Glencore Coal Assets Australia Fatal Hazard Protocols Operations and Projects Effective April 2017

OCH.507.001.
0107
COAL ASSETS
AUSTRALIA
FATAL
HAZARD
PROTOCOLS
OPERATIONS AND PROJECTS
Effective: April 2017

Version: 1.0
Owner: GCAA Chief Operating Officer
Doc ID: GCAA-625378177-13287
Uncontrolled unless viewed on the Intranet

OCH.507.001.0108
Δ
CONTENTS
Δ Δ7
Background Inadequate
energy isolation
Δ1
Strata failure Δ8
Working at
Δ2 height
Fire and explosion
Δ9
Δ3 Lifting and
Mobile equipment cranage
Δ4 Δ10
Inappropriate Confined space
emergency response and irrespirable
noxious atmosphere
Δ5
Inrush and outburst Δ11
Tyre and
Δ6 rim
Explosives management
and shotfiring
Δ12
Electrical safety
SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols

OCH.507.001.0109
Δ
INTRODUCTION
Commitment to SafeCoal
We are absolutely committed to making
SafeCoal a reality and this can only be
achieved with the combined commitment
of every member of our team and other
relevant stakeholders.
SafeCoal can only be as effective as the
commitment we make to implementing
these protocols whilst continuing to be
vigilant regarding the health and safety of
ourselves and others.
SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols

OCH.507.001.0110
Δ0
BACKGROUND
Background Scope
A review of our recent fatalities, These Protocols apply to Glencore Coal Assets
Australia (GCAA) managed activities, Operations,
high potential risk incidents (HPRIs) sites and facilities, including new acquisitions
and serious incidents identified the and exploration, through all phases of projects,
need for an intervention program to construction, demolition, operation to closure, and
eliminate fatalities and improve our where applicable, post closure activities.
health and safety performance. This These Protocols apply to employees, contractors
program is called SafeCoal and one of and visitors who may be involved in controlled
activities.
its main initiatives is to focus on fatal
hazards. Structure of the Protocols
As a result of these reviews, a number of fatal The structure of the Fatal Hazard Protocols
hazard protocols (Protocols) have been developed includes:
that establish minimum requirements for the man- 1 General Mandatory Requirements (Section 0).
agement of these hazards consistently across our These requirements are to be applied to each
business. These Protocols also provide a number of the Protocols.
of additional expectations (Further Considerations)
that Operations are to consider as part of their con- 2 Individual Fatal Hazard Protocols:
tinual improvement and good practice initiatives.
a) Intent – provides the intent of the protocol.
These Protocols have not been developed to b) Mandatory Requirements – are to be
replace or override local health and safety legis- applied by each Operation, unless it can
lation, or associated legislation and other external be clearly demonstrated and agreed that a
requirements. The content and intent of these particular risk does not exist.
Protocols is to provide minimum requirements.
c) Further Considerations – are to be
The development team reviewed the catastrophic, considered, and if not applied then a
significant, and major hazards that were identi- justification is to be provided.
fied in the various Operations’ Broad Brush Risk
Assessment (BBRAs), the HPRIs, Industry Safety Assurance
Alerts, and the health and safety legislation that Assurance activities are to be conducted as de-
currently exists across the relevant jurisdictions, as tailed in GCAA Standard HSEC – Assurance.
well as other relevant information, including good
industry practice. Operations should be undertaking their own assur-
ance and verification processes from time to time
Context to satisfy themselves that the protocols are being
implemented and maintained, and the require-
It should be acknowledged that these Protocols
ments are being met.
may not represent all of the fatal hazards that
may exist or be faced by our operations, but the A self-assessment tool is available for Operations
outcomes do focus attention on the hazards that to use to internally track and monitor compliance
have resulted in recent fatalities and high potential against these Protocols.
risk incidents.
Variation to the Protocols
The other hazards and associated risks are
being, or will be, addressed through existing risk Deviation from any of the mandatory requirements
management processes, in accordance with GCAA will require formal approval from the General
Standard FIN - Risk Management. Manager – Health, Safety and Training, and the
relevant Operational Director.
SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols Version: 1.0

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OCH.507.001.0111
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BACKGROUND
Continued
General Mandatory Requirements ►► Developing a risk prioritised treatment plan.

All employees and contractors are to be fully aware ►► Identifying training needs for relevant employ-
of the specific fatal hazards in their direct workplac- ees, contractors, and visitors regarding each of
es and be trained and competent to manage the the Protocols.
risks associated with these hazards. To achieve Do – Develop, implement, and maintain processes,
this: controls, and communication strategies, as appro-
►► Operating and project teams at each Operation priate, to meet the requirements of these Protocols.
(eg longwall, development, pre-strip, drill and This includes:
blast, CHPP, maintenance and projects) are to ►► Implementing and maintaining the management
identify their respective fatal hazards. plans, procedures or permit systems.
►► A risk management approach is to be under- ►► Providing training and refresher training to rel-
taken so that robust control mechanisms (hard evant employees and contractors, as identified
barriers, systems and procedures) are in place; in the training needs analysis, refer to GCAA
►► All employees and contractors are to be trained Standard HSEC - Training.
in understanding fatal hazards and their con- ►► Assessing the training learning outcomes to
trols. verify competence.
►► All employees and contractors are to under- Check – Develop, implement, and maintain a
stand their role in controlling the fatal hazards to monitoring program to measure and review com-
protect themselves and their fellow workers. pliance with the Protocols and effectiveness of the
►► Managers and supervisors are to have the controls. This includes:
control of fatal hazards as part of their job ►► Conducting internal audits, reviews, and/or self
description. assessments to monitor compliance with the
►► The Field Visible Safety Leadership Program is Protocols requirements against a predetermined
to be implemented at each site. Refer to GCAA monitoring program.
Standard HSEC - Leadership, Culture and Act – Analyse outcomes of monitoring programs,
Accountability. including audit outcomes, and identify areas for
In achieving this, Operations and projects are re- continual improvement and maintenance of man-
quired to implement and maintain the requirements agement plans, procedures and permit systems.
of these Protocols into their operational HSEC This includes:
management systems. ►► Recording outcomes and feedback into the
This should follow the Plan, Do, Check, Act Pro- Operation’s risk management process, plans,
cess: procedures and permit systems.
Plan – Identify and develop processes and con- ►► Using the change management process for
trols to meet the requirements of these Protocols, significant planned and unplanned changes, as
considering relevant legal and other external detailed in GCAA Standard HSEC - Change.
requirements. This includes: ►► Implementing and maintaining documentation in
►► Conducting appropriate documented risk as- accordance with document control processes,
sessments for each of the Protocols. refer to GCAA Standard HSEC – Documents
and Records.
►► Documenting the outcomes of the risk assess-
ments. The importance of effective risk and change
management processes, particularly the risk as-
►► Developing a management plan, procedure, sessment, is fundamental to achieving the desired
system (e.g. permit system) and/or other formal outcome of the Protocols.
risk control process, as appropriate, that iden-
tifies the individual controls and their effective- Operations are to consult relevant local legislation,
ness that are adopted to eliminate or manage standards, codes and additional external require-
the risks. ments, as appropriate, when implementing the
requirements of the Protocol.
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OCH.507.001.0112
Δ1
STRATA FAILURE
Intent 1.1.3 A strata failure risk assessment is to be

conducted and documented to identify and
The intent of this Protocol is to assess strata-related risks. A Strata Failure
eliminate or minimise potential Management Plan is to be developed,
implemented and maintained to eliminate,
fatalities, injuries and incidents or control the risks.
arising from risks related to a strata
1.1.4 The Strata Failure Management Plan is
failure event in an underground and to include the following minimum require-
or surface environment. ments:
Mandatory Requirements a) Appropriate factors of safety in the mine
and pillar design.
1.1 General
1.1.1 Geotechnical/geological surveys and b) Inspection, monitoring and surveys
analysis of the conditions likely to be including the type and frequency
encountered including the presence of requirements.
any faults, dykes and other geological c) Assessment and mapping of changing
features is to be conducted. geotechnical and/or geological
1.1.2 The risk assessment is to, as a mini- conditions.
mum, give consideration to the following d) Support rules or surface slope stability
matters: rules.
a) Mine design, layout and plans; e) Trigger Action Response Plans (TARP)
b) Strata failure modes; that define risk based response to
manage or react to changes.
c) Existing and proposed support
systems and design criteria; f) Rules and/or controls to prohibit
personnel from working under
d) Exposure of personnel to strata unsupported roof and rules to control
failures; and access when required to work in close
e) Potential windblast conditions/events. proximity to a highwall or other slope
stability hazard.
.·
--
.•
-
--
~-. ' ....
-.,. ~•~ --
~-
."t I I
I I I ;:
I I I I

OCH.507.001.0113
Δ1
STRATA FAILURE
Continued
g) Identification of training needs of 1.3 Surface

relevant employees and contractors 1.3.1 The Surface Strata Failure Management
in relation to strata management and Plan is to include the following require-
failure, and the provision of adequate ments:
training and assessment to verify
competency. a) Controls to manage the stability of
highwalls, low walls, overburden dumps
1.1.5 Records are to be maintained of data and and benches.
calculations used in the development of
mine designs and Strata Failure Manage- b) Controls to be established following the
ment Plans. assessment of the stability of the ground
and materials that are to be stored in
1.1.6 The Strata Failure Management Plan is to
stockpiles.
be reviewed annually by a third party expert
and/or following the reporting and investiga- c) Provision controls (e.g. berms) so that
tion of any significant strata failure event. any falling material will not expose
1.2 Underground personnel or equipment to undue risk.
1.2.1 The Underground Strata Failure Man- d) Provision of adequate controls (e.g.
agement Plan is to include the following berms) to prevent personnel and
requirements: equipment being exposed to edge
failure.
a) Development of controls following the
assessment of the stability of roadways e) Controls to manage the impacts
and work areas. of subsidence from augering and
underground mining activities.
b) Development of support measures that
provide stability including maximum f) Controls to manage the stability of
roadway width and minimum dimensions the walls or sides of an excavation or
of coal pillars. trench.
c) Maximum distance roadways can be g) Management of railway cuttings which
advanced before support is installed. are the responsibility of the operation,
including design, maintenance and
d) Additional support required when inspection.
carrying out work in areas above normal
1.4 Further Considerations
operating height dimensions.
1.4.1 Where applicable to the Operation, or a
e) Adequate controls to manage surface risk is identified, consider the use of the
subsidence impacts relating to health following equipment or processes:
and safety of employees, contractors
and/or the general public. a) Using real time strata movement
detection systems for both underground
f) Installation of strata monitoring devices
and open cut mines e.g. radar for
based on risk.
monitoring and trending highwall and
g) Frequency and method of testing low wall movements; longwall face
rock bolts, cables and other support pressures for detection of roof weighting
elements for effectiveness. events.
h) Inspections of strata conditions and b) Using benches for surface operations.
strata support in:
►►Active and accessible workplaces. Notes:
►►Shafts, declines, access ramps, Application of this Protocol is to be read with
airways, escape ways, etc. the General Mandatory Requirements outlined
►►Other sections, e.g. workshops, in Section 0 (Background) of this Fatal Hazard
fuelling areas, storage locations, crib Protocol.
rooms, and similar.

