obtaining properly and consistently prepared financial statements. Frequent changes of
accountants can impede the audit process. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) has established a Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS 7) which governs the conduct of the
predecessor and successor auditors and requires that communications take place with regard to matters
affecting the integrity of the client. Further, some companies require stockholder approval of the retention
of present auditors or a change to new auditors.
The AICPA has its own ethical standards which prohibit solicitation in a manner that is false, misleading, or
deceptive. Solicitation by the use of coercion, overreaching or harassing conduct is prohibited. (Rule 502
of the Code of Professional Conduct.)
5. The Restatement (Second) of Torts lists a number of factors which provide guidance on the degree of
protection afforded. (See discussion above regarding Section 767.) The determination of tortious
interference remains highly factual. While the case-by-case approach creates uncertainty, it is an approach
which has the advantage of balancing the competing social interests in each individual case.
6. Jones should be quite concerned with the wording of the letter regarding comparisons made with Adle &
Bart. Tortious interference is a highly factual determination and the outcome of a lawsuit could turn on the
exact wording. Further, the wording could potentially expose Jones to a lawsuit for libel.
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS AND CASE PROBLEMS

1. The Penguin intentionally hits Batman with his umbrella. Batman, stunned by the blow, falls
backwards, knocking Robin down. Robin's leg is broken in the fall, and he cries out, “Holy
broken bat bones! My leg is broken.” Who, if anyone, is liable to Robin? Why?
Answer: Battery. The Penguin is liable to Robin for battery. Section 13 of the Restatement
imposes liability if the actor (Penguin) intends to injure a third person (Batman) and causes
injury (directly or indirectly) to the person of the other (Robin). Batman is not liable because
he did not act with intent and, as Section 14 states, “To make the actor liable for a battery,
the harmful bodily contact must be caused by an act done by the person whose liability is in
question.”
2. CEO was convinced by his employee, M. Ploy, that a coworker, A. Cused, had been stealing
money from the company. At lunch that day in the company cafeteria, CEO discharges
Cused from her employment, accuses her of stealing from the company, searches through
her purse over her objections, and finally forcibly escorts her to his office to await the
arrival of the police, which he has his secretary summon. Cused is indicted for
embezzlement but subsequently is acquitted upon establishing her innocence. What rights, if
any, does Cused have against CEO?
Answer: Injury or Damage to the Person. CEO might be liable for slander if there was no basis
for the embezzlement accusation and there was a publication of the defamatory information
to someone else in the cafeteria. By taking the employee’s purse, CEO committed a trespass
to personal property, an intentional dispossession or unauthorized use of another’s property.

