Contemporary Environmental Aesthetics and the Requirements of Environmentalism

Author(s): ALLEN CARLSON

Source: Environmental Values , August 2010, Vol. 19, No. 3, Environmental Aesthetics
(August 2010), pp. 289-314
Published by: White Horse Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/25764252

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Contemporary Environmental Aesthetics and the
Requirements of Environmentalism

ALLEN CARLSON

Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Canada, T6G 2E7
Email: allen.carlson@ualberta.ca

ABSTRACT

Since aesthetic experience is vital for the protection of nature, I address the
relationship between environmental aesthetics and environmentalism. I first
review two traditional positions, the picturesque approach and formalism.
Some environmentalists fault the modes of aesthetic appreciation associ
ated with these views, charging they are anthropocentric, scenery-obsessed,
superficial, subjective, and/or morally vacuous. In light of these apparent
failings of traditional aesthetics of nature, I suggest five requirements of
environmentalism: that aesthetic appreciation of nature should be acentric,
environment-focused, serious, objective and morally engaged. I then examine
two contemporary positions concerning appropriate aesthetic appreciation
of nature, the aesthetics of engagement and scientific cognitivism, assessing
each in terms of the requirements of environmentalism.

KEYWORDS

Aesthetic experience of nature,picturesque,formalism,aesthetics of engage

ment, scientific cognitivism

Environmental Values 19 (2010): 28?-314. ? 2010 The White Horse Press

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290
ALLEN CARLSON

I. INTRODUCTION

Aesthetic experience of nature has been and continues to be a vitally impor

tant factor in the protection and preservation of natural environments. This
relationship between aesthetic appreciation and environmentalism has a
long and interesting history. As demonstrated by environmental philosopher
Eugene Hargrove in his historical study of the development of American
environmental beliefs and attitudes, over the past three centuries the aes
thetic value of natural environments has been increasingly brought to public
attention by both the arts and the sciences. Consequently, according to Har
grove, aesthetic appreciation has been extremely influential in a number of
landmark decisions concerning the preservation of some of North America's
most magnificent environments.1 Other environmental philosophers agree
with Hargrove's assessment. For example, J. Baird Callicott claims that:

What kinds of country we consider to be exceptionally beautiful makes a huge

difference when we come to decide which places to save, which to restore
or enhance, and which to allocate to other uses. Therefore, a sound natural
aesthetics is crucial to sound conservation policy and land management.2

The importance of a sound conception of the aesthetic value of nature to

environmentalism is echoed by other environmental thinkers. Ned Hettinger
sums up his investigation of the significance of environmental aesthetics
for the 'protection of the environment' by affirming that 'environmental
ethics would benefit from taking environmental aesthetics more seriously' .3

II. TRADITIONAL AESTHETICS OF NATURE: THE PICTURESQUE

AND FORMALISM

To more fully understand the relationship between aesthetic appreciation

of nature and environmentalism, it is useful to keep in mind the historical
development of the aesthetics of nature.Two movements in this development
are especially significant concerning the relationship between traditional
aesthetics of nature and environmental preservation: first, the picturesque
landscape tradition and, second, the formalist theory of art. I briefly review
each of these in turn.
The picturesque landscape tradition has its roots in the eighteenth century,
with the acceptance of nature as an ideal object of aesthetic experience and
the development of the notion of disinterestedness as the mark of such experi
ence. The idea of disinterestedness reached its full theoretical development

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CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS

at the end of the century by which time disinterested aesthetic experience

was taken to exclude not only the personal and the economic, but also the
moral. Moreover, the concept of disinterestedness provided the basis for the
separation of aesthetic experience of nature into three distinct modes: first,
the traditional idea of the beautiful, which applied to tamed and cultivated
gardens and landscapes; second, the concept of the sublime, in the experience
of which the more threatening of nature's manifestations, such as mountains
and wilderness, when viewed disinterestedly, could be aesthetically appreci
ated rather than feared and despised; and third, the idea that was to become
more central to nature appreciation than either the beautiful or the sublime,
that of the picturesque. Historian John Conron summarises the differences:
the beautiful tends to be small and smooth, but subtly varied, delicate and
fair in colour, while the sublime, by contrast, is powerful, vast, intense and
terrifying. The picturesque is typically in the middle ground between the
sublime and the beautiful, being' complex and eccentric, varied and irregular,
rich and forceful, vibrant with energy' .4
As Conron puts it, the idea of the picturesque stands between those of
the beautiful and the sublime, and thus it is not surprising that, of the three
notions, the picturesque achieved pre-eminence as a model for nature ap
preciation. It captures the extensive middle ground of, in Conron's words,
the complex, eccentric, varied, irregular, rich, forceful and vibrant, all of
which seem well suited to nature. Moreover, the idea of the picturesque also
had grounding in the theories of some earlier eighteenth-century aestheti
cians, who thought that what they called 'works of nature' were, although
proper and important objects of aesthetic experience, more appealing when
they resembled works of art.5 Indeed, the term 'picturesque' literally means
'picture-like' and thus the idea of the picturesque gave rise to a mode of
aesthetic appreciation in which nature is experienced as if divided into a set
of scenes - into blocks of scenery. Such scenes aim in subject matter and
composition at ideals dictated by the arts, especially landscape painting.
Initially these ideals were found in the works of seventeenth century art
ists, especially Gaspard Dughet and Claude Lorrain; later they were given
expression by English landscape painters such as George Lambert, Richard
Wilson and Paul Sandby.
Picturesque-influenced appreciation of nature culminated in the late
eighteenth century when popularised in the works of William Gilpin, Uvedale
Price and Richard Payne Knight.6 At that time and under the guidance of their
writings, the idea of the picturesque provided the reigning aesthetic ideal for
English tourists, who pursued picturesque scenery in the Lake District and
the Scottish Highlands. Moreover, after the close of the eighteenth century,