OCH.507.001.0114
Δ2
FIRE AND EXPLOSION
Intent 2.1.6 Inspection, testing, calibration and mainte-

nance of fire and explosion detection and
The intent of this Protocol is to monitoring systems in compliance with the
eliminate or minimise potential manufacturers specifications and the Glen-
core Coal Guideline CA HSEC GDL 0018 -
fatalities, injuries and incidents arising Mining Equipment Fire System Guideline.
from risks related to unplanned or
2.1.7 Permit system or process for use whenever
uncontrolled fire or explosion. a fire or explosion detection, monitoring or
Mandatory Requirements suppression system is off line.
2.1 General 2.1.8 Display up-to-date copies of the Fire Fight-

ing Control Plans (i.e. showing the location
2.1.1 A fire and explosion related risk assess- of fire equipment, hydrants, etc.) in promi-
ment is to be conducted and documented nent locations, e.g. control rooms, muster
to identify the potential hazards and risks. A areas, crib rooms, supervisor stations,
Fire and Explosion Management Plan is to office areas, etc.
be developed, implemented and main-
tained. 2.1.9 Register of fire monitoring, detection,
suppression, fire fighting and emergency
2.1.2 As a minimum, the risk assessment is to response/rescue equipment.
give consideration to:
2.1.10 Procedures that clearly define the actions
a) Sources of ignition. to be taken on discovering a fire or an
b) The presence of combustible material. explosion risk e.g. elevated gas levels.
c) The presence of explosive gases and 2.1.11 a) A hot work permit system whenever
atmospheres. personnel are required to conduct hot
work outside of a designated hot work
d) The storage of incompatible substances. area; (refer to GCAA Permit HSEC –
2.1.3 The Fire and Explosion Management Plan Hot Work (surface)).
is to, as a minimum, include the following
requirements: b) A hot work permit is not required in
a designated hot work area, except
a) Fire and explosion prevention. where an area is deemed hazardous
b) Fire and explosion control. (within 15 metres of flammable liquids,
vapours, gases, combustible liquids,
c) Fire fighting equipment, including the
dusts or fibres, or other flammable
availability of an adequate water supply.
or explosive substances are present
d) The Fire and Explosion Management including equipment with fuel in the
Plan is to reference other applicable tank or exposed hydraulic areas).
related management plans e.g. 2.1.12 Where hot work is carried out in a hazard-
spontaneous combustion and dust ous area (including mobile or fixed plant
suppression. and structures which meet the definition)
2.1.4 Installation of fire and explosion detection/ it is mandatory that a fire watcher be
monitoring systems commensurate to the stationed in the area of the hot work to
fire and explosion related risk in appropriate continuously monitor the job during the hot
locations and/or on relevant items of plant work for a minimum of 2 hours (and up to 4
and equipment, e.g. heat or smoke detec- hours, dependent upon the risk after task
tors, gas detection systems, gas, foam or completion). The role of the fire watcher is
water deluge systems, explosion suppres- to continuously monitor for a fire outbreak
sion systems, hydrants and hoses, portable and is not to be given other duties or leave
fire extinguishers, etc. the location unless replaced. The fire
watcher time may be reduced to 30 minutes
2.1.5 Installation of continuous monitoring sys- where a thermographic camera is used to
tems capable of monitoring the status of the detect presence of heat and that no ignition
fire and explosion risk. source remains. Cameras are to be proper-

OCH.507.001.0115
Δ2
FIRE AND EXPLOSION
Continued
ly calibrated, maintained and operated by a

competent person.
2.1.13 Where an explosion risk is present, the
Operational Engineering Management Plan
is to contain standards for the purchase,
installation, commissioning, use and
maintenance of equipment (e.g. flameproof/
intrinsically safe electrical equipment and
diesel engines).
2.1.14 Where there is a risk of spontaneous
combustion, frictional ignition or high levels
of methane being present, issue specific
processes are to be developed, implement-
ed and maintained for each of the hazards.
2.1.15 Identification of training needs of relevant
employees and contractors in relation to
fire and explosion, and the provision of
adequate training and assessment to verify
competency.
2.1.16 Inspection, testing, calibration and mainte-
nance of fire and explosion and detection
and monitoring systems in compliance with
manufacturer’s specifications.
2.1.17 Specific competency is to be assessed
before working on explosion protected d) Appointment of competent persons to
equipment. monitor and take action when an alarm
2.2 Underground is triggered.
2.2.1 Ignition of gases and coal dust in under- e) Maintenance of a record of alarm
ground coal mines can be initiated by events.
electrical arcing, lightning, frictional ignition, f) An inspection regime for monitoring
spontaneous combustion or fire. A docu- gas levels in intake and return airways,
mented technical assessment (including sealed areas and work areas.
sampling and laboratory testing) is to be
made for the seam gas content, frictional g) Installation of methane monitors on coal
ignition potential, and spontaneous com- cutting machinery and either installed or
bustion potential. carried on diesel vehicles operating in
hazardous zones.
2.2.2 Where a flammable gas risk exists, the
controls are to include: h) Installation of ventilation structures, e.g.
stoppings and seals, that are designed
a) A real time gas monitoring system that and constructed to a standard that is
monitors concentrations of gases in commensurate to the risk potential.
return airways and ventilation splits.
i) A Ventilation Management Plan and
b) A tube bundle system for monitoring gas appropriate procedures to demonstrate
concentrations in sealed or abandoned that adequate ventilation is provided
areas of the mine. to remove, dilute and control explosive
c) Setting of threshold levels for the levels of mine gases.
monitoring of gases.

OCH.507.001.0116
Δ2
FIRE AND EXPLOSION
Continued
j) Electrical equipment that is designed, drums are maintained to an appropriate

approved, installed, used, inspected and standard.
maintained to operate safely within a d) Ventilation to the cutting area to remove
hazardous zone. or dilute the accumulation of methane.
k) The prohibition of smoking, smoking e) Appropriate gas fire extinguishing
related products, or any non-approved equipment maintained in close proximity
tool or other device capable of creating of the face.
a spark or flame, which is able to ignite
flammable gas. f) Face cutting procedures that minimise
the risk of frictional ignition, particularly
2.2.3 Where a coal dust risk exists, the controls around the intersection of methane
are to include:
drainage holes.
a) The minimisation of coal dust generated g) Roof/rib bolting procedures that
from the cutting, transport and transfer minimise the risk of frictional ignition,
of coal through the use of water particularly over-spinning or heat
suppression and/or scrubber systems generation in or near the roof/rib.
and the design of equipment.
2.2.5 Where a spontaneous combustion risk
b) The removal of accumulations of coal exists, the controls are to include:
dust.
a) A real time gas monitoring system that
c) Procedures and methods for the monitors concentrations of gases in
application of stone dust, or another return airways and ventilation splits.
explosion inhibitor, in quantities that will
prevent the propagation of an explosion b) A tube bundle system for monitoring gas
initiated at any location in the mine. concentrations in sealed or abandoned
areas of the mine.
d) The means by which the stone dust, or
other explosion inhibitor, is to be applied c) The analysis of bag samples using gas
to surfaces in the return roadways, in chromatograph.
close proximity to the working faces, d) Trigger Action Response Plans
and intake and return roadways. (TARPs) for indicators of spontaneous
e) Procedures and methods for the combustion.
examination, sampling and testing e) A procedure for managing stowage
of roadway dust. The methods around a mine.
for sampling are to incorporate a f) A procedure to manage spontaneous
combination of spot and strip samples combustion in the relevant areas of the
taken over set frequencies of time mine, including sealing and inertisation.
depending on location.
2.2.6 Where a risk from lightning initiated gas
2.2.4 Where a frictional ignition risk exists, the ignition exists, the controls are to include:
controls are to include:
a) Completion of a lightning risk
a) The verification that the drums and picks assessment with the involvement of a
used on cutting machines are designed subject matter expert.
to eliminate or minimise the potential of
a frictional ignition event. b) The risk assessment is to consider the
following:
b) The use of adequate water sprays for
suppressing any sparking associated ►►The electrical resistivity of the strata
at the operation.
with cutting.
c) An inspection and maintenance program ►►Conductive boreholes that enter
that demonstrates the effectiveness of the workings are to be assessed for
location and application.
the water sprays and that the picks and

OCH.507.001.0117
Δ2
FIRE AND EXPLOSION
Continued
c) A Lightning Management Plan is transformer compounds, conveyor

required. As a minimum it is to: systems, hazardous goods storage
►►Document all possible connection areas, fuel depots, offices and other
points. buildings.
►►Undertake lightning mitigation studies b) Providing fire and explosion information
on mine infrastructure such as (e.g. copy of the fire plan, dangerous
conveyors, pipelines, communications goods information) at the entrance to
cables, power cables that enter the the site.
mine via standard portals. c) Identifying machine or installation
►►Prohibit shot firing during times of components that could cause a fire or
high lightning activity. explosion, e.g. turbo chargers, lack of
segregation of ignition sources from fuel
►►Require removal of conductive sources, cables, fuel lines and hydraulic
elements from sealed areas that are
hoses clamped to reduce chaffing and
longer than 20m.
other damage, etc.; and if appropriate
2.3 Further Considerations modify the equipment to minimise the
2.3.1 Where applicable to the Operation, or a risk.
risk is identified, consider the use of the
following equipment or processes: Notes:
a) Installing both fire detection and fire In the context of fire and explosion, the term
suppression systems (deluge, water, ‘Fixed Plant’ includes buildings, structures and
chemical, gas etc.) on major mobile fixed installations, and the term ‘Mobile Plant
equipment, Motor Control Centres Equipment’ includes items of medium and
(MCC), electrical sub stations, heavy mobile machinery, but excludes dragline
buckets, jewellery or dragline boom work.
Application of this Protocol is to be read with

the General Mandatory Requirements outlined
in Section 0 (Background) of this Fatal Hazards
Protocols Document.