This constituted an interference with the employee’s right to exclusive use and possession.
By searching the purse, the CEO has committed the tort of intrusion. Cused could also
demonstrate that CEO’s physical contact constituted a battery, which is the intentional
infliction of harmful or offensive bodily contact. Cused did not consent to the touching. An
action might also lie for emotional distress since the courts now grant recovery for mental
anguish despite a lack of physical injury. Also, there may be false imprisonment if there was
not a lawful restraint under local shoplifting law. Finally, given the acquittal, a claim for
malicious prosecution could be made if CEO filed the charges without probable cause and
for an improper purpose.
3. Ralph kisses Edith while she is asleep but does not waken or harm her. Edith sues Ralph for
battery. Has a battery been committed?
Answer: Battery. Yes. Decision for Edith. Section 18 provides: “(1) An actor is subject to
liability to another for battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact
with the person of the other or third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact,
and (b) an offensive contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.” All
of these elements have been satisfied by the facts of this problem. Moreover, Comment d to
Section 18 states: “In order that the actor may be liable under the statement in this
Subsection, it is not necessary that the other should know of the offensive contact which is
inflicted upon him at the time when it is inflicted. The actor’s liability is based upon his
intentional invasion of the other’s dignitary interest in the inviolability of his person and the
affront to it while it is being perpetrated.”
4. Claude, a creditor seeking to collect a debt, calls on Dianne and demands payment in a
rude and insolent manner. When Dianne says that she cannot pay, Claude calls Dianne a
deadbeat and says that he will never trust her again. Is Claude liable to Dianne? If so, for
what tort?
Answer: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. No. Liability for infliction of emotional
distress would not arise out of these facts. Liability clearly does not extend to mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. There is no occasion
for the law to intervene in every case where someone’s feelings are hurt. Comment d to
Section 46. In this case, although Claude’s behavior was unthinkable, it was not sufficient
to support a claim of infliction of emotional distress. Moreover, there is no defamation
because there has been no communication to a third party.
5. Lana, a ten-year-old child, is run over by a car negligently driven by Mitchell. Lana, at the
time of the accident, was acting reasonably and without negligence. Clark, a newspaper
reporter, photographs Lana while she is lying in the street in great pain. Two years later,
Perry, the publisher of a newspaper, prints Clark's picture of Lana in his newspaper as a
lead to an article concerning the negligence of children. The caption under the picture
reads: “They ask to be killed.” Lana, who has recovered from the accident, brings suit
against Clark and Perry. What result?
Answer: Invasion of Privacy: False Light. Judgment for Lana against Perry but not against
Clark. The facts make out a case against Perry for the tort of invasion of privacy; in
particular, placing another in a false light. Section 652E of the Restatement imposes
liability for publicity which places another in a false light. It is unlikely that Perry could
utilize the First Amendment as a defense because Lana was neither a public official nor a
public figure. Even if that defense were available, it is forfeited if Perry acted with
“malice,” which appears to be the case here because Perry acted in reckless disregard of the
truth. Clark did not commit the tort of intrusion because he photographed an event that
occurred in public.
6. The Saturday Evening Post featured an article entitled “The Story of a College Football
Fix,” characterized in the subtitle as “A Shocking Report of How Wally Butts and Bear
Bryant Rigged a Game Last Fall.” Butts was athletic director of the University of Georgia,
and Bryant was head coach of the University of Alabama. The article was based on a claim
by one George Burnett that he had accidentally overheard a long-distance telephone
conversation between Butts and Bryant in the course of which Butts divulged information on
plays Georgia would use in the upcoming game against Alabama. The writer assigned to the
story by the Post was not a football expert, did not interview either Butts or Bryant, and did
not personally see the notes Burnett had made of the telephone conversation. Butts admitted
that he had a long-distance telephone conversation with Bryant but denied that any advance
information on prospective football plays was given. Has Butts been defamed by the Post?
Answer: Defamation. Yes. Decision for Butts. The publication was defamatory because it was
a communication that injured Butts’ good name. Although Butts was a public figure, the
magazine published the story in reckless disregard of the truth, which constitutes malice and
results in a loss of First Amendment protection. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S.
130.
7. A patient confined in a hospital, Joan, has a rare disease that is of great interest to the
public. Carol, a television reporter, requests Joan to consent to an interview. Joan refuses,
but Carol, nonetheless, enters Joan's room over her objection and photographs her. Joan
brings a suit against Carol. Is Carol liable? If so, for what tort?
Answer: Invasion of Privacy: Intrusion. Yes, Carol is liable to Joan. Carol has committed the
tort of intrusion, the invasion of privacy with unreasonable and highly offensive interference
with the solitude or seclusion of another. Restatement, Section 652B. Such unreasonable
interference would include improper entry into another’s dwelling. This form of invasion of
privacy is committed once the intrusion occurs, as publication is not required. The defense
of constitutional privilege would not be available.
If Carol published the photograph, she would also be liable to Joan for public disclosure of
private facts. The law of privacy imposes liability for the offensive publication of private
information about another. As with intrusion, this tort only applies to private, not public,
information regarding the plaintiff, but unlike intrusion it requires publicity. This tort
applies to truthful private information if the matter published would be offensive and
objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.
8. Owner has a place on his land where he piles trash. The pile has been there for three
months. John, a neighbor of Owner and without Owner's consent or knowledge, throws
trash onto the trashpile. Owner learns that John has done this and sues him. What tort, if
any, has John committed?
Answer: Real Property: Trespass. John is liable for trespass. Section 158 provides:
“One is subject to liability to another for trespass, irrespective of whether he thereby causes
harm to any legally protected interest of the other, if he intentionally
(a) enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or a third person to do so, or
(b) remains on the land, or
(c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove.”
The actor without himself entering the land may invade another’s interest in its exclusive
possession by throwing, propelling, or placing a thing either on or beneath the surface of the
land or in the air space above it. Comment i.
9. Chris leaves her car parked in front of a store. There are no signs that say Chris cannot
park there. The store owner, however, needs the car moved to enable a delivery truck to
unload. He releases the brake and pushes Chris's car three or four feet, doing no harm to
the car. Chris returns and sees that her car has been moved and is very angry. She threatens
to sue the store owner for trespass to her personal property. Can she recover?
Answer: Personal Property: Trespass. Probably not. Liability for trespass to a chattel (movable
personal property) is imposed only if–(a) the actor dispossesses the other of the chattel, or
(b) the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or (c) the possessor is
deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or (d) bodily harm is caused to the
possessor, or harm is caused to some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally
protected interest. Section 218. The deprivation of use, not amounting to a dispossession,
necessary to render the actor liable for his use or other intermeddling with the chattel of
another without the other’s consent must be for a time so substantial that it is possible to
estimate the loss caused thereby. A mere momentary or theoretical deprivation of use is not
sufficient unless there is a dispossession. Comment i.
10. Carr borrowed John's brand-new Ford for the purpose of going to the store. He told John
he would be right back. Carr then decided, however, to go to the beach while he had the
car. Can John recover from Carr the value of the automobile? If so, for what tort?
Answer: Conversion. The tort for which John can recover depends in part on the amount of time
Carr has the vehicle. John can definitely recover for a trespass to personal property since
Carr dispossessed John of the vehicle beyond the authorized use. This would apply if the
beach is just a few miles away and Carr is only gone for a few hours or so. Recovery would
not be for the full value of the car. If, however, the beach is hundreds of miles away and
Carr keeps the vehicle for an unreasonably long time, John may be able to recover for
conversion. This is a much more significant interference with the other’s right of control,
and would allow John to recover the full value of the vehicle. Section 222A.
11. Marcia Samms claimed that David Eccles had repeatedly and persistently called her at
various hours, including late at night, from May to December, soliciting her to have illicit
sexual relations with him. She also claimed that on one occasion Eccles came over to her
residence to again solicit sex and indecently exposed himself to her. Mrs. Samms had never
encouraged Eccles but had continuously repulsed his “insulting, indecent, and obscene”
proposals. She brought suit against Eccles, claiming she suffered great anxiety and fear for
her personal safety and severe emotional distress, demanding actual and punitive damages.
Can she recover? If so, for what tort?
Answer: Infliction of Emotional Distress. Yes, Samms could recover for Infliction of
Emotional Distress. The courts recognize a cause of action for severe emotional distress
even if not accompanied by bodily impact or physical injury, where defendant engaged in
intentional conduct aimed at the plaintiff (1) with the purpose of inflicting emotional
distress, or (2) where any reasonable person should have known that emotional distress
would result. Also, the conduct must be outrageous and intolerable according to general
community standards of decency and morality. Eccles’ conduct constitutes more than a
mere solicitation, considering that it persisted for eight months and also involved indecent
exposure. The aggravating circumstances are sufficient to give Samms a cause of action