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ALLEN CARLSON

the idea of the picturesque continued in the nineteenth century to have a great
impact on nature appreciation. In North American, it inspired the works of
Ralph Waldo Emerson and the essays of Henry David Thoreau.7 Aesthetic
experience governed by the idea of the picturesque was also exemplified in
American landscape paintings of the time, such as those of Thomas Cole and
Frederic Church. And in the twentieth century, its influence can be detected
in much nature painting and photography. Moreover, throughout this period
it continued to dictate a popular way of aesthetically experiencing nature.
Indeed, this remains the mode of aesthetic appreciation commonly associated
with ordinary tourism - that which sees and appreciates the natural world in
light of the scenic images found in travel brochures, calendar photographs
and picture postcards.8
Even as aesthetic appreciation of nature influenced by the idea of the pic
turesque continued to be extremely popular in the early part of the twentieth
century, a related but somewhat distinct approach to nature appreciation was
spawned by that period's most influential theory of art: the formalist theory.
As developed by British art critics Roger Fry and Clive Bell, formalism is
basically a theory about the nature of art, which holds that what makes an
object a work of art is an aesthetically moving combination of lines, shapes
and colours. Bell called this 'significant form' and argued that aesthetic ap
preciation of art is restricted to it, notoriously stating that to 'appreciate a
work of art we need bring with us nothing but a sense of form and colour' .9
Bell was perhaps the greatest advocate of formal beauty as the proper and
sole focus of aesthetic experience and he found such beauty mainly in works
of art. However, in line with the formalist theory, aesthetic appreciation in
general can be construed as the contemplation of the formal structure of any
object of appreciation. Thus, even Bell, whose aesthetic interest was almost
exclusively devoted to art, could find aesthetic value in nature when it is
experienced, in his words, 'with the eye of an artist' by which an apprecia
tor, 'instead of seeing it as fields and cottages,... has contrived to see it as
a pure formal combination of lines and colours'.10
Bell recommended that we see nature with the 'eye of an artist'. Like the
tradition of picturesque landscape appreciation, Bell had in mind seeing it as
it might look in certain landscape paintings, but not exactly the same kind
of paintings as those favoured by the picturesque tradition. Understandably,
Bell's view was more closely allied with the work of the artists of his own
time, such as Paul Cezanne. For example, Cezanne's paintings of Mont
Sainte-Victoire are classics of one kind of formal treatment of the landscape,
in which nature is represented as patterns of shapes and colours. Throughout
the first part of the twentieth century, various artists and schools of painters

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CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS

developed this kind of formal approach to nature appreciation in a number

of different ways. For example, American artist Georgia O'Keefe is famous
not only for her sensuous representations of flowers but also for her fluid
formal renderings of the mountain landscapes of the American southwest.
Similarly, the members of the Group of Seven, such as Frederick Varley,
Franklin Carmichael and Lawren Harris, depicted the rugged landscapes of
the Canadian north in vivid compositions of lines and colours. Formalism
also had a great influence of the work of American nature photographers, as
illustrated by the striking formal patterns in the black and white photographs
of artists such as Edward Weston and Ansel Adams.
Although formalism and the tradition of the picturesque have somewhat
different emphases and take different kinds of art as their models, they are
yet similar enough in their overall approach to the aesthetic appreciation
of nature to come together in what might be called traditional aesthetics of
nature. The overall approach combines features favoured in picturesque ap
preciation, such as being, to return to Conron's words, 'varied and irregular',
'rich and forceful' and 'vibrant with energy', with the prominence of the
bold lines, shapes and colours privileged by formalists. In this sense, tradi
tional aesthetics of nature is the legacy of both the picturesque tradition and
formalism. In popular aesthetic appreciation, this legacy has given rise to an
emphasis on striking and dramatic landscapes with scenic prospects, such as
found in the Rocky Mountains of North America, where rugged mountains
and clear water come together to contrast and complement one another.11
The role of traditional aesthetics of nature in the development of popular
appreciation of nature as well as in the growth of environmental thought
and action is difficult to over-estimate. As I noted at the outset of this essay,
aesthetic appreciation of nature has played a major role in North American
environmentalism. And throughout environmentalism's development in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such aesthetic appreciation was shaped
largely by the picturesque landscape tradition and later supplemented by
formalism. North America's rich heritage of parks and preserves is in large
part the result of the fact that these areas were found to be aesthetically ap
pealing in light of the appreciative approach of traditional aesthetics of nature.
The same is true of many other parts of the world. To underscore this point
in regard to America in particular, I return to the words of environmental
philosopher J. Baird Callicott:
Natural aesthetic evaluation ... has made a terrific difference to American
conservation policy and management. One of the main reasons that we have
set aside certain natural areas as national, state, and county parks is because
they are considered beautiful. In the conservation and resource management

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ALLEN CARLSON

arena, natural aesthetics has, indeed, been much more important historically
than environmental ethics. Many more of our conservation and management
decisions have been motivated by aesthetic rather than ethical values, by
beauty instead of duty.12

III. THE FAILINGS OF TRADITIONAL AESTHETICS OF NATURE

Callicott's claims are no doubt true. However, more recently the relationship
between aesthetic appreciation of nature and environmentalism has become
less congenial. Increasingly individuals interested in the preservation of natural
environments have started to doubt that traditional aesthetics of nature has
the resources necessary to fully carry out an environmentalist agenda. The
beginnings of these doubts can be found in the middle of the last century in
the writings of Aldo Leopold. In A Sand County Almanac published in 1949
and Round River in 1952, Leopold presented a vision of the relationship
between aesthetic experience of nature and the natural environment that
continues to shape contemporary understanding of the relevance of aesthetic
appreciation to environmentalism. Nonetheless, although recognising the
historical importance of traditional aesthetics of nature, he yet expressed
some concern about its role in shaping what he called the 'taste for country':

The taste for country displays the same diversity in aesthetic competence
among individuals as the taste for opera, or oils. There are those [the vast
majority] who are willing to be herded in droves through 'scenic' places;
who find mountains grand if they be proper mountains with waterfalls, cliffs,
and lakes. To such the Kansas plains are tedious.13

What Leopold came to see was that the 'taste for country' of the vast
majority of nature appreciators, which was largely the result of traditional
aesthetics of nature, had certain limitations and perhaps did not fully accord
with the environmental values that were becoming clear to him as he worked
out the details of his 'land ethic'. He realised that for aesthetic appreciation
of nature to support environmentalist thought and action, its aesthetic values
must be more or less in line with environmental values. Recent environmental
thinkers, following in Leopold's footsteps, have become increasingly con
cerned that the aesthetic values embodied in traditional aesthetics of nature
have failed in a number of ways to accord with the values of contemporary
environmentalism.14 In fact, in the opinion of some contemporary environ
mentalists, there are at least five major failings of traditional aesthetics of
nature. To put it succinctly, traditional aesthetics of nature is criticised for

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CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS

endorsing aesthetic appreciation of nature that is: (1) anthropocentric, (2)

scenery-obsessed, (3) superficial and trivial, (4) subjective, and (5) morally
vacuous.151 discuss each of these in turn.