OCH.507.001.0118
Δ3
MOBILE EQUIPMENT
Intent h) The operation of the mobile plant and

equipment on roadways where the
The intent of this Protocol is to condition of the roadways may adversely
eliminate or minimise potential affect safety, e.g. wet roads, steep
fatalities, injuries and incidents arising grades.
from risks related to mobile plant and i) The loading and unloading of the mobile
equipment. plant and equipment, including the
security and stability of the load and the
Mandatory Requirements precautions to be taken in the tipping of
coal or stone.
3.1 General
j) The interaction of heavy and light mobile
3.1.1 A risk assessment is to be conducted and
documented to identify the risks associat- plant and equipment. An analysis is
ed with the interaction of heavy and light to be undertaken to determine where
vehicles and pedestrians. light vehicles and heavy mobile plant
and equipment can be separated
3.1.2 A Transport/Traffic Management Plan is to and implement appropriate controls,
be developed, implemented and main- particularly around workshops and
tained. As a minimum, it is to include: stockpiles.
a) Conditions (operational and k) Control measures to eliminate and
environmental) under which the mobile manage the interaction of people from
plant and equipment may be used. mobile plant and equipment whilst
b) That mobile plant and equipment is only moving including mine work areas, travel
to be used within its approved design roads, workshops and stockpile areas.
parameters. l) Where mobile plant and equipment is
c) The design and maintenance of to be left unattended, it is to be left in
roadways, including minimum a fundamentally stable condition e.g.
dimensions and conditions. through the use of chocking, ditches,
d) The maximum loads that may be trenches or with wheels turned towards
carried or towed by the mobile plant the wall. This is also to be applied
and equipment, whether by reference to to vehicles that are broken down or
weight, dimensions or other criteria. undergoing maintenance.
e) The maximum speeds at which the m) The safe refuelling of the mobile plant
mobile plant and equipment may and equipment.
operate. n) Interaction of mobile plant and
f) Steps to be taken by the operators equipment with fixed structures,
of the mobile plant and equipment to including overhead power lines,
demonstrate that the mobile plant and buildings, elevated structures, or bins.
equipment is safe for use, including o) Specific operational procedures
brake testing, pre-shift inspection and involving certain items of mobile plant
defect reporting. and equipment, e.g. haul trucks queuing
g) Measures to be taken when people at a loader, continuous miners and
are transported in the mobile plant or shuttle cars, etc.
equipment, including the segregation p) Road demarcation and signage.
of people from loads, the provision q) The establishment of designated parking
of seating, the wearing of seat belts, areas, to enable light vehicles to be
and the use of other operator restraint parked in a location, and/or, position that
devices. Where seat belts or other is separated from, and is clearly visible
restraint devices are installed they are
to be used.

OCH.507.001.0119
Δ3
MOBILE EQUIPMENT
Continued
to, the operators of the heavy mobile 3.2 Surface

plant and equipment. 3.2.1 The Surface Transport/Traffic Management
r) The wearing of high visibility clothing by Plan is to include the following require-
persons in operational areas. ments:
s) The installation of Roll Over Protection a) The establishment of design criteria for
System (ROPS) and Falling Object roadways that, as a minimum include:
Protection System (FOPS) on vehicles grade, curvature, line of sight, pavement
where the requirement has been shape, surface material, guideposts,
identified by risk assessment. safety berms or windrows, signs and
t) A stability survey to identify and assess barriers.
the stability related hazards and risks, b) The width of primary haul roads that
e.g. as it relates to LHD equipment carry two way traffic are to be at least
using quick detach systems, (QDS) three times the width of the widest
forklifts, scissor lifts and similar items of vehicle regularly using the road.
mobile plant and equipment. This is to c) The provision in roadway design criteria
be supported by training, signage, and for appropriate controls that prevent
other control initiatives or strategies to vehicles from falling or driving over
control identified risks and to, highlight edges.
the limitations of the mobile plant and
equipment. d) The construction and maintenance of
safety berms or windrows alongside
u) A procedure to stop the mobile plant or the edges of roadways where there is
equipment whenever a person boards or a sudden change in terrain, e.g. drop
dismounts. off, water body, or other hazard, and
v) The development, implementation the safety berms or windrows are to
and maintenance of an inspection and be constructed using suitable (solid)
maintenance program for mobile plant materials, and be of a height, density
and equipment. and profile so that they are capable of
w) The identification of training needs of acting as an effective barrier.
relevant employees and contractors e) The establishment of robust edge
in relation to mobile equipment. protection along the top of highwalls
The competency is to be based on or any other areas where there is a
relevant competency standards risk that a vehicle could drive over an
taking into account road licensing, unprotected edge.
Original Equipment Manufacturer f) A documented process for vehicles
(OEM) requirements, other recognised entering any area below a reject or coal
standards and include site rules and bin that will enable safe access, loading
procedures. and egress. The system is to prevent
x) Provision of adequate training and the cabin of the vehicle from entering
assessment to verify competency. the area under the bin, unless a Falling
y) The prohibition of the use of hand-held Object Protection System (FOPS) is
personal electronic devices (PEDs) installed over the cabin of the vehicles
when operating a vehicle. that can withstand and exceed potential
consequences (i.e. maximum weight
impact).
g) That mobile plant and equipment is to
be clearly and uniquely identified in
order to allow positive communication
between operators.

OCH.507.001.0120
Δ3
MOBILE EQUIPMENT
Continued
h) The provision of two way radios 3.3 Further Considerations - Surface

in mobile plant and equipment in 3.3.1 Where applicable to the Operation, or a
operational areas, and when personnel risk is identified, consider the use of the
are working on the ground at least one following equipment or processes:
member of the work party is to be in
possession of a two way radio. a) Implementing one way traffic in high
traffic areas, or installing centre safety
i) Positive communication is to be berms to eliminate, or at least minimise,
established (caller and receiver are to the potential for unwanted vehicle
identify the vehicles and clearly respond) interaction.
before any vehicle or person enters an
active work area, e.g. dragline or shovel/ b) Designing park up areas for one way
loader, or intends to overtake another traffic flow and segregated parking
vehicle, to verify that it is safe to do so. areas for heavy plant and equipment,
light vehicles and pedestrians. Park up
j) Rules for: areas should consider the use of spoon
►►Safe operation of vehicles including drains, humps (between front and rear
the verification of competencies and axles) or some other method to prevent
operator authorisation. uncontrolled movement of heavy
►►Safe travelling and parking distances. vehicles.
►►In pit refuelling. c) Spacing guideposts at distances
relative to the distance required to be
►►Vehicle visibility, i.e. the provision maintained between mobile vehicles.
of flashing lights, flags, reflective Colour reflectors should be used on
material. each side of the guidepost.
►►The safe movement of vehicles, i.e. d) Using collision avoidance and proximity
reversing alarms, use of horns to detection technology.
indicate vehicle operation, i.e. once
prior to starting the vehicle, twice e) Conducting a risk assessment to identify
before forward movement, three times blind spots on vehicles, LHDs etc. and
before reversing. where a risk exists implement controls
i.e. PAT, PDT and CAT.
k) The fitting of tilt switches and installation
of laminated glass, whilst making f) Providing advanced training such as
provision for a means of egress/ virtual reality (simulators) in safety
escape in the event of an emergency, aspects pertaining to the use and
and installation of oxygen generating interaction with mobile equipment.
self rescuers in dozers that operate on 3.4 Underground
stockpiles where there is a risk of falling 3.4.1 The Underground Transport/Traffic Man-
into a void. agement Plan is to include the following
l) Procedures for operating mobile plant requirements:
near sources of electricity and during a) When pedestrians cannot move to
electrical storms. a position of safety in a roadway the
vehicle is to stop, the operator is to
acknowledge the pedestrians presence
and allow the pedestrian to walk past
the vehicle before continuing.
b) Establishment of no-go zones.
c) Development, implementation and
maintenance of access, egress and
communication procedures for mobile
plant and equipment.

OCH.507.001.0121
Δ3
MOBILE EQUIPMENT
Continued
d) Procedures that prevent vehicles from c) Conducting a risk assessment of blind

entering or operating in methane rich spots on vehicles, and where the risk
atmospheres. exists implement controls i.e. PAT, PDT,
e) Requirement that personnel are not to and CAT.
be transported in work baskets, buckets, d) Providing advanced training such as
or other machinery not designed for the virtual reality (simulators) in safety
transport of personnel. aspects pertaining to the use and
3.5 Further Considerations - Underground interaction with mobile equipment.
risk is identified, consider the use of the Notes:
following equipment or processes:
a) Installing one way block lights for the General Mandatory Requirements outlined
intersections and drifts. in Section 0 (Background) of this Fatal Hazards
Protocols Document.
b) Using collision avoidance and proximity
detection technology.