based solely on her emotional distress. Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (1931).
12. National Bond and Investment Company sent two of its employees to repossess Whithorn's
car after he failed to complete the payments. The two repossessors located Whithorn while
he was driving his car. They followed him and hailed him down in order to make the
repossession. Whithorn refused to abandon his car and demanded evidence of their
authority. The two repossessors became impatient and called a wrecker. They ordered the
driver of the wrecker to hook Whithorn's car and move it down the street while Whithorn
was still inside the vehicle. Whithorn started the car and tried to escape, but the wrecker
lifted the car off the road and progressed seventy-five to one hundred feet until Whithorn
managed to stall the wrecker. Has National Bond committed the tort of false imprisonment?
Answer: False imprisonment. Yes, National Bond falsely imprisoned Whithorn. The result of
Whithorn’s departure would have been an automatic parting with his automobile, which he
did not desire to part with and which he did not have to part with, and which the two
repossessors had no right to take over his protests. He had a legal right to be in his car at the
time the repossessors hooked up the car and forcibly dragged Whithorn down the street.
This was a restraint imposed upon him and a detention of his person, such as to constitute a
false imprisonment. National Bond & Investment Co. v. Whithorn, 123 S.W.2d 263 (1939).
13. William Proxmire, a United States senator from Wisconsin, initiated the “Golden Fleece of
the Month Award” to publicize what he believed to be wasteful government spending. The
second of these awards was given to the Federal agencies that had for seven years funded
Dr. Hutchinson's research on stress levels in animals. The award was made in a speech
Proxmire gave in the Senate; the text was also incorporated into an advance press release
that was sent to 275 members of the national news media. Proxmire also referred to the
research again in two subsequent newsletters letters sent to 100,000 constituents and during
a television interview. Hutchinson then brought this action alleging defamation resulting in
personal and economic injury. Assuming that Hutchinson proved that the statements were
false and defamatory, would he prevail?
Answer: Defamation/Constitutional Privilege. Yes, Dr. Hutchinson would prevail. Proxmire’s
speech on the Senate floor was immune from liability, but the advance news release, the
newsletters and the comments made by Senator Proxmire during the television news
interviews were not privileged under the Speech and Debate clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Nor are they protected by the First Amendment as to defamatory comments made. Dr.
Hutchinson was not a public figure prior to receiving the Golden Fleece Award since his
published writings reached a relatively small audience concerned with research in human
behavior. Rather, any notoriety he achieved came as a result of the alleged defamation, and
therefore cannot serve as a basis for Proxmire’s defense. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S.
111.
14. Capune was attempting a trip from New York to Florida on an eighteen-foot-long
paddleboard. The trip was being covered by various media to gain publicity for Capune and
certain products he endorsed. By water, Capune approached a pier owned by Robbins, who
had posted signs prohibiting surfing and swimming around the pier. Capune was unaware
of these notices and attempted to continue his journey by passing under the pier. Robbins
ran up yelling and threw two bottles at Capune. Capune was frightened and tried to
maneuver his paddleboard to go around the pier. Robbins then threw a third bottle that hit
Capune on the head. Capune had to be helped out of the water and taken to the hospital. He
suffered a physical wound which required twenty-four sutures and, as a result, had to
discontinue his trip. Capune brought suit in tort against Robbins. Is Robbins liable? If so,
for which tort or torts?
Answer: Battery/Assault. Yes, Robbins is liable to Capune for battery. Robbins’ throwing the
bottles with the intent to frighten Capune constitutes sufficient intent to make Robbins liable
in battery for any injuries that resulted. The harmful physical contact resulted from Capune
being hit by the bottle thrown by Robbins. Capune v. Robbins, 273 NC. 581, 160 S.E.2d
881 (1968).
15. Ralph Nader, who has been a critic of General Motors Corp. for several years, claims that
when General Motors learned that Nader was about to publish a book entitled Unsafe at any
Speed, criticizing one of its automobiles, it decided to conduct a campaign of intimidation
against him. Specifically, Nader claims that GMC (a) conducted a series of interviews with
Nader's acquaintances, questioning them about his political, social, racial, and religious
views; (b) kept him under surveillance in public places for an unreasonable length of time
including close observation of him in a bank; (c) caused him to be accosted by women for
the purpose of entrapping him into illicit relationships; (d) made threatening, harassing,
and obnoxious telephone calls to him; (e) tapped his telephone and eavesdropped by means
of mechanical and electronic equipment on his private conversations with others; and (f)
conducted a “continuing” and harassing investigation of him. Nader brought suit against
GMC for invasion of privacy. Which, if any, of the alleged actions would constitute invasion
of privacy?
Answer: Intrusion. Judgment in part for Nader. The tort of invasion of one’s privacy includes
instances of intrusion by physical trespass or otherwise into areas from which an ordinary
man would reasonably expect that others should be excluded. The concern is not with one’s
broad right to be left alone, but rather with the right to keep one’s private affairs secret from
others. Thus, one must show that the questioned conduct was truly “intrusive” and that it
was designed to elicit information that would not be available through normal inquiry or
observation.
In the present case, only two of the activities complained of could constitute an invasion of
Nader’s privacy: (1) the unauthorized wiretapping and eavesdropping by electronic means,
and (2) certain potentially overzealous surveillance of Nader in a public place by closely
observing him in a bank. In contrast, the other activities may have uncovered information of
a personal nature about Nader, but this cannot be regarded as an invasion of his privacy
since it was gained from third persons. Presumably since Nader confided in these third
persons, he also assumed the risk that they would breach his confidence. Nader v. General
Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970).
16. Bill Kinsey was charged with murdering his wife while working for the Peace Corps in
Tanzania. After waiting six months in jail he was acquitted at a trial that attracted wide
publicity. Five years later, while a graduate student at Stanford University, Kinsey had a
brief affair with Mary Macur. He abruptly ended the affair by telling Macur he would no
longer be seeing her because another woman, Sally Allen, was coming from England to live
with him. A few months later, Kinsey and Allen moved to Africa and were subsequently
married. Soon after Bill ended their affair, Macur began a letter writing campaign designed
to expose Bill and his mistreatment of her. Macur sent several letters to both Bill and Sally
Kinsey, their parents, their neighbors, their parents' neighbors, members of Bill's
dissertation committee, other faculty, and the president of Stanford University. The letters
contained statements accusing Bill of murdering his first wife, spending six months in jail
for the crime, being a rapist, and other questionable behavior. The Kinseys brought an
action for invasion of privacy, seeking damages and a permanent injunction. Will the
Kinseys prevail? If so, for what tort?
Answer: Invasion of Privacy. Judgment for the Kinseys. The tort of invasion of privacy
includes four separate torts, two of which are involved here: (1) the public disclosure of true,
embarrassing private facts concerning the plaintiff; and (2) publicity that places the plaintiff
in a false light in the public eye. In both of these torts there must be a communication to the
general public or a large number of people as opposed to private communications. In this
case, Macur sent the letters to approximately twenty people. The recipients were such a
diverse group, however, living in several different states and totally unconnected either
socially or professionally, that her campaign satisfied this requirement. Macur claims that
even if she invaded Kinsey’s privacy, it was privileged because he was a public figure by
virtue of his participation in the Peace Corps and his widely publicized murder trial. The
definition of a public figure is not clear, but membership in the Peace Corps is not sufficient
to make a person a public figure. Moreover, once Kinsey had been acquitted at his trial, he
was no longer a public figure and should be allowed “to melt into the shadows of obscurity”
once again. Kinsey v. Macur, 107 Cal.App.3d 265, 165 Cal.Rptr. 608 (1980).
17. Plaintiff, John W. Carson, was the host and star of “The Tonight Show,” a well-known
television program broadcast by the National Broadcasting Company. Carson also
appeared as an entertainer in nightclubs and theaters around the country. From the time he
began hosting “The Tonight Show” in 1962, he had been introduced on the show each night
with the phrase “Here's Johnny.” The phrase “Here's Johnny” is still generally associated
with Carson by a substantial segment of the television-viewing public. In 1967, to earn
additional income, Carson began authorizing use of this phrase by outside business
ventures.
Defendant, Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., is a Michigan corporation engaged in the
business of renting and selling “Here's Johnny” portable toilets. Defendant's founder was
aware at the time he formed the corporation that “Here's Johnny” was the introductory
slogan for Carson on “The Tonight Show.” He indicated that he coupled the phrase with a
second one, “The World's Foremost Commodian,” to make “a good play on a phrase.”
Carson brought suit for invasion of privacy. Should Carson recover? If so, for which tort?
Answer: Appropriation. Yes, Carson should recover for violation of his right of privacy. The
right of privacy involves four distinct torts, one of which is the appropriation of a person's
name or likeness. This tort, also known as the "right of publicity," protects the commercial
interests of celebrities in exploiting their identities and applies to these facts.
In this case there would have been no violation of Carson's right of publicity if the defendant
had used Carson's actual name, such as "J. William Carson Portable Toilet" or the "John
William Carson Portable Toilet" or the "J.W. Carson Portable Toilet." The reason is that,
though literally using the plaintiff's "name," the defendant would not have appropriated
Carson's identity as a celebrity. Here there was an appropriation of Carson's identity without
using his "name," because of the public's association of Carson with the phrase "Here's