Anthropocentrism: The charge that traditional aesthetics of nature is anthro

pocentric or human-centred is directed squarely at the picturesque tradition
of nature appreciation and/or at formalism by a number of commentators.
There is a sense, of course, in which all aesthetic appreciation is, and indeed
must be, from the point of view of a particular human appreciator. However,
the criticism that is directed against the picturesque tradition and formalism
has to do with the specific conception of nature and our relationship to it
that seems implicit in traditional aesthetics of nature. Part of this conception
involves the anthropocentric thought that nature exists exclusively for us
and for our pleasure. For example, environmental aesthetician Yuriko Saito
argues that the 'exclusive emphasis on visual design' of the 'picturesque/
formalist view' encourages us to appreciate only that which is 'amusing,
enjoyable, or pleasing'.16 Landscape geographer Ronald Rees agrees, con
tending that 'the picturesque ... simply confirmed our anthropocentrism by
suggesting that nature exists to please as well as to serve us'.17 Canadian
environmental philosopher Stan Godlovitch draws out the ramifications of
this point, arguing that to 'justify protecting nature as it is and not merely as
it is for us,... a natural aesthetic must forswear the anthropocentric limits
that... define and dominate our aesthetic response'.18

Scenery-obsession: Although there can be no doubt that appreciation of

traditional aesthetics of nature, and the picturesque landscape tradition in
particular, is focused on scenery, the second criticism is that traditional
aesthetics of nature goes far beyond this focus to the point of obsession.
And although it may be granted that there is much of aesthetic value in the
scenery favoured by traditional aesthetics of nature, when the point of view
becomes an obsession with scenery, the upshot is that other less convention
ally scenic environments are excluded from appreciation. This problem is
especially acute concerning environments that may be ecologically valu
able, but do not fit the traditional conception of scenic landscapes, such as
prairies, badlands and wetlands.19 As Yuriko Saito puts it in her essay, 'The
Aesthetics of Unscenic Nature', such environments are deemed 'lacking in
aesthetic values':

The picturesque ... approach to nature has ... encouraged us to look for and
appreciate primarily the scenically interesting and beautiful parts of our
environment. As a result those environments devoid of effective pictorial

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ALLEN CARLSON

composition, excitement, or amusement (that is, those not worthy of being

represented in a picture) are considered lacking in aesthetic values.20

Superficiality and Triviality: The third criticism, that the appreciation en

dorsed by traditional aesthetics of nature is frequently superficial and trivial,
is perhaps the most grave of these five charges, and it is directed at both the
picturesque landscape tradition and formalism. The heart of the criticism
lies in the fact that traditional aesthetics of nature is dependent on artistic
models and does not treat nature as nature - does not treat it as what it in
fact is. Callicott does not mince words in putting the point:

... we continue to admire and preserve primarily 'landscapes',' scenery', and

' views' according to essentially eighteenth century standards of taste inherited
from Gilpin, Price, and their contemporaries. Our tastes in natural beauty
... remain fixed on visual and formal properties .... Western appreciation
of natural beauty is ... derivative from art. The prevailing natural aesthetic,
therefore, is not autonomous: it does not flow naturally from nature itself; it
is not directly oriented to nature on nature's own terms .... It is superficial
and narcissistic. In a word, it is trivial.21

Subjectivity : The criticism that appreciation grounded in traditional aesthetics

of nature is subjective is especially significant concerning environmental
thought and action. In the case of the picturesque tradition, the subjectivity
stems from the fact that aesthetic judgements are seemingly more a reflection
of the pleasurable experiences of appreciators than of the objective features
of objects of appreciation, while formalism is often accused of supporting
only subjective judgements since formalists such as Bell seem to provide no
grounds for making such judgements other than personal experience. How
ever, subjectivity is perhaps more of a problem for the picturesque tradition
than it is for formalism.22 Be that as it may, the problem is that if traditional
aesthetics of nature yields only subjective judgements about nature's aesthetic
value, then aesthetic value will be of little use in serving environmentalist
goals. If such value is subjective, those making environmental assessment
decisions may be reluctant to acknowledge its relevance and importance,
regarding it simply as based on, at worst, completely personal whims or,
at best, relativistic, transient and soft-headed cultural or artistic ideals. As
Ned Hettinger states it: 'If judgments of environmental beauty lack objec
tive grounding, they seemingly provide a poor basis for justifying environ
mental protection'.23 Environmental philosopher JannaThompson concurs,
putting the worry as follows: 'A judgement of value that is merely personal

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CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS

and subjective gives us no way of arguing that everyone ought to learn to

appreciate something, or at least to regard it as worthy of preservation' ?*

Moral vacuity: The last charge made against traditional aesthetics of nature,
that it is morally vacuous, is again especially important regarding sound
environmental thought and action. This is because environmentalists wish
to bring aesthetic appreciation in line with ethical obligations to preserve
and maintain ecologically healthy environments. But the scenery of the
picturesque landscape tradition and the lines, shapes and colours favoured
by formalism seem to support either no moral judgements or else only the
most empty ones, such as theprima facie prescription to preserve that which
pleases the eye. But if traditional aesthetics of nature has no substantive
ethical import, then ultimately there is no significant way of linking, as it
is put by some environmental philosophers, beauty and duty. Ronald Rees
contends that in traditional aesthetics of nature, there is 'an unfortunate
lapse' in that our 'ethics...have lagged behind our aesthetics' allowing 'us
to abuse our local environments and venerate the Alps and the Rockies'.25
Landscape historian Malcolm Andrews makes the point even stronger, arguing
that there is a general moral fault with the picturesque tradition. He asserts
that 'the trouble is that the picturesque enterprise in its later stage, with its
almost exclusive emphasis on visual appreciation, entailed a suppression of
the spectator's moral response'.26