OCH.507.001.0122
Δ4
INAPPROPRIATE
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Intent clearly signposted), and appropriate
transport and response vehicles.
The intent of this Protocol is to e) Effective and robust communication
eliminate or minimise potential devices and procedures for initial
fatalities, injuries and incidents arising notification of personnel of an
from risks related with inappropriate emergency situation, and for ongoing
response to an emergency situation. two-way communication during
emergency situations.
Mandatory Requirements f) Safe evacuation from all workplaces or
4.1 General other occupied spaces.
4.1.1 A risk assessment is to be conducted and g) Control of site access and restricting
documented to identify potential emergency re-entry to the affected areas.
situations. h) Clearly defined procedures for the
4.1.2 An Emergency Response Management reporting of emergencies, and/or for
Plan is to be developed, implemented and initiating an emergency response.
maintained. As a minimum, it is to include: i) Duty cards that clearly identify
a) Response(s) to, and containment of, each of the responsible person’s
identified emergency situations. duties, functions, and reporting
relationships,refer to GCAA HSEC –
b) Processes to minimise further injury, Incident Management Manual - Part 2
damage, or loss to rescuers or others. – Duty Cards and Task Cards.
c) Emergency response procedures, j) Communication with and involvement of
including first aid, medical treatment, fire external emergency agencies.
fighting, and rescue.
k) Preparation for safe resumption of
d) Provision of adequate emergency normal operations.
equipment, including escape and rescue
apparatus (readily accessible and l) Notification of internal and external
stakeholders.

OCH.507.001.0123
Δ4
INAPPROPRIATE
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Continued
m) Provision and maintenance of a suitably 4.2 Further Considerations - General

equipped emergency control centre 4.2.1 Where applicable to the Operation, or a
where communication facilities, and risk is identified, consider the use of the
other relevant information is available following equipment or processes:
(including duty cards, emergency
contact lists, mine plans, including the a) Medical evaluation, including a 12 line
location of emergency equipment and ECG and blood test, following any
services, etc.). electric shock.
n) Identify, assess, and manage potential b) Immediate medical evaluation following
risks associated with vehicles being any injuries involving high pressure
struck by lightning, coming in contact hydraulic fluids.
with high voltage electricity, and/or tyre c) Operating mines to have steel cutting
fires. The risk management process, rescue equipment (such as jaws of life,
as a minimum, is to give consideration air lifting bags, etc.).
to safe disembarkation from the vehicle 4.3 Further Considerations - Underground
without being electrocuted or impacted
by tyre explosion, the establishment 4.3.1 Where applicable to the Operation, or a
of an exclusion zone, time restraints risk is identified, consider the use of the
related to personnel entering the zone,
and fire fighting. a) Providing refuge chambers.
o) For underground mines, the b) Using oxygen generating self rescuers
identification of emergency escape as a minimum for self rescue.
routes (delineation and sign posting), c) Using Compressed Air Breathing
including the second means of egress. Apparatus (CABA) for escape.
p) Processes to record the location and d) Implementing electronic tagging and
number of persons in the mine or at the monitoring systems to determine the
facility. number and location of individuals in the
q) Identification, maintenance and sign mine, and to communicate directly in the
posting of emergency muster points and case of an emergency.
processes to verify that all personnel
have been accounted for.
Notes:
r) Requirements for the conduct of
annual simulated exercises to test Application of this Protocol is to be read with
the effectiveness of the Operation’s
emergency response and evacuation Protocols Document.
capabilities.
s) Provision for sealing underground Develop the Emergency Response Man-
mines, or part of the mine, whilst agement Plan to align with GCAA Manuals
allowing for re-entry as appropriate. HSEC – Incident Management Manual - Part
t) Identification of training needs and 1 - Incident Management and HSEC – Incident
competency requirements of relevant Management Manual - Part 2 – Duty Cards
employees and contractors in relation to and Task Cards.
emergency response, and the provision
of adequate training and assessment to
verify competency.
u) Provision of an adequate number
of competent persons to provide an
appropriate emergency response at all
times.

OCH.507.001.0124
Δ5
INRUSH AND OUTBURST
Intent and each of the potential inrush

sources, and be clearly identified on a
The intent of this Protocol is to plan.
eliminate or minimise potential d) Maintenance of a barrier (inrush control
fatalities, injuries and incidents arising zone) with a minimum separation
from risks associated with an inrush distance of 50 metres in all directions
of water, gases or materials which when the potential inrush source cannot
be eliminated.
flow when wet either in a surface
or underground mine and/or risk e) Requirement to use a Permit to Mine
for any mining within the inrush control
associated with an outburst event of zone (within the 50 metres solid
gas and coal in an underground mine. barrier), which outlines the sequence of
operation and any other controls to be
Mandatory Requirements
applied.
5.1 Inrush f) Permit to Mine approval process is to
5.1.1 An inrush risk assessment is to be conduct- include a requirement for pre-drilling in
ed and documented to identify potential advance of the mining direction for an
inrush sources. Specific issues (e.g. flow inrush control zone, so that mining can
slide) based risk assessments are also advance safely.
to be conducted for each of the potential
inrush sources that give regard to the accu- g) Permit to Mine approval process is
racy of the plans of the mine, future mining to include a requirement for regular
operations and geological conditions and surveys and inspections.
changes. h) When working within the inrush control
5.1.2 An Inrush Management Plan is to be devel- zones, affected personnel are to be
oped, implemented, and maintained. As a informed of the hazards, risks and
minimum it is to include: controls and copies of relevant plans
and permits are to be provided.
a) Original and updated plans, files or
other records (including those held by i) Mine Plan, and/or, Inrush Control
statutory authorities) are to be reviewed Zone Plans are to identify the nature
and verified for accuracy to identify any and thickness of the strata, as well as
potential inrush sources that may exist the presence of any faults, dykes, or
either adjacent to, or in the near vicinity boreholes in the separating strata.
of the underground and surface mine j) Man-made barriers, (e.g. seals,
workings, e.g. current, proposed or stoppings, dam walls) that are installed
disused mine workings, surface waters, to contain an inrush source or event, are
stockpiles, reclaim tunnels or aquifers, designed, constructed, and maintained
etc. to an approved/recognised engineering
b) Where appropriate, a technical standard.
assessment by a competent k) Processes for the monitoring of potential
professional is to be conducted and inrush sources including water pressure
documented to determine the nature and gas content.
and magnitude of potential inrush
sources, and a record of assumptions
made is to be contained within the
Inrush Management Plan.
c) Inrush control zones (i.e. stand-off
distances or solid barriers) are to be
established between any mine workings

OCH.507.001.0125
Δ5
INRUSH AND OUTBURST
Continued
l) Evaluation of the impact of an inrush c) Provision of gas drainage to minimise

event on seals, stoppings, and/or the potential for an outburst related
regulators. event.
m) Trigger Action Response Plans (TARPs) d) Development of TARPs that define risk
that define risk based responses to based response to manage or react to
manage or react to changes of inrush changes of outburst indicators.
indicators. e) Requirement that no mining can occur in
n) Surface to seam boreholes are to be an outburst prone area without approval
fully sealed and locations recorded on under a Permit to Mine process.
a plan. f) Requirement that gas concentration
o) Process of whereby open cut operations levels are to be at a pre-determined
near underground workings have acceptable level before a Permit to Mine
assessed the potential risk of inrush and can be issued.
have implemented appropriate control. g) Appropriate rescue and evacuation
p) In-seam drilling is to be recorded on the equipment is to be identified and readily
plan. available.
q) Annual review of the Inrush h) Procedures that detail mining
Management Plan and the associated sequences, personnel levels and other
Inrush Control Zone Location Plans, health and safety precautions that are to
with additional review prior to the mine be followed.
being extended into any new area. i) Identification of training needs and
r) Identification of training needs and competency requirements of relevant
competency requirements, of relevant employees and contractors in relation to
employees and contractors, in relation outburst, and the provision of adequate
to inrush, and the provision of adequate training and assessment to verify
training and assessment to verify competency.
competency.
5.2 Outburst Notes:
5.2.1 An outburst risk assessment is to be con- Application of this Protocol is to be read with
ducted and documented to identify potential the General Mandatory Requirements outlined
outburst sources and issue-specific risk in Section 0 (Background) of this Fatal Hazards
assessments conducted and documented Protocols Document.
for each of the potential outburst sources
that give regard to the accuracy of the plans
of the mine, future mining operations, and
geological conditions and changes.
5.2.2 An Outburst Management Plan is to be
developed, implemented and maintained
and include:
a) Identification of geological conditions
and indicators of potential outburst.
b) Pre-drilling to identify the gas type,
concentration, pressures and desorption
characteristics of the coal.

OCH.507.001.0126
Δ6
EXPLOSIVES AND
SHOTFIRING
Intent g) Design of blasts to minimise the risk of
fly rock to persons and/or damage to
The intent of this Protocol is to structures and property.
eliminate or minimise potential h) Quality controls for drilling, loading,
fatalities, injuries and incidents that stemming, and tie-up.
arise from risk associated with the i) Risk controls for drilling, loading,
use of explosives, detonators and stemming, and tie-up.
shotfiring equipment. j) Procedures for barricading and
Mandatory Requirements signposting loaded shots to prevent
unauthorised entry and/or to prevent
6.1 General inadvertent access by person(s), plant,
6.1.1 A risk assessment is to be conducted and and equipment.
documented to identify the hazards and to k) Procedures for loading of explosives
assess the risks associated with the stor- into hot or reactive ground, e.g.
age, issuing, transport, handling, loading, spontaneous combustion areas.
and use of explosives, detonators, and
related equipment. l) Establishment of exclusion zones and
procedures for pre-blast inspection,
6.1.2 An Explosives and Shotfiring Management clearance, and sentry placement, for
Plan is to be developed, implemented and
the safety of person(s), plant, and
maintained. As a minimum, it is to include:
equipment during blasting.
a) Only purchasing explosives and m) Assignment of responsibility for clearing
detonators, and provide shotfiring the shot area to the shotfirer or other
equipment, that is of an approved type, responsible person.
(i.e. permitted by a statutory body for
use in a surface or underground mine) n) Requirement that no shot may be fired
and manufactured to a recognised until the clearance is confirmed by the
quality standard. mining supervisor.
b) A Site Security Plan to prevent o) Procedures for managing misfires
unauthorised access to, or use of, and for the recovery and disposal of
explosives and detonators that are undetonated explosives.
transported to and stored on site. p) Establishment of the competency and
c) Storage of explosives and detonators authorisation requirements for persons
in a safe and secure location, and in a involved in explosives handling and
licensed or approved magazine, with shotfiring, including those specified in
separate storage for explosives and relevant legislative requirements.
detonators. q) Identification of training needs and
d) An inventory system that records the competency requirements of relevant
delivery, issue and return of stock employees and contractors in relation
movements. Only authorised person(s) to explosives and shotfiring, and the
are to issue or receive explosives and provision of adequate training and
detonators. assessment to verify competency.
e) Provision of vehicles or other methods
to transport explosives and detonators
safely on site. Only authorised person(s)
are permitted to travel in the vehicle with
explosives.
f) Appointment of a suitably qualified
person to design blasts.