Johnny." Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.
18. Lemmie L. Ruffin, Jr., was an Alabama licensed agent for Pacific Mutual Life Insurance and
for Union Fidelity Life Insurance Company. Union wrote group health insurance policies
for municipalities, while Pacific did not. Plaintiffs Cleopatra Haslip, Cynthia Craig, Alma
M. Calhoun, and Eddie Hargrove were employees of Roosevelt City, Alabama. Ruffin gave
the city a single proposal for health and life insurance for its employees, which the city
approved. Both companies provided the coverage, however, Union provided the health
insurance and Pacific the life insurance. This packaging of coverage by two different and
unrelated insurers was not unusual. Union would send its billings for health premiums to
Ruffin at Pacific Mutual’s office. The city clerk each month issued a check for those
premiums and sent it to Ruffin. Ruffin, however, did not remit to Union the premium
payments he received from the city; instead, he misappropriated most of them. When Union
did not receive payment from the city, it sent notices of lapsed health coverage to the
plaintiffs, who did not know that their health policies had been canceled.
Plaintiff Haslip was subsequently hospitalized and because the hospital could not confirm
her health coverage, it required her to make a partial payment on her bill. Her physician,
when he was not paid, placed her account with a collection agency, which obtained against
Haslip a judgment that damaged her credit. Plaintiffs sued Pacific Mutual and Ruffin for
fraud. The case was submitted to a jury, which was instructed that if it found liability for
fraud, it could award punitive damages. The jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs and
awarded Haslip $1,040,000, of which at least $840,000 was punitive damages. The Supreme
Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Pacific Mutual appealed. Decision?
Answer: Punitive Damages. Judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama in favor of the
plaintiffs affirmed. Under the traditional common law approach, the amount of a punitive
award initially is determined by a jury. Jurors are instructed to consider the gravity of the
wrong and the need to deter similar wrongful conduct in the future. The trial and appellate
courts then review the jury's determination to ensure that it is reasonable. While the common
law method for assessing punitive damages does not always deny due process, neither is it
always constitutional. The task in this case is to determine whether the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment renders the punitive damages award of this case
unconstitutional.
The Court concludes that the punitive damages the jury assessed against Pacific Mutual did
not violate the Due Process Clause. Even though Alabama law, like the law of most states,
imposes punitive damages for purposes of retribution and deterrence, this does not resolve
the issue. The trial judge's instructions gave the jury significant discretion, but such
discretion was not unlimited. It was confined to deterrence and retribution. The trial court
found specifically that the defendants' conduct evidenced intentional, malicious, gross, or
oppressive fraud. The Supreme Court of Alabama previously had decided that courts could
consider the following factors in determining whether an award of punitive damages was
excessive or inadequate: (a) whether a reasonable relationship existed between the punitive
damages award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the
harm that actually had occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defendant's level of awareness, any concealment,
and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct; (c) the profitability to the defendant
of the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and of having the
defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the "financial position" of the defendant; (e) all the costs of
litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its conduct, these
sanctions to be taken in mitigation; and (g) the existence of other civil awards against the
defendant for the same conduct, these also to be taken in mitigation.
The Court concludes that the application of these standards by the courts of Alabama
imposes a sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint on the discretion of Alabama fact
finders (juries) in awarding punitive damages. The Alabama Supreme Court's post-verdict
review ensures that punitive damages awards are not grossly out of proportion to the severity
of the offense and have some understandable relationship to compensatory damages.
19. Susan Jungclaus Peterson was a twenty-one-year-old student at Moorhead State University
who had lived most of her life on her family farm in Minnesota. Though Susan was a dean's
list student during her first year, her academic performance declined after she became
deeply involved in an international religious cult organization known locally as The Way of
Minnesota, Inc. The cult demanded an enormous psychological and monetary commitment
from Susan. Near the end of her junior year, her parents became alarmed by the changes in
Susan's physical and mental well-being and concluded that she had been "reduced to a
condition of psychological bondage by The Way." They sought help from Kathy Mills, a self-
styled "deprogrammer" of minds brainwashed by cults.
On May 24, Norman Jungclaus, Susan's father, picked up Susan at Moorhead State. Instead
of returning home, they went to the residence of Veronica Morgel, where Kathy Mills
attempted to deprogram Susan. For the first few days of her stay, Susan was unwilling to
discuss her involvement. She lay curled in a fetal position in her bedroom, plugging her ears
and hysterically screaming and crying while her father pleaded with her to listen. By the
third day, however, Susan's demeanor changed completely. She became friendly and
vivacious and communicated with her father. Susan also went roller skating and played
softball at a nearby park over the following weekend. She spent the next week in Columbus,
Ohio, with a former cult member who had shared her experiences of the previous week.
While in Columbus, she spoke daily by telephone with her fiancé, a member of The Way,
who begged her to return to the cult. Susan expressed the desire to get her fiancé out of the
organization, but a meeting between them could not be arranged outside the presence of
other members of The Way. Her parents attempted to persuade Susan to sign an agreement
releasing them from liability for their actions, but Susan refused. After nearly sixteen days
of "deprogramming" Susan left the Morgel residence and returned to her fiancé and The
Way. Upon the direction of The Way ministry, she brought this action against her parents
for false imprisonment. Will Susan prevail? Explain.
Answer: False Imprisonment. Judgment for Mr. and Mrs. Jungclaus. "If a person is aware of a
reasonable means of escape that does not present a danger of bodily or material harm, a
restriction is not total and complete and does not constitute unlawful imprisonment." Also, a
person cannot recover damages for any period of detention to which she voluntarily
consents. For the final thirteen days of the sixteen-day period, Susan willingly remained in
the company of her parents. She also had several reasonable and safe opportunities to escape
while playing softball, roller skating, and taking her trip to Ohio. Given that the conditioning
of the cult may have impaired her free will prior to her "deprogramming," it is reasonable to
infer from her subsequent consent that she would have consented to the first three days'
detention if she had had her full capacity. Furthermore, parents may place limitations on
their adult child's mobility, if they have a good-faith, reasonable belief that the child's
judgmental capacity has been seriously affected by a cult and if she at some point assents to
the limitations. Thus, Susan's assent during the thirteen-day period relieved her parents of
liability for false imprisonment.
20. Debra Agis was a waitress in a restaurant owned by the Howard Johnson Company. On
May 23, Roger Dionne, manager of the restaurant, called a meeting of all waitresses at
which he informed them that "there was some stealing going on." Dionne also stated that
the identity of the party or parties responsible was not known and that he would begin firing
all waitresses in alphabetical order until the guilty party or parties were detected. He then
fired Debra Agis, who allegedly "became greatly upset, began to cry, sustained emotional
distress, mental anguish, and loss of wages and earnings." Mrs. Agis brought this complaint
against the Howard Johnson Company and Roger Dionne, alleging that the defendants
acted recklessly and outrageously, intending to cause emotional distress and anguish. The
defendants argued that damages for emotional distress are not recoverable unless physical
injury occurs as a result of the distress. Will Agis be successful on her complaint?
Answer: Infliction of Emotional Distress. Yes. An individual "who, by extreme and outrageous
conduct and without privilege, causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress even though no bodily harm may result." Mrs. Agis
successfully established the following four essential elements: (1) that the defendants
intended to cause emotional distress or that they knew or should have known that emotional
distress was likely to result from their conduct; (2) that the defendants' conduct was
"extreme and outrageous" and "beyond all possible bounds of decency;" (3) that the
defendants' actions caused Mrs. Agis's distress; and (4) that Mrs. Agis's emotional distress
was "severe" and such "that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it."
21. Pro Golf Manufacturing, Inc. is in the business of manufacturing and repairing golf
equipment as well as providing golf instruction. On September 27, the Tribune Review
Newspaper Company published a newspaper article stating that several historic buildings,
including the building containing Pro Golf’s business, were set for demolition. On February
18 of the following year, the Tribune Review published another newspaper article, stating
that the building containing Pro Golf’s business had been demolished. However, the
building containing Pro Golf’s business had neither been scheduled for demolition, nor had
it been demolished. Pro Golf seeks to recover for the financial loss that these false
publications caused. Explain which tort offers the best likelihood of recovery and what Pro
Golf would have to prove to recover.
Answer: Disparagement. This problem is based on Pro Golf Mfg. v. Tribune Review Newspaper,
809 A.2d 243 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2002). The tort that offers the best
likelihood of recovery would be disparagement (injurious falsehood) and Pro Golf would
have to prove:
(1) the statement is false; (2) the publisher either intends the publication to cause pecuniary
loss or reasonably should recognize that publication will result in pecuniary loss; (3)
pecuniary loss does in fact result; and (4) the publisher either knows that the statement is
false or acts in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 623(A) (1977).
ANSWERS TO “TAKING SIDES” PROBLEMS