IV. THE REQUIRMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTALISM

To recap, from the point of view of contemporary environmentalism,

traditional aesthetics of nature supports aesthetic appreciation that is: (1)
anthropocentric, (2) scenery-obsessed, (3) superficial and trivial, (4) sub
jective, and (5) morally vacuous. In light of these failings, we might ask:
What does environmentalism require from the aesthetics of nature? For
appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature, what are the Requirements of
Environmentalism? One way to determine such requirements is by reference
to the criticisms of traditional aesthetics of nature. These criticisms may be
contrasted with solutions or, perhaps better, antidotes, in light of which we
are able to see more clearly what environmentalism wants. Given the five
failings, it seems evident that environmentalism requires appreciation that
is: (1) acentric rather than simply anthropocentric, (2) environment-focused
rather than scenery-obsessed, (3) serious rather than superficial and trivial,
(4) objective rather than subjective, and (5) morally engaged rather than
morally vacuous. I discuss each of these requirements in turn.

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ALLEN CARLSON

Acentrism: The charge that traditional aesthetic appreciation of nature is

anthropocentric means that it is human-centred, but, as noted, aesthetic
experience is seemingly always from the point of view of a specific human
appreciator. However, to the extent that an appreciator can move away
from his or her own particular point of view and attempt to achieve, as it is
sometimes expressed, a4view from nowhere', there will be a corresponding
reduction in the human-centredness of the resulting aesthetic experience.
The basic idea is that in order to avoid an aesthetic experience of nature
that essentially involves the anthropocentric assumption that nature exists
exclusively for us and for our pleasure, an appreciator must strive for an
experience that is not from any particular point of view, human or otherwise.
It is far from clear exactly what it would be for a human appreciator to adopt
such a fully non-anthropocentric point of view. Nonetheless, according to
Stan Godlovitch, an antidote for anthropocentrism in aesthetic appreciation
of nature and thus a requirement of environmentalism is to attempt to achieve
what he calls an acentric approach to appreciating the natural world. After
noting that aesthetics of nature must reject anthropocentrism if it is to justify
protecting nature for its own sake, or as he puts it, 'as it is and not merely
as it is for us', he asks:

How [is] such a non-anthropocentric aesthetic ... possible ... I propose that
only acentric environmentalism takes into account nature as a whole; if we
wish to adopt an acentric environmentalism, we require a corresponding
acentric natural aesthetic to ground it. ... In acentric positions, the value
expressed ... cannot reflect the point of view of the recipient.27

Environment-focus: If aesthetic appreciation of nature is not to be scenery

obsessed, then the focus of appreciation must be broadened to include any
and all kinds of environments. It must be in general environment-focused
rather than tied only to particular kinds of environments as the picturesque
tradition would have it or only to particular kinds of features of environments
as formalism insists. Here, however, the antidote is somewhat less radical
than accepting a theoretical complex notion such as Godlovitch's acentrism.
Rather, it involves only acknowledging any of several rather obvious dimen
sions of the experience of natural environments, such as emotional arousal
or intellectual curiosity, that quite naturally draw appreciators away from a
focus simply on scenery or on lines, shapes and colours. For example, ac
cording to environmental philosopher Holmes Rolston, the requirement of
environmentalism in this case involves the recognition that appreciation of
nature typically requires embodied participation, which will quickly take
an appreciator beyond scenery:

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CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS

Aesthetic appreciation of nature, at the level of forests and landscapes,

requires embodied participation, immersion, and struggle. We initially may
think of forests as scenery to be looked upon. That is a mistake. A forest is
entered, not viewed. It is doubtful that one can experience a forest from a
roadside pullover, any more than on television.... You do not really engage a
forest until you are well within it.... In the forest itself, there is no scenery.28

Seriousness: The requirement that aesthetics of nature should accommodate

aesthetic appreciation that is serious rather than simply superficial and trivial
is quite obvious as well. However, appreciation that is limited to scenery
and/or to the pleasing lines, shapes and colours of nature cannot really be
considered very serious. It seems that for this requirement to be met atten
tion must move beyond this rather narrow focus and be directed toward
what nature really is and the qualities that it actually has in a much fuller
and richer sense. Early in the development of contemporary environmental
aesthetics, in his groundbreaking 1966 essay, 'Contemporary Aesthetics and
the Neglect of Natural Beauty', Ronald Hepburn suggested this requirement
of environmentalism by arguing that moving from aesthetic experience of
nature that is superficial to that which is serious requires appreciation that is
'true to nature', which involves focusing on the real character of the object
of appreciation, and not simply on, as in his particular example, a passing
resemblance. Hepburn put the point as follows:

Suppose the outline of a cumulo-nimbus cloud resembles that of a basket of

washing, and we amuse ourselves in dwelling upon this resemblance. Suppose
that on another occasion we ... try instead to realise the inner turbulence
of the cloud, the winds sweeping up within and around it, determining its
structure and visible form. Should we not... say that this latter experience
was less superficial... than the other, that it was truer to nature, and for that
reason more worth having? ... If there can be a passage, in art, from easy
beauty to difficult and more serious beauty, there can also be such passage
in aesthetic contemplation of nature.29

Objectivity: The question of the objectivity of aesthetic judgments is an is

sue for aesthetics in general, whether of nature or of art. Indeed, attempting
to justify the objectivity of aesthetic judgments has been a major concern
of philosophical aesthetics at least since David Hume's famous essay 'Of
the Standard of Taste', in which he attempted to ground objectivity in the
judgments of informed and practised critics, whom he called 'true judges' ??
The success of such attempts is an issue of continuing philosophical debate.
However, even if one grants some degree of objectivity to aesthetic judgments

