Professional Documents
Culture Documents
7(3):217–238, 2006
mother and self was less clean than I had imagined …for later,
even in my best moments, I never feel myself to have pro-
gressed beyond this division. I merely learn to legislate for two
states, and to secure the border between them [p. 57].
who can simultaneously claim herself and navigate her baby’s needs.
However, Kraemer contends, “interdependence” is not some easily
attained f luidity. She refocuses us on the important question of
“how the mother feels about what she feels and what she does with
how she feels” (Kraemer, 1996, p. 765), and in particular, what she
feels about her own destructiveness in relation to the baby. The
mother in her view has to bear her subjectivity, not by gracefully jug-
gling with constant tensions, but by tolerating very difficult, and
largely unconscious, feelings: hatred, ambivalence, failure, shame,
self-hatred, and remorse. This juggling exacts a price, and at times
causes us to go under.
femininity but as the name for the subject whose ability to put her-
self aside inherently challenges the whole symbolic system. Mater-
nity, in Kristeva’s scheme, becomes the figure for the border terri-
tory between the symbolic and semiotic, agitating the split, making
us think again about what grounds us.
The dilemma of choosing between one’s own and the child’s
needs has been voiced within feminist psychoanalysis as a tension be-
tween the psychical and social mother, the mother that psychoanaly-
sis has told us plays such a vital role in the child’s developing internal
world and the mother who is a desiring subject in her own right. An
emphasis on reciprocity and recognition, particularly in Jessica
Benjamin’s work, has softened this polarity. Benjamin (1995) argues
persuasively for the need to recognize the mother’s subjectivity as a
locus of self-experiencing beyond that of the child. If the child does
not have a mother whose subjectivity is recognizable, then the child
cannot hope for recognition herself. In its crudest form, the mother
can finally be thought of as having a life of her own. The choice is no
longer cast as either/or but the holding in tension of both mother
and child’s needs and desires.
However appealing at an egalitarian level, there is a danger that rec-
iprocity glosses over the skewed nature of the relationship between
mother and child and gives way to the characteristic collapse of the
maternal subject in the face of the needs of the fragile and developing
child. It is the child who is seen to benefit from a mother who has a life
outside of the child’s sphere. In the process, I believe we lose sight of
the way maternal subjectivity is structured through the relation to the
child. I would argue, instead, that one’s subjectivity as a mother is pre-
cisely what emerges through this real and imagined relation. The posi-
tioning of maternal desire as that which goes beyond the child may be
necessary to protect the child from what Kristeva (1987) terms “the
caring and clinging mother” (p. 34). It does not, however, necessarily
help us understand maternal desire itself.
A return to the binary mother–infant relationship is clearly prob-
lematic and prompts a reconsideration of the role of the third,
though this time from the mother’s perspective. It is possible that
the child’s otherness can function as a third term for the mother
and, therefore, prevent the regressive pull of the mother–infant
dyad whilst allowing us to understand her desire as the desire for the
child. When Kristeva (1987) poses the question “What does a
224 Lisa Baraitser
mother want?” (p. 41), the answer she provides is that she wants her
own mother, even in the figure of the child. All desire, in other
words, is understood as desire for the lost mother, including our de-
sire for our children. But surely the mother also has a relation to the
child that at times escapes this repetition.
Psychoanalysis variously configures maternal desire as the desire
for the missing penis, the longed-for union with the imaginary
mother, or the desire for the “father” (or lover, work, politics—what-
ever takes the mother away from the child) that plays a vital function
in breaking up the dyad with the child. If the focus shifts from the
child’s psychic health to the mother’s, it may be possible to consider
how maternal desire, proceeding from the direct encounter with the
child, fundamentally changes the way we mothers feel and think
about our partners and lovers, work and politics, mothers and our-
selves. In other words, although we constantly allude to the felt expe-
rience that we are “transformed” through our relations with our chil-
dren, we are perhaps fearful of dwelling on how or why, because in
doing so, we may jettison the precious connection we have with the
world beyond our babies. We fear we will fall into a regressive symbi-
otic relationship with our children, to their and our own detriment.
shop on the Whitechapel Road. Its name is Carol’s. Carol says her
family members have run a lingerie shop there for generations.