Edith Mitchell, accompanied by her thirteen-year-old daughter, went through the checkout at
Walmart and purchased several items. As they exited, the Mitchells passed through an
electronic antitheft device, which sounded an alarm. Robert Canady, employed by Walmart as
a “people greeter” and security guard, forcibly stopped Edith Mitchell at the exit, grabbed
her bag, and told her to step back inside. The security guard never touched Edith or her
daughter and never threatened to touch either of them. Nevertheless, Edith Mitchell described
the security guard’s actions in her affidavit as “gruff, loud, rude behavior.” The security
guard removed every item Mitchell had just purchased and ran it through the security gate.
One of the items still had a security code unit on it, which an employee admitted could have
been overlooked by the cashier. When the security guard finished examining the contents of
Mitchell’s bag, he put it on the checkout counter. This examination of her bag took ten or
fifteen minutes. Once her bag had been checked, no employee of Walmart ever told Mitchell
she could not leave. Mitchell was never threatened with arrest. Mitchell brought a tort action
against Walmart.
(a) Explain on which torts should Mitchell base her claim against Walmart?
(b) What arguments would support Walmart denial of liability for these torts?
(c) Which party should prevail? Explain.
ANSWER:
(a) Mitchell could base her claim against Wal-Mart on false imprisonment, assault, battery,
defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
(b) Wal-Mart could deny liability base on a merchant’s conditional privilege to investigate a
suspected shoplifting.
(c) Answer: Wal-Mart should prevail. Mitchell v. Walmart Stores, Inc., Georgia Court of Appeals,
1996, 477 S.E.2d 631:
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2296695846303644766&q=477+S.e.2d+631&hl=e
n&as_sdt=2,34
The owner or operator of a mercantile establishment has the right to detain a person
reasonably suspected of shoplifting. The cause of detention must be “established by
competent evidence” and must be reasonable in length of time. In the case of an
establishment utilizing an anti-shoplifting or inventory control device, the automatic
activation of the device as a result of a person exiting the protected area shall constitute
reasonable cause for the detention of the person.
The agent’s alleged rudeness is irrelevant, as his actions were clearly in response to the alarm,
establishing probable cause. The plaintiff's claims for false arrest are without merit. “[I]t
makes no difference to ‘reasonable cause’ whether or not employee negligence in failing to
deactivate the special tag set the device off. What matters is whether the method and time of
detention were reasonable within statutory limitations.”
Plaintiff was subjected to a ten- or fifteen-minute “detention” in the open, during which the
items in plaintiff's shopping bag were individually tested for the presence of the electronic
antitheft sensor and after which plaintiff's bag was returned to her and she was free to leave.
This procedure was reasonable. Causing embarrassment is not the same as unlawful
imprisonment. Although one might conclude that Wal-Mart exceeded its conditional
privilege by acting in an excessive manner, this court determined otherwise.
Similarly, there was no unlawful restraint either by force or fear here, as is necessary to
recover for false imprisonment. It follows that the trial court correctly granted defendant’s
motion for summary judgment.
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The Project Gutenberg eBook of In the name of Time
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
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Title: In the name of Time