OCH.507.001.0127
Δ6
EXPLOSIVES AND SHOTFIRING
Continued

a) Establishing an electronic database
that retains the records associated
with the blasts, (e.g. hole location and
depth, loading charts, tie-up details,
environmental conditions, photographs/
videos, blast vibration, noise and dust
measures).
b) Replacing pre-packaged explosives
with ‘mixed in the hole’ explosive
preparations.
Notes:
Protocols Document.

OCH.507.001.0128
Δ7
INADEQUATE
ENERGY ISOLATION
Intent c) Site requirements for:
►►Individual isolations.
The intent of this Protocol is to
eliminate or minimise potential ►►Group isolations - involves the use of
Permits (refer to GCAA Permit HSEC
fatalities, injuries and incidents arising – Group Isolation).
from risks associated with inadequate
►►High Voltage isolations - involves the
isolation of energy sources. use of Permits, (refer to GCAA Permit
Mandatory Requirements HSEC – High Voltage Access Permit),
except where risk assessment allows
7.1 General otherwise for non-overhead switching
7.1.1 A risk assessment is to be conducted and e.g. longwall electric dump trucks.
documented to identify the hazards and d) Use of locks in preference to danger and
assess the risks associated with interaction permit tags.
with energy sources (electricity, pressure,
temperature stored energy (e.g. springs or e) Use of tags where locks cannot be used.
suspended loads like conveyor takeups) Tags are to be limited to the following
etc.). types:
7.1.2 An Energy Isolation Procedure and Permit ►►Personal danger tags.
System is to be developed, implemented ►►Permit danger tags.
and maintained for relevant energy sourc-
es. As a minimum, it is to include: ►►Out of service tags.
a) The 12-step process for isolations, refer ►►Commissioning tags.
to figure 7-1 below. ►►Information tags.
b) Particular emphasis is to be placed on:
f) Provision of adequate numbers of
►►Identification and dissipation of isolation points on plant and equipment,
relevant energy sources. and in determining locations,
►►Isolating and securing. give consideration to practicality,
accessibility and clear identification.
►►Verification of the isolation, i.e. test
for dead. g) Isolation devices are to be (wherever
possible) lockable and clearly labelled to
identify the equipment that has or is to
be isolated, and to identify whether the
isolation switch or power switch is in the
‘on’ or ‘off’ position.
Figure 7-1 – 12-step isolation process h) For plant and equipment containing
energy sources that cannot currently be
locked out, a risk-based and prioritised
isolate & place tags, locks action plan should be developed to
secure or permits
advise address positive isolation requirements.
relevant verify isolation
parties (test for dead) i) Any person working on high voltage
identify commence
equipment (greater than 1200 volts AC
energy work or 1500 volts ripple free DC) that cannot
sources
be isolated with basic isolation, and
check
complete
work operation cannot verify a break in the electrical
conductors, is to have a permit in place
restore
check energy that incorporates a second competent
work
clear remove tags, electrical isolation verifier; (refer to
area locks or permits

OCH.507.001.0129
Δ7
INADEQUATE
ENERGY ISOLATION
Continued
GCAA Permit HSEC – High Voltage b) Personnel involved in energy isolation

Access Permit). are to be trained in the relevant isolation
j) Provision of specific training for and emergency procedures, and in
Authorised Isolators and Permit the use of related equipment, devices,
Holders. The training and assessment personal protective equipment, and
will include practical applications, other protective devices.
and the competent person is to be c) Medium to long-term training needs and
appointed. competency requirements in relation to
k) Procedures that control the risks energy isolation are identified.
associated with live testing or approved d) A training and competency plan to
‘power on’ maintenance activities. be developed, implemented, and
l) Procedure for the removal of isolation maintained.
devices (locks and/or tags) by persons 7.2 Further Considerations
other than the isolator in the event that 7.2.1 Where applicable to the Operation, or a
the isolator is unavailable to remove the risk is identified, consider the use of the
lock and/or tag. following equipment or processes:
m) Documented processes for the a) Using interlocks to prevent access to
maintenance of isolation equipment. energy sources that have not been
n) Isolations that are complex in nature are isolated.
to have procedures. b) Displaying photographs or diagrams at
o) Documented processes for the use of the various isolation point locations to
stands, chocks, locking pins, clamps or more clearly demonstrate the isolation
other methods for securing objects from requirements within each of the
falling or moving. procedures.
p) Motor control rooms, electrical c) Providing awareness training for the
sub-stations, transformer yards and entire workforce in energy sources
compounds, and electrical cabinets are such as gravitational, stored, kinetic,
to be clearly labelled and signposted pressure, hydraulic, mechanical,
and kept locked to prevent unauthorised electrical etc., to understand correct
access. isolation requirements.
q) Identification of training needs and
competency requirements of relevant Notes:
employees and contractors in relation
to energy isolation, and the provision of the General Mandatory Requirements outlined
adequate training and assessment to in Section 0 (Background) of this Fatal Hazards
verify competency. Protocols Document.
r) Any person performing an isolation is to
be trained, competent and authorised. Where applicable, develop the Permit System
7.1.3 Training requirements include: to include the GCAA Work Authorisation and
Permit Management. Refer to GCAA Protocol
a) All relevant personnel are to become HSEC - Work Authorisation and Permit Sys-
familiar with basic isolation and be tem.
capable of identifying primary and
secondary energy sources. Particular
emphasis should be given to ‘test for
dead’ verification.

OCH.507.001.0130
Δ8
WORKING AT HEIGHT
Intent f) A designated person who is trained and

competent to control an elevated work
The intent of this Protocol is to platform or scissor lift.
eliminate or minimise potential g) A designated person in a work basket
fatalities, injuries and incidents arising suspended by a crane is to be trained
from risks associated with working at and competent to do so, and remain in
height. visual or radio contact with the person
in control of the crane or the crane
Mandatory Requirements operator.
8.1 General h) Persons working in or on elevated work
platforms or work baskets above two (2)
8.1.1 A risk assessment is to be conducted and
documented to identify the hazards and metres are to wear safety harnesses,
assess the risks associated with working with lanyards attached to an approved
at height. anchorage point in the platform or
basket.
8.1.2 A Working at Height Procedure and Permit
System is to be developed, implemented i) Processes are to be developed,
and maintained (refer to GCAA Permit implemented, and maintained to prevent
HSEC – Work at Height). As a minimum, it tools and equipment from falling.
is to include: j) Barricades are to be erected below the
a) Identifying activities involving working at work area to protect persons from falling
height underground and on the surface, objects.
and where practicable, implement k) Procedures to demonstrate that the
engineering or other appropriate elevated work platforms, work baskets,
controls to eliminate or minimise the scissor lifts and scaffolding were
risks. designed, constructed and certified to
b) Persons working at height are not to a recognised standard, and they are
work alone. inspected and maintained to verify
compliance with these standards.
c) Use of fall restraint or arrest equipment
is needed whenever employees or l) Where persons are required to detach
contractors are required to work at and reattach at height, a dual lanyard
a height above two (2) metres whilst system is to be used.
outside the protection of an installed m) Safety harnesses, lanyards, fall arrest
(fixed) access platform with hand rails. devices, and accessories are to be
d) Provision of a safe work environment appropriate to the type of work being
through the installation of a fixed conducted, and meet the relevant
access platform, and/or, provision recognised design Standard.
of an elevated work platform, work n) A lanyard assembly is to be as short
basket, scissor lift or scaffold, where as practicable and the working slack
practicable. length is to be less than two (2) metres,
e) Provision and use of work platforms and fitted to limit the length of free fall to
and scaffolds that have complete floors, (0.6) metres.
guardrails and toe-boards, safe access o) Lanyards are to be fitted so that the
and egress and have been inspected wearer may not fall to a lower level
and tagged by a competent person, without the fall being arrested. When
prior to accessing the work platform or estimating the total fall distance it
scaffold. should include the extension length of
the shock absorber when fitted.

OCH.507.001.0131
Δ8
WORKING AT HEIGHT
Continued
p) Lanyards are to include a shock the user before use, and destroyed
absorber device when being used in following a fall or where inspection has
a fall arrest system, unless it can be shown evidence of excessive wear or
demonstrated that a force of 6kN won’t mechanical malfunction.
be experienced by the harness attached t) Consideration of the means of rescue
point during the fall. of persons who have fallen and are
q) Lanyard anchorage points on apparatus suspended. The appropriate rescue
should be above the head of the worker, equipment and competent employees/
and where practical are to be no lower contractors are to be readily available.
than shoulder height. Where it is u) Factoring in the prevailing environmental
impractical to do so (e.g. on a flat roof), conditions, e.g. wind and rain, that could
a risk assessment is to be conducted have an impact on a person’s ability to
and documented, and alternate work at height safely, and re-inspection
anchorage points selected. and recertification of scaffolding
r) Anchorage points and anchorage following any windy or rainy conditions.
systems are to be signed, tested, 8.1.3 Identification of training needs and compe-
and approved by a competent person tency requirements of relevant employees
to verify that they are capable of and contractors in relation to working at
withstanding a breaking force of 15kN, height.
(single person anchor) or 21kN (two
8.1.4 Provision of adequate training and assess-
person anchor).
ment to verify competency.
s) Fall arrest equipment is to be tested
and certified for use, inspected by

OCH.507.001.0132
Δ8
WORKING AT HEIGHT
Continued
8.2 Use of ladders above two (2) metres: 8.3 Further Considerations
8.2.1 A person may ascend or descend a ladder 8.3.1 Where applicable to the Operation, or a
without fall protection, provided they are risk is identified, consider the use of the
able to use both hands and legs, maintain following equipment or processes:
three points of contact, they continue to
face the ladder, and only take one rung at a) Using mobile elevated work platforms
a time. for undertaking maintenance activities
on large equipment, including workshop
8.2.2 Extension ladders are to be tied off or and field maintenance activities.
footed, with an angle of one (1) in four (4)
maintained and at least one metre of the b) Installing fixed access platforms on
ladder is to extend above the access or installations and large mobile plant and
work area. equipment where routine maintenance
activities require personnel to work at
8.2.3 If a person is to work from a ladder, fall height.
restraint or arrest devices are to be used,
unless three points of contact can be c) Installing stairways for vehicle access
maintained and the task does not involve in place of ladders for large mobile plant
overreaching. and equipment.
d) Engineering the design of plant and
equipment to eliminate the need for
working at height during maintenance
and construction. For example, lighting
towers or fixed lighting that lower the
lights to the ground.
e) Installing controls or modifying the
existing controls on mobile elevated
work platforms so that the control
functions remain the same regardless of
the orientation of the basket.
f) Using non-corrosive materials in areas
where a corrosive environment exists,
for example, wash plants.
Notes:
Protocols Document.
Where applicable, develop all permits to align

with GCAA Work Authorisation and Permit
Management. Refer to GCAA Protocol HSEC -
Work Authorisation and Permit System.