Plump and matronly, she swishes around, breathing womanly se-
crets, as she measures and hoists, clasps and tugs. She is aghast,
horrified that I am out of bed, that I show no visible signs of hav-
ing given birth three days ago other than my tender leaking
breasts. She views me with a faint whiff of irritation.
But despite my body’s refusal to let on, I know that every-
thing has changed. I am unsteady, dizzy, like I’m relearning to
walk after a long illness. I imagine a war has taken place while
I’ve been away. I look for the signs. I can’t understand that no
one else has noticed. I want to rush up to the thin stream of
Bangladeshi men, moving up and down Brick Lane, and confer
with them, join them in their huddled groups to discuss in
hushed voices the catastrophic shift that’s taken place. I stand
on the curb waiting to cross the road, fearful should anything
happen, conscious of needing to protect myself in a way that
has never occurred to me before. Not trusting that I know what
to do, I waver, looking left, then right twenty, then thirty times,
still unable to propel myself off the curb. I have to stay alive. I
am two. Maybe more. I don’t know myself. Severed from my-
self, like the cut end of a worm, I am disorganized, stunned.
PART IV:
IRIGARAY, FEMININITY, MATERNITY
Unlike the veil, the wig, thus historically situated, then allows us to
play with the notion of transformation itself and to return to that dif-
ficult binary: femininity/maternity. Like masks, wigs are odd cul-
tural objects, working their effects not through a suspension of dis-
belief but through an engagement with their artificiality. We are not
asked to believe that the wig is “real hair,” but we engage with it as if
it were real all the same. The “me/not me” quality of this play is rem-
iniscent of the function of Winnicott’s transitional object. The wig
does its work through the ability to get close to real hair and the si-
multaneous exposure of its own fakeness. Wigs, therefore, allow a
process of mimesis to occur.
“One must,” writes Irigaray (1985b, p. 76), “assume the feminine
role deliberately.” Mimesis defines her strategy of reappropriation,
as opposed to “just playing the game,”“which means already to con-
vert a form of subordination into an affirmation and thus to begin to
thwart it…To play with mimesis is thus, for a woman, to try to recover
the place of her exploitation by discourse, without allowing herself
to be simply reduced to it” (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 76). Mimesis is close
to parody, in which parroting becomes a commentary on what is be-
ing parroted, not merely a misguided reappropriation. At another
level, however, mimesis can also be understood as allowing a new
way of being to emerge, through the parodic imitation of a tired dis-
course, just as both actors and children can “go through the mo-
tions” in order to bring on an “authentic” emotion. Mimesis, exceed-
ing that which is being parodied, could be understood as a more
anarchic reappropriation, a subversion that allows something alto-
gether different to emerge.
In its mimesis, can motherhood also subvert? Among the various
discourses on maternity, there is, I have been saying, a dialectic that
understands motherhood as either a movement from unity towards
f luidity, or the opposite, the moment that fixes f luidity in relation to
the unity of the child. Wanting to move beyond matter, whilst being
caught by this impossibility, I have tried to show that transformation
itself contains this double allegiance to materiality. Like the transfor-
mation from veil to wig, the shift to motherhood may fix or free, trap
or liberate. In all likelihood, it does both. If mimesis produces a kind
of creative excess, as it seems to in wig wearing, then transformation
points towards something that is excessive to this dialectic: the
woman becoming mother. In liberating as it binds, motherhood is
Maternal Subjectivity 237
REFERENCES
Benjamin, J. (1995), Like Subjects, Love Objects: Essays on Recognition and Dif-
ference. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bibring, G. L., Dwyer, T. F., Huntington, D. S., & Valenstein, A. F. (1961), A
study of the psychological processes in pregnancy and of the earliest
mother-child relationship—I. Some propositions and comments.
Psychoanaly. St. Child, 16:9–24.