a tragedy
Author: Michael Field
Release date: December 10, 2023 [eBook #72364]
Language: English
Original publication: London: The Poetry Workshop, 1919
Credits: Chuck Greif and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team

at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from
images generously made available by The Internet Archive)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK IN THE

NAME OF TIME ***
IN THE NAME OF TIME
PERSONS
ACT I., ACT II., ACT III., ACT IV., ACT V.
IN THE NAME OF TIME

OTHER WORKS BY MICHAEL FIELD
CALLIRRHOE 1884
FAIR ROSAMUND 1884 & 1897
THE TRAGIC MARY 1890
UNDERNEATH THE BOUGH 1893
THE WORLD AT AUCTION 1898
THE RACE OF LEAVES 1901
JULIA DOMNA 1903
BORGIA 1905
WILD HONEY 1908
QUEEN MARIAMNE 1908
THE ACCUSER 1911
THE TRAGEDY OF PARDON 1911
POEMS OF ADORATION 1912
MYSTIC TREES 1913
DEDICATED 1914
DEIRDRE 1918
IN THE
NAME OF TIME
A
TRAGEDY
BY
MICHAEL
FIELD
THE POETRY BOOKSHOP

35 DEVONSHIRE ST. THEOBALDS RD.
LONDON W.C.
MCMXIX
IN THE NAME OF TIME:

A TRAGEDY
“In the Name of Time.”—The Winter’s Tale, iv, I, chorus.
ἅπανθ᾽ ὁ μακρὸς κἀναρίθμητος χρόνος

φύει τ᾽ ἄδηλα καὶ φανέντα κρύπτεται:
κοὐκ ἔστ᾽ ἄελπτον οὐδέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἁλίσκεται
χὠ δεινὸς ὅρκος χαἰ περισκελεῖς φρένες.
Sophocles—Ajax 646.
Quoted from R. C. Trevelyan’s Translation on the Cover.

PERSONS
Chilperic King of the Franks.
Carloman } { Sons of Charles Martel,
Pepin } { Consuls and Mayors of the Palace.
Marcomir A Frankish Count.
Rachis King of the Lombards.
Astolph His brother.
Zacharias The Pope.
Damiani An Italian Bishop.
Boniface A Missionary Saint.
Geneviva Wife to Carloman.
Cardinals, Nobles, Monks, Servants.
IN THE NAME OF TIME

A TRAGEDY
ACT I.
Scene: Paris. A Hall in the Royal Palace.
Carloman is pacing backward and forward: he pauses by a crucifix set
up at the further end of the hall.
CARLOMAN.
Thou sayest truly that I am—a King

He said Who laid His life down on the Cross:
So will I be, a King. I will possess
The great reality. I war and govern,
I can strike hard as Charles the Hammerer;
Men say I have my father’s qualities,
And in the brief months of my sovereignty
The infidel has recognised my blood:
But this is nothing! Phantom-Emperors
Have made the throne phantasmal. I have felt
In Zacharias, the great Pope, a force
That spreads like spring across the world. No more
Will I be petty marshal to a crew
That hack and murder, while the royal faces
Of wandering martyrs scintillate and thrill.
There is a glorious Betterness at work
Amid the highways and the solitudes;
I would be with it—in obscurity,
No matter!—with the river as it shapes
Its cisterns in the hills or where the wind
First draws its silver volumes to a voice:
Behind, at the beginning, from within:
A cry, a pang—what shall respond to it,
Who help me? I have fiery thoughts of God,
I would attempt Him. In the wilderness
Maybe He will unbosom.
[Enter a Servant.]
SERVANT.
The Archbishop
Of Mentz would see you.
CARLOMAN.
Blessèd Boniface!
He brings me my enfranchisement.
[As Boniface enters the Servant withdraws.]
Great Angel,
My spirit leaps within me to be born,
Beholding you.
BONIFACE.
My son, the Holy Father