OCH.507.001.0133
Δ8
WORKING AT HEIGHT
Continued

OCH.507.001.0134
Δ9
LIFTING AND CRANAGE
Intent ►►Lifts at or more than 90% of the

crane’s or lifting equipment’s rated
The intent of this Protocol is to capacity.
eliminate or minimise potential ►►Lifts involving a work basket.
fatalities, injuries and incidents arising b) Persons are not, under any
from risks associated with lifting and circumstances, to enter an area under a
cranage activities. suspended load.
Mandatory Requirements c) That the lift area is to be delineated,
restricted, and appropriately signposted.
9.1 General
d) Crane/lifting equipment is to have
9.1.1 A risk assessment is to be conducted and at least 20 metres clearance from
documented to identify the hazards and powerlines (clearance is to be measured
assess the risks associated with lifting and
using the fully extended capabilities of
cranage.
a machine) unless a risk assessment is
9.1.2 A lifting and cranage procedure is to be conducted and documented to identify
developed, implemented and maintained. controls to allow for operations within
As a minimum, it is to include: 20 metres.
a) Use of GCAA Permit HSEC - Complex e) That the crane operator is to remain
Lift where complex lifts are undertaken at the crane controls whilst the load is
e.g. lifts that involve: suspended.
►►Multiple crane usage. f) Tag lines are to be used where a load
►►Lifts over facilities, or buildings requires steadying or guidance and to
(unless a basic lift with easily prevent personnel entering the load
controlled exclusion areas). zone.
►►Lifts over power lines. g) Procedures to verify that the crane and
the associated lifting equipment is fit for
use and purpose.

OCH.507.001.0135
Δ9
LIFTING AND CRANAGE
Continued
h) Listing lifting equipment in a register ►►Lift data, e.g. equipment weight,

and subjecting it to routine inspection rigging weight, height of lift,
and maintenance. Shackles, light weight equipment surface area and centre of
slings and eye bolts (<1 tonne) are gravity, etc.
exempt from the register but are to be ►►Equipment data, e.g. manufacturer,
subjected to inspection before use. model, size, boom length, jib length,
i) Labelling or colour coding lifting load block, material size, etc.
equipment to indicate its rated capacity ►►Rigging data, e.g. sling diameter,
and to verify that it is within the length, sling configuration, capacity,
inspection period. hook type, shackle size and capacity,
j) Completing pre-use inspections to verify etc.
that rigging equipment, the load weight, ►►Lift computation, e.g. boom length,
hooks and safety devices to be used by radius of lift, equipment capacity,
operators are checked prior to the lift size of outrigger footplates and wind
being undertaken. speed, etc.
k) Establishment of competency ►►Risks associated with power lines,
requirements for lifting activities. The crane travelling route, ground stability
crane operator and rigger and/or dogger and agreed communication methods.
are to be assessed as competent and
►►Evidence to verify that the crane
appointed to conduct the work. drivers and riggers were involved in
l) Rated capacity and radius limits for the the development of the Lift Plan, and/
crane and associated lifting equipment or, they were consulted before the Lift
is not to be exceeded. Loads are to be Plan was finalised.
slung by competent persons, and the ►►The permit, documented risk
cranes are not to be operated at speeds assessment and Lift Plan are to be
that could de-stabilise the load in the approved and signed by the relevant
event of a sudden stop. authorised person.
m) Equipment used for towing is not to be 9.1.3 A vehicle loading crane is not to be capable
used for lifting activities. of being rotated over the location of the
n) Crane hooks are to be fitted with a operator at the controls.
positive safety catch. 9.1.4 Identification of training needs and compe-
o) Overhead cranes are to be fitted with tency requirements of relevant employees
appropriate stops (e.g. over-travel and contractors in relation to all aspects of
stops). lifting and cranage.
p) Fixed lifting devices/cranes are to 9.1.5 Provision of adequate training and assess-
conform to an appropriate engineering ment to verify competency.
design standard and be subject to
routine structural integrity testing.
q) The lifting of personnel with cranes is
only to be carried out with approved
work baskets and approved crane.
r) Requirement for the development,
implementation and maintenance of a
Lift Plan for complex lifts that contains
or references:
►►A documented risk assessment that is
communicated to the work party.

OCH.507.001.0136
Δ9
LIFTING AND CRANAGE
Continued
9.2 Forklifts 9.3 Further Considerations

9.2.1 Forklifts are only to be operated by a com- 9.3.1 Where applicable to the Operation, or a
petent and authorised person(s). risk is identified, consider the use of the
9.2.2 Forklifts are to be fitted with a load cell or
load limiting device. a) Fitting cranes and lifting equipment
9.2.3 If the forklift is to be used to lift personnel with a load cell in visual range of the
the appropriate attachments are to be crane operator and/or fit or install a load
available and used. limiting device.
9.2.4 Forklifts are to be fitted with a seatbelt that b) Equipping cranes with an anti two-block
is to be worn by the operator when in use. device or limit switch that includes
audible and visual alarm systems.
9.2.5 Provide clear physical delineation or de-
marcation of permitted areas of operation, c) The provision of designated lift points
whilst excluding operation in areas of on equipment that is lifted on a regular
uneven ground, adverse grades, poor road basis.
conditions, and/or, in pedestrian exclusion d) A procedure for the inspection,
zones and walkways. certification and maintenance of the
fixed lifting points.
e) Identifying, registering and displaying
the weight of components that are lifted
on a regular basis.
Notes:
Protocols Document.
Where applicable, develop all permits to align

with GCAA Work Authorisation and Permit
Management. Refer to GCAA Protocol HSEC -

OCH.507.001.0137
Δ9
LIFTING AND CRANAGE
Continued

OCH.507.001.0138
Δ10
CONFINED SPACE AND
IRRESPIRABLE
NOXIOUS ATMOSPHERES
Intent ►►The provision and use of safety
harnesses with life lines attached (for
The intent of this Protocol is to recovery of persons in the event of
eliminate or minimise potential rescue).
fatalities, injuries and incidents ►►Access to the permit at the job
arising from risks associated with location.
personnel entering or working in a ►►Sign-in and sign-out of persons who
confined space or a workplace where enter the confined space.
irrespirable or noxious atmosphere ►►Nomination and identification of
may exist. competent stand-by persons, who are
to be present at the entry point for the
Confined Space duration of the work.
10.1 Mandatory Requirements ►►Defined communication methods
10.1.1 A risk assessment is to be conducted and to be used between the stand-by
documented to identify the hazards and person(s) and personnel within the
assess the risks associated with confined confined space.
space entry. ►►Identification of the appropriate
10.1.2 A Confined Space Procedure and Permit specification for the equipment to be
System is to be developed, implemented taken into or used within the confined
and maintained (refer to GCAA Permit space.
HSEC – Confined Space Entry Permit). As ►►Barricading and sign-posting
a minimum, it is to include: requirements.
a) Identification and signposting of ►►An area/task specific Rescue
confined spaces that exist within the Management Plan and provision
operation. and accessibility of suitable rescue
equipment and competent personnel.
b) A Confined Space Register.
c) A documented pre-entry risk e) Requirement that atmospheric
assessment, atmospheric testing and monitoring equipment is to be of an
clearly defined conditions of entry. approved type, listed on a register,
and be inspected, tested, calibrated
d) Conditions of entry are to include: and stored in accordance with the
►►Isolation of energy sources. manufacturer’s specifications.
►►Establishment and maintenance f) Requirement that atmospheric
of oxygen levels required for the monitoring equipment can only be used
duration of the task. by personnel who have been trained,
►►Identification of contaminants, assessed as competent, and authorised.
temperature extremes, g) Identification of training needs and
concentrations of flammable competency requirements of relevant
substances, and any other hazards employees and contractors in relation
that may be harmful. to Confined Space, and the provision
►►Continuous atmospheric monitoring of adequate training and assessment to
of the space for the duration of the verify competency.
task.
►►Establishment of ventilation
requirements, i.e. natural or forced.
►►Identification of the need for use of
self contained breathing apparatus.

OCH.507.001.0139
Δ10
CONFINED SPACE AND
IRRESPIRABLE
NOXIOUS ATMOSPHERES
Continued
10.2 Further Considerations e) Provide continuous monitoring for the

10.2.1 Consider the maintenance of the competen- presence of atmospheric contaminants.
cy for persons who have been authorised f) Develop withdrawal conditions (Trigger,
but have not used their skills on a regular Action, Response Plans - TARPs) for the
or recent basis, in particular, regarding the presence of atmospheric contaminants.
use of atmospheric monitoring equipment.
g) Provide emergency equipment
Irrespirable or Noxious Atmospheres (including, suitable breathing apparatus
and communication) for personnel who
10.3 Mandatory Requirements may be exposed to the irrespirable or
10.3.1 Routine access to operational areas of a noxious atmosphere.
mine is to be managed in accordance with
the inspection program for the monitoring of h) An area/task specific Rescue Plan and
the mine atmosphere. provision and accessibility of suitable
rescue equipment and competent
10.3.2 Areas of the operations are to be identified personnel.
that have the potential for irrespirable or
noxious atmospheres to be present which i) Identification of training needs and
are not already identified as confined spac- competency requirements of relevant
es or part of the normal inspection program. employees and contractors in relation
A risk assessment is to be conducted and to irrespirable or noxious atmospheres,
documented, and controls identified and and the provision of adequate training
implemented before entering any areas of and assessment to verify competency.
the operations that have this potential.
10.3.3 If personnel are required to enter an area Notes:
that has a high risk of exposure to irrespira-
ble or noxious atmosphere, the Operation is Application of this Protocol is to be read with
to undertake or develop the following: the General Mandatory Requirements outlined
a) A permit system for access and any Protocols Document.
work to be carried out in this area.
b) Provide for barricading and signposting Where applicable, develop all permits to align
to prevent inadvertent access to these with GCAA Work Authorisation and Permit
areas. Management. Refer to GCAA Protocol HSEC -
c) Pre-determine atmospheric conditions
prior to entry.
d) Procedures that minimise the risk of
exposure of personnel to the irrespirable
or noxious atmosphere, e.g. ventilation
requirements.