Blau DuPlessis, R. (1990), For the Etruscans. In: The Pink Guitar: Writing as
Feminist Practice. New York: Routledge, pp. 1–19.
Bronner L. L. (1993), From veil to wig—Jewish women’s hair covering. Juda-
ism., 42.4:465–477.
Buchanan, A. J. (2003), Mother Shock: Loving Every (Other) Minute of It. New
York: Seal Press.
Butler, J. (1994), Bodies that matter. In: Engaging with Irigaray, ed. C. Burke,
N. Schor, & M. Whitford. New York: Columbia University Press, pp.
141–173.
Carle, E. (1969), The Very Hungry Caterpillar. New York: World Pub.
Cusk, R. (2001), A Life’s Work: On Becoming a Mother. London: Forth Estate.
Enright, A. (2004), Making Babies: Stumbling Into Motherhood. London: Jona-
than Cape.
Figes, K. (1998), Life After Birth. London: Viking.
Hogue, C. (2004), To Go Back to the Idea of Process: Form, Feminism and
Kathleen Fraser’s Poetry. Rutgers, NJ: The State University of New Jersey.
21 May 2004 <http://english.rutgers.edu/fraser.htm#N_7>.
Irigaray, L. (1985a), Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. C. G. Gill. New
York: Cornell University Press.
_____ (1985b), This Sex Which Is Not One, trans. C. Porter & C. Burke.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
_____ (1991), The bodily encounter with the mother. In: The Irigaray
Reader, ed. M. Whitford, trans. D. Macey. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp.
34–46.
_____ (1993a), An Ethics of Sexual Difference, trans. C. Burke & G. Gill.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
_____ (1993b), Sexes and Genealogies, trans. G. C. Gill. New York: Columbia
University.
Juhasz, S. (2003), Mother-writing and the narrative of maternal subjectiv-
ity. Studies in Sexuality, 4: 395–425.
238 Lisa Baraitser
Kraemer, S. (1996), “Betwixt the dark and the daylight” of maternal subjec-
tivity: Meditations on the threshold. Psychoanal. Dial., 6:765–791.
Kristeva, J. (1975), Desire in Language, trans. T. Gora, A. Jardine, & L
Roudiez, ed. L. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press.
_____ (1997), Stabat Mater. In: The Kristeva Reader, ed. T. Moi. Oxford, Eng-
land: Blackwell, 1986.
_____ (1987), Freud and love: Treatment and its discontents. In: Tales of
Love, trans. L. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 21–56.
Koppelman, C. (1996), The politics of hair. Frontiers, 17.2:87–88.
Levinas, E. (1969) Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. A.
Lingis. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.
Oliver, K. (1993), Julia Kristeva’s outlaw ethics. In: Ethics, Politics, and Differ-
ence in Julia Kristeva’s Writing, ed. K. Oliver. New York: Routledge, pp.
1–22.
Oxford English Dictionary. (1989), 2nd ed. Oxford, UK: Clarendon.
Parker, R. (1997), The production and purposes of maternal ambivalence.
In: Mothering and Ambivalence, ed. W. Hollway & B. Featherstone. Lon-
don: Routledge, pp. 17–36.
Plato. (1977), Timaeus and Critias, trans. D. Lee. Harmondsworth, London:
Penguin.
Raphael-Leff, J. (2003), Where the wild things are. In: Parent-Infant
Psychodynamics: Wild Things, Mirrors and Ghosts, ed. J. Raphael-Leff. Lon-
don: Whurr, pp. 54–69.
Rouche, H. (1987), Le placenta comme tiers. Languages, 85:75.
Ruddick, S. (1989), Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace. London:
Women’s Press.
Schwab, G. M. (1994), Mother’s body, father’s tongue: Mediation and the
symbolic order. In: Engaging With Irigaray, ed. C. Burke, N. Schor, & M.
Whitford. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 351–378.
Stern, D. (1998), The Motherhood Constellation. London: H. Karnac (Books)
Ltd.
Wolf, N. (2001), Misconceptions: Truth, Lies and the Unexpected on the Journey
to Motherhood. London: Chatto & Windus.