Receives you joyously.
CARLOMAN.
[kissing Boniface] To go to God

Living, unscathed, to give Him everything
One has, to pour one’s soul into His lap,
To let Him play upon one as the wind,
To feel His alternations ...!
BONIFACE.
Carloman,
Your childlike transport shall be surely blessed:
Yet in the convent there are bitter hours
Of exile from God’s presence, penances—
CARLOMAN.
But will they choke my solitude with prayers?
BONIFACE.
The holy brethren chant in unison

For hours within the chapel; there is buzz
About the cloister like a hive of bees.
CARLOMAN.
There have been hermits! Might I live alone,

I could breathe unrepiningly the while
It pleased God to keep silence. I would tame
Some wistful, kingly beast to roam with me,
And we would wait His pleasure. Boniface,
Oh, tell me of His coming! It is plain
He has been with you—You became His friend?
BONIFACE.
His servant rather.
CARLOMAN.
That I cannot be;
I am a Knight free-born; I come as those
Great nobles of the East, and all my service
Is adoration. You may have some converts,
Brute-tribes, who give allegiance to His name,
As those who do not speak the Emperor’s tongue
May rank his subjects. I am not of these.
BONIFACE.
Thou speakest truth, my son; there are some souls

Loved of the Lord as Paul in Araby
With whom one must not meddle. In good time
You will exalt the Church; meanwhile your brother
Who has a tighter grip of circumstance
Than you—
CARLOMAN.
He is short-sighted, politic,
External in his bent. I lead the charge
In battle, I foresee the combinations
Of foreign forces; he is good at siege,
And all the hectoring process of delay.
He is not like my father. That great fight
At Tours! I feel the onslaught in my blood;
It never can run sluggish.
BONIFACE.
Had you seen

King Chilperic’s flower-wreathed waggon in the street!—
You should have looked a last time on the world
Ere you renounced it.
CARLOMAN.
Scanned the heir of Clovis

Drawn like a senseless idol in his car!
You judge unworthily. God bade me come
Up higher to Him on a battlefield
Where I was victor. It was in the night—
I moved about among my sleeping men,
I heard them shout for triumph in their dreams:
It was enough!
BONIFACE.
Yes, all is vanity;

The pride of life, its splendour, vanitas!
CARLOMAN.
There is no vanity in life; life utters

Unsparing truth to us,—there is no line
Or record in our body of her printing
That stamps a falsehood. Do not so confound,
Father, life’s transience and sincerity.
What makes the show out in the streets so vile
Is that it blazons forth the lie that youth,
Kingship and power are ineffectual.
A show of death where life should radiate
Is vanity. And if I now fling off
The honourable titles of my state,
Consul and Patriarch, it is not because
I have not nobly borne them; by my sword
The Church has been defended, and the corn
That bows in shocks about your monasteries
Bows down above the battlefields I won.
You misconceive.
BONIFACE.
A sweep of piety
Beyond my censure! [half-aside] Will he thrive at Rome?
CARLOMAN.
Why should you look so fearful? I have chosen

The path of life, choosing to be a monk,
And I have wisely chosen.
BONIFACE.
Ah, beloved!
CARLOMAN.
Now I must face my brother. Would he come

By chance! I dare not crave a conference.
I am arrested at the lips if ever
We speak of anything beyond affairs.
He will not understand—at least to-day,
When fresh from the procession of that cursed
Do-nothing Chilperic.
BONIFACE.
Set your purpose forth

At once, and let him freely misconceive:
You must not cloud for that.
CARLOMAN.
These mighty thoughts,
Mingled with God, how put them to the shame
Of the world’s censure! What you call my soul
Flees as a shy girl that escapes pursuit.
BONIFACE.
Take your shame meekly. Do not let your eyes

Grow wild and hostile!
[Boniface, who has seen Pepin approaching, withdraws to the back of the
hall, stands before the Crucifix in mute prayer, and then passes out, looking
back at the brothers. Pepin is a short, stout man, with florid complexion and
much vehemence of manner. He wipes the perspiration from his face and
addresses Carloman without looking at him.]
PEPIN.
Woden, what a sight!

This Chilperic is an idol that the people
No longer worship as his car rolls on.
Contempt, indifference! A few more months
Will rid us of the calf. We pull together
In right good part, fraternal, taking pride
Each in the other’s excellence: ere long
The Pope will pour his oil upon our heads
To nourish our short curls.
CARLOMAN.
He has the power

Of making Kings?
PEPIN.
Liutbrand the Lombard winced
Before him and resigned the Exarchite:
And he who can impoverish may endow.
CARLOMAN.
[with a sudden movement]

Pepin, we have not looked upon the face
Of Zacharias: I am bound for Rome.
PEPIN.
A pilgrimage? Stay where you are! Tut, tut!