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ALLEN CARLSON

about works of art, there is yet the worry that the justification of objectiv
ity for such judgments cannot be extended to aesthetic judgments about
nature.31 Moreover, the problem is especially acute concerning the aesthet
ics of nature, for, as noted, if it cannot support objective judgements about
nature's aesthetic value, then aesthetic value will be of little use for serving
environmentalist goals. Thus, the objectivity requirement is a particularly
important requirement of environmentalism. Janna Thompson observes that
the iink ... between aesthetic judgment and ethical obligation fails unless
there are objective grounds - grounds that rational, sensitive people can
accept - for thinking that something has value'.32 And the importance of
the requirement is put in even stronger terms by one of North American's
leading aestheticians, Noel Carroll, who contends that 'any ... picture of
nature appreciation, if it is to be taken seriously, must have ... means ... for
solving the problem of the objectivity of nature appreciation'.33

Moral engagement The question of moral engagement, like that of objectiv

ity, has deeper roots than traditional aesthetics of nature and again infects the
whole of aesthetics. Part of the source lies in the notion of disinterestedness,
which, as noted, underwrites the picturesque tradition and in its strong
est form requires that aesthetic experience be purged of an appreciator's
particular concerns and interests, including the moral. In the recent history
of aesthetics, this idea was re-affirmed in the position known as aestheti
cism, the view that aesthetics and ethics are two separate realms and thus
that aesthetic appreciation is not subject to moral constraints. This view is
historically linked to formalism and associated with late nineteenth century
thinkers such as Oscar Wilde. Wilde said he could not understand how any
work of art can be criticised from a moral standpoint, since the sphere of art
and the sphere of ethics are 'absolutely distinct and separate'.34 However,
this position, as indicated by Wilde's remark, applies primarily to art, and,
although aestheticism may have some limited plausibility for 'pure' works
of art, which have been regarded, at least within some traditions, as isolated,
autonomous entities, it is much less plausible for nature. Thus the key to
supporting the last requirement of environmentalism, that aesthetic appre
ciation of nature be morally engaged, lies in moving beyond the art-based
approaches to nature such as those of the picturesque tradition and formalism
and in recognising the important differences between art and nature. Given
the character of the natural world, as philosopher Patricia Matthews points
out, its aesthetic appreciation can be such that the aesthetic and the ethical
may achieve harmony with one another:

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Our aesthetic assessments [of nature] take into consideration not only for
mal elements such as color and design, but also the role that an object plays
within a system. [This] allows for a complex, deep, and meaningful aesthetic
appreciation of nature. Further with this deeper appreciation ... facts about
the environmental impact of certain species (for example) can affect our
aesthetic appreciation. In this way, our aesthetic and ethical assessments of
what ought to be preserved in nature may be more harmonious.35

In sum, the requirements of environmentalism for the aesthetics of nature

are that it should support aesthetic appreciation of nature that is: (1) acentric,
(2) environment-focused, (3) serious, (4) objective, and (5) morally engaged.36
The question now is the extent to which the new aesthetics of nature that
has been developed within contemporary environmental aesthetics can meet
these requirements and thus foster a stronger and more positive relationship
with environmentalism than is possible with traditional aesthetics of nature.

V. CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS AND THE

REQUIREMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTALISM

With the requirements of environmentalism in hand, I turn to contemporary

environmental aesthetics. In its initial development in the last part of the
last century, environmental aesthetics considered primarily natural environ
ments and thus developed a number of different positions concerning the
appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature. These positions are frequently
divided into two different camps, labelled in various ways, such as non
cognitive and cognitive or non-conceptual and conceptual. Positions of the
first type stress emotional and feeling-related states and responses, which
are taken to be the less cognitive dimensions of aesthetic experience. By
contrast, positions of the second type contend that knowledge about objects
of appreciation is a necessary component of their appropriate aesthetic ap
preciation. I first consider non-cognitive and then cognitive approaches,
focusing on a prominent example of each type and assessing it in light of
the five requirements of environmentalism.
There are a number of non-cognitive approaches to the aesthetic appre
ciation of nature. However, 'non-cognitive' here should not be taken in its
older philosophical sense meaning primarily or only 'emotive'. Rather it
indicates simply that these views argue that something other than a cognitive
component is the central feature of aesthetic appreciation of nature. Thus,
they are grouped together mainly by their lack of emphasis on cognitive
considerations. Different positions focus on different kinds of states and

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ALLEN CARLSON

responses, such as arousal, affection, reverence, intimacy, engagement,

wonder and mystery. For example, the arousal model is championed by
Noel Carroll. Carroll holds that we may appreciate nature simply by open
ing ourselves to it and being emotionally aroused by it, which he contends
is a legitimate way of aesthetically appreciating nature without invoking
any particular knowledge about it.37 Another alternative, sometimes called
the mystery model of nature appreciation, is defended by Stan Godlovitch.
Godlovi tch contends that neither knowledge nor emotional attachment yields
appropriate appreciation of nature, for nature itself is ultimately alien, aloof
and unknowable, and thus the appropriate experience of it is a state of ap
preciative incomprehension involving a sense of mystery38
The most fully developed of the non-cognitive approaches is Arnold
Berleant's aesthetics of engagement. Berleant rejects much of traditional
aesthetics of nature, such as the external, distanced appreciator favoured
by the picturesque tradition and formalism. Moreover, he argues that the
idea of disinterestedness involves a mistaken analysis of the aesthetic and
that this is most evident in aesthetic experience of nature. According to the
engagement approach, disinterestedness, with its isolating, distancing and
objectifying gaze, is out of place in the aesthetic appreciation of nature, for
it wrongly abstracts both natural objects and appreciators from the environ
ments in which they properly belong and in which appropriate appreciation
is achieved. Rather the approach recommends that traditional dichotomies,
such as between the object of appreciation and the subject of appreciation,
be abandoned, contending that aesthetic experience involves a participatory
engagement of the appreciator within the object of appreciation. Thus, it
stresses the contextual dimensions of nature and our multi-sensory experi
ence of it, taking aesthetic experience to involve a total 'sensory immersion'
of the appreciator within the natural world39 As Berleant puts it:

The boundlessness of the natural world does not just surround us; it assimi
lates us. Not only are we unable to sense absolute limits in nature; we cannot
distance the natural world from ourselves. Perceiving environments from
within, as it were, looking not at it but being in it, nature ... is transformed
into a realm in which we live as participants, not observers ... the aesthetic
mark of all such times is ... total engagement, a sensory immersion in the
natural world.40

Berleant's aesthetics of engagement is clearly superior in a number of

ways to traditional aesthetics of nature .An appreciator who is totally engaged
and sensorily immersed in a natural environment contrasts dramatically with
a distanced, disinterested appreciator who focuses only on formalist, pictur

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CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS

esque scenery. Consequently, the aesthetics of engagement can be evaluated

very favourably concerning some of the requirements of environmentalism.
Concerning the acentric requirement, the aesthetics of engagement's stress on
total sensory immersion seems to facilitate about as acentric a point of view
as is humanly possible, since it explicitly calls for abandoning traditional
dichotomies, such as between the object of appreciation and the appreciator,
and thus it would seem that the appreciator's own particular point of view is
also to be abandoned. Concerning the environment-focus requirement, the
aesthetics of engagement's stress on an appreciator's engaged participation
takes into consideration whole environments and explicitly does not focus
on scenery or formal composition. One cannot be immersed within scenery
or within a combination of lines, shapes and colours!
However, the success of the aesthetics of engagement in meeting the
remaining three requirements of environmentalism is less clear. For example,
although total sensory immersion may result in a high level of intensity, it
does not seem to require any degree of seriousness in the sense of being
'true to nature'. It may allow for serious appreciation in this latter sense,
but it is unclear to what extent such appreciation is consistent with intense
immersion. In addition, the aesthetics of engagement's stress on sensory im
mersion seems to make the position even weaker concerning the objectivity
requirement, for such immersion apparently breeds subjectivity rather than
objectivity. Abandoning the dichotomy between the object of appreciation and
the subject of appreciation will seemingly make it difficult for an apprecia
tor to be objective. Moreover, although the aesthetics of engagement would
seem to support moral engagement concerning environmental issues, the
position's subjectivity undercuts the possibility of acompelling moral stance,
for without objectivity, ethical assessments, even if fuelled by engagement
and sensory immersion, can be dismissed as no more than expressions of
personal feelings. Thus, in sum, the success of the aesthetics of engagement
in meeting the requirements of environmentalism is very strong concerning
acentrism and environment-focus, unclear regarding seriousness, and seem
ingly weak in regard to objectivity and moral engagement.
Standing in contrast to the non-cognitive approaches are a number of
positions classified as cognitive, since they are united by the idea that central
to appropriate aesthetic appreciation is knowledge and information about
the object of appreciation. In general, they hold that, in the words of Yuriko
Saito, nature must be 'appreciated on its own terms'.41 Thus, for example,
Marcia Eaton holds that in the aesthetic appreciation of nature, we must
carefully distinguish between facts about nature and fictions, since while
knowledge of the former is necessary for appropriate aesthetic appreciation,

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ALLEN CARLSON

the latter can often lead us astray and pervert our appreciation.42 Other cog
nitive approaches, including Saito's, emphasise other kinds of knowledge
and information, claiming that appreciating nature 'on its own terms' may
involve experiencing it in light of various local, folk, or historical traditions.
Thus, for appropriate aesthetic appreciation, regional narratives and even
mythological stories about nature are endorsed as either complementary
with or alternative to factual information 43
The best-known cognitive approach is called scientific cognitivism.
Like most cognitive positions, which generally reject the idea that aesthetic
experience of art provides satisfactory models for appreciation of nature,
this view stresses that nature must be appreciated as nature and not as art.
Nonetheless, it holds that aesthetic appreciation of nature is yet analogous
to that of art in both its character and its structure and, therefore, that art
appreciation can show some of what is required in adequate aesthetic appre
ciation of nature. In appropriate aesthetic appreciation of works of art, it is
essential that they be experienced as what they are and in light of knowledge
of their natures. For instance, appropriate appreciation of a work of art such
as Jackson Pollock's One: Number 31,1950 requires that we experience it
as a painting and moreover as an action painting within the school of mid
twentieth century American abstract expressionism. Therefore, it should
be appreciated in light of knowledge about paintings, especially American
abstract expressionist paintings and in particular action paintings. In short,
in the case of art, serious, appropriate aesthetic appreciation is informed by
art history and art criticism. However, since scientific cognitivism recognises
that nature must be appreciated as nature and not as art, it contends that,
although the knowledge given by art criticism and art history is relevant to art
appreciation, in nature appreciation the relevant knowledge is that provided
by natural history, by the natural sciences, especially geology, biology and
ecology. In short, to appreciate nature 'on its own terms' is to appreciate it
as it is characterised by science.44
Although scientific cognitivism holds that aesthetic appreciation of
nature must be analogous to that of art, it strongly rejects the picturesque
tradition and formalism.45 An appreciator who is well informed by scientific
knowledge about a natural environment is very different from one who is
primarily interested in formalist, picturesque scenery.46 Moreover, there is
little similarity between either the formalist or the picturesque conception
of art appreciation and the cognitively-rich model of art appreciation on
which scientific cognitivism bases the analogy between art appreciation
and nature appreciation. However, scientific cognitivism does follow in
the footsteps of the other more recent tradition of nature appreciation: the