OCH.507.001.0140
Δ11
TYRE AND RIM
MANAGEMENT
Intent tyres and rim assemblies identified in
FHP 11.1.2e.
The intent of this Protocol is to g) Selection of tools and equipment to be
eliminate fatalities, injuries, and fit for purpose. This includes condition
incidents when working with or near checks and calibration before use of any
tyres, rims, and wheel assemblies. tool used to control pressure or torque
settings.
Mandatory Requirements h) Tyres and wheel assemblies with no
11.1 General recorded maintenance history, or no
11.1.1 The Operation is to complete a document- documented pre-work inspection,
ed risk assessment to identify all hazards to be deflated to zero pressure, and
associated with managing tyres, rims and confirmed, before releasing tension on
wheel assemblies. This includes assessing the rim or wheel assembly fastenings.
the risks and implementing the controls. i) The deflation of all tyres to zero
11.1.2 The Operation is to develop, implement, pressure, and confirmation, before
and maintain a Tyre, Rim, and Wheel releasing tension on the rim fastenings,
Management Plan based on the risk when there is no formal procedure
assessment. As a minimum, the Tyre, Rim, available. A risk assessment, identifying
and Wheel Management Plan is to include specific safe handling pressures, is to
specific requirements for: support all formal procedures for the
a) All identified risks when procuring, removal and handling of wheels and
storing, lifting, fitting, removing, testing, rim fastenings at any handling pressure
repairing, maintaining, and changing greater than zero.
tyres and wheel assemblies where the j) All split rim (divided rim) assemblies to
rim diameter is 24 inch (61 centimetre) deflate the tyre to zero pressure, and
or greater. confirm, before removal.
b) All identified risks when managing k) All dual wheel assemblies to deflate
tyres and wheel assemblies where the both tyres to the specified safe handling
rim diameter is less than 24 inch (61 pressure, and confirm, before releasing
centimetre). tension on the rim fastenings (refer to
c) Task specific procedures to address FHP 11.1.2i).
tyre and wheel deflation, disassembly, l) A process to demarcate a restricted
assembly and inflation risks. For work area when changing tyres and
multi-piece and split rim (divided rim) wheels, to protect other personnel not
assemblies, this includes quality checks directly involved.
at hold points for safety critical steps. m) Formal procedures (or reference to) for
d) A documented maintenance regime for managing ‘no-go zones’ when deflating,
the periodic testing and inspection of removing, installing, and inflating tyres.
tyres, rims, and wheel assemblies. No person is to stand in the direct line of
e) Rim base identification with a unique fire during tyre inflation.
number for maintenance tracking of n) Restraint of wheel assemblies with a
all rims with a diameter of 24 inch (61 rim diameter of less than 24 inch (61
centimetre) or greater, and for rims centimetre) during inflation.
with a diameter of less that 24 inch (61 o) Continuous monitoring of tyres and
centimetre) identified for tracking in the wheel assemblies during inflation and
risk assessment. deflation, from outside the no-go zone,
f) Use of a tyre and rim-base register to and in a safe, remote location (refer to
record the history and maintenance of FHP 11.1.2m).

OCH.507.001.0141
Δ11
TYRE AND RIM
MANAGEMENT
Continued
p) Any tyre in operation, with a rim a) Specialised tyre handling equipment

diameter greater than 24 inch (61 for tyre, rim, and wheel assembly
centimetre), found to be either deflated management.
to or running at less than 70 percent b) Specialised tyre handling modules for
of the recommended cold inflation underground tyre handling, to minimise
pressure, is to be deflated, then the the requirement for manual handling.
wheel assembly dismantled and
inspected, before reinflating the tyre. In c) Nitrogen for tyre inflation to reduce the
a dual wheel assembly this is applicable risk of tyre fire and explosion.
to both wheels. d) Wheel nut tension indicators.
q) The safe handling and storing of tyres, e) Remote tyre condition monitoring
rims, and wheel assemblies, considering systems such as air pressure and
condition, identification, separation, and temperature monitoring, or similar.
component matching. f) Double gutter (quick change) rims for
r) Storing and refitting tyre and wheel 57 inch (145 centimetre) diameter rims
assemblies, where the rim diameter or greater, to reduce the need to unbolt
is less than 24 inch (61 centimetre), rims in a rear dual-wheel assembly.
to allow handling at the cold inflation g) Non-pneumatic tyres.
pressure only if the rim base, rim
components, and tyre meet the
inspection and testing maintenance Notes:
regime. Application of this Protocol is to be read with
s) Preventing any hot work on wheels or the General Mandatory Requirements outlined
any part of the equipment where heat in Section 0 (Background) of this Fatal Hazards
transfer to any tyre is possible, while Protocols Document.
the rim assembly has a tyre mounted,
whether deflated or not. Refer to GCAA Guideline ENG – Tyres and
Rims for additional information.
t) A process to enable the identification,
storage, and selection of matching
components (compatible) for use in
multi-piece rim and wheel assemblies.
u) A process to prevent the assembly of
multi-piece rim and wheel components
unless they meet re-usability criteria.
v) Multi-piece rim and wheel assembly
designs include the selection of bead
seat bands that prevent inflation of the
tyre if the wheel assembly locking ring
is incorrectly seated.
11.1.3 The Operation is to include competency
requirements for managing tyre, rim, and
wheel assemblies for relevant employ-
ees and contractors in the training needs
analysis.

OCH.507.001.0142
Δ12
ELECTRICAL SAFETY
Intent b) Electrical installations including

wiring and earthing, are to comply
The intent of this Protocol is to with relevant legislation, standards,
eliminate or minimise potential codes of practice and other external
fatalities, injuries and incidents arising requirements, and be maintained to
those standards.
from risks associated with the contact
with energised electrical conductors or c) Electrical competency standards are
to be established for electrical work
exposure to faulty electrical systems and include procedures to facilitate
that can cause secondary hazards compliance with the relevant legislation,
such as arc blast, fire or ignition of codes of practice and design criteria.
explosives atmospheres. d) Appropriate PPE (including arc flash
protection) requirements are to be
Mandatory Requirements
identified and used for electrical work.
12.1 General e) Wherever practicable, electrical
12.1.1 A risk assessment is to be conducted and protection devices, suitable for the
documented to identify the hazards and application, are to be installed on
assess the risks associated from contact final distribution circuits, e.g. overload
with energised electrical conductors or protection on circuit breakers, earth
exposure to faulty electrical systems. leakage circuit breakers on general
12.1.2 As a minimum, the following is to be com- purpose outlets that are set to trip at
plied with: pre-determined levels, (e.g. no greater
than 30 milliamps) and the settings are
a) All electrical work is to be conducted by
to be established by competent and/or
competent/authorised personnel.
authorised personnel.
~
415 VOLTS
>"11.U•"lll•l

OCH.507.001.0143
Δ12
ELECTRICAL SAFETY
Continued
f) Testing of these devices are to be

conducted at risk based and pre-
determined intervals, by authorised
personnel, and the results are to be
recorded and retained.
g) Certified explosion protected electrical
equipment is to be installed on circuits in
potentially explosive atmospheres.
h) There is to be a process for removing
electrical equipment from service if it is
unfit for use or unsafe for its purpose.
i) There is to be a system or procedure
for documenting electrical distribution
networks which may include single line
diagrams, system fault calculations,
equipment details, electrical protection
discrimination curves and cable ratings.
j) Electrical panels, enclosures, control
centres, substations and equipment
are to be appropriately guarded,
labelled and signposted, and made
inaccessible (except for emergency
shut off mechanisms) to unauthorised
personnel.
k) All electrical isolation is to comply with Notes:
GCAA Fatal Hazard Protocol FHP 7 - Application of this Protocol is to be read with
Inadequate Energy Isolation. the General Mandatory Requirements outlined
l) A site assessment of overhead and in Section 0 (Background) of this Fatal Hazards
underground/buried power lines Protocols Document.
and a system in place to control
the risks associated with working in Where applicable, develop all permits to align
close proximity to prevent contact by with GCAA Work Authorisation and Permit
personnel or equipment. Management. Refer to GCAA Protocol HSEC -
m) Identification of training needs and
competency requirements of relevant
employees and contractors in relation
to electrical safety, and the provision of
adequate training and assessment to
verify competency.