Wait till he seek us. Frankland is his hope
Against the Lombard: when he seeks us then
We twain will offer him our dutiful,
Strong swords, and keep St. Peter’s realm intact;
While, in return, that gracious influence,
That something that we lack to give our strength
Supremacy, shall be poured down on us.
CARLOMAN.
Something we lack! I dream of a possession—

Pepin, the world if I became a monk
Would recognise that I lay down my rights,
None wrests them from me.
PEPIN.
Are you clean gone mad!
Become a monk, you, Consul, Patriarch!
Our mother had been Christian scarce a year
Before your birth, and haply took the priest
Too much into her privacy. By Thor—
CARLOMAN.
[taking him by the throat]

No, but by God Incarnate, you shall swear
You own me son of Christendom’s great guard
Ere you again draw unimperilled breath!
I, Carloman, your elder, the first-born
Of Charles Martel, of my own choice renounce
My portion in his honours. Own my birthright!
PEPIN.
Plague take you!
CARLOMAN.
Own it!
PEPIN.
Give a fellow breath,
Don’t ...
You have your father’s temper, that’s the test!
I loved you as a boy and set my teeth
Against a rare, sweet craziness that takes you
In certain moods—you need a keeper then:
You need one now. Hold fast your birthright, man;
Don’t trust me with temptation. Geneviva
Will relish this new folly less than I—
Chuck her beneath the chin and threaten her
With your design! She is too young a widow
For me to govern.
CARLOMAN.
[apart] Deaf down to the soul!
PEPIN.
That flush across your forehead like a scar

At mention of your wife! Her lovers!—Think
If you withdrew protection....
CARLOMAN.
Purity,
In woman the ideal and the dream,
Has its firm seat amid the altitudes
Of manhood’s nature—There alone are seats
Of holy contemplation, sexless thoughts,
Love that in God finds goal, a loneliness
That truth, not sympathy, can cure. ’Tis vain
The hope that woman, made to minister
To momentary passion, can provide
Solace and inspiration to her mate.
She breeds no hope; she cannot offer us
A clime for our ideals and our dreams,
Or plant a footstep soft as memory’s
Across futurity’s unimpressed sands.
PEPIN.
You speak from fact, I own.

But Boniface,
What does he say?
CARLOMAN.
He aids me.
PEPIN.
[slapping him on the shoulder] Carloman,

’Twould be cold work without you.
CARLOMAN.
But my son——
PEPIN.
Nay, nay, no substitute! You are my brother,
I know the secret how to humour you,
I weave your projects in our policy,
And now and then you marshal us the way
Of an archangel ... but no substitute!
CARLOMAN.
Yet love him for my sake; give him free training

In war and letters.
PEPIN.
Fie, fie! Geneviva

Will put you from this project. In the cloister
What would you see but men who dig and pray?—
No royal pageants.
[King Chilperic is borne in a litter with great pomp. His golden hair
sweeps over the sides of the litter; his face is nerveless and exhausted.]
CARLOMAN.
[with an ironic smile] Such as this. The King!

Tell him I have transferred the Mayoralty
To you, and do not taunt me any more.
PEPIN.
[to Chilperic]
Sire, you are weary, yet we crave the grace
Of a brief audience.
CHILPERIC.
Business! I can brook
No more of these distractions. Your good brother
Relieves me of all business. I can hear
Scarcely the people’s clamour when they shout,
And I am shy at facing them. To know
There is a god indifferent to its whims
Gives the world courage of its natural awe;
So I expose these curls; that duty done,
Leave me at ease, an idol in his niche.
PEPIN.
But, sire, my brother has persuaded me,

If you consent, to take on me his burthens,
His duties and his honours; being summoned,
He holds, by God to a monastic life.
CHILPERIC.
[with passing animation]

This interests us. After so brief a term
Of dignity! But I applaud his sense:
The convent is a place for peace of mind;
One has no interruption, one may watch
The gold-fish in the fountain half a day,
If so one will; and, though the prayers are long,
One grows accustomed to them as to meals
And looks for their recurrence.
[suspiciously] But, my Consul,
With you it cannot be the luxury
Of doing nothing that attracts. For us
It is the happy and predestined lot;
But for an untamed youth whose pleasures still
Are running in the current of his blood,
Such choice is of ill-omen.

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Cases in This Chapter

*** Chapter Outcome ***

7-1 HARM TO THE PERSON

7-1c False Imprisonment

7-1d Infliction of Emotional Distress

7-2 HARM TO RIGHT OF DIGNITY

DECISION Judgment for Buck affirmed.

*** Chapter Outcome ***

*** Chapter Outcome ***

7-2b Invasion of Privacy

DECISION Judgment reversed.

7-2c Misuse of Legal Procedure

*** Chapter Outcome ***

7-3 HARM TO PROPERTY

7-3b Personal Property

7-4 HARM TO ECONOMIC INTERESTS

*** Chapter Outcome ***

7-4a Interference with Contractual Relations

DECISION Judgment of trial court affirmed.

ETHICAL QUESTION Did Getty or Texaco act unethically? Explain.

7-4c Fraudulent Misrepresentation

ETHICAL DILEMMA DISCUSSION

Social Policy and Ethical Considerations

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS AND CASE PROBLEMS

to personal property, an intentional dispossession or unauthorized use of another’s property.

ANSWERS TO “TAKING SIDES” PROBLEMS

Title: In the name of Time

Author: Michael Field

Release date: December 10, 2023 [eBook #72364]

Original publication: London: The Poetry Workshop, 1919

Credits: Chuck Greif and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK IN THE

IN THE NAME OF TIME

THE POETRY BOOKSHOP

IN THE NAME OF TIME:

“In the Name of Time.”—The Winter’s Tale, iv, I, chorus.

ἅπανθ᾽ ὁ μακρὸς κἀναρίθμητος χρόνος

Quoted from R. C. Trevelyan’s Translation on the Cover.

IN THE NAME OF TIME

Thou sayest truly that I am—a King

[As Boniface enters the Servant withdraws.]

My son, the Holy Father

[kissing Boniface] To go to God

But will they choke my solitude with prayers?

The holy brethren chant in unison

There have been hermits! Might I live alone,

His servant rather.

Thou speakest truth, my son; there are some souls

Had you seen

Scanned the heir of Clovis

Yes, all is vanity;

There is no vanity in life; life utters

Why should you look so fearful? I have chosen

Now I must face my brother. Would he come

Set your purpose forth

Take your shame meekly. Do not let your eyes

Woden, what a sight!

He has the power

[with a sudden movement]

A pilgrimage? Stay where you are! Tut, tut!

* Chapter Outcome *

* Chapter Outcome *

* Chapter Outcome *

* Chapter Outcome *

* Chapter Outcome *