Stability–instability

paradox

The stability–instability paradox is an

international relations theory regarding the
effect of nuclear weapons and mutually
assured destruction. It states that when
two countries each have nuclear weapons,
the probability of a direct war between
them greatly decreases, but the probability
of minor or indirect conflicts between
them increases.[1][2][3] This occurs because
rational actors want to avoid nuclear wars,
and thus they neither start major conflicts
nor allow minor conflicts to escalate into
major conflicts—thus making it safe to
engage in minor conflicts. For instance,
during the Cold War the United States and
the Soviet Union never engaged each other
in warfare, but fought proxy wars in Korea,
Vietnam, Angola, the Middle East,
Nicaragua and Afghanistan and spent
substantial amounts of money and
manpower on gaining relative influence
over the third world.[4]

A study published in the Journal of Conflict

Resolution in 2009 quantitatively evaluated
the nuclear peace hypothesis, and found
support for the existence of the stability–
instability paradox. The study determined
that while nuclear weapons promote
strategic stability, and prevent large scale
wars, they simultaneously allow for more
lower intensity conflicts. When one state
has nuclear weapons, but their opponent
does not, there is a greater chance of war.
In contrast, when there is mutual nuclear
weapon ownership with both states
possessing nuclear weapons, the odds of
war drop precipitously.[5]

This effect can be seen in the India–

Pakistan relationship and to some degree
in Russia–NATO relations.

Mechanism
The stability–instability paradox

posits that both parties to a

conflict will rationally view
strategic conflict and the
attendant risk of a strategic
nuclear exchange as untenable,
and will thus avoid any
escalation of sub-strategic
conflicts to the strategic level.
This effective “cap” on sub-
strategic militarized conflict
escalation emboldens states to
engage in such conflict with the
confidence that it would not
spiral out of control and
threaten their strategic
interests. The causal force of
this theory of increased sub-
strategic conflict is the mutual
recognition of the untenability
of conflict at the level of
strategic interests—a product of
MAD [Mutually Assured
Destruction]. With strategic
interests forming the “red line”
neither side would dare to cross,
both sides are free to pursue
sub-strategic political objectives
through militarized conflict
without the fear that the terms
of such conflict will escalate
beyond their control and
jeopardize their strategic
interests. Effectively, with the
risk of uncontrolled escalation
removed, the net costs to engage
in conflict are reduced.[6]
Assumptions
One of the major assumptions in the
concept of mutually assured destruction
and the stability-instability phenomenon as
its consequence is that all actors are
rational and that this rationality implies an
avoidance of complete destruction.
Particularly the second part of the
assumption might not necessarily be given
in real-world politics. When imagining a
theocratic nation whose leaders believe in
the existence of an afterlife which they
assume to be sufficiently better than our
current life, it becomes rational for them to
do everything in their power to facilitate a
swift transition for as many people as
possible into that afterlife. This connection
between certain religious beliefs and
politics of weapons of mass destruction
has been pointed out by some atheists in
order to point out perceived dangers of
theocratic societies.[7]

See also
Nuclear peace
Minimal deterrence
Deterrence theory

References
1. Snyder, Glenn Herald (1965). The Balance
of Power and the Balance of Terror (https://
 books.google.com/books?id=io4AcgAACA
AJ) .
2. Jervis, Robert (1979). "Why Nuclear
Superiority Doesn't Matter" (https://www.jst
or.org/stable/2149629) . Political Science
Quarterly. 94 (4): 617–633.
doi:10.2307/2149629 (https://doi.org/10.2
307%2F2149629) . ISSN 0032-3195 (http
s://www.worldcat.org/issn/0032-3195) .
JSTOR 2149629 (https://www.jstor.org/sta
ble/2149629) .
3. Jervis, Robert (1989). The Meaning of the
Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the
Prospect of Armageddon (https://books.go
ogle.com/books?id=WDeZHrS9r2EC) .
Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-
9565-6.
4. Krepon, Michael. "The Stability-Instability
Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation
Control in South Asia" (https://web.archive.
org/web/20170812115507/https://www.sti
mson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachmen
ts/stability-instability-paradox-south-asia.p
df) (PDF). The Henry Stimson Center.
Archived from the original (https://www.sti
mson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachmen
ts/stability-instability-paradox-south-asia.p
df) (PDF) on 12 August 2017. Retrieved
12 August 2017.
5. Rauchhaus, Robert (2009). "Evaluating the
Nuclear Peace Hypothesis - A Quantitative
Approach". Journal of Conflict Resolution.
53 (2): 258–277.
doi:10.1177/0022002708330387 (https://d
 oi.org/10.1177%2F0022002708330387) .
S2CID 34287191 (https://api.semanticscho
lar.org/CorpusID:34287191) .
6. Christopher J. Watterson 2017, 'Competing
interpretations of the stability–instability
paradox: the case of the Kargil War', The
Nonproliferation Review, 24(1-2), 86,
https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2017.13
66623
7. Harris, Sam (2005). The end of faith :
Religion, terror, and the future of reason (htt
ps://archive.org/details/endoffaithreligi00h
arr) . W. W. Norton & Company.
ISBN 9780393066722.
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