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CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS

position developed by Leopold in the middle of the last century. As noted,

Leopold's view of aesthetic appreciation of nature has shaped contemporary
understanding of the role of such appreciation in environmental thought and
action. This approach is sometimes labelled ecological aesthetics or the 'land
aesthetic'. It has the same cognitive commitment as scientific cognitivism to
the centrality of scientific knowledge in the aesthetic appreciation of nature.
Callicott points out that 'the land aesthetic is sophisticated and cognitive,...
it delineates a refined taste in natural environments and a cultivated natural
sensibility. The basis of such refinement or cultivation is natural history, and
more especially evolutionary and ecological biology'.47
How then does scientific cognitivism fare in terms of the requirements of
environmentalism? Like the aesthetic of engagement, scientific cognitivism
scores high on the first two requirements. Its stress on scientific knowledge
promotes an acentric point of view similar to that of science. This point of
view may not be as acentric as that resulting from the immersion endorsed
by the aesthetics of engagement, although it can be argued that science is
in fact the paradigmatic acentric approach, since its truths are meant to be
independent of any particular understanding, human or otherwise.48 Similarly,
scientific cognitivism's stress on science focuses appreciation on environ
ments rather than on scenery. There is no ecological science of scenery - or
of lines, shapes and colours! In addition, the emphasis on scientific knowl
edge promotes appreciation that is serious in the sense of being 'true to
nature' by means of attending fully and deeply to what nature really is and
to the properties it has. Moreover, this also promotes an objective point of
view, since science is one of the paradigms of objectivity. Aesthetic judge
ments based on scientific knowledge are not necessarily as objective as that
knowledge itself, but nonetheless they have a more objective foundation than
aesthetic judgements based mainly on, for example, emotional arousal or
immersion.49 Concerning the last requirement, scientific cognitivism is less
clearly successful, for although its objectivity makes possible an engaged
and compelling moral stance on environmental issues, it does not require
it. Yet, it can be argued that the factual character of scientific knowledge
yields a more environmentally informed response to nature than does, for
example, imaginative fiction and thus provides a firm foundation for moral
judgements.50 On the other hand, it is sometimes claimed that scientific
knowledge is morally neutral and therefore promotes such neutrality.Thus, in
sum, scientific cognitivism is successful in meeting most of the requirements
of environmentalism and especially the objectivity requirement, although its
success concerning moral engagement remains somewhat unclear.

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ALLEN CARLSON

VI. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I think five points follow from this investigation of tradi

tional aesthetics of nature, the five requirements of environmentalism, and
contemporary environmental aesthetics. First, if we must choose between
non-cognitive approaches as represented by the aesthetics of engagement
and cognitive approaches such as scientific cognitivism, then, on balance,
the latter scores somewhat higher than the former on the five requirements
of environmentalism. Second and more important, however, we do not have
to choose between them, since, although the two positions have different
emphases, there need be no theoretical conflict between them.51 This is
because each position can be understood as presenting only necessary condi
tions for appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature. Each of engagement
and relevant scientific knowledge can be held to be necessary without either
being claimed to be sufficient for such appreciation52 There is perhaps some
practical tension generated by the two approaches, owing to the appreciative
difficulty of being totally engaged within a natural environment and yet at
the same time taking into account knowledge relevant to its appropriate
aesthetic appreciation. However, this kind of bringing together and balanc
ing of feeling and knowing, of emotion and cognition, is the very heart of
aesthetic experience. It is what we expect in aesthetic experience of art; there
is no reason why we should expect less in aesthetic experience of nature.
The third conclusion, therefore, is that, concerning the requirements of
environmentalism, since the aesthetics of engagement is especially strong
in regard to the acentric and environment-focus requirements and scientific
cognitivism is stronger in regard to the seriousness and objectivity require
ments, and perhaps the moral engaged requirement, the best alternative is to
bring the two positions together as a single unified approach. This conclu
sion is suggested by Holmes Rolston in his essay, 'From Beauty to Duty:
Aesthetics of Nature and Environmental Ethics':

Can aesthetics be an adequate foundation for an environmental ethic? This

depends on how deep your aesthetics goes. No, where most aestheticians
begin, rather shallowly... Yes, increasingly, where aesthetics itself comes
to find and to be founded on natural history, with humans emplacing them
selves appropriately on such landscapes. Does environmental ethics need
such aesthetics to be adequately founded? Yes, indeed.53

Given a unified position, which is, as Rolston puts it, 'founded on

natural history' and has appreciators 'emplacing themselves' within natural
environments, the fourth conclusion is that, concerning the requirements of

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CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS

environmentalism, contemporary environmental aesthetics, as represented by

the conjunction of scientific cognitivism and the aesthetics of engagement,
constitutes a substantial advance over traditional picturesque-influenced and
formalist aesthetics of nature.54 Hence, fifth, unlike traditional aesthetics
of nature, contemporary environmental aesthetics helps to bring aesthetic
values and environmental values more in line with one another. It encour
ages aesthetic appreciation of not simply scenic environments but also other
natural environments - not just spectacular mountain landscapes, but also
less conventionally scenic, but nonetheless aesthetically magnificent and
ecologically valuable environments, like deserts, swamps, savannahs, salt
marshes, prairies, jungles - indeed every kind of natural environment55

NOTES

I Hargrove 1979.
2Callicott2008,p. 106.
3Hettinger2005,p.76.
4 Conron 2000, pp. 17-18. A classic discussion of the three-fold distinction is Hip
pie 1957.
5 Perhaps another reasonfor the pre-eminence of the picturesque as a model for nature
appreciation is that, in spite of Conron's way of putting the three fold distinction, the
beautiful and the sublime, at least initially, were seemingly intended to characterise
states of the appreciator, while the picturesque appears even from the outset to be
more a characterisation of the object of appreciation. I thank Alex Neill for making
clear the importance of this point.
6The classic works include William Gilpin, Three Essays: On Picturesque Beauty, On
Picturesque Travel, and On Sketching Landscape [1792]; Uvedale Price, An Essay
on the Picturesque [1794]; Richard Payne Knight, The Landscape [1794], Analytical
Inquiry into the Principles of Taste [1805]. A standard treatment is Hussey 1927.
7 For example, see Emerson 1849 and Thoreau 1862.
8 For one study of the influence of the picturesque on contemporary landscape ap
preciation, see Andrews 2007.
9 Bell [1913], p. 30.
10 Ibid., p. 45.
II Although I relate what I call traditional aesthetics of nature to the historical devel
opments of the idea of the picturesque and the formalist theory of art, certain aspects
of this kind of view are defended in some recent work on the aesthetics of nature;
for example, see Stecker 1997; Crawford 2004; and Leddy 2005. Formal aesthetic
appreciation of nature is defended in Zangwill 2001; for follow-up concerning
formalism, see Parsons 2004 and Zangwill 2005.