OCH.507.001.0144
GLOSSARY
Glossary ►► An atmosphere that does not have a safe

oxygen level, or
Action Plan - A documented plan of actions to
achieve a specific goal or goals which details –– contaminants, including airborne gases,
responsible people and completion dates. vapours and dusts, that may cause injury
from fire or explosion, or
Anti Two-Block Device - An anti two-block device
is an electrical sensing device that is installed on –– harmful concentrations of any airborne
a crane. It prevents the lower load block or hook contaminants, or
assembly from coming into contact with the upper –– engulfment.
load block or boom point sheave assembly and
consists of a weighted ring around the hose line. Designated Work Area – An area in which typical
The ring is suspended on a chain from a limit hot work tasks (such as welding, grinding, cutting,
switch that is attached to the boom tip. If the hook etc.) may be undertaken with confidence that:
assembly (sometimes referred to as a ‘headache ►► Adequate fire response controls are easily
ball’) touches the suspended weighted ring, the accessible in the area.
switch opens and an alarm sounds in the cab to
warn the operator to stop hoisting. ►► Flammable or combustible items/fuels are well
clear of the task (more than 15 meters).
Audit – Third or second party formal assessment
of a process, system, activity or other element ►► There is adequate ventilation, lighting, space
of the business against set criteria such as legal and work surfaces to easily perform the hot
requirements, site procedures or these Protocols. work tasks without additional hazards being
created.
Basic Isolation – A simple isolation on a single ►► There is adequate shielding, floor/catch pro-
isolation device that is easy to apply and involves tection and PPE in the location for the safety of
a single energy source. (This may involve one or those performing hot work tasks and those in
more personnel and may include multiple isolation close vicinity to the tasks.
of differing energies on the same equipment or
feeding equipment.) ►► It is free from water and damp conditions.
Broadbrush Risk Assessment/ Baseline Risk ►► Safe Working Procedures are in place.
Assessment – See GCAA Standard FIN - Risk Document Control – Formal process for man-
Management. aging documentation, i.e. version number, review
CAT – Collision Avoidance Technology. date, owner, approver. Documents are to meet the
intent and requirements of GCAA Standard HSEC
Change Management – The process of clearly – Documents and Records.
identifying, assessing and managing the planned
and unplanned changes that occur within our activ- Excavations – Excavation is the removal of earth
ities, Operations and facilities. for non-mining activities such as the development
of:
Cold Inflation Pressure – The tyre inflation pres-
sure set in accordance with both the tyre and rim ►► Trenches
manufacturer’s recommendations. ►► Ditches
Complex isolation – An isolation that is not basic. ►► Pits
Confined Space – A confined space means an ►► Shafts
enclosed or partially enclosed space that: ►► Wells
►► Is not designed or intended primarily to be ►► Tunnels
occupied by a person.
►► Pier holes.
►► Is, or is designed or intended to be, at normal
atmospheric pressure while any person is in the Hazardous Zone – A hazardous zone in a coal
space. mine typically means anywhere on the return
ventilation side of a point 100 metres before a
►► Is, or is likely to be a risk to health and safety pillar where mining operations are taking place, all
from. the way back to where the ventilation exhausts to

OCH.507.001.0145
Δ GLOSSARY
Continued
surface and where there is a risk of a methane gas Work Basket – A work basket is an attachment
explosion. (Within such a zone all equipment is to that is attached to a piece of equipment, i.e. a
be either flame-proof or intrinsically safe). crane.
Hot Work - Hot work is any welding, thermal or oxy Monitoring Program – Agreed program to
cutting, frictional cutting and grinding, heating or regularly monitor and measure the effectiveness
other fire or spark producing operation. of specific aspects of controls, procedures and
management plans.
Inrush – Relates to the sudden flow of water or
other substance which could result in drowning, Operational Areas – Any areas where production
asphyxiation, entrapment or physical impact. activities are undertaken.
Potential inrush hazards need to be identified
considering: Operations Engineering Management Plan –
Formal process for management of engineering
►► The potential sources of inrush including practices, in particular as it relates to design,
current, disused or abandoned mine work- install, commission, use, maintenance and decom-
ings, along the same seam or across strata, missioning.
surface water bodies, backfill operations, highly
permeable aquifers, bore-holes, faults or other Outburst – Outburst is the sudden and violent
geological weaknesses. ejection of coal, gas and rock from a coal face and
surrounding strata in an underground coal mine.
►► The potential for the accumulation of water, gas
or other materials that could liquefy or flow into PAT – Proximity Awareness Technology.
other workings or locations. PDT – Proximity Detection Technology.
►► The magnitude of all potential sources and Positive Communication – Includes the active
maximum flow rates. communication between both mobile equipment
►► The Maximum Probable Consequence operators and confirmed responses.
scenarios for each potential source, espe- Permit System – Formal system required for
cially including the accuracy of plans of other specific tasks or activities, ie. working in confined
workings, variation in rock properties, geological space, whereby a permit has to be issued to an
weaknesses or similar unknowns. operator prior to commencing work.
►► The potential sources of inundation (slower flow Procedure – Documented process detailing the
of water) including extreme weather, overflow requirements for conducting an activity or task.
or failure of levies and dam structures, failure
or blocking of flow channels (either regular, Rigger/Dogger – A Rigger is a person that spe-
overflow, or emergency), which have potential cialises in the lifting or moving of extremely large
to accumulate/accelerate and escalate to an or heavy objects, and a Dogger is a person who
inrush event. directs the operation of a crane.
Issue Specific Risk Assessment – Risk assess- Rim – Part of a wheel assembly, mounted to a
ment which identifies and assesses the risk related vehicle using cleats and studs or nuts.
to a specific topic, i.e. strata, which is normally
identified as a risk in the Baseline Risk Assess- Rim Assembly – The assembly of wheel compo-
ment or BBRA. nents, not including a tyre. A rim assembly typically
comprise a rim base, flanges, bead seat band and
Dragline Bucket Jewellery – Miscellaneous items lock ring.
used to attach the dragline bucket to the hoist
ropes. Rim Base – The part of the rim assembly on which
the tyre is mounted and supported.
Management Plan - Formal process for man-
agement of a particular activity, task or are of the Safe Handling Pressure - The nominal pressure,
business which articulates management activities determined by risk assessment, for handling wheel
and roles and responsibilities. assemblies during dismounting, mounting, storage
and transport.
SAT – Safety Adherence Technology.

OCH.507.001.0146
Δ GLOSSARY
Continued
Self Assessments – Internal formal assessment

of a process, system, activity or other element
of the business against set criteria such as legal
requirements, site procedures or these Protocols.
Slope Stability – Relates to the stability of materi-
al on a stockpile or dump.
Split Rims - Rims that bolt together and form the
mating surface between the rim and the hub.
Surface Operations – Includes all surface areas
relating to all activities (Open cut, Underground,
CHPP or Port).
Suspended Load – A load which is being support-
ed by a crane or other lifting device.
Training – Refers to the initial training to verify
competence and subsequent refresher training to
verify that the competencies have been retained.
Underground Operations – Includes all opera-
tions from the entrance to the drift or shaft.
Wheel Assemblies – Comprises a rim base,
flanges, bead seat band, lock ring and a wheel
disc or nave plate welded to the rim base. A wheel
assembly is mounted to earth moving machinery
by a wheel disc and fasteners.

OCH.507.001.0147
Δ REFERENCES
References:
The following references can be a useful source of additional information in relation to the issues ad-
dressed in these Protocols:
Related Documents
Title
Risk Management (GCAA Finance Standard)
Documents and Records (GCAA HSEC Standard)
Leadership, Culture, and Accountability (GCAA HSEC Standard)
Training (GCAA HSEC Standard)
Change (GCAA HSEC Standard)
Assurance (GCAA HSEC Standard)
Incident Management Manual - Part 1 (GCAA HSEC Manual)
Incident Management Manual - Part 2 (GCAA HSEC Manual)
Work Authorisation and Permit System (GCAA HSEC Protocol)
Hot Work (surface) Permit (GCAA HSEC Permit)
Confined Space Entry Permit (GCAA HSEC Permit)
Complex Lift Permit (GCAA HSEC Permit)
Work at Height Permit (GCAA HSEC Permit)
High Voltage Access Permit (GCAA HSEC Permit)
Group Isolation Permit (GCAA HSEC Permit)
Tyres and Rims (GCAA Engineering Guideline)
Reference Information
Reference Title
ACARP Australian coal industry’s research program.
MiRMgate Industry recognised databases, including records of industry related
incidents, hazards, causation factors, and recommended preventative
measures.

OCH.507.001.0148
Δ DOCUMENT HISTORY
Version Date Details
New GCAA document with updates including:

- Changes approved through CMO Change Manage-
ment - refer GCAA FHP Booklet changeover
- New document identification number issued: GCAA-
625378177-13287
- Content based on previous Glencore Coal Protocol
CA HSEC PCL 0009 - Fatal Hazard Protocols, version
4 - January 2013
- Updates to align with Glencore SafeWork Protocols
- Reference to GCAA HSEC Permits and other related
documents
- FHP 1 update - reworded 1.1.4 f to include rules to
1 April 2017 control access when required to work near a highwall
- FHP11 full content review, consultation, and update,
including photograph (refer to separate Change Man-
agement for details)
- Minor formatting and layout changes to other FHPs
(no technical content changes)
- Updated FHP7 Figure 7-1 for isolation to include test
for dead as part of Step 5
- Replacement of FHP8 photographs to correctly iden-
tify minimum personal protective equipment require-
ments and to reflect GCAA operations
- Update of Glossary definitions to include new terms
from FHP11 review

OCH.507.001.0149
Intentionally blank

OCH.507.001.0150
COAL ASSETS
AUSTRALIA
GCAA-625378177-13287
www.glencore.com.au

Glencore Coal Assets Australia Fatal Hazard Protocols Operations and Projects Effective April 2017

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SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols Version: 1.0

l) Evaluation of the impact of an inrush c) Provision of gas drainage to minimise

Version: 1.0 SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols

SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols Version: 1.0

6.2 Further Considerations

Version: 1.0 SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols

SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols Version: 1.0

GCAA Permit HSEC – High Voltage b) Personnel involved in energy isolation

Version: 1.0 SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols

Intent f) A designated person who is trained and

SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols Version: 1.0

Version: 1.0 SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols

Where applicable, develop all permits to align

SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols Version: 1.0

Version: 1.0 SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols

Intent ►►Lifts at or more than 90% of the

SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols Version: 1.0

h) Listing lifting equipment in a register ►►Lift data, e.g. equipment weight,

Version: 1.0 SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols

9.2 Forklifts 9.3 Further Considerations

Where applicable, develop all permits to align

SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols Version: 1.0

Version: 1.0 SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols

SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols Version: 1.0

10.2 Further Considerations e) Provide continuous monitoring for the

Version: 1.0 SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols

SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols Version: 1.0

p) Any tyre in operation, with a rim a) Specialised tyre handling equipment

Version: 1.0 SAFECOAL | Fatal Hazard Protocols

Intent b) Electrical installations including