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ALLEN CARLSON

12 Callicott2008,p. 106.
13 Leopold [1949,1952], pp. 179-180.
14 It is important to note that not all environmental thinkers agree with this assessment
of traditional aesthetics of nature. Some offer a reinterpretation of the picturesque
that is more in accord with environmentalism; see, for example, Brook 2008.
15 Some of these criticisms, especially that traditional aesthetics of nature tends to be
superficial and scenery-obsessed, have been noted since the beginnings of the renewed
interest in the aesthetics of nature; see, for example, Sagoff 1974 and Carlson 1977.
16 Saitol998a,p. 138.
17Rees 1975, p. 312.
18Godlovitch 1994, p. 16.
19 On wetlands, in particular, see Carlson 1999; Rolston 2000; and Callicott 2003.
Perhaps the most dramatic story of the difficulties involved in a wetland's achieving
the status granted to conventionally scenic landscapes is that of the establishment
of America's Everglades National Park. For a classic account of the long struggle
to save the everglades, see Douglas [1947].
20 Saito 1998b, p. 101.
21 Callicott 2008, pp. 108-9.
22 It can be argued that formalism, more so than some competing points of view, infact
underwrites a degree of objectivity of aesthetic value; see Parsons 2008, pp. 41-43.
23Hettinger2008>p.414.
24 Thompson 1995, p. 292. Similar concerns are raised in Loftis 2003.
^Rees 1975, p. 312.
26 Andrews 1989, p. 59.
27 Godlovitch 1994, pp. 16-17. Godlovitch's acentrism reflects some of the ideas
in Nagel 1986.
28 Rolston 1998, p. 162.
29 Hepburn 1966, p. 305. Hepburn returns to these themes in his last essay (2010);
see also Hepburn 1993 and 1996.
30 David Hume, 'Of the Standard of Taste' [1757].
31 This concern is expressed by a number of aestheticians; for example, see Dickie
1974, pp. 169,199, or Walton 1970.
32 Thompson 1995, p. 292.
33 Carroll 1993, p. 257.
34 Oscar Wilde,'Letter to the Editor', St. James Gazette, June 25,1890, in Hlmann
1969, p. 236.
35 Matthews 2002, p. 38. Discussions of the issues involved in bringing aesthetic
appreciation and moral obligation in line with one another include Nassauer 1997;
Eaton 1997; and Lintott 2006. On this same topic, although somewhat more focused
on human environments, see Saito 2007, as well as section III of Saito 2010.

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CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS

361 consider two of these requirements, those of seriousness and objectivity, to be

requirements for the adequacy of aesthetics of nature in general; see Carlson 2007.
This is not the case with the other three requirements of environmental!sms. A posi
tion might be a completely adequate aesthetics of nature and yet not satisfy these
requirements or even be compatible with them. In this latter case, it is possible that
environmentalism might have to reconsider its requirements.
37 See Carroll 1993. Despite the centrality this model grants to emotional arousal,
it is considered by some to be a cognitive rather than a non-cognitive approach,
since Carroll accepts what is known as the cognitive theory of emotions, by which
emotional responses can be judged appropriate or inappropriate. Likewise, although
Emily Brady's work, which is noteworthy for its treatment of environmental issues,
is typically classified as non-cognitive, its central component, that of imagination,
is not clearly non-cognitive in nature; see Brady 1998; and especially Brady 2002
and Brady 2003.
38 See Godlovitch 1994; see also Godlovitch 1998.
39 See Berleant 1992, especially Chapter 11, 'The Aesthetic of Art and Nature' (re
printed in Carlson and Berleant 2004); Berleant 1997; and Berleant 2005.
40 Berleant 1992, pp. 169-70.
41 Saito 1998a.
42 See Eaton 1998.
43 For example, see Saito 1998a; Sepanmaa 1986; and Heyd 2001.
44 See Carlson 1979a; Carlson 1998; and Carlson 2000.
45 See, for example, Carlson 1979b; Parsons and Carlson 2004.
46 A classic illustration of this difference is John Muir's comparison of his own ap
preciation of mountains with that of two artist companions; see Muir 1894.
47Callicott2008,p. 116.
48 If this is the case, then Godlovitch's difficult notion of an acentric point of view
might be explicated in terms of scientific understanding. Although I think this line
of thought has some plausibly, Godlovitch explicitly rejects it in Godlovitch 1994.
49 See Carlson 1981. For follow up, see Parsons 2006.
50 See Eaton's 1998 discussion of Bambi; see also Eaton 1997.
51 Other philosophers also suggest that non-cognitive and cognitive approaches are
not necessarily in conflict with one another; for example, in presenting his emotional
arousal model, Noel Carroll remarks: 'In defending this alternative mode of nature
appreciation, I am not offering it in place of Carlson's environmental model [aka
scientific cognitivism]... I'm for coexistence'; see Carroll 1993, p. 246.
52 Berleant might not accept this conclusion, for he apparently holds not only that a
cognitive component is not necessary for appropriate aesthetic experience, but also
that engagement is both necessary and sufficient for such experience. I argue that
engagement is not sufficient in Carlson 2006a.

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ALLEN CARLSON

53 Rolston 2002, p. 141. Rolston's acceptance of the importance of both scientific

knowledge and engagement in appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature is es
pecially evident in Rolstion 1998, in which he explicitly discusses both scientific
appreciation of forests and aesthetic engagement in forests. For an overview of
Rolston's aesthetics, see Carlson 2006b.
54 In addition to Rolston's work, some other constructive attempts to combine ele
ments of cognitive and non-cognitive approaches include Fudge 2001 and especially
Moore 2008.
55 Some of the points made here are discussed in more detail in the introduction
to Carlson and Lintott 2008. This essay evolved from that introduction and from
presentations delivered in late 2009 at the annual meeting of the Japanese Society
of Aesthetics at the University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan, the International Confer
ence on Ecological Aesthetics and Environmental Aesthetics in Global Perspective
at Shandong University, Jinan, China, and the annual lecture series of the Royal
Institute of Philosophy, London, England. Versions of those presentations will appear
in the Japanese journal JTLA, the Chinese journal Academic Researched the Royal
Institute of Philosophy Supplements. I thank the members of the audiences at those
lectures, as well as the anonymous reviewer for Environmental Values, for valuable
comments and suggestions that I have incorporated into this essay.

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